Other tensions prevent the emergence of a coherent vision of phenomenological anthropology. Some articles, like that of Monica Dalidowicz (ch. 4) on the difficulties of learning (and teaching) Indian classical dance across cross-cultural boundaries, or L. L. Wynn's reflections on the representation of love in anthropology and phenomenology (ch. 10), present rich ethnographic details and accounts. But this tends to go to the detriment of in-depth engagement with phenomenology (or vice versa: in chapters leaning towards phenomenology, like those of Throop and Downey, detailed ethnographic descriptions tend to be less prominent). Either one or the other seems to serve as an attachment to the author's main concern; a genuine synthesis is rarely achieved, or even sought. Robert Desjarlais's essay on the use of photography as phenomenology in his long-standing fieldsite in Nepal is an exception to this rule, combining a nuanced phenomenological discourse with rich ethnographic information. The same applies to Christopher Houston's (ch. 12) reflections on the relationships between phenomenology, poetry, and ethnography, using Michael Jackson as example for their interweaving in the work of a particular writer.

In Wynn's article, the aforementioned tension between the ethnographic and the phenomenological expresses itself in a quite unjustified, yet telling criticism of phenomenology itself. She accuses Merleau-Ponty of having described, in his chapter on sexuality in "Phenomenology of Perception," love and desire in "unrealistic", because experience-distant ways: "what it [the chapter] completely fails to convey is the emotion, the affect, of love and desire" (240). Whoever has read the book, or phenomenological philosophy in general, realizes immediately that it was not Merleau-Ponty's intention to evoke emotion and affect, but to understand its significance in human existence.

With this I do not intend to say that anthropologists should not criticize phenomenology; but I think such criticism should be based on an awareness of the specificity of phenomenology. It needs to acknowledge that phenomenology and anthropology are different kinds of projects. To spell out this difference: anthropology is fundamentally concerned with understanding the aspects of human lives relating to the concrete conditions in a specific space and time; phenomenology as philosophy, by contrast, aspires to formulate the conditions under which human beings are able to transcend this relativity, to make statements that are "true" regardless of circumstance. In short, while anthropology stresses the particularity, phenomenology emphasizes the universality of human existence. Of course, one wants to object, these differences are not clear-cut: anthropology inevitably must make a universalist assumption (about the anthropologist's faculty to communicate across cultural boundaries), and conversely, phenomenology's reflection on experience departs from the paradoxical insight that every kind of universal claim is necessarily connected with a particular perspective. But that does not mean that the two projects can simply be identified with each other, as is implied in Wynn's and other contributions to the volume.

There is thus indeed a great affinity between phenomenology and anthropology, and potential of mutual enrich-

ment in form of a phenomenological anthropology. But for this phenomenological anthropology to materialize, one has to do the groundwork of formulating the essences of both projects and, on this basis, develop a clear understanding of the relationship between them. This might be too much to ask from an edited collection, but Ram and Houston themselves establish this standard through some of their more far-reaching claims (see also Ram on page 30), and their collection, viewed as a whole, does not live up to it.

All of this is not to say that "Phenomenology in Anthropology" is not worth reading, that it does not contain well-crafted and carefully argued contributions full of interesting ideas and insights. What it is supposed to mean is that reading it, I found myself asking the question whether there has indeed been a conceptual refinement of phenomenological anthropology in the last 20 years. Is there really some kind of progress in comparison to Csordas's application of Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body to anthropology, or to Jackson's vision of phenomenological anthropology articulated in his introduction to "Things as They Are" (frequently cited in Ram and Houston)? I am inclined to answer the question negatively, and I am wondering whether an anecdote from Michael Jackson's afterword could not also be applied to the ways in which anthropologists relate to phenomenology. The story is about a famous natural scientist who recalled how she discovered as a five-year old that eggs in a basket do not fall out if the basket is swirled around fast enough, even when it is upside down. When she reported her discovery of an "anti-gravity force" to the grown-ups in her life, they reacted dismissively, to her great disappointment, and treated her experience as an instance of a familiar law. Jackson uses her reaction to illustrate central features of the phenomenological perspective: "But, she thought, it is still my discovery, because I made the discovery on my own. The discovery was mine" (298). Reading "Phenomenology in Anthropology," one sometimes gets the impression that a new generation of anthropologists has discovered phenomenology for themselves, and pronounces excitedly, "this discovery is mine." While this is commendable, one would wish that there was something to which this excitement would lead, the formulation of a principle or "law," some kind of shared understanding of what phenomenology is supposed to mean for anthropology. Only when such an understanding has been produced, one will be able to say that the field of phenomenological anthropology has entered the stage of maturity.

