

Théophile Mally (1960–1963).⁸⁴⁴ Nonetheless, Olympio wanted to send a clear signal that he wanted to break with French colonial policy, civilianize the formerly oppressive security forces and, thus, show that the police forces under his government were different from the colonial forces of order. In June 1959, Olympio announced that the whole police force should be re-organised, beginning with the establishment of a police school with qualified and able instructors to train higher school certificate holders as police officers.⁸⁴⁵ Yet, in order to implement its budget plans, the number of state employees had to be reduced. Since the forces of order made up one-third of the state workforce, they suffered particularly from the downsizing. In June 1960, Olympio created the *Sûreté Nationale Togolaise*,⁸⁴⁶ thereby dissolving the *gardes-cercles*, who were composed of former riflemen of the *Battalion Autonome du Dahomey*, a unit of the French colonial infantry troops, who, despite their lack of education, were thus able to make a good living. Olympio thought that the uneducated were easier enlisted for the repressions of the French colonial policy. Therefore, Olympio envisaged “an intellectual police,”⁸⁴⁷ giving preference to teachers for the recruitment of the police and the armed forces and recruitment was done more and more systematically through written selection procedures. Those *gardes-cercle* that were over 37 years of age, did not speak enough French, or were not approved by the Ministry of Interior, were, thus, not integrated into the new security structure and found themselves unemployed. For quite a few, this effectively closed off one of the few opportunities to make a good living despite a lack of education. Olympio's rapid reform of the security sector continued a policy of bureaucratization, thereby devaluing martial capital which caused growl among the former forces of order as they found themselves with less perspective of employment.

After independence, he placed Kleber Dadjo, the commander of the Togolese Guard, a military unit, not under the authority of the Ministry of Defence but directly under the authority of the new Minister of Interior, Théophile Mally. Following the French model, the infantry and the Gendarmerie were under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, yet the National Security and the Togolese Guard were controlled by the Ministry of Interior.

6.9.1 Repressive Tit-For-Tat (1960–1962)

While the Ghanaian Government spiked the security situation with the pronouncement of threats on the eve of Togo's independence, its attempt to frighten the neighbour into giving up sovereignty only served to heighten the latter's sense of national identity. This seemed to bring Nkrumah “to realise that mere Hitlerian shouting would not achieve his object.”⁸⁴⁸ So he did an unusual about-face: On 11 June 1960, six weeks after Togo's inde-

844 Decalo, *Historical dictionary of Togo*, p. 138.

845 Johnson Adjei, “Togo Prepares for the Big Day,” *Daily Graphic*, 23 June 1959; in MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-4, *Politique intérieure*.

846 ANT (Lomé), 2APA Kloté – 108, *Surêté Nationale*, Décrée N° 60–58, 18 June 1960.

847 Glasman, *Les corps habillés au Togo*, p. 279.

848 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries*, 1961, Confidential Letter WA 10/158/2, High Commissioner in Ghana to Secretary of State, p. 1.

pendence, Nkrumah made a private surprise visit by car to Lomé to ameliorate relations between Ghana and Togo.

Photo 38: Prime Ministers Olympio & Nkrumah, Lomé (11 June 1960)



Source: République Togolaise, *Quelques Discours Importants du Président Sylvanus Olympio en 1961* (Lomé, 1962).

According to the Ghanaian version of the meeting, Nkrumah proposed a political union between Ghana and Togo, to which Olympio replied that it would be wiser to start with economic cooperation. It was agreed that Olympio would table definite proposals for closer economic ties between the two countries. Yet, no proposals were forthcoming, and when Olympio was reminded of his promise at the beginning of August 1960, he replied that he preferred to wait until Nigeria achieved independence and then have a three-nation meeting.⁸⁴⁹ This rebuff made Nkrumah reputedly so enraged that in the following month, in September 1960, the Ghanaian Government had the Ghana-Togo bor-

849 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries.*, Confidential Letter WA 10/158/2, High Commissioner in Ghana to Secretary of State, p. 1.

der closed entirely. On both sides of the frontier, this measure certainly caused hardship to the many people who were dependent upon the trade across it. Furthermore, all civil servants in Ghana of Togolese nationality or descent were requested to declare themselves citizens of Ghana or citizens of Togo in which latter case they had to take an Oath of Allegiance. At first no explanation had been given to these measures, but on 19 December 1960, Nkrumah stated publicly that they had been imposed...

