

## Preface

On the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of David Friedrich Strauß' death (February 8, 1874) and the 300<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Immanuel Kant's birth (April 22, 1724), this project aims: 1) to demonstrate that Gospel scholarship has by no means left Strauß on the scrapheap of history; and 2) to demonstrate that Strauß' significance is equally, if not more, what his metaphysical odyssey can teach us about empirical science and the importance of personal, responsible agency embedded in an encouraging and sustaining community with both science's theoretical reason (understanding) and individual practical reason (morality) requiring the presence in individuals of a creative open-endedness in the closed, causal system of nature.

The reader does not have to be her-/himself a gospel scholar or theologian<sup>1</sup> to grasp Strauß' key insights. Rather, his scholarship by its rigor and detail both in gospel studies and theology can save valuable time not because one must know their details but because he has identified the core issues at issue in both gospel studies and theology. Those issues at issue are reducible to two themes at the heart of the gospels and theology: 'myth' and 'the capacities of *finite*, transcendental consciousness.'

Strauß' crucial conclusions about the gospels are twofold: 1) Just as one does not have to believe in a literal Santa Claus to recognize that there is a 'truth' (the truth of self-less giving) at the core of the Santa 'story'/'myth,' so too, the 'truth' of religion, generally, and Christianity in particular, is not that 'the text tells me so.' The 'truth' of scriptures is the ideas and moral principles that are at the core of their 'stories'/'myths' that one can 'see' only when one looks beyond the literal story. 2) Even more important, though, is Strauß' adaptation to the 'Second' Testament of the *genetic mythical principle* of the 'First' Testament. The stories in the 'Second' Testament in the text have *pre-figured prototypes* in the 'First' Testament that have been employed by the gospel writers to communicate theological convictions. In short, the writers of the scriptures are creative authors, not objective reporters of history. Strauß demonstrates exhaustively that, particularly when it comes to the miracle stories in the gospels, every

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1. One does not have to be a Kant scholar to grasp his key elements, either. Kant himself points out that even children as of a certain age understand full well what he is talking about when it comes to individual creativity, which requires a universe but is not reducible to nature, and the assumption of moral responsibility for one's agency, which is a kind of agency that in degree we find nowhere else in nature. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 410\*[2], and *Religion* AA VI: 48–49.

In fact, the goal of gospel scholarship, theology, and philosophy is to make the scholar irrelevant, not to elevate egos in a system of status and prestige (what Kant calls 'humanity'). See Kant's discussion of the capacities (*Anlagen*) of 'animality,' 'humanity,' and 'personality' in *Religion* AA VI: 26–28.

story (with the exception of the demon stories<sup>2</sup>) have their *pre-figured prototypes* in ‘First’ Testament narratives. The key insight here is that the writers of the gospels are ‘creative authors’ who, like all authors, shape their narratives according to a guiding understanding that they employed to generate their stories.

In short, the ‘truth’ of the gospels is not the truth of factual accounts but a theological ‘truth’ that the evangelist author possessed already in advance of writing. The crucial insight is that ‘truth’ of the text, then, is not a matter of *exegesis* (reading out of) but *eisegesis* (reading into) the texts. Already with their authorship, the pre-conceived theologies of the evangelists are a re-shaping of inherited narratives out of the tradition.

Strauß’ crucial conclusion when it comes to the history of Church Doctrine is similar. One does not have to employ any ‘external philosophical perspective’ to recognize the internal inconsistencies that result in the collapse of objective truth claims for Christian teaching. In other words, the frequently repeated assertion that ‘philosophy places human reason on the throne of God’ (that is, that ‘worldly philosophy’ is innately in conflict with ‘true revelation as in I Corinthians 1:18–25) is as ridiculous as it is misleading. It is misleading because theology placed humanity on the throne of God from its very beginning with its employment of anthropomorphism to describe ‘God.’ Across the spectrum of religions, from Animism, to Polytheism, to Henotheism, and Monotheism in all (!) variations (with one exception<sup>3</sup>) that include, for example, Mysticism, Scholastic Occasionalism/Intellectualism, and 20<sup>th</sup> C Dipolar Theism, literal, anthropomorphic analogies are employed to describe ‘God’ or ‘Nirvana’/‘Emptiness.’

To be sure, recognition of the ubiquitousness of anthropomorphism across religious traditions does not mean that religions are ‘false.’ However, certain about anthropomorphic analogies is their hubris, as David Hume pointed out,<sup>4</sup> but also certain is that the ubiquitousness of anthropomorphism in religion signals that it is probable that humanity is worshiping itself. With the exception of Kant’s approach to religion, all religious traditions are based upon *literal*, attribution of human predicates onto ultimate reality. To be sure, there is no proof that such literal attributions are false, but it is also the case that they are no proof that they are true. In light of the fact that the predicates are only experienced by us as finite, the weight of likelihood is that they are found nowhere but in humanity. At the least, the dependence upon *literal*,

2. Strauß points out that ‘demon possession’ was a ‘new’ disease in the Intertestamental Period. See Strauß, *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* (1864) (*Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet*) (Leipzig: ‘F.A. Brockhaus, 1874): 426, 446, and 454–455. Available at: <https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=uqYPAAAAQAAJ&pg=GBS.PR2> 23 (February 2023).

3. The one exception is Immanuel Kant’s Critical Idealism that recognizes that anthropomorphic language is inescapable when it comes to speaking about God but that one needs to always (!) recognize that it is symbolic, not literal. See Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* AA IV: 356–357. See as well, Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 353.

4. See David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1982): 14–15.

anthropomorphic analogies without the slightest recognition that they are, in fact, symbolic, undermines all claims for absolute certainty. Positively, anthropomorphic analogies place all religions under the methodological status of skepticism in search for the necessary *a priori* synthetic judgments upon which they depend.<sup>5</sup>

However, rather than Strauß' conclusion with respect to the internal inconsistencies of Christian teaching leading to the judgment that the history of Church Doctrine is useless, the more appropriate conclusion with respect to Church Doctrine is the same as with gospel criticism: *Strauß provides a rich resource for the reader's reflections on theology, and he profiles succinctly the key issues at issue to facilitate those reflections.*

My investigation of Strauß follows Paul Ricoeur's 'hermeneutical arc'<sup>6</sup> that extends from the linguistically *pre-figured* material of others that an author employs to *con-figure* her/his own text and results in the reader's *re-figuring* the author's narrative in application to the reader's world. This 'hermeneutical arc' justifies both a 'close' and a 'deep' reading of an author, and Strauß is no exception. However, I maintain that an author is worthy of the reader's time not for her/his clever conclusions but for the care and the extensiveness of her/his corpus. One can discern the degree of 'care' taken by an author when s/he has rigorously documented in her/his own texts the trajectory of her/his own intellectual development. Such discernment requires a 'close reading' of an author's *con-figuration* of her/his *pre-figured* sources. However, one can discern the 'extensiveness' of her/his engagement only by undertaking one's own 'deep reading' of those *pre-figured* sources. Whereas the reader is unequivocally rewarded by a 'close reading' of Strauß' rigorous reflections in the *con-figuration* of his texts given his careful examination and formulation of the 'issues at issue,' a 'deep reading' that includes his sources illuminates both the brilliance *and the flaws* of his engagement of his *pre-figured* sources.

Volume I looks at Strauß, the gospel critic. At the very least, Strauß was misunderstood by those who took to be Strauß' conclusion in his *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined* (LJ) (1835) that the Christian gospels are historically false and only a collection

5. In his posthumously published *Anweisung*, Kant writes of the importance of skepticism: „You can't do anything with some people because they have too limited an understanding of what they have learned. They do not accept any idea that does not fit in with the concepts they have absorbed and, therefore, cannot grasp them. The best opportunity for broadening concepts is a kind of scepsis (doubt), which shakes and rattles everything accepted in order to arouse doubt about it, with the goal that one judge from higher principles than those of conventional thought (*Schulwissenschaft*).” Kant, *Anweisung* Olms, ed.: 100.

6. In the spring of 1970, Paul Ricoeur taught a course, “Hermeneutical Problems in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology,” at the Divinity School on Sections 29 to 34 (‘state of mind,’ ‘understanding,’ ‘interpretation,’ and ‘discourse’) from Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. A core thesis of the course was the notion of ‘hermeneutical arc’ from the author’s world, over the author’s text, to the reader’s application to her/his own ‘world of meaning’ drawn out of the text. The Divinity School recorded Ricoeur’s lectures. I have an unpublished paper, “Heidegger and the Problem of Hermeneutics: A Path of Thought” (December 23, 1970), that summarizes key elements of the course that I submitted to Ricoeur as my seminar paper.

of non-factual ‘myths’ with the aim of undermining the validity of the Christian faith. Yet, more important than how he was misunderstood, this ‘close’ reading of his work and ‘deep’ reading of his sources emphasizes the profundity of his gospel criticism, which anticipates much in ‘Second’ Testament scholarship in our day, that includes, as well, the criteria for discerning ‘historical’ elements in the text even as he himself overlooked the full significance of the ‘*genetic mythical principle*’ for understanding the significance of the ‘evangelist as author.’<sup>7</sup>

Part II of Volume I is a ‘A Historical Reader for the 1839 Zurich Revolution’ that was sparked by Strauß’ appointment to the University of Zurich. It contains background material and summaries of the events of September 6, 1839. These include official documents, newspaper and other eyewitness reports, as well as letters of recommendation and street pamphlets that address Strauß’ appointment both pro

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7. Ferdinand Christian Baur may have contributed to Strauß’ avoidance of the full significance of the ‘*genetic mythical principle*’ for theology. Not only does the ‘*genetic, mythical principle*’ account for the development of Second Testament narratives by gleaning the First (‘Old’) Testament texts for any- and everything that the gospel authors could use to portray their understanding of Jesus, but also the ‘*genetic, mythical principle*’ confirms that the gospel authors were driven by their different theological agendas in the selection and arrangement of their narratives about Jesus and/or the Christ. As indicative of his focus on the ‘subjective’ nature of Kant and the Rationalists (including Schleiermacher) to be characteristic of the Enlightenment age, Baur claims that the ‘subjectivist,’ relativizing of the gospels shattered the ancient, ‘objective’ teaching of the Church. (See Baur, *The Christian Doctrine of Atonement and its Historical Development from Its Most Ancient Time down to the Present [Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung und ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die neueste]*, Vol. II (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2004): 606–607).

Baur’s, the early Strauß, and Hegel’s commitment to ‘science’ was fueled by their conviction that humanity can achieve Absolute Knowledge. Given the enduring influence of the anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment Movement in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> C, Strauß had no alternative but his version of ‘materialism’ in his final work, *The Old and the New Faith* in 1872, because of Strauß’ insistence on ‘objective’ knowledge. Having misunderstood the meaning of ‘necessity’ in Kant’s Copernican Turn, a term which Strauß, Baur, and Hegel/the Hegelians took ‘necessity’ to mean the ‘necessity’ of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to account for absolute causality (see: 702), they judged Kant to have remained limited to ‘subjectivity’ with no awareness of the true significance of Absolute Knowledge although Kant nowhere claims that ‘God’ doesn’t exist. Rather, he called ‘God’ a ‘necessary’ idea of reason as one of the three ideas of reason that are required in order for finite, transcendental consciousness to be what it is. (See Kant’s list of the three ideas of reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 700 and their heuristic value in *ibid.*, B 671–672). However, Strauß, Baur, and Hegel/the Hegelians had no grasp of the significance of ‘necessity’ as did Kant to mean ‘required’ in the sense of an assumption in order to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world, which is possible only for finite, transcendental consciousness. Therefore, they turned Kant’s ‘faith’ in God into a capricious, subjective strategy that both denied Absolute Knowledge and limited all understanding to subjective consciousness – overlooking that the Principle of Sufficient Reason itself is an assumption of subreption, not an absolute certainty.

Kant is no ‘mere subjectivist’. His reflections always begin with empirical phenomena and turn to the discernment of the transcendental conditions of finite consciousness required to experience empirical phenomena. See, for example, the “Introduction” to Kant’s *Logic* AA IX: 11–16 and *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 181–186. He takes the position, then, between empiricism and Absolute Idealism, which he calls Critical Idealism.

and con. Among the materials is Strauß' letter to the Zurich government in which he defends his work against his adversaries in the Canton as well as a letter to the Central Committee of the populist movement written by the Superintendent of Schools, Ignaz Thomas Scherr. It concludes with the official report of the "Aid Society for the Good of the Victims of 6 September 1839" that documents the tragic, enduring effects of the revolution.

In Volume II with its 'close' reading of the 'intellectual crises' that are reflected in Strauß' writings, I propose that a 'deep' reading of his sources adds breadth to the expansive understanding of his corpus as it illuminates the influence of his sources on his reflections and failed opportunities, especially when it came to Immanuel Kant.

Strauß, the gospel critic, was read by many, including his beloved professor, Ferdinand Christian Baur, to have ignored 'history' in the gospels, which is taken to mean that he was intent on destroying Christian doctrine.<sup>9</sup>

However, while acknowledging that 'criticism' of the gospels, especially the miracles, leads to the collapse of the naïve, literal reading and the calling into question of the historical 'truth' of Christian narrative found in the gospels, the primary *constructive aspect of criticism*, according to Strauß in the *LJ*, is to restore the 'scientific truth' (that is, the 'Concept') of the Christian doctrine of incarnation.<sup>9</sup> Strauß emphasized that discernment of the historical was an important aspect for identifying this 'scientific truth.' To be sure, establishment of the 'historical' elements in the gospels is no easy task. In fact, Strauß invoked four criteria for identifying the 'historical' material in the gospels:

The account must be compatible with universal, physical laws and 'objective' science.<sup>10</sup>

8. F.C. Baur was not defending Traditional Christian Theology, but he did defend a 'Hegelianized' Christology that he believed was the 'true' Christology of the gospels. The 'historical' God/Man refers not to a single individual or limited set of philosophers (e.g., Hegelians) but to that growing number of those who grasp the significance of Absolute Spirit in finite spirit over the entire course of history that is the Christian Church (*Gemeinde*) as the 'body of Christ'. See Baur, *Gnosis*: especially, 721 but also 685, 696, and 734–736. To the 'left' of Baur, though, is Strauß with his universally, inclusive Christology that is not limited to the Christian community (*Gemeinde*).

