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THEMENSCHWERPUNKT

Toward a Transatlantic Strategy of Peace

Christopher Holshek*

Abstract: A resurgent Russia has exposed a crisis in confidence manifest in the dearth of a “strategic vision” and the failure to find a “compelling narrative” on both sides of the Atlantic. Instructive inspiration for what Helmut Schmidt called a “grand strategy for the West” can be found in John F. Kennedy’s “mutually beneficial partnership” to harmonize disparate European and American interests – an idea whose time has come more due to the constraints of a complex and hyper-connected environment and the restraints of diminishing strategic resources than recent crises. More than anything else, a values-based grand strategy must see peace and peacebuilding as a pragmatic path of applied grand or geopolitical strategy, inclusive of national security strategy, rather than just an ideal end state. It must shape this emergent strategic narrative and the moral consensus for compelling action from the bottom up as much as the top down, fostering the relationships between peoples as much as governments. Building, maintaining, and applying this unique strategic and operational capital will go far to strengthen the most stable, secure, and prosperous transoceanic basin in the world for decades to come and meet the threats, challenges, and opportunities it faces.

Keywords: Peace, strategy, security, transatlantic values, peacebuilding, moral consensus

Stichworte: Frieden, Strategie, Sicherheit, transatlantische Werte, Friedensaufbau, moralischer Konsens

1. The Inevitability of Grand Strategy

It is tempting to see the crisis in Ukraine and a resurgent Russia as a “game changer” that may lead to a repurposing of NATO and a more balanced approach to both Washington’s “pivot to Asia” and the sharing of military responsibilities in an alliance that stems back nearly a hundred years to the First World War. Less conjectural, however, is how it has exposed a crisis in confidence manifest in a strategic vulnerability on both sides of the Atlantic –

the dearth of a “strategic vision,” as a recent Transatlantic Forum suggested, that could reinvigorate the Alliance as well as bind a sense of how Europe fits into shifting American global strategy and how Europe casts itself as a more unitary international actor rather than a hodgepodge of national

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interests.¹ Mr. Putin's deft exploitation of these geopolitical seams alone is not fraying transatlanticism as much as the failure to find a "compelling narrative" addressing common strategic imperatives that have been growing since 1989 and are now reaching critical mass.

President Barack Obama's speech in Berlin in June 2013 lacked the resonance of John F. Kennedy's famous speech there 50 years prior. For one, it fell short of that compelling vision of a moral consensus. Equally important, it was without a strategy that connected words and deeds. More instructive, in fact, were those the 35th President gave in Philadelphia and at the American University that year and not in Berlin, long foreshadowing a workable transatlantic grand strategic framework. The second one in particular looked toward "a strategy of peace."

The threats, challenges, and opportunities facing Europe and North America are complex and diverse – beyond Russia, the threat of financial collapse from overexposure to public and private debt, competition from an alternative "state capitalist" industrial model in China, the threat of violent extremism from a tumultuously transitioning Middle East, an African continent still hampered by conflict but with tremendous upside, energy and cyber-security, transnational criminal networks and illicit trafficking, the opening of passageways in the Arctic, and so on.

These realities and tightening resources make something along the lines of what Helmut Schmidt called a "grand strategy for the West"² an idea whose time has finally come. But what we cannot expect is a transatlantic grand strategy that is interest-based:

All nations have interests. These differ and in many cases cause conflict... This is because of different geographic positions, different national sizes, and different degrees of economic development or achievement, as well as different historical and cultural backgrounds and the psychologies and ideologies that have developed as a consequence. The great task for the West is to bring about fair compromises among the differing interests within our family – and to do this again and again, as changing situations require. Only thus can we harmonize different national goals into one common strategy among friends and allies who will at the same time remain competitors in many fields.³

Kennedy's vision of a "mutually beneficial partnership" to harmonize disparate national interests is more realizable than ever. The transatlantic nexus is more relevant than ever to global peace, security, and prosperity, if only to shape a future world that will be less controlled by it. The practicalities go well beyond security. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership will cement a financial and economic bloc comprising over half the world's gross national product and nearly two-thirds of its financial power. This area still leads the world in advanced manufacturing, education, technological and social innovation, and is poised, between new energy sources and technologies, to gain further energy independence from less stable and reliable

sources "out of area." All of this portends the strengthening of the most stable, secure, and prosperous transoceanic basin in the world for decades to come, with its possible extension southward from both sides of the Atlantic, as well as toward Asia from both sides. NATO remains the singular principle guarantor of this geostrategic zone of stability.