“to bring home clearly and unmistakably, that the union of Ghana and Togo is natural and inevitable [...] This action has brought home as forcibly no other action could, the hardships and absurdity involved in maintaining an artificial frontier between us, and in proving to Premier Sylvanus Olympio that Togo and Ghana are one, and that no amount of lies and deception to the people of Togo can disprove this fact.”⁸⁵⁰

The irony of this statement lies in the fact that, because of Nkrumah's escalation of the conflict, the ‘artificial frontier’ became more pronounced after independence than it was during colonial times.

Olympio retaliates

In the meantime, the Olympio government had drafted a constitution that would finally replace the French Togoland Statute of 1956 and turn the country into a Presidential Republic. For this purpose, a constitutional referendum was held in Togo on 9 April 1961 alongside general elections.

Prior to the April 1961 elections, Juvento made a tactical alliance with the *Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais* (UDPT), itself a merger of the electorally mauled and disintegrated PTP and its former ally, the UCPN. Together they formed the *Mouvement Nationaliste Togolais-Juvento*. In March 1961, however, the formation was disqualified. The Olympio government was apparently still resentful of Juvento's split just a year earlier and used the merger of the parties to kill two birds with one stone by cracking down on the opposition as a whole. Olympio declared that a country as small and poor as Togo could not afford any opposition at all.⁸⁵¹ As Olympio eliminated the opposition, he was unsurprisingly confirmed president in the election that resulted in 99% of all votes for his party. Only one year after independence, Togo became de facto an authoritarian one-party state.

The pro-Government *Ghanaian Times* described the elections as “fake and a mockery of democratic practices.”⁸⁵² Although the Nkrumah government also cracked down on the opposition, it is also true that opposition candidates were allowed to run in all elections, even though the dice were cast against them in various ways. Needless to say, the Togolese authoritarianism inevitably resulted in the growth of discontentment. In May 1961, the Togolese Minister of Interior, Théophile Mally, had accused the former PTP

850 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries.*, Confidential Letter WA 10/158/2, High Commissioner in Ghana to Secretary of State, p. 2.

851 Munzinger, “Olympio, Sylvanus,” Munzinger, available from <http://www.munzinger.de/document/t/00000009107..>

852 As cited by Snelling TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries.*, WA 10/158/2, Ghana: Relations with Togoland, 17 May 1961, p. 2.

member, Simon Kpodar, of receiving Czech-made pistols through Ghana for an assassination attempt on Olympio.⁸⁵³ The Olympio government cracked down on critics by tightening the reins: As the Nkrumah government had done a year earlier, the Olympio government amended the Togolese citizenship law in August 1961, including the penal code, which empowered the government “to take measures to remove, intern or expel people who posed a threat to public order and the security of the state.”⁸⁵⁴

The Olympio-government grew tired of being harassed by Nkrumah and decided to take the initiative and harass Nkrumah. After Olympio joined the so-called Monrovia Group at the Monrovia Conference in May 1961 to counterbalance the Ghana-Guinea alliance of the Casablanca Group, he immediately flew on to France to finalize negotiations of the defence agreement with the French Government.⁸⁵⁵ Armed with these two assurances in his pocket, upon his return, Olympio declared in a speech on 7 July 1961 that the “former territory of British Togoland indisputably belongs to the Republic of Togo.”⁸⁵⁶ On 2 September 1961, the Chamber of Deputies endorsed his declaration and called for the unification of the Togolese nation.⁸⁵⁷ On 23 September 1961, a demonstration of over 10,000 participants, organised by Olympio’s party, made a tour of all the foreign embassies presenting at each a petition calling for the unification of former British and French Togoland.⁸⁵⁸

Photo 39: March for the re-unification of Togoland, Lomé (23 September 1961)



Source: TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries*.

Photo 40: “The Togo that we want,” Lomé (23 September 196)



Source: ANT (Lomé), Photographic Archive.

