

The OSCE in Crisis: Five Lessons from the League of Nations

Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni*

Abstract

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, questions about the survival of the OSCE have taken an acute form. However, the war in Ukraine is not the only crisis facing the OSCE. The Organization has long been challenged by institutional deadlock, boycotts, budget cuts, increasing great power conflict, and growing contestation from nationalist and populist leaders. The question is therefore: How can the OSCE respond to such challenges to increase its resilience? In this paper I analyze various historical crises faced by the League of Nations and consider the extent to which institutional “coping strategies” during this era offer lessons for the present. Although the League was ultimately dissolved, many of its individual agencies live on in the United Nations. The paper provides recommendations for how to apply lessons from the League with a view to strengthening the OSCE’s resilience.

Keywords

OSCE, Ukraine conflict, organizational survival, interwar period, League of Nations

To cite this publication: Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The OSCE in Crisis: Five Lessons from the League of Nations,” in *OSCE Insights*, eds. Cornelius Friesendorf and Argyro Kartsonaki (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2023), <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748933625-03>

Introduction

Since the early 2000s, OSCE supporters have wrestled with how the Organization can contribute to resolving conflicts in the territories of the former Soviet Union and de-escalate growing tensions between Russia and the West. Lately, this question has taken an acute form: How can the OSCE survive large-scale warfare between two of its participating States? How

can the Organization survive growing hostility from participating States so that it may contribute to future European security dialogue and confidence-building?

The literature in International Relations has considered how joint membership in international organizations (IOs) can reduce the risk of inter-state war, but less attention has been paid to how IOs can survive violent conflicts among member states. Viewed from a historical perspective, the OSCE’s survival odds look slim. Looking at the survivability of IOs across the past two centuries, studies have found that security organizations have

* Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni
University of Cambridge
mer29@cam.ac.uk

the lowest survival rates, with organizational deaths peaking during times of war or economic crisis.¹ The Great Depression and the world wars killed off most existing security-focused IOs.² History also offers examples of IOs terminating due to violent conflict among pairs of member states. The Development Bank of the Great Lakes States was terminated after Rwanda invaded Zaire³ in 1996 to defeat rebel groups taking refuge there in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan civil war. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 is widely said to have undermined the League of Nations (LoN), although previous failures to check inter-state aggression had already shaken its foundations. If these historical examples are anything to go by, the outlook for the OSCE is bleak.

The war in Ukraine is far from the only crisis facing the OSCE: institutional deadlock, boycotts, budget cuts, increasing great power conflict, and growing contestation from nationalist and populist leaders all present acute challenges to the OSCE. How can the OSCE respond to such challenges to increase its resilience? In considering this question, it is instructive to explore how economic crises, great power conflicts, and nationalist populism have affected IOs in the past. The last period of hyper-nationalism, de-globalization, and democratic backsliding began in the late 1920s and lasted until the end of World War II. Protectionism rose, authoritarian populism spread in Europe and beyond, and both great powers and smaller states turned away from the LoN and other multilateral organiza-

tions towards ad hoc, bilateral diplomacy.⁴ Many IOs were terminated during this period or saw their memberships and mandates reduced. Others, however—including many League agencies—survived and continued to expand their functions.

This paper looks “under the hood” of the LoN and other IOs during the interwar period and examines whether the “coping strategies” they employed hold lessons for the OSCE. My analysis draws on recently released archival records of the League and previous academic research. International organization archives contain official documents (conference proceedings, speeches, working papers, official reports, treaties, agreements) and operational information such as internal briefing papers, budgets, staffing reports, and the correspondence of senior staff. These sources provide crucial insights regarding the goals, interests, and perceived challenges faced by IOs during geopolitical crises, allowing us to drill further into the important detail of how IO agents perceive and manage member state conflict and pushback against their authority.

Looking to the LoN for lessons about IO resilience may seem unorthodox. The League has long been regarded as a failed experiment in international co-operation. Recently, however, international historians and IR scholars have begun to reassess the League's legacy, pointing out that important elements of its institutional structures have lived on in the UN.⁵ In rewriting the League's legacy, scholars have considered the ways in which its Secretariat and staff shaped

its evolution during its twenty-five-year existence, providing detailed evidence of how its central institutions—in co-operation with supportive member states and transnational actors—wrestled with membership strife, treaty denunciations, shrinking budgets, and populist push-back (with varying degrees of success). Although the League was ultimately dissolved, these individual fights for survival can teach us much about how IOs battle adversity. Ultimately, we can learn from failure as well as success. In what follows, I consider various dimensions of crisis faced by the League and other interwar IOs and conclude with recommendations for how lessons can be applied to the OSCE today.

