

Chapter V. Healing of the burdened memory

5.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: on history and memory

5.1.1 The duty to remember

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has adopted a twofold approach to historical memory. On the one hand, she emphasises the duty to remember the past and its victims. On the other hand, however, she pleads to forget the past where it is necessary for reconciliation. How to reconcile those two ideas? In this paragraph I will elaborate on the duty to remember as it appears in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

In his “Declaration of the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians” Cardinal Liubachivskyi emphasised the need to remember. In the course of history Ukraine has repeatedly been a victim of the northern neighbour and suffered countless material and spiritual damages. Those sufferings should not be silenced; neither should they pass into oblivion.¹ Christian love presupposes justice and truth which means that the deeds of the past should not be forgotten. However, at the same time love goes beyond justice and truth and it opens up the road for forgiveness. This is the theological basis for pardon and reconciliation of Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi.

In the message on the occasion of the Day of Remembrance of the victims of World War II the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church suggests three notions that should characterise the attitude towards the history of war – memory, responsibility, reconciliation.² Everyone who perished during the warfare, regardless of nationality, religion or worldview, has a right to be prayed for and to be remembered. It is a strong expression because the authors of the text use the term *right*. The *right to be prayed for and to be remembered* implies the *obligation* of the contemporaries to do this, namely to remember all the victims of the war in prayers. Everyone has to be remembered regardless of where he or she lost his or her life during the war, whether in battle, in death or labour camp or whether he or she fell victim as a civilian.

1 No. 5000, 438.

2 No. 2001.

The idea of the duty to remember is coupled with the benefices of remembrance. In a number of pronouncements the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church points at the service that the memory of the past can render to contemporaries. In particular, this opinion is emphasised in the texts on the commemoration of the Holodomor in Ukraine of 1932-1933. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Soviet regime to eliminate the memories of this organized famine from the collective conscience of Ukrainians, it survived, and people pray nowadays that such a disaster will never be repeated.³ One of the founders of the Memorial Society in Russia, Catherine Merridale, claims: "While humankind survives... it must preserve the memory of its forbearers... to remain human and to avoid becoming... people without memory, whom it is easier to make slaves."⁴ In the light of the Greek-Catholic teaching on memory those words mean that while remembering the past, people are able to reconsider it and single out those actions which were against human dignity. Remembering makes the purification of memory possible.

However, not only that aspect deserves remembering. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is convinced that the memory of the Holodomor helps contemporary Ukrainians discover the causes of the current problems in their society and respectively look for ways to solve them: "Do we not have to look for the sources of our current difficulties – the inability to organise social, political and economic life – in the calamities of the past century, a notable place among which the Holodomor occupies?"⁵ In that regard the Initiative 1st December pointedly noticed: "To be the masters of our destiny is to uproot the vestiges of Soviet thinking which makes people who have been humiliated and robbed by the state, expect this state to provide some social benefits; Soviet-style thinking prevents one from taking part in the life of the community."⁶ Besides the physical extermination of the population, in particular of the Ukrainian farmers, this artificial famine gravely affected the spirituality of Ukrainians. The entrepreneur's spirit of the Ukrainian farmer was destroyed through the subsequent organisations of the *kolkhoz* (collective farm). Other disasters of the 20th century, such as forced resettlements of the

3 No. 155, 275.

4 Catherine Merridale, "War, Death, and Remembrance in Soviet Russia," in *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (n. p.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 83.

5 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

6 The 1st December Initiative, Ukrainian Charter.

population or the Gulag, the Russification contributed towards the further “destruction of the person.”⁷ Additionally, alcoholism, drug habit, abortions, and suicides prove that the elimination of the Ukrainian population continues. In that sense the Greek-Catholic bishops are right. It suffices just to mention that between 1991 and 2012 the population of Ukraine diminished by 6 million people. Therefore, the duty to remember means the ability to see the current situation in Ukraine through the prism of the past. The expression *a duty to remember* is not directly mentioned in the Church message regarding the 70th anniversary of the Holodomor, but the reader understands that the past mirrors the present and closing the eyes for the past deprives one of the opportunities to work for a better future.

The duty to remember means that the past should be uncovered and evil should be named: “The memory of the perished appeals to the conscience of the living and the evil cannot be overcome until it is recognised as evil and condemned.”⁸ This idea appears in all the official addresses that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church issued together with other Church leaders on the topic of the Holodomor. For instance, together with the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Head of the Conference of the Roman-Catholic Bishops of Ukraine, Liubomyr Husar emphasises that the memory of the Holodomor makes us responsible to name evil as such. Only upon discerning and naming evil can we discover and overcome it. A year later this idea was reiterated in the address of the All-Ukrainian Council for Churches and Religious Organisations: “The evil has to be named evil and the crime has to be named crime... The truth about the terrible genocide against Ukrainian people has to sound loudly because the people who do not remember their past are doomed to wander in the search of the future.”⁹ Only after having properly evaluated the past and having understood it can a nation discern its way in the future.¹⁰ In 2008 Ukrainian Churches claim once more that “the evil committed by Stalinism has to be named evil and has to be condemned.”¹¹ Remembering, telling the truth about the evil of the past and grounding the national unity on the tragedy of the great famine are among the key insights of the texts on the Holodomor.

7 Merridale, War, Death, and Remembrance.

8 No. 303, 502. Translation from the original source.

9 No. 319, 521. Translation from the original source.

10 Ibid.

11 No. 2003.

5.1.2 “Leave the past to God and... to historians”

In her discourse on the purification of memory the official Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church often suggests leaving the past/history to historians or to God. This idea appears in different sorts of documents on the reconciliation between Ukrainians and Poles, the reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches or while dealing with the memories of World War II. At first sight, it may seem that the authors advocate a sort of forgetting the past and that they merely concentrate on the present tasks. In what follows I will analyse these documents and try to decipher their underlying meaning

To begin with, on the occasion of the opening of the Polish military memorial on Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv, the Greek-Catholic bishops recognise that during the long history of mutual coexistence Poles and Ukrainians have developed distinctive views of the past including a different vision of mutual conflicts. The Polish pacification campaign in western Ukraine in the 1930s and the forced resettlements of Poles and Ukrainians during and after World War II remain in the historical memory of both nations. This history cannot be denied or changed. In the absence of real war, nowadays the memory weighs upon both peoples and it is manifested on different levels in disinformation, unwarranted accusations and pseudo-historical manipulative views of the past. Consequently, the bishops believe that the best Christians can do is to leave the history “before the altar of God’s grace and leave it to historians”¹² because there are no alternatives to continuing the mutual coexistence and foster the development of democratic civil societies. In other words, the bishops call to abandon for the moment any historical discussions on the public level allowing them only to professional researches.

The same approach can be observed regarding the memories of World War II. Liubomyr Husar does not want to judge the past. He believes that the events of wartime must be studied by historians. Calling people to realise the genuine meaning of the victory over the Nazis for Ukraine, Husar seeks to put an end to historical discussions and manipulations and make people concentrate on their presence. The task of the Church is to evaluate and to address the impact of the past on the souls of contemporaries¹³ which was explained by Volodymyr Volkovskiy in the following way:

12 No. 162, 283. Translation from the original source.

13 No. 2005.

“The Church distinguishes between the moral aspect of the past, the condemnation of any injustice that has taken place, and the historical science that has to study and reveal the facts of the past.”¹⁴

Similarly, Cardinal Liubachivskyyi does not want to judge the liquidation of his Church in 1946, even though he mentions the guilty secular and Church authorities (that is the Soviet government and the Russian Orthodox Church): “Here, on earth, the evaluation of all the events I leave for the judgment of history and its honest researchers. And there, in heaven, the just and merciful Judge, the Creator of the universe, will pass a judgement.”¹⁵ On the occasion of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod Husar sent the Moscow Patriarch a letter written “with the desire to leave to God’s grace what happened and to step in the future prepared to look for the common ways.”¹⁶ Calling the Patriarch of Moscow to revise the attitude to the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, Husar aims at the establishment of the truth about the past, then leaving it behind and focusing on the present coexistence. Similarly, in “Conception of the Ecumenical Position of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church” the authors write that both Churches must recognise their historical faults in order to eliminate the psychological burden and to leave history to God.¹⁷ Obviously, here the truth must be revealed and articulated before the past slides into the hands of God.

Concerning the memories of the conflicts between the Ukrainian Churches, the approach of leaving the past aside slightly varies. The authors of the analysed texts, first of all Liubomyr Husar, propose to all the branches of the once united Kyivan Metropolia to create their common history together. After her foundation, the Kyivan Church was open to the then not yet divided centres of Christianity, Rome and Constantinople. The further complicated history of the development of the Church on the hills of Kyiv is differently viewed by the traditional Ukrainian Churches. Liubomyr Husar believes that those Churches should avoid writing their own confessional history of the Kyivan Church because even historians themselves have not yet come to a joint conclusion about how to evaluate

14 Volodymyr Volkovskyyi, “Poliaky ta ukraintsi: mozhlyvosti prymyrennia ta dialohu” {Poles and Ukrainians. Possibilities of reconciliation and dialogue}, <http://www.religion.in.ua/main/analitica/22702-polyaki-ta-ukrayinci-mozhlyvosti-primyrennya-ta-dialogu.html> (accessed January 17, 2014).

15 No. 21, 35. Translation from the original source.

16 No. 217, 364. Translation from the original source.

17 No. 5003, 59 (No. 4000, 126).

it. For that reason Husar claims: “We therefore leave the past to God in the hope that in the future, Ukrainian Christians may reach a common view of their ecclesial history.”¹⁸ This quotation contains an important idea: the Ukrainian Churches should not forget the past but strive to revise it and prepare the common history of their mutual relations that excludes any strictly confessional viewpoint. History is to be dealt with but only by the joint efforts of the Churches. The present moment is not the best to start the review of Church history because it will provoke further tensions and destroy the thin feeling of trust that was established. It is a project for the future, and as for now, history should be left to the grace of God.

In some cases one can leave the past to God only after the truth has been revealed, such as in the case of the Holodomor. In the address on the occasion of its 75th anniversary Cardinal Husar, together with other representatives of the Ukrainian Churches and religious organisations, calls to leave the past crimes for God’s trial as both victims and perpetrators do not exist anymore.¹⁹ However, contemporary Ukrainians are obliged to learn the truth about the great famine as the foundation of their national unity. The learning of historical truth would prevent the spread of the misinterpretations of history, division and conflicts.²⁰ Thus, we came to the last element of leaving the past to God, that is not condemning or searching the guilty but looking for what unites the opponents. The reconciliation with the past comes through learning the truth and leaving it to the grace of God. Only in that way can Ukrainians build their future in solidarity.²¹ This circumstance plays a tremendously important role in the all-Ukrainian rapprochement as it was mentioned in the address of the Greek-Catholic bishops on the preservation of public peace.

Concluding, we can discern four scenarios of leaving the past to God and to historians:

- Reveal the truth about the past and leave it to God, do not revenge (healing the memories of the Holodomor).
- For the moment, leave the established confessional versions of the past to historians and write a joint vision of history together in the future (inter-Church relations).

18 No. 177, 307-308 (No. 3000, 129).

19 No. 319, 521.

20 No. 2008.

21 Ibid.

- Leave the history to historians and create a new future (healing the memories of World War II).
- Learn the truth about the past, deliver it in the hands of God, and work for a common future (relations of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church).

In all the cases, the truth has to be scrutinized. The difference consists in the moment when the truth has to be studied and in the way this examination of the past should take place. In some cases this enterprise would better be postponed. Yaroslav Hrytsak opines that in the Ukrainian situation it would be best to introduce the politics of national amnesia in order to leave the dividing narratives behind during this initiative stage of the development of the state.²² Practically that means that using history for political purposes should be forbidden. However, since it is practically impossible, the politics of the all-encompassing consensus that includes different and even sometimes exclusive patterns of memory seems to be more realistic.²³ Instead of misusing politics for their interests, Ukrainian politicians must promote a responsible politics of memory for the sake of the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation.²⁴ Leaving the past to God does not mean forgetting or acting as if evil never happened. It rather is about the establishment of the truth about the past, so that every party realises its guilt. Eventually then the past could be left in peace.

5.1.3 The purification of memory

It is undeniable that in the thought of Liubomyr Husar, reconciliation starts from the purification of memory.²⁵ It appears already in the earliest

22 Hrytsak, *Memory*, in *Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti*, 77; Hrytsak, *Nil Desperandum*, in *Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti*, 233.

23 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Klopoty z pamiattiu” {Troubles with memory}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?klopoty_z_pamyattyu&objectId=1097756 (accessed January 21, 2014).

24 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Historical Memory Needs to Be Accountable,” interview by Mariana Karapinka, *Risu.org.ua*, http://risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/interview/39241 (accessed January 21, 2014).

25 I have chosen to translate the Ukrainian expression *ochyshchennia pamtati* as purification of memory in English. The term has different smaller nuances which I explain in my research, however, the core meaning of purification as discerning

messages dedicated to the Days of Purification and Reconciliation in Lviv. This element is inherently present in all the documents. The purification of memory is inseparably combined with history. History burdened with violence demands the closest attention because “history is memory”²⁶ be it individual, collective history, or the history of the Church. Memory is often not objective and very vulnerable to misuses and manipulations provoking the desire of vengeance and divisions among people. Husar does not call to investigate the history in order to determine who is guilty. This task should be left to professional historians. The Church has another assignment, namely to prevent the past from becoming an obstacle for the future.²⁷ This should be the aim of the process of the purification of memory and in this paragraph I will decipher this term in the official documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

The individual examination of the conscience

How should the purification of memory be practically conducted keeping in mind that the past cannot be erased or totally forgotten? According to Liubomyr Husar, in order to build a new future one should both maintain the memory of the good and deal with the negative and painful remembrances. The problem arises when one realises that there are different groups of believers and non-believers, people of diverse nationalities and various cultural backgrounds. Therefore, there cannot be a single way towards the purification of memory. The Church may apologise for the behaviour of her children. A particular group can ask pardon. However, taking into account the diversity of people, the best method of the purification of memory leads through the individual examination of one’s own conscience.²⁸ The process of the purification of memory means that every individual truly evaluates his or her past without trying to justify what one has done. One needs to discern the personal participation in the evil committed to one’s city, community, parish or family.²⁹

between positive and negative aspects of memory of the past is preserved in practically every document.

26 No. 99, 184.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

A message issued by the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 2005 on the occasion of the Day of Remembrance of the victims of World War II argues that the purification of memory starts from discerning the personal participation in evil. All the Churches are called to witness justice and peace. Peace is the fruit of truth and justice. Christians have to foster the culture of reconciliation through the recognition of one's own faults by being ready to listen to and forgive the other. Therefore, "in order to avoid the repetition of the destructive events in the future... we call everyone to say a prayer at the graves of the victims of World War II for the souls of the diseased."³⁰ This prayer that involves faithful of different confessions will signify the recognition of the responsibility of contemporaries. We are obliged to remember the victims of World War II in our prayers for two reasons: the tragic events should not be repeated and we must always remain aware of our responsibility. Responsibility concerns the direct or indirect support of or the silencing of the evil committed under the communist or Nazi regimes. Those regimes not only started and waged World War II, they also account for the destruction of human values and evils which happened in the Soviet Union after the war. Contemporaries have to recognise that they are also affected by the evil in their hearts. The responsibility for the past remains even if a person was not directly involved in committing evil. In her message about the memory of World War II and responsibility, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church reminded one that the hatred of warfare is always manifested through a concrete person as Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi maintained in his pastoral letter "Do not kill: "A person who sheds innocent blood, even that of an enemy or political opponent, is equal to a murderer who kills for the sake of robbery."³¹ Both powers, Nazism and communism, brought about the destruction of the human person and society. Everyone who at least partly supported any of those ideologies carries responsibility for the destructions and has to clean his or her heart through prayer.³² Thus, the responsibility of our contemporaries does not arise out of a personal contribution to the extermination of people during the war, but it is connected with the direct or indirect support of the ideologies that caused those human sufferings. When one

30 No. 346, 579. Translation from the original source.

31 No. 2001. Translation from the original source.

32 Ibid.

recognises evil in one's own heart, one will be more eager and willing to forgive the wrongdoings of the other.

Learning the truth about the past

In his sermon during the divine service on the Reconciliation Day in 2001 in Lviv, Husar linked this celebration with the terrorist attacks of September 11 and with the war in Afghanistan. In this atmosphere of fear, the Cardinal postulates that the citizens of Lviv also faced injuries committed against themselves or their families. The memory of these grievances continues in the hearts of people. Hence, it is necessary to purify the burdened memory. This process is placed at the beginning of every change of attitude that leads to reconciliation. The purification of memory has a twofold meaning. On the one hand, "We have to strive to evaluate sincerely and objectively how big the suffered injuries were, to understand what happened in order not to burden memory with the untruth."³³ Therefore, in its primary sense, the purification of memory refers to learning the truth objectively. On the other hand, Cardinal Husar emphasises an additional dimension of the purification of memory, namely, the need to envisage something good in every painful and unjust situation. As an explicit example of this statement, referring to the terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001, the author mentions that, except for terrorists, there were also fire-fighters and police people who strolled into the collapsed Twin Towers in New York in order to save the people buried under the ruins. In Husar's opinion, the awareness of the positive side of every event is necessary for not letting one's heart fall into despair and not starting to hate the people around oneself.³⁴

It seems that the attitude to history and memory slightly differs in the teaching of Husar. He calls for abandoning history to historians and at the same time encourages clarifying the past in order to discover the truth. Husar calls for the individual purification of memory, for discerning personal evil and abandoning the collective evil of history to professionals. This approach is determined by the diversity of people and the impossibility to assume a single unified way of the purification of memory. However, one may object that history is not only a matter of individual but also

33 No. 346, 578; No. 128, 240. Translation from the original source.

34 No. 346, 579.

of collective memory, and that the examination of the collective memory should become an essential part of the reconciliation process. People act as members of a certain group and the group identity often determines their actions. Therefore, the insufficient emphasis on the significance of collective memory and identity is a significant shortcoming of Husar's approach. This observation does not diminish the value of Husar's suggestion that one should not only objectively unveil the truth but also find the good amidst the sufferings of the past.

Essential for the healing of the wounds of a victim is the recognition of his/her suffering. Even when the immediate perpetrator is not able anymore to express sorrow for what was done, it remains important to name the evil that took place. In the address on the occasion of the return to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church of the documents of Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi that were confiscated at his arrest in 1945, Cardinal Liubachivskyi said: "One cannot always expect in this life the complete justice and the compensation for the harm that was done. However, it is already an important step for the victim to hear avowal that what happened was really wrong."³⁵ Consequently, the return of the documents that belonged to Yosyf Slipyi meant to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church the recognition of the injustice of this act that was one of the stages of the liquidation of the Church in 1946.

As it follows from the analysed texts, the purification of memory requires learning of the truth about the past. It is obviously essential to figure out what indeed happened for a successful rapprochement in the case of the clashing memories of World War II, in the common Polish-Ukrainian history or even during the centuries of the coexistence of Ukrainians from the east and west of the country: "For being able to rejoice a genuine and lasting peace we have to long for truth, in particular historical, because everywhere where lie and falsehood are being spread, inevitably appears a threat of divisions and conflicts."³⁶ However, the Greek-Catholic bishops warn against studying the past with the aim to discover one more stone to be thrown to the enemy. The quest for the historical truth must be genuine and at the same time it has to lead to reconciliation.

35 No. 33, 59-60. Translation from the original source.

36 No. 2008. Translation from the original source.

Drawing lessons from the past

For contemporaries the healing of memory means that they have to name evil as evil, not to accuse perpetrators but to understand the roots of evil. The essence of the process of the healing of memory of World War II does not consist in detecting and accusing the guilty ones (veterans of the Soviet Red Army or the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), in calling the war Great Patriotic War or World War II, admitting Victory Day on the 9th of May or commemorating the victims of the war on the 8th of May. The purification of memory consists in the realisation that killing and war is evil as such, which also means the recognition that the communist regime was no better than the Nazi one. The memory of the victims of war must unite Ukrainians regardless of which party they belonged to, whether they were soldiers of the Red Army, of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or even German soldiers. Ultimately, what is at stake is the peaceful future development of the country and the ability to evaluate and detect evil existing nowadays. In that sense the Greek-Catholic documents on World War II are future-oriented.

The pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the commemoration of the Holodomor unfold another dimension of the purification and the healing of memory. Crucial here is the memory of the Holodomor, the discernment of its ramifications for the spiritual state of contemporary Ukrainians and the search for the ways to initiate changes in society. In the light of the spiritual legacy of the Holodomor, contemporary Ukrainians have to work on what they were deprived of. The consequences of the Holodomor and Stalinism in general determine many weak features of Ukraine in the present: indifference, inertia, the lack of initiative and responsibility, the habit to rely upon others and first of all on the state.³⁷ According to the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, “This realisation has to penetrate the national conscience in order to heal the terrible wound of the past and of the present.”³⁸ Reconciliation in that case defined as healing of the wounds of the past can take place provided that the past is remembered:

“We remember the Holodomor victims in order to cure our memory, to heal the wounds of the past, to counteract the repetition of similar crimes in the future and

37 Oksana Hrabovych, “Kolonialna spadshchyna v siohodnishnii Ukraini” {Colonial heritage in present-day Ukraine}, *Patriarkhat* 6 (2011): 19.

38 No. 155, 275. Translation from the original source.

to free the contemporary person from the dangers of a people-hating ideology... to protect the dignity of every human being, to build on the foundation of God's life-giving commandments a more just society."³⁹

It means that contemporary Ukrainians have to repent of the evil fruits of the Holodomor that they allowed to ripen in their souls.

The Holodomor is considered by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as part of the bigger problem of healing the wounds of communism. Here the Church leadership thinks in line with the French philosopher Alain Besançon who spoke about the communist distortion of human hearts. Besançon distinguishes between the material, political, and moral evil of communism where the moral one means that "honest, rational souls became criminal, insane, and stupid."⁴⁰ Communism, like fascism, caused "the perversion of souls and minds"⁴¹ and it "set out to change something more fundamental than mores – that is, the very rule of morality, of our sense of good and evil."⁴² The purification of memory has to become a healing from this moral destruction. The task is difficult as "Nothing is so problematic after the dissolution of a totalitarian regime as the reconstruction of the people's normal moral conscience and intellectual capacity."⁴³

That task points at a new mutual project for the traditional Ukrainian Churches. According to Oleh Hirnyk, a Greek-Catholic theologian, the Ukrainian Churches should not only celebrate the Holodomor commemoration services together, but also initiate a joint theological reinterpretation of this tragedy.⁴⁴ Moreover, the Churches should resist the modern genocide of Ukrainians as a result of social injustices, general poverty, abortion, euthanasia, human trafficking.⁴⁵ One finds a clear reference to the

39 No. 2023.

40 Besançon, *A Century of Horrors*, xxi.

41 Ibid., 96.

42 Ibid., 36.

43 Ibid., 101.

44 Oleh Hirnyk, "20-littia vyhodu z pidpillia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy – buttia mizh 'post' i 'proto' {20th anniversary of the coming out of the underground of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church – existence between "post" and "proto"}, *Patriarkhat* 5 (2009): 5.