853 See Skinner, “West Africa’s First Coup,” p. 24, endnote 21.

854 ANT (Lomé), 2APA Sokodé/212Add, *Loi Nationalité Togolaise*

855 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries*, Confidential Letter ACC.203/278/3, 25 July 1961, p. 2.

856 Translated from French, TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries*, Resolution pour la reunification des 2 Togos, 23 September 1961.

857 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries*, Resolution pour la reunification des 2 Togos, 23 September 1961.

858 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries*, Confidential Letter C.4931, D.A. Roberts, 28 September, p. 1.

The petition came as a bit of a fright to the British Foreign Office, fearing that the issue of the 1956 referendum in British Togoland would be re-opened.⁸⁵⁹ The British acknowledged that the Togolese had some justice in their contention that the referendum should have been counted separately in the Northern and Southern regions as was suggested by the 1955 UN Visiting Mission and actually done in the recent UN-supervised referendum in British Cameroon.⁸⁶⁰ The British Foreign Office agreed that, if it had been put to a vote, a considerable part of the population would have favoured reunification with French Togoland if the French wouldn't have protracted the latter's independence until after 1956.

Now, it seemed that both Togo and Ghana blamed the imperialist division of the Ewe as a pretext for territorial demands and attributed the others' attitude to the instigation of a Western power. Although the British rumoured that the Togolese Foreign Minister, Paulin Freitas, intended to raise the issue before the General Assembly, Olympio appeared more pliant to the British. During private talks, Olympio assured that the claim to former British Togoland was put forward rather as an answer to Nkrumah's public expression to make Togo the seventh province of a unitary Ghana.⁸⁶¹

However, Olympio's claims to British Togoland coincided with wildcat strikes that broke out amongst railway workers of Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana, who purportedly protested the high taxes and the imposition of a development levy. The strike spread quickly to Accra and Kumasi and lasted seventeen days. Yet, Nkrumah attributed the unrest to political sabotage and under the pretext of the *Preventive Detention Act* commenced detention of virtually all prominent members of the opposition. This approach didn't sit well with the Minister of Finance and former AEC member, Komla Gbedemah, who was considering the overthrow of Nkrumah. He is quoted saying: "I would be sorry to have to do it, but the country has had enough of Nkrumah's arrogance, whims and madness."⁸⁶² In the same month of the strike, Nkrumah called for the resignation of Gbedemah, who, together with Kofi Busia, leader of the oppositional *United Party*, sought refuge in Togo.⁸⁶³

The Olympio government finally intended to raise the issue of Ghanaian refugees, already amounting to 6,000 people, before the General Assembly's Third Committee,

859 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries.*, Minutes by B. Miller JW 1061/11, Ghana/Togo Relations, 18 November 1961, p. 2.

860 On 11 February 1961, voters of British Trusteeship Territory of Cameroon were given the choice of joining either the newly independent Federation of Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon. Although the framework resembled the British Togoland referendum of 1956 (even the British referendum administrator, John Dring, participated in both referendums), in accordance with the United Nations position, the vote of the Northern and Southern parts of British Cameroon were assessed separately so that each territory could decide independently on its future: The northern part of British Cameroon voted for incorporation into Nigeria, while the southern part of British Cameroon voted for incorporation into the Republic (formerly French) of Cameroon.

861 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries.*, Telegram N° 83, 19 December 1961.

862 "Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, Africa," Released by the Office of the Historian, accessed 23 January 2023, available from <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjff/50758.htm>.

863 PRAAD (Accra), RG 17/1/281, *Special Committee – Togoland Affairs*, Ivory Coast and Togo Affairs, Dei-Anang to Prime Minister, 12 December 1961.

which deals with human rights and humanitarian affairs, to canvass for the idea of a resolution accusing Ghana of creating a refugee problem in the border area.⁸⁶⁴ With the alleged intent to securitise the situation of the Ghanaian refugees in Togo, Olympio once again seemed to hope “to internationalize his quarrel with Nkrumah.”⁸⁶⁵ This move was certainly based on Olympio's long experience before the Fourth Committee. Yet, the move had only a slight success as at the end of October 1961, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees sent a mission to study the situation in Togo.⁸⁶⁶