9. See Strauß' account of what he understood to be the aim of his *LJ* in "I. Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel'schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik" in *Streitschriften III*: 58–59.

10. Strauß, *LJ*: 88. In his *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, Strauß summarized Schleiermacher's take on miracles to be: where we reach the limits of rational understanding, anything is possible. In dramatic contrast, according to Strauß, the limits of rational understanding are established by physical laws. Where Schleiermacher was willing to leave open the possibility of miracles, Strauß maintains that lack of understanding can never trump the necessary untruth of an event that violates the laws of nature. See Strauß summary of Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith*, par. 47, sec. 3 in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 86–87. Schleiermacher insists that "[...] our judgment concerning miracles must be such that through it the credibility of the Gospels is not injured; for otherwise our faith in the person of Christ would be ruined, and he would become for us a mythical person?" (*Ibid.*, 97) [Keck's text emphasized 'mythical'] In other words, according to Schleiermacher there are no absolute miracles; but all miracles are possible: "miracles as such, as something absolute" are

The account must neither be inconsistent with itself nor in contradiction with other acknowledged historical material.

The account cannot be historical if the representation is poetical, the actors converse in hymns, and their communications are of a 'diffuse and elevated strain' from their actors' training and situation.

The account cannot be historical if it 'strikingly accords with ideas prevailing within the circle from which the narrative was generated and the ideas appear to be the product of preconceived opinions. In such cases 'it is more or less probable' that such narratives are of mythical origin.<sup>11</sup>

These criteria are anticipatory of the three criteria for historical authenticity summarized in the 20<sup>th</sup> C.<sup>12</sup> However, Strauß remains a valuable resource for gospel scholarship not only with respect to his establishment of criteria for identifying 'history' in the gospels, but, more significantly, *for his robust defense of their 'myths' as a conveyance of 'scientific truth.'*

In other words, Strauß' understanding of myth is crucial, paradoxically, to his defense of what he presented in the *LJ* as the 'scientific truth' of the gospels although the miracle stories in the gospels were factually impossible. In the post-Copernican world of Strauß' day, the choice was limited either to *rejection of 'science'* (as the case for biblical literalists) or to preserve 'science' (as the case of the 'Rationalists') with the latter required to distort the text. The Rationalists' 'Accommodation Theory' claimed that the gospels were factual, historical accounts written with the non-scientific under-

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impossible; "but [...] the gospel miracle stories, insofar as they can be viewed relatively, he provisionally acknowledges as all possible." (*Ibid.*, 87) To be sure, Schleiermacher wrote that "In the interest of piety *there can never arise a necessity* of understanding a fact in such a way that its dependence on God destroys its contingency on the continuity of nature." (*Ibid.*, 84) Schleiermacher wrote: "If in time an explanation of the basis of these [miracle] narratives were to be found in which the miraculous were to disappear, [...] than that would be no disturbance of faith; to the contrary, it would be the most desirable outcome of our investigation" [...] (*Ibid.*, 93) However, Schleiermacher leaves open a loophole: *it is never 'necessary' for faith to understand an event as a disruption of the continuity of nature, but it is, nonetheless, possible because of human ignorance.* This is profoundly opposite to Strauß' claim that the limits to reason require that we recognize the universality of physical laws – otherwise, we cannot understand anything!

11. See Strauß, *LJ*: 88–89. This latter criterion, positively formulated, is the 'criterion of dissimilarity' of 20<sup>th</sup> C. gospel scholarship. Note, however, that here Strauß is cautious with his 'more or less probable.' The criterion is no guarantee of the historical content of the account. Strauß applies the criterion of dissimilarity, for example, to justify belief in Peter's having denied Jesus – although he points out that the cock's crow and three-fold repetition of the denial are "[...] legendary is not to be denied." Strauß, *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*: 546–547.

12. Norman Perrin summarizes the criteria from Bultmann and Käsemann: 1) the criterion of dissimilarity; 2) the criterion of coherence; 3) and the criterion of multiple attestation. See Norman Perrin, *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus* (New York: Harper and Row, Pub., 1967): 39–48. For an analysis of these 20<sup>th</sup> C. criteria see Chapter 1, "On the Function of the Historical Jesus in Theological Reflection: The Question of Authority" in Douglas R McGaughey, *On the Soteriological Significance of the Symbol of the Kingdom of God in the language of the Historical Jesus* (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Divinity School of The University of Chicago, 1983): 51–52.

standing of physical events of the day, but that it is the task of the biblical scholar to demonstrate that those reported events have a ‘scientific’ explanation according to the 19<sup>th</sup> C understanding of empirical science. *The Rationalists, then, either turned Jesus and the disciples into deceivers or they had to dramatically distort the text in order to account for the miracles on the basis of empirical science.*

Strauß’ ‘scientific’ alternative to Traditional Christian Theology and the Rationalists cut the Gordian knot by distinguishing between a story and its ‘truth.’ This option employed Hegel’s understanding of ‘science’<sup>13</sup> that is based on the epistemological structure of perceptible form (representations) and ‘true’ content (idea). The ‘true’ content is the abstract idea that makes both possible, and is at the core of, the ‘actual,’ form or perceptible representations of experience.<sup>14</sup> When it comes to the gospels, the ‘actual’ consists of the reported ‘events’ in the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth. The ‘true content,’ according to the Hegelian perspective, is the Absolute Knowledge that is the incarnation of the God/Man.

Although not grounded in the hypothetico-deductive method of empirical science, Hegel took Copernicus as an example of the ‘scientific’ conclusion of the Hegelians. Copernicus had demonstrated that, whereas the ‘actual,’ perceptible representations ‘prove’ that the sun circles the earth, scientific ‘truth’ is only grasped by an imperceptible, mathematical model (Copernicus’ true ‘idea’) that understands that the earth is moving around the sun although we cannot ‘see’ it doing so. In other words, Copernican science acknowledges a difference between ‘perception’ (form) and ‘truth’ (content) with perception in the sensible realm requiring the ‘scientific correction’ of the true content (Idealism) that one can acquire only in the intelligible realm.

Strauß applies to the gospel stories (myths) Hegel’s notion of ‘science’ that distinguishes between perceived ‘form’ (husk) and ‘true’ content (the kernel). In the *LJ*, he thought that Hegelian ‘science’ allowed him to ‘scientifically restore’ the Christian doctrine of incarnation even though many of the stories themselves were literally false. *No more than the ‘truth’ of the heliocentric system can be established by the ‘false’ perception of the sun’s movement, the ‘truth’ of the narratives was not their literal representations as factual accounts of events as maintained by Traditional Christian Theology and the Rationalists.*

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13. This is not the science of the hypothetico-deductive method with which we are familiar today.

14. ‘Objective’ means in Hegelian philosophy the grounds of the distinction between ‘representations’ (*sinnliche Anschauung*) and ‘ideal content’ (*intellektuelle Anschauung*). See Hegel, “Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie” GW II: 305–306; „A representation [Form] is [...] present as exactly the same both in the subject and the object” [“Die Form A ist [...] dieselbe im Subjekt und Objekt vorhanden.”] – *ibid.*: 312; “The ‘real’/‘actual’ [Reale] is the absolute identity of the universal and the particular;” abstraction ‘needs’ the positive of the particular – “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten” GW II: 521; reason = highest abstraction (Unity, Knowledge, Freedom) but without the particular it is empty abstraction” – *ibid.*: 525; see as well, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 78–79!!; 97–98; 103–104.

Rather, gospel narratives can have as their kernel a historical event, a theological/philosophical idea, or a 'symbol.' The first task of the exegete is a) to determine what element at the core of the story (myth) is, followed by b) an explanation of the 'true' meaning of that core element and c) an account of how the 'false,' literal myth was generated (penultimately, without addressing the genetic origin of the 'First' Testament prototypes) in order to communicate the 'truth' of the individual, gospel pericopes. However, the 'truth' of the gospels was their abstract ideas (established as the 'truth' at the core of a fanciful account of an historical event, a 'true' philosophical idea, or a 'true' symbol) that are *the real kernels of the stories*. The 'truth' of the gospels is not literally what one 'sees' when one reads the text. For the 'scientific' reading of the gospels, the text is to the 'truth' what the 'movement of the sun' is to the 'truth' of the heliocentric solar system.

Strauß claimed in the *LJ* that the scientifically 'true' meaning of Church Doctrine, the 'kernel' of the gospel narratives, is that '*God has become man*.' He took this to mean that the mythic narratives of the gospels are a perceptible account of what cannot be perceptibly portrayed: *Spirit coming to conscious awareness of Itself*. What distinguished him from Traditional Christian Theology was his rejection of the *exclusive* limiting of the Spirit's incarnation to a particular historical individual in Palestine at the beginning of the Common Era. Strauß' rigorous reflections on Hegelianism, though, led him to see that Absolute Spirit's incarnation is neither limited to one individual (Hegel's Christology) nor applicable only to a group of individuals who alone 'know' its truth as the 'escape from materialism' (Right-Wing Hegelians). Rather, he defended a radically *inclusive* understanding of Christology that applied, universally, to *all finite consciousness* past, present, and future *in history*.<sup>15</sup>

Yet, in addition to his gospel criticism, whose aim was to demonstrate the non-historical nature (particularly, of the miracles as obvious violation of 'science'), he took the task of the gospel exegete not only to be discernment of the 'truths' or kernels of the gospel narratives (the meaning at their core) but also *to account for the generation of their non-historical stories*. Strauß especially drew on the work of Wilhelm Krug, who explained the development of myths as the consequence of the '*genetic mythical principle*'.<sup>16</sup> This principle maintains that the stories in the gospels are *pre-figured* through inherited narrative prototypes from the 'First' Testament. Strauß

15. F.C. Baur limited his inclusive, historical Christ by employing the Apostle Paul's notion of the Christian church as the 'body of Christ' to mean that the incarnation (the God/Man) is all those who understand (confess) that Christ's Spirit is the spirit of finite consciousness. In other words, the Christian is one who takes her/his spirit to be inseparable from Christ's Spirit because all Christians share the same body, which is the meaning and purpose of the Eucharist.

16. See Wilhelm Krug, „Versuch über die genetische oder formelle Erklärungsart der Wunder“ in *Museum für Religionswissenschaft*, I (1803): 395–413. From Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 267. Strauß cites Krug in the first edition of the *LJ*: 35–36. In the fourth edition, Strauß maintained the paragraph of the first edition (56), but the explicit citation of Krug occurs first on page 59.

demonstrates that all of the miracle stories in the gospels with the crucial exception of the stories involving demons,<sup>17</sup> have *pre-figured* parallels in the ‘First’ Testament.<sup>18</sup> Given the significance of Jesus for the early Church, these authors believed he ‘had to’ have performed the miracles in the ‘First’ Testament in a superior fashion. *In the Gospel of Luke 24:27; 24:44; 22:37, the gospel author anchored the ‘genetic mythical principle’ in the teaching of the ‘historical’ Jesus.*

The gospel exegete, then, has the task of identifying the *pre-figured* elements in the First Testament that were drawn upon by the early Christian community and the gospel writers in order to *formulate their narratives understanding* (their *con-figurations*) of the significance of what they had experienced in the ministry of Jesus of Nazareth. I provide in Appendix I to Volume II a list of what Strauß took to be ‘historical’ material in the gospels.<sup>19</sup>

This second aspect of the *genetic mythical principle* in Strauß’ mythic reading of the text also remains significant for today’s gospel exegetes. If the texts are not actual accounts of factual events but generated out of a deep reading of the ‘First’ Testament on the part of the early Church to identify the *pre-figured* prototypes that they *con-figured* to tell their ‘story’ about Jesus of Nazareth, then *the key to the ‘truth’ of the gospels is not the certainties of historical claims but the theology of the author and her/his community that shaped their con-figuration of the prototypes*. In short, in light of the theological options present in the gospels and other texts of the ‘Second’ Testament for understanding the significance of Jesus of Nazareth for faith, the text doesn’t give the reader ‘the’ absolute, objective truth. Rather, the text challenges the reader to take responsibility for her/his theological truth.<sup>20</sup>

17. Although demon possession was a ‘new’ disease in the Intertestamental Period so that there are no miracles involving demons in the First Testament, even when it came to miracles involving demons, the plethora of First Testament miracles provided the explanatory framework for the ‘new’ demon miracles: Jesus had to have demonstrated his sovereignty over demons because of the theological status he came to possess for the early Church.

18. See “Appendix II: Annotated ‘First’ Testament **Concordance:**” 993 ff.

19. See Appendix I: „Likely ,Historical’ Elements of Jesus’ Life” 985 ff.

20. One can take this to be the challenge of ‘classical mythology’ as well. Ernst Cassirer proposes that myths have a ‘perceptual’ and a ‘conceptual’ structure. See Cassirer, *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977): 76.