45 Ibid., 6. Oleh Hirnyk opines that the theological reinterpretation of the Holodomor as the experience of the silence of God (meontology of evil) and of the whole Christian world could be a particular contribution of Ukrainian theology to evangelisation. Such a theology of the Holodomor can serve as a key for the denunciation of the modern evils of liberal economics in the globalised world when despite the surplus of production whole nations are suffering from hunger. (Oleh Hirnyk, "Ukrainian theology: Vid novoi yevanhelizatsii do kontekstualnoi teolo-

idea of a modern genocide of the Ukrainian people in the thought of Liubomyr Husar.

Summarising, it is evident that according to the official Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the core of the idea of the purification of memory consists in discovering the truth about the past with the aim of naming evil as evil. Only in that way the contemporaries can assume their responsibility for the past. Liubomyr Husar maintained that “If we desire to change substantially the direction of the development of our society we have to change the system of values.”⁴⁶ That is exactly what Liubomyr Husar tries to change with his promotion of reconciliation – to purify memory, see what was wrong, to define the wrong patterns and start living according to genuine Christian values. Speaking about the ways to the purification of memory, Liubomyr Husar emphasises a personal examination of one’s consciousness. Even the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation that was officially crowned with the mutual solemn Eucharistic celebration is proclaimed to be built upon the efforts of every individual to long for rapprochement. Hence, Husar’s approach remains very personal and spiritual. It does not suffice to express the words “We forgive and ask forgiveness” when no profound internal work on the purification of memory has taken place previously and when one does not sufficiently acknowledge the collective aspects of the purification of memory. In the following paragraph I will focus on the Greek-Catholic approach to concrete cases of the healing of memory.

5.1.4 The healing of memory: main issues

5.1.4.1 Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation

Reconciliation through prayer

In the history of independent Ukraine one of the most problematic Polish-Ukrainian conflicts concerns the opening of the Polish military memorial on the Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv in the early 2000s. That conflict

hii” {Ukrainian theology. From new evangelisation to contextual theology}, *Patriarkhat* 6 (2011): 6-7).

46 Liubomyr Husar, “Dukhovni tsinnosti” {Spiritual values}, *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, August 22, 2012. Translation from the original source.

showed that neither contemporary Poland, nor Ukraine can boast nowadays authoritative figures of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation like Jerzy Giedroyc.⁴⁷ In the absence of the respected politicians who would work for the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement, the initiatives of the Churches are especially important.

From the very beginning, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has been actively involved in settling the issue. Cardinal Husar gave a favourable opinion for the opening of the Polish military memorial and suggested a platform for the peaceful solution of the conflict by elucidating the meaning of the monuments in construction. In Husar's vision, the military memorial is a sign of love to one's homeland because both Polish and Ukrainian soldiers buried at the cemetery died for those ideals. The love for the own people and the readiness to lay down one's life for them is a virtue blessed by the Church and cherished by every state.⁴⁸ Poles have a right to pay homage to their soldiers. Lychakiv memorials also remind of the deficiency of the human condition that results in mutual hatred and violence.⁴⁹ Consequently, people have to praise their heroes and at the same time pray for the forgiveness of their own sins.

The same vision of the role of the monuments was reiterated by Husar during the ceremony of the opening of the Polish war memorial and the cemetery of the Ukrainian Galician Army soldiers in May 2005. Cardinal Husar referred to Ukrainians and Poles gathered at the cemetery and called them to prayer for the soldiers, notwithstanding their national origins. Moreover, Husar calls the leaders of Poland and Ukraine to transmit to the young people the awareness that "everyone must have a certain ideal and stand for it, has to be ready if necessary to lay one's life for it."⁵⁰ It makes no sense to discuss who was guilty or who suffered more. The task of the present generations is to have their own ideals and remember in prayers those who died for their country years ago. The Church reconciliation initiative at the Lychakiv memorial was successful because it was an approach of prayer and delivering a meaning to the monument for the deceased soldiers. Perhaps such concrete steps of suggesting alternatives ra-

47 Petro Kraliuk, "Polsko-ukrainski vidnosyny: u poloni stereotypiv i vzaiemnykh obraz" {Polish-Ukrainian relations. Captured in stereotypes and mutual offences}, http://gazeta.dt.ua/SOCIETY/polsko-ukrayynski_vidnosyni_u_poloni_stereotypiv_i_vzaiemnih_obraz.html (accessed January 11, 2014).

48 No. 139, 251.

49 Ibid., 252.

50 No. 202, 342. Translation from the original source.

ther than general appeals to forgiveness and purification of memory are needed for the resolution of controversial questions.

The emphasis on the Christian roots of the Polish and Ukrainian cultures helps us understand the way of reconciliation that was accepted by the Catholic bishops of both countries, which is the way of mutual prayer and personal forgiveness. As we have observed above, the novelty of the approach of Husar to the problem of the Polish military memorials in Lviv was that he granted them a new meaning – that of the space for prayer. The adversaries of the opening of that memorial accentuated that there should be no place on the Lviv cemetery for Poles who were invaders and combatted Ukrainians in their own city. Instead, with his initiative of the yearly mutual Polish-Ukrainian prayers on the graves Husar showed that enemies can pray together and purify in that way their common violent historical memory.⁵¹

The prayerful attitude is very peculiar to the thought of Liubomyr Husar. On many diverse occasions he calls for prayer. A good example is the action of the non-stop prayer during the Orange Revolution. Another example is the call for prayer found in the extensive address of the Synod of Bishops about the role of Christians in the modern world. Having described the basis of the social engagement of a Christian and having elaborated on the concrete aspects of social life, the bishops conclude that the strength to lead such a virtuous life is to be found in God's help: "A Christian citizen must be a man or a woman of prayer."⁵²

During the joint Polish-Ukrainian prayer in November 2005, Liubomyr Husar clarified that people come together on the cemetery in order to honour and recall the memory not what divides but what unites them and they do it in prayer, notwithstanding differences in culture, religion, or origin.⁵³ This is the central message of his speech. Soldiers, whom the people pay homage to, used to fight each other, but the Poles and Ukrainians attending the event are united in a joint prayer of the memory. Contrary to poli-

51 No. 139, 252.

52 "Zvernennia Yepyskopiv Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy do virmykh ta vsikh liudei dobroj voli pro zavdannia khrystyianyha v suchasnomu suspilstvi" {Address of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Bishops to the faithful and all people of good will about the mission of the Christian in modern society}, in *Sotsialno zorientovani dokumenty Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy (1989-2008)*, ed. Lesia Kovalenko (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008), 162. Translation from the original source.

53 No. 208, 350.

ticians who spoke about the obstacles to having a Polish military memorial on Lychakiv Cemetery, the Church initiative of a joint prayer and homage to the soldiers proved that it is possible to approach the issue from a different side. Instead of accusations and searching for the guilty ones, people could pray together.

Finally, the act of reconciliation between Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops was a liturgical act. The document “Reconciliation between nations is possible” culminates in prayer: striving to fulfil the words of the prayer “Holy Father”: “Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us,” by the intercession of the Mother of God, “being aware of the historical past of one’s own nation and the state of one’s soul, we ask forgiveness from our brothers and sisters Poles/Ukrainians and forgive them from all our hearts all their transgressions against us.”⁵⁴

What unites both nations

The initiative of the joint prayer on the graves of Polish and Ukrainians soldiers culminated in 2005 in the act of mutual forgiveness and reconciliation between the Catholic bishops of Ukraine and Poland, which was celebrated first in Warsaw on June 19, 2005 and subsequently in Lviv on June 26, 2005. On that occasion the bishops issued a joint document “Reconciliation between nations is possible.” For the Polish side this document was the continuation of its tradition of reconciliation with the Polish neighbours that started from the Polish-German rapprochement in the 1960s. The most recent initiative of that type, the declaration of the Russian-Polish reconciliation, was signed on August 17, 2012 by Patriarch Kirill, the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and Józef Michalik, the President of the Polish Episcopal Conference. Those three letters differ in length, scope, and the interpretation of a painful historical past. The peculiarity of the Ukrainian-Polish act of reconciliation consists in the fact that the bishops put an emphasis on what both nations have in common instead of returning to the historical grievances that both peoples inflicted upon each other.

The common history of sufferings under the communist rule, the mutual pain of the disasters of the 20th century, the spiritual testament of John Paul II who promoted reconciliation between the countries, are under-

54 No. 289, 483. Translation from the original source.

standable and dear to both Poles and Ukrainians. However, in the opinion of the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops, the most evident element that both nations have in common is their Christian faith through baptism. Ukrainians adopted Christianity of the Byzantine rite, Poles that of the Latin rite. Throughout time, this fact led to disagreements and conflicts, however, it was Christianity that helped both peoples endure all the predicaments of history. Especially tragic was the 20th century with its wars, political terror, and the suppression of the Church by communist authorities. However, the end of the 20th century was marked by joyful events of the fall of communism, the obtaining of religious freedom, the rebirth of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the unification of Europe. On the threshold of the new century, Polish and Ukrainian peoples have to overcome their hatred, forgive mutual offences and purify their historical memory for the sake of further peaceful and trusty relationships.⁵⁵

The idea that the shared Christian faith is a ground for reconciliation was expressed by the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in their letter to “Ukrainian and Polish peoples, brothers in Christ”⁵⁶ issued in May 2003. In that document, the bishops emphasised that it is important that the reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine takes place on the level of Churches and not only on a political one.⁵⁷ After having named the benefits of the neighbouring geopolitical situation of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, the Greek-Catholic bishops highlight that both nations share the Christian faith. Therefore, not just the solidarity between Poles and Ukrainians as neighbours but the Christian tradition and the commandment of the love of God and neighbours must govern their relations. The bishops evoke the words of Jesus’ prayer “Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us,” which, when applied to the Ukrainian-Polish relations, mean that the truth is that both peoples have offended each other, therefore, both must forgive.⁵⁸

According to Shevchuk, the steps that have to be taken by the Church to address the possible worsening of the Polish-Ukrainian relations include Christian forgiveness that can heal the wounds in the relations between people and looking for what the two countries have in common: “I think that both Polish and Ukrainian people have to look for such topics that

55 No. 289, 481; No. 3002.

56 No. 162, 282.

57 Ibid., 284.

58 Ibid., 283.

unite us, and not to search for what dissociates. In particular, keeping in mind that Ukrainian people long to integrate into Europe.”⁵⁹

“The past through the prism of Christianity”

Sviatoslav Shevchuk was right in his fears. On the occasion of the approaching celebration of the 70 anniversary of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the Volyn territories, on March 11, 2013, the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church issued an address explaining its position concerning this event. That address was not signed by the Polish Catholic bishops in Ukraine. The Greek-Catholic bishops recognise that Ukrainians and Poles will always have distinct views and a different collective memory of what happened.⁶⁰ Therefore, the Synod of Bishops suggested evaluating the Volyn events as well as other tragedies that took place between Ukrainians and Poles from a Christian point of view. It means that they condemn both the policies that deprived Ukrainians of the right of self-determination on their lands and the violence against the Poles in Volyn.⁶¹ From the Christian perspective, both the Volyn tragedy and any other crimes in the Polish-Ukrainian relations that preceded or followed it must be condemned. The Greek-Catholic bishops believe that in the light of the commandment “Do not kill,” both nations should be able to find a reconciling vision of the past.

The reality proves to be more complicated. The message was signed only by the Greek-Catholic bishops, although the Polish Catholic bishops in Ukraine were consulted as well. However, they refused to approve of the final version of the document because in their opinion it contained a number of postulations that Poles cannot agree with. In particular, in the words of the Polish Archbishop of Lviv, Mieczysław Mokrzycki, the Ukrainian side has to recognise that the ethnic cleansing of the Polish population in

59 Rostyslav Kramar, “Predstoiatel Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy Sviatoslav Shevchuk: Istorychnu pamiat ukraintsiv i poliakiv ozdorovyt vzaiemne proshchennia” {The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Sviatoslav Shevchuk: Historical memory of Ukrainians and Poles will be healed by mutual forgiveness}, <http://nslowo.pl/content/view/2378/73/> (accessed December 30, 2012). Translation from the original source.

60 No. 2018.

61 Ibid.

the Volyn territories in 1943 was committed by Ukrainian nationalists.⁶² Additionally, Mokrzycki reproaches the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic bishops for the relativisation of the Volyn tragedy and he calls this a typical way of reasoning of the nationalistically oriented Ukrainians.⁶³ The Polish Catholic bishops could not accept the reconciliation formula proposed in the current message of the Greek-Catholic Church “We forgive and ask for forgiveness.” In their opinion, the correct approach of Ukrainians should rather be the opposite – “We ask forgiveness and forgive.”⁶⁴ Poles expected from Ukrainians the recognition of their responsibility for the mass killings of the Polish population. Instead, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic bishops claim that Ukrainian nationalism in the Volyn territories, which belonged to Poland until World War II, was caused by Polish oppressive policies. Hence, at some point, the disagreement about the principal elements of the message made it impossible to reach a rapprochement between Poles and Ukrainians on that issue. This controversy proves that reconciliation between the nations is a durable process that needs constant verification and assessment of every historical event that burdens their mutual memory.

The role of learning truth about the past is emphasised in “Declaration of Catholic Churches of Ukraine and Poland on forgiveness and reconciliation” that was finally issued on June 28, 2013. There is a call to remember the agreeable pages of the common Polish-Ukrainian history, the common Christian faith (the text mentions the 1025th anniversary of baptism in Ukraine and the upcoming 1050th of Polish baptism), the references to the Churches of Poland and Ukraine as martyr Churches during the communist dictatorship. The bishops call to make a Christian evaluation of the Volyn massacres and condemn crimes committed under political, economic, or religious considerations. Equally, the atheistic totalitarian regime is mentioned as the ideology that caused millions of deaths in the 20th century.⁶⁵

The declaration does not contain the notion genocide that was speculated about in the context of the Volyn anniversary in 2013. Sviato-

62 The difficult common assessment.

63 Ibid. For a thorough analysis of the document of the pastoral letter of the Ukrainian Roman Catholic bishops concerning the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy and commentaries of Archbishop Mokrzycki, see Volkovskiy, Poles and Ukrainians.

64 The difficult common assessment.

65 No. 2019.

slav Shevchuk reminds one of the declaration of forgiveness that Cardinal Husar made during the Pope's visit to Ukraine and asks himself forgiveness from his Polish brothers. Józef Michalik, the President of the Polish Episcopal Conference in his turn asked for forgiveness for the Poles who answered violence by violence towards the Ukrainians.⁶⁶ Those words indirectly indicate that the Polish side believes that the Volyn massacres are the fault of the Ukrainians and the Poles only answered the violence committed against them. Thus the current declaration contains certain concessions to please the Polish side.

The text indirectly refers to the stance of Jerzy Giedroyc that without a free Ukraine there cannot be a free Poland: "The cooperation of the free Ukraine and the free Poland is necessary for the peace to reign in this part of Europe."⁶⁷ Besides, the Churches of both countries have a task to bear witness to the Christian roots of Europe. The message concludes with the greetings to the Orthodox of both countries as those should equally be involved in the process of reconciliation.

This joint message was welcomed by a number of Ukrainian intellectuals. Myroslav Marynovych argued that one has to christianise history in order to stop the endless spiral of mutual accusations of the opponent and justification for one's own wrongdoings.⁶⁸ The principle of mutual forgiveness is the expression of this approach. Additionally, the openness for the painful and heroic histories of each other is needed. For instance, the Poles have to acknowledge that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is glorified in Ukraine not because of its participation in the Volyn exterminations but because of its struggle against the Nazi and especially Soviet regime. Marynovych believes that the Polish side has to realise that difference and stop fighting against the distinctive status that the Insurgent Army has in Ukraine. There is no sense in trying to impose one's own version of history upon the opponent.⁶⁹

In the light of those events Marcin Wojciechowski diagnoses that the problem lies in the desire of one side to perform the role of victim and focusing on the own sorrows without granting such a right to the opponents. Moreover, he stresses that it is absurd to measure who suffered more and

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

68 Marynovych, Poland and Ukraine, 28.

69 Ibid., 28.

who started first, as it will only swirl the spiral of hatred.⁷⁰ He calls for understanding and explains that the glorification of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Ukraine is not at all connected with the resurgence and appraisal of fascism. For Ukrainians this military group is a symbol of the fight for independence against all possible enemies of their country, first of all against the Soviet empire, having nothing to do with honouring the methods that insurgents used. Consequently, when the Ukrainian Insurgent Army would be rehabilitated in Ukraine for their struggle against the sovietisation of the country during and after World War II, it does not mean the rehabilitation of fascism.⁷¹ In their turn Ukrainians have problems with explicitly recognising the murders inflicted by the insurgents and not only against Poles, but also Jewish and even Ukrainians who refused to help them, the facts known in Ukraine as “the black legend of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army” and not often openly mentioned.⁷² There will be no reconciliation when the historical truth is not recognised.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Churches equally expressed themselves on the Volyn anniversary. In particular, Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate issued a statement concerning the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre.⁷³ The author reminded one of what unites Poles and Ukrainians: the history of coexistence in one state, the common struggle against the oppressor, totalitarian communist and imperial regimes, and Christian faith. In the name of his Church, the Patriarch appealed to Poles for forgiving and asking for forgiveness. Filaret pleaded to leave the history of the confrontation between both nations to historians and concentrate on peaceful relations in the future. Hence, the stance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate contains similar elements as the reconciliation appeals of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: references to the common heroic history, religion, the mutual forgiveness formula and the appeal to abandon the history to historians.

70 Marcin Wojciechowski, “Manowce ‘Manowcow pojednania’” {Wrong ways of the “wrong ways of reconciliation”}, *Wież* 618, no. 4 (2010): 100.

71 Ibid., 101.

72 Ibid., 100.

73 “Zvernennia Patriarkha Kyivskoho i Vsiiei Rusy-Ukrainy Filareta z nahody 70-kh rokovyn masovykh vbyvstv na Volyni” {Message of the Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine Filaret on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre}, <http://www.cerkva.info/en/messages/3267-zvernennya-patriarha-27-03-2013.html> (accessed January 20, 2014).

Equally, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate expressed herself on the topic. In his message Metropolitan Volodymyr⁷⁴ maintains that the fault of this tragedy lies on both people who mutually exterminated each other. While the assignment of historians is to reveal the truth about the events, the task of the Church is to deliver a moral estimation of the Volyn tragedy.⁷⁵ The Orthodox Church condemns the interethnic struggle and Christian patriotism combined with violent means. Metropolitan Volodymyr warns politicians against misusing the Volyn anniversary and calls both peoples up to forgiveness and reconciliation.

Mykola Krokosh, a Greek-Catholic theologian, observes that an important element is missing in the healing of the memory of Volyn. He claimed that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should have issued a joint message on the occasion of the Volyn anniversary with the Orthodox Ukrainian denominations.⁷⁶ The Ukrainian Orthodox of the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchate officially announced their positions in the corresponding messages. However, the majority of Ukrainians in general and of those residing in the Volyn are declared Orthodox. A joint message of the Orthodox and Greek-Catholics would be a logical step if it really is about reconciliation between the entire nations. I can only add that working jointly on reconciliation with the Poles would serve to the rapprochement between the Ukrainian Churches themselves.

5.1.4.2 Healing the memories of World War II

Teaching: redefining victory in moral terms

The challenge of the healing of the memories of World War II has to do with the reconciliation of different visions of war. The peculiarity of the Ukrainian situation derives from the fact that, generally speaking, half of its citizens praise the Soviet victory over fascism whilst another half emphasises the heroic actions of the Ukrainian nationalist underground troops who fought against Soviets, Poles, and Nazis together. Some observers do

74 “Zvernennia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy z pryvody 70-richchia Volynskoi trahedii” {Message of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/church_doc/uocmp_doc/52772/ (accessed January 20, 2014).

75 Ibid.

76 Krokosh, Reconciliation. A difficult dialogue.

not believe in the possibility of reconciliation between the veterans of the Red Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army because it is about two completely different ideologies, views of the past and visions of Ukraine's future. Consequently, one should abandon the attempts at reconciling the differences and better help the still living veterans of both armies in terms of establishing historical justice and ensuring better social security of those people.⁷⁷ The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church undertakes the task of healing the memories of World War II by defining the meaning of the war and victory, naming the winners, and drawing lessons from the biggest war in the 20th century.

At first, the Greek-Catholic Church leadership confers a new sense to World War II by presenting an alternative meaning to the official Victory Day in Ukraine, admitted on May 9th. The very title of "Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the clergy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Metropolia of Kyiv-Halych on the 60th anniversary of the arrest of Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyi and the victory over Nazism"⁷⁸ proves that the end of war did not bring the desired defeat of evil. Husar reminded one of the fact that Yosyf Slipyi's arrest by the Soviet authorities on April 11, 1945 signified for the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church the first step in the process of her liquidation, which was accomplished at the Lviv Synod in 1946. The arrest of Slipyi happened only a few weeks before the official termination of World War II. Hence, the end of the war and the defeat of the Germans signified for Ukraine only a change of regimes – from the Nazi to the Soviet one.

The celebration of the anniversary of the victory over Nazism was defined by Cardinal Husar as "wholly justifiable because the German Nazi regime posed a serious danger for the whole Europe including Ukraine."⁷⁹ Still, the celebration of the victory has a negative connotation as well. It should be rather admitted as a day of prayer and sorrow over the perished in that war than as a day of triumph. Therefore, Husar claims that for Ukrainians World War II "was a struggle on two fronts because our people and our Church as though found themselves in the jaws of two totalitarian systems. The victory over Nazism did not bring the end to the suf-

77 Bohdan Chervak, "Chy potribne 'prymyrennia?'" {Is "reconciliation" necessary?}, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2013/05/8/6989371/> (accessed January 15, 2014).