More than any of this, however, European-American norms and values continue to dominate international institutions in international cooperation and international peacebuilding as well as international security. Realizing that such a partnership "will not be easily or cheaply finished," Kennedy nonetheless saw this moral consensus as "a nucleus for the eventual union of all free men."⁴ Yet, something even more compelling and comprehensive is required to transform this partnership beyond the convenience of shared interests. This is where "a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions... toward a strategy of peace," comes into play.⁵

Neither Kennedy nor Schmidt got to further their visions. The first real opportunity came with the end of the Cold War, but both Europe and America were even then too self-absorbed. The end of large-scale Western military intervention in Afghanistan and the profound changes in the international landscape leading to greater multilateralism and collaboration on issues like debt consolidation and climate change, let alone Russia, may make this eventuality finally irresistible. Doing this requires a grand strategy that fosters the relationship between peoples as much as governments, looking at the connection between peace and security, finding the right moral scale of reference, and understanding what applied grand strategy looks like.

2. The Problem with Strategy Is Not a Problem

American national security strategy in particular has been flawed of late because it still runs on a 20th century operating software based on the National Security Act of 1947. This strategic software suite no longer adequately processes two emergent systemic imperatives. First are the constraints of a complex and hyper-connected 21st century environment in which the power of persuasion is increasingly more relevant than that of coercion and where less formal power structures among non-state communities and networks are counting as much as that of centralized governments. Then there are the restraints of diminishing strategic resources, especially financial, in the face of these broader and more complex challenges to a widening sense of "security." The convergence of these imperatives is historic in proportion.

Strategy is fundamentally about making choices now about the future, and a strategic mindset is driven mostly by scarcity. (If you can do everything, you don't have to make choices.) Long-standing penchants for "throwing money at the problem" or the overwhelming focus on operations and tactics such as stability

1 "Transatlantic Forum: Rebalancing and Reinforcing the Transatlantic Bond," Conference Proceedings, January 27-28 2014, T.J. Cipoletti and Kathleen H. Hicks, Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2014.
2 *A Grand Strategy for the West*, Helmut Schmidt, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985.
3 Schmidt, 137-8.

4 "President Kennedy at Independence Hall, 4 July 1962," John F. Kennedy Presidential Library; internet: <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03IndependenceHall07041962.htm>; accessed 16 October 2013.
5 "Towards a Strategy of Peace," John F. Kennedy, *The Department of State Bulletin*, XLIX, No. 1253, 1 July 1963, 2-6; internet: <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1963Kennedy-peacestrat.html>; accessed 21 February 2013.

operations, counterinsurgency, or “winning hearts and minds” have been substitutes for strategy. Even NATO’s Comprehensive Approach, while no doubt advancement in strategic thinking, is largely predicated on a Westphalian national security paradigm – the security of states over the security of people – and focuses on crisis management rather than advances something much more holistic and anticipatory.

The underlying weakness of a national security approach to national or international geopolitical strategy is its obsession with threats and the intrinsic assumption that national security drives everything. Threats-basing does call for more actionable, measurable, and readily available “hard” power and its resource-intensive solution sets. But it limits the strategic view of the world to being reactive and averse to innovation as well as risk, preferring more static than adaptive planning. You can be reactive if you can afford to react to everything, and you dominate the scene. But when you can’t and don’t, your approaches have to be more comprehensive, collaborative, connective, and coordinated.

And when everything is a problem, it’s awfully hard to see beyond the scope of negativity. The problem with strategy, therefore, really is not a problem at all:

Strategy is not problem-solving. Problem solving as a mode of action is appropriate when goals or objectives are simple and clear. Complex situations that strategists should be thinking about are anything but simple and clear, so strategists are making multiple errors when they reduce ontological complexity and then apply an inappropriate epistemological model (i.e., means/ends reasoning) via problem-solving.⁶

As legislative bodies and other state-level collective decision-making institutions are coming to realize, lurching from crisis to crisis is not a viable way forward. No wonder there have been more calls for a “grand strategy” on one side of the Atlantic or the other.