Budget crisis

A major challenge facing the OSCE is a steady reduction in its annual budget (in real terms).⁶ In this regard, the OSCE has much in common with the League. The League began its activities in 1920 at a time of considerable economic distress and national opposition to “wasteful” international institutions given the destitution caused by war. Between 1922 and 1926, the League’s budget increased by only 5 percent, while its employed staff grew by 27 percent.⁷ To economize on resources, traveling was discouraged; documents and minutes could not always be printed.⁸

Yet such penny-pinching fell far short of balancing the books, and therefore ways for the League to fulfill its tasks had to be found. Since the chief task

of the Secretariat was to gather and disseminate information, issue recommendations, and produce expert reports, agreements were reached with individual governments and other IOs to gather and disseminate their research and statistical data, thus reducing operational costs.⁹ Another way to cut costs was to lean on private actors. From 1922, the American Rockefeller Foundation made a series of grants to the League’s Health Organization (LHO). During the 1930s, these amounted to approximately half a million Swiss francs per year.¹⁰ Between 1933 and 1942, the Rockefeller Foundation also funded research by the Secretariat’s Economic Intelligence Service on combatting economic depression, contributing one-third of its budget at its peak.¹¹ Likewise, the League’s substantial investigations into trafficking in women and children were funded by the American Bureau of Social Hygiene.¹²

In addition to private foundations, labor and peace movements also played a significant role in supporting the League’s institutions. During the 1920s and 1930s, women’s peace activists, labor unions, and scholars gathered at transnational conferences to campaign against war and imperialism. National League of Nations societies and NGOs campaigned for the ratification of the League’s Permanent Court and supported its technical, economic, social, and humanitarian work.¹³ To facilitate such links, Secretariat officials frequently attended meetings of international NGOs and promoted NGO access not only to the Secretariat but also to the Council and the Assembly.¹⁴

Partnering with private actors served several purposes. First, amidst tight budgetary constraints, NGOs and civil society groups brought additional expertise, knowledge, and funds to the League. More broadly, it was hoped that involvement by civil society and NGOs would increase public support by bringing the League closer to the public. Civil society actors were also relied on to scrutinize state claims and politics towards the League, thus preempting national political mobilization based on scapegoating the League and enabling citizens to better evaluate political claims. For example, the League appointed NGO “assessors” to its committees on communications and transit, social policy, teaching, trafficking in women, and refugees.¹⁵ Finally, by allying with subnational and transnational actors, League institutions sought to broaden their bases of political and material support beyond governments to political agents within and across member states.

These examples may offer lessons for the OSCE. During the past decade, the OSCE’s operational capacity has steadily declined due to a decrease in seconded personnel and financial support. Expecting participating States to increase their financial contributions in the current climate would be wishful thinking. Instead, the OSCE might adopt the League’s strategy of building strategic partnerships with subnational, transnational, and supranational actors—including municipal governments, NGOs, private foundations and businesses, and IOs—that have complementary epistemic and material resources, using these to

fill gaps in operational capacities.¹⁶ Allying with substate and transnational actors simultaneously increased the resources available to the League and helped to improve its perceived legitimacy through epistemic validation, by serving to discredit state criticism and by influencing state policy “from within.” Transnational alliances also served in some cases to lessen tight state control by supplementing or replacing government funds with private funds and expertise.

