

The West is Russia's Main Adversary, and the Answer is New Generation Warfare*

Jānis Bērziņš**

Abstract: After the demise of the Soviet Union, the West considered Russia to be a partner that shares common goals and values. Russia's annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of Eastern Ukraine took many by surprise. It showed that Russia's and the West's geopolitical interests differ. This article aims to comprehend Russian geopolitical ambitions and the way it might use military power to pursue them. For this, Russian military literature and official documents were analysed to delineate Russia's strategic assessment and its current views on warfare. The West and its values are considered to be Russia's main adversaries. The way that Russia is addressing the Western threat is through *New Generation Warfare*.

Keywords: Russia, Geopolitics, New Generation Warfare

Stichworte: Russland, Geopolitik, Neue Generation der Kriegsführung

1. Introduction

Since the commencement of the Crimean operation, it has been difficult for many to find a term that adequately describes the way Russia conducted its operation. The most commonly accepted term is *Hybrid Warfare*. NATO itself has adopted this term. The seminal work on Hybrid Warfare is Hoffman's "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges" (Hoffman 2009). The author developed the idea of a hybrid strategy, which is based on tactically employing a mix of instruments, resulting in the difficulty of fully understanding and establishing a proper strategy for dealing with it. The main challenge results from state and non-state actors employing technologies and strategies that are more appropriate for their own field, in a multi-mode confrontation. This may include exploiting modern capabilities to support insurgent, terrorist, and criminal activities, the use of high-tech military capabilities combined with terrorist actions and cyber warfare operations for use against economic and financial targets. Therefore, this strategy still largely presupposes the application of kinetic force or military power to defeat the enemy.

There are two problems with arguing that Russia conducted hybrid warfare. First, this still presupposes the application of kinetic force, while Russian *New Generation Warfare* does not (Berzins 2014). Second, it is a conceptual mistake to try to fit Russian New Generation Warfare, the result of a long military academic discussion, into Western concepts. Naturally, the word *hybrid* is catchy, since it can represent a mix of anything. However, its basic framework differs from the one developed by the Russians due to being a military concept and the result of American military thought. Therefore, it is a methodological mistake to try to frame a theory developed independently by the Russian military as a theory developed in another country. It reflects another culture's way of thinking and strategic understanding about the way warfare should be conducted. What the Russians call *New Generation Warfare*, is a combination of asymmetric warfare with network-centric warfare and sixth-generation warfare, with components of reflexive control. Its main aim is to achieve political objectives, and, therefore, the use of military power may not even be necessary.

2. Russia vs. NATO and the United States: Geopolitical Enemies

The rhetoric that the transatlantic community, especially the United States, is Russia's main enemy, has been developing in Russia for some years. Albeit relatively marginal until about 2005, the idea that Russia is a victim of the United States' vested interests which are being implemented and executed by multilateral agencies and NATO, has been gaining legitimacy in Russian security circles. This idea has been gradually incorporated into Russian policy making over the past ten years. It has also had significant influence on the military.

A very comprehensive analysis of NATO and the transatlantic community in relation to Russia was undertaken by Major-General (ret.) Aleksandr Vladimirov, the president of Russia's Board of Military Experts. He is the author of more than 150 publications on defence and security issues. He is also one of the protagonists of the idea that a war between the United States and Russia is inevitable within 10 years. This idea was fully developed for the first time in his article "The Great American War" in 2008. The article begins with the statement "Tsely Vashingtona – Polnomasshtabnyi kontroly nad prirodnyimi resursami planet" [Washington's objective: total control of the planet's natural resources] (Vladimirov 2008, p. 1). According to Vladimirov, this is the result of five factors.

First, economic: Although the United States have the most powerful economy in the world, it is also the most fragile. This is the result of American external debt, trillions of dollars which cannot be paid. The only way the United States can maintain its influence is to provide security to the world and demonstrate its superior power. Second, the military: The United States have extensive military and technological superiority over the rest of the world (including Russia and China). Third, information: The United States practically control major sources of information,

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being able to portray facts to its advantage. Fourth, geopolitical: The United States have the opportunity to control the majority of the nations in the world, although this power is in decline. It includes controlling Europe, and attempting to push European countries to the political periphery. Fifth, internal politics: In the United States, the basis for internal stability is a high level of consumption. Thus, any reduction in the level of individual consumption will certainly result in social unrest and a loss of political legitimacy. Since natural resources are limited, the United States need to guarantee their control at any cost. The conclusion is that the United States never stopped conducting warfare against Russia on several levels and in various forms, with the objective being to submit Russia's national interests to the needs of the United States (Vladimirov 2008).