3. Peace Is Greater than Security

War and peace remains the central dichotomy of strategy. Colin S. Gray simply states that “war is about peace, and sometimes vice-versa.”⁷ Ringing eerily prescient, Sun Tzu noted that “there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.”⁸ Clausewitz, in his famous dictum about war as an extension of policy “by other means” also seemed to imply warfare as an exceptional state. Even the War on Terror, like any war, is a “finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of affairs.” Peace, on the other hand, “must be regarded as the norm toward which the human race continually strives.”⁹ B.H. Liddell Hart, observed that strategy, in its grandest sense, “looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.”¹⁰

We all want peace – but it seems more difficult to have and to hold than conflict. Everyone from Baruch Spinoza and Immanuel Kant to Martin Luther King Jr. and the Dalai Lama have told us that peace is not merely the absence of war and conflict, adding other qualifiers such as justice and social harmony. But peace is not merely an end state. In his own vision of “a strategy of peace,” Kennedy described peace as a process: “Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation.”¹¹

Seeing peace as a process as much as a determinant goal helps identify a workable theory of change to form a more realistic national or grand strategy. For one, peace and conflict are part of a cycle of change, as Kennedy implied. Another way of looking at peace as a process is in the most nettlesome of quandaries: The adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan are the latest reminders of a pathological problem with democracies, as de Tocqueville observed – “the United States knows well how to get into wars, and fight them, but not how to end them... It takes a strategic decision-making process to get into wars. There should be a comparable national capability to help figure out how to end – or better yet – prevent them...”¹²

As Georgetown University’s Eric Patterson constructs in *Ending Wars Well*, successful *jus post bellum* features three co-determinants in expanding magnitude, complexity, difficulty, time required and so on: order, justice, and (re)conciliation.¹³ These roughly relate to the more familiar elements of peace and stability operations, as shown in Figure 1. Order and security in current situations comes mainly through the protection of civilians. Justice is facilitated through transparent and accountable (formal and informal) governance and the rule of law. Development, in a broader sense, is the way to encourage (re)conciliation or a civil society characterized by a more fair distribution of socioeconomic advantages and inclusiveness.




Figure 1.

If the object of war is indeed a more favorable peace, it comes through this emergent path – a process leading to stable, just, and concordant civil society. Conversely, what often results in

6 “Tipping Sacred Cows – Moral Potential Through Operational Art”, Lt. Col. (ret.) Tim Challans, *Military Review*, September-October 2009, 21.

7 “Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory,” Colin S. Gray, *Prism* 3, No. 3, 22.

8 *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu, trans. By Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, 73; also quoted in the preface by B.H. Liddell Hart, vi.

9 “The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?” Jeh Charles Johnson, Oxford University, 30 November 2012, speech transcript available at internet: <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/>; accessed 25 March 2013.

10 *Strategy*, B.H. Liddell Hart, second revised edition, Meridian, London, 1991, 322.

11 Kennedy, “Towards a Strategy of Peace.”

12 “Ending Wars”, Christopher Holshek, *Diplomatic Courier*, 2 August 2012, internet: <http://www.diplomaticcourier.com/news/opinion/1068-ending-wars>; accessed 26 March 2013.

13 See *Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Contemporary Post-Conflict*, Eric D. Patterson, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2012.

conflict is the breakdown of these three elements, usually (but not always) in reverse order. While the three are hierarchical, their relationships are not necessarily linear, depending on the circumstances of culture and geography as well as the influence and impact of internal (local) and external (transnational) actors. What's clear in all this, however, is that peace is greater than security, in operative and not just moral terms.

What this model also implies is that, moving from conflict to peace, the enterprise at hand becomes more essentially civilian in nature. Although inter-state wars and violent conflicts have essentially been the realm of the military, the emergence of "human security" as the predominant challenge calls for more collaborative approaches beyond formal state instrumentalities. Hybrid operations such as security sector reform and assistance are growing in criticality, requiring a blend of both civilian and military involvement and generally taking place in the area of governance and justice. Two more things are thus implied: one is the overriding significance of the primacy of civil authority at all levels of policy and engagement (and thus a demonstrably healthy civil-military relationship, especially in those hybrid areas); and the other is the greater importance of civil-military coordination and transition management to the peace process.

This model also helps explain the relationship, for example, between peacebuilding and stability operations. Stability operations focus mainly on the lower tasks of order (or security) and, to a certain extent, governance related to the rule of law and other essential security-related public services. Peacebuilding goes beyond that, looking to help create more sustainable, local solutions in developing civil society in the appropriate sociocultural context. In a multilateral sense, the key nexus is between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. UN Security Council Resolution (2086) on "Multidimensional Peacekeeping" emphasizes "early peacebuilding" in both peacekeeping and conflict prevention.¹⁴

Most important here is the recognition that security is a component of peace – not the other way around. This is why simply expanding national security to include economic and social development issues – here or there – is counterproductive. Security issues, in fact, are problems of peace. Moreover, peace is the outcome of superior strategy – an inherently comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated process inclusive of all components of governance and civil society, including security.