78 See No. 199.

79 Ibid., 336. Translation from the original source.

ferings of our people.”⁸⁰ The Nazi Germany was not yet overcome when Stalin’s regime demonstrated its true face a month before the end of World War II by arresting the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

In light of what is said above, the 9th of May, which some celebrate with a feeling of joy, symbolises for Ukrainians the beginning of one more period of persecutions. Liubomyr Husar could legitimately repeat the questions like

“Has Ukraine indeed become a free independent country after 1945 and got the opportunity to define her own fate without the Moscow supervision? Did democracy and freedom of speech begin to reign on her territories, did the guaranties of human rights appear, and were the possibilities of a normal development of Ukrainian identity created?”⁸¹

Consequently, with her discourse the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church tries to make Ukrainians realise that the Soviet period of their history can be compared to the occupation, a tragedy that obviously shows the celebration of the 9th of May in a different light.⁸² It is not about neglecting the heroic deeds of those who defeated the Nazi totalitarian regime that wanted to conquer Europe and Ukraine on the basis of its racist ideology, however, the war victory did not eliminate the totalitarian regime in Ukraine.⁸³ This fact should find its place in the picture of Victory Day.

In the opinion of the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, behind the celebration of Victory Day should stay both a deep feeling of gratitude to those who contributed to the triumph over the Nazis and commemoration of those who were persecuted by the Soviet regime.⁸⁴ Similarly, on that day Ukrainians should think of their liberation from the communist rule in 1991. Ultimately, both Victory Day and the anniversary

80 Ibid, 337. Translation from the original source.

81 Ihor Losiev, “Zaruchnyky velykoi nepravdy. Chomu lidery “Batkivshchyny” i UDARu sviatkuili ukrainsku trahediiu?” {Hostages of the great lie. Why do the leaders of {Ukrainian political parties} “Batkivshchyna” {Fatherland} and UDAR {Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms} celebrate Ukrainian tragedy?}, <http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/79664> (accessed January 15, 2014). Translation from the original source.

82 Ibid.

83 Liubomyr Husar, “Den pamiaty zhertv politychnykh represii. Utrachena nahoda buty razom” {The Day of the remembrance of the victims of political repression. Lost opportunity to be together}, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/2013/05/31/125040/> (accessed January 15, 2014).

84 No. 199, 337.

of independence call for prayer and work to finally overcome the consequences of the tragic past and to think about the current needs of the Ukrainian people. The last observation is remarkable. Husar is aware of the fact that different visions of World War II split Ukraine and those attitudes are often misused by the ruling political elite. Thus, by calling people to realise the genuine meaning of the victory over fascism, Husar seeks to put an end to the historical discussions and manipulations and make people concentrate on their present. “Leave the past to God and do what you have to at present” could be another description of this attitude of Husar.

Drawing upon such considerations, Husar redefines the meaning of victory. He claims that historians have to study what exactly happened during and after World War II. The author focuses on what happened in the souls of people at that time and which repercussions that has for our contemporaries. Husar considers such an analysis important because “we feel the influence of the past on our presence that is not always positive and beneficial. Therefore, we pray to God that he helps us see the past with the eyes of faith and build our future on this basis.”⁸⁵ Further, Liubomyr Husar divides the participants or eyewitnesses of the war into four categories according to how they behaved during those tragic events. To the first group belong the people who had enough means to prevent the war but have not done that. To the second category belong those who also executed some authority but because of fear used to serve evil. The third, the most numerous group, consists of the people who were frightened by the powerful evil of this world and who only tried to rescue. Finally, we have to be grateful to God for those from the fourth group – people who were strong enough to oppose evil, who even in the hard circumstances of war made the choice for justice and truth. Only they are worth being called the real winners of the war because “they preserved their human dignity and their faith in God and truth.”⁸⁶ Hence, Husar defines victory in moral terms. Winners are the people who sustain the truth in all their life circumstances and in that way reveal their human dignity. It is an alternative way to talk about Victory Day where those are usually praised as victors who contributed to the downfall of the Nazi regime.

What is the impact of this analysis on modern Ukraine? Liubomyr Husar believes that we can think of a better future only after the faults of the

85 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

86 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

past are overcome. It is necessary to purify the souls from totalitarian heritage and only then can Ukrainians celebrate a real victory. The evil cannot be tamed by means of arms and weapons but by defeating the internal enemy of fear, hate, and desire of vengeance or violence: "One can change the world by respecting dignity of every single person, by treating everyone as equal to oneself, as a creature of God that is endowed with the same of God's graces."⁸⁷ The whole concept of the genuine victory is best expressed in those words of Husar: "The real ultimate victory will become possible when all of us in the strict sense of the word behave in a human way. All other victories are only partial or imaginary and will never bring the real peace."⁸⁸

The reinterpretation of World War II, its significance, and its lessons for contemporary Ukrainians is equally to be found in the thought of Sviatoslav Shevchuk. In particular he emphasises that every anniversary of war should be an occasion for the nation to come together in prayer for the victims. Shevchuk denotes June 22, the date of the beginning of war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as a day of sorrow for those perished in the brutal bloodshed. The 70th anniversary of this event has to become a Day of Remembrance and Prayer for Ukrainians who suffered terrible human losses during World War II.⁸⁹ Next, the author defines who should be remembered on that day. First of all, he mentions Ukrainians and people of other nationalities who perished in Stalin's camps of death. Then, the Patriarch speaks of the soldiers of the Red Army who were the first to confront the Nazi troops and who lost their lives often left in lurch by their military superiors. Another group of the perished constitute countless civil victims of the Nazi invaders. As a separate group Patriarch Sviatoslav mentions all those who despite exposing their lives to the danger of being executed, managed to rescue fellow human beings, first and foremost persecuted Jews. The name of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi is explicitly mentioned in the first place because his contribution to saving Jews under the Nazi regime was indeed remarkable. Sviatoslav Shevchuk claims that the Jewish rescue actions were not exceptional but elements of a well-organised plan under the guidance of the great Metropolitan. Last but not least, the criminals from the Nazi and Soviet camps are mentioned. Patriarch Sviatoslav asks for prayers for them who caused so much suffering to

87 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

88 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

89 No. 2009.

Ukraine. “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do” (Lk 23,34) is the prayer that is mentioned in regard to perpetrators. The author of the document calls all the people in Ukraine regardless of their confession to unite their hearts in prayer for the victims of World War II so that the day of June 22 becomes a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation in prayer and that God saves Ukraine from a similar tragedy in the future.⁹⁰ Obviously, pointing at the variety of victims and their common sufferings, Sviatoslav Shevchuk desires to draw the entire picture of war instead of its fragmented images that predominate in Ukraine. In a similar way, Yaroslav Hrytsak maintains that instead of solidarity with the heroes of war, Ukrainians should better hold together with its victims or with those heroes who used to save the lives of the victims because ultimately World War II in Ukrainian territories was simply a war between two hostile empires.⁹¹

Shevchuk is aware of the competing visions of the war in Ukraine and attempts to suggest a ground for reconciliation. In particular, the war of 1939-1945 and its period dated 1941-1945 – the Soviet-Nazi struggle – is not given any name in “Call of His Beatitude Sviatoslav to the clergy and the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and all people of good will to prayer on the Commemoration Day of June 22, 2011.” What in the European historiography is called World War II, in Ukraine is referred to with another name of the Great Patriotic War that defines the struggle of 1941-1945. The name applied to the war still causes disputes between the citizens of different parts of Ukraine. In western Ukraine people speak more often about World War II and settle in this way the events of the war in the context of the struggle of nations against the Nazis. At the same time, this title incorporates the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, thus ascribing the fault for the beginning of the war also to the Soviet Union. In the eastern regions of Ukraine the term Great Patriotic War is preferred focusing on the special contribution of the Soviet Union into defeating the Nazis. In this interpretation one omits the guilt of the Soviet state for the outburst of the war in 1939. We presume that Sviatoslav Shevchuk intentionally does not mention any of the common names of the war in order to prevent tensions among Ukrainians who support competing visions. The Patriarch wanted to make his call sound peacefully

90 Ibid.

91 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Viina” {War}, in *Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti*, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011), 138.

and increase its acceptance by avoiding conflicting elements. His primary message is to describe the war as an event that uselessly deprived people of their lives and where finally all are losers, notwithstanding the camp that the victims might have belonged to. Contrary to the victory rhetoric, the war is labelled a tragedy. In Shevchuk's opinion, the homage to all the victims of the war and the prayer for the forgiveness of their trespasses must constitute a basis for the reconciliation of the competing interpretations of World War II.

According to Shevchuk, what unites the adherents of the different visions of the history of World War II is the memory of its numerous victims. Our contemporaries have to recognise that soldiers of the Red Army, Jews who died in Nazis camps, Ukrainians who perished in Soviet camps, and millions of innocent civilians of any nations who lost their lives during the warfare must be remembered in prayer. The pain of the witnesses still alive should be a unifying factor instead of instigating people to continue the war nowadays.⁹² The day of June 22 has to become a Day of Reconciliation that will be the best memory of World War II.

The accomplishment of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the memories of war can be precisely described by the words of Oksana Smerechanska: "It is necessary to shift accents from victory to memory that opens up ways to reconciliation (it concerns especially national reconciliation of Ukrainian society for the common future)."⁹³ The purification of memory by passing from the discourse of victory to that of memory is one of the most valuable contributions of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the discussions on the legacy of World War II.

What others say

The interpretation of war by Sviatoslav Shevchuk significantly coincides with the leading ideas of the document called "Historical memory of World War II and spiritual unity of Ukraine" edited by the initiative group "Memory without Aggression." That document appeared shortly after the

92 No. 2009.

93 Oksana Smerechanska, "Istorychna pamiat pro Druhu svitovu viinu ta formuvannya ukrainskoi identychnosti u suchasnii Ukraini" {Historical memory of the Second World War and the formation of national identity in present-day Ukraine}, *Naukovi zapysky. Seriya kulturolohiia* 7 (2011): 198. Translation from the original source.

already mentioned street riots in Lviv connected with the celebration of Victory Day on May 9th, 2011. In their text the authors, a group of Lviv intellectuals, attempted to define a platform for national reconciliation in Ukraine concerning the memory of war. Their proposal sounds very similar to that of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church:

“We acknowledge that it is not possible to unify forcibly the present memories of Ukrainians on World War II. However, we remain of the conviction that these memories can and should be reconciled by honouring our common victims. One cannot emphasise the pain of some victims and silence the pain of others.”⁹⁴

Recognising that the commemoration of the victims of war can bring people together, the authors of the address propose to construct on it a platform for national reconciliation: “Our destiny from God and our moral duty before the common victims is to build a shrine of unity and reconciliation on their innocent blood. The spiritual unity of Ukraine is possible and achievable when we respect the pain of each other and entrust ourselves to the God of love and mercy.”⁹⁵ According to Shevchuk, the memory of all victims of war should unite contemporaries. Thus, the thinking of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church coincided with particular tendencies in society.

It is interesting to compare the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the 9th of May with that of the other traditional Christian Churches. In the interview on the topic Dymytrii Rudiuk, Metropolitan of Lviv and Sokal of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, suggested that the most important thing in the memory of World War II is prayer and paying honour to all its victims – soldiers of the Red Army and of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, millions of civilians, those who perished in the Nazi and Soviet concentration camps.⁹⁶ The tragedy of war should be in the foreground of the war memory. Strong Soviet archetypes are still present in the consciousness of many Ukraini-

94 Myroslav Marynovych, “Platforma dlia natsionalnoho porozuminnia” {Platform for national reconciliation}, http://zaxid.net/blogs/showBlog.do?platforma_dlya_natsionalnogo_porozuminnia&objectId=1131824 {accessed August 29, 2012}. Translation from the original source.

95 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

96 Dymytrii Rudiuk, “Prymyrennia veteraniv stalo b naivazhlyvishym znakom zavershennia Druhoi svitovoi viiny v Ukraini” {Reconciliation of the veterans would be the most important sign of the termination of World War II in Ukraine}, interview by Oksana Smerechanska, *Cerkva.info*, <http://www.cerkva.info/uk/publications/intervju/1671-vijna.html> (accessed January 11, 2014).

ans and they do not allow people to accept the plurality of the national identifications of the people.⁹⁷ Metropolitan Rudiuk leaves aside the discourse on victorious Soviet people but defines victory in moral terms: every person has won if he/she has discovered his/her responsibility for the evil created.

Very similar messages on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the end of war are conferred by Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The truth must be said about war and its heroes. Both Nazism and Bolshevism are built on the basis of hate towards the human person; the crimes of Stalinism and Nazism have equally to be condemned.⁹⁸ Patriarch Filaret also defines the moral lesson of war: evil has to be first of all discovered in one's own soul as everybody carries responsibility for the injustices that happened around. Hence, the real victory means the vanquishing of individual evil: "We will only then overcome evil when we recognise that hate and aggression are our common enemy and when we defeat them in mutual forgiveness."⁹⁹

On the contrary, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate focuses on an alternative set of narratives of World War II. Her Head, Metropolitan Volodymyr, speaks about the "Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945," expresses the confidence that this "feast of the heroes who defeated fascism will live on," mentions that also the Church "calls to commemorate the heroes and victims of war," and pleads for special attention to the veterans.¹⁰⁰ Thus, not only historians and politicians but also the traditional Ukrainian Churches demonstrate alternative attitudes in their estimation of World War II.¹⁰¹

The Greek-Catholic vision of World War II is very similar to the one being promoted in contemporary Poland. The condemnation of communism and of the Soviet domination is one of the strongest themes in the

97 Ibid.

98 "Zvernennia Patriarkha Kyivskoho i vsiiei Rusy-Ukrainy Filareta z nahody 65-richnytssi peremohy nad hitleryzmom" {Message of Filaret, Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of victory over Hitlerism}, <http://www.cerkva.info/uk/documents/13-documents/319-peremoha.html> (accessed January 11, 2014).

99 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

100 "Message of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the 65th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War," http://risu.org.ua/en/index/resourses/church_doc/uocmp_doc/35505/ (accessed January 16, 2014).

101 Bohdan Chervak, "Tserkva i viina" {The Church and the war}, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2010/05/20/5058776/> (accessed January 21, 2014).

Polish redefinition of the Victory Day celebration after 1989. The 9th of May is currently admitted as Europe Day whilst the termination of war is admitted on the 8th of May. Elzbieta Halas explains that for the present-day Poles the old Soviet Victory Day is “referring collective memory to the end of the Second World War in an inadequate manner – exclusively as a fight against Hitlerism and Fascism, while the end of war with Germany was at the same time the beginning of the communist slavery.”¹⁰² The Polish President Kwasniewski expressed himself in a similar way: “But Victory Day was not only rosy for Poland, it did not bring liberation and hope. It was the same for other countries in the region.”¹⁰³ Exactly this is the key idea of the official messages of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the theme of World War II.

Finally, the Greek-Catholic position is different from that of Russia where “the Church has reconciled the Russian attachment to the Soviet state (which is synonymous with victorious power during the Second World War) with the memory of those who died for their faith).”¹⁰⁴ Whilst the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church speaks about the crimes of communism as equal to that of fascism, the memory of the victims of Stalin’s repressions in Russia is perpetuated leaving behind the element of crime or criminals: “There are victims of a tragedy whose origin and significance is beyond the reach of public opinion.”¹⁰⁵ This comparison of the approach of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the war memory with other actors in Ukraine and abroad confirms that the Greek-Catholics have adopted the western narrative of war that is however not shared by all Ukrainians. Equalising Nazism and communism contributes to spreading the truth about war, and prayers for all the victims and soldiers of both armies should advance the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation.

102 Quoted in Horolets, Collective Memory, in *The Post-Communist Condition*, 51.

103 Quoted in *ibid.*, 59.

104 Kathy Rousselet, “The Russian Orthodox Church and Reconciliation with the Soviet Past,” in *History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Memory Games*, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (n. p., Palgrave, 2013), 50.

105 *Ibid.*, 51.

The actions

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church not only issued official pronouncements on reconciliation but also organised some activities in order to disperse and promote that idea. This claim is particularly plausible concerning the purification of the memories of World War II. I will briefly sketch some of the activities here to be able to follow how the practical actions inspire, accompany, or elucidate the reconciliation messages of the Church hierarchy.

Among its declared tasks the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church indicates the “assisting in the process of reconciliation and peaceful cooperation among people, nations and Churches.”¹⁰⁶ By steadily pursuing its initiative “Day of Memory,” the members of the Commission strive to spread “the idea of the need to remember the victims of World War II, and all other wars in Ukrainian history, conducting symbolic actions, ecumenical prayer services, seminars and meetings.”¹⁰⁷ The international ecumenical commemoration of the victims of World War II in 2005 was one of the most known initiatives of the Commission. On May 8, 2005 Ukraine admitted the 60th anniversary of the termination of the war. On that day, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church together with the independent cultural journal “Yi” arranged a common ecumenical prayer of the Ukrainian and German bishops for the victims of the warfare at the soldiers’ graves in the village of Potelych. Later the same day, in the Ukrainian Catholic University the Commission organised a round table on the topic “Memory. Responsibility. Reconciliation.” On the occasion of those celebrations with the blessing of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Patriarch Liubomyr, the Commission issued the “Open Letter of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the Christian Churches of Ukraine on the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of World War II.”¹⁰⁸

In 2008-2011, every May 8, the Commission undertook the cleaning of the graves of civilians and German war prisoners at the Yanivskyi cemetery in Lviv thus practically emphasising the element of memory instead

106 “Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Justice and Peace,” <http://www.ugcc.org.ua/39.0.html?&L=2> (accessed February 14, 2012).

107 Ibid.

108 No. 2001.

of victory.¹⁰⁹ The tidying of the abandoned graves was followed by an ecumenical prayer. At the General Assembly of the European Conference of the Justice and Peace Commission held in Kyiv in 2007, the topic of healing the burdened memory in Ukraine, including the memory of war, was addressed during the workshop “Unity in precarious diversity.”

A particularly important issue for the Commission remains searching ways to reconciliation between the veterans of the Red Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Liubomyr Husar underscored the core of the problems with veterans in such a way: “The Soviet Army veterans have been for years repeated that the Ukrainian national conscience, a desire of Ukrainians to have their state and those who used to fight for it are enemies. Therefore, they cannot imagine the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as companions in arms.”¹¹⁰ Accordingly, Husar claims the necessity of the state programme that would make it clear that everyone who defended the rights and dignity of Ukrainians are their heroes and veterans.¹¹¹ Responding to that challenge, on May 7, 2012 the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in cooperation with the Union of Officers of Ukraine conducted a round table “Models of reconciliation and attitude to the past.” The aim of that event consisted in the development of a philosophy of reconciliation and construction of a shared vision of the participation of the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Soviet Red Army in World War II. The address to the state authorities was signed where participants called to initiate a peaceful public discussion concerning the reconciliation between Ukrainians who in the absence of their own state used to take different sides during the war.¹¹² Concluding the round table veterans from the opposing

109 “Ne Den peremohy, a Den pamiati” {Not Victory Day, but Memory Day}, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/news_single.0.html?&tx_ttnews%5bS%5d=1268292152&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=2826&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=1&cHash=71729e5e4c (accessed January 21, 2014).

110 Liubomyr Husar, “Viina uviishla v moie zhyttia 1 veresnia 1939 roku, koly na Lviv upaly pershi bomby” {The war came into my life on September 1, 1939 when the first bombs fell on Lviv}, interview by Oksana Smerechanska, *Istpravda.com.ua*, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2011/05/8/38076/> (accessed August 30, 2012).

111 Ibid.

112 For more details about the round table and the text of the address, consult the website of the Union of Officers of Ukraine: “Uchasnyky kruhloho stolu “Modeli prymyrennia ta vidnoshennia do mynuloho” pidpysaly zvernennia” {Participants of the round table “Models of Reconciliation and Attitude to the Past” signed an

sides symbolically shook hands as a sign of future reconciliation. By describing those initiatives I intend to confer the importance of symbolic actions for the sensible issue of the healing of memory. Unlike words, actions demand deeper participation and visualise the meaning.

5.1.4.3 Reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church

The relations between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Moscow Patriarchate, her difficult northern neighbour, are problematic. When reading the official pronouncements of those Churches, it becomes clear that both Churches struggle because of seemingly irreconcilable visions of their joint past and are fighting to divide their spheres of influence in today's Ukraine. This struggle mirrors the relations between the Ukrainian and Russian states. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church advocates her formula of dealing with the burdened memory in the relations between both Churches. The encyclical *Ut Unum Sint* suggests that in the process of the purification of memory the Churches must sort out mutual misunderstandings and prejudices, the insufficient knowledge of one another, complacency and indifference, re-examine the common painful past and acquire a truthful vision of things.¹¹³ In this paragraph I will elucidate the platform of rapprochement with the Moscow Patriarchate that the Greek-Catholic leadership proposes.

Recognition of historical faults

The contemporary troubles between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church began at the end of the 1980s during and after the campaign for the registration of the Greek-Catholic parishes. Greek-Catholics demanded the establishment of religious freedom in the Soviet Union and consequently, the official recognition of their existence. The Moscow Patriarchate opposed the transfer of its parishes in western

address}, <http://uoun.wordpress.com/tag/%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F/> (accessed August 28, 2012).

113 Ioannes Paulus II, “*Ut Unum Sint*. On Commitment to Ecumenism,” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_250519_95_ut-unum-sint_en.html (accessed February 1, 2014).

Ukraine to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The interconfessional struggle was in full swing. That period of the relations between the two Churches was reflected in the language of their official pronouncements.

In comparison with later texts, at the beginning of the 1990s the tone of the official documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was more demanding, concrete and straightforward. In particular, this is typical of the style of Cardinal Liubachivskyi. The struggle for the rights of Greek-Catholics in the Soviet Union received wide support among the faithful and was elucidated in the mass media. The 100,000 participants at the demonstration in Lviv for the return of the Saint George Cathedral proved that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church had the power to put forward demands. This spirit is reflected in the statements of the hierarchy of the Church. With the weakening of the open interconfessional struggle the language of the official statements became less peremptory, more tolerant and sustained. The definite turn in the language and character of the official documents came in the pastoral letter of Cardinal Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi "About the Unity of the Holy Churches" issued in August 1994. From this message on begins the active promotion of the unity of Churches in Ukraine and the reconciliation with the Moscow Patriarchate. Until that time, the leading topics of the documents had been property conflicts and the strengthening of the identity of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

The calls towards forgiveness, love, and reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church were a distinctive part of the official statements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church even amidst the most acute struggle. For instance, expressing his great appreciation of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachov and Pope John Paul II on 1 December 1989 that signified the definite turning point in favour of religious freedom in the Soviet Union, Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi assured the importance of "forgiveness, reconciliation and honour to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church."¹¹⁴ In several messages Liubachivskyi expressed his desire to solve the conflicts between both Churches in the spirit of love, forgiveness and reconciliation¹¹⁵ according to the principle "We forgive and we ask forgiveness."¹¹⁶ At the same time, the Moscow

114 No. 1, 3. Translation from the original source. See also, No. 15, 26; No. 32, 59; No. 5001, 420.

115 See, for instance, No. 3, 5; No. 4, 5; No. 9, 12.

116 No. 6, 7.

Patriarchate is accused of helping the Stalin regime to liquidate the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946.¹¹⁷ The Lviv Pseudo-Synod is considered a joint action of the communist government and the Russian Orthodox Church and this fact has to be irrevocably recognised.¹¹⁸ Greek-Catholics have suffered a lot during the years of underground existence from the Soviet authorities and their brothers in Christ, the Moscow Patriarchate.¹¹⁹ Hence, it is no wonder, that along with offering forgiveness, Liubachivskyi wishes that the Russian Orthodox Church reveals the same respect, love, and reconciliation in the spirit of the Gospel and justice with regard to Greek-Catholics.¹²⁰ Finally, one should not forget the message of Liubachivskyi from 6 November 1987 where he asked and offered forgiveness to the Moscow Patriarchate and the whole Russian people. This text appeared still before the introduction of religious freedom in the Soviet Union and it was a courageous and forward-looking gesture of Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi. However, whilst the forgiveness text of 1987 is a humble plea to reshape the relations between the Churches, the documents issued after the legalisation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church put forward demands that the Russian Orthodox Church should recognise her historical faults.

