

Chapter III The Drafting of a Plan of Operations for the Southern Advance

1. Fixing the Outline of the Plan of Operations

Although the plan of operations for the [administrative] year 1941 of the Navy General Staff was completed in March of that year, the plan [only] covered operations against one single country [at a time] of each of the hypothetical enemies. Since the summer of 1940, a joint study of the Army and the Navy General Staff Offices had been conducted on simultaneous operations against all four hypothetical enemies (the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China), but it did not reach the stage of examining concrete details due to a lack of material for [planning] operations at that time. It was in April 1941 and onwards that the Navy General Staff seriously set about studying a plan of simultaneously executing operations against all four countries, assuming that the United States and Britain were inseparable.⁽²⁸⁾

By June, the working plan for the operations showed considerable progress, and by the beginning of July the outline was informally and tentatively agreed upon between the persons in charge at the General Staff Offices of both the Army and the Navy; by mid-August they also won an unofficial agreement from [both] the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Nagano Osami, and the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Sugiyama Gen.⁽²⁸⁾

In the meantime, Germany's opening of hostilities against the Soviet Union at the end of June, Japan's advance into southern French Indochina, the [subsequent] break-off of economic relations with Japan by the United States and Britain at the end of July, and [Japan's] informal decision in the beginning of August to not take the offensive against the Soviet Union before the end of the year, had rapidly altered the situation. The outline of the plan to simultaneously execute operations against four countries, agreed upon by the Army and the Navy around mid-August, when the Navy General Staff showed a firm determination to "complete war preparations by the end of October," was in summary as follows.⁽²⁸⁾

1. Tentatively setting the opening of hostilities at the beginning of November, [the Navy] shall, concurrently with the opening of hostilities, launch simultaneous operations against both the Philippines and Malaya in conjunction with the Army and complete the invasion of the necessary key areas in the south in roughly five months.
2. The naval strength to be employed for the southern operation shall consist of the bulk of the surface units of the Combined Fleet and the land-based air units, while the carrier-based air units shall be employed in the air campaign at the beginning of the opening of hostilities.
3. The Army strength to be employed for the southern operation shall consist of about seven divisions of ground [units] and two numbered air forces.

4. In the operation against the United States, the submarine unit shall keep watch on [the U.S. fleet in] Hawaii, and the Fourth and the Fifth Fleets shall be on alert [for the U.S. fleet] in the area east of Japanese territory, while the battleship unit shall stay in the homeland [waters], ready to intercept [the U.S. fleet]. In case the U.S. fleet comes to the attack in the western Pacific, the main force of the southern operation task force shall be extracted, be combined with the battleship unit and together with strength rallied from everywhere, they are expected to destroy the U.S. fleet.

As seen in the above outline of the plan of operations, the Navy General Staff Office at that time still set the U.S. Navy as the main enemy even in the [simultaneous] operations against multiple countries. It drew up a [new] operational policy on the basis of the former plan of operations against the United States by [only and newly] adding to this plan an operation to capture key areas in the south right at the opening of hostilities.

The Navy General Staff Office, which unofficially had decided on a plan to speedily complete war preparations, gave instructions to the Combined Fleet around the middle of August to break off its ongoing trainings and operations by the end of August and complete a rapid war preparation roughly in one month starting from the beginning of September. Following this instruction and keeping only a part of the strength in reserve, almost the full strength of the Combined Fleet began to take positions in the homeland [waters] in the beginning of September to speed up the war preparations. Also, on 15 August, a part of the second stage of the preparatory fleet mobilization order was put into motion.⁽²⁹⁾ (The first stage of the preparatory fleet mobilization order had [already] been put into motion in November 1940. The first stage preparation was supposed to require about half a year and be completed by the issuing of the order of the war formation. The second stage was to be executed following it.)

Meanwhile, the Combined Fleet headquarters pressed the Navy General Staff Office to adopt [the idea of an] operation to conduct a surprise attack on Hawaii by aircraft carriers right at the outset of the war. In mid September, after getting the approval of the Navy General Staff Office, the Combined Fleet headquarters conducted a map exercise at the Naval College in Meguro, Tokyo, and examined [the feasibility of] this plan, taking the previous roughly fixed outline as a start and further based it on a concrete draft plan of operations that included the surprise attack on Hawaii, on which the headquarters had firmly insisted. This is the so-called "Map Exercise at the Naval College," although the exercises of the operation to control the western Pacific and the operation of a surprise attack on Hawaii were conducted separately.⁽²⁸⁾

The general outline of the map exercise at the Naval College was as follows (parts concerning the Philippines and Malaya have been omitted by the author):

1. Assuming the hostilities to be opened on 16 November, the operations against the Philippines and Malaya shall be launched almost simultaneously, and the strategic areas of the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies shall be captured in roughly 150 days.⁽³⁰⁾
2. The strength to be employed in the southern operation^(11, 31, 32, 33)
 - (1) Navy
 - One element of the First Fleet (one destroyer squadron and carrier division each)
 - The bulk of the Second Fleet
 - The full strength of the Third Fleet, the Eleventh Air Fleet, and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet

One element of the First Air Fleet (small aircraft carrier(s))

The bulk of the force attached to the Combined Fleet (a seaplane tender division, submarine squadrons, landing force(s), supply vessels, etc.)

(2) Army

About 300,000 troops consisting of about 10 divisions as the core

An air unit of about 600 aircraft in about two numbered air forces

3. Assessment of the enemy situation in the southern region at the time of the map exercise⁽³⁴⁾

(1) The Philippines area (the U.S.-Filipino Army)

Naval vessels: About 60 ships, consisting of 2 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 17 submarines, 4 sea-plane tenders as the core

Air force: About 160 aircraft (of the Army and the Navy in total)

Ground troops: About 40,000 regular troops ([and possible] mobilization of about 160,000 troops of the Filipino Army)

(2) Malaya area (British armed forces, including [those from] Hong Kong)

Naval vessels: About 90 ships, consisting of 5 cruisers and 10 destroyers as the core (A powerful unit including battleships and aircraft carriers is deployed in the Indian Ocean)

Air force: About 200 aircraft (A reinforcement of 300 aircraft or more is anticipated by the end of year)

Ground troops: About 60,000 – 70,000 regular troops (Apart from these, a voluntary army of about 20,000 men)

(3) The Dutch East Indies area (the Dutch East Indies armed forces)

Naval vessels: About 90 ships, consisting of 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 19 submarines as the core

Air force: About 300 aircraft ([of] front line aircraft; apart from these, about 200 reserve aircraft)

Ground troops: About 70,000 troops

4. General Plan of Operations^(11, 34, 35)

(1) An air force of about two to three times as strong as that of the enemy directly in front shall be employed.

(2) In the Malaya area, an army unit shall be disembarked in the southern Thai area and sent southward along the Malay Peninsula, to capture Singapore. This operation is supposed to be accomplished in about 100 days from the opening of hostilities.

(3) The operation against the Philippines shall be launched from Taiwan, and pushed ahead first to Luzon, then to the central and southern Philippines. The capture of Manila is supposed to be accomplished in about 45 days from the opening of hostilities.

(4) In the Dutch East Indies, the lines of operation shall be pushed forward to Celebes and Borneo in the east with the southern Philippines as the basis, and to Sumatra in the west, setting the capture of Java as the final target. This operation is supposed to be accomplished in about 150 days from the opening of hostilities.

(5) The area to be captured is roughly set as the Philippines, British Malaya, British Borneo and the Dutch East Indies. [An attack on] Burma shall be conducted for the purpose of eliminating interference with the Malaya operation, and [only] to the degree of capturing a part of southern Burma and conducting air campaigns.

5. The disposition of forces of the Navy^(12, 33, 36, 37, 38)

(1) The Philippines and the Dutch East Indies

Commander: Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet

Forces: The bulk of the Second Fleet

The full strength of the Third Fleet

The bulk of the Eleventh Air Fleet

The bulk of the units attached to the Combined Fleet

Three small aircraft carriers of the First Fleet and the First Air Fleet

Outline of the Disposition:

Capture of strategic areas: a force [consisting of] the Third Fleet as the core

Air campaign: a force [consisting of] the Eleventh Air Fleet as the core

Destruction of the enemy surface forces: a force [consisting of] the Second Fleet as the core

Submarine operation: submarine squadrons

(2) Malaya area

Commander: Commander in Chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet

Forces: The full strength of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet
 One element of the Eleventh Air Fleet (About one air unit each of land-based attack planes and fighter planes)
 One cruiser division and destroyer squadron each from [both] the First and the Second Fleets
 One small aircraft carrier of the First Fleet
 One element of the 6th Submarine Squadron

Outline of the Disposition:

Surface escort: a force [consisting of] cruiser divisions, destroyer squadrons and a small aircraft carrier as the core

Destruction of the enemy surface forces: a force [consisting of] cruiser divisions, destroyer divisions and the Eleventh Air Fleet

6. Outline of the Philippines operation^(12, 33, 34, 39)

- (1) Right at the outset of the war, about 200 Navy aircraft and about 450 Army aircraft shall launch an air campaign from southern Taiwan to destroy the enemy air power on its air bases on Luzon. Prior to this, Type-0 fighter planes of the land-based air unit shall be advanced on the waters at a short distance from Manila on three small aircraft carriers on the first day of hostilities to support the strikes of the land-based attack units from Taiwan.
- (2) On the day of the opening of hostilities, the advance unit shall make surprise landings at Aparri and Vigan, swiftly seize the air bases and make them ready for use, and let the fighter plane unit(s) advance from Taiwan, so as to thoroughly carry out the operation to destroy the enemy air power from that time on.
- (3) Making use of the results of the campaign to destroy the enemy air power right at the opening of hostilities, the main force of the Army unit to capture Luzon shall be disembarked at Luzon in about ten to fifteen days after the opening of hostilities and seize the capital Manila at a stroke. The strength of the Army ground forces is supposed to be about two divisions.
- (4) When the air campaign against Luzon is for the greater part completed, the frontline of the operation shall gradually be extended southward towards the central and southern Philippines, so as to seize Davao and Jolo roughly in twenty to thirty days after the opening of hostilities, and secure footholds for the Dutch East Indies invasion operation.

7. Outline of the Malaya operation^(30, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40)

- (1) Right at the outset of the war, the air units of both the Army and the Navy (about 450 aircraft) shall conduct preemptive air strikes against northern Malaya and Singapore from southern French Indochina. Simultaneously, small advance units of the Army shall conduct surprise landings (under the escort of a small number of Navy war vessels) at the strategic locations north of and including Singora, or north of and including Nakhon in southern Thailand, swiftly seize the airfields and make them ready for use, so as to advance the Army air units one by one.
- (2) After that, when the [air] campaign of the Army air unit as the main strength to destroy the enemy air power has achieved results, the main force of the Army Malaya invasion unit shall go ashore, advance overland through the Malay Peninsula southward to capture Singapore. The Army ground forces to be employed in this area are supposed to be about five divisions.

- (3) In the early period after the opening of hostilities (roughly between Day X and about Day X + 5), a Navy unit shall make a surprise landing at Miri and Kuching in northern Borneo, secure the oil fields in Miri and quickly ready the airfield in Kuching, so as to advance the Navy air unit [there] and put them in charge of air campaigns against Singapore and the Java Sea.
8. Outline of the Dutch East Indies operation (summary)
 - (1) After the air unit has been advanced to Davao and Jolo in the southern Philippines, invasion operations against Borneo and Celebes shall be launched from about Day X + 50 onwards.
 - (2) In the eastern part [of the Dutch East Indies], operations shall proceed along two lines of operation, that is, the line Tarakan – Balikpapan – Banjarmasin and the line Menado – Kendari – Makassar. The capture [of those areas] and the advance of the air units [there] shall be conducted [simultaneously] in parallel. [Then, the air units] shall conduct the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Java from Makassar and Banjarmasin in concert with [the campaigns conducted] from the direction of Malaya and Sumatra.
 - (3) When the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power has achieved results, the Army units shall be disembarked on Java and capture the entire island. This operation is supposed to be completed in about five months from the opening of hostilities.
 - (4) The forces to be employed for the Dutch East Indies [Operation]
 - {1} Navy: the force of the Second and Third Fleets, and the Eleventh Air Fleet, after participating in the Philippines operation.
 - {2} Army: The ground forces of three divisions, and one numbered air force to be transferred from the Malaya Invasion Operation.

Note by the author: No specific materials are extant concerning the advance of the lines of operation in the western part.

According to the above plan, the map exercise was carried out; the findings concerning the Dutch East Indies Operation were in outline as follows:^(11, 12, 33, 36)

1. It should be expected that while advancing the air bases [of the air units] from the Philippines one after another, as many as ten bases have to be made ready in three months before reaching eastern Borneo. As it is also quite difficult to carry out operations in which air units would shift their positions one after another, it may be a [better] idea to focus all the strength on the Malaya area and advance southward toward Java from the west, avoiding the southern advance in the east. (Eleventh Air Fleet)
2. Concerning the above opinion, [the Combined Fleet] cannot agree to the idea to put priority on the advance from the west because on an operational level it is an essential condition that the Combined Fleet first copes with the Philippines. (Combined Fleet)
3. Concerning the above, it is necessary to study a case in which the share of responsibility is clearly defined in such a way that the Army air unit shall take charge of the operation in Malaya and the Navy air unit of that in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.
4. The Navy has no units specialized in the speedy preparation of airfields after seizing them, and no such trainings were ever conducted. [The Navy] should swiftly form [such] construction units, conduct trainings, and draw up concrete plans of how to condition bases.
5. In this map exercise, the loss of Type-0 fighter planes and the land-based attack planes respectively reached 160% and 40%. We have to be prepared for the possibility that no aircrew leaving from Taiwan will make it to Java. It is necessary to give due consideration to the training and the replenishment of personnel and draw up an adequate plan, let alone [a plan for] the replenishment of aircraft. (Eleventh Air Fleet)
6. The Philippines invasion plan of operations of the Second Fleet is too careful. As the research by the Navy General Staff Office judges that the defense of the Philippines is not so much to be

worried about, it should be captured in a shorter period. (And [the invasion unit] shall [more] quickly advance to the line of Davao and Jolo) to swiftly set about the Dutch East Indies [operation]. (Navy General Staff Office [Note by the author:] it seems that along with the interception of the U.S. fleet, the biggest matter of concern of the Navy in those days was to swiftly seize the oil fields in eastern Borneo.)