4. The Moral and the Physical

Strategy is an innately moral exercise – if you can't do everything and thus have to make choices, you have to make those choices based on what you value most. Values largely shape collective interests, whereas interests, in turn, inform policy, operations, and tactics. Such is the hierarchy of national or grand strategy. Peace, as both outcome and process, inculcates a values-based approach to grand strategy as well as shapes its operating principles.

Values, of course, come from the psychological and not the physical domain. In the 21st century, Napoleon's famous observation

that "the moral is to the physical as three to one" in war has a new relevance in the power, reach, and velocity of ideas as a primary agent of change – in other words, how ideas are communicated and made to work in people's everyday lives. Morality, in this sense, "can be usefully described along the lines of what people intend, what people do, and what consequences people bring about."¹⁵ In looking at the "enduring lessons from the past decade of operations," the U.S. Joint Staff has identified among its five major lesson areas as "the battle for the narrative."¹⁶

The key to re-shaping grand strategy is thus in the relationship between intimidation and inspiration. George F. Kennan's advice to "first use moral authority" embodied in the last successful grand strategy of the United States laid out in NSC-68 still resonates. In containment strategy, diplomacy (not defense) was in the lead, and military power was a holding or enabling action until moral suasion could facilitate the collapse of the Soviet system under the weight of its self-contradictions through the connective and "corrosive power of freedom." What brought down the Berlin Wall, prompted Islamic fundamentalists to launch the 9/11 attacks, stirred many to rise up and overthrow the old order of minority rule in the Middle East or migrate to Europe or the United States, and prompted Putin's actions in Ukraine remains the same dynamic – the rising aspiration of people living under those systems for a better life as demonstrated elsewhere.

The good news for the emerging transatlantic partnership is that it is, if anything, long been more a community of enduring values than a community of changing interests. Although it no doubt has varying national inflections, there is "a large degree in our sets of values in the West: the open society, the democratic structure of our polities; the basic human rights of the individual and his or her individual pursuit of happiness."¹⁷

A values-based grand strategy is a strategy of peace. More attainable, popular, marketable, and flexible than an interests-based grand strategy, it stands a greater chance of success and sustainability. Further, we must understand that, "if a lasting and desirable peace is to come from any war, the means and ends must possess moral symmetry..."¹⁸

5. Peacebuilding as Applied Grand Strategy

A strategy of peace is also superior to a national security strategy because it is, conceptually and operationally, grand strategy and thus includes national security strategy. It lends to more appropriate comprehensive, collaborative, connective, and coordinated approaches to the more whole-of-society challenges and opportunities of our times. It works from a positive rather than a negative, being more about inspiration than intimidation. It is a maximizing, inclusive strategy, leading foremost with full moral suasion. Being values-based, it leverages and revitalizes renewable strengths rather

15 Challans, op. cit.

16 *Decade of War, Volume I – Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis*, Joint Staff J7, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 15 June 2012, 2.

17 Schmidt, 141-2.

18 "War Is a Moral Force – Designing a More Viable Strategy for the Information Age," Peter D. Fromm, Douglas A. Pryer, and Kevin R. Cutright, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 64, 1st Quarter 2012, 40 and 46.

14 S/RES/2086 (2013), United Nations Security Council, 21 January 2013, internet: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2086%282013%29; accessed 26 March 2013.

than tries to cover or compensate for weaknesses through costly, risk-laden, and more perishable power mechanisms. It is thus more economical. As such, like all good strategies, it “doesn’t just draw on existing strength; it creates strength through the coherence of its design.”¹⁹ It is playing to win and not to lose.

A strategy of peace, as Kennedy pointed out, is neither idealism nor realism, but both. It is a practical idealism, focused on helping to bring order, justice, and civil society to a world of increasing interdependency. In the 21st century, American and European national strategies must be less about “peace through strength” and more about realizing that peace *is* strength.

