

Chapter 2: The Soul

For the later Plato, *techne* is neither primarily an epistemological scheme nor a practical form. Rather, it is primarily an ontological concept, not only in the sense of sociopolitical ontology but also in that of cosmological ontology, since the world is created by God's divine *techne*, whose first *ergon* is the soul of the world (cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 29a on cosmological ontology; *Laws* 10.892a–d on sociopolitical ontology). In the *Nomoi*, Plato conceives of souls as the chief cause of all alterations and transformations of corporeal substances (10.892a). This does not mean, however, that the soul is a *causa sui*: According to Plato, both the world soul itself and its connection with its body (the world, consisting of varied corporeal substances) are effects produced by God. In Plato's assertion that *πάν δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν*« [*Timaeus* 28a; everything that becomes must of necessity become by some cause, for everything without cause has no power to attain becoming], we can see a similar cosmological image and, consequently, a similar political ontology to that of Spinoza, setting aside the two philosophers' different understandings of God. Both consider everything apart from God to be dominated by causal relationships, whereas the political community is constituted by active subjects that are affected and constituted by various causes, whose relationships with those active subjects can be understood through a theory of power (cf. Spinoza, *Ethica* 2 prop. 14, 4 prop. 2–7, 32–36; *Tractatus Politicus* 2.17, 3.7, 4.1, 3). For the later Plato, two concepts are key to understanding active subjects and their power relationships: soul and *techne*.

2.1 The *Nomos–Physis* Opposition

Many legal scholars and philosophers believe that the rise of the Sophists in the fifth century BCE represented a crisis of *nomos*⁸ in which normativity was deprived of its natural legitimacy (see, e.g., Van der Walt 2020, pp. 29–32; Van den Berge 2022, p. 272). Schmitt (1950) discerns that, historically, the *nomos–physis* opposition (NPO) proposed by the Greek Sophists has nothing to do with the modern debate between theories of natural law and legal positivism predominant since the nineteenth century CE (p. 45). Nevertheless, like most exegetists, he considers the NPO a sort of separation between »is« and »ought« (SIO; p. 38). What Sophistic speeches imply, however, is quite the opposite. Classical Greece did not experience a crisis of *nomos* in the general sense, since the normativity proposed by the Sophists, much like the common morality maintained by their opponents, was still based on an understanding of nature.

The idea of the NPO can mostly be traced back to two passages by Plato: The first is the speech of Callicles, an ambitious young man learning the art of Sophistry, in *Gorgias* 482c–486d. The second is Plato’s commentary on the NPO in *Nomoi* 888d–890b. In the *Gorgias*, Callicles sets actions justified by nature (φύσει) in opposition to those justified by *nomos* (482e). He does not suggest, however, that no *nomos* exists that can be justified by nature. On the contrary, he claims the following (483c–d):

ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλεον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατότερον τοῦ ἀδυνατώτερου. Δηλοὶ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλεον ἔχειν.

I believe that nature itself proclaims that it is just for the stronger and more capable [man] to have a greater [share] than the weaker and less capable. It is obvious that in many places—not only in the

8 See section 3.2 on the meaning of this term.

other animals but also in whole cities and races of human beings—justice (τὸ δίκαιον) has been decided [to be that] the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than they.

With this statement, Callicles emphasizes that it is a common phenomenon for the stronger individual or group to have a greater share than the weaker. More importantly, this phenomenon implies the justification and legitimation of the former's actions. It is clear that in his eyes, the natural »is« implies, for human beings, the »ought« and, in a normative sense, entitles the strong to do anything they have the power to do. Ascribing the SIO to the Sophists is thus a misunderstanding.

Many interpreters simply equate the NPO with the genuine opinions of the Sophists, failing to keep in mind that Sophists were primarily rhetoricians. For rhetoricians, the truth value of their speeches' content is, as Gorgias emphasizes, by no means important (*Encomium of Helen* 13; see also section 4.2). Plato reminds us more than once of the technicity of Sophistry, marked by the production of appearance (τὸ φανταστικόν; cf. *Sophist* 262e–268a). For the Sophists, speeches are instruments that serve to persuade. To achieve this goal, they formulate specific speeches for specific cases according to the features of each individual they attempt to persuade. In other words, the content of a Sophistic speech, as well as the NPO, is a result of their strategy and not the truth in which they believe.