7. It is necessary to attach [more] importance to Miri and Kuching. Agreements between the Army and the Navy have to be arranged concerning the preparation of these air bases. (Navy General Staff Office)
8. During this operation, the [enemy sea] transport around Burma and in the Indian Ocean has to be destroyed with land-based attack planes from the airfields in Thailand or Malaya, so as to cut off the enemy from its rear. (Eleventh Air Fleet)
9. It is necessary to employ more careful measures in the campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Java. (Eleventh Air Fleet [Note by the author:] this meant that such campaigns should be launched after the lines [of operation] to southern Sumatra, Banjarmasin and Makassar had been duly established.)
10. As the military information on the southern region is inadequate, a further study should be made especially on the air bases to be seized and used, so that the plan of operations will not be frustrated. [Particularly,] further photoreconnaissance of Menado, Kendari, Miri, Kuching, Ambon, etc. needs to be conducted immediately. Also, it is necessary to obtain as much as possible meteorological information on this region because it is seriously lacking. (Eleventh Air Fleet)
11. The Third Fleet, which shall execute the invasion operations, has a severe lack of small craft. It is necessary to quickly increase the number [of such craft]. (Third Fleet)
12. As operations are carried out at sea, it is impossible to specify the invasion schedule in the form of detailed operation timetables. The plan must be given elasticity by dividing the schedule into rough periods and allotting areas of operations to the participating units.

These problems were solved one by one, except for a few (such as those of the invasion schedule, the units to condition air bases, and the measures to be taken against attrition in the air campaigns, which shall be explained later). That is, measures were taken to split the responsibility for the air operation in such a way that the responsibility for Malaya would fall on the Army and that for the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies on the Navy, that base construction units would be promptly formed, and that in the early period after the opening of hostilities sudden landings would also be conducted on the central and the southern Philippines simultaneously with those on the northern Philippines.

The map exercise at the Naval College marked a major advance in the process of formulating the Navy plan of operations. Meanwhile, the Army had also started studying the details of the [draft] southern plan of operations and was hurriedly completing a concrete version.

After going through [further] study on the Army side and passing through the “Kanoya Map Exercise” on the Navy side in the beginning of October 1941 (a map exercise conducted by the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters at the Kanoya Air Group’s [base] in Kagoshima), the [draft] plan of operations of the General Staff Offices [of the Army and the Navy] was for the most part completed and had reached a stage where the views of the Army and the Navy on the whole could find mutual agreement. In mid-October, the Combined Fleet headquarters conducted a map exercise based on the roughly completed final draft of the plan of operations on its flagship *Nagato* and saw to it that the plan was fully understood by the commanders at every level as well as their staff officers. This is the so-called “*Nagato* Map Exercise.” From the viewpoint of swiftly obtaining oil resources to build up a self-supporting position and doing it before U.S. and British forces in the Far East were reinforced, it would

be better to wage war as soon as possible. However, the massive personnel shifts due to the Combined Fleet's shift to a wartime formation caused the readiness level to drop and preparations could not be managed in time. The supposed date [of the opening of hostilities] in the Kanoya map exercise was [delayed until] 7 December 1941, and in the *Nagato* map exercise, it was [further] put off until 8 December. Also, the number of the regular aircraft carriers to be employed in the air strike on Hawaii, which might have quite a large impact on the southern operation, underwent the following changes. In the map exercise at the Naval College, the number of carriers allotted to the southern operation and the operation against Hawaii were nil and four respectively. After the completion of the large aircraft carrier *Zuikaku* on 25 September 1941 and due to the postponement of the assumed date of the opening of hostilities, the number of carriers allotted to the southern operation and Hawaii were changed to two and four respectively.⁽²⁸⁾ Then in the Kanoya map exercise in the beginning of October, a [new] idea of employing three carriers (with shorter cruising ranges, the *Akagi*, the *Sōryū*, and the *Hiryū*) for the southern operation and the other three (with longer cruising ranges, the *Kaga*, the *Shōkaku*, and the *Zuikaku*) for Hawaii was adopted.⁽³⁵⁾ After all these changes, a strong request by Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto Isoroku and his confidence [in his proposal] finally won the agreement of the Navy General Staff Office, so on 19 October the number of carriers to be allotted to the southern operation and Hawaii was decided upon as nil and six respectively (so as to ensure the success of the [Hawaii] operation and have sweeping military gains).

In this way, the final decision was made to execute the air strike on Hawaii with the full strength of the main aircraft carriers. With the other problems mostly solved, [the draft of] the central agreement between the Army and the Navy concerning the southern operation was for the most part informally decided by 26 October. The main persons of the Army and the Navy in charge added necessary modifications to this draft and obtained the approval of the chief of the Navy General Staff by 29 October.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Although some pending issues remained at that time, most of them were solved one after another by the time of the conclusion of the agreement between the Army and the Navy on 10 November 1941.

During this period, the [Japanese] government was trying hard to reach an agreement in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, but the negotiations made no progress. Finally, at the Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941, the *Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy* was decided upon with the following contents (excerpted by the author):⁽⁴¹⁾

1. In order to resolve the present crisis, to assure its self-preservation and self-defense, and to establish a New Order in Greater East Asia, the Empire [of Japan] is now determined to wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. The following measures are to be taken:
 - (1) The time to initiate military action shall be set at the beginning of December, and both the Army and the Navy shall complete operational preparations accordingly.
 - (2) The main points of the negotiations with the United States (omitted by the author).
 - (3) Cooperation with Germany and Italy shall be strengthened.
 - (4) Close military relations with Thailand shall be established (omitted by the author).
2. If the negotiations with the United States are successful by 0000 on 1 December, the initiation of military action shall be suspended.

By IGHQ Navy Department Order No. 1⁽⁴²⁾ and IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No. 1⁽⁴³⁾ of the same date [5 November 1941], the Navy issued to the Commander in Chief of the Com-

bined Fleet the Imperial command “to complete operational preparations by early December, expecting to wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands,” and also announced the “Operational Policy of the Imperial Japanese Navy” and the “the Army-Navy Central Agreement,” based upon which this operation should be executed. The chiefs of the Navy and the Army General Staffs [also] informed the Combined Fleet that the tentative date to wage war was set on 8 December 1941.

In the meantime, on 6 November, the Army issued the order of battle⁽⁴⁴⁾ of the forces to be involved in the southern operation, and gave new assignments [to its personnel] accordingly. And while conveying to the commander in chief of the Southern Army the Imperial command “to prepare for the invasion of the strategic areas in the south,” it also announced the “General Plan of Operations of the Imperial Japanese Army” as well as the “Army-Navy Central Agreement.”

The southern operation, the Dutch East Indies invasion operation in particular, had the following characteristics:

1. It is required to complete the operation in as short a period as possible.
 - (1) It is required to secure the strategic materials, which are absolutely indispensable for Japan to fight a protracted war, oil in particular, as soon as possible before the enemy destroys them.
 - (2) As the preparations for a joint defense between the United States, Britain and the Netherlands are rapidly progressing, it is required to invade [the area] before the preparations of the enemy are [further] strengthened.
 - (3) It is desirable to carry out the invasion of the area before the U.S. Fleet is fully prepared to come for an attack, so as to establish a strategically unbeatable position.
 - (4) Considering a worst-case scenario where [Japan] would have to conduct operations in both the northern and southern theaters, the Dutch East Indies operation shall be completed by spring when it becomes feasible to conduct operations against the north.
2. Characteristics of the execution of the operation
 - (1) The operation is [characterized by] a repeated process of gaining control of the air, invading, capturing and preparing bases, and advancing [the Army and Navy] air forces over a wide area. For this reason,
 - (i) It is required to draw up a detailed plan for the operation of transport ships and their escort vessels.
 - (ii) A close cooperation between ground, sea and air forces is particularly required.
 - (2) Due to the shallowness of the waters, large-scale mine warfare is expected.
 - (3) It is necessary to prepare for the employment of paratroopers to occupy the oil fields in sudden attacks, and also for their quick reopening and resumption of production, etc.
3. [The operation] will be greatly affected by other operations.
 - (1) The operation depends on the success or failure of the Carrier Task Force’s surprise attack on Hawaii. That is, whereas the Malaya invasion operation and the Philippines invasion operation shall be pushed through regardless of the success or failure of the surprise attack on Hawaii, the execution of the Dutch East Indies operation shall be affected by the success or failure of the surprise attack on Hawaii.
 - (2) As the operation is carried out by advancing air bases while using the Philippines, Malaya and British Borneo as stepping-stones, it is affected by the progress of these [local] operations. As the main strength of the enemy in the southern [region] is situated in the Philippines and Malaya areas, the operation will turn into a pursuit battle once the main strength of the enemy has been overcome.

2. IGHQ's [Navy Department's] Mission Directives and the Army-Navy Central Agreement

On 5 November, IGHQ [Navy Department] issued the following order and instructions to the Combined Fleet.^(42, 43)

IGHQ Navy Department Order No. 1

5 November 1941

By Imperial Order, Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano Osami **directs Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto as follows:**

1. The Empire [of Japan], for the sake of its self-preservation and self-defense, expects to wage war against the United States, Britain and then the Netherlands in early December and has decided to complete all operational preparations.
2. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall implement the necessary operational preparations.
3. Regarding details, the chief of the Navy General Staff shall give instructions.

IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No. 1

5 November 1941

Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano Osami **directs Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto in conformity with IGHQ Navy Department Order No.1 as follows:**

1. In anticipation of waging war against the United States, Britain and later the Netherlands in early December, the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall timely advance the necessary units to their standby points before the launch of operations.
2. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall be on strict alert against unforeseen attacks delivered by the United States, Britain and the Dutch [East Indies] forces.
3. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet may secretly conduct reconnaissance when it is specifically required for executing operations.
4. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall have the Fourth Fleet timely lay mines in the [waters] of the equatorial Pacific Islands in conformity with its defense plan.
5. The mission directives and the Army-Navy Central Agreement, in conformity with which the operations are to be conducted, are given in the supplement.
6. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall make agreements with the commanders concerned of the Army on joint operations between the Army and the Navy.
7. The bases of operations right at the launch of the operations are generally determined as follows:

Yokosuka:	The Fourth, the Fifth and the Sixth Fleets
Kure:	The First and the Second Fleets, the First Air Fleet and the units under direct control of the Combined Fleet
Sasebo:	The Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet

IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No.1, Supplement

Mission of the Imperial [Japanese] Navy for War against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands (Excerpted by the author)

Part 1.

Mission in Case War against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands Breaks Out
During the Operation Against China

Chapter 1. Summary

1. The outline of the mission of the Imperial [Japanese] Navy is, while continuing [operations] to take control of the Chinese coast and the lower reaches of the Yangzi basin, to promptly destroy the enemy fleet and air power in the East, to occupy and secure key areas in the south, to build up a sustainable and unbeatable position, and [eventually] to destroy [more of] the enemy's fleet and in the end deprive the enemy of his will to fight.

Chapter 2. Mission of the Combined Fleet

Section 1. Stage-One Operations

2. The unit, consisting of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and the Eleventh Air Fleet as its core, shall clear [the sea] in the Philippines, British Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies of the enemy fleet, destroy them, and in conjunction with the Army, carry out the following operations:
 - (1) [The unit] shall launch operations against British Malaya and the Philippines simultaneously, conduct preemptive air strikes on the air power and on the naval forces of the enemy in these areas and [at the same time] put ashore the Army's advance corps in the key locations in Malaya and the Philippines as quickly as possible in order to push ahead the air units and intensify the air operations.
 - (2) After the above operations [in 2.(1)] produce results, the main force of the invasion corps of the Army shall be put ashore in the Philippines and then in Malaya to promptly capture the Philippines and British Malaya.
 - (3) In the early stages of the operations, strategic places in British Borneo shall be occupied, followed by those in Dutch Borneo, Celebes, and southern Sumatra at the earliest opportunity. Key places in the Moluccas and Timor shall [also] be occupied at favorable opportunities and the necessary air bases [at each place] shall be made ready for use.
 - (4) As soon as the air bases mentioned in the above [2.(3)] are made ready for use, air units shall be advanced one after another to suppress the air power of the enemy in the Java area. After [the operation] produces results, the main force of the invasion corps of the Army shall be put ashore on Java to capture it.
 - (5) After capturing Singapore, strategic areas in northern Sumatra shall be occupied, and the operations against Burma shall timely be conducted in order to block the enemy's supply route to China.
3. -5. (Omitted by the author - [concerning] the operations in the equatorial Pacific Islands as well as the sea to the east of Japan, and the operation by submarines against Hawaii.)
6. The unit consisting of the First Air Fleet as its core shall conduct a surprise attack on the enemy fleet in Hawaii right at the outset of the war and strive to degrade its power. After that, it shall mainly be assigned to support the operations of the Fourth Fleet and the southern invasion operation.
7. The main force of the Combined Fleet shall be assigned to support operations as a whole and take action at the right moment according to the movements of the enemy fleet.
8. An element of the Combined Fleet shall be assigned to disrupt the shipping lanes of the enemy in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas at the right moment.
9. As for Thailand and French Indochina, while doing our best not to provoke their hostility, efforts shall be made to make [both countries] follow our operations. However, if any hostile behavior is observed, armed force shall be employed without hesitation so as not to let it hinder our operations.

Section 2. Stage-Two Operations

10. While continuing the task of reconnoitering, observing and conducting surprise attacks against the main force of enemy fleets, the unit consisting of the Sixth Fleet as its core, shall, along with

an element of the Combined Fleet, intensify [operations to] disrupt the shipping lanes of the enemy, and when required, destroy enemy advance bases in surprise attacks.