Vladimirov's two most relevant articles on understanding how the Russian military considers NATO and the United States strategically are: *NATO v paradigme obshchey teorii voyny* [NATO in the Paradigm of the General Theory of War] (Vladimirov 2014) and *SShA – Glavnyy Aktor Mirovoy Voyny* [The United States – The Main Actor in the World War] (Vladimirov 2012). In the first, the author develops the idea that there are many civilizations in the world, but only four are really relevant geopolitically. The Christian/ Western civilization (USA, Europe, and Australia) with its objective of imposing fundamentalist liberalism globally; Orthodox civilization ("white" Russian), the objectives of which are still developing; Islamic civilization, with its objective of expanding radical religious Islamic fundamentalism; and Chinese civilization, with its project of slowly expanding Chinese chauvinism. Applying this division, all the significant conflicts in the world can be divided up as between the West and the Orthodox, the West against Islam, all of them against China, and vice-versa. The general rule is that each civilization is fighting alone and will lose alone. Thus, Russia has no other choice than to be independent and look for its own path of development and interests (Vladimirov 2014).

Vladimirov argues that the western civilization project is, in reality, the United States' project. There are four implications for NATO. First, NATO is intentionally and wilfully failing to fulfil its obligations. In the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, it states that NATO members are "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."¹ In other words, NATO's main objective is to guarantee the security of the transatlantic community, and thus, of Western civilization and its cradle, Europe. Vladimirov sees it as failing, however, because, in the face of the current war of civilizations between Western and Islamic civilizations, Muslim immigrants and their descendants are gradually displacing indigenous European ethnic groups physically on European soil. At the same time, while Western civilization is losing the war of civilizations in its own cradle, it is doing nothing for its own salvation. On the one hand, it engages in a pointless and costly war for freedom and democracy in places where these values are not important, or are even not wanted; on the other, the result is instead the radicalization of the Islamic people, not only in places where NATO soldiers have been fighting for freedom and democracy, but inside Europe and the United States. (Vladimirov 2014).

Second, in Vladimirov's view, NATO is not ready to contain the approaching "civilizational stress" that Europe is facing at this moment because of Muslim immigration. Europe is said to be doing nothing to save its own indigenous people, but is instead hiding behind the ideology of political correctness. This he sees as extremely dangerous, since the result, will mostly probably, be a war between civilizations within Europe, as the revolts in Paris and Stockholm have already signalled. As a result he predicts Europe's implosion. Similar scenarios can be expected in the United States and Russia. Third, NATO has lost its meaning and purpose and has not yet found a new role. NATO's security guarantee to its members is still only to assure its members that the USSR, but now Russia, will not engage in a war against them. An annexation of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Georgia is neither necessary nor strategically significant for Russia. Therefore, in its present form, NATO is not needed for the defence of NATO member states but a necessity first for the United States, since it is an instrument to legitimize American actions. As a result, the United States is able to ignore the UN Security Council. Second, for its own bureaucracy; third, for splitting regimes – in Z. Brzezinski's terms (Vladimirov 2014).

As to Russia, Vladimirov writes that NATO has never confirmed its friendliness. It continues to consider Russia to be an enemy and is constantly preparing for war with Russian military forces. Finally, NATO supports anti-Russian military-political trends in the regions of Russia's natural interest. Notwithstanding the difficult relationship between NATO and Russia, they both need each other – first, as basis for certain continental bipolar stability; second, as a necessary strategic deterrent; third, as the "official" enemy; fourth, as an incentive for development; and fifth, as a potential strategic ally to win the civilizational war. In this sense, Russia's efforts to weaken NATO are counterproductive (Vladimirov 2014).

The problem, in reaching stability and establishing a productive relationship with NATO countries, according to Vladimirov, is the United States. It has to maintain its global hegemony to guarantee the dollar as the global currency par excellence. This is necessary to guarantee financial stability, mostly because of America's unpayable foreign debt. In addition, it is giving the United States the power to buy unlimited amounts of whatever is necessary to maintain its global hegemony. The American pursuit of globalization results in a state of permanent war, causing poverty, injustice, and lawlessness. In addition, in the United States, the formation of values and the development of financial, economic ideological, technological, informational, and organizational power, guaranteeing national survival were transferred from the state to private transnational corporations. The result, according to Vladimirov, is the establishment of global oligarchical fascism. (Vladimirov 2012).