The ‘perceptual’ structure treats ‘nature’ as the literal face of the parent that the child must ‘read’ in order to respond in ways that its needs can be met by the parent (nature). It takes myth to be accounts of humanity’s satisfying its self-interest in its interaction with ‘powers’ greater than the individual. Classic examples would be found not only in ‘pagan’ mythology but also in the key ‘covenantal’ narratives of the ‘First’ and ‘Second’ Testaments. Strauß comments on the centrality of God for success (or failure) in achieving ‘self-interest’ that is at the foundation of all religion and questions its baseness. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift* (*Herman Samuel Reimarus and his Protected Writing*) (1862), Vol. 5 in the *Gesammelte Schriften von David Friedrich Strauß* (Bonn: Verlag von Emil Strauß, 1877): 281–282.

The ‘conceptual’ structure views myths as a ‘fictional account’ (the husk) of their kernels, which are a portrayal of the ‘first’ time that the ‘eternal prototypes’ occurred and which agency can subsequently

The ‘truth’ of the gospels is a theological understanding that the gospel authors (and today’s readers) already bring with them to the text. The gospels are, thereby, transformed into a rich source of theological reflection already in the early Church. Only the individual can think for her-/himself, and only the individual can give her-/himself permission to exercise her/his agency. This turns the purported perceptible ‘Kingdom of God’ into an imperceptible Commonweal of God<sup>21</sup> that rejects all heteronomous, moral finger-wagging and encourages the individual to cultivate the capacities to think and assume personal responsibility for her-/his own theology and agency. Strauß’ presentation of Church History in his *Glaubenslehre* of 1841 is valuable, as well, *not as a set of theologically, objective ‘truths’ but as the valuable stimulation of one’s own reflections. Both the gospels and the Christian tradition, then, become resources for the reader today to sort out her/his own theological understanding.*

For example, the gospels themselves present various readings of Jesus: He can be taken to be a Jewish reformer or a Jewish Socrates, an Ebionite (a human being infused with God’s will), or the opposite, a Docetic vision (only an appearance of God’s Spirit in flesh), a vehicle for Stoic/Cynic wisdom; later, of course, Jesus was portrayed as Hercules (particularly in the Roman catacombs) as well as the ‘solution’ to Augustine of Hippo’s novel teaching of Original Sin at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> C based on a misreading of Romans 5:12, along with many more options. However, once the shift occurs from the gospels as historical truth to the gospels as theological reflection, the gospel exegete has to step down from the throne of divine certainties to acknowledge the role of relative, human understanding (that is, faith) shaping the text. This shift can enable the individual to seek certainty neither in ‘objective’, empirical claims that are historical events nor in capricious, ‘subjective’ opinion but in the ‘necessary’,<sup>22</sup>

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only ‘copy,’ as with what Thomas Kuhn calls ‘exemplary past achievements’ in the “Postscript” of his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Foundations of the Unity of Science*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970): 175. Contrary to early Christianity’s dismissal of Greek mythology because of its ‘immorality,’ then, Greek mythology is confronting the hearer with the inescapable, personal choice whether or not the individual will ‘copy’ the action of the gods. The ‘eternal prototype’ itself at the ‘kernel’ of the myth is amoral. It becomes an issue for morality only when the individual chooses to act according to it. The same can be said of the gospel ‘myths’. The ‘kernel’ of a pericope is a theological claim that must be adjudicated by the reader. The gospels, then, serve along with the history of Church Doctrine as a resource that aids the reader with its rich theological options. The task of the theologian is not to establish objective ‘truth’ but to save the time of others by clarifying the issues at issue in a theological claim so that the ‘other’ can decide for her-/himself the ‘truth’ to guide her/his agency.

21. Kant stresses that the ‘Kingdom of God’ has nothing to do with a particular covenant but a ‘moral’ Kingdom “available to cognition through mere reason.” *Religion AA VI: 137\** In order to avoid the metaphor interference that accompanies the notion of a ‘Kingdom’ of God and to emphasize its universality as a capacity of reason, I prefer the notion Commonweal of God.

22. The term ‘necessary’ appears to be problematic for some readers. Instead of reading it simply as ‘required,’ it is read to mean ‘causally determining,’ as if the conditions of possibility and capacities of transcendental consciousness pre-determined what transcendental consciousness actually *does* with those *a priori* conditions and capacities. For example, to drive a car, it is *necessary* that one has a car. However, the fact that one has a car does not determine how one is going to drive it.

finite, transcendental conditions that are universally required for consciousness to experience and understand anything whatsoever.

However, Strauß himself did not grasp the significance of the author's creativity when it comes to the '*genetic mythical principle*'. If the author is intentionally employing prototypes from the 'First' Testament in the writing of her/his gospel, then the author's theology is driving her/his writing. The written text is not what establishes or confirms the 'truth' of the author's theology. However, Strauß' failure to appreciate the 'evangelist as author'<sup>23</sup> when it came to the '*genetic mythical principle*' is not out of stubborn insistence against his opponents that he rejected history in the gospels but because of his epistemological assumptions and moral consequentialism.

Strauß' concern was not with 'theological pluralism' in the text but, contrary to the opinion of many, on *historical certainties established by the text*. He anticipated 'liberal' 20<sup>th</sup> C biblical scholars who remained committed to the value of the gospels only to the extent that one can establish factual history in them. Post-Kähler 20<sup>th</sup> C theology even insists that what matters is not the 'Jesus of history' but the 'historic, biblical Christ' of faith.<sup>24</sup> However, by 1864 Strauß had concluded that the historical evidence of the gospels is incapable of carrying the weight of a biography of Jesus, and by 1872 he questioned the historical foundation for conclusions with respect to his actual teaching.<sup>25</sup> Whatever history is in the text, he had concluded in 1864, it is only an aggregate of unconnected, fragmentary elements. This conclusion contributed to his turn to Feuerbachian materialism at the end of his career.

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The conditions of possibility and capacities (*Anlagen*) of transcendental consciousness *are not uncovered by means of the causal assumption of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*): that the cause of an effect must have at least as much 'reality' as the effect; otherwise, something would come from nothing. They are *a priori* elements 'deduced' from the experience of appearances that are required if a consciousness is to be capable of experiencing the appearances – *not create the appearances!*

23. Even Norman Perrin, author of "The Evangelist as Author" failed to articulate the theological significance of the 'evangelist as author'. However, in the last paragraph of his article he adds the caveat: "I have limited myself quite deliberately to the critical method involved in interpreting the text historically, and I am very well aware that this is only the beginning and not the end of the hermeneutical task." Perrin, "The Evangelist as Author: Reflections on the Study and Interpretation of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts" in *Biblical Research*. 17 (1972): 18.

24. See Martin Kähler, *The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ*. Carl E. Braaten trans. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970. This theological trajectory includes the 'hermeneutical' theology of Gerhard Ebeling's 'Word event' and Ernst Fuchs' 'Kerygma event'. See Gerhard Ebeling, "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus und das Problem der Christologie" in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 56 Jahrgang (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1959), Beiheft 1: 14–30. Ernst Fuchs, Ernst Fuchs, D. Ernst. "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus" in *Zur Frage nach dem historischen Jesus* (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1965): 377–404.

25. Strauß writes in 1872: "I only wanted to give an indication [...] how [...] little we are sure [...] on any point in the speeches and teachings of Jesus that we have words and thoughts from him, or only such before us, which [...] were] put into His mouth in later times." Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube. Ein Bekenntnis [The Old and the New Faith: A Confession]* (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1872): 58; see as well 53.

As insightful as Strauß' solution to the problem of 'science' in the gospels was, the *LJ* was only the first step in his fascinating metaphysical odyssey. Volume II of this work focuses not only on the changes in his understanding of metaphysics alone but also on the constantly present, but mis-represented, ghostly image of Immanuel Kant, which shaped Strauß across his career.

In his battles with the Hegelians over his portrayal of the incarnation (collected in his *Streitschriften* [*Polemical Writings*] of 1837)<sup>26</sup>, he lamented his rejection by even the so-called 'Left-Wing' Hegelians. However, with the publication of "On the Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" of 1838, the Hegelian meta-narrative of the dialectic of Double Negation is entirely absent. This is not simply a consequence of his attempt to 'break the lance' of his opponents who viewed him as an 'elitist' Hegelian. Rather, here he explicitly rejects any theology whose ultimate goal is a 'one-sided, *theoretical* reason'.<sup>27</sup> He sought a different philosophical framework for the grounding of Christianity than an escape from history. He now speaks of the ground of faith in terms of the '*religious genius*' who achieved the highest form of '*internal harmony*' with '*reason*' (in the tradition of Scholastic 'Intellectualists' in contrast to the 'Occasionalists'/'Voluntarists') reconciled with external, moral teaching. Importantly, the crucial conviction that drives this attribution of the label '*religious genius*' to Jesus is that the text is taken to provide enough factual, historical evidence (!) to support it.

Furthermore, in January of 1839, precisely at that point when the government of the Canton of Zurich named Strauß to the professorship for Biblical Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics at their new university in Zurich (1833), which led to the political revolution in Zurich in September and the termination of any chance for an academic career, Strauß began publishing, serially, a devastatingly critical manuscript on Schleiermacher and the 'Right-Wing' Hegelian, Carl Daub. In Chapter 4, I present a detailed analysis of why Schleiermacher was not an option for Strauß. As rector of the university in Heidelberg, Daub played a vital role in Hegel's joining him in Heidelberg for two years before Hegel went on to Berlin. Significantly, as well, Daub was Ludwig Feuerbach's professor in Heidelberg. In Chapter 8, I look at Strauß' blistering attack of Daub.

Despite his disdain for Daub, Daub's reading of Kant was formative for Strauß because it reinforced what he had learned about Kant from F.C. Baur, Hegel, and Schleiermacher. A careful examination of the warped elements of Kant in his writings illuminates what were/are, unfortunately, common misunderstandings of Kant, which, when corrected, allow recognition of Kant as an option to Strauß' Feuerbachian

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26. The three pamphlets are reprinted in the single volume: Strauß, *Streitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie*. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1980).

27. See Strauß, „Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum“ (1838) („On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity“) in *Zwei friedliche Blätter* (Altona; Verlag von J.F. Hammerich, 1839): 108.

materialism that itself only slowly emerged for Strauß over the last thirty years of his life and is solidified in *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872.

A key barrier to Strauß' embracing of Kant's notion of *a priori* synthetic judgment is not merely the false reading of synthesis to mean the *a posteriori* synthesis of dialectic, but also because, since Aristotle, the dominant trope for 'knowledge' is 'causal explanation' and, already with Aristotle, ethics is measured by the consequences of one's agency.

Aristotle's *Metaphysics* begins: "All men (*sic.*) by nature want to know." (980a 21) He adds: "[...] [M]en (*sic.*) of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the 'why' and the cause." (981a 29–31) Aristotle concludes that wisdom has to do with first causes and the first principles of explanation:

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28. This is Aristotle's formulation of the difference between 'theoretical' and 'practical' reason. Theoretical reason is abstract knowledge whereas practical reason is concerned with teleological agency. This is what Kant means by theoretical and practical reason. Hegel, though, defined theoretical reason as the realm of the intelligible whereas practical reason is the realm of the sensible. Aristotle and Kant take theoretical and practical reason to be concerned with the question, "How is one in the world 'in the right way'?" Hegel separates theoretical and practical reason to answer the question, "How does finite consciousness escape from the pain and suffering of the world?" He views Absolute Spirit as an escape from the world of pain and suffering.

### Kant's 'Negative Method'

Kant's 'right way' is no external, heteronomous imposition of moral principles on the individual measurable by moral consequences. In addition to emphasizing the positive 'passion' (*Lust*) for the imperceptible, universal order (physical and moral) in phenomena of theoretical and practical reason, in the face of the ennui, pain, suffering, and injustice of the world, Kant rejected Stoic indifference (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 891–892; Olms ed.: 45); rejected Epicurean concupiscence (*Anweisung*, Olms ed.: 34); rejected Cynic viewing of pain as a lesson to toughen oneself (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 891–892; Olms ed.: 45); rejected 'melancholy' (belief that 'pain' is the fundamental condition of all life that makes suicide attractive) (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1071; Olms ed.: 251); rejected Sophist indifference to truth and the reduction of life to 'winning' (*Logik* AA IX: 26); rejected mystical escapism from the world (*Conflict of the Faculties* AA VII: 54–58, *End of All Things* AA VIII: 335–336, *Metaphysic Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 950); rejected drunkenness as illusory hope (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1072–1073; Olms ed.: 253: 253); and proleptically rejects the Hegelian desire for divinization that escapes the pain and suffering in the world, as well as gave warning against passive waiting for divine grace (*The Conflict of the Faculties* AA VII: 43,44 and *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* AA VI: 190). Rather, Kant offers a 'negative method' echoing his distinction within autonomous freedom's degree of 'freedom-from' nature's determinism serving as the condition for 'freedom-for' creativity (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 580). His 'negative method' (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 891–892; Olms ed.: 45) responds to the *negative* (ennui, pain, suffering, and injustice in the world) not by calling for a stiff upper lip or escape but as the thorn in the flesh that generates the 'passion' (*Lust*) for the *positive: intentional creativity that holds itself responsible to universal principles* (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1070–1072, 1092; Olms ed.: 250–252 and 275–276), which achieves the highest satisfaction in life (*Anweisung* Olms ed.: 36–37). In short, when it comes to agency for which "[e]rror is always accompanied with the appearance of truth and deliciousness (*Ergötzlichkeit*)" (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 891; Olms ed.: 44), Kant proposes: "[O]ur teaching of what is right (*Rechtsgelehrsamkeit*) is so overloaded with restrictions and subtleties that of the many people, often the one who has the most just cause is deprived of justice. The negative method simplifies and cuts much learning" (*Menschenkunde* AA

so that [...] the man (*sic.*) of experience is deemed to be wiser than those who merely sense things, the artist more than men (*sic.*) of experience, and the master worker more than the manual workers. Thus, *wisdom is thought to consist in theoretical rather than in productive kinds of knowledge*.<sup>28</sup> Clearly, then, wisdom is rational knowledge concerning certain basic factors and causes.<sup>29</sup> (emphasis added)

Furthermore, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* begins: "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason, the good rightly has been declared to be that at which all things aim."<sup>30</sup>

In short, *for Aristotle the highest wisdom is to know the causes of things, and the good is defined by the ethical quality of the 'consequences' of one's actions*. For Hegel and Strauß, as well, the highest wisdom is to know the ultimate causes of things, which according to Hegel is Absolute Spirit, whereas moral goodness is a cause made clear by the consequences of one's actions. That is, the good is defined in terms of virtuous 'consequences' caused by agency.