                                                                                                  Bernhard Leistle

Rogers, Chris: The Use and Development of the Xinkan Languages. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016. 262 pp. ISBN 978-1-4773-0832-5. Price: $ 29.95

Mesoamerica is one of the World's major areas of linguistic diversity, evidencing a considerable number of seemingly unrelated families. Mesoamerican languages promise many insightful linguistic reconstructions, supported by colonial descriptions and pre-Columbian texts, implying a lot of details on language contact in the deep

past and prospects for long-range comparison. That is why Mesoamerican linguistics heavily depends on grammatical descriptions and reconstructions for every single member in the area; if one of them is not under consideration, any hypothesis of borrowing or independent development becomes weak. Until very recently, Xinkan languages of Guatemala were a gap being represented in post-Saussurian times only by two articles (O. Schumann Gálvez, Fonémica del dialecto xinca de Chiquimulilla. In: Summa antropológica de homenaje a Roberto J. Weitlaner. México 1966: 449–454; L. Campbell, Mayan Loan Words in Xinca. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 38.1972: 187–190), a diagnostic 100 word-list (H. McArthur, Xinca. In: M. K. Mayers [ed.], Languages of Guatemala. The Hague 1966: 309–312) and an unpublished master's thesis (O. Schumann Gálvez, Xinca de Guazacapán. México 1967). Two recent books by Frauke Sachse (Maldonado de Matos. Arte de la lengua szinca. Markt Schwaben 2004; Reconstructive Description of Eighteenth-century Xinka Grammar. 2 vols. Utrecht 2010) and by Chris Rogers (2016) changed the situation. They are very different in the nature of the analysed data (an 18th-century manuscript and field recordings made in the 1970s), in volume (957 and 262 pages), and in the way of presenting the data. The last book is under review here.

The book is based on the author's Ph.D. thesis of 2010, "A Comparative Grammar of Xinkan," but is different in scope and aims and includes additional data. The intriguing title suggests a particular perspective taken, though the book does not say much about the use of Xinkan languages and by development the author means reconstruction of proto-Xinkan. The book is nicely organised and easy to digest for one who knows little about the subject. It consists of an introduction, two parts, and appendices. Part 1, "Synchronic Grammar," includes chapters on phonology, morphology, and syntax and an interlinear glossed text. Part 2, "Diachronic Grammar," gives excurses in historical phonology, morphology, and syntax and discusses perspectives for future research.

Part 1 complies with today's standards of grammatical descriptions, although a chapter on lexical semantics is missing. Sometimes chapters lack generalisations and conclusions; the author rarely presents alternative ways of analysis and avoids parallels with earlier descriptions. I will comment on two precious findings of this linguistic description.

The Xinkan languages are characterised by a contrast between non-glottalised and glottalised stops, sibilants, an affricate and sonorants, and many grammatical morphemes trigger either glottalisation or deglottalisation of consonants. The glottalised fricative lateral *ł* is realised as a liquid [l'] and the glottalised sibilants *s* and *ş* as an affricate [ts']. Importantly, glottalised sonorants have not been recognised in previous publications. It is unclear which mechanism may account for the processes of glottalisation and deglottalisation, i.e., which phonetic entity may trigger them. I would like to raise a number of questions at this point. Does the free variation between glottalised and non-glottalised consonants involve laryngealisation of adjacent vowels? What is the glottalised counterpart of

the glottal fricative? Taking into account that all consonants are attested in glottalised and glottalised form, does it make sense to reanalyse the phonological system as one of non-glottalised consonants, non-modal, and laryngealised vowels? Similar distribution is the main argument for considering Totonacan languages to have laryngealised vowels. Is it possible to treat glottalised consonants in Xinkan as biphonemic combinations? Word-medial biconsonantal clusters of glottalised consonants are banned in the language; the glottalisation of the second member in word-medial consonantal clusters involves an epenthetic vowel inserted between two consonants.