If you want peace, however, then you have to plan, organize, and resource for peace – and you need to have a way to get there. Whether within or beyond the transatlantic basin, peacebuilding is the method by which to apply such a grand strategy. Peacebuilding is the whole-of-society strategic approach to essentially whole-of-society challenges, where the most appropriate capabilities lie outside government organizations, which nonetheless must still leverage the comparative advantages of players as diverse as society itself (including the military):

The most effective strategy for addressing transnational or global problems involves mixed networks of public, private and civic actors created under the rubric of public-private partnerships, global alliances, global campaigns or collaborative networks. Although not a panacea, such arrangements can stretch scarce government resources and ensure that they leverage other contributions of money, expertise and other in-kind resources.²⁰

Peacebuilding is a somewhat more modest and less ambitious way to apply grand strategy, whether at home or abroad. Indeed, it requires “recalibrating civil-military roles and relationships and developing a clearly articulated shared mission of building global human security consistent with national interests.”²¹

6. Leadership and Learning

Schmidt’s contention that the “lack of a coherent strategy in the Western world” is based, more than anything, on an “absence of leadership” seems as true today as in 1985.²² This leadership must come from both sides of the Atlantic, at all levels and walks of life, with an understanding of shared responsibilities as well as their division. The United States must still continue to play its role as global superpower, due more to the pragmatics of its global position and its unique geostrategic advantages and capabilities than its own brand of “exceptionalism.” But it must do so more strategically and collaboratively, sometimes from behind as much as in front.

While Schmidt posed that the United States is “not prepared to lead” because isolationist, hegemonic, and internationalist tendencies vie for supremacy, this alone is not disqualifying. For one, divisiveness is as much a constant in American as European politics. Secondly, we may have seen the high water mark of government dysfunction on both sides of the Atlantic. As the realities of globalized financial and economic systems, climate change, and transnational actors for both good and bad set in and continue to reach closer to home, both Europeans and Americans will learn, albeit slowly, to look more outward than inward.

The impetus for this kind of transformation comes from more than the strategic imperatives of constraints and restraints mentioned earlier. It comes from the people. In a remarkable study conducted by the Fund for Peace, a major conclusion was that, while Americans still think the U.S. should play a global leadership role, it leads most effectively when it “walks the talk...”

America’s ideals impel it to lead in the world... But how America leads is as important as whether it leads... there was significant discussion about the differences between “American power” and “national strengths”. Many associated the former with an emphasis on coercive behavior in the world, while they viewed the latter as concerning principles and values, such as democracy, liberty, and tolerance. While coercive means might be necessary in some cases, an over-reliance on them was seen as counter-productive and even disastrous; whereas pursuing policies on the basis of the nation’s strengths was seen as the most effective way to produce lasting influence in the world. In addition, people viewed a predominantly coercive approach as out of touch with new global realities.²³



Figure 2.

Despite its incongruities, the United States is still in a very good position to lead in the 21st century. Its dynamic, multicultural civil society under an overarching national ethos captured in its national motto of *e pluribus unum* and its democratic national values are the foundation of its moral strength and tremendous social and strategic capital. The ethos of its engagement with the world and the civil-military relationship connecting peace and security is most clearly depicted in a symbol more than two centuries old – namely, the obverse of the Great Seal of the United States (Figure 2, Copyright United

19 *Good Strategy, Bad Strategy*, Richard Rumelt, New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2011, 9.

20 “A Grand Strategy of Network Centrality,” Anne-Marie Slaughter, in *America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration*, Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (eds.), Washington, D.C., Center for a New American Security, May 2012, 54.

21 “Peacebuilding in US Foreign Assistance – Recommendations and Proposed Language for the Foreign Assistance Act,” 3D Security and Alliance for Peacebuilding Policy Brief, 2010, internet: http://3phumansecurity.org/site/images/stories/PolicyBriefs/peacebuilding_in_us_foreign_assistance%202010.pdf; accessed 28 March 2012.

22 Schmidt, 146.

23 *The Use & Purpose of American Power in the 21st Century – Perspectives of Americans from the 2008-2009 National Dialogue Forums*, Will Ferroggiaro, Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, June 2010, 15-16 and 32.

States of America 1792). The state, symbolized by the eagle, aspires for peace and civil society, looking in the direction of the olive branches in one talon while holding the arrows of war in reserve (or support) in the other – hard power, after all, is most effective when implied and not applied. The Great Seal elegantly illustrates the alignment and application of these civil-military priorities.²⁴ This ethos must permeate not just policy but its practice in every aspect.