At first, Liubachivskyi justifies the return of a great number of faithful to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church from a legal and moral point of view. In particular, the author states that “The reregistration of the Russian Orthodox parishes as the Ukrainian Catholic is not the expulsion of one group of parishioners from their Church by the other, but the confirmation of the fidelity of a particular group of parishioners to the Ukrainian-Catholic Church.”¹²¹ The word reregistration here implies the return of the Greek-Catholic faithful to their roots and to their Church. This should explain to the Russian Orthodox Church that the Greek-Catholics did not appear all of the sudden but that this Church survived the underground and

117 See, for instance, No. 12, 20.

118 Ibid., 21.

119 No. 15, 26.

120 No. 1, 3.

121 No. 3, 4. Translation from the original source. It is worth noting that in the documents issued in the 1990s the term Ukrainian Catholic Church was used instead of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Such a name was commonly applied by the Church hierarchy in the diaspora. Myroslav-Ivan Cardinal Liubachivskyi returned to Ukraine on March 30, 1991.

aspires now to get back what their ancestors possessed in terms of both faith and property.

On the accusation of the Russian Orthodox Church that the registration of the Greek-Catholic parishes is an intrusion of the state in religious affairs, Liubachivskyi answers by claiming that it is rather the question of exercising the right of religious freedom.¹²² At the end, the Moscow Patriarchate itself used the Soviet law to register the Greek-Catholic parishes as Russian Orthodox in 1946; Moscow has tolerated and welcomed the interference of the state authorities to regulate the religious affairs until recent times.¹²³ Liubachivskyi reproaches the opponent with an unfriendly and unjust attitude to the Greek-Catholics. The language is strict and straightforward. The Russian Orthodox Church has to recognise that Greek-Catholics can exercise their right to religious freedom. It means that there can be no alternative to the official registration of the Greek-Catholic parishes and the relations between the two Churches have to be regulated in mutual dialogue.

For the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church the fact of the participation of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Lviv Pseudo-Synod remains an impediment to the reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church. The Greek-Catholics are still waiting that someone will assume responsibility for the consequences of the liquidation of their Church.¹²⁴ As we have seen above, the Church leadership does not always emphasise that collaboration; however, coming to terms with this wound of the past is always implied in the analysed documents.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid., 5.

124 Ivan Dacko, "U Yosyfa Slipoho bula dalekohliadnist Andreia Sheptytskoho" {Yosyf Slipyi possessed the foresight of Andrei Sheptytskyi}, interview by Sophia Kochmar, *Day.kiev.ua*, <http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/article/cuspilstvo/u-yosyfa-slipogo-bula-dalekoglyadnist-andreya-sheptickogo> (accessed January 11, 2014). A strong plea to the Orthodox to recognise their faults regarding the uniate Churches including the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, see in the article Robert Taft, "The Problem of "Uniatism" and the "Healing of Memories." Anamnesis, not Amnesia," *Logos. A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* 41-42 (2000-2001): 155-196. The author reproaches the Orthodox for not having purified their conscience for the destruction of the uniate Churches in an active or passive way during 1946-1950 and for their opposition to the re-emergence of those oppressed Churches when the existence of the Soviet Block was coming to an end. Taft opines that those failures of the Orthodox to reconsider their past "continue to render real ecumenical progress impossible." (Ibid., 192).

In the letter to the Patriarch of Moscow on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod Husar is asking the Russian Orthodox Church to reassess her participation in this event. With full confidence Husar claims that the Moscow Patriarchate was acting under the difficult circumstances of the time and was to a certain degree forced to cooperate in the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church by the Soviet authorities. The analysis of the degree of participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in those events should be conducted by the Orthodox themselves.¹²⁵ Still, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has been waiting for the Moscow Patriarchate to apologise for its sinful subjugation to the totalitarian regime that traumatised the very nature of the Church.¹²⁶ By claiming that both Churches fell a pray to the communist dictatorship, Cardinal Husar tried to get out of the circle of mutual accusations and found an honourable basis for rapprochement. The letter contains some practical steps to rapprochement as well. Among them is the recognition of the historical mistakes, asking forgiveness and granting pardon, the avoidance of unfriendly actions, looking for the platforms of trust and cooperation on the inter-Church level.¹²⁷ Ultimately, attaining reconciliation and healing the wounds of the past is possible only through the good will of both Churches.

The concise description of the state and perspectives of the Greek-Catholic and Russian Orthodox relations one finds in “Conception of Ecumenical Position.” Greek-Catholic hierarchs dedicate a separate paragraph to the relations with the Russian Orthodox Church as those influence the state of the inter-Church relations in Eastern Europe and in the whole Christian world.¹²⁸ The Lviv Pseudo-Synod burdens the attitude of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the Moscow Patriarchate. According to conception, for the fruitful reconciliation dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church several conditions have to be fulfilled.¹²⁹ First, both sides have to recognise their historical faults in order to eliminate the psychological burden and to leave history to God. Second, a genuine mutual forgiveness is needed for it will free the Churches-opponents from the perpetual reawakening of historical pain. Third, both Churches have to

125 No. 217, 362.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid., 363.

128 No. 5003, 58 (No. 4000, 126).

129 Ibid., 59 (No. 4000, 126).

avoid hostile rhetoric and actions because they contribute to the growth of mutual prejudices and lead to distrust. Finally, both Churches have to look for possible areas of cooperation concerning the pastoral care of the Greek-Catholic faithful in Russia and the Orthodox faithful in Ukraine.

Destruction of Orthodox dioceses in western Ukraine

In the years that followed the violent phase of the interdenominational conflicts, the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church paid a lot of attention trying to disclose to the world the hollowness of the Moscow accusations that the Greek-Catholics destroyed three dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church in western Ukraine. Until now, the Moscow Patriarchate has declined contacts with Greek-Catholics on the official level under the pretext that those destroyed Orthodoxy in western Ukraine and continue to persecute the Orthodox of the Moscow Patriarchate in those territories. The card of the sufferings of the Orthodox in western Ukraine has been used in the ecumenical contacts with the Vatican until today. Therefore, in several messages the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church endeavours to answer those reproaches. For instance, in 2001, Liubomyr Husar published a statement concerning the interview of the Moscow Patriarch Alexius II published in an Italian newspaper answering the accusations that I mentioned above. “We long for unity and love” is the title of this statement of the position of Husar where he explains in detail the history of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the Westerners who are not familiar with that Church and who cannot truthfully assess the Moscow rhetoric.

Cardinal Husar acknowledges that the Russian Orthodox Church indeed experienced great losses in western Ukraine with the legalisation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. From more than 1000 parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Lviv Archdiocese during the Soviet times, at the time of the publication of that text, remained only 47.¹³⁰ Human and material losses were combined with the negative images that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church¹³¹ has because of her allegiance to Moscow that has

¹³⁰ No. 107, 205.

¹³¹ Husar speaks about the situation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. She is part of the Moscow Patriarchate and the letter speaks on behalf of its counterpart in Ukraine.

cooperated with the authorities during Soviet rule. However – and Husar states that explicitly – one cannot speak of the persecution of the Orthodox in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate. The attitude of the local population towards the Russian Orthodox Church nowadays may contain some malevolence; however there are no acts of violence.¹³² The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not share that attitude, criticises it, and fights against it as much as it can. At this place in plain language Cardinal Husar claims that the hostility of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Greek-Catholics is explained not by its desire to settle the problem of particular cases of interdenominational conflicts but by the longing to renew its lost positions in western Ukraine. The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church has always used only general accusations without any concrete facts or has referred to already solved conflicts.¹³³ According to Husar, the strategy of his Church in solving property conflicts consists in the promotion of dialogue between the opponents (sometimes with the assistance of the local state authorities).¹³⁴ Many conflict situations were settled by sharing one sacral building by the communities of different confessions in turns.

Finally, in order to clarify the accusations, Husar invites the Patriarch of Moscow to present his vision of possible solutions to the problem of the interdenominational conflicts with the Greek-Catholics. He calls for the exchange of truthful, non-biased, and by the third side confirmed information about the cases of conflicts on the local level. Husar believes that those solitary cases of conflicts do not have to be brought on the international level because this ultimately harms both Churches. The Christian world is divided not into Catholics or Orthodox but into those who long for unity and those who oppose it.¹³⁵ As a matter of fact, the Moscow Patriarchate has never answered that or any similar invitation.

Still, as some critics from the Greek-Catholic milieu maintain, the issues of the Orthodox parishes in western Ukraine demand a more delicate

132 No. 107, 205.

133 Ibid., 206.

134 Ibid. 204. It has to be mentioned that the intrusion of local state authorities in looking for solutions to the interdenominational conflicts has always been contestable and there were indeed cases when the decision was made in favour of the Greek-Catholic community because of the Ukrainian national sympathies of the local authorities. However, those have never been predominant but rather solitary instances.

135 Ibid., 206.

approach from the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Only Church documents are not enough for a successful promotion of reconciliation; one has to turn from words to action.¹³⁶ Mykhailo Dymyd upholds that except for the appeals to reconciliation his Church has not yet made concrete gestures that would show her sorrow for the period of the violent redistribution of sacral buildings. Similarly, Antoine Arjakovsky contends that from the side of the Greek-Catholics it would be reasonable to shed light on the violence that took place during their overtaking of sacral buildings in 1989-1992.¹³⁷ The question must be addressed. During his official visit to Poland in June 2010, Hilarion Alfeyev, the chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, claimed that the Russian Orthodox Church recognises the illegitimacy of the defeat of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946,¹³⁸ but believes that it would have been better to restore this Church at the beginning of the 1990s in a more peaceful way than just taking over the Church buildings.¹³⁹ The issue of the Orthodox parishes must be addressed in one package with the apology of the Russian Orthodox Church for the Lviv Pseudo-Synod.

The struggle for the patriarchal status of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is challenged by the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate has a stronger lobby and much more possibilities on the international level to promote its own vision of the ecclesial situation

136 Dymyd, Reconciliation.

137 Arjakovsky, *En attendant*, 500.

138 This statement of Hilarion Alfeyev where he practically called unjust the defeat of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was welcomed by a number of Greek-Catholic theologians, for instance, Mykola Krokosh and Mykhailo Dymyd, as a first step towards the reappraisal by the Russian Orthodox Church of her role in the fate of Greek-Catholics in the 20th century (“Rosiiska Pravoslavna Tserkva – Ukrainska Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva – nova faza vidnosyn?” {Russian Orthodox Church-Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church – a new phase of relationships?}, *Patriarkhat* 4 (2010): 24-25).

139 “Mitropolit Ilarion: ‘My dolzhny byt soyuznikami, chtoby truditsya vmyesty na yedinom missiynerskom polye’ {Metropolitan Hilarion: “We have to be allies in order to work together on the single missionary field”}, <https://mospat.ru/ru/2010/06/24/news20890/> (accessed January 23, 2014).

in Ukraine. This was proved again in the early 2000 when the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church declared her development towards the patriarchal status and the Seat of Metropolitan was transferred from Lviv to Kyiv. The Moscow Patriarchate managed to organise the all-Orthodox opposition to this plan of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Vatican, threatening the latter with the cessation of the ecumenical dialogue.¹⁴⁰ The

-
- 140 February 16-22, 2004 Cardinal Walter Kasper, the President of the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity visited Moscow and met Patriarch Alexis II. Before the visit Cardinal Kasper sent a memorandum where he expressed his vision in favour of the creation of the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The memorandum was negatively received by the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church that answered accusing Rome of Catholic proselytism and unfriendly attitude, and threatened to hamper the ecumenical dialogue. Furthermore, during the meeting with Cardinal Walter Kasper the Moscow Patriarch Alexis II accused Greek-Catholics of the lack of gratitude for the spiritual care that they received from the Russian Orthodox Church in the aftermath of the Synod of Lviv in 1946. Subsequently, Patriarch Alexis II traditionally reproached Greek-Catholics with the destruction of three Orthodox dioceses in western Ukraine instead of thankfulness. Nowadays, Greek-Catholics are supported by Rome in their desire to be elevated to the patriarchal level which is an absurd idea for Patriarch Alexis II: "Why do they attempt so fervently to transfer the seat of the head of the uniate Church in Ukraine from Lviv to Kyiv and to create a patriarchate? The foundation of the patriarchate will for years put an end to our relations... Sometimes we are told that this {*Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church*} is an independent Church. No. It is a part of the Roman-Catholic Church that to the full bears responsibility for the actions of the uniates" ("Kommyunikyye o vstryechyie Svyatyeyshyego Patriarkha Alyeksyeya II s kardinalom Valtyerom Kaspierom" {Communiqué about the meeting between His Holiness Patriarch Alexis II and Cardinal Walter Kasper}, <http://www.ugcc.org.ua/214.0.html> (accessed August 30, 2012). Translation from the original source). A few months before the visit of Cardinal Kasper to Moscow, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew sent a letter to Pope John Paul II conveying his concerns regarding the project of the foundation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Patriarchate ("Lettre du Patriarche œcuménique Bartholomé au Pape Jean-Paul II concernant le projet de fondation d'un patriarcat uniate en Ukraine," *Istina* 51 (2006): 200-206). Equally the leaders of other Orthodox Churches univocally expressed their disturbance concerning the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine. The extracts of those responses that deny the idea of the patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church appeared on the official website of the Russian Orthodox Church www.mospat.ru. They can also be consulted on the official page of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: "Vsye Pravoslavnyye Tsyerkvi nyegativno otsyenivayut pyerspyektivy sozdaniya gryeko-katolichyeskogo Patriarkhata na Ukraine" {All the Orthodox Churches negatively evaluate perspectives of the creation of the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine}, <http://www.ugcc.org.ua/211.0.html> (accessed August 30, 2012).

Vatican's stance towards Moscow provokes a certain suspicion of Ukrainians regarding ecumenism:

“Therefore the ecumenical position of the Vatican was criticised not only by Orthodox but even by Ukrainians who were generally pro-Catholic (especially in the diaspora). This was because the so-called Ostpolitik of the Vatican, which lay at the basis of its ecumenical initiatives, was, in the eyes of these Ukrainians, too “pro-Moscow” to be strictly ecumenical.”¹⁴¹

The Moscow Patriarchate does not recognise the ecclesial autonomy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considering her only a constituent of the Roman Catholic Church.¹⁴² Consequently, Moscow tries to solve the contesting issues between the two Churches via the Vatican without appealing directly to the Church leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics.

In the letter on the occasion of the visit of Cardinal Kasper to Moscow in February 2004, the Greek-Catholic bishops expressed their indignation about the fact that the discussions about such an important development in the life of their Church as a patriarchate were taken not in Ukraine or in Rome but in Moscow without any representative of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The authors of the document with confidence claim that they will not turn away from the chosen path to a patriarchate: “Negotiations in Moscow will not obliterate at all this general process of the development of patriarchate that derives from the decisions of the Synod of Bishops of our Church. We chose this course long before and it represents the clear will of the people of God of our Church.”¹⁴³ This passage answers to the Moscow Patriarch Alexis II who postulated that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is only part of the Roman-Catholic Church and cannot decide herself about the changes of her status. We read in the text: “According to canon law, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is a Church *sui iuris* and not a constituent of any other Church and, hence, it develops according to its ecclesial nature.”¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the Greek-Catholic bishops claim that responses of the Orthodox Churches contain expressions that are inadmissible in the ecumenical dialogue, for instance,

141 Marynovych, *Obstacles on the Road*.

142 Anatolii Babynskiy, “Za pretenziiamy z boku Rosiiskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy do ukrainskykh hreko-katolykiv stoiat zovsim inshi prychny” {Completely different reasons stay behind the claims of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/open_theme/44340/ (accessed January 13, 2014).

143 No. 5004, 207.

144 *Ibid.*, 208.

the statement that the Roman-Catholic Church has to diminish step by step the presence of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.¹⁴⁵ The threatening of the Vatican with the cessation of the contacts with the Orthodox Churches can be directly regarded as blackmail and a personal insult of the Pope.¹⁴⁶ In general, the Greek-Catholic leadership is very disappointed at such a critical reaction because it proves the inability of the Orthodox Churches to solve historical contradictions taking into account the interests of all sides.¹⁴⁷

The Russian Orthodox Church opposes the creation of the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate considering Ukraine her canonical territory. Interestingly, in his “Unique people of God” where he justifies the creation of a united Ukrainian Patriarchate, Cardinal Husar does not employ the term canonical territory speaking instead about the spheres of influence: inter-Church relations “are marked by an inertia associated with schemes and models of the past, which delineated “spheres of influence.”¹⁴⁸ It can be averred that Husar consciously desires to make his listeners comprehend that the language of ultimatums in the inter-Church relations has to be changed by a dialogue of partners that presupposes the openness of Churches for the needs of each other. Ultimately, the relations between Churches are also subjected to the natural processes of historical development:

“Ecumenical dialogue also supposes that all the participants share one and the same values. In the case under consideration, there is at least one value, religious freedom, which the two sides evaluate in often radically different ways. So the Moscow Patriarchate treats the revival of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine exclusively as a consequence of Catholic proselytism and the interference of the government, giving no consideration to the right of Ukrainian citizens freely to choose their religious affiliation.”¹⁴⁹

When will the Patriarchs meet?

Contrary to the opposition of the Russian Orthodox and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the pilgrimage of John Paul II to Ukraine in 2001, Car-

145 Ibid., 209.

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid.

148 No. 177, 311 (No. 3000, 136).

149 Marynovych, *Obstacles on the Road*.

dinal Husar was in favour of a visit of the Patriarch of Moscow Alexis II to Ukraine. In the address that expresses his positive attitude towards it, Husar claims that this occasion could be a chance for the Heads of both Churches to try to solve a number of burning issues. Among them is the peaceful coexistence of Orthodox and Greek-Catholics in Ukraine, the re-evaluation of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod of 1946, the settlement of the property claims, or finding solutions to the legal situation of Greek-Catholics in the Russian Federation.¹⁵⁰ It is worth mentioning that not a single meeting between the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Moscow Patriarch took place even though Greek-Catholics have many a times expressed this wish. Moscow constantly declines invitations, traditionally accusing Greek-Catholics of the defeat of Orthodox dioceses in western Ukraine.

Equally Sviatoslav Shevchuk several times expressed his wish to meet Patriarch Kirill, however he has not yet got an answer. In Shevchuk's opinion, there are many topics to be discussed between the Heads of both Churches, among them also the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.¹⁵¹ As a reaction to this message, Patriarch Kirill benevolently claimed that even though the conflicts between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics have not been solved yet, the relations between both Churches have improved in the last years.¹⁵² Shevchuk opines that the Churches should cooperate in view of the challenges of globalisation, liberal secularisation, family crisis, and the decline of traditional morality:

“We are certain that we will be able to find ways to heal the wounds of the past by forgiving and asking for forgiveness... We are convinced that the way of reconciliation between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox

150 No. 156, 277.

151 “Patriarkh Kyryl ne vidpovidaie Hlavi Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {Patriarch Kirill does not answer the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church}, <http://www.unian.ua/news/467225-patriarh-kiril-ne-vidpovidaie-glavi-ugkts.html> (accessed January 11, 2014).

152 “Kyrylo: ‘Vidnosyny mizh pravoslavnyimi i hreko-katolykami v Ukraini polipshuiutsia” {Kirill: “Relations between the Orthodox and Greek-Catholics in Ukraine improve”}, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/11/11/6747624/> (accessed January 11, 2014).

Church on the basis of historic and pastoral realism is an effective way of renewal of the dialogue and the formation of a new model of the ecumenical relations.¹⁵³

Hence, for the moment the relations of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with the Moscow Patriarchate remain tense. In fact, not a big progress has been achieved in the last 20 years. Although there are some steps that point at a bigger openness of Moscow to the dialogue with Greek-Catholics,¹⁵⁴ the general atmosphere of distrust and the accusation of proselytism prevails. The suspicion of Moscow to the canonical plans of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church expressed in the desire to create a patriarchate, the extension of the activity of that Church in the east and south of Ukraine, her good contacts and recognition of the two non-canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Churches are indicated by the Russian Orthodox Church as obstacles to a possible reconciliation.¹⁵⁵ The burden of the historical relations between both Churches weighs down upon them and foments present conflicts. The plan of the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula that was realised by Russia did not evoke any protests from the side of the Russian Orthodox Church and of Patriarch Kirill except his statement on March 2, 2014 that accentuates the closeness of the three fraternal nations of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and appeals not to destroy that prox-

153 “Patriarch Sviatoslav Stresses Priority of Ecumenical Dialogue,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/interchurch_relations/50238/ (accessed January 17, 2014).

154 Some positive changes happened after the enthronisation of Sviatoslav Shevchuk. Among those is the private visit of Shevchuk to Metropolitan Volodymyr, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the positive attitude towards the improvement of the relations with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church expressed by Hilarion Alfeyev, the chairman of the External Church relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. Shevchuk several times expressed his readiness for the reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church according to the example of the Polish and Russian Church in August 2012 (“Sviatoslav Shevchuk: ‘Duzhe b khotiv, shchob Hlava Rosiiskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy pidpysav ugodu pro prymyrennia z Ukrainskoiu Hreko-Katolytskoiu Tserkvoiu” {Sviatoslav Shevchuk: “I would like very much the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church to sign the agreement about the reconciliation with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church”}, http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/17897-svyatoslav-shevchuk-duzhe-b-xotiv-shhob-glava-rpc-pidpisav-ugodu-pro-primirennia-i-z-ugkc.html (accessed March 28, 2013).