Hegel's distinction between theoretical and practical reason, though, is different from Aristotle's. According to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, theoretical reason is abstract contemplation (Book 10) of ideas (Aristotle's Platonism) whereas practical reason is *productive agency/creativity with the rationale of both being 'proper' living in the world!*

Hegel drives a wedge between theoretical and practical reason. According to Hegel, 'theoretical reason' is the Absolute Unity of a '*divisible I*' (Absolute Spirit) that is mental ideality (*Ideelle*) over against 'practical reason,' which for Hegel is the 'unreasonable many' of the '*divisible non-I*' that is empirical actuality (*Realität*).<sup>31</sup> Theoretical reason (or pure thought) for Hegel is 'contemplation' of the 'true content' (*Inhalt*)

XXV,2: 892; Olms ed. 46). Even the most powerless (including children and 'handicapped') can make a creative and responsible difference. Kant's reference to the injustice of a judicial system 'overloaded with restrictions and subtleties' might be a reference to the struggle between the saddle makers and the harness makers by which, apparently, Kant's father lost his business. See August Schreiner, *Immanuel Kant, der Königsberger Weltweise* (Königsberg: von Emil Rautenberg, 1861): 3.

29. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 981b 27 – 128a 1.

30. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094a 1–3.

31. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 455–456. According to Hegel, *Realität, Reale, Reelle* refer to-concrete actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] as a negation within Absolute Spirit. Abstract ideas are the *Ideelle*, which, in turn, is a negation of concrete determination. *Realität/Reelle* is the 'empirical.' Hegel contrasts the idea as the 'true' content/*Inhalt* from the 'actual' form (representations) with the latter the *Reale/Reelle*. In his *Logik*, Hegel writes: "In relation to reality [*Realität*] and ideality [*Idealität*] (...), the opposition of the finite and the infinite is conceived in such a way that the finite applies to the real [*Reale*], the infinite applies to the ideal [*Ideelle*], just as furthermore the concept is regarded as an ideal [*Ideelles*] and indeed as an only ideal [*Ideelles*], concrete existence in general, however, as the real [*Reale*]. GW V: 165–166.

See, as well, Hegel, Review of "Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntniss.—Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der Philosophie unserer Zeit. Von Carl Friederich G[öschen]" in *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, Bd. 1 (Mai/Juni) (1829): 810–811.

of consciousness with Absolute Spirit as ultimate cause and explanation of all ‘that is.’ Practical reason, in contrast, is concerned with the ‘lower appetites’ driven by ‘actual representations’ (self-interest, imagination, and wishful thinking).<sup>32</sup> Aristotle’s productive agency is reduced by Hegel to being driven exclusively by appetites in the sensuous world – *in opposition to theoretical reason!* For Hegel, the goal of reason is not ‘proper’ living in the world but escaping the seductions of sensuousness. This is accomplished, Hegel claims, by the individual recognizing that s/he is the ‘point to indifference’ beyond history, that is the Second Negation of Absolute Spirit.

Hegel’s ‘Absolute Knowledge’ claims to know the ultimate cause of all ‘that is’ to be a historically horizontal, non-personal, Absolute Spirit that creates not like Plato’s vertical, top-down ‘artisan’ who must first internally think an idea before externalizing it in matter. Rather, for Hegel, *history is the product of emanation out of Absolute Spirit* that occurs by means of a historical, logical, dialectical process of Double Negation.<sup>33</sup>

Hegel’s meta-narrative is an account of causal necessity based on the *petitio principii* of Absolute Oneness that, when combined with the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) and the logic of dialectic, is taken to be a causal account for the ‘creation’ (horizontally, not vertically) of all ‘that is’.<sup>34</sup>

Although a first impression might lead one to take his account of causal necessity to be justified by Kant’s Copernican Turn<sup>35</sup> to identify the conditions of possibility for

32. On Hegel’s understanding of theoretical and practical spirit, see his “Zusatz” („Addendum“) *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* GW X: 237. See as well, in “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten” Hegel’s portrayal of practical reason’s laws as analytical’ (GW II: 460) and governed by the ‚negative‘ of physical necessity rather than the ‚absolute freedom‘ of Absolute Spirit (GW II: 457–458, see as well, *ibid.*: 463, 466). See as well, Strauß, [Glaubenslehre] *Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft* (*Christian Doctrine in its Historical Development and in Conflict with Modern Science*) (1841) 2 Vols. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009) I: 17.

33. See Hegel’s „Einteilung“ of „II Teil. Die subjektive Logik“ in *Wissenschaft der Logik* II (1832) GW VI: 269–279.

34. On Kant’s rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of ‘what is,’ see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and in Chapter 6: 670.

35. Kant articulated in 1770 the ‘metaphysical principle’ that he later explicitly applied to Copernicus in the *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1781/1787 and is referred to as the Kantian ‘Copernican Turn.’ In his “Inaugural Dissertation: On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World” of 1770, Kant wrote: “§24 The method of all metaphysics [...] is reducible [...] to this all-important principle: *carefully prevent the principles proper to sensitive cognition* [sensible perception/*sinnliche Erkenntnis*] from passing their boundaries and affecting the knowledge of understanding [*Verstandeserkenntnisse* of theoretical reason] [for to ignore this ‘metaphysical principle’ is what Kant calls ‘subreption’]. Because the predicate in every judgment of understanding [*Urteil des Verstandes*, i.e., theoretical judgment] is the condition without which the subject is said to be inconceivable, and consequently the predicate is a principle of cognition, the predicate will, *in the case of a sensuous concept* [*sinnlicher Begriff*], *be only the condition of possible sensuous understanding* [*sinnliches Erkenntnis*] [...] However, if the predicate be applied to a concept of understanding [*Verstandsbegriff*], the judgment so constituted will be valid *only according to subjective laws*; it will not be predicable, nor capable of being objectively stated, of the intellectual notion itself. *It can be asserted only as a condition without which there is no sensitive*

experience, understanding, and responsible agency, that initial impression overlooks that Kant is not concerned with the necessity of infinite, eminent causality that *explains* 'what is' but with the necessity of those required elements of *finite* transcendental consciousness that make possible any limited experience, understanding, and responsible agency possible *in the world*. Included in those required necessary elements, especially, is the assumption (not a proof) of *finite*, creative, eminent causality. Hegel's

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*knowledge* [sensible perception/*sinnliche Erkenntnis*] of the given concept." (emphasis added) Kant, "Inaugural Dissertation" AA II: 411–412 NOTE: 1) Kant is not saying that the intellectual judgment can apply capriciously *a priori* to just any predicate that it wishes. The intellectual judgment of theoretical reason is one that is *necessary* or else there would be no experience or judgment regarding an object of cognition on the part of theoretical reason! This necessity, however, is not the necessity of ultimate cause, but the required elements needed for present, immediate experience and understanding. 2) As a 'subjective law' the intellectual judgment cannot be stated objectively. It is, however, a judgment that is *necessary*, again, not as ultimate causality but, rather, as the immediate conditions for us to have the sense experience and understanding that we have.

Kant, in the next §25, gives the example of space and time. Objectively, we do not experience space and time themselves. We experience things 'in space' and events 'in time,' but space and time themselves are not immediately given in perception: "Here now is such a principle for the examination of every sentence resulting from such confusion [of subreption]: *if there be universally predicated of any concept of understanding [Verstandsbegriff] anything belonging to the relations of space and time, it must not be enunciated as objective: it [the universal predication of space and time] denotes only the conditions without which [!] the given concept is not perceptibly knowable.*" Kant, "Inaugural Dissertation" AA II: 412.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant expands further: "We should then be proceeding [with our theoretical reason] precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis. Absent satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics [theoretical reason], as regards the *perception* [*sinnliche Anschauung*] of objects. If perception [*sinnliche Anschauung*] must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter *a priori*; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of perception [*intellektuelle Anschauung*], I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility [of conceiving something *a priori*]." *Critique of Pure Reason* B xvi-xvii

"[...] [E]xperience is itself a species of knowledge [of theoretical reason] which involves understanding; and *understanding has rules which I must presuppose* as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as being *a priori*. They find expression in *a priori concepts to which all objects of experience necessarily conform*, and with which they must agree. As regards objects which are thought solely through reason, and indeed as necessary, but which can never – at least not in the manner in which reason thinks them – be given in experience, the attempts at thinking them (for they must admit of being thought) will furnish an excellent touchstone of what we are adopting as our new method of thought, namely, that we can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves put into them." (emphasis added) *Critique of Pure Reason* B xvii-xviii. However, Kant points out that 'metaphysical principles' are *apodictic* because without them there can be no experience, understanding, or responsible agency. This is not because the 'metaphysical principles' necessarily *cause* experience, understanding, or responsible agency. They are merely the conditions required for there to be finite, experience, understanding, and responsible agency.

Importantly, *a priori* elements are not merely *hypotheses*: "See *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxii<sup>a</sup>. Furthermore, *a priori* hypotheticals are not *capricious constructions*. In fact, they constitute a coherent architectonic of all such *a priori* apodictic (lawful) elements. See *Ibid.*: B xxiii.

*Absolute Knowledge of infinite, eminent, causal necessity places him squarely in the metaphysical tradition of Aristotle<sup>36</sup> and leaves him clueless about Kant's Copernican*

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In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant proposes the metaphysical principle of the Copernican Turn as a third alternative to verification and falsification as well as extends its application to practical reason: "If someone cannot prove that a thing is, he may try to prove that it is not. If he does not succeed with either (a case which often occurs), he may still ask whether he is interested in assuming the one or the other (by a hypothesis), either from a theoretical or from a practical point of view, that is, either merely to explain a certain phenomenon (as, e.g., for the astronomer, that of the retrograde motion and standstill of the planets). An assumption is adopted from a practical point of view in order to achieve a certain end, which may be either a pragmatic (merely technical end) or a moral end, that is, an end such that the maxim of adopting it is itself a duty [...] What is incumbent upon us as a duty is [...] to act in conformity with the idea of that end, even if there is not the slightest theoretical likelihood that it can be realized, as long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated either." (emphasis added) *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 354. Like the universal hypotheses/apodicitic certainties of theoretical reason, the *hypotheses/lawfulness* of practical reason (morality) are not capricious constructions by the individual but constitute a coherent architectonic of universal principles that are *necessary* for the responsible functioning of autonomous freedom.

36. Hegel's metaphysics is a logical canon without an organon of practical principles, which alone govern what 'ought to be'. In his *Logic* AA IX: 12–14, Kant already anticipated the vacuity of Hegel's logical necessity when he refers to logic as a canon (rules) without an organon (the five senses and, in addition to the *a priori* elements of theoretical reason, the moral principles of practical reason). See, especially, Kant, *Menschenkunde*: AA XXV,2: 905–907; Olms ed.: 60–62

A 'canon' is a set of rules that requires no causal agency. An 'organon' is an organ of sense with a set of rules that requires causal agency, which extends understanding, not merely guides it. On the basis of this distinction, Kant distinguishes between 'logic' and 'mathematics'. "By an organon we understand an instruction as to how a certain knowledge is to be brought about. However, this implies that I already know the object of the knowledge to be produced according to certain rules. An organon of the sciences is therefore not merely logic because it presupposes a precise knowledge of the sciences objects and sources. Mathematics, for example, is an excellent example of the need for an organon, as a science that contains the ground of the extension of our knowledge with regard to a certain use of reason, which we possess only because we experience physical sensations. Logic, on the other hand, as a general propaedeutic of all uses of understanding and reason in general, does not anticipate scientific conclusions but is only a general art of reason (canonica epicuri), of understanding in general." (emphasis added) *Logic* AA IX: 13. In his *Menschenkunde*, Kant distinguishes between mathematics and philosophy: „If mathematics and philosophy are eminently suited to the attainment of the ends of reason, they are nevertheless so heterogeneous that one cannot be completed by the other. The philosopher recognizes everything by concepts, the mathematician by the representation of the concepts in perception. The latter cannot establish the matter from concepts, as the former can, but must present the concept in perception. The philosopher cannot represent his concepts in the perceptible world; and because he lacks this means, the mathematician, when he begins to philosophize, cannot move from the spot, and the most astute mathematician makes mistakes in philosophizing that would not be forgiven in mathematics. The mathematician is aided by the juggling of figures, and so he differs from philosophers, even if they agree that both are engaged in the exercise of reason. The philosopher requires more wit and attention when he comes to the speculative; the mathematician can project his notions by figures, but the philosopher must keep his notions floating before him, and thus all his reflections become much deeper and more tedious. *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1053–1054; Olms ed. 231

Hegel insists that ideas/content (*Inhalt*) without representations (*Form*) are merely empty abstractions. However, Hegel overlooks Kant's observation that logic is merely a 'canon,' not an 'organon'. Not only is the role of representations for Hegel merely a logical 'point of indifference' that overcomes sensuality to embrace Absolute Spirit, Absolute Oneness, and Absolute Knowledge, but also Hegel claims that

Turn. Succinctly, Hegel's notion of 'necessity' is an ultimate, causal determination of 'what is' whereas Kant's notion of 'necessity' is a finite, set of limited epistemological conditions for 'free' (in the sense of non-determined) responsible agency in *the world*.