Hiding from harm: Great power conflict and institutional retrenchment

Operating in an environment of growing nationalism and great power conflict, the League had a difficult start, especially in facilitating co-operation on issues seen to entail high sovereignty costs. A Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition was signed in September 1919 but never came into force as France declined to ratify it.¹⁷ A Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which outlawed wars of aggression, was rejected by governments in 1924. The Geneva Protocol of 1924, which created a system of compulsory arbitration, likewise faltered as Britain refused to sign.¹⁸

Given repeated failures of disarmament co-operation and amid growing political tension, the League’s Disarmament Section and the Secretariat adopted a new strategy of “hide and retrench.” Between 1930 and 1934, the Secretariat carefully avoided bringing proposals it deemed doomed to fail before the Council. Meetings of the General Commission

and the Disarmament Section were repeatedly canceled or postponed as leading bureaucrats considered it better not to convene the League's disarmament committees than to allow meetings to become a stage for public displays of animosity and megaphone diplomacy.¹⁹ As Sir Drummond reflected after Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935: "If the League emerges successfully from the Ethiopia-Italo ordeal the prospects will be bright for a convention to adjust armaments. If not, the whole position will have to be revised [...]. In any event, until next year, the less said about disarmament the better."²⁰

The moratorium on high-level conferences did not, however, imply the end of active disarmament diplomacy. Rather than convening full intergovernmental conferences, the Secretariat turned its efforts to organizing meetings among smaller groups of like-minded states with the aim of building consensus around limited, practical objectives. It also began collecting and analyzing data on national armaments. Making this data widely available, it was hoped, would help to generate public pressure on governments and might serve as a starting point for future arms control negotiations. That hope was never realized, but had governments been willing to discuss disarmament, the League would have had extensive data on hand as a basis for negotiations.

Trade co-operation underwent a similar development. As economic nationalism intensified following the Wall Street crash of 1929, a series of intergovernmental trade conferences failed.²¹ Unable to influence political aspects of trade such as

tariffs and customs, the League's economic institutions abandoned plans for further trade conferences. Instead, efforts by senior officials in the Secretariat focused on improving the League's machinery for economic diplomacy. Henceforth, the Economic Committee focused on resolving legal and administrative problems that acted as indirect barriers to trade—for example commercial arbitration, the simplification of customs formalities, and the standardization of statistical methods and customs terminology.²² Another area for expansion was research and publication of economic data. In 1931, the Secretariat published a report entitled *The Course and Phases of the World-Economic Depression*. Addressing the danger that states might object to any findings that were politically sensitive, Alexander Loveday, Director of the Economic, Financial, and Transit Section, recommended that the analytical side of the research "be subordinated to its fact finding aspects [...] since, ultimately, the findings would speak for themselves."²³ In short, to avoid alienating states, the Economic Section stuck to producing "neutral" research, leaving outside experts to draw unpopular conclusions.

"Hide and retrench" presented an obvious strategy for League institutions dealing with the politically sensitive issues of armaments and trade, yet less overtly political IOs navigated nationalist backlash in similar ways. From its birth in 1929 until the war, the International Bureau of Education (IBE) was highly active despite a limited budget and staff.²⁴ Launched in 1934, the IBE's "pedagogical tour of the world," which collected

data on national educational reforms and issued recommendations, reached more than seventy countries and provided a crucial resource for national education reformers. During World War II, the IBE's Secretariat collaborated with the International Red Cross to create the Service of Intellectual Assistance to Prisoners of War, which provided prisoners of war with books. Thanks to the broad appeal of such activities, the IBE's membership grew from twelve in 1929 to twenty by the end of the war, spanning Europe and Latin America. Undoubtedly, a crucial factor in the IBE's resilience was its apolitical, technical nature, which insulated it from political strife. This apolitical nature reflected a deliberate choice. Many governments were suspicious of international meddling in their domestic affairs and of a perceived Western bias in the global education agenda. To avoid political controversy, the IBE "ceaselessly stayed clear of interfering with [the] educational freedom of partners."²⁵ Rather than pushing for the standardization of national approaches, the Bureau strove to promote universal education without interfering with "local priorities," leaving specific recommendations and implementation to local authorities and NGOs. The IBE survives to this day as a specialized agency of UNESCO (IBE-UNESCO).