In the *Gorgias*, the rhetorical speeches can be divided into at least three categories according to the particularities of the individuals to be persuaded:

- (1) The speech of Gorgias, who talks to Socrates in 449a–461a, is devised for average people and upright individuals such as Socrates. As an implement of rhetoric, this speech aims to convince people that Sophistry is novel and harmless and does not threaten political justice. This is Gorgias' reason for answering in the affirmative in 460a, when Socrates asks whether Sophistic rhetoric is based on knowledge of justice. According to Socrates' analysis, it is clear that this rhetoric is not based on justice; Gorgias merely disguises it as a *techne* of justice. This is proved by his own admission that

it can be used for evil goals (457a). The necessary relationship between justice and rhetoric is an appearance Gorgias fabricates »διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων« [482d; out of deference to human custom] or, in other words, to avoid making people indignant. It is neither a theory nor Gorgias' genuine opinion.

- (2) Polus claims in 466a–473e that doing what is unjust is beneficial. This claim serves as an advertisement to attract or tempt clients, namely elites seeking fame and wealth.
- (3) The speech of Callicles in 482c–486d represents, on the one hand, his frank opinion, as Socrates points out, and, on the other hand, the *ergon* of sophistic rhetoric: a justification of the convention (*nomos*) widely recognized among elites.

The NPO asserted by Callicles suggests by no means a form of SIO but rather a »war« between advocates of different conventions, that is, between average people and elites. The NPO is not Callicles' original idea but, obviously, a rhetorical *ergon* by his master, Gorgias, who proposes it to cater to the convention (*nomos*) among their clients, the elites who are hostile to democracy and contemptuous of the conventions of average people. Gorgias does not care whether nature itself truly entails normative force nor whether the norms of nature are opposed to the convention (*nomos*) of average people, as he considers the truth value of rhetorical content indifferent. His speech functions to make his clients happy, confirming that their ambition is admirable and informing them of the necessity of learning rhetoric should they wish to realize this ambition in the specific circumstances of democratic Athens. Sophists did not care whether the NPO was true. They simply grasped the market conditions: With a widening gap between rich and poor, a new class differentiation, characterized by the opposing interests of the two groups, was taking hold among Athenian citizens.

Many scholars claim that Athenian democracy was characterized by egalitarianism. This interpretation only corresponds with reality, however, for a relatively short period of time (no more than fifty years), far less than the entire democratic period (508–322 BCE). Early Athenian democracy was based on relative class homogeneity, which, aside from the vio-

lent exclusion of the enslaved class, was realized through the following methods that reduced the impact of social inequality on political practice:

- (1) Drawing lots for the distribution of political power ensured relative equality in political practice (cf. Malkin 2024).
- (2) Although Solon introduced property as the qualifying criterion for political classes, economic mobility realized a class differentiation without opposing interests.
- (3) Athens' accumulation of wealth through the exploitation of other Greek cities via colonialism and imperialism gave poor citizens sufficient resources and opportunities to become wealthy (cf. Samons II 2019). Given that the aggressive wars involved could be easily won, the rich and poor did not have opposing interests.

If we conceive of these methods as instruments of a political *technē* whose *ergon* was to maintain the relative class homogeneity on which Solon's intended democracy rested, then such a *technē* should be considered badly employed, since it ignored the changing circumstances of the time, such as the widening gap between rich and poor. In her article »Access to Resources in Classical Greece,« Lin Foxhall (2002) points out the significant inequalities that developed in the distribution of wealth and land ownership. For instance, based on inscriptions recording colonial enterprises in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, she reports as follows (p. 214):

[A]lthough the original colonists may have received equal portions of some categories of land, there is no provision for maintaining equality of landholdings over time, and later colonists get a poorer deal (Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 124–5). The decree detailing the establishment of an Athenian colony at Brea, c. 445 BCE (Meiggs and Lewis 1988: no. 49) provides for the appointment of *geonomoi* to take charge of land distribution, but there is no explicit provision that portions be equal. Demokleides, the proposer of the decree, has engineered a considerable degree of power and autonomy for himself (lines 8–9, 20–6). Phantokles' amendment on side B may be the most revealing, and most truly democratic, aspect of the

inscription, limiting participation in the new settlement to *thetes* and *zeugites*. Several interpretations are possible (Davies 1981: 56; Jameson 1994: 59, n.21), but this could be an attempt to block the efforts of wealthier men to dominate in terms of both landholding and political power.