More recently, the Kremlin backed the Izborsk Club's "Defence Reform as an Integral Part of a Security Conception for the Russian Federation: a Systemic and Dynamic Evaluation" (Nagorny & Shurygin 2013).² The first point is the understanding that the

2 The Izborsk Club was formed by a group of Russian nationalists, some of them sympathetic to national-Bolshevik ideas. It has major influence on Vladimir Putin's thinking and policies, including in Eurasianism (Dugin), geopolitics (Ivashov), socio-economic doctrine (Glaziev), and the concept of Russian civilization in a clash with the West (Platonov).

1 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

1990s idea of Russia not having any direct external adversary has proved to be unreal. The adoption of a strategy of unilateral diplomatic concessions, showing Russia as a responsible and serious international player, and therefore, persuading the West to accept it in the international system as an equal partner, resulted in failure (Nagorny & Shurygin 2013).

The second is that the main external threat to Russia are the interests of the United States and their Western allies. According to this idea, the West has no interest in Russia restoring its status as a global power. Instead, it pursues policies, mostly economic, to force Russia to become a producer of raw materials, unable to develop military power. To achieve supremacy over Russia, the Euro-Atlantic community has been using so-called power instruments, including the imposition of unbalanced agreements on, for example, the reduction of strategic nuclear missiles and tactical nuclear weapons. The main instruments are (Nagorny & Shurygin 2013):

- i. The stimulation and support of armed actions by separatist groups inside Russia with the objective of promoting chaos and territorial disintegration;
- ii. Polarization between the elite and society, resulting in a crisis of values followed by a process of reality-orientation to western values;
- iii. Demoralization of the Russian armed forces and military elite;
- iv. Strategic controlled degradation of Russia's socio-economic situation;
- v. Stimulation of a socio-political crisis;
- vi. Intensification of simultaneous forms and models of psychological warfare;
- vii. Incitement of mass panic, with the loss of confidence in key governmental institutions;
- viii. Defamation of political leaders who are not aligned with United States' interests;
- ix. An annihilation of Russia's opportunities to form coalitions with foreign allies.

The authors conclude that Russia should prepare for three possible military conflict scenarios: First, a major war with NATO and Japan; second, a regional-border conflict scenario, i.e. disputed territories; and third, an internal military conflict as a result of terrorism. It is not believed that a direct military conflict with NATO in the short term can be expected. However, Russia has been facing severe pressure with the infringement of its strategic national interests. NATO has politically and militarily wiped out most of Russia's natural potential allies. This can be exemplified by NATO's expansion into the former Warsaw Pact space. The monetarist economic ideology imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other multilateral organizations, not only had the objective of weakening Russian society overall, but resulted in the underfunding of the Armed Forces, thus, an operational degradation (Nagorny & Shurygin 2013).

The authors argue that this would provide a basis for developing a strategy to neutralize the information-network war of

controlled chaos the United States and NATO has been waging against Russia. The first step is to include the list of factors threatening the state in the military doctrine. These are rebels, extremists, ethno-religious and nationalist organizations, using rebels, bandits and mercenaries, conducting warfare without any rules and classical canons. The most important threat to Russia in the view of the authors is a type of subversive weapon called "Westernization." It is the imposition of a social system, economics, ideology, culture, and way of life similar to the West on Russia. The objective is to discredit Russia's political and social system, resulting in population stratification into hostile groups, which are then supported by the United States and NATO (ibid).

Core ideas discussed above are explicit in both the latest version of the *Russian Military Doctrine* and the *National Security Strategy*. In both cases, the West, especially the United States, appears as Russia's main adversary, but not necessarily as the main enemy. Other problems affecting Russia's security are poor economic development, demographics and the environment, among others. Both documents stress the use of non-military instruments to achieve political goals, the most important one being social destabilization by colour revolutions and terrorism. (Russian Federation 2014; Russian Federation 2015). Since it is a broader strategic document, *The National Security Strategy* also mentions radical public associations, the activities of criminal organizations, corruption, natural disasters, the utilization of economic methods and instruments of financial, trade, investment, and technological policy (Russian Federation 2015).