According to Hegel's meta-narrative, Absolute Oneness negates itself (the First Negation) into multiplicity, which initiates a sequence of subsequent dialectical negations (a 'this' distinct from a 'that' which leads, *a posteriori*, to a new synthesis) that first produces the spiritual realm of the 'divisible-I' and, eventually, material realm of the 'divisible non-I'.<sup>37</sup> After eons, the dialectical process has generated the material conditions for the emergence of finite consciousness that eventually leads to what Hegel calls the 'Christ event' or the 'point of indifference':<sup>38</sup> the negation of multiplicity (the Second Negation) as the *influx* back to Absolute Unity. This is a negation that for Hegel occurs beyond, not in, history because it overcomes all history<sup>39</sup> as the Good Friday that brings spiritual divinization to finitude.<sup>40</sup> In short Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation is a classic, but now 'horizontal,' not 'vertical,' Gnostic account of emanation and influx.

Hegel's epistemology claims that knowledge is a mental grasping of an objective 'idea' or 'true content' (*Inhalt*) of the individual's subjective, 'actual representations' (*Form*) of perception.<sup>41</sup> The ultimate cause of all 'actual' representations is their 'true' content because ideas precede representations in the dialectical process of the First Negation that produces the representations. Hegel claims that when there is a 'content' (*Inhalt*) without actual representations (*Form*), the idea is an 'empty abstraction,'<sup>42</sup> not

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*the logic of Double Negation is the causal explanation* of 'all that is'. On Hegel's 'point of indifference,' see Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" (1802) GW II: 456. Therefore, anticipating Hegel, Kant dismisses those metaphysicians who are like a flying dove dreaming that it would be easier to fly in a vacuum where speculative philosophy leaves behind all particularities (representations) to claim to grasp Absolute Truth/Absolute Spirit. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See as well, *Groundwork* AA IV: 462–463.

37. On Hegel's non-divisible-I, divisible-I, and divisible non-I, see: 160.

38. Hegel calls this event in finite consciousness the 'point of indifference.' On 'the point of indifference' as both a turn to non-difference and affectless equanimity, see Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456, 465–7, 484, 487–8, 496–97, 499–500.

39. On Hegel's post-resurrection Christology see: 152, n. 156.

40. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 432–433.

41. The alternative to Hegel's Absolute epistemology is Kant's system of *a priori* synthetic judgment within the limits of finite, transcendental consciousness.

42. Hegel could well have his notion of an 'empty abstraction' from Kant's aphorism in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 75 that 'thoughts without content are empty.' On the notion of 'empty abstraction' and Kant's aphorism in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 75, see: 158.

The Hegelian (and F.C. Baur's) charge that Kant's philosophy, generally, is a system of 'empty abstractions,' by its failure to grasp the metaphysical unity of Absolute Spirit, has as its corollary that concepts and moral norms are subjectively, relative constructions. Given that Hegel views Kant as limited to what Plato calls 'understanding' in his Simile of the Line in the *Republic* 509c ff., Kant's epistemology *must be* subjective construction because it ignores what Plato calls 'reason'. Furthermore, Hegel describes Kant's moral theory as subjectively 'constructivist' precisely in this manner in the "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" (1803). See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW

objective knowledge. In other words, empty abstractions are ideas that do not occur in actual representations. However, the representations themselves can be ‘false’ but, nonetheless, convey their ‘true’ content because the idea is the same both as ‘true content’ and as the imperceptible in ‘actual representation’: <sup>43</sup> “[...]in spite of the fact that the ideal (Ideelle) [content] and the actual (Reelle) [form] are identical in practical reason [as concrete experience in the world], the actual (Reelle) nevertheless remains absolutely opposed [to the ideal].” <sup>44</sup> Hegel’s account of ‘truth,’ then, is an imperceptible, causal emanation of nature, the world, and finite consciousness as the product of a meta-narrative driven by a dialectical logic of Double Negation whose aim is Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Freedom, and Absolute Spirit. <sup>45</sup>

Furthermore, in “The Moral View of the World” of the *Phenomenology*, <sup>46</sup> Hegel, like Aristotle, takes ethics (the application of moral principles) to be consequentialist. In conformity with his epistemology of ‘idea’ and perceptible ‘representations,’ he distinguishes between ‘moral duty’ (abstract principles) and ‘ethics’ (the concrete achievement of sovereignty over sensuousness). However, moral duty is an ‘empty abstraction’ because finite consciousness is incapable of attaining the goal of perfect sovereignty over the sensuous world demanded by moral duty. <sup>47</sup> Finite consciousness

II: 459–461. However, in his *Phenomenology* (1807), he gives an account of morality in “The Moral View of the World” that is based on a heteronomous, divinely imposed *moral duty*. Given the limits placed on humanity by ‘nature’s freedom’, humanity is incapable of ethical fulfilment of its moral duty. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442 ff. (Baillie trans: 615 ff.). Strauß consistently reads Kant’s notion of heteronomous, ‘moral duty’ through Hegel’s narrative of „The Moral View of the World” although in the *LJ* as I point out momentarily, he describes Kant’s moral principles as ‘derived from the self’ and ‘the cultivation of an epoch’. In his post-*LJ* writings, Strauß stresses humanity’s inability to live up to ‘moral duty’ just as Hegel describes in “The Moral View of the World.” Moral principles, though, cannot be both a matter of subjective ‘construction’ and heteronomously, externally imposed ‘moral duty’.

43. See Hegel, „Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten“ GW II: 511.

44. Hegel, „Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten“ GW II: 456.

45. In his Göschel review, Hegel calls this the ‘supernatural’ (*übernatürliche*). See Hegel, “Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis” GW XI: 383–384.

46. See Hegel, “The Moral View of the World” in the *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442–452 (Baillie trans.: 615–627). For a summary of Hegel’s “The Moral View of the World,” see Vol. II “Introduction:” “Hegel on ‘I should, but I can’t’ in Contrast to Kant’s ‘If I should, I can:’” 550 ff. and Chapter 7: “Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason” the section “Hegel’s Account of ‘The Moral View of the World’ is not Kant’s Morality:” 727 ff.

47. See Hegel, „Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten“ GW II: 481, 507–8. See as well, „The Moral View of the World“ in the *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442–452. The logic of ‘empty abstraction’ and the unachievability of moral perfection is Ferdinand Christian Baur’s logic for dismissing Kant’s moral theory as ‘empty ideas’ and ‘subjective’. See Baur’s *The Christian Doctrine of Atonement*: 581–582. Baur’s criticism of Kant, however, is based on the assumptions 1) that God and Christ are objective *causes* of any and all atonement with God (*Versöhnung*) rather than *a priori* synthetic judgments; 2) that reconciliation with God is grounded in the objective actions by God (either of ‘paying a ransom’ to the devil [e.g., Matthew 20:28] or the ‘substitution’ of the perfect God/Man to pay the debt owed to God for past sins [Colossians 2:14 and Anselm’s *Cur deus homo*])); 3) that turns Kant’s moral theory of

is a moral failure. However, although ‘sin’ is the problem for Traditional Personal Theism, it is not the ‘true’ ‘problem’ for Hegel. For him, the overcoming of moral failure does not require grace granted by a Personal God. It requires attainment of Absolute Knowledge. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Hegel rejects the role of ‘grace’ from a Personal God as formulated in “The Moral View of the World.” His replacement for ‘grace’ is the ‘cunning of reason’<sup>48</sup> that silently works in the background to bring about the ‘point of indifference’ of the Second Negation that nullifies sensuousness. In other words, for Hegel morality is an “I should, but I can’t” that doesn’t ultimately matter. *Just as the suffering and pain of history is only a meaningless, logical ‘place holder’ that the ‘Idea’ that claims to insure that Absolute Spirit is not ‘empty,’ so too, the ethical failures of humanity are ultimately meaningless because they are only a logical ‘place holder’ for reason achieve Absolute Knowledge.*

The formative element of Strauß’ initial intellectual training was Hegel. He encountered Hegel in Mattias Schneckenburger’s classroom in Tübingen, but for four semesters he met twice a week with fellow students (Binder, Märklin, Gauß, and Seeger), first to read Kant but mostly to read Hegel. Strauß’ biographer, Theobald Ziegler, reports that Strauß was the leader of the group and the real interpreter. Their encounter with Kant was limited to his *Prolegomena* whereas their study of Hegel focused on the *Phenomenology*.<sup>49</sup> Prior to his writing of the *LJ* in 1835, though, Strauß read Ferdinand Christian Baur’s *Christian Gnosis or the Historical Development of Christian Philosophy of Religion* (*Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*), which included an extensive and detailed examination of Hegel and Schleiermacher, the two figures who had the most influence on Strauß, along with Baur’s own quasi-Hegelian, historically anchored Christology as the development of the Church as the ‘body of Christ’ in the world.

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internal, moral sentiment (*Gesinnung*) into a ‘consequentialist’ theory of external, objective, quantified moral achievement/failure (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: discussion of past ‘sins’ 567 and discussion of the logic of Anselm’s *Cur deus homo*: 568–569;4) that the heart of Kant’s Theory of Atonement is the notion of ‘worthiness’ that refers to a proportioning of morality and happiness (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 567, 569); 5) that Kant ignored the moral past (the ‘debt’ owed to God by sinful humanity as a totality) and only focused on future, moral effort which can only attain an ever closer, yet always imperfect, approximation of moral perfection (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 567); all of which results 6) in Baur’s dismissal of Kant as a defender of ‘empty abstractions’ (the inability of actual attainment of moral perfection) and radically ‘subjective’ (all moral achievement is based solely on the individual’s revolution of moral sentiment to embrace the internal moral law and achieve ‘worthiness’ before God solely by individual effort) (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 581–582).

48. See Hegel, „Introduction“ to *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*): GW XII: 49 (Sibree trans.: 34). See Strauß’ reading of the ‘cunning of reason’ in the “Preface:” 89, n. 35 as well as the discussion of the notion in Chapter 1: “Methodology:” 168, n. 210 and Chapter 5: “Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:” 608, n. 182.

49. See Ziegler, I: 51.

As a lecturer himself in Tübingen, Strauß' first clash with the faculty was over the popularity of his lectures on Hegel, which drew large numbers of students and enflamed the jealousy of, particularly, the Philosophy Faculty.<sup>50</sup> Ziegler reports that the issue of the 'mediation between the speculative, 'real' content [*Inhalt*] that is the 'Idea'/Concept and the historical representation [*Form*] from Hegel's *Phenomenology* is what Strauß in the 1830s „placed at the center of his thought [...]: *what religion has in the form of representation philosophy has in the form of the Concept.*“<sup>51</sup> (emphasis added) However, Strauß' reaction to the pushback from the faculty in Tübingen over the popularity of his courses on Hegel was to stop teaching Hegel in order to concentrate on the writing of the *LJ*.

Above all, though, it is clear in the *LJ* that Strauß thoroughly embraced Hegel's criticism of Kant's philosophy as 'non-scientific' because of its failure to make objective, Absolute Spirit the only *a priori* synthetic judgment as ultimate cause of all of reality. Rather, Strauß under the additional influence of F. C. Baur,<sup>52</sup> took Kant to be a mere 'subjectivist' who spurned Absolute Reason to attend exclusively to the finite, subjective understanding in the world.<sup>53</sup> Hegel called this the 'weakness' and 'barbarism' of Kant's understanding of reason.<sup>54</sup> In addition and equally erroneously, Strauß took Kant, not Martin Luther, to be the paradigmatic representative of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology* although Hegel elsewhere described Kant's 'practical' reason (morality) as a form of 'analytical' constructivism, not as 'empty abstraction'.<sup>55</sup> Strauß insisted, obviously without having carefully studied Kant and by limiting his reading of Hegel up to that point to the *Phenomenology*, that Kant not only took morality to be the struggle to overcome sensuousness, but also to constitute a confirmation of the 'empty abstraction' of Kant's philosophy because humanity is incapable of fulfilling the expectations of moral duty in the sensuous world as Hegel had described in "The Moral View of the World" of the *Phenomenology*. According to Strauß, morality (including Kant's) consists of 'I should, but I can't.' This shaped his understanding of 'moral improvement' in his later writings as an issue of the human species rather than an achievement of the individual.

Within two years of the publication of the *LJ*, though, Strauß was only left with a sour taste: First, over the failure of even the Left-Wing Hegelians to accept his

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50. See Ziegler, I: 119.

51. Ziegler, I: 131.

52. On 'empty abstraction' and Baur's reading of Kant as 'subjectivist', see footnote 47 above.

53. I map Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation on top of a 'reclined' version of Plato's Similes of the Sun and Line from Book VI of the *Republic* in Chapter 8: "Strauß' Kant Reading Across His Career" in the section "Hegel's Reclined PlatoHegel, G.W.F.A reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'" 811 ff. and in Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment" in the section "Hegel on Beauty:" 868 ff.

54. See Hegel, „Glauben und Wissen“ GW II: 287–288.

55. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 460, 463, 466. See as well Hegel's statement on Kant's 'origin' of categories in subjectivity, which makes them merely 'empty abstractions' in Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment:" 866, n. 4.

*inclusive* Christology as Hegelian; second, over the ‘obvious’ historical indifference of the Hegelian meta-narrative of Double Negation that only viewed the particularities of history to be an in-itself meaningless ‘place holder’ required for ‘grounding’ the ‘reality’ of Absolute Spirit in ‘actual’ representations only in order to assure that Absolute Spirit Itself was no merely ‘empty abstraction.’ Rather than reject ‘history’ in the gospels, Strauß couldn’t accept that the historical ‘falsehood’ of representations (e.g., the gospel events) had no influence on the ‘truth’ of Christianity.

