

contemporary lives of the Tabiteueans, who instead of the local products prefer imported provisions of rice, flour, and kava drink from Fiji or the Solomon Islands. The workforce in the villages has decreased because of emigration to the capital for employment or education and many Tabiteuean youths have left to work in German merchant ships or Japanese fishing vessels.

It is certain that many *maneaba* traditions have changed, with myths and knowledge having been forgotten, but we should not overlook the fact that knowledge and practices are being continuously reorganized. Although this book concentrates on the mythological continuity of practices in the *maneaba*, it seems that this view is too partial if anthropologists are to grasp the holistic lives of the people through fieldwork. If readers travel to Tabiteuea with the impression of the myths and traditions as presented in the volume, they might be surprised to witness the villagers' present lives. Therefore, they must search for the people living in the contemporary globalizing world.

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Das, Veena, Michael Jackson, Arthur Kleinman, and Bhargupati Singh (eds.): *The Ground Between*. Anthropologists Engage Philosophy. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014. 351 pp. ISBN 978-0-8223-5718-6. Price: £ 16.99

"The Ground Between" is a collection of essays in which leading anthropologists – primarily from universities in the United States – respond to the question of why and how they sometimes turn to philosophy during the "course of concrete projects of research and thought." The book's twelve inspiring essays demonstrate that there are at least a dozen different ways in which such an engagement with philosophy can take form. The contributions all seem to have one thing in common, though, they acknowledge that "for philosophy to have value in our world, it must learn to respond to the puzzles and pressures that an ethnographic engagement with the world brings to light," as the editors state in the introduction. Each of the essays requires attentive reading, as one of the premises of the book is that it is no simple task to clarify what role philosophical reflections might play in ethnographic inquiries. However, we do get some answers. In the following, I choose three essays as examples to address in detail, after which I briefly mention the other nine essays.

Didier Fassin's essay follows the definition of Deleuze and Guattari that philosophy is about creating concepts, whereas anthropology, according to Fassin, is concerned with making sense of the world. The reductive character of Fassin's suggestion aside, this implies that philosophy and anthropology must live parallel lives that only cross each other's regions in the form of disloyal "translations" that exploit the discourses and/or contents of the other discipline. To Fassin, the key criterion for justifying such exploitations is that they must be heuristic, i.e., they must prove to be fruitful pathways to making new discoveries. In order to clarify this point, Fassin opposes two ways of approaching Foucault's theory of biopolitics. On one

side, we have a research proposal produced by a graduate student who, in the formulation of his abstract, is so loyal to the vocabularies of Foucault and Agamben that the proposal reads like a code that is almost impossible to decipher. How could such a mimetic reproduction lead to new discoveries? On the other side, we have the story about Fassin himself, who, at the end of a lecture on biopolitics, received critical comments from a colleague, an expert in Foucault. The colleague found that Fassin's lecture had very little to do with the concept of biopolitics in Foucault and was actually abusing it. But what Fassin realized was that he had actually been exploring a concept through his "abusive" analysis of Foucault that Foucault, paradoxically, had ignored in his theory of biopolitics, namely the concept of life, i.e., life as something which human beings grant a certain worth. On the basis of this new insight, Fassin proposes to address the politics of life as an alternative research program to that of biopolitics.

The role of philosophy in Michael Jackson's contribution is another than that of concept creation. While Jackson understands ethnography as a strategy for close encounters which demands "immersion in a world of others and otherness," he sees philosophy as a strategy to distance ourselves to the world of immediate experience. This act of distancing oneself is motivated primarily by what Jackson calls an existential imperative: To be a human being means to be thrown into the immediacies of life. At the same time we are reflective, sense-making, and sense-seeking creatures. Once in a while, one therefore needs to "stand back, take stock, and gain some purchase over events that one was simply too involved in to see clearly," as Jackson states. He then applies this existential imperative as an analogy to the use of philosophy in anthropological work. It was thus due to the remoteness of Sartre's philosophy from the subject of Jackson's early fieldwork among the Kuranko in West Africa that Jackson gained a perspective on his fieldwork from a certain distance. In that way, the juxtaposition of Sartre's conceptual apparatus with the ethnographic materials helped him in the process of thinking and writing about it.

The theme of Arthur Kleinman's contribution, on the other hand, is the shortcomings of philosophy in regards to an existential longing for wisdom. During the Vietnam War era, Kleinman was stationed in Taiwan where he found himself in search of a direction in his life. He, therefore, spent his spare time reading different philosophers and wrote down phrases and quotes from these studies in a notebook. These philosophical fragments have since been informing all of his work and given him the clear sense that theory is important. But they did not offer him the wisdom he was in search of. This point becomes accentuated during the time of crisis that Kleinman experiences many years later after the loss of his wife, who died after years of suffering. In the moment of his crisis, Kleinman begins rereading his old notebook. But the wise, philosophical words are of no help, and Kleinman realizes that he has been searching for wisdom – the art of living – in the wrong way. So he turns his attention to practice, since he did not discover the true subject of his quest for wisdom by reading philosophers in