With regard to the increasing wealth gap and its impact on politics, the reason behind Socrates' accusation that Pericles made the Athenian people greedy is quite evident (cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 515d–e). Pericles' establishment of the system of public fees was a result of the collapse of class homogeneity among Athenian citizens. The interests of the polis were no longer identical to those of individual citizens from the lower class: Consequently, in this case, salary became the decisive reason for them to fight for their polis. Substantial conflict between the interests of different classes led to the functional transformation of Athenian democracy. That democracy was no longer an instrument of collective practice that produced public wealth, because the identity of personal and common interests had collapsed since the age of Pericles. The event underlying this collapse was the creation of the Delian League, which provided Athens with a huge opportunity to exploit other Greek poleis and intensified economic differentiation among Athenian citizens in terms of their access to resources. Democracy thus became an instrument of class struggle as democratic decisions that benefited all classes were rendered almost impossible. This is why Aristotle defined democracy as what people today call populism (*Politics* 3.1279b). Meanwhile, a new group of elites emerged. They were rich and ambitious, and with their interests opposed to those of the average people, their conventions became different from those of the average people. The *nomos* of average people was still the old *nomos*, which, like the past Athenian democracy, was based on the relative homogeneity of class.

The elites wished to achieve their ambitions, but they were constrained by the old *nomos* and the democracy, which was designed for class homogeneity. Calicles, the elite representative in the *Gorgias*, has clearly grasped that *nomos*, in his time, is primarily an instrument of the average people (483b–c):

Ἄλλ' οἶμαι οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν καὶ οἱ πολλοί. Πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν· ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλεόν ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλεόν ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλεόν τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν φαυλοτέροι ὄντες.

I believe that those people who promulgate the laws [νόμους] are the weak and the many. With a view to themselves and their own interest, they promulgate the laws [νόμους] and distribute their praises and blames. To terrorize the strongest of men—who has power to get a greater share—so that they [the strongest] do not get more than they [the weaker], they claim that seeking to get more is shameful and unjust; and the injustice is to seek to get a greater share than others. I believe that they prefer to get an equal share, since they are inferior.

Grasping the NPO through any universal perspective regulated by the doctrine of truth is futile, since the NPO is proposed by the Sophists, who, as *technitai*, do not care for truth if they find it to be useless. As creators of specific speeches to persuade specific people, Sophists emphasized the NPO not because they believed it to be true but because they, as businessmen of knowledge, recognized the rising market demand among elites for ways to manipulate democracy and justify their new *nomos*, which opposed the old *nomos* of the average people.

Invoking nature—or something higher than human convention—as a normative force is a polemic strategy used throughout history across many cultures to deny the legitimacy of a given convention and justify actions opposed to it. In Buddhism, for instance, the Sanskrit word *Dharma* implies an indistinction between nature, natural law, and the Buddha's normative theory: Interpreting nature thus helped ancient Buddhists deny the legitimacy of the Brahmin caste system. Similarly, the interpretation of the Chinese word *Dao*, which is characterized by an indistinction

between nature, natural law, and convention played an important role in the debate between ancient Chinese schools of thought such as Daoism, Confucianism, and Legalism. The Sophistic NPO, as a strategy to justify a new *nomos*, was thus not unique. Instead, it was a practiced *techne* based on the specific circumstances of the time, in which the elites were locked in a struggle with the average people of Athens over Classical democracy.