What are the possible lessons for the OSCE in this context? During the last few decades, arms control and disarmament—centerpieces of the OSCE's agenda—have become increasingly difficult as both the United States and Russia have pulled out of major arms control treaties.²⁶ Hence, many argue in favor

of seeking to revive disarmament discussions and strengthening the OSCE's role in arms control verification.²⁷ Yet any present attempt to update the 2011 Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building or to relaunch conventional arms control within the scope of the Structured Dialogue (initiated by the German Chairperson-in-Office in 2016) or the group of like-minded countries in the Berlin format would likely be fruitless.²⁸

The same is true for human rights initiatives. As the relationship between Russia and the West has deteriorated, debates on human rights have descended into ideological confrontation, leading to institutional blockages.²⁹ It seems counterproductive to table new initiatives or to seek to rekindle existing ones against such opposition. The Helsinki and Paris Charters would not be agreed by OSCE states today any more than the League's Covenant would have been agreed in 1935. It is therefore futile to insist on their enforcement in the current climate. As long as agreement remains elusive, individual states should seek to build greater confidence and trust by engaging in specific projects within the OSCE to increase transparency, or by using coalitions of the willing to advance specific projects. Such minilateral measures may not achieve much in the short term but would be more productive in the current climate than attempting to push ambitious schemes on which no agreement can be found.

Exploiting a flexible mandate

By 1934, the League's intergovernmental activities had mostly ceased. Had its mandate been limited to conventional security co-operation and trade, its operations would have ended. However, a broad mandate based on a comprehensive approach to security allowed the League's institutions to explore new areas of activity, including transportation, literacy, nutrition, and sanitation. An important focus for the League's social and economic institutions during the latter half of the 1930s was to outline a common front against poverty and disease as root causes of conflict.³⁰ This task was deemed to be of greater potential appeal to states and wider publics than the controversial issues of trade and disarmament.

Co-operation on social matters and broad conflict prevention tasks also allowed the League to gain supporters beyond its core member states. Two conferences were held in Java in 1937—one on combating trafficking in women, another on rural hygiene. In June 1936, the League's Health Organization held a session in Moscow, the only League institution to ever meet there.³¹ Links between Soviet health authorities and the LHO offered an ideal opportunity to forge practical connections in an apolitical domain. Ravaged by civil war, famine, and disease, Soviet health institutions were under severe strain. Hence, despite widespread fear and mistrust between Russia and Western governments, a special commission was founded to investigate typhus in Russia.³² By 1935, collaboration on communicable diseases and intellectual

matters had helped pave the way for Russia's inclusion as a formal member of the League.³³

In sum, as geopolitical conflict in Europe intensified, there was a change in the work of the League's institutions. Rather than attempting to gain agreement on divisive issues of trade and military security, they focused on issues where common ground could be found.³⁴ At the same time, they exploited a broad mandate to tailor activities to the needs of countries outside Europe, thereby broadening political support and patronage.³⁵ This strategy proved particularly successful for the LHO. Despite the financial restrictions imposed by the General Assembly, the generosity of private supporters allowed the LHO to continuously expand its activities. Early on, its focus broadened from epidemiological work in Eastern Europe to addressing health problems in Asia and Africa. NGOs, leading scientific institutes, and individual experts from all over the world freely contributed their knowledge and time to it, increasing its autonomy from states and helping it to transcend great power conflict.³⁶ In 1945, rather than being dissolved, the LHO was transformed into the World Health Organization.

While clearly a different kind of institution than the LHO, the OSCE can nevertheless take inspiration from this success story. Entrusted with a broad array of activities—from combatting human trafficking, radicalization, and terrorism to promoting economic connectivity and building scientific expertise on climate issues—the OSCE is well placed to reduce threats to its existence by widening its

activities and thereby its appeal to diverse states. While state funding is likely to be scarce for the foreseeable future, partnering with non-state actors may help to increase the financial and technical resources available to the OSCE, increasing autonomy from governments in the process. For their part, many NGOs are likely to welcome the political access and added legitimacy that may come from collaboration with an intergovernmental organization.

Harnessing institutional complexity

A major challenge confronting the OSCE which the League did not face to the same extent is competition from other IOs. Despite strengthening the OSCE with the 1990 Paris Charter, Western states have prioritized co-operation within NATO and the EU, while Russia has supported the creation of alternative regional organizations which address various aspects of collective security and economic and political stability, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In conjunction with the overlapping mandates and activities of UN agencies like the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), this has led to a proliferation of overlapping and potentially competing institutions in the OSCE space. Histori-

ally, institutional overlap has sometimes contributed to organizational deaths, as competition for scarce resources has put some IOs out of business.³⁷ However, institutional overlap can also be turned into a strength, provided IOs achieve a level of specialization and division of labor that prevents states from “forum shopping” or playing organizations off against one another.³⁸ In this case, co-ordination and collaboration between IOs can help to increase value for money for states while giving potentially competing IOs a positive stake in one another’s flourishing.