11. The unit consisting of the First Air Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet as its core shall take charge of searching for and attacking enemy forces. Also, it shall at an opportune moment attack and destroy enemy advance bases.
12. The Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and [other] necessary units shall take charge of defending and patrolling the occupied [sea] areas in the south as well as protecting the shipping lanes in these areas. They shall [also] strive to search for enemy naval vessels appearing in these areas as well as to attack and destroy enemy advance bases in the outer areas [of the south].
13. The unit consisting of the Fourth Fleet as its core shall take charge of seizing the equatorial Pacific Islands as well as the Bismarck Islands, defending and patrolling strategic locations, protecting the shipping lanes in these areas, and searching for and attacking enemy naval vessels [there]. At the same time, it shall strive to surprise the enemy advance bases in the outer areas.
14. The unit consisting of the Fifth Fleet as its core shall take charge of defending the Ogasawara [Bonin] Islands, and patrolling and protecting the shipping lanes in the waters north of and including the islands and to the east of Japan. At the same time, the unit shall search for and attack enemy fleets appearing in the waters and, at a favorable opportunity, strive to surprise the enemy advance bases in the Aleutians.
15. One element of the Combined Fleet shall timely be sent to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, where it shall make utmost efforts to disrupt enemy shipping lanes.
16. The main force of the Combined Fleet shall take charge of timely acting in response to movements of the enemy fleets and supporting the entire operation.
17. In case the U.S. main fleet comes [for an attack], the unit consisting of the Sixth Fleet as its core shall take charge of reconnoitering the enemy at close range, so that while the air units and the submarine units strive to weaken the enemy power, the major part of the Combined Fleet, which shall timely be concentrated, shall intercept them and destroy them.
18. In case a powerful British fleet comes [for an attack], the Third Fleet, the Fourth Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, air units and submarine units, etc. shall timely be moved and concentrated, and try to scout, reconnoiter at close range, and weaken the power of the enemy. In the meantime, while responding to the movements of the U.S. fleet, the main force of the Combined Fleet shall search for the British Fleet and destroy it.
19. Among the areas to be occupied, defense shall be provided for the following strategic locations: Manila, Hong Kong, Davao, Singapore, Batavia, Surabaya, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Menado, Makassar, Ambon, Penang and Rabaul.
20. Advance bases [to be set up] in the occupied areas shall be as follows:
Manila, Singapore and Surabaya.

Chapter 3. Mission of the China Area Fleet (Omitted by the author)

IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No. 1 Supplement

The Army – Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation (Summary)

1. The areas to be occupied in the south are as follows:
The Philippines, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Timor, etc.
2. Forces to be employed for the operation

(1) The Army (as in the following table)

Army	Forces		Deployment Area
Southern Army	14th Army	16th Div, 48th Div, 2 tank rgts, 44 antiaircraft guns, 6 artillery bns under direct control of the army (Note: 65th Bde shall not be employed in the invasion operation.)	The Philippines
	15th Army	33d Div, 55th Div (minus one element)	Thailand, Burma
	16th Army	2d Div, 38th Div (to be transferred after completing the Hong Kong operation), 3 tank rgts, 48th Div (to be transferred after completing the Philippines operation), 56th Mixed Inf Gp (Sakaguchi Det), 5 artillery bns under direct control of the army, 88 antiaircraft guns	The Dutch East Indies
	25th Army	Imperial Guard Div, 5th Div, 18th Div, 56th Div (to be afterwards transferred to Burma), 4 tank rgts, 11 artillery bns under direct control of the army, 60 antiaircraft guns	Malaya
	Units under direct control of the Southern Army	21st Div, 21st Independent Mixed Bde, 48 antiaircraft guns, 3d Air Force, 5th Air Force, 21st Independent Air Unit	
23d Army	38th Div, 1 light bomber air gp		Hong Kong
South Seas Detachment	55th Mixed Inf Gp		Pacific [Islands]

(2) The Navy

Fleet		Forces	Areas of operation
Combined Fleet		Flagship of the Combined Fleet, 4th and 5th Submarine Sqdns, 11th Seaplane Tender Div	11th Seaplane Tender Div: The Philippines, The Dutch East Indies Submarine Sqdns: entire South Pacific area
	1st Fleet	One element of 3d Battleship Div, 3d Destroyer Sqdn, one element of 3d Carrier Div, *6th Cruiser Div, one element of 1st Destroyer Sqdn	3d Destroyer Sqdn: Malaya area Others: in areas where necessary
	2d Fleet	4th, *5th, and 7th Cruiser Divs, 2d and 4th Destroyer Sqdns, *8th Cruiser Div	At the outset, main force: the Philippines area, one element: Malaya Later: Malaya and the Dutch East Indies
	3d Fleet	16th Cruiser Div, 17th Minelayer Div, 5th Destroyer Sqdn, 6th Submarine Sqdn, 12th Seaplane Tender Div, 1st Base Force, 2d Base Force	At the outset, main force: the Philippines, one element: Malaya Later: the Dutch East Indies area
	4th Fleet	One element of 18th Cruiser Div, one element of 6th Destroyer Sqdn, one element of 5th Base Force, 24th Air Flotilla, 1 seaplane tender	Areas of [equatorial] Pacific Islands (a powerful unit shall be added if required)
	1st Air Fleet	1st, 2d, 4th and 5th Carrier Divs	Where required
	11th Air Fleet	21st, 22d, and 23d Air Flotillas	Entire area of operations
	Southern Expeditionary Fleet	The <i>Kashii</i> , the <i>Shimushu</i> , 9th Base Force (at the outset of the operation, 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer sqdn, 1 carrier, 2 seaplane tenders shall [also] be assigned)	Malaya, British Borneo and Sumatra areas
China Area Fleet	2d China Expeditionary Fleet	Bulk of the 2d China Expeditionary Fleet, one element of the China Area Fleet, one element of the Combined Fleet	Hong Kong

Notes:

(1) Part of the strength shall be increased or reduced depending on the situation.

(2) * Indicates forces whose strength may be partly employed depending on the situation.

3. Outline of the launch of the operation (Omitted by the author)
4. Outline of the Philippines operation
 - (1) Right at the outset of the war, while preemptive air strikes shall be carried out on the enemy air power, naval vessels, etc. in the Philippines, the Navy unit shall simultaneously make a sudden attack on Batan Island to quickly prepare an emergency landing field.
 - (2) Advance units shall, with the cooperation of the Army and the Navy, land in Aparri, Vigan (followed by Laoag), Legaspi and Davao and their vicinities, first seize air bases and make them ready for use. Then, they shall capture Jolo Island and make the air base ready for use as quickly as possible. After that, air units of both the Army and the Navy shall advance their air bases to continue their air operations.
 - (3) Making most of the results of the above air campaigns, by the fifteenth day of the operation at the latest, the main force of the Fourteenth Army shall be put ashore at Lingayen Gulf, and one element at Lamon Bay, to promptly capture Manila, and subsequently occupy [other] key locations in the Philippines.
 - (4) When the [Philippines] invasion operation is for the most part completed, the 48th Division shall be assembled near Manila to be transferred to the Dutch East Indies invasion corps.
5. Outline of the British Malaya operation
 - (1) The unit consisting of the Twenty-fifth Army, the Third Air Force and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet as its core shall launch the operation in the following manner:
 - {1} Plan A (in case execution of a sudden landing is likely in view of the situation in Britain and in Thailand)

The advance corps shall enter into the anchorage at 0000 on Day X and onwards, conduct a sudden landing at Ban Don, Nahkon, Singora and Pattani and their vicinities, to swiftly seize air bases and make them ready for use. Air units of both the Army and the Navy shall launch air strikes at 0000 on Day X and onwards from southern Indochina, and mainly carry out preemptive air strikes on the enemy air power and naval vessels in British Malaya.
 - {2} – {4} (Plan B and others; omitted by the author)
 - (2) Outline of the invasion of Singapore (Omitted by the author)
6. Outline of the British Borneo operation
 - (1) Right at the opening of hostilities, one element of the force under the direct control of the Southern Army shall seize Miri in a sudden attack, and secure the important resource areas and the air base.
 - (2) After the seizure of Miri, it shall proceed to capture Kuching, seize the air base, make it ready for use, and advance the Navy air unit.
7. Outline of the Dutch East Indies operation
 - (1) During the Philippines operation, the Army and the Navy in conjunction shall, with one element of the Sixteenth Army, capture Tarakan as swiftly as possible, then Balikpapan and Banjarmasin one after another, depending on the situation of the Philippines and the Malaya operations. During or after this operation, Ambon and Kupang shall be seized at an opportune moment, where necessary air bases shall be seized and made ready for use, and key resource areas shall be secured.
 - (2) Roughly at the same time with the capture of Tarakan, the Navy shall seize Menado, then Kendari and Makassar without assistance [of the Army] during the latter's operations in the previous item.
 - (3) Apart [from the above], when the operation against British Malaya has made progress, one element of the Sixteenth Army shall at an opportune moment seize the key locations on Bangka Island as well as Palembang, ready the air base and secure the important resource areas.

- (4) After the necessary air bases [seized] in the above (1), (2), (3) [operations] have been readied and the enemy air power in Java has been brought under control, the main force of the Sixteenth Army shall land in western Java and one corps diverted [from the Philippines] in eastern Java, and promptly capture Batavia, Bandung and Surabaya. After that, they shall mop up the key areas in Java.
- (5) When the Malacca Strait has been brought under control after the capture of Singapore, one element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall timely be disembarked in the vicinity of Medan from the west coast of the Malay Peninsula to seize the key areas in Aceh and, at an opportune moment, Sabang Island.

8. Command

The operations shall be carried out by the Army and the Navy in conjunction. However, when the Army unit and the Navy special landing force shall conduct operations in the same area in a local landing operation, a unified command may be instated depending on the situation.

9. Transport and escort

- (1) The Navy shall provide escort to the landing units in all operational areas. However, escort to be provided for transport units after the landing of the main force [in charge] of the area shall be provided within the limit of the strength available under the circumstances of that time.
- (2) Generally, no particular direct escort shall be provided to empty return ships and to general shipping north of Taiwan. [However,] depending on the circumstances, escort for general shipping north of Taiwan may be provided by one element of the forces of the China Area Fleet.
- (3) Necessary escorts shall be provided to ships replenishing and transporting the Army or evacuating its casualties. These transports, which should be carried out in groups as much as possible, shall be determined in view of the timing of the transport and the situation of the operations, taking the availability of escort forces into consideration.

10. Assembly points of the invasion units (Omitted by the author)

11. Agreements and arrangements to be made between the commanders of the Army and the Navy

If the opening of hostilities should be decided on, [agreements and arrangements] shall be concluded at an earliest opportunity between the commanders of the following units:

- (1) The Southern Army, the Combined Fleet, and the Second Fleet (Note: concerning southern operations in general)
- (2) The Southern Army and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Note: concerning the British Borneo operation)
- (3) The Fourteenth Army, the Sixteenth Army and the Third Fleet (Note: concerning the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies operations)
- (4) The Fifteenth Army, the Twenty-fifth Army and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Note: concerning the Malaya operation)
- (5) The Third Air Force, the Fifth Air Force and the Eleventh Air Fleet (Note: concerning the southern air operation)
- (6) The Third Air Force and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the 22d Air Flotilla (Note: concerning the Malaya air operation)

12. Code names

The Philippines operation: Operation M; The British Borneo operation: Operation B; The Malaya operation: Operation E; the entire southern operation: Operation "A-GO"; The Dutch East Indies operation: Operation H

Attachment to the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation**The Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Air [Operation] for the Southern Operation (Summary)**

1. The forces to be employed (as in the following table)

Areas	Navy			Army		
	Commander	Forces		Commander	Forces	
The Philippines	Commander in Chief, 11th Air Fleet	9 land-based reconnaissance planes, 108 land-based fighter planes, 144 land-based attack planes, 18 flying boats (reinforcements shall be brought from other areas, if situation requires)	279	5th Air Force Commander	36 reconnaissance planes, 36 fighter planes, 54 light bombers, 18 heavy bombers (apart from these, about 30 fighter planes shall be employed for the air defense of Taiwan)	144
	Commander in Chief, 3d Fleet	About 60 reconnaissance sea-planes (40 right [at the opening of hostilities])	60 (40)			
Malaya Burma British Borneo	Com- mander, 22d Air Flotilla	9 land-based reconnaissance planes, 36 land-based fighter planes, 72 land-based attack planes	117*	3d Air Force Commander	72 reconnaissance planes, 168 fighter planes, 108 light bombers, 99 heavy bombers (after the completion of the Philippines operations, main force of the 5th Air Force shall be diverted)	447
	Commander in Chief, Southern Expeditionary Fleet	7 reconnaissance seaplanes (about 20 right [at the opening of hostilities])	7 (20)			
The Dutch East Indies	Most of the forces assigned to the Philippines and Malaya operations shall be diverted, and one element of the 1st Air Fleet shall be added, depending on the situation.			As much force as possible shall be diverted from Malaya areas after the Malaya operation is for the most part completed or the fate of Singapore is sealed, though depending on the situation.		

* The text mistakenly has 177.

2. Outline of the Philippines operation
 - (1–4) (Omitted by the author)
 - (5) When the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Philippines is completed, the Navy air units shall be diverted to the Dutch East Indies operation.
3. Outline of Malaya, Burma, and British Borneo operations
 - (1–4) (Omitted by the author)
 - (5) While the Army shall be in charge of the preparation of the air bases in Malaya, Thailand and Burma, the Navy shall be in charge of those in British Borneo and of the seaplane bases.
 - (6) When the air bases on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula are made ready for use, the Army shall successively advance [its forces], while the Navy shall appropriately use these bases with one element to intensify its air campaigns.
4. Outline of the Dutch East Indies operation
 - (1) Although the Navy shall take the major part in this operation, the operation in northern Sumatra shall be mainly conducted by the Army, whereas those in southern Sumatra and western Java shall be carried out by the Army and the Navy in conjunction.
 - (2) The Navy shall allocate the air units to be diverted from the Philippines to the main force and, according to the war situation, also divert necessary strength from the units conducting the Malaya and British Borneo operations.
 - (3) The Army shall cooperate in this operation with the units to be diverted from the Malaya area. The air campaign against northern Sumatra shall be carried out at appropriate moments even while the Malaya operation is in progress.

3. The Plan of Operations of the Combined Fleet

In conformity with the mission directives and the central agreement given by central command, the Combined Fleet disclosed its plan of operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands to all its units by Combined Fleet Operation Order Classified No. 1 of 5 November, an excerpt of which is as follows (some parts are summarized):⁽⁴⁵⁾

Supplement to Combined Fleet Operation Order Classified No. 1

Operations of the Combined Fleet in a War against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands (Excerpted by the author)

Part 1.