More importantly, however, in October and November 1961, the Olympio government signed various cooperation treaties with France, including the finalized defence agreement. Therefore, on 3 November 1961, the Togolese National Army was created, whereby the French ceded control of the armed forces and the gendarmerie to the Togolese government (yet, the French Commander of the Togolese Gendarmerie, Georges Maitrier, remained in place). During the negotiations Olympio showed the French a cold shoulder as he intended to adhere strictly to an open-door regime. Olympio did not grant any privileges, even indirectly, to French exporters and even refused the technical assistance staff in the cooperation agreement that had been signed the previous year.⁸⁶⁷ Olympio, as an Anglophile, had his eye on international assistance from the British and Americans. He was aware that London and Washington became increasingly wary of Nkrumah's shift to the left. They desired the survival of both Togo and the Olympio regime as a valuable counterweight, who would provide a link between the moderate Nigerian leaders and the French-speaking states.⁸⁶⁸ Moreover, the British considered it unlikely that Nkrumah will take an early aggressive action against French Togo and tried to dissuade him,⁸⁶⁹ especially since a large proportion of the trained troops of the Ghanaian army were involved in the United Nations Operation in the Congo at the time.

Bombings

On 5 November 1961, that is, just five days before Queen Elizabeth's trip to Ghana, bombs went off in the capital city of Accra. A statue of Nkrumah was hit, showing symbolically that the president was a target. Concerns were heightened about the Queen becoming collateral damage while with him,⁸⁷⁰ and Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sands, flew to Ghana to examine the security arrangements for the Queen's visit in view of the recent bomb incidents.

A month after the bombings, on 2 December 1961, the Togolese Government allegedly uncovered a plot to overthrow the Olympio-government by killing Olympio and some

864 GAOR, “16th Session: 3rd Committee” (1961), pp. 271–72.

865 Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland*, p. 202.

866 Shortly before the mission submitted its preliminary report in July 1962, the Olympio government decided in May 1962 to establish a National Refugee Committee in Togo. But relations between Ghana and Togo had deteriorated.

867 ANF (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine), AG/5(F)/1887, *Contexte politique des relations bilatérales*, Telegram N° 7/8 by Mazoyer, 3 January 1963.

868 TNA (London), DO 195/75, *Problems of disaffected Ghanaians seeking refuge in Togo*, Togo Annual Review for 1960, Watson to Foreign Office, 23 January 1961.

869 TNA (London), DO 35/9278, *Future of Togoland*, Note (without number).

870 *The Times*, “Accra Shaken by Another Explosion,” 07 November 1961, p. 12.

Ministers. According to the Minister of the Interior, Théophile Mally, interrogation of those captured in the night of 1–2 December revealed that since 1959 the plot had been prepared at a camp in the Volta Region and financed by the Nkrumah-government.⁸⁷¹ Allegedly, about 600 young Togolese and Ghanaians were undergoing weapon training with tear gas bombs and pistols. Implicated were the principle Togolese pro-French leaders, such as Grunitzky, Meatchi, Ajavon, Ayassou and above all Simon Kpodar, but also the former allies of Olympio's unification campaign, such as Apaloo and Ahtson, that is, the leaders of both Juvento wings.⁸⁷²

On 4 December 1961, two days after the abortive attempt to overthrow the Togolese government, Olympio left for the independence celebrations of the former trusteeship territory of Tanganyika. He is reported saying that the men involved had been trained in Ghana. During the independence celebrations in Tanganyika, on 9 December 1961, Olympio was quoted that in the event of military attacks on Togo by Ghana, Togo would "invoke its pact with France and Ghana would lose its independence."⁸⁷³ The December 1961 'conspiracy' prompted Théophile Mally, Minister of the Interior, to take into detention 50 to 80 members of the opposition,⁸⁷⁴ including the Juventists Ben Apaloo, Firmin Abalo, and Anani Santos, who were arrested, trialled for the alleged assassination attempt organized from Ghana and imprisoned under harsh conditions in Sansanné-Mango in the far north.⁸⁷⁵ Juventists appealed to the New York-based *International League for the Rights of Man* (ILRM), to whose director Olympio responded "At the same time, you might agree with me that exceptional measure are necessary in exceptional circumstances."⁸⁷⁶