In recent years, the EU has been a major funder of the OSCE in areas where institutional interests converge. The two organizations have many interests in common, including good governance and fighting organized crime and corruption. Yet given Russian animosity towards the EU, the OSCE must not be perceived simply as an instrument of EU security interests; it must clearly articulate its own agenda.³⁹ In addition to collaborating with the EU, the OSCE would gain from deepening co-operation with relevant UN agencies, such as UNODC, UNDP, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.⁴⁰ Co-operation with regional organizations such as the CIS, the CSTO, and the EAEU will also be important. Some might worry that the different values embodied in these organizations present a barrier to co-operation; as former Secretary General Thomas Greminger points out, however, for reasons of politico-geographical balance, it is crucial to engage organizations both east and west of Vienna. For example, with the SCO, common ground may be found

in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism in Central Asia.⁴¹

International organizations can survive and thrive in a crowded institutional space either by developing niche functions and tools that render their services unique compared to those of other IOs or by playing a co-ordinating role, acting as convenors and building bridges between other IOs—or between international and national organizations. The OSCE is well placed to do both. For example, combatting violent extremism is one domain in which the OSCE has its own distinctive tools compared to other IOs. Given its extensive field experience, the OSCE is often better placed than NATO or the EU to reach out to local NGOs and municipal authorities. Compared to these organizations, the OSCE is also more likely to be accepted as a neutral mediator or monitor on the ground. Finally, the OSCE “focuses on promoting a comprehensive approach to cyber security, particularly in Central Asia, where NATO and the EU have a limited presence.”⁴² In terms of convening power, the OSCE’s broad membership, which intersects with the membership of NATO, the EU, the SCO, and the CSTO, puts it in a good position to play the role of convenor and inter-institutional co-ordinator.

Conclusions and recommendations

Significant care must be taken in applying lessons from the 1930s to the present or in comparing a “multi-purpose” IO like the League of Nations to the OSCE.

Still, the two organizations have strong similarities, above all their comprehensive approach to co-operative security and a membership which spans deep political and ideological divides. What’s more, present challenges to the OSCE carry strong echoes of the period leading to the downfall of the League. Much like the League during the 1920s and 1930s, the OSCE is operating in a climate of economic instability and austerity. Both organizations have seen political conflict trigger direct challenges to their founding principles. Just as Italy, Japan, and Germany violated the collective security clause of the League’s Charter, we have seen a series of grave violations of the OSCE’s founding documents, starting with NATO’s bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 and continuing with Putin’s war in Chechnya that same year, Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.

Given the magnitude of these challenges, it is clear that the OSCE needs a recipe for surviving both the immediate crisis triggered by the Ukraine war and the wider onslaught against its authority and the hollowing out of its resources. What can be done? Looking back at events during the 1930s, many have blamed the League for not doing enough to uphold the Charter’s collective security provisions, which called for automatic sanctions and armed defense of the territorial status quo.⁴³ Likewise, some have called for harsher diplomatic sanctions against Russia, and Ukraine has demanded its expulsion from the OSCE.⁴⁴

This is a high-risk strategy with uncertain benefits, however. When threatened with economic and military sanctions by other member states, Germany swiftly withdrew from the League and announced its full rearmentation. If pushed too far into a corner, Russia may simply leave the OSCE, perhaps taking others with it. Although this would not necessarily spell the end of the OSCE, it would rob it of a major part of its *raison d'être*.

To overcome present woes, others have called for institutional reform to strengthen the autonomy of the OSCE's Secretary General and to extend the one-year budget cycle to prevent quarreling governments from taking the budget "hostage."⁴⁵ While such reforms would be positive for the OSCE in the long run, they would achieve little in the short term, since they would fail to address the political nature of the current crisis. As Byron Hunt observed in his study of the Italo-Ethiopian war, IOs "rely as much on a common will to maintain themselves as they do on their constituted authority. If the League failed where the United Nations has not, it was because of the lack of this will in the former, and not because the latter is a better constituted organization."⁴⁶ In the same way, the OSCE's present crisis is not primarily "constitutional" but unmistakably political. Institutional reform will not fix that.