the end but “through caregiving and mentoring, as a doctor, a husband, and a teacher.” To illustrate this, Kleinman offers the example of caregiving, which to him is the closest one gets to “an existential definition of what it means to be human.” It was thus in the act and process of taking care of his wife during her illness that Kleinman learned what caregiving is all about. Here one might think of Aristotelian virtue ethics as an obvious vantage point, but the philosopher Kleinman concentrates on William James as a discussion partner, who is well known for his pragmatism. Concerning the relation between philosophy and anthropology, Kleinman ends his essay by discussing James’ conception of the university as a “place where wisdom was at home.” According to Kleinman, however, the IT revolution has had a negative influence on the universities of our days. Meaning is replaced by information, which implies a turn away from research interests concerned with lived experience. What we might hope for is that philosophy and anthropology would learn from each other in order to “revivify quests for wisdom in the university and more broadly in public life.”

Ghassan Hage’s essay discusses Bourdieu’s relation to philosophy and provides an informative interpretation of the notion of *habitus*, coined as a principle of “hom-ing and building.” As a self-styled, habitual eavesdropper, Hage takes his starting point in the experience of his loss – and eventual regaining – of hearing. He then uses this case study to point out some limitations in Bourdieu’s theoretical corpus, which is based on a modern ontology through and through, and as an alternative suggests a critical “anthropology of radical alterity.” Clara Han and Veena Das both discuss how Austin’s and Cavell’s theories of speech acts can prove fruitful for the understanding of – and, conversely, be enriched by – their respective fieldwork in poor urban neighborhoods in Chile (Han) and India (Das). João Biehl is concerned with the mutual influence of the anthropologist Pierre Clastres and the philosophers Deleuze and Guattari. He stresses that ethnography should not be conceived as proto-philosophy but as a genuine way of doing theory that admits for an emancipatory reflectivity. Bhrigupati Singh concentrates his efforts on discussing how non-dialectical philosophy (Nietzsche, Deleuze) can be helpful in the course of thinking about ethnographic fieldwork, while Michael M. J. Fischer delivers a tour de force through considerations on how philosophers like Benjamin, Derrida, and Arendt can relate to anthropological reflections about different circumstances and issues in Iran. Taking up an example of ritual thinking from early China, Michael Puett argues that philosophy and anthropology can both gain insights from indigenous visions in that they challenge the way in which we moderns categorize the world around us. On the basis of Bergson’s concept of duration, Steven C. Caton introduces a new way of thinking about the production and reliability of ethnographical work and suggests a form in which one strives to imagine what goes on in the mind of the other by focusing on the perception of duration that a certain subject might have in a given context. Vincent Crapanzano also discusses the question of other minds but in a line of reasoning that underscores the opac-

ity of the other. His essay does not draw conclusions, but rather sets the scene for rethinking the question of knowing the other’s mind as a question of which a part of the answer should call attention to the social conventions of a given people.

Now, what is the “ground between” anthropology and philosophy? This book does not address this question directly, but on the basis of the essays it is possible to point out some themes around which the two disciplines could be said to meet and, at the same time, differentiate themselves from each other. Just to mention some: life/lives, lived experience, subjectivity, the question of knowing the other’s mind, and the everyday / the ordinary. It is my contention that not only anthropologists – and maybe other social scientists – but also philosophers can profit from studying the inquiries presented in this book, in which most of the contributions, by the way, display a predilection for twentieth-century Continental philosophers. In the phenomenological and hermeneutical philosophy of the twentieth century, the concept of a “ground between” is sometimes utilized to denote the place where the familiar meets the strange – and this is the place where new understandings, for instance, between anthropologists and philosophers, might take their first steps.

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Debaene, Vincent: *Far Afield. French Anthropology between Science and Literature.* Transl. by Justin Izzo. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014. 398 pp. ISBN 978-0-226-10706-6. Price: \$ 35.00

This work, originally published in French in 2010 under the rather different and more apt title of “L’adieu au voyage,” traces the relationship between anthropology and literature in France from the 1930s to the 1980s. The author explicitly contrasts his work here with “Writing Culture,” the famous volume edited in 1986 by James Clifford and George Marcus, which problematized the way ethnography is written and is seen as having contributed to a “crisis of representation” in anthropology generally. Debaene’s starting point, conversely, is a phenomenon that, if not unique to French anthropology, certainly lends it distinction, namely the quondam propensity of French fieldworkers to write not just a “scientific” ethnography based on their experiences, but a second work more literary in character: not works of fiction, but works more in the tradition of *belles lettres*, reflecting on the author’s fieldwork experience in a manner that may or may not be more philosophical, but is certainly not intended to be “scientific” or rigorously academic, and may often be intended for a wider readership than academic ethnographies per se. For a more international anthropological readership, the classic text is probably Claude Lévi-Strauss’s “Tristes tropiques” (published with that title in both English and French), while the archetypal author in this regard is surely the poet-ethnographer Michel Leiris, who in fact published “L’Afrique fantôme” before writing up his thesis on the *zar* possession cult in Ethiopia – but there are plenty of others, as Debaene makes clear. In his own words, therefore, unlike “Writing Culture,” “I focus