The Juvento case showed that the Togolese opposition was already being trained in Ghana. Each time, Olympio blamed Nkrumah. The uncovered plot was used by Olympio to securitise and thus justify the banning of the *Mouvement Nationaliste Togolais-Juvento* and the silencing of oppositional newspapers such as the *Togo Observateur*.⁸⁷⁷ Since Olympio adopted an increasingly authoritarian course, many opposition members fled to Ghana. The regime was consequently led to break its promises of democracy by arresting its opponents and restricting liberties, thus finalizing its relapse into presidential and single-party rule.

On 11 December 1961, the Ghanaian government issued a White Paper in which the government justified its arrest and incarceration of leading members of the opposition for instigating the labour strike by unionized workers three months earlier. The White Paper accused Olympio by name of supporting members of the Ghanaian opposition, the *United Party*, and some disaffected members of the CPP in exchange for "a promise of

871 ANT (Lomé), 2APA Tsevié/64Add, *Affaires Politiques*, 1962, procès verbal, 11 April 1962.

872 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries.*, J.W.S. Corbett, Summary of Recent Togolese Statements, as reported in Lomé in the official daily bulletin, 16 December 1961.

873 ANF (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine), AG/5(F)/1887, *Contexte politique des relations bilatérales*, Accords Franco-Togolais, July 1963.

874 ILRM (New York Public Library), b. 28, *Togo*, Cablegram N° 308, Olympio to Baldwin, 6 March 1962.

875 ILRM (New York Public Library), b. 28, *Togo*, Note by RNB, 9 February 1962.

876 ILRM (New York Public Library), b. 28, *Togo*, Letter N° 308, Olympio to Baldwin, 5 March 1962.

877 ANT (Lomé), 2APA Dapango – 18, *Affaires Politiques*, Decree N°628, 13 January 1962.

ceding to Togo the Volta region of Ghana.”⁸⁷⁸ Olympio had allegedly supported these men in their attempt to overthrow the Nkrumah government through the September strikes and bomb explosions just before Queen Elizabeth’s visit.

The day after the publishing of the White Paper, the Principal Secretary of Ghana’s African Affairs Secretariat, Michael Dei-Anang, called for a “stronger, firmer line” towards Togo and proposed the creation of a special ‘Committee of Togoland Affairs’, which Nkrumah ordered two days later,⁸⁷⁹ “to make concrete suggestions as to how best reciprocal repressive measures could be taken against Togoland.”⁸⁸⁰ Olympio in turn, had expressed repeatedly that he merely wished that Nkrumah leave Togo alone and did not want to quarrel but merely “to diminish the importance of the border.”⁸⁸¹ The irony was perfect: Olympio, who had built his reputation as a political leader by campaigning against the hardship and the division of the border, wanted it to remain but now followed the same argumentative line, which the French used since 1947 to hamstring Ewe unification.

Due to the unrelenting threats from Ghana, Olympio increased the search radius for allies. In January 1962, 20 African heads of state met at the unofficial study conference in Lagos, the successor to the Monrovia Conference, where they discussed, among other things, how to keep the Cold War out of Africa and what to do about Pan-Africanism. It is noteworthy that the countries of the Casablanca Group did not participate. Although there was the widely held view that Pan-Africanism was the only way to keep the Cold War out of Africa, which would have obliged the new African states to take sides against each other in the event of hostilities, the Lagos Charter, which was rallied around by eighteen African countries, recommended that members should support each other in the event of an attack, implying Ghana as a principal addressee. Skinner notes that Olympio had furthermore secured from the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Jaja Wachuku, a commitment to defend Togo against any Ghanaian attempt at annexation.⁸⁸²

But Olympio also sought out more powerful allies. During his visit to the US in March 1962, the US Government had offered their help in intelligence and security training countering Nkrumah’s intention to annex Togo.⁸⁸³ An American Police Mission was sent to Togo, studied its security forces, and recommended that the Army, the *Garde Togolaise*, and the Gendarmerie, should all be amalgamated into one single force of gendarmerie – a measure which the French Commander of the Togolese Gendarmerie, Georges

878 Government of Ghana, “Statement by the government on the recent conspiracy,” White Paper no. 7 of 1961, 41, p. illus. (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting on behalf of the President, Accra, 1961).