Contrary to the idea of inevitable war among all civilization, the *National Security Strategy* explicitly mentions China as a key partner for maintaining regional and global stability, looking for an all-embracing partnership and strategic cooperation. This denies the idea of Russia feeling strategically encircled by a rising China. Other countries, regions, regional blocks, and international institutions of special interest to Russia are the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), RIC (Russia, India, China), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Africa, Latin America, and the countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. The Commonwealth of Independent States, the Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia are also key strategic areas (Russian Federation 2015).

3. Military Strategy as a Political Instrument

The Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battle-space is the mind. As a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing an enemy's armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is to reduce the need to deploy hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent's military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country (Berzins 2014). It is interesting to note the notion of permanent war in the *Military Doctrine*, since it denotes a permanent enemy. In the current geopolitical

structure, this enemy is NATO which stands, not only for the writers mentioned above, for Western civilization, its values, culture, political system, and ideology.

The main guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020 are:

- i. Direct destruction to direct influence;
- ii. Direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;
- iii. A war with weapons and technology to a culture war;
- iv. A war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings;
- v. The traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and a war of perceptions;
- vi. A direct clash to contactless war;
- vii. A superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy's internal side and base;
- viii. War in the physical environment, to a war in the human consciousness and in cyber-space;
- ix. Symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns;
- x. War in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.

In other words, the Russians have placed the idea of influence at the very centre of their operational planning and used all possible levers to achieve this: skilful internal communications; deception operations; psychological operations and well-constructed external communications. This is relevant for understanding its strategic significance, since it is the operationalization of a new form of warfare that cannot be characterized as a military campaign in the classic sense of the term. The operational phases of new-generation war can be schematized as follows (Chekinov & Bogdanov, 2013, pp. 15-22):

First phase: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psycho-logical, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favourable political, economic, and military setup).

Second phase: special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.

Third phase: intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.

Fourth phase: destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.

Fifth phase: establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

Sixth phase: commencement of military action, immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance, and subversive missions; all types, forms, methods, and forces, including special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage.

Seventh phase: combination of targeted information operation, electronic warfare operation, aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, combined with the use of high-precision weapons launched from various platforms (long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles, including microwaves, radiation, non-lethal biological weapons).

Eighth phase: roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations conducted by reconnaissance units to spot which enemy units have survived and transmit their coordinates to the attacker's missile and artillery units; fire barrages to annihilate the defender's resisting army units by effective advanced weapons; air-drop operations to surround points of resistance; and territory mopping-up operations by ground troops.

The Russian New Generation Warfare's main feature is the idea of asymmetry. As Vladimir Putin stated in 2006, "Quantity is not the end (...) Our responses are to be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical and less expensive, but will certainly improve the reliability of our nuclear triad" (Putin 2006). In its classic definition, asymmetry is the strategy of a weaker opponent to fight a stronger adversary. The main idea is, as Clausewitz put it, that war "(...) is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means. (...) The political design is the object, while war is the means, and the means can never be thought of apart from the object" (Clausewitz 2000, p. 280). As a result, since the objective of war for the Russian leadership is to achieve political gains, the instruments of warfare may be military or non-military. This means that a direct attack followed by territorial occupation and annexation might not be necessary. Therefore, warfare may be direct or indirect. In the first case, it means disarming and destroying the enemy. In the second, it means to wear down the enemy by a process of gradual exhaustion of capabilities, equipment, number of troops, and moral resistance.

This is the basis for the Russian strategy of creating an alternative reality as military strategy. The idea is that the support for the strategic objectives of war by society in a country at war, in other words, the legitimization of war, is fundamental for achieving victory. In other words, the success of military campaigns in the form of armed conflicts and local wars is much dependent on the relationship between military and non-military factors – the political, psychological, ideological, and informational elements of the campaign – then on military power as an isolated variable (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2010).

Therefore, asymmetric warfare has the objective of avoiding direct military operations and interference in internal conflicts in other countries. Therefore, as a result of the specificities of fighting weaker adversaries, the following strategy was predominant: employment of small, specially trained troops; preventive actions against irregular forces; propaganda among local populations that the weaker adversary pretended to

defend; military and material support given to support groups in the country being attacked; a scale-back of combat operations and employing non-military methods to pressure the opponent (Kremenjuk 2003).