For the United States, understanding that the most effective form of 21st century leadership is by example, is critical to maintaining its moral credibility and thus its right to lead. The United States, however, is not the only Western country that struggles with “walking the talk,” but it stands out more than any other precisely because of its global leadership position. The key here is humility on both sides of the Atlantic and the appreciation that one has as much to learn from the other. What was said about the winner in counterinsurgency being the better learning organization²⁵ is as true with regard to businesses, sports teams, governments, and nations.

While Europeans have much to emulate in many respects from the culture of both immigration and assimilation in the United States, Americans have much to learn from Europeans about collaboration and cooperation, and that neither national sovereignty nor the latest “pivot to Asia” is necessarily zero-sum. If the European Foreign Policy Scorecard is any indicator, the relationship remains a good one but still a work in progress.²⁶ In a remarkably prescient moment, Kennedy proposed a “Declaration of Interdependence” in the same place where his own nation declared its independence:

Acting on our own, by ourselves, we cannot establish justice throughout the world; we cannot insure its domestic tranquility, or provide for its common defense, or promote its general welfare, or secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. But joined with other free nations, we can do all this and more. We can assist the developing nations to throw off the yoke of poverty. We can balance our worldwide trade and payments at the highest possible level of growth. We can mount a deterrent powerful enough to deter any aggression. And ultimately we can help to achieve a world of law and free choice, banishing the world of war and coercion.²⁷

But this must be more than a meeting of minds. It must also be pragmatic. With respect to the Middle East, the Alliance needs “to stop seeing regional political upheavals as some brief prelude to the triumph of Western values and democracy, and focus on their real world human impact as well as the threat they pose... It means accepting the fact that years of effort will now be needed with unstable states and changing regimes. It means dealing with the human consequences of what is happening, and understanding how deep the threat

of the religious struggles within Islam and posed by violent religious extremism has become.”²⁸

At the same time, however, “there is nothing so terrible as activity without insight,” as Goethe reminded us. While not overlooking the “crisis of trust” brought on by the NSA scandal, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen recently framed discussion of that issue – as well as the challenges laid out by Mr. Putin – first by recounting that “Europe specifically, Germany and the United States, [have] a strong bond – [a] transatlantic bond and alliance because we share the same values and we defend the same values.”²⁹

A transatlantic strategy of peace need not be articulated in a single treaty or proclamation. But there can be an overarching “strategic narrative” that guides both policy and action. Kennedy’s “Declaration of Interdependence” in a true partnership of equals is symbolic. The intellectual foundations of democratic civil society, perhaps the greatest comparative advantage of the West, going back to Locke, Rousseau, and Jefferson, are manifest in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – the standard of enduring sociopolitical values to which most of the nations of the world, as signatories, must be accountable and that inform transatlantic grand strategy.

A transatlantic strategy of peace needs simply to exist, as most grand strategies do, through a conscientious complexity of policies, statements, and most of all actions – connected and coordinated by this strategic narrative and informed and updated by a steady state dialogue in all corners of society. Simply referring more to the Universal Declaration in policy, conference, and media statements alone will help shape this emergent strategic narrative and the moral consensus for compelling action based on more popular support.

As much about the relationship between peoples as governments, a grand strategy of the West is, indeed, an international learning association. Conferences and meetings of elites such as the *Wehrkunde Tagung* in Munich will still play a role in more conscientiously articulating this narrative in terms of peace and security. Last fall’s summit in Wales, the first in a long time for NATO, was a great opportunity for the West to lay out a more meaningful strategic agenda. Also, the Transatlantic Forum was right in recommending that, while the U.S. should strive to treat the European Union more seriously as the agent of European peace and security interests, the Europeans in turn must share greater responsibility in promoting security as well as peace.

Nevertheless, all of this must also ultimately emerge from a galaxy of exchanges among institutions of learning and dialogue, social media, and other socioeconomic and cultural vehicles. Like any true grand strategy and peace itself, it must come from the bottom up as well as the top down. What could be more democratic and enduring than this?

24 For a detailed explanation of the Great Seal of the United States, see *The Power of Myth*, Joseph Campbell (with Bill Moyers), New York: Anchor Books, 1991, 31-34.

25 *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife – Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, John A Nagl, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. See especially Ch. 1.

26 *European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014*, European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2014; internet: www.ecfu.eu; accessed 30 January 2014.

27 “President Kennedy at Independence Hall, 4 July 1962.”

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