If neither the expulsion of non-compliant states nor institutional reform presents a viable strategy for survival, what can participating States do to enhance the OSCE's resilience? My analysis suggests five specific strategies for harnessing the OSCE's institutional strengths.

Retrench and diversify. A consensus-based organization like the OSCE (or the League) cannot be (much) more than the sum of the will of its participating States. Therefore, the OSCE's greatest asset may be its broad mandate, which provides flexibility to focus on tasks where *some* agreement can be found. The OSCE should exploit its flexible mandate to take a tempered approach—for now—to highly divisive issues like human rights and disarmament and should instead focus on less contentious issues like combatting radicalization, terrorism, human trafficking, and organized crime, as well as promoting co-operation on "low political issues" like economic connectivity, water diplomacy, and the security implications of climate change in order to reduce tensions. Producing consensual (and fact-based) knowledge about such problems should be highlighted as a key institutional deliverable. This does not mean abandoning the OSCE's core mandate but rather limiting its activities in these domains to promoting informal dialogue and building consensus among smaller groups who may contribute extra-budgetary funds to undertake specific programmatic initiatives. Clearly, such activities must be carefully designed to avoid alienating non-participants. Field activities outside Europe, in Central Asia, or focused on relatively non-contentious issues like transnational crime may be particularly fruitful targets.

Broaden political support. History teaches us that IOs thrive by cultivating a broad base of political support. A clear asset in this respect is the OSCE's large and heterogeneous membership. While

it may often lead to deadlock and lowest-common-denominator agreements, a large and heterogeneous membership means that an IO may lose active support or interest from some states while still retaining relevance to others that continue to see it as worthwhile. Indeed, having a large and heterogeneous membership has historically been a strong predictor of IO survivability.⁴⁷ The OSCE should therefore focus on engaging the *whole* of its membership, for example by pivoting towards a stronger focus on security-building in Central Asia.

Broaden bases of patronage. Most IOs lean on different sponsors during their lifespan. As the OSCE's budget continues to decline in real terms, it should strive to build stronger alliances with NGOs and subnational and supranational actors that share its objectives and that have complementary financial and technical resources that can be used to fill critical gaps in institutional and operational capacities.

Plan ahead. The OSCE does not have the political or technical capacity to engage in military crisis resolution. For now, it must therefore seek to “ride out the storm” by retreating from politically sensitive areas such as human rights promotion, arms control, and the policing of unstable ceasefires to focus on providing other benefits to supportive states. This does not mean taking its eyes off the Ukraine conflict. Rather, OSCE officials—in collaboration with like-minded states—should be ready with a plan of engagement if and when a ceasefire is agreed. This is especially important given that the OSCE is surrounded by institutional “competitors”—for example the

EU, the UN, and NATO—with bigger budgets who will also be ready to get involved. Here, the OSCE must prepare to use its unique convening power as the largest co-operative security organization in the world to co-ordinate the efforts of other IOs.

Plan B. Finally, the OSCE leadership should focus on articulating a Plan B should the present conflict fail to be resolved. A key lesson from history is that organizational flexibility is essential to survival. OSCE supporters should ask: If Russia were to disengage, where would that leave the OSCE? Does it have sufficient institutional assets to maintain its appeal to its remaining participants and thus give it a continued *raison d'être*? In such a scenario, offering a durable platform for dialogue between European and (some) Eurasian states and leaving the door open for Russia's eventual return might be one of the strongest arguments for keeping the OSCE alive.

Notes

- 1 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Death of International Organizations: The Organizational Ecology of Intergovernmental Organizations, 1815–2015,” *Review of International Organizations* 15, no. 2 (2020): 339–70; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “What Kills International Organisations? When and Why International Organisations Terminate,” *European Journal of International Relations* 27, no. 1 (2021): 281–310.
- 2 For example the Suez Canal Administration (dissolved 1914), the Reparations Commission (dissolved 1933), the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission

(dissolved 1934), the European Commissions for Control of the Oder and Elbe (dissolved 1936), the European Commission of the Danube (dissolved 1939), the Committee on Non-Intervention in Spanish Affairs (dissolved 1939), the Committee of Imperial Defence (dissolved 1940), and the League of Nations (dissolved 1946).

