

Leonhard Kreuzer

The Harm Prevention Rule in Cyberspace

An Obligation of Due Diligence



Nomos

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Der Familie

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List of Abbreviations

ARSIWA	Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CBM	Confidence-building measure
NATO CCDCOE	NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
CERT	Computer Emergency Response Team
CoE	Council of Europe
CIA	Confidentiality, integrity and availability
COVID	Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
GCSC	Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace
IACtHR	Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICT	Information and communications technology
ILC	International Law Commission
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NIS Directive	EU Directive on the security of network and information system, EU/2016/1148
NIS 2 Directive	EU Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, EU/2022/2555
NSA	National Security Agency
OAS	Organization of American States
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe

List of Abbreviations

PCIJ	Permanent Court of International Justice
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UN Charter	Charter of the United Nations
UN GGE	UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security
UN ODC	UN Office of Drugs and Crime
UN OEWG	UN Open-Ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security
TRIPS	WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
WTO	World Trade Organization