The author proposes that Xinkan verbs are lexically and morphologically divided in four classes: transitive verbs, agentive intransitive verbs, affective intransitive verbs, and fluid intransitive verbs. It is a kind of semantic alignment. Agentive intransitives denote actions performed by an agent in control of the action; affective intransitives are those whose subjects are not in control of the action or ensuing state, i.e., undergoers. Fluid intransitives can belong to both agentive and affective classes. However, the examples given show that the so-called agentives are mostly verbs of bodily processes and speaking (to cough, be sick, sleep, spit, speak), while the so-called affectives are verbs of motion and posture (to enter, climb, stand, squat, drown). I suggest a revision of the proposed semantic categorisation because in my opinion verbs of motion and posture are prototypically agentive.

The interlinear text in Guazacapán Xinka is supplied with a word-for-word translation only. Notes on the general plot, structure of the text, and explanations of unexpected switches between the first and third person are necessary. The story is about Thunder who obtained the maize from the sacred mountain and about the colouring of maize white, yellow, red, and black by the lighting which Thunder used as its weapon to split open the mountain where the maize was hidden. It includes the motifs "Man used his penis to climb a tree and got stuck," "Monster killed by an unripe fruit thrown into its maw," "Miraculous birth from the buried body of a murdered woman," "Thunder, the youngest of the brothers (Storms)," "Quest for agricultural plants," and "Failed attempts to cultivate plants." It is a very Mesoamerican story, indeed, but it is difficult to recognise because a coherent translation is not given and the plot and motifs are not discussed.

Part 2 is dedicated to the reconstruction of proto-Xinkan. Few examples are given for every particular sound correspondences and just a couple of conditioned sound changes are identified. Cognate sets, lexical word lists, and an index of Xinkan words are missing, so the reader cannot see how and if the proposed correspondences work, neither can he search for such himself. Here the reader gets an impression that Xinkan languages are in fact closely related dialects. No estimations for the time depth are given; a 100-word list for every language variety and lexico-statistical counts, even if not translated into glottochronological estimates, could help to understand how different the languages under discussion are. Some examples in the chapters "Historical Phonology" and "Phonology" look like borrowings but are not recog-

nised as such: *ts'uułi 'ladino,' cf. Lowland Mayan *ts'uul 'nobleman, foreigner, master,' *weetan/*k'eetan 'large worm,' cf. Mexican Spanish cuétlano '(large) edible worm,' miitʃi 'cat,' cf. Nahuatl mistoon 'cat,' mistłi 'puma,' etc. More attention to loanwords would have been rewarding. For instance, loans from Mayan languages might inform the reconstruction of proto-Xinkan and perhaps pre-proto-Xinkan.

I recommend the book to every library specialising in Amerindian languages as a good introduction. I would hope that more books on Xinkan languages are on their way. Some great desiderata are a collection of analysed texts and detailed work on reconstruction including an etymological dictionary. I also hope that the 1967 thesis of the late Otto Schumann – incorrectly cited in the work as a book under review – will be finally published with an introduction and commentaries.