Mission of the Combined Fleet in Case War against the United States, Britain and
the Netherlands Breaks Out During the Operation Against China

Chapter 1.

Summary of the operation

1. In the east, the U.S. fleet shall be destroyed and the lines of operation and the supply lines of the United States to [their forces and allies in] the east shall be disrupted.
2. In the west, the British Malaya area shall be captured, and the lines of operation and the supply lines of Britain to [its forces and allies in] the east, as well as the supply route in Burma [to China] shall be cut off.
3. The enemy power in the east shall be destroyed, their operational bases seized and resource areas captured.
4. By seizing key locations, expanding [the seized areas], and strengthening defenses a position shall be secured from where a protracted war can be conducted.
5. The enemy power shall be intercepted and destroyed.

6. By expanding the military gains, the morale of the enemy shall be undermined.

Chapter 2

Preparations for the opening of hostilities and the [actual] opening of hostilities

Section 1

Preparations for the opening of hostilities

1. In case the Empire [of Japan] anticipates a war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands and determines to complete various operational preparations, the “first [phase] of preparations for the opening of hostilities” order shall be passed down, along with a tentative date for the opening of hostilities (Day Y). Each unit shall act as follows:
 - (a) Each fleet and unit shall, without particular separate orders, shift its formation according to the phase-one operational disposition of the stage-one operations, complete war preparations and timely advance to the standby point before the launch of the operation designated by the commander of each unit, and stand by.
 - (b) Each unit shall stay on strict alert against unexpected attacks delivered by U.S., British, and Dutch forces.
 - (c) Each commander may secretly conduct reconnaissance when it is specifically required for executing operations.
 - (d) (The laying of mines in the [Japanese administered] equatorial Pacific Islands: omitted by the author.)
2. When advance units required for executing the operation are sent to the operational waters, the “second [phase] of preparations for the opening of hostilities” order shall be issued.
Each unit shall act as follows:
 - (a) The advance units, the Carrier Task Force, the units to disrupt [the enemy] shipping lanes, the submarine units belonging to the Southern Task Force and the South Seas Unit shall timely start for their respective operational waters designated by the commander of each unit.
 - (b) The remaining units shall act as designated by the commander of each unit in conformity to their dispositions right at the opening of hostilities.
3. Depending on circumstances, [it is possible that] some units shall be designated to make [specific] necessary preparations for the opening of hostilities. It is [also] possible that the “second [phase] of preparations for the opening of hostilities” shall be reversed to the “first [phase] of preparations for the opening of hostilities,” if huge changes should occur in the circumstances.

Section 2

The opening of hostilities and the use of arms before the opening of hostilities (Omitted by the author)

Chapter 3

Stage-one operations

Section 1

Mission

1. The advance units, the Carrier Task Force, the South Seas Unit, the Northern Task Force and the main unit [the Combined Fleet] shall conduct operations against the U.S. Fleet.
Right at the outset of the war, the advance unit and the Carrier Task Force shall destroy [the U.S. Fleet] in a surprise attack and block its offensive operations. The units shall strive to capture and destroy the U.S. Fleet if the latter should go into action (the rest omitted by the author).

2. While holding the upper hand in the area, the Southern Task Force shall clear and destroy the enemy fleets in the waters of the Philippines, British Malaya, and Dutch East Indies; at the same time it shall conduct the following operations in conjunction with the Army:
 - (a) [The unit] shall launch operations against British Malaya and the Philippines simultaneously, conduct preemptive air strikes on the air power and on the naval forces of the enemy in these areas and repeatedly attack them. [At the same time] it shall put ashore the Army's advance corps in the key locations in Malaya, the Philippines and then British Borneo as quickly as possible in order to push ahead the air units and intensify their air operations.
 - (b) After the above operations [2(a)] produce results, the main force of the invasion corps of the Army shall be put ashore in the Philippines and then in Malaya to promptly capture the Philippines and British Malaya.
 - (c) In the early stages of the operation, strategic places in Celebes shall be occupied, followed by those in Dutch Borneo and southern Sumatra. Key places in the Moluccas and Timor shall [also] be occupied at favorable opportunities and the necessary air bases [at each place] shall be made ready for use.
 - (d) As soon as the air bases mentioned in the above [2(c)] are made ready for use, air units shall be advanced one after another to suppress the air power of the enemy in the Java area. After [the operation] produces results, the main force of the invasion corps of the Army shall be put ashore in Java to capture it.
 - (e) After capturing Singapore, strategic areas in northern Sumatra shall be occupied, and the operations against Burma shall timely be conducted in order to block the enemy's supply route to China.
3. In case the U.S. Fleet should come for an attack, the Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and others shall carry out the southern operation for the time being, while the bulk of the decisive force shall take charge of implementing the operation to intercept the U.S. Fleet.
4. – 5. (The operation to disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes, and the items concerning Thailand and French Indochina [operations]: Omitted by the author.)

Section 2

Outline of the operation against the U.S. Fleet (Omitted by the author)

Section 3

Outline of the southern operation

The southern operation shall be conducted by the commander of the Southern Task Force, except for mission directives and orders particularly given in conformity with the agreements between the commanders in chief of the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army.

Section 4

Periodization of the operation

Stage-one operations shall be divided into the following phases, and particular orders shall be given for shifts [from one phase to another].

1. Phase-one operations: The operations [cover the period] from the opening of hostilities roughly until the completion of the landing of the main force of the Army Philippines invasion [unit]
2. Phase-two operations: The operations [cover the period] after phase-one operations roughly until the completion of the landing of the main force of the Army British Malaya invasion [unit]
3. Phase-three operations: The operations [cover the period] after phase-two operations until the Dutch East Indies operation is for the most part completed.

Section 5

Disposition of forces

The disposition of forces during stage-one operations shall be designated as follows:

1. Phase-one disposition: Separate Table No. 1
2. Phase-two disposition: Separate Table No. 2
3. Phase-three disposition: Separate Table No. 3
4. Disposition for the interception operation: Separate Table No. 4 (Omitted by the author.)

Chapter 4

Stage-two operations

Section 1

Mission

1. The advance units shall continuously watch and surprise the U.S and British fleets and, at favorable opportunities, land-based air units and carrier-based air units shall [also] carry out raids.
2. The lines of operation and the supply lines of the United States and Britain to [their units and the allies in] the East shall be securely cut off, and the defense of key locations shall be strengthened.
3. Enemy forces in the waters under [Japanese] control as well as enemy remnants in the seized key locations shall be cleared and destroyed, resources shall be secured, and the shipping lanes shall be protected.
4. By taking advantage of [our] inner [defense] lines, the U.S. and British fleets coming for an attack shall be destroyed one by one.
5. The operation to disrupt the U.S. and Britain's shipping lanes shall be intensified.

Section 2

Strategic locations and advance bases in the occupied areas to be defended

1. In the occupied areas, the strategic locations to be defended shall be planned as follows:
Manila, Davao, Singapore, Batavia, Surabaya, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Menado, Makassar, Ambon, Penang, and Rabaul
2. In the occupied areas, the advance bases shall be planned as follows:
Manila, Singapore, and Surabaya

Section 3

The areas planned to be occupied or destroyed

The areas to be occupied or destroyed as swiftly as the operational situation permits are as follows:

1. Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Fiji, and Samoa area
2. Aleutians, and Midway area
3. Andaman Islands
4. Key locations in Australia

Section 4

Disposition of forces

(Omitted by the author)

Chapter 5

Protection of shipping lanes and disruption of those of the enemy
and mining operations

Section 1

Protection of shipping lanes

In addition to the following table, the protection of the shipping lanes shall be implemented as designated by the commander of each unit in accordance with the Wartime Commerce Protection Plan of [administrative] year 1941.

Unit	Assigned Areas	Main Assignments
The Philippines Dutch East Indies Unit	West of 136.2° E (excluding the waters guarded by the 3d Base Force) South of 20° N East of the 315° line with the north end of British Borneo as the center (excluding the areas of the 2d China Expeditionary Fleet)	– Controlling the movements of ships in the assigned areas – Matters concerning the escort of [friendly] ships in the assigned areas – Collecting information and its communication – Controlling ship signals in the assigned areas – Issuing warnings and all-clear signals in the assigned area
Malaya Unit	South of the 315° line with the north end of British Borneo as the center	
South Seas Unit	East of 136.2° E (also includes the waters guarded by the 3d Base Force) Waters south of 24° N	
[Assigned to the Northern Task Force:]	Waters north of 24° N Waters south of 29° N	
Other operational units	Each operational area	Shall cooperate in the following way: 1. Destroying the enemy power in each operational area 2. Cooperation in the escort (by mainly providing indirect escort; direct escort depending on the circumstances) 3. Support of signal communications

Section 2

The operation to disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes

1. Mission

The operation to disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes shall swiftly be conducted against the most important areas for the shipping of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, while at the same time containing the enemy forces in order to support the main operations.

Later, the operations shall be increasingly intensified and carried out for a longer period, so as to undermine the morale of the enemy.

2. Outline of the implementation

(a) – (c) ([Areas] other than the southwestern region: Omitted by the author.)

- (d) After stage-one, phase-one operations, the 4th, the 5th, and the 6th Submarine Squadrons shall take charge of disrupting the [enemy] shipping lanes partly at the south coast of Java or near the west exit of the Malacca Strait, as designated by the commander of the Southern Task Force. When the southern operation is for the most part completed, they shall further actively engage in the disruption of [enemy] shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and [the waters near] Australia.
- (e) When stage-one operations are for the most part completed or when favorable opportunities are found during the operations, the force engaging in the disruption of [enemy] shipping lanes shall further be strengthened, and [the operation] shall be vigorously carried out with naval vessels and aircraft.

Section 3

Mining operations

Apart from the below, the mining operations of the Combined Fleet shall be [carried out] as designated by the commander of each unit.

1. The southern operation area

- (a) The standard implementation of offensive mining operations: As in Attached Table No. 1
- (b) The table of the bases to be defended with mines and antisubmarine nets (standard): As in Attached Table No. 2
- (Followed by "A table of mines and antisubmarine nets to be replenished" and "Mining operations in the equatorial Pacific Islands," etc., which are omitted by the author.)

Attached Table No. 1

The standard implementation of offensive mining operations in the southern operation area

- (1) Stage-one, phase-one operations (The Philippines and Malaya areas: Omitted by the author)
- (2) Stage-one, phase-two operations (Note by the author: As in the following table)

Areas	Waters to be mined	Moment [to lay mines]	Forces to be employed	Number of mines	Remarks
The Dutch East Indies	North exit of Surabaya	Around Day X + 25	Submarines of 6th Submarine Sqdn	About 40	Light cruisers and other war vessels with shallow draft are set as targets
Malaya	Entrance of Singapore Strait or south of Malaya	At appropriate moments	1 Minelayer of the 9th Base Force and 3 [minelayers] of the 17th Minelayer Div	About 500	1. To block the enemy's passage 2. To intensify the mining operations in phase-one operations

- (3) Stage-one, phase-three operations and thereafter

Areas	Waters to be mined	Moment [to lay mines]	Forces to be employed	Number of mines	Remarks
Waters off Australia	Port Darwin	At the earliest opportunity	Minelayers of the 17th Minelayer Div	300	To block the enemy's passage
	Key locations of Australia	Advance at the first opportunity	1 or 2 submarine(s) of the 6th Submarine Sqdn 1 minelayer* of the 17th Minelayer Div	Appropriately [as needed]	1. To block the enemy's passage 2. Mines shall be laid when Type88 mines are supplied
Indian Ocean	Rangoon Colombo Bombay	At the earliest opportunity after the seizure of Singapore	1 or 2 submarine(s) of the 6th Submarine Sqdn	Appropriately [as needed]	Ditto

Attached Table No. 2

The table of the bases to be defended with mines and antisubmarine nets

(1) The Philippines area (Omitted by the author)

(2) The French Indochina area (Omitted by the author)

(3) The Dutch East Indies area:

Tarakan, Balikpapan, Makassar, Surabaya, Ambon or Kupang, Batavia, and the Sunda Strait.

(4) The Malaya area:

Outer area of the port of Singapore, and the Malacca Strait.

Chapter 6

Signal Communications

(Omitted by the author)

Chapter 7

Replenishment

(Omitted by the author)

Chapter 8

Operations [to be conducted] by others than the Combined Fleet

(Omitted by the author)

Part 2

Operations of the Combined Fleet in Case War against Russia Breaks Out While the War

Against the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China Is Underway

(Omitted by the author)

* The text mistakenly has *submarine*.

Part 3
Miscellaneous Rules
(Omitted by the author)

Separate table No. 1

Stage-One, Phase-One Disposition of Forces (Note by the author: As in the following table*)

(From the first [phase] of preparation for the opening of hostilities until about Day X + 20, when the landing of the main force of the Army Philippines invasion unit is completed.)

Unit	Com- mander	Force to be employed	Main assignment	Outline of operation	Standby position	Notes
Main Unit		1st Battleship Div, 1st Fleet (minus 3d Battleship Div, 6th Cruiser Div, 1st De- stroyer Sqdn (minus 2 destroyer divs), and minus 3d Destroyer Sqdn), and 1 de- stroyer of 7th De- stroyer Div	Support for the entire operation	1. The unit stays on alert at anchor in the west- ern part of the Inland Sea and makes a sor- tie for support when necessary. 2. Based on Operation Tactics 1 against the U.S. Fleet, it shall cover the return of the Carrier Task Force after the attack by de- parting on Day X.	Western part of the Inland Sea of Japan	
Carrier Task Force	Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Cdr in Chief, 1st Air Fleet	1st Air Fleet (minus 4th Carrier Div and destroyer div), 1st Destroyer Sqdn (minus 3 destroyer divs), 1 destroyer div of 2d Destroyer Sqdn, the <i>Akigumo</i> , 3d Battleship Div (minus 2d Section), 8th Cruiser Div, 7th Destroyer Div (minus 1 de- stroyer), and 1 transport ship	1. [To conduct] Operation Tac- tics 1 against the U.S. [Fleet]. (a) To destroy the enemy fleet in Hawaii in a surprise at- tack. (b) To support the opera- tions of the South Seas Unit and the Northern Task Force. 2. [To conduct] Operation Tac- tics 2 and 3 against the U.S. Fleet. (a) To support the operations of the South Seas Unit and the Northern Task Force.	1. Operation Tactics 1 against the U.S. [Fleet]. (a) On Day X, it shall destroy the enemy warships in Hawaii in a surprise attack with all its air strength. (b) It shall attack the Midway Islands with one element to destroy the [enemy] base facilities there. (c) After the air strikes, it shall return to the mainland [of Japan] for maintenance and replenishment. 2. Operation Tactics 2 and 3 against the U.S. Fleet. (a) It shall take action, responding to the enemy situation; while staying on alert against U.S. Fleet, it shall cooper-	Hitokappu Bay	

* Separate tables No. 1-3 contain a number of small mistakes. We have revised these tables on the basis of the original archival document cited in note 45.