However, already before the publication of the *LJ*, Strauß had articulated his intent to write a history of Church Doctrine with the same aim as the *LJ*: to ‘restore’ with Hegelian philosophy what a ‘critical’ history of Church Doctrine had destroyed.<sup>56</sup> By the time he undertook that project in 1841, though, his Hegelianism had disintegrated with the exception of his retaining of “The Moral View of the World.” His aim was not to restore the ‘truth’ of Christian doctrine but solely: to demonstrate that the ‘critical’ analysis of the history of Church Doctrine demonstrates its inconsistencies and internal collapse without any need to appeal to ‘external philosophy’ Hegelian or otherwise.

By the time of writing of his *Glaubenslehre* (1841), though, Feuerbach’s criticism of the use of anthropomorphic analogies whatsoever in religion (and chiefly, analogies based on ‘reason’) had shattered Strauß’ efforts at the restauration of Christian doctrine both within the framework of Hegelianism and with his version of ‘harmonious, eternal’ reason articulated in “On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity.”

Strauß’ failure to find a philosophical framework for his theological understanding clearly contributed to his twenty-year theological silence after the publication of the *Glaubenslehre*. Yet, the issue was not that there was no history in the gospels, having established the mythic elements of the text in the *LJ*. Rather, without an alternative to the Idealist epistemology of ‘true’ content and, ultimately, irrelevant ‘actual’ representations, which reduced factual history to irrelevance, and no longer embracing the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit’s Double Negation, he had no way to ensure the grounding of religious claims in ‘factual’ data.

Although his ‘return’ to theology is announced by his work on Reimarus in 1862,<sup>57</sup> his *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* of 1864 articulates what he sees as the internal collapse of theology based on the scriptures, but he does not articulate a constructive, theological/philosophical option until 1872 with the materialism of *The Old and the New Faith*. Here in 1862, he explicitly rejects the Hegelian ‘Spirit’ theology of the 19<sup>th</sup> C that took itself to be superior to Second Testament theology. Strauß writes:

56. See Strauß, “Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel’schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik,” *Streitschriften* III: 58–59.

57. See the discussion of Strauß’ *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 55, n. 58; in this project’s sections “1864: *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*” 617–627; “On Kant’s ‘Pure’ Religion” 968, n. 158; and “Appendix II: Annotated ‘First’ Testament Concordance” 985, n. 1; and 968, n. 158.

We in the nineteenth century take a different view of this point [on the relationship between revealed and natural religion]; [speaking ironically Strauß writes] from our side it would be the last reproach we would make to the Old Testament that it lacked the doctrine of immortality. It is true that, because the New Testament contains this doctrine, we take the New Testament to be superior [over the Old Testament] because we know that the path from the external to the internal, from the sensual to the spiritual, passes through the beyond. Man first necessarily becomes aware of the *Spirit as the power over matter in the form that his soul continues after the dissolution of the body*; of the mind as that which determines the value and destiny of man independently of the course of the world only in such a way that he promises himself a reward in the hereafter.<sup>58</sup>

Strauß proceeds to clearly and strongly distance himself from this 19<sup>th</sup> C 'Spirit' theology:

The Old Testament is just as far behind this [19<sup>th</sup> C] point of view on the New Testament as we are beyond it: we know that *one only begins to think about all questions concerning human destiny and human skill when one has renounced the fantasy of a continuation after death; that morality only stands on solid ground when it no longer needs a future retribution because it finds its reward in itself*. And [sic.] we see with satisfaction how even a man of so high a spirit and so noble a disposition as Reimarus falls into the inevitable fate of all those who seek to prove immortality from the standpoint of a future retribution: namely, to contradict themselves and to speak vulgarities. The tenth of his treatises on the noblest truths of natural religion, so far as it is devoted to this point of view, is in direct contrast with the ninth, in which he refutes the doubts against divine providence, and had resolved with much subtlety all those alleged contradictions between worthiness and happiness in this life, from which he now seeks to extract proofs of retribution in another. However, when Reimarus even says in the *Schutzschrift* that without a future life animals would be happier than man; when he exclaims: "If we are born only for this life, what good is the knowledge of the highest being, from whose perfections we are completely cut off? What good are the moral precepts which restrain our sensual pleasures, and yet are not connected with any certain but long-lasting reward? What the foresight of an inevitable death, the mere idea of which makes our whole life bitter?" – With such commonplaces and vulgarities, Reimarus sinks even deeper below himself than the apostle Paul in the well-known passage 1 Cor. 15, 19 ["If our hope in Christ has been for this life only, we are the most unfortunate of all people"]. 32 ["If my motives were only human ones, what good would it do me to fight the wild animals at Ephesus?"].

Incidentally, Reimarus is completely right here in his opposition to church doctrine. If [...] the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is such an important part of revealed religion, such a powerful motivation for piety, then it is not clear why God, given that it is so easy to understand once it is made known, should have waited so long to make it known and should have left so many thousands of sincere and pious people without this support from Christ.<sup>59</sup>

With his 1864 *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, he maintained his conviction expressed in "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity" of 1838 that

58. David Friedrich Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 333.

59. Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 333–334.

the gospels provide enough factual, historical evidence regarding Jesus of Nazareth to draw conclusions about elements of his moral teaching sufficient to place Jesus among the 'religious geniuses' of history. However, the historical evidence was not sufficient to carry the claims of a biography or Christology as maintained by Traditional Christian Theology and Hegelianism. On the basis of the historical record, one could speak of a 'religion of humanity' but no longer of a 'religion of Jesus' person.

At the beginning of the 1860s, his friends called for a 'Return to Kant,' and this 'return' provided Strauß with a new philosophical, yet religious, framework for his increasingly 'materialistic' worldview. Not only is all of the Hegelian terminology completely absent here, but also bracketed out is his dismissal of Kant as a 'subjectivist' that profiled his understanding of Kant in the first *LJ*. However, now, Jesus is not so much the 'religious genius' of internal 'rational harmony' and moral teacher unsurpassable by others, but he is a moral teacher who represents the highest achievement of moral understanding of *his age*! Notably, in a non-Kantian fashion and without explicit reference to Hegel's „Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten,“ Strauß understands morality in terms of socially constructed, 'hypothetical' imperatives<sup>60</sup> manifest by external, ethical achievement (not internal moral mindset [*Gesinnung*] of commitment to 'wide,' universal moral principles<sup>61</sup>). Socially constructed norms constitute the ethical values of a community demanded by the circumstances of its historical situatedness. Hence, although Jesus reached a pinnacle of moral understanding for *his age*, he could not have anticipated the occurrence of the industrial revolution. Even his political awareness, not to speak of the absence of a personal family life, left great room for subsequent 'improvement' of his ethical teaching.<sup>62</sup>

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60. Hegel writes in his "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" GW II: 460 [...] [W]hat Kant recognizes very well [...] is that practical reason lacks all the material of law, and that it can do nothing more than make its supreme law a maxim of arbitrariness in the form [representation] of appropriateness [*Tauglichkeit*]. A maxim of arbitrariness has a content [Inhalt] of abstraction, and includes a determinateness in itself; pure will, on the other hand, is free of the determinations of particularities."

61. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant provides three criteria for discernment of a categorical imperative: 1) The maxim upon which one chooses to act ought to be 'universal' like a law of nature (AA IV: 421); 2) always treat oneself and the other as an 'end' and not mere 'means' (AA IV: 429); and 3) acknowledge every 'rational being' (transcendental consciousness) as a self-imposing agent of moral principles capable of acting consistently with the system of universal (moral) laws (AA IV: 434). In addition to these three criteria, *Kant distinguishes between narrow, 'hypothetical' imperatives demanded by particular, teleological tasks from 'wide, moral categorical imperatives in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals* AA IV: 414–421. In short, not all imperatives are 'categorical.' Already in his *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (1774–1775), Werner Stark and Manfred Kühn, eds. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004): 39, 55, 106–107, he stressed that it is not the measurable success or failure external action and the judgments of others (and especially God) that determine one's moral status, but internal conviction and commitment to the moral order that is required for the exercising of creative, autonomous freedom – regardless of self- or communal-interest.

62. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

In 1865, Strauß examines, once more, Schleiermacher's theology in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*. Much of what he says here he covered in the 1839 "Schleiermacher und Daub" manuscript, but a significant, new theme is the issue of *absolute, eminent* causality, a causality that has 'more reality than any and all finite effects.' Schleiermacher takes Christianity to be the promise of 'perfect God-consciousness' made possible for imperfect, finite consciousness by the Christ event as a new, absolutely eminent, causal act of creation by God. Schleiermacher's claim is based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*), which maintains that a cause must have as much 'reality' as its effect or else 'something could come from nothing.' Echoing Anselm of Canterbury's *Cur Deus homo* and Descartes' *Meditations*, Schleiermacher proposes that a 'perfect God-consciousness' cannot arise out of an imperfect God-consciousness because the difference between imperfection and perfection 'would have to come from nothing.' Given that humanity is without exception imperfect, Schleiermacher argues that God had to exercise His absolutely, eminent causality in a new act of creation at a particular point in historical time by 'sending His perfect Son' into creation. Logically, though, Strauß points out that, again, given that humanity is without exception imperfect and remains so, there is no basis but enthusiastic, wishful thinking for justifying a perfect cause of God-consciousness. An imperfect effect not only does not require a perfect cause<sup>63</sup> but also the delay in the introduction of the 'new perfect cause' until the Christ is extremely problematic for a perfect Creator.

Given Strauß' rejection of the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit and underappreciation of Kant's Copernican Turn, his commitment to the value of history led him to Feuerbachian 'materialism' in his final work, *The Old and the New Faith*. Although he readily acknowledges that there are huge gaps in grasping causal explanations generally and material causality in particular, he now proclaims his allegiance to hylozoism that all 'that is,' including life and consciousness, is the product of bottom-up, physical causality, exclusive of any other causality. Consciousness is nature 'turning inward on itself' in order to continue its advancement.<sup>64</sup> The empirical sciences are 'on the right track' and will surely fill in the gaps.<sup>65</sup> At the end of his career, Strauß was yet a 'religious seeker' who was as much, if not more, a product of his own age than a shaper of it. His 'new' faith was a new 'religion of nature.'

63. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History: A Critique of Schleiermacher's Life of Jesus* Leander Keck, trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977): 29–31. Strauß leaves it up to the reader to recognize that this is as much a criticism of Anselm's, Descartes', and Hegel's 'ontological arguments' so that here Strauß is flagging his 'materialism.'

64. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 145, 240, and 365. It is as if Strauß' materialism is as much a parody of Hegel's Spirit metaphysics as it is an embracing of the empirical sciences. Instead of finite consciousness constituting the location where Absolute Spirit 'returns' in awareness to Itself, finite consciousness is where nature 'turns inward' to continue its material advancement. See 627, n. 256.

65. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 216: „Let us remember here the Kantian: 'give me matter, I will show you how a world shall arise from it;' an enterprise of which he judged that it could be carried out on the inorganic mass world but must fail already on 'a caterpillar.' Today's science, not

I, particularly, examine Strauß' misreading of Kant in Strauß' defense of his own hylozoism argument.<sup>66</sup> Kant by no means dismisses the important work of explaining the origin of life and consciousness! The generating of causal explanations is a crucial task of finite, transcendental consciousness, undertaken by no other consciousness of which we are aware. However, Kant stresses 'finitude.' Causes are not given directly in perception. We can only perceive the effects of causes. Finite, transcendental consciousness has to *add to* the phenomena *a priori* synthetic elements not given in the phenomena in order to 'explain' them. What Kant rejects with respect to hylozoism is only that, given the limits to finite consciousness, whatever causal explanation proposed will not be able to avoid an element of 'top-down,' teleological causality.<sup>67</sup> To be sure, Kant acknowledges teleological causality only as a heuristic strategy for finite understanding, not as an argument for a Personal God!

Kant explicitly rejects all *literal*, anthropomorphic God-talk (e.g., teleology), which means that he brackets the notion of a Personal Deity. However, he recognizes that it is impossible to avoid *symbolic*, anthropomorphic God-talk. "God" as a Noumenal X is a required assumption for finite, transcendental consciousness to be able to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world, which our finite, transcendental capacities make possible but do not necessitate.<sup>68</sup> Such responsible agency, in addition to the Noumenal cause of the lawful order of nature and morality, requires acknowledgment that all experience is anchored in nature, whose 'explanation' always requires starting with the natural phenomena,<sup>69</sup> and depends upon the supporting role of a community that is committed to this imperceptible 'divine commonweal' of lawfulness (physical and moral). *The notion of 'required, but not necessitating, assumptions' that are demanded by the capacities (not the accomplishments) of finite, transcendental consciousness is a crucial indicator of Kant's novel philosophical project.*

Strauß' emphasis exclusively on bottom-up causality in *The Old and the New Faith* sharply profiles Strauß' understanding of 'knowledge' as causal explanation. True knowledge for Strauß consists in causal explanation of events, whether it be Hegel's causality of Absolute Spirit, Schleiermacher's perfect God-consciousness, or empirical science's 'natural' bottom-up causality. As the case with Hegel, Strauß also took the two pillars of knowledge to be the same as for Aristotle: seeking 'wisdom' as causal explanation and taking the 'good' to mean a consequentialist ethic.

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only including the caterpillar, but even man, has not yet accomplished it, but has found the sure way, on which it can accomplish it in the future."

66. 150 years after Strauß, there has still been no contradiction of Kant's claims with respect to the limits of hylozoism as a bottom-up, causal explanation of life.