To defeat the Sophists in these specific circumstances, Plato designs a set of *technai*. The scene depicted in sections 888d–892c of the *Nomoi* resembles a strategic meeting, with three old men analyzing the concrete circumstances in which the *politike techne* should be implemented:

Theoretical circumstances:

- (1) Sophists and natural philosophers define »nature« as the generation of primary things (γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα; 892c).
- (2) Invoking the theories of natural philosophers, Sophists divide all things into natural things, produced by nature and chance (ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην), and *technika*, produced by *techne* (889a).
- (3) Sophists claim that the *politike* counts as a *techne*, which has little to do with nature (889d).
- (4) Nobility according to nature is, in their opinion, different from nobility according to *nomos*, so justice, as a sort of nobility according to *nomos*, has nothing to do with nature (889e).
- (5) Sophists thus assert that winning by violence is the most just thing according to nature (889e–890a).

Social circumstances:

- (6) The arguments above are widely disseminated across the whole Greek world (891b).
- (7) Among young people, Sophists are encouraging an alleged »true« life, which consists in dominating others instead of serving them according to *nomos* (890a).
- (8) *Nomos* is being corrupted by wicked men (891b).

The argument of the Sophists here is obviously self-contradictory because they attribute the justice of violence to nature while rejecting the unity of justice and nature. Plato does not seem interested in denouncing this self-contradiction, however, because *reductio ad absurdum* alone does not help resolve social problems. To find real solutions, therefore, the later Plato remakes the concept of the soul, with his aim not solely the theoretical reunion of natural things and *technika*. Rather, the concept of the soul in terms of *politike techne* is part of his strategic thinking, aimed at resolving social problems and building a good polis.

2.2 The Function of the Soul

Across Plato's complete works, there are extensive arguments about the soul that oppose each other to varying degrees. Since not all of these are formulated for the sake of the *politike*, however, this thesis deals exclusively with those relevant to *techne*, with a particular focus on Plato's final work: the *Nomoi*. Cooper (1997) elegantly suggests that the *Nomoi* perhaps offers concrete advice on establishing a good polis for the purposes of reforming existing poleis or founding new ones. Given that »Plato's Academy was not merely an institute for higher education and for research« but that Plato and his associates were also called upon for practical advice, it is reasonable to suggest that »in writing *Laws* [*Nomoi*] Plato was perhaps not engaging in pure constitutional and legislative theory, as in *Statesman* and *Republic*.« This means that »in considering *Laws* in relation to these other works, one should bear in mind this context of possible practical applications« (p. 1319) and that it is appropriate to consider the *Nomoi* *ergon*-directed.

Indeed, Plato clearly points out this *ergon*-directedness at the end of the third book, where Clinias reveals his current *ergon*: to found a new polis that is as good as possible (*Laws* 3.702c). With regard to this concrete *ergon*, the soul in the *Nomoi* is neither a mysterious entity, as it is described in Plato's earlier works, nor primarily an object that can be understood within the framework of the modern discussion of mind–body problems. Instead, the concept of the soul is primarily a theoretical model that serves to help the reader understand the motion of materials and

grasp the etiology of political phenomena. In short, defining the soul is part of the strategy of the *politike*. In *Nomoi* 10.896a, the soul is defined as

τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν.

the motion that has power to move itself.

Why does Plato define the soul as such? There are several reasons. At first glance, this definition serves to reject the NPO and the related arguments formulated by the Sophists. In *Nomoi* 10.893b–893e, Plato presumes that everything is becoming and in motion. A thing in motion is moved either by itself or by others; motion that cannot move itself must ultimately be traced back to what Plato calls the »soul,« that is, the motion that has power to move itself. In this sense, the soul »ἐμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη« [10.892a; is generated first among all things], »ἄρχει παντὸς μᾶλλον« [10.892a; rules over all other things], and is the »αἰτία ἅπασιν« [10.896a–b; cause of everything], as well as the »ἀρχὴ κινήσεως« [10.896a–b; principle of motion]. The phrase ἀρχὴ κινήσεως is a wordplay, meaning both »the beginning or the source of motion« in a descriptive and etiological sense and »the rule over motion« in a normative sense. One must thus conclude that not only *technika* but also all natural things are caused by the soul, if, indeed, one adopts the Sophists' definition of »nature« as »γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα« [10.892c; the generation of the primary things]. In this context, the normativity derived from the alleged »nature« is by no means nobler than that derived from *nomos*.