Advance Unit	Supply Unit	Cdr in Chief, 1st Air Fleet	11 transport ships	(b) To cooperate with the South Seas Unit in its operation to seize key locations. (c) To support the operation of the Southern Task Force if required.	ate in the South Seas Unit's operation to seize key locations if required. (b) One element shall participate in the operations of the Southern Task Force by separate orders.		
	Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet	Cdr in Chief, 6th Fleet	6th Fleet	1. To reconnoiter, observe and attack the U.S. Fleet in the Hawaii area. 2. To cooperate with the Carrier Task Force in its operation. 3. To attack [the enemy] air bases between Hawaii and Samoa.	1. It shall observe and attack the U.S. Fleet in the area of Hawaii. It shall intercept [the enemy] at the waterway of Pearl Harbor and strive to block the waterway. If the enemy makes a sortie, follow him and attack him. 2. In the Operation Tactics 1 against the U.S. Fleet, it shall operate roughly as follows: (a) The key locations in the Aleutians as well as those in the areas of Samoa, Fiji and Tutuila shall be reconnoitered by Day X - 3 with one submarine each for both areas. Should any powerful enemy units, which may cause damage to the Carrier Task Force, be found, they shall be watched and reported. (b) An element shall sail and sweep in front of the Carrier Task Force; Others shall secretly conduct reconnaissance, encircling Hawaii at a distance by Day X - 5, while approaching	Designated by the Advance Unit commander	The Advance Unit shall remain under command of the Carrier Task Force commander after the completion of the surprise attack on Hawaii until Day X + 3.

South Seas Unit	Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet		Cdr in Chief, 6th Fleet	6 transport ships		Hawaii with one element. (c) When the operation of the Carrier Task Force is successfully [over], one submarine division or less shall timely be dispatched to [the area] between north America and Hawaii to disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes. 3. In Operation Tactics 2 against the U.S. Fleet, one element shall timely make an attack on enemy air bases between Hawaii and Samoa. Also [the unit] shall timely cooperate with the South Seas Unit in its operation to destroy Howland.		
	Supply Unit							
South Seas Unit	Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet		Cdr in Chief, 4th Fleet	4th Fleet (minus 6th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 1 destroyer div), 2 patrol boats, 5th Base Force (minus one element)), 6th Cruiser Div, and 1st Combined Signal Unit 2d Section	1. To defend and patrol the assigned areas. 2. To capture Wake and Guam. 3. To timely prevent the enemy from using air bases in the Howland area. 4. Depending on the situation, to capture Rabaul.	1. In addition to capturing Wake and Guam as swiftly as possible, it shall take charge of defending and patrolling its assigned areas, while prepared for actions of the U.S. and British fleets. 2. In Operation Tactics 1 against the U.S. Fleet, the 6th Cruiser Div shall join the main force at a designated point to provide cover for the Carrier Task Force to return. Flying boats shall advance to Wake Island as soon as possible to conduct the required patrol. 3. In Operation Tactics 2 against the U.S. Fleet, depending on the situation, Rabaul and other key locations shall be invaded with the cooperation of the Carrier Task Force.	[[Japanese administered] Equatorial Pacific Islands; one element in Chichijima	
				6th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 1 destroyer div), 2 patrol boats and 1 Co of special landing forces				
				5th Base Force (minus one element) 23d Destroyer Div The <i>Obo</i>				
				21 transport ships				

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Northern Task Force	Supply Unit	Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet	Cdr in Chief, 5th Fleet	5th Fleet, (Kisarazu Air Gp), Chichijima Signal unit, 9 land-based attack planes of Yokosuka Air Gp 3 transport ships	1. To patrol and defend the assigned areas. 2. To guard the sailing route of the Carrier Task Force and cover its return. 3. To guard against the Soviet Union.	Omitted by the author	[Location] designated by the commander	
	Commercial [Maritime] Transport Disruption Unit		Cdr, 24th Auxiliary Cruiser Div	24th Auxiliary Cruiser Div 1 transport ship	To disrupt [the enemy] shipping lanes.	Omitted by the author	[Japanese administered Equatorial] Pacific Islands	
Signal Unit	1st Combined Signal Unit Cdr		1st Combined Signal Unit first section (minus Chichijima Signal Unit)	To [maintain] operational communications and conduct espionage through signals.	Omitted by the author	Each location		
Attached Units	Omitted by the author							
Remarks	Omitted by the author							

Separate table No. 2**Stage-One, Phase-Two Disposition of Forces**

(Until about Day X + 40, when the landing of the main force of the Army Malaya invasion unit is completed.)

Unit	Commander	Force to be employed	Main assignment	Outline of operations	Notes
Main Unit	Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet	1st Battleship Div, 1st Fleet (minus 3d Battleship Div, 6th Cruiser Div, 1st Destroyer Sqdn (minus 3 destroyer divs) and minus 3d Destroyer Sqdn), and 1 destroyer of 7th Destroyer Div	[These units] shall continue phase-one operations		
Carrier Task Force		1st Air Fleet (minus 4th Carrier Div and destroyer div), 1st Destroyer Sqdn (minus 3 destroyer divs), 3d Battleship Div (minus 2d Section), 8th Cruiser Div, 1 destroyer div of the 2d Destroyer Sqdn, the <i>Akigumo</i> , 6 transport ships			
Advance Unit		6th Fleet			
South Seas Unit		4th Fleet, 6th Cruiser Div, 1st Combined Signal Unit 2d Section 23d Destroyer Div, the <i>Oboro</i>			
Southern Task Force		4th Cruiser Div, 3d Battleship Div 2d Section, 4th Carrier Div (minus 2d Section), 1 destroyer div of 1st Destroyer Sqdn, 1 destroyer div of 4th Destroyer Sqdn, the <i>Akashi</i> , the <i>Asahi-maru</i> , 5 bns of special landing forces, some fishing boats	1. To continue the phase-one operation and expand the military results. 2. To escort at sea the main force of the Army Malaya invasion unit and cover its landing. 3. To capture key places of the Dutch East Indies.	1. The forces employed in the Philippines operation shall be re-structured to be ready for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies. The [air] campaign to destroy the enemy air power and naval vessels in the Malaya and the Dutch East Indies	12th Seaplane Tender div shall be added to the [Navy] Malaya Unit before the landing of the main force of the Army British Malaya invasion unit.

Southern Task Force				
Supply Unit	Malaya Unit	Philippines Unit	Dutch East Indies Unit	Air Unit
Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet				
Cdr in Chief, 2d Fleet				
35 transport ships	1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 7th Cruiser Div, 3d Destroyer Sqdn, 12th Seaplane Tender Div, the <i>Tatsumiya-maru</i> , 5th Destroyer Sqdn, 4th Submarine Sqdn, 1 submarine div of 6th Submarine Sqdn, 22d Air Flotilla, 36 fighter planes, the <i>Asahi</i> , the <i>Muroto</i>	3d Southern Expeditionary Fleet	3d Fleet (minus one element), 5th Cruiser Div, 2d Destroyer Sqdn (minus 1 destroyer div), 4th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 1 destroyer div), 11th Seaplane Tender Div, 8 patrol boats	5th Submarine Sqdn, 6th Submarine Sqdn (minus 1 submarine div)
4. To defend the seized key places on the Philippines.				11th Air Fleet (minus 22d Air Flotilla and 36 fighter planes), 2 bns of special landing forces 4. To defend the seized key places on the Philippines.
				areas shall swiftly be intensified. 2. One element of submarines and minelayers shall advance to the waters south of the Dutch East Indies, and [also] that south of Java, to observe and attack enemy warships, disrupt [enemy] shipping lanes and lay mines. 3. The key locations in the Dutch East Indies shall be seized [making use of the results of] the advanced air forces roughly in the following order: (a) Menado, Tarakan (b) Balikpapan, Kendari (c) Banjarmasin, Makassar, depending on the situation, Sorong, Ambon, and Kupang shall be seized. 4. The air force shall advance to the Kuching area by the time of the landing of the main force of the Army Malaya invasion [unit].

Northern Task Force	Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet	Cdr in Chief, 5th Fleet	5th Fleet, (Kisarazu Air Gp), Chichijima Signal Unit	[These units] shall continue phase-one operations	
			5 transport ships		
Commercial [Maritime] Transport Disruption Unit		Cdr, 24th Auxiliary Cruiser Div	24th Auxiliary Cruiser Div, 1 transport ship		
Signal unit, at-tached units, etc.			Omitted by the author		
Remarks		Same as phase-one operations			

Separate table No. 3

Stage-One, Phase-Three Disposition of Forces

(Until the southern operation is for the most part completed.)

Unit	Commander	Force to be employed	Main assignment	Outline of operations	Notes
Main Unit	Cdr in Chief of the Combined Fleet	1st Battleship Div, 1st Fleet (minus 3d Battleship Div, 6th Cruiser Div, 1st Destroyer Sqdn (minus 2 destroyer divs), and 3d Destroyer Sqdn)	[The units] shall continue phase-two operations.		
Carrier Task Force		1st Air Fleet (minus 4th Carrier Div), 3d Battleship Div (minus 2d Section), 8th Cruiser Div, and 1st Destroyer Sqdn			

Southern Task Force	Dutch East Indies Unit	Submarine Unit	Air Unit	South Seas Unit Supply Unit	Advance Unit Supply Unit	Supply Unit	Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet	(minus 2 destroyer divs)	[The units] shall continue phase-two operations.	
								6 transport ships		
								6th Fleet		
								6 transport ships		
							Cdr in Chief, 4th Fleet	4th Fleet, 6th Cruiser Div, 1st Combined Signal Unit 2d Section		
								22 transport ships		
							Cdr in Chief, 2d Fleet	4th Cruiser Div, 2 destroyer divs of 4th Destroyer Sqdn, 4th Carrier Div (minus 2d Section), 3d Battleship Div 2d Section, the <i>Akashi</i> , 5 bns of special landing forces, the <i>Asahi-maru</i> , and some fishing boats	1. To continue the phase-two operation and expand the military results. 2. To escort at sea the main force of the Army [units] to invade Java and Sumatra and cover their landings. 3. To disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes in the Malacca Strait and the waters south of Java and Sumatra.	
								11th Air Fleet (minus 22d Air Flotilla and 36 fighter planes), and 2 bns of special landing forces		
								4th, 5th and 6th Submarine Sqdns		
								3d Fleet (minus one element), 5th Cruiser Div, 2d Destroyer Sqdn, 4th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 2 destroyer divs), 11th Seaplane Tender Div, and 8 patrol boats		

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By means of the above [plan of operations], the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet gave detailed instructions concerning the operational outline of the stage-one operations to all units under his control and also disclosed the plan for the stage-two operations. Following this, on 7 November, he gave the order of the first [phase] of preparations for the opening of hostilities and indicated the scheduled date to open the hostilities.⁽⁴⁶⁾

The Combined Fleet Operation Order Classified No. 2

7 November 1941

[Start] the first [phase] of preparations for the opening of hostilities; Day Y [is] 8 December.

By this order, each unit shifted to the phase-one disposition of forces and started its advance toward the standby point before the launch of operations.

In the wartime organization of the Imperial [Japanese] Navy, the composition of the main force of the Combined Fleet was as follows:

Disposition		Units of Warships and Auxiliary Warships		Notes
Combined Fleet		1st Battleship Div	<i>Nagato, Mutsu</i>	2 battleships
	1st Fleet	2d Battleship Div	<i>Ise, Hyūga, Fusō, Yamashiro</i>	4 battleships
		3d Battleship Div	<i>Kongō, Haruna, Kirishima, Hiei</i>	4 battleships
		6th Cruiser Div	<i>Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako, Furutaka</i>	4 heavy cruisers
		9th Cruiser Div	<i>Kitakami, Ōi</i>	2 light cruisers
		1st Destroyer Sqdn	<i>Abukuma</i> 6th Destroyer Div 17th Destroyer Div 21st Destroyer Div 27th Destroyer Div	1 light cruiser 16 destroyers
		3d Destroyer Sqdn	<i>Sendai</i> 11th Destroyer Div 12th Destroyer Div 19th Destroyer Div 20th Destroyer Div	1 light cruiser 14 destroyers
		3d Carrier Div	<i>Hōshō, Zuihō, Mikazuki, Yūkaze</i>	2 small carriers 2 destroyers
	2d Fleet	4th Cruiser Div	<i>Takao, Atago, Chōkai, Maya</i>	4 heavy cruisers
		5th Cruiser Div	<i>Nachi, Haguro, Myōkō</i>	3 heavy cruisers
		7th Cruiser Div	<i>Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano</i>	4 heavy cruisers
		8th Cruiser Div	<i>Toné, Chikuma</i>	2 heavy cruisers

Combined Fleet	2d Fleet	2d Destroyer Sqdn	<i>Jintsū</i>	8th Destroyer Div 15th Destroyer Div 16th Destroyer Div 18th Destroyer Div	1 light cruiser 16 destroyers
		4th Destroyer Sqdn	<i>Naka</i>	2d Destroyer Div 4th Destroyer Div 9th Destroyer Div 24th Destroyer Div	1 light cruiser 16 destroyers
	3d Fleet	16th Cruiser Div	<i>Ashigara, Nagara, Kuma</i>		1 heavy cruiser 2 light cruisers
		17th Minelayer Div	<i>Itsukushima, Yaeyama, Tatsumiya-maru</i>		3 minelayers
		5th Destroyer Sqdn	<i>Natori</i>	5th Destroyer Div 22d Destroyer Div	1 light cruiser 8 destroyers
		6th Submarine Sqdn	<i>Chōgei</i>	9th Submarine Div 13th Submarine Div	1 submarine tender 4 submarines
		12th Seaplane Tender Div	<i>Kamikawa-maru, San'yō-maru</i>		2 seaplane tenders
	4th Fleet		<i>Kashima</i> [Flagship of the 4th Fleet]*		1 light cruiser*
		18th Cruiser Div	<i>Tenryū, Tatsuta</i>		2 light cruisers
		19th Minelayer Div	<i>Okinoshima, Tokiwa, Tsugaru, Ten'yō-maru</i>		3 minelayers 1 auxiliary minelayer
		6th Destroyer Sqdn	<i>Yūbari</i>	29th Destroyer Div 30th Destroyer Div	1 light cruiser 8 destroyers
		7th Submarine Sqdn	<i>Jingei</i>	26th Submarine Div 27th Submarine Div 33d Submarine Div	1 submarine tender 9 submarines
		24th Air Flotilla	Chitose Air Group Yokohama Air Group		2 air groups
	5th Fleet	21st Cruiser Div	<i>Tama, Kiso, Kimikawa-maru</i>		2 light cruisers 1 seaplane tender
		22d Aux Cruiser Div	<i>Awata-maru, Asaka-maru</i>		2 auxiliary cruisers
	6th Fleet	1st Submarine Sqdn	<i>Yasukuni-maru</i>	1st Submarine Div 2d Submarine Div 3d Submarine Div 4th Submarine Div Submarine I-9	1 submarine tender 13 submarines
		2d Submarine Sqdn	<i>Santos-maru</i>	7th Submarine Div 8th Submarine Div Submarine I-7 Submarine I-10	1 submarine tender 8 submarines
		3d Submarine Sqdn	<i>Taigei</i>	11th Submarine Div 12th Submarine Div 20th Submarine Div Submarine I-8	1 submarine tender 9 submarines

* Table rearranged by the editor.