155 “Rosiiska Pravoslavna Tserkva i Ukrainska Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva: Mytropolyt Ilarion (Alfieiev) rozpoviv pro vidnosyny dvokh Tserkov” {The Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) told about the relations of both Churches}, <http://religions.unian.net/ukr/detail/8648> (accessed March 28, 2013).

imity because of different present moment interests.¹⁵⁶ Patriarch Kirill did not oppose the politics of the Kremlin of the interference in the internal affairs of the independent neighbouring country. Similarly, the Moscow Patriarchate continues to influence the ecclesial politics of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church through the Vatican. The Russian Orthodox Church needs a thorough examination of her conscience.

Still, the Orthodox theologian Andrii Yurash highly praises the Greek-Catholic politics of reconciliation: “In Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has demonstrated many gestures of the goodwill to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, that is to the Church that contributed to her liquidation. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has shown the models of reconciliation and understanding that were not known in Ukraine until now. In that way, she testified the high level of Christian virtues and longing for a non-hypocritical peace. For instance, Cardinal Husar a number of times appealed to the Lviv authorities with the plea to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church a building terrain for the erection of a cathedral.”¹⁵⁷ The willingness of Moscow and the readiness for forgiveness are needed for the continuation of the dialogue.

156 “Obrashchyneniye Svyatyeyshyego Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vsyey Rusi Kirilla k myestoblyustityelyu Kiyevskoi mitropolichyey kafyedry mitropolitu Chyernovitskomu i Bukovinskomu Onufriyu, arhipastyryam, pastyryam i vsyem vyernym chadam Ukrainskoy Pravoslavnoy Tsyerkvi v svyazi s situatsiyey na Ukrainye, 2 marta 2014 goda” {Message of His Holiness Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus Kirill to the locum tenens of the Kyiv metropolitan see, Metropolitan of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna Onufrii, archpriests, priests and all the faithful children of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church regarding the situation in Ukraine, March 2, 2014}, <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3588256.html> (accessed March 13, 2014).

157 Andrii Yurash, “Tserkovne zhyttia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy ye duzhe intensyvnyy” {The ecclesial life of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is very intense}, interview, *Risu.org.ua*, http://risu.org.ua/article_print.php?id=34648&name=society_digest&_lang=ua& (accessed January 22, 2014). Translation from the original source.

5.1.4.4 The missing memory of Jews

Tony Judt. Why the memory of Jews is absent in Ukraine: the point of view of a historian

Ernest Renan has once said: “The essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things.”¹⁵⁸ That describes very pointedly the situation concerning the memory of the Jewish presence in Ukrainian territories before World War II. It is not accidental that I quote Renan from the book of Tony Judt. In the epilogue to his masterpiece *Post-War. A History of Europe since 1945*, this scholar investigates the modern European memory and claims that it was designated around the Holocaust. He helps map specifically the Ukrainian situation within the greater framework of the European history of dealing with the memory of the mass destruction of European Jews in the 20th century. Upon reading Judt, one becomes aware of the complexities of that history and why Ukraine handles the Jewish issue as it does. Judt makes it clear why the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church pronounces herself so little on the Holocaust. Finally, the “Epilogue” to Tony Judt’s *Post-War* helps us understand why the Churches have to tell more.

According to Tony Judt, it is the memory of the Holocaust that builds the common European narrative: “Today the pertinent European reference is not baptism. It is extermination. Holocaust recognition is our contemporary European entry ticket.”¹⁵⁹ In other words, the memory of the Jewish dead constitutes one of the strongest pillars of the shared European history and identity. The European adventures of memory are interesting and ambiguous: from deliberate forgetting in the post-war times (“Forgetting as a way of life”¹⁶⁰) to the surplus of memory since 1989 (“institutionalised public remembering as the very foundation of collective identity”¹⁶¹). The construction of that memory “has become the very definition and guarantee of the continent’s restored humanity.”¹⁶² Guy Verhofstadt, the former Belgian Prime Minister, expressed himself in a similar way maintaining that the tragedies of the two world wars of the 20th century and the Holo-

158 Tony Judt, *Post-War. A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Vintage Books, 2010), 803.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid., 829.

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid., 804.

caust bestowed upon Europe generosity and considerateness.¹⁶³ The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church also tries to come to terms with the memory of war, however contrary to Western European history, the Jewish tragedy does not occupy a great place in Ukraine.

The emergence of the Jewish question in the social and political arena in post-war Europe is a long and painful history of total repression until even obsession with that question. In Germany the situation began to change in the 1950s with the trials against the former Nazi officials. Konrad Adenauer's decision to introduce in the schools the course about the German history of 1933-1945 was dictated by the practical consideration that "The health of German democracy now required that Nazism be remembered rather than forgotten."¹⁶⁴

In general, the history of the emerging awareness of Europeans of their contribution to the Jewish fate during the war times has lasted for years taking even four to five decades until the wide masses have recognised their complicity in the Holocaust. For example, in France until the 1990s, the collaboration of the citizens in the extermination of Jews has been depicted as the exclusive affair of the Vichy regime that does not touch upon the whole French nation.¹⁶⁵ The country has waited until 1995 when President Jacques Chirac broke the silence and acknowledged his country's guilt of collaboration in the Nazis' plans concerning Jews.¹⁶⁶ Before there was no collective French responsibility and no need to work on this page of history on the official level.

The situation with the Jewish memory in Eastern Europe differs. This region demonstrates the absence of deep interest in the issue until the 2000s. According to Judt, there are several reasons for that. On the one

163 Valerie Rosoux, "Yevropeiska pamiat chy yevropeiski pamiati? Obmezhennia sterylizovanoho i zastyhloho mynuloho" {European memory or European memories? Limits of a sterilised and frozen past}, in *Yevropa ta yii bolisni mynuvshyny*, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, trans. Yevhen Marichev (Kyiv: Nika-Tsentr, 2009), 224.

164 Judt, *Post-War*, 810.

165 Susan Rubin Suleiman speaks about the conscious post-war "Gaullist 'hijacking of memory' (as Rousso calls it) in favour of the Resistance during the 1950s and 1960s" in France. This conscious forgetting caused a shock in the 1970s when the truth about the Vichy regime collaboration with the Nazis came out. (Susan Rubin Suleiman, "Amnesia and Amnesty. Reflections on Forgetting and Forgiving," in *Crisis of Memory and the Second World War*, ed. Susan Rubin Suleiman (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 222).

166 Judt, *Post-War*, 819.

hand, in those countries the extermination of Jews was erased from the historical discourse during the Soviet era, being intentionally dissolved in the suffering of the Soviet people in general without distinguishing any national, ethnic, or religious groups.¹⁶⁷ It simply did not officially exist. Consequently, any reflections failed. Still nowadays Soviet historical narratives continue to prevail, the most evident ones in Russia. In that country World War II is the Great Patriotic War, Soviet soldiers and civilians are recognised as the biggest victims of the war, the Red Army is the liberator of European territories, all in all the myths of the great deliverance from German rule still occupy the minds of the Russians.¹⁶⁸

On the other hand, “Eastern Europe after 1946 had much more than Western Europe to remember – and to forget.”¹⁶⁹ There were many more Jews killed in that part of the world and perhaps many more people collaborated. The war history was permanently present in the public consciousness and emphasised in political discourse, but the fate of the Jews was exempt from that history and silenced.¹⁷⁰ For example, under the communist regime the concentration camp in Auschwitz in Poland was rendered as a death camp for different nationalities without mentioning that Jews constituted the biggest part of those gassed. Additionally, for Poles the fate of Jews was competitive with the discourse of their own sufferings under the Nazi occupation: “Three million (non-Jewish) Poles died in World War II; proportionally lower than the death rate in parts of Ukraine or among Jews, but a terrible figure notwithstanding.”¹⁷¹ The third reason for the lacking interest in the Jewish plight during Soviet rule is that communist authorities themselves imposed enough suffering on their subjects which facilitated forgetting the Jewish issue during wartime.

According to Sarah Fainberg

“In Ukraine, as in other Eastern European countries, this phenomenon has tended to dilute the distinction between perpetrators, victims and bystanders, has empha-

167 Judt, *The Past Is another Country*, in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*, 165.

168 Judt, *Post-War*, 824-825.

169 *Ibid.*, 821.

170 See the chapter “Stalinist Anti-Semitism” in Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (n. p.: Basic Books, 2010), 339-377.

171 Judt, *Post-War*, 823.

sised universal suffering rather than historical responsibilities, and has swerved away from a direct and public confrontation of the Shoah question.”¹⁷²

The attitude of the Ukrainian presidents also varies. During the commemoration ceremony of the 50th anniversary of Babi Yar, the first president, Leonid Kravchuk, asked forgiveness for those Ukrainians who share the guilt of the destruction of Jews.¹⁷³ Viktor Yushchenko acknowledged the Jewish tragic history as part of the Ukrainian one and in his inauguration speech in 2005 he placed the victims of the Holocaust alongside the victims of the Holodomor and the Soviet and Nazi camps.¹⁷⁴ However, Yushchenko did not emphasise the particular character of the Jewish destruction and did not initiate the discussion about the Ukrainian collaboration. Finally, president Viktor Yanukovych emphasised the general meaning of the Holocaust in Ukraine for the entire humanity without stressing its particular place in Ukrainian history. Hence, despite the clear tendencies to adopt the western models of the attitude towards the tragedy of the Jews, Ukraine has not established yet its clear-cut norm of the interpretation of the Shoah.

Commenting on the specific situation of the marginal interest in the public memory of the Holocaust in western Ukraine Yaroslav Hrytsak makes two additional points. First, “the absence of the memory about Galician Jews is a consequence of the disappearance of this very group.”¹⁷⁵ In addition to the extermination of Jews during the war, a great number of them left Ukraine immediately before and in the first decade of the independence of the country. According to the census, the number of Jews in Ukraine between 1989 and 2001 diminished by 21 times.¹⁷⁶ Those rare Jews living in Galicia nowadays are descendants of the Jews arriving from eastern Ukraine and Russia after the end of the war. They do not retain the memory of the Galician Jews before World War II. Second, having gained independence, Ukrainians began to regenerate their national memory which they were deprived of during the Soviet era, for instance, the

172 Sarah Fainberg, “Memory at the Margins. The Shoah in Ukraine (1991-2011),” in *History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Memory Games*, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (n. p.: Palgrave, 2013), 99.

173 Ibid., 92.

174 Ibid., 92-93.

175 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Holokost poprostu” {Simply Holocaust}, in *Strasti za natsionalizmom: stara istoriia na novyi lad* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011), 246. Translation from the original source.

176 Ibid.

memory of Stalin's repressions or of the defeated Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.¹⁷⁷ The memory of Jews is simply not the most important item on the agenda.

The unwillingness of Ukrainians to speak about Jews in particular derives from the fact that they have suffered immensely under the Stalin and Nazi regimes.¹⁷⁸ Similar attitudes of emphasising the own miseries were typical directly after the end of the war and in the 1950s among other European nations, for instance, Tony Judt points at the example of the Italians.¹⁷⁹ Yaroslav Hrytsak shares the opinion of Istvan Deak that Europe has managed to integrate the memory of the Holocaust in its collective narrative, however, the memory of the victims of Stalinism are still excluded as something that could have taken place in an uncivilised Eastern Europe.¹⁸⁰ The clear tendency of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to equalise the evil of the Nazi and Stalin regimes to Ukraine proves the double victimisation of the nation. The Church has good reasons for that because for millions the Nazi oppression became the post-war Soviet oppression with labour camps, deportations, imprisonment, and the absolute caesura with the past. In Judt's opinion, the Church's equation of both regimes is typical of the eastern European treatment of that issue: "With this post-Communist reordering of memory in Eastern Europe... politicians and scholars started to insist upon such comparisons... Communism was... an all too successful local application of the criminal pathologies of twentieth-century authoritarianism and should be remembered thus."¹⁸¹

In some eastern European countries the rediscovery of the Jewish memory provoked a shock in society. It happened in Poland in 2002 when Jan Thomas Gross issued his *Neighbours*,¹⁸² a book that describes the extermination of a group of 1500 Jews in a Polish town Jedwabne by Polish citizens under Nazi surveillance in 1941. This book was followed by

177 Ibid., 247.

178 The region of Galicia faced the unprecedented extermination of the Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish population under Stalin's and Hitler's rule. Timothy Snyder estimated the number of civilians who were gassed, shot, and starved in Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, and the Baltic states at around 14 million people. (Snyder, *Bloodlands*, 379).

179 Judt, *Post-War*, 807.

180 Hrytsak, *Holocaust and Holodomor*, in *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, 259.

181 Judt, *Post-War*, 826.

182 Jan Gross, *Neighbours. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (London: Arrow Books, 2003).

Gross' *Fear. Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz*¹⁸³ that reconstructs and analyses the pogrom of Jews after the end of the war in a Polish town Kielce on July 4, 1946. The fact of the Polish cooperation in the destruction of Jews perhaps evoked the biggest historical discussion that has ever taken place in independent Poland.¹⁸⁴ This stirred discussion challenged the hitherto existing paradigm of the national conscience of Poles built on heroism, pride, sufferings under the Nazi and communist regimes, and the struggle for independence. The fact that certain Poles were not only victims but also wrongdoers shattered the existing vision of national history. Paweł Machcewicz, contemporary Polish historian, noted that the most important question that the book of Jan Gross posed was whether the Poles will be able to remember that next to their own history of struggle and sufferings they caused pain to people of another nationality and religion.¹⁸⁵ The debate in Poland is completed whereas Ukraine is still waiting for its Jan Gross.

Omer Bartov. The guilt of Ukrainians from the point of view of a Jew

The book that in recent years stirred discussions on the fate of Ukrainian Jews was authored by Omer Bartov, one of the leading Holocaust scholars, under the title *Erased. Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine*.¹⁸⁶ The author represents this group of Jewish historians who emphasise the fault of Ukrainians in the destruction of Jews in cooperation with the Nazi regime.

As it follows from the very title of the book, Bartov is of the opinion that the Jewish legacy in the western region of Ukraine, Galicia, has vanished. Ukrainians failed to preserve adequately their historical heritage and continue to lose the last traces of one of the biggest Jewish communi-

183 Jan Gross, *Fear. Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006).

184 Paweł Machcewicz, "Rizanyina v Jedwabne 1941 roku. Dyskusia pro yevreiskopol'skyi konflikt na pivnichnomu skhodi Polshchi za nimetskoi okupatsii" {Massacre in Jedwabne in 1941. Discussion on the Jewish-Polish conflict in North-East Poland during the German occupation}, in *Yevropa ta yii bolisni mynuvshyny*, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, trans. Yevhen Marichev (Kyiv: Nika-Tsentr, 2009), 165.

185 Ibid., 157.

186 Omer Bartov, *Erased. Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

ties in Central and Eastern Europe. According to Bartov, who in 2003-2004 travelled across Galicia and visited 20 urban centres in the region, the places that before World War II manifested the Jewish presence are falling into decay. Jewish cemeteries are abandoned and difficult to find because very often they are not marked at all, the same fate concerns the places of mass killings of Jews. Jews are not mentioned on a monument erected on the place of the Yaniv concentration camp in Lviv, and many synagogues are not being restored. At the same time, Omer Bartov reproaches Ukrainians for emphasising the memory of the nationalistic Ukrainian Insurgent Army to the detriment of the memory of other nationalities that inhabited western Ukraine before the war. Bartov claims that Ukrainians care more about the preservation of the public memory of their sufferings under the Soviet and Nazi regimes and forget or diminish those of Jews and Poles. Moreover – and this is perhaps the most important thought in his book – the author postulates that one of the reasons of this disregard of the Jewish issue consists in the fact that Ukrainians were involved in the destruction of Jews during the Holocaust and desire to hide this page of their history.

Erased posed a challenge to the Ukrainian historians of Jewish and Ukrainian origins who reacted in different ways to the book. I find it important to mention here some of the commentators of Bartov because already those point at the complexity of the issue that cannot be interpreted in white-black terms. The Israeli-American historian Tarik Cyril Amar agrees with Bartov's questioning of the Jewish-Ukrainian history during the war mentioning that such a discussion would be very important for contemporary Ukraine.¹⁸⁷ Another historian, Christian Ganzer, indicates the shortcomings of the research of Bartov, for instance, the fact that sometimes his extreme one-sided interpretations are connected with his insufficient knowledge of contemporary Ukrainian realities.¹⁸⁸ In other words, Bartov visited the sights and museums but did not care a lot about communication with the local people in order to clarify why the Jewish exhibition in a particular museum is being organised in this particular

187 Tarik Cyril Amar, "Potribna knyzhka" {A necessary book}, *Ukraina Moderna* 4 (2009): 288.

188 Christian Ganzer, "Nezvychaini pryhody pana Bartova v kraini..." {Mr Bartov's extraordinary adventures in the country of...}, *Ukraina Moderna* 4 (2009): 292-293.

way. Still, Ganzer appreciates the book and believes that after being re-worked it can influence a lot the culture of memory in western Ukraine.¹⁸⁹

Myroslav Shkandrii, Canadian professor of Slavic Studies, is very critical of *Erased*, accusing its authors of assuming a traditional Russian, Polish, and Soviet interpretation of the history of the Ukrainian nationalistic movement¹⁹⁰ where Ukrainian nationalists are considered as allies of the Nazis in the extermination of other peoples. Bartov “degrades the national dimension of Ukrainian history and fails to see the positive side of Ukrainian-Jewish relations,”¹⁹¹ portrays Ukrainians as inherently hostile towards Jews, does not care about the broader historical context of the region. Still, also Shkandrii agrees that the research of Bartov stimulates the necessary discussion about the Ukrainian involvement in the extermination of Jews during World War II.

Finally, I consider the commentary on *Erased* of the historian Anna Veronika Wendland the most instructive for the attitude that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should adopt concerning the purification of Jews. The author believes that Ukrainians need time in order to come to terms with their collective historical traumas, silencing certain facts, and the unwillingness to talk about crimes that they might have committed during their difficult history.¹⁹² Their task at the present moment should consist in “taking an interest in the state of Jewish memorials and discussing this question with Jewish communities in the region.”¹⁹³

The regulation of the Ukrainian-Jewish relations demands that both sides learn to talk about certain taboos. Ukrainians should become open to discussions like that initiated by Omer Bartov in his book. Yaroslav Hrytsak, one of the most prominent contemporary Ukrainian historians and a promoter of the purification of the national historical memory, is convinced that Ukrainians should recognise that a certain part of their society, for instance, members of the police, indeed cooperated with the Na-

189 Ibid., 295.

190 Myroslav Shkandrii, “U poshukakh mynuloho” {Searching for the past}, *Ukraina Moderna* 4 (2009): 301.

191 Ibid., 310.

192 Anna Veronika Wendland, “Ukrainske movchannia” {Ukrainian silence}, *Ukraina Moderna* 4 (2009): 317.

193 Ibid., 318.

zis in the organisation of the executions of the Jewish population.¹⁹⁴ The rescuing actions like that of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi were rather seldom and therefore have to be appreciated even more. As a general rule, Ukrainians did not dare help Jews although they were compassionate to them.¹⁹⁵ On the other hand, the immediate accusations of anti-Semitism that follow when someone dares talk about Jewish communists do not serve reconciliation.¹⁹⁶ Finally, both the Ukrainian collaboration in the destruction of Jews and the Jewish cooperation with the Soviet communists have indeed taken place.

Tony Judt and his essay on the European memory demonstrate that a nation cannot become a real member of the European community without having examined its national conscience. For Yaroslav Hrytsak this means that Europe has not yet heard from Ukraine those key words which would confirm that Ukraine is a truly European country, namely words of apology for the contribution to the Holocaust.¹⁹⁷ In which way can the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church help overcome this challenge?

Myroslav Marynovych. Jewish-Ukrainian reconciliation from the point of view of a Greek-Catholic

The fact is that Ukrainians protected, rescued, and helped Jews during the final solution as well as betrayed them to the Nazi police.¹⁹⁸ In the circumstances of war, extreme violence, and total decadence of moral values, people demonstrated both the most genuine examples of love to the suffer-

194 Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Ukrainci v antyievreiskikh aktsiakh u roky Druhoi svitovoi viiny" {Ukrainians in anti-Jewish actions in the years of World War II}, in *Strasti za natsionalizmom: stara istoriia na novyi lad* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011), 95.

195 Ibid., 99.

196 Isabella Hruslinska and Petro Tyma, *Dialohy porozuminnia. Ukrainsko-yevreiskii vziemyny* {Dialogues of mutual understanding. Ukrainian-Jewish relations} (Kyiv: Duh i litera, 2011), 55.

197 Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Movchannia ne po-yevropeisky" {The non-European-like silence}, in *Strasti za natsionalizmom: stara istoriia na novyi lad* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011), 237.

198 A well-researched article about the different factors and history of the participation of Ukrainians in the Holocaust: John-Paul Himka, "Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during World War II. Sorting out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors," <http://www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje16/text11.htm> (accessed January 24, 2014).

ing neighbour and the deepest instincts leading to destruction.¹⁹⁹ In the opinion of a number of scholars, this would be a balanced vision of Jewish-Ukrainian history in the years of World War II. One of these scholars is an outstanding contemporary Ukrainians philosopher and theologian, Myroslav Marynovych.

The issue of the regeneration of the Jewish memory in Ukraine has received attention from a number of scholars; from the Ukrainian side, the most important for this study are Myroslav Marynovych and Yaroslav Hrytsak. The former is one of the most eloquent proponents of reconciliation in Ukraine. He wrote extensively on the reconciliation with Russians, Poles, Jews, and the reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches. The purification of the national memory of Ukrainians is one of his biggest concerns. Additionally, this Greek-Catholic author is perhaps the most consistent promoter of the Ukrainian-Jewish reconciliation.

For his contribution to the Ukrainian-Jewish reconciliation Myroslav Marynovych received a prize from the International Society “Ukraine-Israel,” a medal “For the Reconciliation between Nations.” He cultivates a friendship with many supporters of the Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement, delivered a number of lectures and speeches on the topic, and, as the director of the Institute of Religion and Society, Marynovych organised the first Judeo-Christian seminar in independent Ukraine “The State of the Judeo-Christian Dialogue in the World and in Ukraine” in 1999. His interest in the Jewish-Christian relations is dictated among other things by his desire to help Ukrainians overcome the non-Christian stereotypes in their history because still nowadays many people believe that the current developmental crisis in Ukraine is the fault of Jews.²⁰⁰ The author refers here to the popular belief that Ukraine is in a crisis because there are many persons of Jewish origin in the leading positions of Ukrainian politics and

199 Zhanna Kovba has splendidly illustrated this point in the examples of 150 interviews, memoirs, and archive material describing the relations of Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles in western Ukraine during the Nazi extermination of the local Jewish population: Zhanna Kovba, *Liudianist u bezodni pekla. Povedinka mistsevoho naseleennia Shkhidnoi Halychyny v roky “Ostatnochnoho rozviazannia yevreiskoho pytannia”* {Humanity in the abyss of hell. Behaviour of the local population of eastern Galicia in the years of the “Final solution of the Jewish question”} (Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2009).