Albert Davletshin

Röschenthaler, Ute, and **Mamadou Diawara** (eds.): Copyright Africa. How Intellectual Property, Media, and Markets Transform Immaterial Cultural Goods. Canon Pyon: Sean Kingston Publishing, 2016. 393 pp. ISBN 978-1-907774-42-3. Price: £ 75.00

The application of copyright laws in first world nations has a long and complex history, based primarily upon the fundamental principles of author's rights and the protection of their intellectual property. The primacy of an identifiable (usually single) author has been the foundation upon which international copyright regulations and agreements, for example, the Berne Convention of 1886, have been built. An additional layer is the concept that an author's works exist in a kind of stasis, where borrowing and reproducing from its core elements (for example, in music, the melody and lyrics of a song) would constitute an infringement on the author's rights.

How then to apply such principles, bound as they are to the primacy of the individual over the community, to Africa, where "authorship" of cultural materials is shared and owned by communities? Who owns "intangible cultural heritage" and how are concepts of copyright and intellectual property applied in order to protect and preserve it? These questions are the focus of "Copyright Africa," an edited collection of 14 chapters which addresses the issue through case studies of local creative industries.

Since the digital era and its inexpensive access to technologies, Africa has been beset by the large- and small-scale copying of cultural materials. Piracy on a commercial scale is commonplace in many African nations, where notions of "ownership" and authorship are contested and where major creative works reside in the realm of intangible cultural heritage. The situation is complicated by lax enforcement of anti-piracy laws, and the introductory chapter provides a historical context to these conditions, explaining that concepts of "ownership" of cultural materials, be it a song, work of art, or literary piece, are not new to Africa. Indeed, for many centuries, ownership of cultural materials was clearly structured. Local societies, castes, families and nominated individuals were vested with the mantle of ownership and were the recognized custodians. However, with colonialism, these rights and norms were challenged and in many cases superseded by Western regulations and laws. The imposition of copyright agreements on African societies brought with it inherent conflicts, particularly Western ideals related to the ways in which cultural materials are created, shared and reproduced. This "genealogy of cultural expression" (22) is critiqued by the editors in a fine introduction which leads to the case studies which are divided into four sections based upon theme.

The case studies of how copyright laws are practiced in Africa cover the major cultural industries, with a strong focus on music. Chapters are devoted to hip-hop in Africa, wrestling in Senegal (with its accompaniment of drumming troupes), music piracy and traditional dance in Cameroon, the transmission of intangible cultural heritage in Mali, and several chapters on different aspects of music in South Africa. Of the latter, "Lion's Share: Intellectual Property Rights and the South African Music Industry" is an impressive chapter worthy of attention as it illuminates one of the greatest copyright scandals of the 20th century. In 1939, Solomon Linda released on 78 rpm disc an *a capella* song called "Mbube," a composition which embeds Western and South African musical ideas in a style known as *isicathamiya*, of which Ladysmith Black Mambazo are the contemporary heirs. "Mbube" became a hit, not just in South Africa, for it found its way into the living rooms of continental Europe and the USA via groups such as The Weavers, who re-named it "Wimoweh." Under that name and also as "The Lion Sleeps Tonight" it became, no less, "one of the most profitable songs in the history of recorded sound" (88), making fortunes for its owners, Disney Enterprises, while Solomon Linda died in poverty. The author of the chapter, Veit Erlmann, provides a thorough overview of the copyright agreements in South Africa which permitted such bounty at the expense of local creators. First World incursions into Africa and the wholesale "borrowing," to put it mildly, of its cultural treasures still litter the landscape ("The Lion King" franchise and the epic narrative of Sundiata, a key piece of the intangible cultural heritage of the Mandé people of West Africa, for example, and Paul Simon's "Graceland"), and a concurrent theme throughout the work is the argument that Western models for the publication of creative works and their regulation have been imposed upon African society, and that copyright agreements, such as the Berne Convention, facilitated the "reproduction of imperial colonialism on the level of international law" (58).

It is Africa's response and resilience to this "imposition" which forms the basis of the text, and case studies are presented which investigate the ways in which local actors have responded creatively to the limitations and opportunities presented. In addition to the aforementioned chapters on music, the text presents works which critique the Nollywood film industry of Nigeria, beauty pageants and the shifting notions of femininity in Mali, and the World Cup in South Africa and its cultural markers. A critical question that underlies these and other chapters in