Combined Fleet	1st Air Fleet	1st Carrier Div	<i>Akagi, Kaga</i> , 7th Destroyer Div	2 aircraft carriers 3 destroyers
		2d Carrier Div	<i>Sōryū, Hiryū</i> , 23d Destroyer Div	2 aircraft carriers 3 destroyers
		4th Carrier Div	<i>Ryūjō, Kasuga-maru</i> , 3d Destroyer Div	2 aircraft carriers 2 destroyers
		5th Carrier Div	<i>Shōkaku, Zuikaku, Oboro, Akigumo</i>	2 aircraft carriers 2 destroyers
	11th Air Fleet	21st Air Flotilla	Kanoya Air Group Tōkō Air Group 1st Air Group	3 air groups
		22d Air Flotilla	Mihoro Air Group Genzan Air Group	2 air groups
		23d Air Flotilla	Takao Air Group Tainan Air Group 3d Air Group	3 air groups
	Southern Expeditionary Fleet		<i>Kashii, Shimushu</i>	1 light cruiser 1 coastal defense ship
		24th Aux Cruiser Div	<i>Hōkoku-maru, Aikoku-maru, Kiyosumi-maru</i>	3 auxiliary cruisers
		11th Seaplane Tender Div	<i>Mizuho, Chitose</i>	2 seaplane tenders
		4th Submarine Sqdn	<i>Kinu</i> 18th Submarine Div 19th Submarine Div 21st Submarine Div	1 light cruiser 8 submarines
		5th Submarine Sqdn	<i>Yura</i> 28th Submarine Div 29th Submarine Div 30th Submarine Div	1 light cruiser 6 submarines
		1st Combined Signal Unit	Tokyo Signal Unit Takao Signal Unit Chichijima Signal Unit Okinawa Signal Unit 3d Signal Unit 4th Signal Unit 5th Signal Unit 6th Signal Unit	8 signal units

4. Conclusion of the Tokyo Agreement

In conformity with the Army-Navy Central Agreement that was issued on 5 November, [a conference to conclude] operational agreements between the top commanders of the Army and the Navy of the southern operation (i.e. the commanders in chief of the Combined fleet and the Second Fleet and the commander in chief of the Southern Army) was held at the War College from 8 to 10 November, and on the 10th of the same month [the agreements] were sealed.

The persons concerned at the high command of the Army and the Navy were present as well, and also the staff officers of each army and fleet involved in the southern operation participated in the meeting. This is the so-called "Tokyo Agreement," which consisted of the following two agreements.

Agreement Between the Commanders in Chief of the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army

This agreement was signed on 10 November, 1941 between Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, and General Terauchi Hisaichi, commander in chief of the Southern Army. It was in summary as follows:⁽³⁴⁾

1. The operation shall be launched in the following manner:
 - (1) At the moment of the launch of Operation A-Go (Note: a code name for the southern operation) [i.e.] ([on] Day X), the Combined Fleet shall conduct preemptive air strikes against the enemy fleet in another area. (Note: another area means Hawaii.)
 - (2) If after the Emperor's order to launch operations is given, we come under a serious preemptive attack from the enemy prior to Day X, the Navy shall immediately go into the state of war and launch its operations.
2. The agreements concerning plans for Operation A-Go other than this (except for the operations against Guam, Hong Kong, and the Bismarck Islands), and those during the implementation of the operation shall be made between the commanders in chief of the Southern Army and the Second Fleet. However, if the commander in chief of the Second Fleet is engaged in an operation to intercept the U.S. Fleet, the commander in chief of the Third Fleet shall take charge of concluding agreements concerning implementation of the operation instead.

Agreement Between the Commander in Chief of the Southern Army and the Commander of the Navy Southern Task Force

This agreement was concluded between Commander in Chief of the Southern Army, General Terauchi Hisaichi and Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake. It was in outline as follows:⁽³⁴⁾

- I. Policy of the joint operations

In conformity with the "Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation" of 6 November 1941 (hereinafter referred to as the "Central Agreement"), the Navy Southern Task Force and the Southern Army shall accomplish the objective of the southern operation within a short period of time in an atmosphere of close and proper cooperation.
- II. [Editor's note: omitted by the author.]
- III. Standard dates [to implement] the invasion [operations]

The key areas where the Army and the Navy shall in cooperation with each other launch invasions as well as the starting dates of the landings (along with assembly points and the key areas which the Navy shall capture unassisted as well as the starting dates of the landings)

Date of the start of the landings	Key areas to capture (*stands for the areas which the Navy will capture unassisted)				Assembly points
	Operation M	Operation E	Operation B	Operation H	
Day X	*Batan Isl	Vicinities of Ban Don, Nakhon, Singora, Pattani			M: Magong, E: Sanya
Day X + 1	Vicinity of Vigan or vicinity of Laoag, and vicinity of Aparri				Magong
Depending on the proviso of 5.2.a)*		Vicinity of Kota Bharu			Sanya
By Day X + 4	Vicinity of Legaspi				Palau
By Day X + 6	Vicinity of Davao				Palau
Around Day X + 8		Vicinities of Singora and Pattani			Cam Ranh Bay
Around Day X + 8			Vicinity of Miri		Cam Ranh Bay
Around Day X + 13			Vicinity of Kuching		Miri
Around Day X + 13	Jolo				Davao
By around** Day X + 14	Lingayen Gulf, Vicinity of Lamon Bay				Penghu Islands [for the unit] for Lingayen Gulf; Amami Ōshima [for the unit] for Lamon Bay
Around Day X + 23				*Vicinity of Menado	Palau
By around Day X + 25		Southern Thailand or east coast of Malaya (for the first [landing] of the main force)		Vicinity of Tarakan	E: Penghu Islands (Guangdong) H: Palau
Around Day X + 35				*Vicinity of Kendari	Menado

* The text has 5.2.1. We have followed the numbering in Vol. 3.

** The text has no *around*. We have followed Vol. 3.

Around Day X + 35				Vicinity of Balikpapan	Tarakan
Around Day X + 45				*Vicinity of Makassar	Kendari
By and large around Day X + 50				Vicinity of Banjarmasin	Balikpapan
Around Day X + 60		Southern Thailand or east coast of Malaya (for the second [landing] of the main force)			Cam Ranh Bay (Sanya)
By around* Day X + 60				Ambon and Kupang (as far as possible)	Palau
By and large around Day X + 80				Java, Sumatra	Hong Kong for [the units to capture] Sumatra; Manila for [the units to capture] eastern Java; Taiwan and Hong Kong for [the units to capture] western Java
[Particulars for] other [targets] shall be decided on in arrangements between the highest commanders of the Army and the Navy of each area					

IV. Disposition of Forces

1. Southern Army

Commander in Chief, General Terauchi Hisaichi (Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen. Tsukada Osamu, Vice Chiefs of Staff: Lt. Gen. Sakaguchi Yoshitaro, Lt. Gen. Aoki Shigemasa)	Areas	Corps	Commander (Chief of Staff)	Forces (assembly point or the position at the opening of hostilities)	Outline of mission in the early stages of operation
	M	14th Army	Lt. Gen. Homma Masaharu (Lt. Gen. Maéda Masami)	16th Div (Southwest Islands**) and 48th Div (with main force in Taiwan) as the core; 5th Air Force (Taiwan) shall be attached	Air campaigns and seizure of airfields in the Philippines, and the capture of Manila

* Following Vol. 3, we have added *around*.** Following Vol. 34, we have added *Islands*.

Commander in Chief, General Terauchi Hisaichi (Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen. Tsukada Osamu, Vice Chiefs of Staff: Lt. Gen. Sakaguchi Yoshitarō, Lt. Gen. Aoki Shigemasa)	Thailand, Burma and E area	15th Army	Lt. Gen. Iida Shōjirō (Maj. Gen. Isayama Haruki)	55th Div (French Indochina) and 33d Div (northern China) as the core; Main force of the Imperial Guard Div (French Indochina) shall be attached at first	Advance into central Thailand, preparation for the Burma operation
		25th Army	Lt. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki (Lt. Gen. Suzuki Sōsaku)	Imperial Guard Div (French Indochina), 5th Div (advance unit* in Sanya; the rest in Taiwan), and 18th Div (advance unit* in Sanya; main force in Guangdong) as the core	Sudden landings in southern Thailand, launch of Singapore invasion operation
		3d Air Force	Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō	3d, 7th, 10th and 12th Air Divs (all in French Indochina) as the core	Support for the operations of the 25th Army and the 15th Army; air campaigns
	B	Kawaguchi Det	Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi Kiyotake	One inf rgt of the 18th Div (French Indochina) as the core	Capture of key locations in British Borneo
	H	16th Army	Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi (Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō)	2d Div (homeland Japan), 38th Div (Op C at first), 48th Div (Op M at first), 56th Mixed Inf Gp (Palau), and South Seas Det (Ops G and R at first) as the core	Capture of Jolo, Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin
	French Indochina area	25th Army at first; later 21st Div	21st Div commander Lt. Gen. Tanaka Hisakazu	21st Div (northern China), 21st Mixed Bde (French Indochina) and 4th Independent Mixed Rgt (French Indochina) as the core	Securing stability in French Indochina

* We have followed the term used in Vol. 34.

Remarks:

- 1 The outline of the distribution of the first transport for the landing operations and the landing schedule is as shown in Attached Table No. 1 (omitted by the author).
- 2 The units other than those in the above table, which are standing by for embarkation at the time of the opening of hostilities, and the ships they shall embark are in outline as shown in Attached Table No. 2 (omitted by the author).

2. Navy Southern Task Force

The Southern Task Force Commander Commander in Chief Second Fleet, V Adm Kondō Nobutake (Chief of Staff R Adm Shiraishi Kazutaka)	Operational area	Name of unit		Commander (Chief of Staff)	Forces (positions at the opening of hostilities)		Outline of assignments around phase-one	
	The Philippines area and the South China Sea	Main body of the Southern Task Force	Main unit	Under direct command Capt of the <i>Haruna</i> , Capt Takama Tamotsu	4th Cruiser Div (minus the <i>Maya</i> and the <i>Chōkai</i>) (at Magong), the <i>Kongō</i> , 6 destroyers (at Magong)	1 battleship, 2 large [heavy] cruisers, 6 destroyers, 10 reconnaissance seaplanes	Support for entire operation	
			Eastern Support Unit		The <i>Haruna</i> , the <i>Maya</i> , 2 destroyers, (at sea northeast of Luzon)	1 battleship, 1 large [heavy] cruiser, 2 destroyers, 7 reconnaissance seaplanes	Support for the (east of) Philippines and the Dutch East Indies operation	
		The Philippines; later the Dutch East Indies	The Philippines Unit, the Dutch East Indies Unit ([The latter] shall be formed with the bulk of the Philippines Unit after the Philippines operation is for the most part completed)			Commander in Chief 3d Fleet, V Adm Takahashi Ibo (R Adm Nakamura Toshihisa)	Bulk of 3d Fleet, 5th Cruiser Div, bulk of 2d Destroyer Sqdn, bulk of 4th Destroyer Sqdn, 4th Carrier Div (minus 2d Section), 11th Seaplane Tender Div, 12th Seaplane Tender Div (from the middle of the operation) and 4 bns of special landing forces as the core (main force at Taiwan and Amami Ōshima; one element at Palau)	4 large [heavy] cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 seaplane tenders, 5 minelayers, 33 destroyers Air forces: 12 fighter planes, 18 attack planes, 40 reconnaissance seaplanes

The Southern Task Force Commander Commander in Chief Second Fleet, V Adm Kondō Nobutake (Chief of Staff R Adm Shiraishi Kazutaka)	Southern French Indochina and the Malaya area	Malaya Unit	Commander in Chief Southern Expeditionary Fleet, V Adm Ozawa Jisaburō (R Adm Sawada Torao)	Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the <i>Chōkai</i> , 7th Cruiser Div, 3d Destroyer Sqdn, 4th Submarine Sqdn, one element of 6th Submarine Sqdn, 17th Minelayer Div 2d Section, 12th Seaplane Tender Div ([shall] return to the Philippines [unit] in the middle of the operation), 22d Air Flotilla, as the core (the bulk of the surface vessels at Sanya, submarines at Singapore, air forces in southern French Indochina)	5 large [heavy] cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, 8 submarines, 3 seaplane tenders Air forces: 36 fighter planes, 72 land-based attack planes, 6 land-based reconnaissance planes, 24 reconnaissance seaplanes	1) Destroying enemy naval vessels 2) Disembarkation of the Army units in southern Thailand 3) Seizure of northern Borneo 4) Air campaigns against Malaya 5) Mine laying and submarine operations
	Philippines, Dutch East Indies and Borneo areas	Air Unit	Commander in Chief 11th Air Fleet, V Adm Tsukahara Nishizō (R Adm Ōnishi Takijirō)	The bulk of 11th Air Fleet as the core (main force in Taiwan; one element in Palau)	Air Force: 72 fighter planes, 114 land-based attack planes, 18 flying boats, 12 land-based reconnaissance planes	1) Destroying the [enemy] air power in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies 2) Searching for the enemy at sea and attacking it 3) [With one element] advancing into Borneo
	Philippines and Dutch East Indies areas	Submarine Unit	Commander 5th Submarine Sqdn, R Adm Daigo Tadashige	5th Submarine Sqdn, one element of the 6th Submarine Sqdn (the Philippines)	1 light cruiser, 1 submarine tender, 8 submarines	In the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies areas 1) Patrolling and observing 2) Surprise attack on enemy naval vessels 3) Mine laying and severing [enemy] electric cables
		Unit attached [to the Southern Task Force]	Under direct command	Special service vessels and about 30 transport vessels in total ([at] replenishment bases)	1 repair vessel, 1 hospital ship, 30 transport vessels	Replenishment, transport, repair, rescue and [medical] treatment, etc.