200 Myroslav Marynovych, “Shchob podolaty stereotyp yudofobii” {To overcome the stereotype of anti-Semitism}, in *Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y intervju* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 274.

economics who exploit the resources of the country and hinder its development.²⁰¹

His concern over the truth about the Jewish fate in Ukraine flows from his conviction that human civilisation is built on truth, compassion, and sacrifice.²⁰² It is therefore extremely important to discover the truth about the dark pages of the own history in order to develop empathy with those who suffered and the ability to show love to one's neighbour in need. According to Marynovych, the two biggest crimes that Ukraine faced in the 20th century are the Holodomor of 1932-1933 that aimed at the destruction of the class of Ukrainian peasants and the Jewish tragedy during World War II.²⁰³ The truth about both has to be discovered. I may add that while the history of the Holodomor has already occupied its place in Ukrainian historiography and national mentality, the return of the Jewish story in that country has only recently begun. Telling the truth about the Jewish presence in Ukraine during wartime should help develop empathy to them and praise those who put their lives and the lives of their families in danger in order to save a Jewish neighbour. Consequently, Marynovych welcomes the educational projects of the Jewish charity foundation "Hesed-Arieh" in the schools in Lviv where they present the history and culture of Jews in order to regenerate the Jewish memory in this multinational and multicultural city.

Marynovych understands that the pointed awareness of their own historical misfortunes hinders Ukrainians from recognising in an appropriate

201 Several Jewish and Ukrainians observers pointed at this image of Jews for contemporary Ukrainians, for instance, Yosyp Zisels, Semen Hluzman, Mykola Riabchuk, Vahtang Kipiani (Hruslinska and Tyma, *Dialogues*, 146, 174, 217-218, 269-273). More about this and other typical stereotypes of Jews in the Ukrainian and general East-European consciousness (for instance, the Jewish crucifixion of Christ, the Jewish rule of the world, the economic exploitation of non-Jews by Jews), read in Leonid Finberh, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations. Mythology Substituting for Reality," *Yi* 11 (1997), <http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n11texts/finberg-eng.html> (accessed April 11, 2014).

202 Myroslav Marynovych, "Blahodiinytstvo "Khesed-Arie" ta yoho liudynoliubni proieky. Peredmovy do broshury 'Vidkrytyi dim. Ruka v rutsi'" {Charity "Hesed-Arieh" and its philanthropic projects. Introduction to the brochure "Open House. Hand in hand"}, in *Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interv'iu* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 92.

203 Ibid.

way the genocide of Jews in Ukrainian territories.²⁰⁴ Self-perception as the greatest victim of history is typical of many nations. I have already emphasised in this book that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church occasionally refers to the feeling of victimisation, which is very distinguishing for Ukrainians. Marynovych equally warns against extolling the sufferings of the own nation above the tragedies of others. The philosopher calls for the sensibility for the tragedy of every nation, because quoting Alain Besançon “The temptation to judge one death as innately more terrible than another must be resisted: no death can be seen from the inside. No one can know what a child experienced while inhaling Zyklon B gas or while starving to death in a Ukrainian *isba*.”²⁰⁵

Marynovych explains in an interesting way a certain daily anti-Semitism in Ukraine expressed in a form of suspicion of the Jews. Among Ukrainians the conviction of Judeo-bolshevism (Judeo-communism)²⁰⁶ was strong. Historically Ukrainians have always believed that Jews allied with the enemies of the Ukrainian nation thus holding an anti-Ukrainian position. Additionally, Jews were depicted as exploiters of the Ukrainian people due to their specific occupations. A number of contemporary

204 Myroslav Marynovych, “Tse potribne zhyvym!” {Those living need it!}, in *Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y intervju* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 235.

205 Besançon, *A Century of Horrors*, 10.

206 Judeo-communism in the Polish example which equally reflects the Ukrainian reality confers the belief that “Jews en masse supported Communism in Poland before the war and made up a vast majority of its adherents, while after the war they enjoyed a privileged position in the regime and benefited from it while imposing it on everybody else” (Gross, *Fear*, 192). The accusations of Jews in Judeo-communism are very typical of Eastern Europe. The conflict around the planned Carmelite convent and a cross erected by the fence of Auschwitz in Poland in 1998-1999 has one more time showed this in the Polish example. The big cross and many small crosses around it raised during the debate evoked protests from Jewish organisations and accusations of the attempt of the Christianisation of Auschwitz. During the debate where the Church, the state, Jewish organisations, and regular Poles were involved, the mutual Polish-Jewish accusations were repeated including that of Judeo-communism oppressing the Poles. For instance, a banner was hung by the fence of Auschwitz with the inscription “Polish Holocaust by Jews (1945-1956)” (more about the conflict of the crosses, see in the article by Imke Hansen, “In the Name of the Truth One Has to Say...’ Anti-Semitic Statements in the Memorial Discourse about the Crosses in Auschwitz,” in *The Post-Communist Condition. Public and Private Discourses of Transformation*, eds. Aleksandra Galasinska and Dariusz Galasinski (Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010), 67-87).

Ukrainian oligarchs of Jewish origin serve for many as the modern embodiment of Jewish evil.²⁰⁷ Instead, Jews typically perceived the Ukrainians as a nation casing pogroms and believed the Ukrainians to be organic anti-Semites. Hence, Marynovych explains the Ukrainian animosity to Jews by different models of the historical survival of the two peoples.²⁰⁸ Throughout history, Ukrainians used to suffer from occupants on their native lands. Jews as dispersed people learned to survive by making alliance with the stronger side on particular territory; hence, they used to support also the foreign forces that ruled in Ukraine. That explains the animosity of Ukrainians to Jews that in the course of history even acquired the form of pogroms. Additionally the current latent anti-Semitism was hastened during World War II by the deliberate anti-Jewish politics of Stalin. This helps us realise the complexities of the Ukrainian-Jewish reconciliation. Being aware of those challenges should help the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church speak plausibly about the purification of historical memory with regard to Jews.

Concerning the troubled and seemingly irreconcilable memories of both nations Marynovych shares the idea of “the double vision” of Miroslav Volf and Robert Schreier. Marynovych substantiates the revelation of the historical truth and at the same time goes further than that: he calls the Jewish and Ukrainian nations to see themselves with the eyes of the other. Perhaps that strategy would help reconcile the exclusive versions of the common history.²⁰⁹ Both nations “have survived terrible catastrophes, and

207 Hruslinska and Tyma, *Dialogues*, 217-218.

208 “Rozмова z Myroslavom Marynovychem pro ukraïnsko-yevreïski stosunky” {Conversation with Myroslav Marynovych on the Ukrainian-Jewish relations}, in *Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interv’iu* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 436.

209 How difficult it is to draw conclusions about the people’s actions and how important it is to see the world with the eyes of the other, the enemy, shows the film “Three Stories of Galicia” produced in 2010. In the film people of different nationalities and religions in western Ukrainian region Galicia are shown in their disastrous situation: “A Jewish man whose family chose to save the life of its worst enemy. A Ukrainian woman who endured the theft of her children to save her country. A Polish priest who risked everything to end the sectarian hatred that tore at his parish... In their quest to rule the world, those two empires {*the Soviet and the Nazi*} made use of the ethnic jealousies between Ukrainians, Jews and Poles, and fueled some of modern history’s worst ethnic conflicts. But in the midst of evil, where trust had lost its meaning and human life had no value, there were those who were willing to risk what little they had left to do what was right

the shrivelled corpses of Auschwitz are not more dreadful than the shrivelled corpses of the times of the Holodomor (and vice versa). And the scales to compare the national harms are in the hands of God but not in those of the crowd blinded by rage.”²¹⁰ Myroslav Marynovych calls to abandon the struggle against anti-Semitism in Ukraine as it is often perceived by Ukrainians as being against their national interests and historical pain.

This position may seem strange given the essentially undiscovered history of the Jewish presence in the Ukrainian territories before World War II. Still, the author does not call for historical amnesia. After all, it is Myroslav Marynovych who is a well-welcomed speaker, attendant, and organiser of the joint Ukrainian-Jewish events, the editor of a number of books on the Jewish-Christian dialogue whose appreciation of the Ukrainian-Jewish rapprochement originates in his dissident past in the camps of the Gulag. Marynovych only claims that the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation and the reassessment of its history will help overcome the negative stereotypes of the Jews. However, the Jews have to perform the same work with regard to Ukrainians, since reconciliation is a mutual process. Seeing only the guilt of the other while remaining sure of one’s own innocence will make reconciliation void.

The controversy on Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi

The figure of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi, his actions for rescuing Jews during the Nazi persecution, and the issue of his recognition as a Righteous one among the Nations occupies a particular place in the Greek-Catholic stance on the Jewish issue. The great Metropolitan managed to organise a network for rescuing Jews in the monasteries of his Church, in particular on the basis of the Studite monastery of the Holy Transfiguration under the supervision of Klyment Sheptytskyi, the brother of the Metropolitan. Jewish children were concealed in the monasteries by nuns and monks and thus got a chance to survive. Several of those rescuers were recognised by the Jewish community as the Righteous among the Nations

instead of what was easy.” (“Synopsis of Three Stories of Galicia,” <http://www.threestoriesofgalicia.com/synopsis/> (accessed January 23, 2014)).

210 Marynovych, Ukrainian-Jewish relations, in *Vybrane*. T. 4, *Naukovi pratsi*, 115. Translation from the original source.

which is however not the case of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi who himself hid 150 Jewish children and 15 adults in his metropolitan palace in Lviv.²¹¹ The Jewish community explains the unwillingness to grant Sheptytskyi that title by his welcoming address directed to the Nazi troops as they entered the city of Lviv in the summer of 1941.²¹²

The accusation of the collaboration of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi with the Nazi invaders weighs upon this person still nowadays overshadowing otherwise one of the greatest leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Leonid Finberg, the Head of the Centre for Studies of History and Culture of East European Jews in Kyiv, characterised the great Metropolitan with the following words: "Society has not yet appreciated enough his intellectual heritage and his organisational talent as the leader of the nation. Equally, we have not yet paid enough tribute to the readiness for sacrifice of the Metropolitan and his nearest entourage for rescuing Jews during World War II."²¹³ His beatification process has been running since 1955. Several Greek-Catholic and Jewish scholars as well as Jewish survivors have attempted to correct the indiscriminate vision of the biography of Sheptytskyi.²¹⁴ A number of contemporary Ukrainian and Jewish intel-

211 Hrytsak, Ukrainians in anti-Jewish actions, in *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, 99.

212 Shimon Redlich, one of the rescued Jews, defends the case of Sheptytskyi before Yad Vashem and defeats this and other arguments against the non-recognition of the Metropolitan. According to Redlich, Sheptytskyi is reproached for the following: he supported the Ukrainian division "Galicia" that used to fight on the Nazi side; as the leader of the nation at the time of war, Sheptytskyi is responsible for crimes committed by Ukrainians; although he rescued certain Jews, those actions were only second-rate for him; additionally, he was not personally in danger while helping Jews; Sheptytskyi has never spoken publicly in defence of Jews; the Metropolitan also sometimes expressed anti-Semitic sentiments; Sheptytskyi has not stopped the crowd in Lviv from the destruction of Jews at the first days of the arrival of the Nazis; the Metropolitan was an ideological ally of Hitler; and finally, Sheptytskyi hated the Soviets and they used to rescue Jews. (Shimon Redlich, "Moralnnyye printsypy v povsyedneyevnoy dyeastvityelnosti: mitropolit Andrey Sheptytskiy i yevreyi v pyeriod Holokosta" {Moral principles in daily life. The Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and the Jews in the period of the Holocaust}, <http://www.jcrelations.net/Сропона.3180.0.html?L=7> (accessed November 3, 2013)).

213 Leonid Finberg, "Danyina nashoi poshany" {Tribute of our reverence}, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 1941-1944*, eds. Zhanna Kovba and Andrii Krawchuk (Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2003), 313. Translation from the original source.

214 The following authors are worth mentioning: Kurt Lewin, *A Journey through Illusions* (n. p.: Fithian Pr, 1997); Shimon Redlich (in a number of articles and in-

lectuals (Myroslav Marynovych, Zhanna Kovba, Leonid Finberg, Andrii Kravchuk, Shimon Redlich) plea for the recognition of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi by Yad Vashem as the Righteous among the Nations. Equally, Sheptytskyi deserves to be beatified by the Vatican in order to serve as an example of practical love for one's neighbours and for the sake of the establishment of the historical truth. Even the Ukrainian state itself has not yet officially admitted the particular role of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi in rescuing Jews. The issue remains politicised too much even though a solid basis of witnesses has been gathered that confirms the solicitousness of Sheptytskyi in the fate of the Jews. It seems that the recognition of the merits of the Metropolitan towards the Jews will influence the discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Therefore, I will briefly sketch here several phases of the Metropolitan's attitude towards the Nazis in order to shed light on this controversial page of his life.

The story of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi shows that even persons of this moral value can get lost in the cruel perturbations of history. The attitude of Sheptytskyi towards the Nazis confirms that conclusion. In particular, official pronouncements and attitudes of the Metropolitan prove that he underwent a change in his attitude towards the German invaders. In 1939-1941, Galicia in the west of contemporary Ukraine was submitted to the

interviews, for instance: Shimon Redlich, "Sheptytskyi zaperechuvav rasystske myslennia" {Sheptytskyi denied racist thinking}, interview, *Istpravda.com.ua*, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2011/03/3/28812/> (accessed October 8, 2013)); Zhanna Kovba (in numerous articles and interviews, for instance: Zhanna Kovba, "Sheptytskyi faktychno ocholov yedynu v Yevropi orhanizovanu aktsiiu riativannia yevreiv" {Sheptytskyi practically led the only organised European action of rescuing Jews}, interview by Tetiana Lutsyk, *Risu.org.ua*, <http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/ideas/interview/32551/> (accessed October 8, 2013)); Myroslav Marynovych (in a number of articles and presentations, for instance: Myroslav Marynovych, "Postat Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptytskoho u neliniinomu prostori istorychnoho chasu" {The figure of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi in the non-linear space of historical time}, in *Vybrane. T. 4, Naukovi pratsi* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 410-417); Julian Bussgang, *Mytropolyt Sheptytskyi. Shche odyń pohliad na zhyttia i diialnist* {Metropolitan Sheptytskyi. One more view on his life and actions}, trans. Roman Skakun (Lviv: Drukarski Kunshty, 2009); Andrii Krawchuk, "Sotsialne vchennia ta diialnist Andreia Sheptytskoho pid chas nimetskoi okupatsii" {Social teaching and action of Andrei Sheptytskyi during the German occupation}, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 1941-1944*, eds., Zhanna Kovba and Andrii Krawchuk (Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2003), 224-281.

Soviet occupation. Metropolitan Sheptytskyi, residing in the city of Lviv, at the centre of the crimes of the new power, was deeply impressed by this cruel atheistic rule and hence the arrival of the German troops in July 1941 was appreciated as a liberation. Only later did Metropolitan Andrei realise the horror of the Nazi rule, and his criticism of certain aspects of this regime evolved into his complete opposition to it.²¹⁵ The evolution of the attitude of Andrei Sheptytskyi towards the German occupants is evident in his pastoral letters, decrees, and letters to the Vatican. It is instructive to refer to some of them more in detail.

As already mentioned, with the arrival of the Nazi troops in Lviv in July 1941, Metropolitan Andrei issued two important letters; one of them encumbers his recognition as a Righteous one among the Nations. On June 1, 1941, Sheptytskyi greeted the proclamation of the independent Ukrainian state²¹⁶ which became possible at the withdrawal of the Soviet army.²¹⁷ A few days later, on June 5, 1941, the Metropolitan issued a letter that welcomed the Germans in Lviv: “We greet the victorious German army that has already occupied almost the whole land with joy and gratitude for the liberation from the enemy.”²¹⁸ However, it is worth noting that the new authorities were accepted by Sheptytskyi under the condition that their rule was just and did not contradict the Gospel. The Metropolitan

215 Krawchuk, Social teaching and action, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy*, 232.

216 As a proof that Sheptytskyi aspired and supported the establishment of a state-like organisational body for the Ukrainians (for instance, political autonomy) serves his pastoral letter issued in December 1941 where the Metropolitan elucidates the Christian principles of the independent state: “Pastyrskie poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia do dukhovenstva ta narodu *Nasha derzhavnist* (Idealom nashoho natsionalnoho zhyttia...)” {Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to the clergy and nation “Our Statehood” (The ideal of our national life...), in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944*, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn *et al.* (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 131-158.

217 “Pastyrskie poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia do virnykh z nahody proholoshennia Ukrainskoi derzhavy” {Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei to the faithful on the occasion of the proclamation of the Ukrainian state}, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944*, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn *et al.* (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 114-115.

218 “Pastyrskie poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia do dukhovenstva i virnykh iz pryvodu vyzvolennia Halychyny z-pid radianskoi okupatsii” {Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei to the clergy and faithful on the occasion of the liberation of Galicia from the Soviet occupation}, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944*, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn *et al.* (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 116. Translation from the original source.

called the people to obey the new state authorities as long as their orders corresponded to the law of God.²¹⁹

However, already after a few weeks of the Nazi rule, it became clear that the German authorities had nothing to do with the just and wise order. The Ukrainian dream of political autonomy was destroyed when Galicia became part of the General Government and the amplitude of violence was only growing. At that period Sheptytskyi released two pastoral letters in which he indirectly criticised the new state powers and addressed the issue of the duty to defend human life. In the pastoral letter “On mercy” (May 1942) the author did not only refer to mercy as charity, but also spoke about the pain of the father whose son sheds innocent blood²²⁰ (a reference among other things to those who cooperated with the Nazis in mass killings), taught that the love for one’s neighbour does not stop even before giving one’s life for him,²²¹ or warned against the crime of murder.²²² In November 1942, there appeared a pastoral letter and later a decree under the title “You should not kill”²²³ in which Sheptytskyi openly defended the sanctity of human life and condemned different sorts of killings, including political murder exercised by the Nazis. This document was allowed for publication after being censured by the Nazi authorities.

Finally, Sheptytskyi came to the conclusion that the German rule in its scale of destruction and extermination was even worse than the Soviet one. In his letter to Pope Pius XII, the Metropolitan called the Nazis a diabolical system of “lie, deceit, injustice, robbery, distortion of all the ideas of civilisation and order... It cannot be anything other than the degeneration of humanity that has never ever happened in history.”²²⁴ Furthermore,

219 Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei to the faithful on the occasion of the proclamation of the Ukrainian state, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi*. T. 3, *Pastyrski poslannia*, 114.

220 “Pastyrske poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia do dukhovenstva ta virnykh pro myloserdia” {Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei to the clergy and faithful on mercy}, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi*. T. 3, *Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944*, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn et al. (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 208.

221 Ibid., 209, 220.

222 Ibid., 220.

223 “Dekret Mytropolyta Andreia ‘Ne ubyi’” {Decree of Metropolitan Andrei “You shall not kill”}, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi*. T. 3, *Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944*, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn et al. (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 541-550.

224 The letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to Pope Pius XII, August 29-31, 1942, quoted in Krawchuk, Social teaching and action, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy*, 235. Translation from the original source.

Sheptytskyi even desired the return of the Soviet rule which he announced in his letter to Cardinal Tisserant in March 1944: "Maybe the arrival of the Bolsheviks will be useful in this sense that it will terminate the anarchy that rules now in all the land."²²⁵ This criticism of the Nazi authorities was coupled with the organisation of the networks for rescuing Jews among the clergy and in particular in the monasteries of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.²²⁶ There are also testimonies that Sheptytskyi sent a personal letter to Heinrich Himmler directly protesting against the destruction of Jews and the involvement of the Ukrainian police in such actions.²²⁷ Yaroslav Hrytsak opines that Metropolitan Sheptytskyi was the only Church leader of this rank at that time who dared openly stand for the rescue of Jews.²²⁸ His appeal failed, and therefore letters and reports to the Vatican for help, the secret rescuing of Jews,²²⁹ and the plea to the Ukrainians to abstain from the extermination was all that remained at his disposal.

The facts above should reveal why the recognition of the contribution of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to the rescue of Jews is so important for the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. It is about the Church heritage that is still underestimated. That brings us closer to the final point of interest in the discourse on the Jewish question and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. I will now present those scarce appeals to the theme of Jewish-Ukrainian relations that are to be found in contemporary Church documents.

225 The letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to Cardinal Tisserant "L'approche des bolchéviques," March 23, 1944, quoted in Krawchuk, *Social teaching and action*, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy*, 235. Translation from the original source.

226 *Ibid.*, 256-258.

227 Krawchuk, *Social teaching and action*, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy*, 251. There are no copies of this letter preserved. Kurt Lewin, a Jew rescued by Sheptytskyi, has testified to have seen the letter to Himmler in the archives of the Metropolitan in 1943-1944. (*Ibid.*, 275-276).

228 Hrytsak, *Ukrainians in the anti-Jewish actions*, in *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, 101.

229 Probably the most valuable and enlightening testimony of this rescuing campaign of Sheptytskyi comes from the son of the Lviv Rabbi, Kurt Lewin, who survived because he was saved by the Metropolitan in his palace. Lewin elucidates the details in his biographical book: Kurt Lewin, *A Journey through Illusions* (n. p.: Fithian Pr, 1997). Ukrainian translation: Kurt Lewin, *Mandrivka kriz iluzii* {A journey through illusions}, eds., Zhanna Kovba, Leonid Finberg, and Myroslav Marynovych (Lviv: Svichado, 2007).

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Jewish-Ukrainian relations

The actions

Even though the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has not pronounced a lot on the Jewish issue, she introduced and supported a number of initiatives directed at the re-emergence of the discussion on the Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Zhanna Kovba, contemporary Ukrainian historian, highly estimates the contribution of the Ukrainian Catholic University, the most important educational and scientific establishment of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, to the promotion of the Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue.²³⁰ It is worth mentioning some initiatives at that place.