3 The present-day Democratic Republic of Congo.

4 League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service, *The Network of World Trade: A Companion Volume to "Europe's Trade"* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1942), 1:90–91.

5 M. Patrick Cottrell, *The League of Nations: Enduring Legacies of the First Experiment at World Organization* (New York: Routledge, 2018); Susan Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations,” *American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (2007): 1091–1117.

6 United States Mission to the OSCE, Statement on the Presentation of the 2022 Unified Budget Proposal by the Secretary General, PC.DEL/1590/21 (Vienna: October 21, 2021), <https://www.osc.e.org/files/f/documents/8/4/502990.pdf>

7 F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 174. See also “General Report Adopted by the Assembly on September 27th, 1927,” *League of Nations Official Journal* 9, no. 1 (January 1928): i–vii.

8 Walters, cited above (Note 7), pp. 133–34.

9 A. Alexander Menzies, “Technical Assistance and the League of Nations,” in *The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the Symposium Organized by the United Nations Library and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 6–9 November 1980* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1983), 295–312. See also Cost, Printing and Distribution of Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1921, R309/10/12065/6408, United Nations Archives at Geneva.

10 Health Organisation – Rockefeller Foundation – Financial Cooperation 1937, 1937–1938, R6040/8A/27171/546, United Nations Archives at Geneva. This corresponds to some 9–10 million Swiss francs by present-day values.

11 “First Meeting (Private),” *League of Nations Official Journal* 19, no. 2 (February 1938): 74–77; Disarmament Conference – Progress Reports of the President of the Conference to the Bureau, 1933–1934, R4220/7B/10742/596, United Nations Archives at Geneva; Kathryn Lavelle, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in International Organizations: US Involvement in the League of Nations,” *Review of International Organizations* 2, no. 4 (2007): 380.

12 Pedersen, cited above (Note 5).

13 Craig Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

14 Thomas Richard Davies, “A ‘Great Experiment’ of the League of Nations Era: International Nongovernmental Organizations, Global Governance, and Democracy beyond the State,” *Global Governance* 18, no. 4 (2012): 405–23; Steve Charnovitz, “Learning from Early NGO Activity,” *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)* 92 (April 1–4 1998): 338–41.

15 Davies, cited above (Note 14), p. 409; Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1939).

16 David Galbreath, André Härtel, and Stefan Wolff, “Towards a More Strategic Partnership: Strengthening the OSCE through Enhanced EU-OSCE Cooperation,” in *OSCE Insights*, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911456-03>; Ranjit Lall, “Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining

the Performance of International Organizations,” *International Organization* 71, no. 2 (2017): 245–80.

17 Traffic in Arms, 7 May 1920, R186/8/4407/4407, United Nations Archives at Geneva.

18 Record of Th. Achnides’s conversations in London during his mission to attend Mr Henderson’s funeral. “Disarmament Conference – Correspondence between the Secretariat and the President of the Conference,” R4220/7B/10257/596/Jacket 4, United Nations Archives at Geneva.

19 Memoranda on Disarmament Forwarded by the Foreign Office London, 1934, R4220/7B/10829/596, United Nations Archives at Geneva; Pedersen, cited above (Note 5).

20 As reported by Th. Achnides, cited above (Note 18).

21 Martin D. Dubin, “Toward the Bruce Report: The Economic and Social Programs of the League of Nations in the Avenol Era,” in *The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the Symposium Organized by the United Nations Library and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 6–9 November 1980* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1983), 42–72.

22 Alexander Loveday, “The Economic and Financial Activities of the League,” *International Affairs* 17, no. 6 (1938): 788–808; Menzies, cited above (Note 9).

23 Lavelle, cited above (Note 11), p. 379.

24 Pedro Rosselló, *Conférence internationale de l'instruction publique, Recommandations 1934–1977* (Geneva: UNESCO-BIE, 1961).

25 Rita Hofstetter and Bernard Schneuwly, “The International Bureau of Education (1925–1968): A Platform for Designing a ‘Chart of World Aspirations for Education,’” *European Educational Research Journal* 12, no. 2 (2013): 217.

26 For example, Russia withdrew from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 2015, and both the United States and Russia withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty in 2020 and 2021, respectively.