V. Outline of the operation

1. Measures to be taken against the enemy [if it comes for an attack] before the opening of hostilities (omitted)
2. The general operational outline
 - (1) The operation to capture key areas shall be carried out in conformity with [item] III. Standard dates [to implement] the invasion [operations] (omitted).
 - (2) Escort at sea
 - {1} When required, restrictions may be placed on the sea routes and the movements of empty homeward-bound ships and of ships transporting army supplies, sick and wounded being sent back, or transporting diverted forces, etc. by the commander of the Navy (commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area, or the commander of the Philippines (the Dutch East Indies) Unit). However, when it is recognized that such restrictions may seriously affect subsequent operations, [further] agreements or arrangements shall be made between the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area and the commander of the Southern Army, or the commanders of the Army and the Navy on site.
 - {2} An escort for the transfer of Army forces shall be provided according to item (3) [below].
 - {3} Other particulars shall be arranged between the commanders of each landing corps and the escort fleet.
 - (3) Transfer of Army forces and replacement of Army forces by Naval forces
 - {1} The replacement of the forces guarding Jolo shall be arranged between commanders of the Navy Philippines unit and the Sixteenth Army.
 - {2} The replacement of the forces guarding Tarakan and Ambon
The replacement of the forces defending these areas after they are seized and secured shall be arranged between the commanders of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army.
 - {3} The transfer of the 48th Division (the Dutch East Indies invasion corps)
The completion of the corps' assembly near Manila shall be scheduled roughly on Day X + 55, and its departure from the assembly point on around Day X + 70. The Navy Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit commander shall provide escort for the above transfer with the necessary forces.
 - {4} The escort for the transfer of the corps that is to capture Bangka and southern Sumatra (one element of the Sixteenth Army) shall be provided by the Navy Malaya Unit commander with the necessary forces.
 - {5} The transfer of one element of the 38th Division (a unit to invade the Dutch East Indies)
The escort for the transfer of this corps (from Hong Kong to western Java), along with [the escort of] the main force of the Sixteenth Army (from Taiwan to southern French Indochina and further to western Java), shall be provided by the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit commander with the necessary forces.
 - {6} The transfer and redeployment of the units to capture Ambon and Kupang (one element of the Sixteenth Army)
The escort for the transfer and redeployment (between Palau and Hong Kong, and the departure from Palau or Hong Kong) of the units shall be arranged between the commanders of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army.
 - {7} The escort to be provided for the transfer and redeployment of other smaller units shall be arranged between the commanders of the Army and the Navy concerned.
3. Outline of the air operation (Omitted)

VI. Signal communications (Omitted)

VII. Setting up of supply bases (Omitted)

VIII. Exchanges of information (Omitted)

IX. Exchanges of agreements and arrangements

1. Further detailed communication of the Central Agreement shall be made as follows:

[Between] the commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and Major General Kawaguchi ([at] Saigon)

The commanders in chief of the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet, and the commanders of the Fourteenth Army and the Fifth Air Force shall conclude joint arrangements ([at] Iwakuni).

The commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the commanders of the Fifteenth Army, the Twenty-fifth Army, the Third Air Force and the [Navy] 22d Air Flotilla shall conclude joint arrangements ([at] Saigon).

2. Conferences to be held between the commanders concerned of the Army and the Navy shall be scheduled as follows:

(1) Around the 40th day of the operation

(2) Around the 120th day of the operation

(3) Conferences shall be added if necessary.

3. For the duration of this operation and in order to communicate all particulars resulting from the Central Agreement as well as this agreement, the Navy shall dispatch one staff officer to each army headquarters [concerned] and the Third Air Force [headquarters]. Other than the above, if the situation permits, the Army and the Navy shall dispatch staff officers to each other at every important moment, promote their mutual understandings and communicate information so as to attain a smooth and swift implementation of the joint operations.

4. The responsibility [to provide] support and provisions for the dispatched staff officers, as mentioned in the previous item, which may be necessary to accomplish their tasks, shall fall on each receiving unit.

5. Conclusion of the Iwakuni Agreement and the Saigon Agreement

After concluding the Tokyo Agreement on 10 November, the main persons in charge of the Army and the Navy units involved in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies operations gathered at [the base of] the Navy Iwakuni Air Group in Yamaguchi Prefecture from 14 to 16 November and made the necessary arrangements stipulated in the Tokyo Agreement. This is the "Iwakuni Agreement." In the Iwakuni Agreement, the arrangements concerning the Philippines and those concerning the Dutch East Indies were separately dealt with. In the following outline, only the points that differed from those in the Tokyo Agreement are given:⁽³⁴⁾

1. [Operations in] the Philippines ([arranged] between the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet of the Navy, and the Fourteenth Army and the Fifth Air Force of the Army)

[The scheduled dates for] the sudden attacks on the key locations in northern Luzon and the disembarkation of the main force of the Army Luzon invasion unit shall be postponed for two days.

2. [Operations in] the Dutch East Indies ([arranged] between the Navy Third Fleet and the Sixteenth Army)

Other than deciding on the postponement of the landing on Tarakan for five days and that of the seizure of Banjarmasin for six days, the capture of Bali, which was not included in the Tokyo

Agreement, was scheduled for Day X + 70. A proposal of adding the Sakaguchi Detachment of the Sixteenth Army to [the forces to] capture Davao was made, but it was left pending (On 24 November [the proposal] was adopted as it was).

In the meantime, the Army and the Navy units involved in [the operations in] the Malaya area held a meeting in Saigon on 18 November, and made arrangements between the commanders on site. This was the “Saigon Agreement,” which was in summary as follows:

1. [Operations in] British Malaya and Thailand ([arranged] between the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the 22d Air Flotilla of the Navy, and the Twenty-fifth Army, the Fifteenth Army and the Third Air Force of the Army)

The details of the action of the advance corps, a simultaneous landing [also] to be conducted on Kota Bharu in British [Malaya], the share of responsibility concerning the air campaign and others were decided on.

2. [Operations in] British Borneo ([arranged] between the Navy Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Army Kawaguchi Detachment)

Arrangements for the capture of Miri and Kuching, etc. were made.

6. Issue of Orders by Each Navy Unit

The Southern Task Force

On 15 November, when the Iwakuni Agreement was essentially ready, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō issued Southern Task Force Order Classified No. 1, which read in summary as follows:⁽⁴⁷⁾

- I. The Southern Task Force shall, in conjunction with the Army, completely destroy the U.S., British and Dutch naval vessels and air power in the Far East, demolish all bases in the Philippines, British Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies, and capture key areas in these territories, while making preparations to intercept attacks by the U.S. mainland fleets and others.

II. Mission

1. In conjunction with the Southern Army, it shall first destroy the enemy power in the Philippines, British Malaya and British Borneo, invade the Dutch East Indies from both the southern Philippines and Malaya, and mop up [the enemy] there.
2. The execution of the operations shall roughly be divided in the following three periods. (Omitted)
3. The launch of the southern operation (Omitted by the author)

III. Outline of the operation

1. The Philippines operation (Omitted by the author)
2. The British Malaya and British Borneo operations
 - (1) – (4) (Omitted by the author)
 - (5) At the earliest opportunity after the opening of hostilities, the British Borneo invasion unit shall be escorted to capture first Miri, and then Kuching, and quickly make air bases [there] ready for use, so as to advance one element of the Navy air units and intensify the air campaigns against Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.
3. The Dutch East Indies operation

- (1) When the air bases in Davao and Jolo are ready, forces of the Eleventh Air Fleet shall successively be advanced [there] to completely destroy the remnants of the enemy in the Philippines, as well as to launch the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Dutch East Indies.
 - (2) Once operations at sea around Malaya are for the most part completed, the Navy air units in the area shall also be diverted to the bases in Miri, Kuching and others to participate in the air campaign against the Dutch East Indies.
 - (3) After the Philippines invasion operation has made progress, submarines shall gradually be advanced to the waterways south of the Celebes Sea. The surface units shall [also] be advanced and act in concert with the air campaign, and Menado shall be seized with a Naval landing force. After that, they shall advance to Kendari and Makassar one after another. Apart from [the above], in conjunction with the Army, invasion operations shall be carried forward largely in parallel with the above against Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin, while at an opportune moment Ambon and Kupang shall be captured.
 - (4) Necessary bases in the above captured areas shall be quickly prepared, and the air forces shall be advanced one after another, in order to secure footholds (Kupang, etc.) for operations against Australia, as well as to further intensify air campaigns against Java from the east and to destroy the enemy air power and naval vessels. Also, one element of the submarine [units] shall be advanced to the Indian Ocean to disrupt the supply lanes to British Malaya through the Malacca Strait and those to the Dutch East Indies from the south.
 - (5) When the operation in the Malaya area has made progress, strategic locations on Bangka Island (Note: [near] Sumatra) and Palembang shall be seized at an opportune moment, and air bases [there] shall be made ready for use, so that [the Japanese forces can] close in on western Java. Concerted air campaigns from the east and the west shall be intensified, so as to suppress the enemy air power, and gradually tighten the encirclement. [Meanwhile,] the main force of the Sixteenth Army shall be disembarked near Batavia, and another corps near Surabaya. They shall swiftly seize Batavia, Bandung and Surabaya and then mop up the enemy in the key areas on Java.
 - (6) When the Malacca Strait is brought under control after the capture of Singapore, one element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall timely be put ashore near Medan from the west coast of the Malay Peninsula to capture the strategic areas in northern Sumatra and then at an opportune moment the island of Sabang.
 - (7) In this operation, depending on the nature of the terrain, etc., the 1001 Unit (Note: paratrooper unit) and maneuvers and supply by fishing boats and other small vessels shall be employed.
4. [Later] when the situation permits, submarine cables from Java to Malaya, Australia and the Cocos Island (Note: [in] the Indian Ocean) shall be severed with submarines. [However,] those between the islands of the Dutch East Indies shall not be cut with the aim of using them after the Dutch East Indies has been occupied.
 5. The areas to be invaded in the final stage of the southern operation and the operations afterwards

[The areas to be invaded] shall be the U.S., British and Dutch territories, enveloped by western New Guinea and the eastern islands of the Dutch East Indies in the east, and Burma, the Andaman Islands, the Nicobar Islands and the line [stretching to] the western peripheral islands of the Dutch East Indies in the west. Advance bases shall be set up along the lines connecting the outer border islands, and mine barriers shall be set up in the waters adjacent to Australia such as the Arafura Sea, the areas around the Malacca Strait, and a part of waterways south of the Dutch East Indies. At the same time, one element of the submarine units shall reconnoiter the movements of the enemy forces in Australia and India, attack

them and disrupt the [enemy] shipping lanes. Also, an air raid shall timely be carried out on Port Darwin for the purpose of defending the occupied areas.

IV. Deployment of forces

Main body of the Southern Task Force:

departure from the Inland Sea on Day X – 9
arrival in Magong on Day X – 6

Submarine Unit/ 6th Submarine Sqdn:

departure from the Inland Sea on Day X – 17
arrival in Sanya on Day X – 9

5th Submarine Sqdn:

departure from the Inland Sea on Day X – 13
arrival in Palau on Day X – 7

V. Disposition of forces

1. Phase-one (as in the following table)

Name of unit		Commander	Forces
Main Body	Main unit		4th Cruiser Div (minus 2d Section), 3d Battleship Div 4th Ship (the <i>Kongō</i>), 4th Destroyer Div, 6th Destroyer Div 2d Section; Support for entire operation ([also] cooperation in the Hong Kong invasion operation)
	Eastern Support Unit	Senior Captain	3d Battleship Div 3d ship (the <i>Haruna</i>), 4th Cruiser Div 3d ship (the <i>Maya</i>), 6th Destroyer Div (minus 2d section); Support for the operation in the area east of the Philippines
The Philippines Unit		Cdr in Chief, 3d Fleet	3d Fleet (minus one element), 5th Cruiser Div, 4th Carrier Div (minus 2d Section), 2d Destroyer Sqdn (minus 1 destroyer div), 4th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 1 destroyer div), 11th Seaplane Tender Div, 4 bns of special landing forces, 8 patrol boats, etc.
Malaya Unit		Cdr in Chief, Southern Expeditionary Fleet	Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 4th Cruiser Div 4th Ship (the <i>Chōkai</i>), 7th Cruiser Div, 3d Destroyer Sqdn, 4th Submarine Sqdn, 1 submarine div of 6th Submarine Sqdn, 17th Minelayer Div 2d Section, 12th Seaplane Tender Div, 22d Air Flotilla, one element of 23d Air Flotilla (36 fighter planes and 6 land-based reconnaissance planes), 1 bn of special landing forces, etc.
Air Unit		Cdr in Chief, 11th Air Fleet	11th Air Fleet (minus 22d Air Flotilla and one element of 23d Air Flotilla), 1001 Unit
Submarine Unit		Cdr, 5th Submarine Sqdn	5th Submarine Sqdn, 6th Submarine Sqdn (minus one submarine div)

Note: The 1st Section of the 4th Carrier Division consisted of the aircraft carrier *Ryūjō* and the destroyer *Shiokaze*.