At first, the Institute of Religion and Society of the Ukrainian Catholic University issued a number of publications in order to steer a discussion on the controversial Jewish-Ukrainian relations. Myroslav Marynovych, the director of the Institute, cooperated in the Ukrainian translation of Kurt Lewin's *A Journey through Illusions*, which among other things describes Lewin's rescuing by Metropolitan Sheptytskyi in his metropolitan palace and later in the Studite monasteries. Still in 1999, the Institute of Religion and Society organised the first Judeo-Christian seminar in Ukraine where the Jewish community was represented at the highest level by the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Yaakov Bleich and the Ukrainian delegation was headed by Liubomyr Husar.²³¹ The Ukrainian Catholic University cooperates with the leading Jewish organisations such as the Tkuma Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies²³² in Dnipropetrovsk and "Hesed-Arieh"²³³ in Lviv. In particular, the researchers of the Ukrainian Catholic University together with the Liubomyr Husar participated in the international scientific conference of the "Tkuma" Centre "Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi: the dilemma of the humanistic choice in conditions of totalitarian regimes."²³⁴

230 Hruslinska and Tyma, *Dialogues*, 54.

231 In the aftermath of the seminar a booklet was published containing the speeches of the participants and the most interesting issues of the discussions: Myroslav Marynovych and Leonid Finberg, eds., *Yudeo-khrystyianskyi dialoh v Ukraini (stenohrama seminaru 19-20 kvitnia 1999 roku. Lviv, Lvivska Bohoslovska Akademiia)* {Judeo-Christian dialogue in Ukraine (shorthand record of the seminar 19-20 April, 1999. Lviv, Ukrainian Theological Academy} (Lviv-Kyiv, 2000).

232 Tkuma Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies: <http://tkuma.dp.ua/>.

233 Jewish Home "Hesed-Arieh": <http://www.hesed.lviv.ua/>.

234 Some materials of the conference can be consulted in "Materialy mizhnarodnoi naukovoï konferentsii Tsentru "Tkuma" "Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi: dylema

Additionally, the “Tkuma” Centre and the Ukrainian Catholic University belong to the organisers of the international Polish-Jewish-Ukrainian youth seminar “Kovcheh” (“The Ark”) that aims at the reconciliation between those three nations and was held for the eighth time in 2013. Another project aiming at the education against xenophobia is the yearly all-Ukrainian international children’s camp “The Sources of Tolerance” directed by Josef Zisels, a Jewish public leader, under the support of the Ukrainian Catholic University.

The deeds are there, however the question remains why the Jewish issue is almost absent in the Greek-Catholic official pronouncements. What does the Church say?

The Church documents

For Primo Levi only individual guilt matters, because public guilt is no guilt at all. The author is against the Churches asking for forgiveness for the anti-Semitism in the name of the whole people. That makes Giorgio Agamben criticise the Churches for showing not enough enthusiasm in disclosing how her own priests contributed to the fuelling of anti-Jews sentiments among the people.²³⁵ The absence of the criticism of Pope Pius XII who failed to defend the Jews is a sign of the inability of the Catholic Church in dealing with her past. According to Levi, it is a lie when the perpetrators say that they have not seen the pain and death that they have caused to the Jews.²³⁶ The demands of the survivors of the Holocaust are understandably high. How should the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church react in view of this accusation in her own context?

The references to Jews and the Ukrainian-Jewish relations are very rare in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In the analysed texts I discovered only 6 such allusions. In 2002, speaking about the innocent blood that during history was shed on the streets of the

humanistychnoho vyboru v umovakh totalitarnykh rehymiv” {Materials of the international scientific conference of the “Tkuma” Centre “Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi: dilemma of the humanistic choice in conditions of a totalitarian regime”}, *Problemy istorii Holokostu* 4 (2006): 76-151, <http://tkuma.dp.ua/images/stories/jurnal/z4.pdf> (accessed October 8, 2013).

235 Giorgio Agamben, *Was von Auschwitz bleibt. Das Archiv und der Zeuge*, trans. Stefan Monhardt, 5th ed. (n. p.: Suhrkamp, 2013), 82.

236 Primo Levi, *I sommersi e i salvati* (Torino: Einaudi, 2003), 16.

city of Lviv, along the victims of the Soviet occupation and the Polish-Ukrainian resistance Cardinal Husar mentions Jews as victims of the Holocaust.²³⁷ Consequently, Husar calls for purification and reconciliation. In 2005, commenting on the importance of the reconciliation act between the Catholic bishops of Ukraine and Poland, the Greek-Catholic Synod of Bishops emphasises that the Ukrainian people should begin to work for reconciliation with their other historical neighbours: Russians, Hungarians, Byelorussians, Crimean Tatars, Rumanians, and among others, Jews.²³⁸ Husar warns against committing violent acts against other peoples, and in case the others offend Ukrainians, those latter should abstain from answering in an equally unjust way. Finally, the past should not poison the present, and one's own rights cannot be sustained to the detriment of the rights of another nation.

In the address on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, the Greek-Catholic Synod of Bishops reminded one of the "ecumenism of the Gulag" as a symbol of spiritual unity between different nations including the Jews that should lay at the foundation of the present-day relations between peoples.²³⁹ Finally, Jews are mentioned twice in the context of the rescuing actions of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi. The Metropolitan is a courageous leader who "protected the holiness of human life, appealing with letters to the leaders of Nazi Germany and organising an action to rescue Jews."²⁴⁰ In another text, already Sviatoslav Shevchuk calls to remember those who despite danger saved their neighbours including Jews; such heroic actions were not solitary, but part of the separate rescue campaign initiated and realised by Metropolitan Andrei.²⁴¹

The only document in which the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church explicitly speaks about the Jewish memory is "Declaration of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations "Knowledge of the past – way to the future" from 2012. Together with other denominations the Greek-Catholics call to study the tragic pages of the Ukrainian history of the 20th century including the Holodomor, Stalin's repressions, the Holocaust and other crimes of the Nazi occupational regime, and the forced deportations.²⁴² It is remarkable that in this text the extermination

237 No. 125, 232.

238 No. 205, 345.

239 No. 219, 371.

240 No. 2004.

241 No. 2009.

242 No. 2017.

of the Jews is portrayed as part of Ukrainian history. However, the declaration ascribes the fault to the Nazi regime and does not mention anything about the cooperation of Ukrainians themselves. Still, the very call to study the Holocaust is a positive distinctive development. The declaration also mentions and praises the contribution of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and other heroes in rescuing the Jews.²⁴³

The Orthodox Churches in Ukraine also demonstrate only scarce references to the issue of the Jewish-Ukrainian relations. Interestingly enough, in 2012, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate maintained that it would be reasonable to remove the character of the Jew, *zhyd*, from the traditional Ukrainian Christmas puppet and theatre play called *vertep* where Jews are represented as liars who strive to deceive simple Ukrainian farmers.²⁴⁴ “The use of a grotesque offensive image of the “Jew” in Nativity plays is incongruous in the context of the Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue.”²⁴⁵ In 2011, an almost identical initiative came from the side of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In the time before Christmas, this university issued a message calling to find out a new personified embodiment of usury, corruption, love for money, perfidy in the Christmas *vertep* instead of the traditional figure of the Jew.²⁴⁶ Hence, those two messages are the first Church appeals to change the stereotypic Ukrainian image of Jews. Earlier, in September 2010, Bishop Ionafan Yeletsykh of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate appealed to the Ukrainian people that they should make an apology to the Jews for pogroms committed during the rebellion against the Polish rule under the guidance of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1648-1654.²⁴⁷ In his message, Bishop Ionafan compared those pogroms with the Holocaust.

243 Ibid.

244 “Patriarkh Filaret vvazhaie nedorechnym vykorystannia u postanovtsi rizdvian-ykh vertepiv obrazu ‘zhyda’ {Patriarch Filaret considers it inopportune to use the character of “Zhyd” in the staging of Christmas verteps}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/orthodox/uoc_kp/49455/ (accessed November 3, 2013).

245 “Patriarch Filaret to Visit Lviv Eparchy,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/orthodox/uoc_kp/49455 (accessed January 24, 2014).

246 Borys Gudziak, Yurii Shchurko, and Myroslav Marynovych, “U nashu khatu znovu uvirvetsia vertepnyi zhyd” {The Jew from vertep will burst again into our homes}, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2011/12/19/65501/> (accessed November 3, 2013).

247 “Vladyka Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy zaklykav pastvu do pokaiannia za ‘masovyi etnotsyd yevreiv chasiv hetmana Bohdana Khmelnytskoho” {The Bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church called his flock for an apology “for the

It is plausible to claim that the words of asking and offering forgiveness to any nation offended by Ukrainians, pronounced by Liubomyr Husar during the Pope's visit to Ukraine in 2001, are also directed to the Jews. On the other hand, this message is too general to be perceived as a particular apology for the Ukrainian wrongdoings against Jewish people. Still, especially the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has the mission to address the issue. It is her Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi who in the circumstances of his time attempted to save Jews. In that sense, Greek-Catholics have a tradition to continue. Besides, this Church is the leading denomination in western Ukraine, a territory greatly populated by Jews before the war whose memory has been predominantly lost. Because the Church endeavours to establish the moral truth of the past considering this as a key to changing the future, she cannot leave the Jewish memory aside. I opine that this topic could be organically intertwined with the discourse on the purification of the memory of World War II. As the Church calls for prayer for the victims of war, she could ask for prayer for those who committed crimes with regard to their neighbours during the perturbations of war, mentioning among others also Ukrainians involved in the destruction of Jews.

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church would contribute in a double way to the Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement: first, by integrating the memory of Jews into the historical memory of Ukrainians; second, by telling the truth about the past and eventually apologising for committed wrongdoings. The discourse on the purification of memory in Ukraine would remain incomplete if the Jewish question is not touched upon. Contemporary Ukrainians do not carry juridical responsibility for the destruction of Jews, but assuming the moral responsibility would only be beneficial to society:

“Finally, reflections on the issues of guilt on the individual level begin from the sense of personal responsibility for every word and every act... And the universal meaning of the lesson of the Holocaust one can feel everyday: in our attitude towards the people of other skin colour, other denomination, other sexual orientation, other political views.”²⁴⁸

mass ethnocide of Jews during the times of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi”}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/state/national_religious_question/38053/ (accessed November 3, 2013).

- 248 Andrii Portnov, “Pro moralni ta politychni smysly vybachennia za istorychni provyny” {On the moral and political sense of apology for historical faults}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?pro_moralni_ta_politychni_smisli_vib

Jan Gross asked in *Neighbours*, “Can we arbitrarily select from a national heritage what we like, and proclaim it as patrimony to the exclusion of everything else?”²⁴⁹ And he answers:

“And even if selectivity in the process of forging national identity is unavoidable..., the boundaries of a collective identity so constructed – in order to remain *authentic* – would have to remain open forever. Anyone must be at any time empowered to challenge such a construct by asking how some episodes, or series of episodes, or an epoch from ancestral history, fits into the proposed self-image of a nation.”²⁵⁰

Every nation has its glorious and darker sides and the purification of the national memory consists in the recognition of those latter which in the Ukrainian case concerns the regeneration of the Jewish memory on a national level as part of the own Ukrainian history.²⁵¹ The Church should look for the traces of anti-Semitism in her official teaching and theological tradition.²⁵² This echoes the words of Mykola Krokosh who claims that Ukrainians must realise that they also committed faults in history and apologise for the German collaborators among them who actively participated in the mass destruction of the Jews.²⁵³

However, the genuine Jewish-Ukrainian reconciliation will only then take place when also the Jewish attitude changes. That means that Jews have to overcome the stereotyping of Ukrainians as organic anti-Semites. The Jewish change of attitude towards Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi would also contribute to the Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement. Finally, both nations have to speak with each other, not about each other. Considering the existing initiatives of cooperation between both peoples, including those on the side of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the hope remains that rapprochement will indeed once take place.

achennya_za_istorichni_provini&objectId=1240606 (accessed January 24, 2014). Translation from the original source.

249 Gross, *Neighbours*, 135.

250 Ibid., 135-136.

251 Heleen Zorgdrager, „Das Ringen um das Gedächtnis des Holocaust in der Ukraine“, *Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West* 2 (2012): 15.

252 Ibid.

253 Mykola Krokosh, “Neveseli dumky bohoslova pro novitniu propahandu starez-noho hrikha {Sad thoughts of a theologian about the modern propaganda of the aged sin}, *Patriarkhat* 2 (2009): 24.

5.2 Robert Schreiter: on the moral truth of the past

5.2.1 Social healing of memories

According to Schreiter, dealing with the past includes the healing of memory, truth-telling, and the pursuit of justice. Dealing with the past on a broader society level, contrary to individual healing, can be otherwise called social healing, which pursues a triple task: “To take into account the lingering, toxic presence of the past in society; it must diagnose and mobilise the energies of the present; it must sketch out a vision for the future.”²⁵⁴

Dealing with the past necessarily means dealing with the memory of the past. Since this is a paragraph on memory, at the beginning it must be clearly stated that Robert Schreiter does not support the attitude “Forgive and forget.” First, this approach is unrealistic and, second, it is even undesirable for the relations in society. A certain forgetting is indeed important if the energy of society is to be directed to the future instead of dwelling on the past.²⁵⁵ However, notwithstanding the Christian mandate to forgive, we are not obliged to forget. Forgiveness in the reconciliation process is about reframing the narrative of the past rather than about forgetting past suffering.

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church holds on to a similar approach. For example, Cardinal Liubachivskyi was teaching that the past should be remembered with love for one’s neighbours. Remembering the past is even postulated to be a duty, for example, the duty to remember the victims of the Holodomor or the victims of World War II including the victims of the Polish-Ukrainian confrontations. The memory of the past is beneficial to contemporaries and this coincides with the Schreiter’s belief that forgetting could be dangerous both for individuals and societies. Finally, the past should be remembered so that the lesson of evil is not erased from the collective memory of the people. The most obvious example is that of the Holodomor. Even Miroslav Volf, a proponent of the “Forgive and forget” approach, does not contest the educative side of the past which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Schreiter believes that dealing with the past is often the most important part of social healing. The past is present through memories, hence, deal-

254 Schreiter, *A Practical Theology*, 377.

255 Ibid., 393.

ing with the past means healing the memories of violence. According to Schreiter, the past should be remembered in a different way by drawing moral lessons: “The moral truths from why and how what happened serve as building blocks for a new and different kind of society.”²⁵⁶ That corresponds to the goal of reconciliation declared in the discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

Healing the memories by drawing moral lessons from the past is strongly present in the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. For instance, on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation the Church leadership emphasises that history should be left to God and contemporaries have to recognise that killing neighbours for the sake of the advancement of a concrete political project (an independent Ukraine or an independent Poland) is wrong. The same concerns the expected apology from the Moscow Patriarchate concerning its role in the Pseudo-Synod of 1946. Whatever circumstances of the time might have inclined the Russian Orthodox Church to take part in the liquidation of another Church, the evil of that act has to be recognised. By telling that the immoral way of approaching problems is unacceptable people indirectly agree that such violent methods have to be omitted in the future. It is a way of acknowledging the truth about one’s own history and a way of setting moral priorities for the coming times. In that sense, the process is very pointedly called the purification/healing of memories.

Social healing equally includes “assessing the energy available in the present and mobilising those energies for social change.”²⁵⁷ The task is to level those obstacles that hinder society from moving forwards or to heal the population from the social trauma. According to Schreiter, “social trauma manifests itself in how traumatised populations react to the role of the past in the present and in the future.”²⁵⁸ Schreiter does not dwell a lot on this question, however, John Paul Lederach and his emphasis on moral imagination is of great help here. It is relatively easy to find out what took place, who were guilty, and who the victims were, but the real challenge consists in finding resources that would be necessary to move away from the acquired patterns of reaction to a violent past.

The mobilisation of the energies of the present for the sake of the future happens by turning the ruling narrative of violence into a redemptive nar-

256 Ibid., 378.

257 Ibid.

258 Ibid., 379.

rative which results in stopping being driven by the sole version of the past.²⁵⁹ The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church assumes that task by providing platforms of reconciliation, for instance, regarding the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement. A platform of reconciliation means breaking the existing narrative that fuels hatred and exchanging it for a story that promotes forgiveness and understanding. In the case of the reconciliation concerning the Polish military memorials on the Lychakiv Cemetery this narrative was to allow the Poles to honour their soldiers by means of a joint prayer with the Ukrainians. The reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church has to be built on the narrative of common suffering during the communist rule, and the unity between the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine is derived from their common Kyivan origin. Similarly, healing the memories of World War II means paying honour to the different parties of the war who fought for their ideals and condemning the evil that each of them committed during wartime. The common topic that unites all those cases is the narrative of the evil in human hearts that has to be discovered and repented of.

The final point of the healing of memories is sketching out the vision of the future. The question should be answered what the coexistence of opponents should look like in the time to come. This vision is important as it unfolds the picture of what all the efforts of reconciliation with the enemy are directed at. Having a concrete vision supports one in difficult moments and gives imagination to develop actions towards reconciliation. It is a creative process, a horizon for all the efforts towards understanding. Liubomyr Husar means precisely that when he speaks about his vision of the united Kyivan Church as the soul of a united eastern and western Ukraine. A united Ukraine means the absence of a cultural gap between both Ukraines, when human dignity is cherished and everyone gets the chance to develop his or her humanity. Finally, all that should bring about social change and a successful transformation of the country in transition from its communist past. The Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation must account for the peaceful coexistence between those countries and their support of each other on the way to their successful integration into a united Europe.

The most important value at stake in the process of reconciliation is the establishment of the moral order in society that was destroyed during the decades of the Soviet rule. Reconciliation, namely, presupposes that the

259 Ibid., 378.

evil is discovered and named. The forced collectivisation campaign undertaken in the time of Stalin, millions of Ukrainian farmers who died during the intentionally organised famine in 1932-1933, the imprisonment of the larger part of the intelligentsia and the hazardous nationalities policy are just a few examples which come to mind when speaking about the legacy of the communist rule in Ukraine. The same is true for the double morality, the common dissimulation, the inviolability of the oligarchic class at power, corruption, the weakening of the institutes of ethical education, which continue to haunt the country also nowadays. The roots of the growing number of crimes and violence can also be traced back to the communist police-controlled state that managed to preserve a seemingly external order. There are many things from the communist past which have to be recuperated.

The healing of memories means witnessing and telling the story of what happened. Witnessing brings the memory to the public and demands telling the truth about the past. This process “is central to building a new, shared narrative of the community that moves from loss to redemption.”²⁶⁰ The essence and the biggest task of the purification of memory is that “the overcoming of evil begins from its recognition as evil. Then it loses its power and does not regenerate anymore.”²⁶¹ The retelling of the story is not a simple reconstruction of what has taken place; it is simultaneously the process of the creation of a new narrative. Illustrative in that sense is the healing of memories of the Holodomor that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church advocates. The Church leadership endeavours to establish the truth about the artificial famine as a genocide of the Ukrainian nation, to make it a nation-building identity element, to bring about social cohesion, and to detect the influence of the Holodomor on the current moral stance of the Ukrainians. By preserving the memories of the Holodomor, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church show the truth about it and demonstrate its consequences for the Ukrainian nation nowadays. That is the process of the healing of memory in the sense of Schreier as witnessing the truth and drawing lessons from the past. In that sense, the

260 Ibid., 381.

261 Oleksandr Zinchenko, “Volynska proshcha. U poshukakh prymyrennia” {The Volyn pilgrimage. Searching for reconciliation}, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2013/07/11/130015/> (accessed July 16, 2013). Translation from the original source.

memory of the Jewish presence in Ukraine must be regenerated as another essential step of the purification of memory.

5.2.2 Discovering the moral truth of the past

In the previous paragraph I brought up the issue of the importance of truth-telling as a way of discovering the moral truth of the past. This idea occupies an important place in the process of the healing of memories according to Robert Schreiter. In this paragraph I will delve deeper into that question.

A separate moment of the healing of memories is truth-telling. Schreiter even speaks about the theology of truth as the expression of the trustworthiness that we find in God and which in secular terms means the search for the culture of truth.²⁶² Truth is presented by Schreiter as the antecedent of doing justice.²⁶³ Similarly, in the pronouncements on the healing of the memories of World War II or of the Holodomor Liubomyr Husar emphasises that already by telling the truth about the past we are doing justice. To say the whole truth about the man-made famine is to do justice to the memory of its victims. Moreover, Schreiter claims that the mere pronouncement of the truth can be healing for society, especially in cases where the victims were forced to conceal the truth for a long time under the oppressive regimes.²⁶⁴ The example of the survivors of the Holodomor is illustrative here.

Among the different aspects of truth-telling Robert Schreiter distinguishes the breaking of the culture of silence. Very often the whole process of healing starts there. I consider that element important for the Ukrainian situation since some facts have already been discussed in the history of Ukraine that have not been spoken of until recent times. The most eloquent example are the vanished pages of the Jewish presence in Ukraine after World War II. This page of history was successfully erased by the communist rulers and the efforts to revive it are at a starting stage. Little is said about the participation of Ukrainians in the Shoah. Such a purification of the consciousness of the nation is necessary because, accord-

262 Ibid., 388.

263 Ibid., 386.

264 Ibid.

ing to Schreiter, the establishment of the truth about the past is a way towards the reconstruction of the moral order.²⁶⁵

The truth shall be revealed. Which kind of truth, however, should it be? When one says that the truth about the past should be made known, objective or forensic truth is usually meant. That is the description of what has taken place in the past. In addition to forensic truth Robert Schreiter indicates several other types of truth. There is a personal truth, an individual story of the events of the past which can be described as personal witnessing.

Two other forms of truth – dialogical and restorative or moral truth – are especially important for the process of reconciliation. Dialogical truth endeavours to create a common narrative that includes separate distinctive narratives of victims and perpetrators.²⁶⁶ An example of the difficulties of discovering dialogical truth are the efforts to create the common narrative of the Polish-Ukrainian hostilities during the years of World War II that hinders the process of reconciliation still nowadays. The recent refusal of the Polish Archbishop of Lviv, Mieczysław Mokrzycki, to issue a common letter with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Volyn tragedy because of the different versions of what happened, demonstrates that the competing versions of the past are difficult to reconcile. Notwithstanding the years of work of a joint Polish-Ukrainian commission on that question, the misunderstandings remain evident.

According to Schreiter, when the troubles of searching for dialogical truth are settled, the conflicting parties arrive at the restorative or moral truth, “the truth about a society that stands as a cautionary story intended to keep the conflicts of the past from even happening again.”²⁶⁷ The task of that story is obviously not only to prevent the past from repeating itself in similar circumstances but also to name the moral standards that a concrete society agrees to accept. For instance, remaining in the example of the Volyn tragedy, the possible common narrative is to look at those events from a Christian perspective, saying that killing is wrong, even killing because of national sentiments. Exactly this lesson appeared in the joint “Declaration of the Catholic Churches of Ukraine and Poland on forgiveness and reconciliation” that was finally adopted by both Churches in June 2013:

265 Schreiter, *The Ministry of Reconciliation*, 119.

266 Schreiter, *A Practical Theology*, 387.

267 Ibid.

“The Christian evaluation of the crime of Volyn demands unanimous condemnation and apology. We are convinced that violence and ethnic cleansing can under no circumstances become a means of solving conflicts between peoples, they can be justified neither by political, nor economical, nor religious circumstances.”²⁶⁸

The moral lesson from the Volyn tragedy is that the solution of the conflict by violent methods accounts for more violence, perpetuates it. It equally says that the oppression of one nation by another will inevitably lead to violence at some point of their common history. Commenting on the present Polish-Ukrainian discussions around the Volyn events Myroslav Marynovych mentioned that those talks and actions show how deep people are dechristianised when each side speaks about its right to kill the opponent as a reaction to oppression. Following this line of argumentation, the moral burden of killing as such is lost.²⁶⁹ Hence, the quest for truth aims at the healing of society, delivering the message of the moral values which have to be placed at the foundation of the organisation and functioning of community.