879 PRAAD (Accra), RG 17/1/281, *Special Committee – Togoland Affairs*, Dei-Anang to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 December 1961.

880 PRAAD (Accra), RG 17/1/281, *Special Committee – Togoland Affairs*, Notes of the First Session of the Special Committee for Togoland Affairs, p. 2.

881 TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries.*, Telegram N° 83, Watson to Foreign Office, 19 December 1961.

882 Skinner, “West Africa’s First Coup,” p. 389.

883 TNA (London), DO 195/75, *Problems of disaffected Ghanaians seeking refuge in Togo*, Ghana-Togo Relations [N°101], Oliver Kemp to K.M. Wilford, 21 April 1961.

Maïtrier, recommended as well.⁸⁸⁴ Olympio, still attached to his policy to demilitarize and decolonise the security forces, decided, however, to maintain the separation of the army and the police.

The Togo-Ghana relations, already at a low point, deteriorated even further when a series of bombings rocked Ghana in the second half of 1962. On 1 August 1962, a grenade attack on Nkrumah occurred in Kulungugu, a village in northern Ghana, killing several people and leaving Nkrumah with a shrapnel wound in his back. On 9 September 1962, about 200 yards from Nkrumah's official residence, at Flagstaff House, a bomb exploded, killing 3 and injuring 60.⁸⁸⁵ On 20 September 1962, two bombs exploded in Accra, killing 3 and injuring 100.⁸⁸⁶ On 6 November 1962, in Chorkor, Accra, two explosions were caused by grenades, which according to the Ghanaian investigation were of French manufacturing.

The Ghanaian Government drew up an official note of protest, accusing Togo to harbour the men whose attacks have caused up to that point 21 deaths and 385 injured people. Yet, since the Togo-Ghana relations were so bad, the Nkrumah-Government had to ask the British ambassador in Togo to send the letter to the Togolese Government. Yet, the latter did not accept the letter, stating that the Ghanaian Government must direct itself to the French embassy – the official representation of Togo in Ghana at the time.⁸⁸⁷ On 7 January 1963, another bomb exploded in Accra, which according to the Ghanaian authorities was supposedly of "French origin, and of a type supplied to a neighbouring territory in West Africa."⁸⁸⁸

6.9.2 Assassination of Olympio (1963)

At this point, the Americans, the British, and even the French were seriously concerned about Olympio's security and had been trying for some time to persuade him to take better security measures for his person.⁸⁸⁹ Yet, Olympio had never bothered to do so. A fatal mistake that would cost him his life. Three theories circulated in the subsequent period about those behind the murder of Olympio and the exact course of events. Since Skinner has already discussed these theories in detail, they will only be repeated very briefly here.⁸⁹⁰

The first, on which subsequent political events developed, emphasised the role of disaffected but essentially apolitical Togolese ex-soldiers, who overthrew the Olympio

884 TNA (London), FO 371/161755, *Army and police remain separate*, 1962, Confidential Letter, O. Kemp to Barbara Miller, 5 October 1962.

885 *The Times*, "News in Brief," 11 September 1962

886 *The Times*, "100 Injured in Accra," 21 September 1962

887 PRAAD (Accra), RG 17/1/325, *Note of Protest to the Govt of Togo*, de Freitas to Nkrumah, 7 December 1962.

888 *The Times*, "Four Killed by Accra Bomb," 10 January 1963, p. 7.

889 TNA (London), FO 371/167647, *Assassination of President Olympio: coup d'état*, 1963, Secret Letter 0214/24/1G, British Embassy, Abidjan, to FO, 24 January 1963, p. 2; TNA (London), FO 371/155660, *Political relations: Commonwealth countries*, Confidential Letter ACC.203/278/4, B.A. Flack to H.R.E. Brown, 20 June 1961, p. 2.

890 Skinner, "West Africa's First Coup"