In comparison to the educational *ergon*, however, this polemical use is a less important reason for defining the soul in this way (cf. Plato, *Laws* 10.907c). The argument of the Sophists is full of holes, and the popularity of the NPO among young men was by no means a result of the subtlety of Sophistic rhetoric. Plato himself realized that disproving the Sophists' arguments would not help solve the social problems of his time. His definition of the soul is, therefore, not a purely polemical design out of touch with the real world. Considering the suggestion of the Athenian in *Nomoi* 1.632d, it is clear that the definition of the soul is a consequence of empirical knowledge–*technē* concerning *nomos* (τῷ περὶ νόμων ἐμπείρῳ τέχνῃ).

The definition of the soul does not count as knowledge–*episteme*, which is based on truth discovered through intellectual inquiries regulated exclusively by the will to know. Instead, defining the soul as Plato does is a strategy of knowledge–*techne*, whose ultimate governing principle is its appropriateness for a specific *ergon*, which, as an object of the will to power, rules over the will to know. Plato acknowledges that while the soul is invisible, »much expectation« (ἐλπίς πολλή) allows us to presume that it is functioning and perceptible by rationality (νοητὸν δ’ εἶναι) alone (*Laws* 10.898d–e). Given that Plato has disproved Sophistic arguments many times and in many different ways, the ἐλπίς πολλή, no doubt, refers to more concrete reasons.

The soul, then, is primarily a theoretical model designed to help us grasp the etiology of the generation of a good state. A state, as well as its *nomos*, is generated either by itself or by others. Given that a good state, for which laws are promulgated, should possess rationality (νοῦς), be free, and exist in friendly unity with itself (cf. Plato, *Laws* 3.701d: ἡ νομοθετουμένη πόλις ἐλευθέρα τε ἔσται καὶ φίλη ἑαυτῇ καὶ νοῦν ἔξει), it should be generated by itself. Since the soul rules (ἄρχει) over all motion and transformation (cf. 10.892a–b), a good state must be generated by its own soul, which consists of its citizens’ souls. In a similar sense, the human soul is a theoretical model designed to help one grasp the etiology of the generation and self-generation of the individual selves whose motions are the basic elements of *politeia*.

Due to the influence of the Romans, who translated the title of Plato’s *Πολιτεία* as *Res Publica*, translations of this work into various languages are often inaptly titled *The Republic* or *The State*. Additionally, πολιτεία is often translated as »constitution« or »government.« While the term does refer to the constitution of a state or commonwealth, however, it does so in a way that is by no means consistent with the »constitution« in the sense of modern constitutional theory. For this reason, I prefer to transliterate it. *Politeia* is neither a constitution of a state created through a one-off constituent power, nor a promulgation of constitutional law, nor a purely theoretical design of a state, although the latter appears frequently in Plato’s *Politeia*. If one seeks to consider *politeia* as the constitution of a state, it is better to understand the »state« from a Foucauldian per-

spective: »l'État est une codification de relations de pouvoir multiples qui lui permet de fonctionner« [1977, p.151; the state is a codification of multiple power relations that enables it to function]. In this view, as Mark Kelly (2015) notes, »power relations preexisted the state and it is ultimately to them that we must turn to understand politics« (p. 478).

It is an underappreciated fact that the later Plato, as a theoretician of the *politike*, holds a similar understanding of the structure of political unity to that of Foucault. The soul, as the motion that has power to move itself, is a concept of power relationships, that is, on the one hand, the self-relationship, and on the other, the relationship between souls. Souls continuously generate one another. Furthermore, the *politike*, the craft of the soul, denotes the local power relationships between *technitai* and their *erga* and materials. Through the *ergon*-directed strategy based on etiology, the souls of *technitai* are always subject to power relationships with animate and inanimate materials. These relationships form the basis of the *politeia* insofar as they enable the polis to generate itself, political unity to exist, and *nomos* to function.

Although the craft of the soul is divided into δικαιοσύνη (justice) and νομοθετική (legislation; cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 464b), Plato's emphasis is always on the former: This *technē* aims to produce just souls. The reason for this emphasis is clear: A free state is generated by the souls of its own citizens.