5.3 Miroslav Volf: how to treat the burdened memory

5.3.1 Rules of salutary remembering

The central element of reconciliation for Volf is memory and its healing. This theologian resolves the issue in terms of the salutary use of memory dedicating the whole book *End of Memory. Remembering Rightly in a Violent World* to that question. I am interested in Volf's understanding of the purification of memory, in his concept and rules of the salutary use of memory, and, finally, in the sometimes controversial proceeding of forgiving and forgetting. As we have seen above, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church also dedicates a lot of space to the discussion on memory in her documents on reconciliation, but the question is whether it is sufficiently articulated. Although the theology of memory is a central element of rec-

268 No. 2019. Translation from the original source.

269 “Dyskusii shchodo Volynskoi trahedii pokazaly, naskilky hlyboko my dekhristyianizувалysia,” Myroslav Marynovych” {“Discussions on the Volyn tragedy have shown how deep we are dechristianised,” Myroslav Marynovych}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/community/religion_and_society/52867/ (accessed July 12, 2013).

conciliation for that Church, much can still be learned from the more elaborated vision of Volf.

Tony Judt is convinced that commemoration in contemporary times is much more complicated than ever because “we live in a growing fear that we shall forget the past, that it will somehow get misplaced among the bric-a-brac of the present.”²⁷⁰ Volf gives credit to that thought and supports the appeals to remember in a world marked by vanishing memory and a tendency towards quick forgetting. Modernity is characterised by the innovation and experimentation dictated by the progress and quick pace of life, and hence, people are not eager to look for the past in order to find a sense of identity.²⁷¹ The appeals to remember the evil suffered arise either to pay honour to the victims or to protect the future generations, the non-remembering amounts into the failure to fulfil the obligation of justice.²⁷² However, Volf warns against the ambiguities of memory since remembering in a wrong way only perpetuates violence and does not let the past perform its educating and warning role. Further, it is important to emphasise the public ramifications of someone’s individual memory. Which implications individual memory has on the wider social setting is equally of great interest for Volf.

From the outset Volf argues that the whole discussion on memory is inseparably tied to the issue of identity. People have multiple identities, to avoid violence different identities should be taken into account. Memory has such a profound impact on people because it performs an identity-shaping role both on the individual level and on the level of the whole of society: “History is primarily a matter of intellection and its vehicle is historiography; memory is primarily a matter of identification and its vehicles are commemorative rituals and liturgies.”²⁷³ Volf adds that not only are we shaped by our memory, but we shape memories ourselves. Consequently, it is important not only what we remember but also how we re-

270 Tony Judt, *Reappraisals. Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (London: Vintage Books, 2009), 197.

271 Miroslav Volf, “Love’s Memory. The Role of Memory in Contemporary Culture,” 60, http://www.ptsem.edu/uploadedFiles/School_of_Christian_Vocation_and_Mission/Institute_for_Youth_Ministry/Princeton_Lectures/Volf-Role.pdf (accessed July 24, 2013).

272 Ibid., 59.

273 Miroslav Volf, “Love’s Memory. Redemptive Remembering,” 76, http://www.ptsem.edu/uploadedFiles/School_of_Christian_Vocation_and_Mission/Institute_for_Youth_Ministry/Princeton_Lectures/Volf-Redemptive.pdf (accessed July 25, 2013).

member. Hence, the Yale theologian developed certain rules for salutary remembering.²⁷⁴ Let us have a look at them in order to determine whether the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church applies those rules in her teaching.

1. *Remember with love*

In the introduction to his book on memory, Miroslav Volf declared the task of this project dedicating it to the “*memory of wrongdoing suffered by a person who desires neither to hate nor to disregard but to love the wrongdoer.*”²⁷⁵ Evidently, the use of memory will be judged against the horizon of love: “What does it mean to remember well? It means to remember as the one who loves.”²⁷⁶ The author considers what it means to remember rightly in a Christian perspective trying to answer the fundamental question: “How do the parties whose common past contains offences and sufferings go about remembering so that their memories are a source of healing rather than of increased enmity?”²⁷⁷

2. *Remember truthfully – fulfil the obligation of justice*

The primary feature of remembering rightly is to remember truthfully: “When we remember, we bear the moral obligation to pay to others the

274 In fact Miroslav Volf elaborates four rules of salutary remembering, that is numbers 2, 4, 5 und 6. Items 1 “Remember with love” and 3 “See with the eyes of the other” are not determined by Volf as rules of remembering. However, on the basis of his vision of the purification of memory I am inclined to add those additional rules to his memory code. Remembering with love and seeing from the perspective of the double vision derive from Volf’s emphasis on the primacy of the will to embrace. Both additional rules of remembering point at the Volf’s fundamental claim that genuinely salutary memory is to be placed in the perspective of reconciliation and love.

275 Volf, *The End of Memory*, 9. Italics preserved from the original text.

276 Miroslav Volf, “Remembering Well in a Violent World,” in *Mission und Einheit. Gemeinsames Zeugnis getrennter Kirchen? – Mission and Unity. Common Witness of Separated Churches? Proceedings of the 16th Academic Consultations of the Societas Oecumenica*, Beihefte zur Ökumenischen Rundschau 91, eds. Peter De Mey, Andrew Pierce, and Oliver Schuegraf (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012), 60.

277 Volf, *Love’s Memory. The Role of Memory*, 60.

debt of giving events their “due” by remembering them truthfully.”²⁷⁸ In that way telling the truth means doing justice. Truthful remembering is grounded on the moral commitment to truth. However, truthfulness is more than a moral obligation; it is equally a precondition to reconciliation. The obligation to remember truthfully is derived from the care about the relationships with the other. Volf is convinced that “our goal should be to remember as truthfully as possible, no matter what our perspectives and interests are... If we care about other people and our relations with them, we will feel obligated genuinely to seek the truth.”²⁷⁹ Seeking, telling, and doing truth are indispensable elements of the reconciliation-embrace that heals and helps build relationships of trust. Hence, the desire of reconciliation presupposes the commitment to truth: “There can be no truth between people without the will to embrace the other... Inversely, the will to embrace cannot be sustained and will not result in an actual embrace if the truth does not reign. If truth cannot do without the will to embrace, neither can embrace do without the will to truth.”²⁸⁰

3. *See with the eyes of the other – “double vision”*

Miroslav Volf points at the complexities of remembering in the example of his interrogations by the Serbian police. Dwelling on his conversations with Capitan G., Volf tries to take into consideration the position of his interrogator, his motivations to become part of the system of evil. In that way the author aims at gaining understanding of the other side. His major concern is the Christian obligation to condemn the deed, but not the doer. As the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church show, the difficulty of the reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians consists in the fact that both sides are not eager to recognise the painful truth of their mutual history. Instead, both sides have to take into account the complexity of their historical situation during World War II. The Greek-Catholic Church authorities emphasise that the sheer condemnation of Ukrainians as villains distorts the objective picture of their stance under the Polish rule in the 20th century and earlier. This does not mean that ethnic killings can be justified under any historical circumstances. However, keeping an

278 Volf, *The End of Memory*, 53.

279 Volf, *Love’s Memory. Redemptive Remembering*, 73.

280 Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace. A Theological Exploration*, 258.

eye on the broader context helps see the motivation and the driving forces of the opponent. It is about seeing history with the eyes of the other: “Realising that many conflicts generate from the perception of a common history by opponents as a unilateral set of injuries caused by the other side, it is helpful for conflicting parties to enter into the position of the enemy and try to understand it.”²⁸¹

What I have described above is looking at the situation from the perspective of the “double vision.” For Volf this element is indispensable if we want to pave the way to reconciliation because no version of history is completely unbiased. Poles interpret the actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Volyn as a horrendous violence committed by the nationalistic-driven Ukrainian people, whereas Ukrainians conceive the mass killings of Poles as an attempt to restore the Ukrainian state and put an end to the Polish rule. This is a classic example of clashing memories. Equally, the Russian Orthodox Church considers the Lviv Pseudo-Synod as the re-establishment of historical justice because the creation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church at the Synod of Brest in 1589 is interpreted by Moscow as a betrayal of Orthodoxy. From here derives the non-desire of Moscow to ask forgiveness for her cooperation in the defeat of the Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine in 1946. Being aware of such attitudes, Miroslav Volf appeals to see history from the perspective of both parties: “Seekers of truth, as distinct from alleged possessors of truth, will employ “double vision” – they will give others the benefit of the doubt, they will inhabit imaginatively the world of others, and they will endeavour to view the events in question from the perspective of others, not just their own.”²⁸² Perhaps the creation of common manuals on Polish-Ukrainian history or even on Ukrainian-Russian history could be a contribution to reconciliation applying the principle of the “double vision.” Liubomyr Husar seems to be aware of that when he promotes the project of a Church history in Ukraine jointly elaborated by all the traditional Christian denominations.

For Cardinal Husar the healing of memory presupposes learning the truth about the past, determining the facts, and naming evil. Additionally, the healing of memory includes looking for the good sides of the story.

281 Myroslava Rap, “Miroslav Volf’s Interpretation of Memory, Justice, and Reconciliation. A Constitutive Contribution to Peace Ethics” (master’s thesis, Leuven Catholic University, 2006), 73.

282 Volf, *The End of Memory*, 57.

Husar is convinced that the past cannot only be atrocious. Miroslav Volf also draws attention to that fact asking to remember someone's wrongdoings in the context of the whole life that might exhibit some virtues as well.²⁸³ "Should I not remember those moments of seeming goodness, however dubious they were?"²⁸⁴ In that regard the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church can express her appreciation to the Russian Orthodox Church for the preservation of her sacral buildings and the formation of her priests during communist rule. However, the truth about evil cannot be overshadowed by the elements of good, and the expectations of the recognition of the complicity of the Russian Orthodox Church are completely justified. The Polish-Ukrainian relations also illustrate that idea of the evaluation of wholeness. The Ukrainian side could express more appreciation for the efforts of the official Poland to promote the Ukrainian case at the European institutions. That helps envisage what unites both countries and nations, where they cooperate, and helps tune to the mode of reconciliation.

Volf's idea of the "double vision" has common points with Moyaert's proposal of interreligious hospitality. Both presuppose the questioning of one's identity in order to reveal the elements which hinder the final aim of genuine relationships with God and the neighbour. Both are directed at openness and welcoming the other, the stranger. And both are prescribed to the Churches and ordinary Christians in Ukraine so that they can find the basis of unity.

Marianne Moyaert attempts to create a vigorous religious identity by referring to Ricoeur's notions of *idem* and *ipse*. The *idem* describes the personal element of continuity and constancy while the *ipse* refers to becoming a self through the encounter with the otherness of persons or texts. Applied to religious identities, Moyaert claims that the *idem* encompasses religious norms, values, doctrines, texts, and behavioural prescriptions.²⁸⁵ The *ipse* focuses on "commitment with respect to the living God,"²⁸⁶ where the relationship to God is central. Religious identity arises at the interplay between the *idem* and *ipse* elements and that practically means that the attachment to rituals, doctrines, and behaviours is viewed in the light

283 Ibid., 15.

284 Ibid., 16.

285 Marianne Moyaert, *Fragile Identities. Towards a Theology of Interreligious Hospitality* (Amsterdam – New York, NY: Rodopi, 2011), 254.

286 Ibid., 255.

of the personal commitment to God. This posture grants openness to the other one who does not share the same religious tradition.

Those reflections led Moyaert to suggest the theological hermeneutics of interreligious hospitality referring to the biblical virtue of hospitality as welcoming the stranger to one's own home. The identity of everyone contains a certain strangeness, which means those elements that are not chosen but given one from birth (for instance, the body or contingency of existence).²⁸⁷ The awareness of the own strangeness makes one realise that the own identity is not complete and thus makes it possible to openly turn to the identity of the other. Also God appears as a stranger and "people can receive God in the stranger only when God is no longer fixed to the known and the familiar. This presupposes again acknowledging the strangeness in the familiar and thus not understanding religious identity exclusively in terms of the permanence of the *idem* pole."²⁸⁸

4. *Remember therapeutically – healing the identity*

Volf elaborates on both the personal and social healing of memory. The former he describes as the restoration of the narrative of one's own life. Volf acknowledges that memories are not only a form of knowledge but also a form of doing. Drawing upon the two ways of remembering by Paul Ricoeur, Volf claims that there are memories that just happen and memories that are actively pursued. The memories of the wrongs suffered "envelop us in dark mists of melancholy, they hold us back so that we cannot project ourselves into the future and embark on new paths. They chain our identity to the injuries we have suffered and shape the way we react to others."²⁸⁹ Inner healing is achieved through the integration of the painful memories in one's life story. It has happened by granting a positive meaning to the past or at least by labelling the painful memories as senseless segments of life hoping for their redemption at the end of history.²⁹⁰ By naming the memories we tame them in a certain way and let life run its course. Ultimately, it is about recovering from the identity of the victim that is so peculiar in conflict settings. In his pronouncements, Liubomyr

287 Ibid., 263-264.

288 Ibid., 264.

289 Volf, *The End of Memory*, 69.

290 Ibid., 76-78.

Husar points at the narrative of victimisation, which is so typical of Ukrainians who consider themselves to be victims of history and of their more powerful neighbours. In the message on the Reconciliation Day in Lviv, Husar reminds his nation that they have also acted as perpetrators and must admit that fact, thus purifying their consciousness. Miroslav Volf adds a valuable supplement claiming that the identity of a Christian should not be primarily defined by what he or she has endured but by how God relates to them. It is an invitation to consider one's own history in the perspective of God's love for humanity. Also that aspect was admitted by Husar when he encouraged his faithful to perceive God as a loving Father rather than as a condemning Judge.

5. *Remember so as to learn from the past*

The point here is to use memory in order to draw lessons for the future, which Volf calls the exemplary use of memory described by Tzvetan Todorov in the following way: "Exemplary use, by contrast, allows one to use the past in the light of the present, to make use of the lessons of injustice undergone in the past to fight injustices taking their course today, to leave the self in order to approach the other."²⁹¹ In other words, people should remember in order to draw parallels between situations of injustice that have once taken place in order to keep an eye on the signs that might indicate that evil could repeat itself. Liubomyr Husar's reflections on the lessons of the Holodomor can also be considered an exemplary use of memory. Cardinal Husar claims that Ukrainians have to determine the influence of the Holodomor's culture of death on the contemporary stance of Ukrainian society. For example, the failure to reform the economics is ascribed to the lost spirit of entrepreneurship because of the extermination of the class of farmers in 1932-1933. Thus, Husar not so much warns one of the repetition of the Holodomor nowadays, as elucidates the accompanying consequences of that tragedy.

Notwithstanding this apparently useful feature of remembering, Volf is sceptical about that preventive function of memory: "The problem is not that people fail to draw lessons from memory but that they do so in a way that flames the fires of conflict rather than contributing to peace."²⁹² Even

291 Quoted in Volf, *Love's Memory. Redemptive Remembering*, 74.

292 *Ibid.*, 76.

realising evil as such, people might apply unjust methods to fight for justice. Additionally, it is difficult to determine the proper lessons of memory in new situations and people may simply draw divergent lessons from the same experience.²⁹³ In a protracted conflict it is even difficult to determine who is the victim and who the perpetrator. The Ukrainian-Polish relationships illustrate this thought well. Both nations accuse each other of an unjust treatment and both consider themselves victims.

6. *Remember in a redeeming way*²⁹⁴

Giving credence to his rules of remembering, Volf is convinced that only they do not suffice to prohibit abuses of memory. For that aim a broader theological ethical framework is needed which Volf derives from the story of the Passion and Resurrection of Christ and from the memory of the Exodus from Egypt. The memories of those two events are sacred for Jews and Christians, they shape their identities, they constitute communal memories directed to the future, and finally, those are memories of God: “When the people of God remember wrongs suffered, they remember them out of a sense of identity and community, out of expectations and ultimate trust derived from the sacred memory of the Exodus and Passion.”²⁹⁵ The importance of the memories of Exodus and of Christ’s death on the cross is that they not only remind one of, but more importantly ritualise those events for Christians. People need to receive a true ethical in-

293 Volf, *The End of Memory*, 89.

294 It seems that Miroslav Volf borrowed the notion “redemptive remembering” from Lewis Smedes’ masterpiece *Forgive and Forget*. Volf refers to Smedes in his *Exclusion and Embrace* when speaking on the issue of memory and forgetting. Smedes suggests redemptive remembering as a means to navigate “between the rock of risky forgetting and the hard place of futile remembering.” (Lewis Smedes, *Forgive and Forget. Healing the Hearts We Don’t Deserve* (n. p.: Harper One, 2007), 136). Smedes dwells upon the practical repercussion of the old Hebrews’ way of remembering their story of redemption from slavery in Egypt. For Smedes redemptive remembering is a healing way of remembering “the wrongs of our irreversible past, a way that can bring hope for the future along with our sorrow for the past. Redemptive remembering keeps a clear picture of the past, but it adds a new setting and shifts its focus.” (Ibid.) Miroslav Volf has borrowed and developed the notion of redemptive remembering in his theology by combining the Hebrew memory of the Exodus with the New Testament memory of Christ’s Passion.

295 Volf, *The End of Memory*, 102.

struction in order to be able to draw correct lessons from the memory of the past.

The Israelis' memory of their deliverance by God is linked with their obedience to God. The memory of God delivering the Israelis from slavery should prompt them to treat their neighbours with justice. The four lessons from the Exodus are the imperative to remember and do it truthfully, the duty of solidarity with the oppressed, the imperative of the struggle against injustice (which means fighting injustice even with violent methods), and finally the realisation that it is God who ultimately delivers his people. The imperative of the struggle against injustice poses a problem because as the story of God's killings of the Egyptians or of the destruction of the Amalekites demonstrates, the memory of Exodus allows the use of violence when it is necessary, thus perpetuating it. Hence, Volf emphasises that for genuinely salutary remembering the lessons from the story of Christ's Passion, the principal memory narrative of the New Testament, are indispensable.

The memory of the Death and Resurrection of Christ remind us of his ultimate delivery of humanity. Volf points to the following essential distinction of the Christ's saving event: the Passion of Christ delivers the same lesson of solidarity and fighting for justice, however, the reconciliation message is dramatically opposite. The memory of the Christ's sufferings obliges us to remember all those who suffer. At the same time, it goes not only about the memory of Death, but also about the memory of Resurrection. The story of suffering does not end there; there is the future of redemption, of hope. Thus, the memory of the Passion is open to a transformed future.²⁹⁶ Christ's death on the cross as a universal redemptive event does not concern only the oppressed, but also the oppressors. Furthermore, Christ has not only reconciled both perpetrators and victims to God, he has also reconciled them between themselves: "But since he {*Christ*} also reconciled them in his own flesh on the cross, the Passion memory anticipates as well the *formation of a reconciled community even out of deadly enemies*."²⁹⁷ This universal reconciliation of humanity is the last point that should inform the redemptive use of memory. As a reconciled community people should not lose sight of the promise of the ultimate reconciliation between them keeping in mind that all the offences that have happened are only landmarks on the way to an eschatological

296 Volf, *Love's Memory. Redemptive Remembering*, 80.

297 Volf, *The End of Memory*, 119. Italics preserved from the original text.

reconciliation. The lessons of the Lord's Supper validate the promulgation of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in 2005 as a liturgical celebration. The act of the Eucharist reminds one that both nations have already been reconciled in the flesh of Christ. Hence, they have the duty to reconcile on earth anticipating the eschatological reconciliation. From a theological point of view, the Eucharist is a very successful locus for the promotion of the understanding between peoples.

5.3.2 Slipping into oblivion

Miroslav Volf is convinced that forgiveness is completed with the slipping of the offence into oblivion, a certain forgetting, when the right time is there. Not remembering the offence is part of the most early Christian and even Jewish belief, Volf notes. The debt must be remembered in order to be able to forgive, however, after having forgiven we must forget the offence. What does that mean: "forgiving and forgetting," letting "slip into oblivion" or "non-remembering" the offence? It is about one of the most original contributions of Miroslav Volf to the theology of forgiveness.

Volf explains non-remembrance as the endeavour of not letting evil be the last point: "Far from being a victory of evil, consigning forgiven wrongdoings to oblivion – done at the right time and in the right way – denies evil the honour and the glory of memory."²⁹⁸ And still, Volf remains realistic and confesses that in many cases it would be dangerous to forget: "As long as there is potential for harm in a relationship, we *should* remember... Since the potential for harm is great in our sinful world, forgiveness will mostly remain incomplete."²⁹⁹ Volf considers non-remembrance to be a gift from God to the wronged ones that will be received in the world to come: "... Memory of wrongs suffered – a particular example of the memory of sin – will not come to the minds of the citizens of the world to come because they will be fully immersed in the love that God is and that God will create among them."³⁰⁰ This not-coming-to-mind cannot be properly described as forgetting or the inability to recall, as the repression of memories or their fading. Volf is very clear that the not-coming-to-mind of the suffered wrongs will happen by God's grace

298 Ibid., 176.

299 Ibid. Italics preserved from the original text.

300 Ibid., 141-142.

only at the end of times in the world of love created by God. Paraphrasing Derrida and similar to Volf, Anthony Bash maintains that interpersonal forgiveness as “a poor imitation of divine forgiveness” will be fulfilled at the end of times: “The extent that human forgiveness bears the imprint of its prototype is the extent to which human beings can glimpse at – and have a foretaste of it – the divine forgiveness that will have its consummation at the *eschaton*.”³⁰¹

Only this eschatological meaning of slipping into oblivion correctly represents Volf’s position. Hence, I support the opinion that both the theology of Volf and of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church consider the remembering of repugnant events as beneficial and instructive in this world. In fact, Volf’s rules of salutary remembering emphasise the importance of preserving the memories of the past. Eschatological forgetting will once be granted by God, however, in the current world it makes sense to remember. The bishops of the Greek-Catholic Church elaborate well on the benefits of remembering, while Miroslav Volf considers certain rules of remembering in a redeeming rather than destroying way. In that way both theologies complement each other.

301 Bash, *Forgiveness*, 178. Italics preserved from the original text.