27 Benjamin Schaller, *Strengthening the Role of the OSCE in Times of Increased Tensions and Emerging Crisis Situations: The Untapped Potential in the European Arms Control Framework* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2021), <https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/doc/strengthening-the-role-of-the-osce-in-times-of-increased-tensions-and-emerging-crisis-situations>; Galbreath, Härtel, and Wolff, cited above (Note 16); Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “The Presentation of the New OSCE Action Plan in Vienna Sends a Strong Signal,” January 13, 2022, <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/newsuebersicht/2022/01/aktionsplan-osze-2025.html>

28 Twenty-two states participate in the German-led group of like-minded countries on conventional arms control, but major players like the United States, Canada, Poland, and the Baltic states and Norway remain aloof.

29 Stefan Lehne, *Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12952#metadata_info_tab_contents; David Galbreath, “Putting the Colour into Revolutions? The OSCE and Civil Society in the Post-Soviet Region,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25, nos. 2–3 (2009): 161–80.

30 Walters, cited above (Note 7), p. 575.

31 Ingeborg Plettenberg, “The Soviet Union and the League of Nations,” in *The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the Symposium Organized by the United Nations Library and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva,*

6–9 November 1980 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1983), 156.

32 Epidemics in Russia, 29 August 1921, R824/12B/15319/15255, United Nations Archives at Geneva. See also Plettenberg, cited above (Note 31).

33 Plettenberg, cited above (Note 31), p. 156.

34 Walters, cited above (Note 7), p. 750.

35 Thomas Müller, “Institutional Reforms and the Politics of Inequality Reproduction: The Case of the League of Nations’ Council Crisis in 1926,” *Global Society* 34, no. 3 (2020): 304–17.

36 Health Organisation, 28 August 1919, R811-1/12B/921/126, United Nations Archives at Geneva; Plague Epidemic, 28 August 1925, R815/12B/6646/5568, United Nations Archives at Geneva; Establishment of Medical or Sanitary Section under the League of Nations, 4 July 1919, R811-1/12B/126/126, United Nations Archives at Geneva; Karen Gram-Skjoldager and Haakon Andreas Ikonomou, “The League of Nations Secretariat: An Experiment in Liberal Internationalism?,” *Monde(s)* 19, no. 1 (2021): 31–50.

37 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “What Kills International Organizations?,” cited above (Note 1); Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Oliver Westerwinter, “The Global Governance Complexity Cube: Varieties of Institutional Complexity in Global Governance,” *Review of International Organizations* 17, no. 2 (2022): 233–62.

38 C. Randall Henning and Tyler Pratt, “Hierarchy and Differentiation in International Regime Complexes: A Theoretical Framework for Comparative Research” (unpublished paper, 2022), <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c54747ad7819e06b909fb1f/t/61f351dd6cf4da0b9d3d2eed/1643336157728/Hierarchy+and+Differen> tiation+in+International+Regime+Complexes_Jan20.pdf

39 Galbreath, Härtel, and Wolff, cited above (Note 16).

40 Lamberto Zannier, “A Stronger OSCE for an Uncertain Future,” in *OSCE Yearbook 2017*, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), 35–50.

41 Thomas Greminger, “Strengthening Cooperative Security in Difficult Times: Three Years as Secretary General of the OSCE (2017–2020) – a Critical Appraisal,” in *Multilateralism in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities for the OSCE*, eds. Simon J. A. Mason and Lisa Watanebe (Zürich: Center for Security Studies [CSS], ETH Zürich, 2021), 22–84.

42 Monika Wohlfeld and Fred Tanner, *Comprehensive Security and New Challenges: Strengthening the OSCE* (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2021), p. 9, <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2123.pdf>

43 F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

44 Stefanie Liechtenstein, “Ukraine Calls for Suspending Russia from the OSCE,” *Security and Human Rights Monitor*, June 30, 2022, <https://www.shrmonitor.org/ukraine-calls-to-expel-russia-from-the-osce/>

45 Greminger, cited above (Note 41).

46 Byron Walfred Hunt, “The League of Nations and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict” (master’s thesis, University of Montana, 1957), iii, <https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9685&context=etd>

47 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Death of International Organizations” and “What Kills International Organisations?,” cited above (Note 1).