67. See Kant's discussion of the antinomy of 'mechanical laws' in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 386–395.

68. Equally, though, when he comes to discussing nature, Kant employs – to speak of what 'nature wants'. See Kant, „Third Proposition“ in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* AA VIII: 19.

69. On the 'deduction' of concepts out of the experience of associations among appearances, see "On Imagination, the Law of association, and Reflecting Judgment" at: 86, n. 26.

Both pillars were profoundly placed in an entirely different intellectual framework by Kant. However, neither Hegel nor Strauß understood the Kantian framework as I demonstrate in Volume II.

A clear indicator of the difference between Kant and Hegel/Strauß is the notion of 'critique.' In Kant, it is not to be confused for the objective, analytical 'criticism' of diairesis ( $\deltaιαιρεσις$ )<sup>70</sup> that depends upon distinguishing between and among phenomena as with Hegel and Strauß. Kant already clearly understood that empirical analysis is incapable of establishing absolute truth for two reasons: 1) reason cannot grasp directly things (substances) as they are in-themselves, and 2) reason itself must contribute elements, which are not directly given with appearances, but which make it possible, for transcendental consciousness to arrive at adequate and appropriate judgments/understanding.

Philosophical 'critique,' according to Kant, involves a profound shift from knowledge consisting exclusively of perceptible, empirical data to knowledge of imperceptible capacities that make it possible to experience and to understand perceptible phenomena on the basis of which one can initiate, and take responsibility for, one's agency in the world. However, Kant explicitly rejected the notion of a subject-object dualism.<sup>71</sup> It is Fichte who speaks of the 'I' and the 'Not-I' as if they were ontologically distinct, not Kant. For Kant there is only one world, and it is a world experienced only as appearances that we understand and in which we act by means of finite, transcendental capacities. Reality is an architectonic, not a mere aggregate (see Section 3: "The Architectonic of Pure Reason" of "The Transcendental Method" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 860–879) either of things or an aggregate of two ontological dimensions next to one another. The same goes for theoretical and practical reason: No more are they dualistic than the inorganic and organic or the host of dyadic elements (river & its banks, light & darkness, protons & neutrons) of experience. These dyadic elements are not excluding contrasts but complementarities that are understood (bridged) by reflecting judgment that grasps relationalities. Knowledge cannot consist of absolute,

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70. On diairesis ( $\deltaιαιρεσις$ ), see Chapter 3: "Academic Controversy Based on Criticism." 219 ff.

71. Having bracketed 'top-down' explanations of experience and understanding from the perspective of God (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 862), Kant reminds us that "We [...] begin only at that point where the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and *throws out two stems*, [...] the rational and the empirical." (*Ibid.*, B 863) (emphasis added) In other words, *understanding can only begin where there is a deeper, common root of phenomena (rational and empirical) upon which it depends*, not on a dualism, in and of itself, between the rational and the empirical. See, as well, *Über eine Entdeckung nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll* (1790) AA VIII: 249–251 wherein Kant finds the claim that Leibniz defended a soul-body dualism ridiculous (lauter Unsinn). In the footnote of *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxxix\* Kant writes: "I am just as surely conscious that there are external things which refer to my senses as I am conscious that I myself unequivocally exist in time." See as well, the *Prolegomena* (AA IV: 293): "My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense) because it never occurred to me to doubt the existence of things, only the mere perceptible representation of things [...]" (McGaughey translation).

causal explanations because finite, transcendental consciousness has no direct access to causes. It is in this respect that Kant emphasizes that ‘critique’ is ‘subjective,’ “according to human understanding” (κατ’ ἄνθρωπον), not dogmatic, “according to absolute truth” (κατ’ ἀλήθειαν).<sup>72</sup>

*The world of perception is not merely a random aggregation of elements but ‘ordered.’* However, the order (for example, of ‘substances’ and ‘causes’) is never a matter of direct perception but only of indirect deduction stimulated by perception because we only can perceive the effects of imperceptible order. For finite, transcendental consciousness to comprehend the imperceptible causal order that governs imperceptible ‘substances,’ it must introduce elements, then, not directly given in perception. These elements that are *added to* the phenomena by finite, transcendental consciousness are *a priori* synthetic judgments.<sup>73</sup> Although finite, transcendental consciousness ‘legislates’ them (*ist gesetzgebend*),<sup>74</sup> the *a priori* synthetic elements that it adds to perception and ‘legislates’ to give itself moral permission to do what it does, are not subjectively *created* – any more than the individual *creates* the physical laws that order nature.<sup>75</sup>

Hegel misunderstood Kant’s account of *a priori* synthetic judgment in two crucial respects: 1) he takes ‘synthesis’ to mean dialectical synthesis, which seeks *something in common to a ‘thesis’ and a ‘synthesis’* based on the analytic of diairesis (διαιρέσις) – ‘synthesis’ can only be *a posteriori* for Hegel; and 2) he takes Kant’s account of *a priori* synthetic judgment to be a *causal explanation* of the origin of the ‘categories of the understanding’.<sup>76</sup>

However, for Kant, an *a priori* synthetic judgment is a supplementary not an elucidating analytic judgment.<sup>77</sup> Kant’s notion of synthesis, therefore, is not, as Hegel

72. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 767–768.

73. On Kant’s distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgment, see below, 60, n. 77.

74. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 195 ff.

75. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 185–186: “Judgment [...] prescribes a law, not to nature (as autonomy) but to itself (as heutonomy) for reflection on nature, which one could call the law of the specification of nature with regard to its empirical laws, which it does not cognize in nature *a priori* but rather assumes on behalf of an order of nature cognizable for our understanding [...].”

76. On Kant’s rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of ‘what is,’ see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and Chapter 6: 670.

77. On Kant’s distinction between *a priori* synthetic judgments that are ‘supplementary’ (*erweiternd*) to phenomena and *a posteriori* analytic judgments that are not concerned with merely making distinctions among ‘representations’ (*diairesis*) but elucidating [*erläutern*] that which is already contained in a judgment’s ‘subject’ (e.g., ‘all men are bachelors’), see Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (1783) AA XXIX: 968, 970. In order for there to be knowledge, Kant points out in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 104 (see B 194) that there, first, must be a manifold of perception; second, the synthesis (unity) of the manifold by means of the imagination; however, for knowledge, third, concepts must be applied to the first two, and “they rest on the understanding” (not on speculative metaphysics). In the third *Critique*, Kant accounts for how concepts are ‘added to’ perception and imagination by the heuristic strategy of reflecting judgment, not the grasp of innate metaphysical ideas.

erroneously claims, the elucidating, *a posteriori* synthesis of dialectic. Dialectic seeks something in common, the synthesis, that is (imperceptibly) shared by distinctly different elements, the thesis and antithesis. For Hegel, a synthesis' can only be an *a posteriori* judgment with one exception. That one exception is Absolute Spirit, which Hegel claims is a sole, *a priori*, dialectical synthesis. Hegel's sole, *a priori* synthetic judgment is the claim that everything originates from an Absolute Unity that negates Itself into multiplicity.<sup>78</sup> In other words, Hegel's single, *a priori* synthetic judgment is a *causal claim* (!) of *ultimate origin* for all 'that is;' not an epistemological claim with respect to the conditions required for theoretical reason and with respect to the conditions required for practical reason in the world.

Especially when it comes to the notion of 'synthesis,' Hegel is, unlike Kant, not concerned to illuminate how it is possible for a *finite*, transcendental consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world. Rather, Hegel's concern, again unlike Kant's, is with Absolute Knowledge that is the *causal explanation* for how there can be a *finite*, transcendental consciousness in a world. *A priori* synthesis for Kant is not a *causal explanation* of knowledge accounted for by dialectic. In short, Kant's understanding of 'synthesis' does not occur as the consequence of an analytical 'differentiation' by diairesis (διαιρέσις) between external phenomena to arrive at their common, synthetic unity.

Rather, *a priori* synthesis for Kant is, precisely, a *supplement* to phenomena. Without the *supplement* of *a priori* synthetic judgment, there can be no experience, understanding, or responsible agency. However, Kant's *a priori* synthetic judgment is *no causal explanation for the 'existence' of a world!* Critique for Kant means pursuing the Copernican Turn that identifies the *a priori* elements and capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness in order to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency *in the world*, not to escape from the world into Absolute Spirit.

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78. Hegel has one, single *a priori* synthetic judgment that is a dogmatic claim for the existence of Absolute Spirit as the objective, ultimate, causal source of all that is. Hegel claims that „[...] the Concept [...], without the variety of perception, is empty and without content, although *it is a priori a synthesis*. Because it is this, it has determination and difference in itself. As the determinateness of the Concept, absolute determinateness, the uniqueness, the Concept is *the basis and source of all finite determinateness and multiplicity*” (*Wissenschaft der Logik* II (1832) GW VI: 261; and Hegel claims that the I and the Concept (One) are an *a priori* unity: “That I am the One and that I am active as thinking, setting unity, is, however, not so precisely stated in Kant. That which thinking produces is unity; thus, it produces itself, for it is the One [the Concept]. (The unity can also be called relation; insofar as a manifold is presupposed and this remains on one side as manifold, it is called related). This is transcendental apperception; *the pure apperception of self-consciousness is the synthesizing function.*” *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 344. Hegel's ‚I' here is not the ‚I' of finite consciousness. It is Absolute Spirit. Absolute Spirit is the Absolute Unity of the ‚divisible I' that is mental ideality (*Idee*) over against perceptible phenomena'. Perceptible phenomena are the ‚unreasonable many' of the ‚divisible non-I' that is empirical actuality (*Realität*). See Hegel, “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten” GW II: 455–456.

The difference between Hegel and Kant could not be greater, and that difference is not because Kant is limited to a weak, barbarous, ‘subjective reason’ and Hegel is concerned with an ‘objective Absolute’ Truth as Hegel claimed already in “*Glauben und Wissen*” (1802) (“Faith and Knowledge or the Subjective Reflection’s Philosophy in its Most Complete Form as Kantian, Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy”/“*Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantisches, Jacobisches und Fichtesches Philosophie*”). Whereas Hegel does, Kant does not succumb to the hubris of Absolute Knowledge that claims that the sole, ultimate, objective truth that is Absolute Spirit generates a material world in order to experience Itself.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, as I present, the difference between them is not because Hegel’s reason is ‘strong’ whereas Kant’s is ‘weak.’ To the contrary, there is a strength to Kant’s ‘reason’ that can, literally, destroy the world.

Hegel illuminatingly formulates the differences between Kant and himself on the meaning of ‘synthesis’ as follows in the *Wissenschaft der Logik*. As a so-called ‘psychological idealist,’ Hegel maintains:

Kant has introduced [...] the most important thought that there are synthetic judgments *a priori*. This original synthesis of apperception<sup>80</sup> [McG: note the ‘singular’] is one of the deepest principles for speculative development; it contains the beginning of the true apprehension of the nature of the Concept and is completely opposed to that empty identity or abstract generality, which is no synthesis in itself.<sup>81</sup> – However, [... *Kant’s*]

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79. Hume had written a quarter century before Hegel that, given our “limited and imperfect experience,” we have never experienced matter being generated by “reason” [spirit]. See David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1982): 47.

80. Hegel’s understanding of the ‘synthesis of apperception’ is not Kant’s notion of apperception. According to Hegel, apperception is the synthetic unity of perception: “*the ‘I’ is the unity which connects the empirical substrate of representations. This unity of self-consciousness is the transcendental unity of apperception*; and the particular way in which this [empirical] substrate is connected in self-consciousness is a particular category [...] Kant says, these [categories] do not appear in perception [...] *The thinking mind is thus the source of the categories*, of the quite general determinations of thought [*Denkbestimmungen*]. In themselves these [categories] are empty, unrealized, and belong to thinking. [Categories] require a substrate in order that they may be realized. [According to Kant], [t]hey have a content [*Inhalt*] only through the given manifold substrate of perception; they are the relation, the bringing into unity of the manifold substrates, and have meaning only through their connection with these substrates. This realization comes to us from sensuality, from perception, from contemplation, from feeling, and so on.” Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 346. Hegel takes Kant’s ‘apperception’ to mean a dialectical synthesis of perceptible ‘apprehension’ (*apprehensio*). However, Kant distinguishes limited perception (*Anschauung*) *apprehension* from illimitable ‘apperception’ (*comprehensio aesthetica*), the sublime, to emphasize the extraordinariness of finite, transcendental consciousness as *comprehension aesthetica* of the sublime. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 251–252.