2.3 Justice as *Technē*

If one were to choose one key concept as the core of Plato's political philosophy, it would undoubtedly be »justice.« In Plato's vocabulary, however, there are three nouns that can be translated as »justice«: δίκη, δίκαιον, and δικαιοσύνη.

The first is probably the oldest of the three, since the capitalized Δίκη is also the name of the goddess of justice. Compared to the other two, δίκη has a relatively clear meaning, as it is primarily used in the context of legal proceedings. »Νικᾶν δίκην,« for example, means »to win a legal battle.« »Δίκη γίγνεται,« meanwhile, means »a judicial decision is made.«

An adjective derived from δίκη is δίκαιος, which means »just.« Its meaning is more general than that of δίκη, and it can be used in varied

contexts. The word δίκαιον, in turn, is a noun derived from δίκαιος, usually used to refer to »justice« as a feature of a person, behavior, institution, political unity, and so on. Plato's *Politeia* is subtitled »περί δικαίου« [On Justice], which precisely indicates the core topic of the work. While δίκαιον and δικαιοσύνη (*dikaiosyne*) are interchangeable in many contexts, it is inappropriate to consider them equivalent, since the latter is used to denote »justice« not as an abstract property but rather as a *technē*.

According to Plato's *Politeia*, justice-*dikaiosyne* is a kind of power that produces just citizens and a just state (cf. *Republic* 1.335c–d: Ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ συλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὺς; Ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον, 4.443b: Ἐτι τι οὖν ἕτερον ζητεῖς δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἢ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις; Μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε). In other words, *justice-dikaiosyne* is defined by its *ergon*: a just state and just citizens. The entirety of the *Politeia* is formulated to help the reader grasp the nature and etiology of the *ergon* of justice-*dikaiosyne*. By the end of the fourth book, this goal has been partially achieved, as the features of the just state have been determined. *Callipolis*, the ideal state, »γε τῷ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν τριῶν ὄντων γενῶν δικάια ἦν« [4.441d; is just insofar as each citizen does their own work in the city, consisting of three classes]. A state enjoying such harmony is free from injustice, that is, stasis and disorder (cf. 4.444a–b).

The idea of the individual, as conceived of by modern political philosophy as the opposite of the state, was unimaginable to the ancient Greeks, as Aristotle suggests (*Politics* 1.1253a). Against this backdrop, Plato argues that producing a just polis and producing just citizens are the same thing, at least in a logical sense: Consequently, analyzing the structure of *Callipolis* is a potential way to understand the *ergon* of justice-*dikaiosyne* (*Republic* 2.368d–369b). Following this methodology, Plato begins his investigation of *Callipolis* in *Politeia* 2.369b. This unfolds in the form of a detailed description of *Callipolis*' genesis and *politeia*, which continues for the remainder of the work. In the *Politeia*, etiological thinking entails thinking about how an ideally just polis produces just citizens who continue to (re)produce the polis.

Nevertheless, the *Politeia* is a purely theoretical work. It cannot be seen as a step forward in the development of *technē* either in the broad sense

or in terms of Plato's later thoughts on the topic. Put simply, the *Politeia* is a work that concentrates on the *ergon* without sufficient strategic thinking based on real circumstances. Plato's investigation of the etiology of *Callipolis* presupposes ideal circumstances, which differ greatly from real circumstances in both his time and ours. *Callipolis* produces just citizens autonomously and continuously because it consists of sufficient just citizens. In the real world, producing a just polis and producing just citizens are by no means the same thing in an etiological sense, since there are not enough just citizens to produce a just polis. This means that, in the real world, just citizens cannot be produced through the institutions of *Callipolis*, because *Callipolis* has not yet been produced.

Guided by strategic thinking that pays attention to concrete situations, in his late works, Plato recognizes that to produce a just polis in the real world, one must develop a *techne* that can produce just citizens in the absence of *Callipolis* (cf. *Laws* 6.751d). This *techne* is, after justice-*dikaiosisyne*, the second sub-*techne* of the craft of the soul: the *nomothetike* (νομοθετική).