2. Phase-two (as in the following table)

Main Body	Cdr in Chief, 2d Fleet		Same as phase-one
The Philippines Unit		Cdr in Chief, 3d Fleet	One element of 3d Fleet
The Dutch East Indies Unit			Bulk of 3d Fleet, 5th Cruiser Div, 2d Destroyer Sqdn (minus 1 destroyer div), 4th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 1 destroyer div), 11th Seaplane Tender Div, 8 patrol boats, 4 bns of special landing forces, etc.
Malaya Unit			5th Destroyer Sqdn and 4th Carrier Div (minus 2d Section) shall be added to the force deployed for phase-one.
Air Unit			Same as phase-one
Submarine Unit		Cdr, 5th Submarine Sqdn	Same as phase-one

3. Phase-three

Main Body	Cdr in Chief, 2d Fleet		4th Cruiser Div (minus the <i>Chōkai</i>), 3d Battleship Div 2d Section, 4th Carrier Div (minus 2d Section), 4th and 24th Destroyer Divs
The Philippines Unit		Cdr in Chief, 3d Fleet	One element of 3d Fleet
The Dutch East Indies Unit			Bulk of 3d Fleet, 5th Cruiser Div, 2d Destroyer Sqdn, 4th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 2 destroyer divs), 11th Seaplane Tender Div, 8 patrol boats, 4 bns of special landing forces, etc.
Malaya Unit			Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 4th Cruiser div 4th Ship (the <i>Chōkai</i>), 7th Cruiser Div, 3d Destroyer Sqdn, 22d Air Flotilla, one element of the 23d Air Flotilla, 1 bn of special landing forces
Air Unit			Same as phase-one
Submarine Unit		Cdr, 4th Submarine Sqdn	4th, 5th and 6th Submarine Sqdns

Then, the commander of the Southern Task Force dealt with [the units] to cooperate in the Hong Kong operation, along with the necessary measures for the ground units, such as special landing forces, construction squads and defense details, as follows:

1. In order to cooperate in the Hong Kong operation, the 2d Section of the 6th Destroyer Division (assigned to the main body of the Southern Task Force) was temporarily put under the command of the Second China Expeditionary Fleet.
2. Distribution of the special landing forces and others

As the units in the following table were incorporated into the Southern Task Force as of 20 November, the commander ordered the distribution of each unit [as follows].

Type	Name of unit	Disposition	Notes
Special Landing Force [SLF]	1st Yokosuka SLF	Air Unit	Paratrooper unit
	2d Yokosuka SLF	Malaya Unit	Order was given to advance to Sanya by Day X – 6; to be employed for the British Borneo operations
	3d Yokosuka SLF	Air Unit	Paratrooper unit
	1st Kure SLF	The Philippines Unit	Planned to be employed for the Legaspi and Jolo operations
	2d Kure SLF	Ditto	Planned to be employed for [the operation in] the Dutch Borneo area
	Sasebo Combined SLF	Ditto	Planned to be employed for [the operation in] Celebes
Construction Squad	1st Construction Squad	Ditto	Planned to be employed for [the operation in] Legaspi; attached to the 1st Kure SLF
	2d Construction Squad	Ditto	Planned to be employed for [the operation in] Davao
	3d Construction Squad	Ditto	Planned to be employed for [the operation in] Celebes; attached to the Sasebo Combined SLF
	4th Construction Squad	Malaya Unit	Planned to be employed for [the operation in] British Borneo; attached to the 2d Yokosuka SLF
	5th Construction Squad	The Philippines Unit	Planned to be employed for [the operation in] Dutch Borneo; attached to the 2d Kure SLF
	6th Construction Squad	Ditto	Planned to be employed for [the operation in] Celebes; attached to Sasebo Combined SLF
Defense Detail	1st Defense Detail	Ditto	Planned to be employed for [the operation in] Dutch Borneo; attached to the 2d Kure SLF
	2d Defense Detail	Ditto	Ditto

Note: The defense details are units for preventing fire and destruction, and providing emergency repairs of oil fields and other important facilities.

The Philippines Unit

The order of the Philippines Unit was issued on 20 November 1941 [actually 23 November]. It started with an assessment of the enemy situation in the Philippines area, gave an outline of the situation of friendly forces (the operations of the Air Unit and the Submarine Unit as well as the Malaya and Hong Kong operations), and explained in detail the operational directives, the disposition of forces, and actions of each unit in the Philippines area; furthermore it gave the general idea of the Dutch East Indies operation.⁽⁴⁷⁾

The Malaya Unit

The order of the Malaya Unit was issued on 20 November 1941. It roughly explained the enemy situation in the Malaya area, the mission [of the unit], the employment of force before and after the opening of hostilities, the disposition of forces, and the outline of the operational directives.⁽⁴⁷⁾

7. The Southern Army Issues the Order to Launch the Invasion

Dated 6 November, the Army Department of IGHQ disclosed its concept of the operation. On the same day, General Terauchi Hisaichi was personally appointed commander in chief of the Southern Army by the Emperor. He was given by [the Army Department of] IGHQ the Order to Prepare for the Seizure of Strategic Areas in the South, along with the Summary of the Operations of the Southern Army, and the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation." On 10 November, Commander in Chief Terauchi, along with his staff officers, concluded agreements for the southern operation with the commanders in chief of the Combined Fleet and the Second Fleet, and simultaneously issued to his subordinate units the orders concerning the operational preparations. On 15 November, based on the order of battle of the Southern Army his high command came into effect, and the Southern Army issued the Plan of Operations for the South.⁽³⁴⁾

Then on 16 November, the armies [under] the Southern Army concluded the necessary arrangements with the Navy units concerned (the Iwakuni Agreement), after which on 20 November he [Terauchi] issued the order to invade the southern key areas, the excerpt and summary of which are as follows:⁽³⁴⁾

1. – 10. (Concerning the Philippines, Malaya, Thailand, and Burma: Omitted by the author.)
11. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall swiftly occupy Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and then Balikpapan, Banjarmasin with an element of his force and secure the necessary air bases as well as vital resource areas. (The rest omitted by the author)
12. Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment shall depart from the assembly point after the opening of hostilities, occupy Miri and Seria first in a sudden attack, secure vital resource areas as well as air bases and, immediately after that, occupy the air base near Kuching as quickly as possible.
13. – 14. (Omitted by the author)
15. In order to restore order, obtain resources crucial to national defense and secure the means for the armies to maintain themselves on their own account in the occupied territories, each army commander and Commander Kawaguchi shall take charge of establishing a military administration in each area. Separate orders shall be issued concerning the details of the establishment of a military administration (summarized by the author).

With this, [the Southern Army] had issued the orders to control the operations of the armies under its command for the next forty to fifty days.

8. Remaining Problems in the Southern Operation

Among the problems concerning the southern operation that became clear after the map exercise at the Naval College, the following three major problems remained unsolved until the last minute:

1. The problem of the invasion schedule⁽¹¹⁾

The Army was eager to shorten the [invasion] schedule from the strategic point of view that it wanted to be ready for a [possible] northern operation sooner, that it wanted to seize the oil before it was destroyed by the enemy, and that it wanted to quickly [complete the invasion] before the enemy strengthened its defenses. However, this was difficult to realize due to the problems in the shipping operation, etc. Meanwhile, the Navy shared the same view about the shortening of the schedule from the point of view that it wanted to be ready for the operation against the United States, and that it wanted to quickly seize oil. However, it had to be cautious by all means due to the required thorough air campaigns to safely transport the convoy carrying the invasion [corps], the preparation of bases, the operation of its vessels for escort, and others. That is to say, both the Army and the Navy had a strong ambition to shorten the schedule but it was difficult to form a clear view of the schedule. Moreover, both had concerns about whether they [even] could conduct the operations as scheduled.

2. The problem of the construction units to set up air bases

The operational outline against the United States that the Japanese Navy had adopted for years was based on the idea to intercept the main force of the enemy by making use of the [Japanese administered equatorial] Pacific Islands and destroy the enemy at a stroke in a decisive battle. Therefore, it had almost never considered an operation [to be conducted while] advancing its bases.

However, the main part of the present southern operation was an operation [conducted while] advancing bases. As a quick preparation of advance bases was required, operational units assigned to [setting up] facilities became necessary. (In peacetime, the Navy Facility Department was in charge of the construction of naval air bases.)

Therefore, on 12 September 1941, the formation of construction squads was stipulated in an amendment to Navy order No. 105, the Auxiliary War Vessels Unit Order. At that time, the regular personnel of a construction squad consisted of engineers, assistant engineers and civil officers totaling 10 officers, about 20 clerks, employees, etc., and up to 3,000 military laborers as needed. However, they were not equipped with modern construction machines. For this reason, the construction capacity of the squads was too low to meet the needs of the operational units.

3. Measures against attrition in the air campaigns

(1) Shortage of aircraft

The map exercise at the Naval College had shown that 160% of the fighter planes and 40% of the land-based attack planes of the land-based air units would be lost in fighting before advancing to the line of Java, so the replenishment [of the loss] became an issue. After further examination, it was found that whereas the 40% loss of land-based attack planes could somehow be replenished, it was totally impossible to replenish the 160% loss of fighter planes. Although [a total of] 150 Type-0 fighter planes were built by April of 1941, the production capacity around October of the same year was merely about 50 aircraft per month.⁽⁴⁹⁾ For

reference, the following table shows the actual numbers of aircraft built in April 1941 (monthly production) and the planned numbers of aircraft to be built in April 1942 estimated as of July 1941.⁽⁵⁰⁾

Classification	1 Apr., 1941 (actual numbers)	1 Apr.,1942 (planned numbers)
Carrier-based fighter planes	32	58
Medium-sized land-based attack planes	15	23
Large-sized land-based attack planes	1	5*
Carrier-based attack planes	28	0
Carrier-based bombers	13	17
Three-seater reconnaissance seaplanes	6	23
Observation planes	9	15
Large-sized flying boats	4	9
Medium-sized flying boats	0	3
Transport planes	7	12
Training planes	47	31
In total	162	196

At the study meeting of the map exercise at the Naval College, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto strongly demanded that 150 more Type-0 fighter planes should be built by January 1942 on top of the current production plan. However, it was totally impossible to meet his demand.⁽⁴⁹⁾ As a countermeasure, the [Navy] Aeronautical Department drew up a plan to increase the production of Type-0 fighter planes and land-based attack planes by decreasing the production of land-based transport planes and observation planes until March 1942, while increasing the production of 20-mm machine guns to be mounted on aircraft by also making use of the production capacity of 25-mm machine guns at the Toyokawa Naval Arsenal, which was under control of the Navy Technical Department. But these measures were only able to slightly increase production.⁽⁵¹⁾

(2) Shortage of flight crew

The Navy, which had envisioned the scenario of an intercepting operation, had planned for a short decisive battle. Therefore, in training its flight crew, it had set the target of [just] filling the full regular number of personnel for its units. The regular number of personnel was one and a half times the number of flight crew for the regular number of aircraft. Even the report of the Aviation System Study Committee of the [administrative] year 1939 stated that the targeted [full regular number of] flight crew in peacetime should be set at three times as many as the number of flight crew for the regular aircraft.⁽⁵²⁾ ([Note by the author:] As the military capacity [the number of aircraft] is to be doubled in wartime, the number of flight crew, [three times as many as the number of flight crew for the regular aircraft at peacetime,] will make half as many again as the [increased] military capacity.)

* The text mistakenly has 15.

In the meantime, every time a [new] naval armaments supplement program was approved, the plans to increase the power of air units had been significantly stepped up. As a result, despite the desperate efforts of the persons concerned, the number of trained flight crew could not even reach [the targeted number] as in the above, which was half as many again [as the number of flight crew for the regular aircraft]. For that reason, the naval armaments supplement program (five-year plan) of the [administrative] year 1939 went so far as to stipulate the increase of air training units by as many as forty units all at once.

Due to the [difficulty of] the tasks, flight crew were given piloting (reconnaissance) training for about one year on top of a [just] sufficient fundamental training, after which they were further given in-service training for about one year before somehow becoming full-fledged crew members. [Moreover,] in order to become a cadre flight crew member of aircraft carriers or of the front line base units, a further training of one to two years was required, which meant that the training of flight crew had to be started at least three years prior to an increase in the armaments supplement programs. It was impossible to increase [flight crew numbers] just like that.

Although adequate documents about the actual situation of the training of flight crew are not extant, the rates of filled vacancy of flight crew as of the end of March 1941 were respectively 80% and 70% for pilots and reconnaissance staff. These numbers included a large number of fledgling crew, who had just finished [flying training].⁽⁵¹⁾ The rate of filled vacancy of specially-trained mechanics was 74% until the end of March 1941.⁽⁵¹⁾

Although the rates of filled vacancy were improved in the autumn of 1941, there was a great shortage in personnel skilled enough to be assigned to the immediate operations, especially to aircraft carriers, due to the [particular] increase in the number of younger crew [on one hand] and the rapid increase in the number of aircraft carriers [on the other].

Such being the case, the meeting of the Navy General Staff and the Combined Fleet decided the following:⁽³⁵⁾

1. Skilled members among the flight crew of the 3d and the 4th Carrier Divisions shall [be removed to] replenish the 1st and the 2d Carrier Divisions (main aircraft carrier unit), so as to prevent a deterioration in skills which may be caused by the increase in the regular number [of crew] due to the wartime shift.
2. [The flight crew of] each ship of the 5th Carrier Division ([consisting of] newly built vessels) shall be replenished with teachers, instructors and the cadre crew of air training units and homeland units. For that purpose,
 - (1) The number of students and trainees assigned to a teacher or an instructor shall be increased.
 - (2) Training of unskilled flight crew shall be conducted in the units engaged in battles outside [Japan].
3. It cannot be helped to reduce the rate of [flight] crew assigned to the fleets. ([In such a case,] the reserve flight crew shall [first] be reduced.)
4. No replenishment may be required for the 3d and the 4th Carrier Divisions (small aircraft carriers).
5. No reinforcement shall be made to the Eleventh Air Fleet. Consequently, a large number of unskilled flight crew was assigned to the Eleventh Air Fleet, [consisting of] land-based air units, which also incurred the responsibility for their training.