81. Hegel’s point here is his claim that ideas (and the Concept) are ‘merely empty’ without their ‘grounding’ in actual representations. Kant, of course, agrees. However, the conclusion from this point is exactly the opposite: For Hegel, the conclusion focuses on Absolute Spirit, not on phenomena *per se*. Phenomena arise only as a meaningless place holder for the ‘point of indifference.’ The indifference here is twofold. It is both 1) the non-difference of Absolute Unity and 2) the non-essentialness of

*further execution corresponds little to this beginning* [McG: that is Absolute Spirit]. Already the term *synthesis* easily suggests the idea of an external unity and mere connection among things that are separate in and of themselves [McG: = the *a posteriori* synthesis of dialectic]. Kant's philosophy stopped only at the psychological reflection of the concept and went back to the assertion of the permanent conditionality on the concept on the basis of a manifold of perception. It did not pronounce understanding and experience as an appearing content [McG: as *Inhalt* that is Absolute Spirit], given that the categories themselves are only finite, but for the purpose of a *psychological idealism*, because they [the categories] are only determinations that come from self-consciousness. It belongs here that *the Concept, again, without the variety of perception, is empty and without content, although it is a priori a synthesis. Because it is this, it has determination and difference in itself. As the determinateness of the concept, absolute determinateness, the uniqueness, the Concept is the basis and source of all finite determinateness and multiplicity* [McG: Absolute Cause].<sup>82</sup> (emphasis added)

The description of Kant's philosophy as '*psychological idealism*' and the categories as 'only determinations that come from self-consciousness' are expressions of Hegel's insistence that Kant's philosophy is 'merely subjective' and concerned with 'mere empty abstractions' of human construction. At a minimum, Hegel's description suggests that Kant's *a priori* synthetic judgments are a Nominalist creation of categories/ideas (Hegel doesn't distinguish between categories and ideas, although Kant does) because they consist of the subject's determination of a synthetic unity of external phenomena 'that are separate in and of themselves.' However, it is not infrequent that Hegel is read to be claiming that Kant is a 'solipsistic,' 'constructivist,' that is, the subject creates the categories/ideas/laws that it imposes upon phenomena.<sup>83</sup>

Kant's emphasis on the subjective capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness and rejection of absolute truth is a defense neither of Nominalism nor of Solipsism, and it is by no means an embracing either of merely 'empty abstractions or an inadequate defense of the 'weakness' of reason, as Hegel claimed.

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multiplicity. That is, Hegel is an Absolute Idealist who claims Absolute Knowledge. In contrast, for Kant the conclusion focuses on the experience of phenomena. There can be no finite, transcendental consciousness without a world. That is, Kant is a Critical Idealist who only claims to know the conditions of possibility for finite experience and understanding – as beneficial and dangerous as it is. It is beneficial because it is the only place in the order of nature that is open-ended (that is, not blindly driven by mechanical causality), and it is dangerous because its causal agency of autonomous freedom can destroy nature. Succinctly, Hegel is calling finite consciousness out of the world. Kant is anchoring finite consciousness in the world in possession of finite capacities alone for which it can hold itself responsible.

82. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* II (1832) GW VI: 260–261.

83. To the extent that Hegel insists that Kant claimed the subjective 'construction' of ideas and laws that it imposes upon nature and moral agency (see Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 322–323 and *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 346), for whom identity, "[...] which is true and exclusive reason applies [...] not to 'reason' [in the Hegelian sense of Absolute Reason] but only to reflecting judgment," Hegel is claiming that Kant is a solipsist who has chosen to ignore the 'objective' truths of Absolute Reason, Absolute Freedom, and Absolute Spirit 'beyond' which are the 'ultimate cause' of reality.

A Nominalist claims that the individual grasps the imperceptible ‘thing-in-itself’ as its ‘idea’ by means of an intelligible abstraction stimulated by sensible perception. However, to claim that Kant is a Nominalist would be to ignore his rejection of objective ‘subreption’ that he asserts in his earliest writings and retains consistently across his corpus. In 1770 he defined subreption as:

[...] the tricks (*praestigiae*) of the intellect in decking out sensitive concepts [perceptual representations] as intellectual [...], the interchange of the intellectual and the sensitive, will be the metaphysical fallacy of subreption (the fallacy of intellectualizing the phenomena [...]). An axiom thus hybrid [...] in that it proffers what is sensitive as being necessarily bound up with an intellectual concept I call a subreptive axiom.<sup>84</sup>

Equally, the suggestion that Kant’s categories of the understanding constitute a solipsistic ‘construction’ imposed upon nature/the world ignores his explicit rejection of such a claim.<sup>85</sup>

With respect to Hegel’s assertion that for Kant reason is ‘weak’: <sup>86</sup> Hegel does so without anywhere, to my knowledge, engaging Kant’s notion of freedom as autonomy. The same, unfortunately, must be said of Strauß and the other anti-Kantians addressed in this study.

Kant pointed out already in 1775 that not only is transcendental consciousness the one location in the natural order that is open-ended and not exclusively governed by blind, physical causality,<sup>87</sup> but also Kant emphasized in 1775 that autonomous freedom, in principle, possesses the power to destroy nature itself.<sup>88</sup> This is because autonomous freedom is a finite, eminent causality that is capable of initiating se-

84. Kant, “On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (Inaugural Dissertation).” AA II: 412 in *Kant’s Latin Writings: Translations, Commentaries, and Notes*. Lewis White Beck ed. New York: Peter Lang, 1986): 179.). Kant expands AA II: 412–413: “The principle [...] of any subreptive axiom is this: if there be universally predicated of any intellectual concept anything belonging to the relations of space and time, it must not be enunciated as objective: it denotes only the conditions without which the given concept is not sensitively knowable [...] [T]he subject of the judgment, being intellectually conceived, pertains to the object, whereas the predicate containing determinations of space and time pertains only to the conditions of human sensitive knowledge.” (Trans. John Handyside, revised by Lewis White Beck). See as well, the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 257; see also the *Critique of Pure Reason* A 389, A 402; B 53, B 537, B 647 and *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 771. However, note what Kant says in the *Prolegomena* AA IV: 293: “My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense) because *it never occurred to me to doubt the existence of things, only the mere perceptible representation of things [...]*” (emphasis added).

85. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 185–186 quoted above in footnote 75.

86. For Hegel’s claim that Kant’s understanding is that reason is ‘weak’ and ‘barbarous’ see Hegel, „Glauben und Wissen.” GW II: 287–288.

87. Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*: 176 ff.

88. Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*: 177.

quences of events that nature, left on its own, could never accomplish.<sup>89</sup> This is an *autonomous freedom* because it is the only causality that can give itself permission to act by ascribing a law to itself (literally, αὐτόνομος/autonomos means ‘to give oneself the law’). No one else can either think for another or give one permission to do what the individual must grant solely by her-/himself.<sup>90</sup> Succinctly, autonomy, for Kant, clearly does not mean simply independence from one’s tradition or social institutions.

Hegel and Strauß, in agreement with Aristotle, take knowledge to consist of ultimate, causal explanation. Respectively, Hegel and Strauß are reductionists. For Hegel, the ultimate cause of all ‘that is’ is Absolute Spirit, and historical phenomena are merely an indifferent place holder of finitude in order that Absolute Spirit not be ‘merely and empty abstraction.’ Although he was a convinced Hegelian at the beginning of his career, by 1872 and *The Old and the New Faith* Strauß takes the ultimate cause of all ‘that is’ to be ‘matter’ not Spirit.

However, for Kant, given that humanity has no access to ultimate causal explanations, to claim to possess them is like a dove dreaming that it can fly in a vacuum.<sup>91</sup> The limits to reason are the key to its illimitable strength.

In other words, according to Kant, the ‘pure’ ideas of reason are neither subjectively nor socially constructed, nor mere ‘empty abstractions’ independent of, and incapable of manifestation in phenomena.<sup>92</sup> They arise in consciousness only because they are required by the experience of phenomena in order for finite consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise agency in phenomena, as it does. The notion that they are somehow independent of sensuousness turns thought into the wishful thinking of the dove. Nonetheless, not only are even ‘pure’ ideas not empty abstractions, but they also inappropriately taken to be causal explanations. Causes are understood only through their effects because they can never be directly experienced in phenomena. Causal explanations, therefore, are *a priori* synthetic judgments (not subjective creations) supplementing the perception of phenomena because we only experience the effects of causality, not causes themselves, directly.

As prophetic as Strauß is with respect to the emerging predominance of the materialist worldview in *The Old and the New Faith*, he himself never entered the promised land but could only assure that it was yet to come. However, it is a misleading promise.

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89. Furthermore, in Hegel’s presentation of Kant’s aesthetics in his *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* and *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, he completely ignores Kant’s distinction between the ‚mathematical’ and the ‚dynamical’ sublime, which indicate the profound ‘strength’ of reason. See Chapter 9, “Missing Aesthetic Judgment:” “Hegel on the Sublime” 870 ff.

90. This is precisely what Kant means by ‘enlightenment’: “Have the courage to use your own mind!” Kant, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* AA VIII: 35. Hegel ridiculed Kant’s understanding of ‘enlightenment’ for its ‘vain posturing’ by elevating finite understanding above Absolute Reason. See Hegel, “Glauben und Wissen:” GW II: 288–289.

91. See *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See as well, *Groundwork* AA IV: 462–463.

92. See “Vol. II Introduction,” “Kant’s Defense of Metaphysics:” 542 ff.

This deep reading of Strauß that follows his metaphysical odyssey exposes the alternative understanding of humanity that is the un-examined elephant in the room across Strauß' entire career. This alternative takes humanity to be an instance of transcendental consciousness capable of adding elements to its perceptions. Humanity can do so because its transcendental consciousness exercises *an eminent, but finite* causality that makes possible understanding of phenomena in an intelligible dimension of experience not directly given in the sensible realm. This *theoretical* reason that is able to understand 'what is' as the basis for *practical* reason's exercising of the same *eminent, but finite* causality to discern 'what ought to be.' In conformity with its autonomous freedom that can initiate sequences of events that physical causality on its own cannot, this freedom is the condition that makes possible, but does not require the individual to assume responsibility for its creative agency in an otherwise closed, materialistic system of determining, physical causality.

This alternative understanding of humanity from Kant was present right at the beginning of Strauß' career, but I am able to document both in his sources and his own writing that it was present only in a distorted form, and its distortion played a role in his metaphysics and understanding of 'religion' right up to the end of his life. Strauß inherited a narrative about Kant through the *pre-figurations* of his mentors and friends. My aim is to de-mythologize the narrative that is this distorted, un-examined elephant in Strauß' corpus.<sup>93</sup> Kant remains a viable, supplementing alternative to the quest for absolute, causal explanations for experience and life to this day.

In other words, Kant is not 'correct' because he possesses the right causal explanations of experience. Rather, his project is and will remain beneficial because he identifies the *apodictic, a priori* synthetic elements to finite, transcendental consciousness and the crucial significance of the community of finite, transcendental consciousness that encourages one another to think for oneself and encourages one to act on the basis of 'wide,' moral principles regardless of one's self-interest.

Strauß' gospel criticism confirms that the 'true' reading of the scriptures requires distinguishing between the 'husks' and 'kernels' of its narratives as well as an understanding that the evangelists are creative authors, not historians. The text presupposes the theology of the author that shaped the text just as it presupposes the theology of its reader.

Strauß' metaphysical odyssey confirms that the aim of theological reflection is not the 'correct,' objective account of Jesus, the Christ, or God derived from the text. Rather, theology is the illuminating of the imperceptible, universal conditions and capacities (not yet developed capabilities) that make all experience, understanding, and responsible agency possible, in the first place. Theology is the foundation for the moral community that grasps the significance of the imperceptible Commonweal of God

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93. See, especially, the "Conclusion" "John Dewey and the Enduring Need to De-Mythologize the Hegelian/Straußian Reading of Kant."

as the set of universal elements of both theoretical and practical reason for guiding human creativity. Higher than technical culture is moral culture that empowers the individual to think, understand, and act for her-/himself in light of not only 'what is' and 'what can be' but 'what ought to be'.<sup>94</sup>

**COMMENT ON TRANSLATIONS:** Unless otherwise marked, all of the translated material is from McGaughey. When I have used the 'standard' Cambridge University Press translation of Kant's works, I have directly checked with the German text. Where I disagree with the terminology used by CUP, I have explained why and provided in Kant's text the justification. When I used DeepL translating software, which is a terrific tool as a time saver with the mundane, I, nonetheless *always* checked the German original carefully and revised the translation *often* dramatically because of the technical vocabulary of this material.

**COMMENT ON INDICES AND CROSS REFERENCES:** The text is thoroughly indexed, and, in the body of the text, themes are cross referenced to a section heading, a footnote, or a page bookmark in order that the text can serve as a reference work.

**TWO SPECIAL THANKS:** This project would not have been possible without the Nota Bene software package. I measure my career analogously to 'BCE' and 'CE' as 'BNB' and 'NB'. Nota Bene was developed by Steve Siebert as a grad student in theology at Yale in the 1980s as I completed my PhD at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. In my first teaching position, I had hit the wall of research and writing time constraint because of family and other career obligations. Note Bene opened a window of personal growth for me. IBIDEM (originally Ibid) organized my library and made footnotes and bibliographic lists easy to generate in more style sheets than one would ever need. For my first book, I even generated with Nota Bene the unique style sheet required by Walter de Gruyter as well as created the index. I already had cultivated the practice of typing up my reading notes 'BNB'. However, Orbis (originally Textbase) became my reading memory bank by turning my text-based documents into an indexed and searchable totality for immediate retrieval of search terms across the entire database. Orbis makes possible accessible retention of one's notes so that one has access to not only what and where an author said something but also to one's samples of exactly what s/he said. Over more than 50 years of computerized note taking and because of Orbis, I have literally thousands of pages (3,000+ from Kant alone) of immediately accessible, personal notes to consult 'in the blink of an eye' when I am writing. Thanks, a million, Steve!

The project has also profited from the assistance of librarians all across the globe. I mention just two of many debts that I owe to them. First, were it not for the library at the University of Zurich in 1993 placing in my hand a cardboard box of disorganized, loose documents surrounding the 1839 Revolution in Zurich, this project would never have been written. These materials are the 'Historical Reader' of Volume I. Second,

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94. See Kant's formulation of the difference between the 'culture of skills' and the 'culture that promotes the (moral) will,' in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* A V: 431–432.

without the assistance of the Interlibrary Loan staff at Willamette University in Salem, Oregon, this project would not be what it has become. I want to acknowledge my deep debt to Liz Butterfield, Bill Kelm, Doreen Simonson, Shanel Parette, and Melissa Trichel (I hope that I haven't left anyone out), who all 'dug up' material for me to which, otherwise, I would never have achieved access. "Thanks, so much, for what you (and all reference librarians) do!"