The main instruments of asymmetric warfare to be employed by Russia are according to Chekinov & Bogdanov (2010):

- i. Measures making the opponent apprehensive of the Russian Federation's intentions and responses;
- ii. A demonstration of the readiness and potentialities of the Russian Federation's groups of troops (forces) in a strategic area to repel an invasion with consequences unacceptable to the aggressor;
- iii. Actions by the troops (forces) to deter a potential enemy by guaranteed destruction of its most vulnerable military and other strategically important and potentially dangerous targets in order to persuade it that its attack is a hopeless case;
- iv. The impact of state-of-the-art highly effective weapons systems, including those based on new physical principles (remote versus contact);
- v. The widespread employment of indirect force, non-contact forms of commitment of troops (forces) and methods;
- vi. The seizing and holding of enemy territory is not always needed, and is only undertaken if the benefits are greater than the "combat costs" or if the end goals of a war cannot be achieved in any other way;
- vii. Information warfare is an independent form of struggle along with economic, political, ideological, diplomatic and other forms;
- viii. Information and psychological operations to weaken the enemy's military potential by other than armed force, by affecting its information flow processes, and by misleading and demoralizing the population and armed forces personnel;
- ix. Significant damage to the enemy's economic potential, with its effect showing up at a later time;
- x. A clear understanding by a potential adversary, that military operations may turn into an environmental and socio-political catastrophe.

Much of what has been written by Russian military experts about Russia's strategic challenges reflects the way it has been conducting warfare. Nagorny & Shurygin (2013), when analysing Russia's most important strategic challenges, established the instruments that the West would employ against it and the way it would go about to achieve its objectives. Although their analysis is mostly based on the "colour revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere as a result of a strategy of controlled-chaos deliberately being employed by the West, it reveals more about the Russian strategy itself. Although it could possibly be used by the West against Russia, when looking for cases in reality it closely reflects the Russian asymmetric strategy operationalized in Ukraine. It has nine points (Nagorny & Shurygin 2013):

- i. The stimulation and support of armed actions by separatist groups with the objective of promoting chaos and territorial disintegration;

- ii. Polarization between the elite and society, resulting in a crisis of values followed by a process of reality-orientation to Western values;

- iii. Demoralization of the armed forces and military elite;

- iv. Strategic controlled degradation of the socio-economic situation;

- v. Stimulation of a socio-political crisis;

- vi. Intensification of simultaneous forms and models of psychological warfare;

- vii. Incitement of mass panic, with the loss of confidence in key government institutions;

- viii. Defamation of political leaders who are not aligned with Russia's interests;

- ix. Annihilation of opportunities to form coalitions with foreign allies.

In the field, the above discussion implies employing high-precision non-nuclear weapons, together with the support of subversive and reconnaissance groups. The strategic targets are those that, if destroyed, result in unacceptable damage for the country being attacked. They include top government administration and military control systems, major manufacturing, fuel and energy facilities, transportation hubs and facilities (railroad hubs, bridges, ports, airports, tunnels, etc.), potentially dangerous objects (hydroelectric power dams and hydroelectric power complexes, processing units of chemical plants, nuclear power facilities, storage places for strong poisons, etc.). Therefore, Russia's objective is to make the enemy understand that it may face an environmental and socio-political catastrophe, avoiding engagement in combat (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2010).

4. Final Remarks

It is important to understand that the paranoid narrative of a clash of civilizations, of Russia as a fragile nation being victimized by foreign powers which are only interested in its natural resources, by colour revolutions as an instrument of organized warfare, has become very strong among the population, politicians, and the military in Russia. It serves the interests of the ruling political elite for maintaining power.

Moscow is openly considering the transatlantic community, especially the United States, as Russia's main geopolitical enemy. It has been preparing for three possible scenarios for military conflict: first, a major war with NATO and Japan; second, a regional-border conflict scenario, i.e. disputed territories; and third, an internal military conflict as a result of terrorism. This is not to believe that a direct military conflict with NATO is to be expected in the short term. However, Russia considers that it is facing severe pressure with the infringement of its strategic national interests. NATO has wiped out most of Russia's natural potential allies both politically and militarily. This is exemplified by NATO's expansion into the former Warsaw Pact space. The monetarist economic ideology imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other multilateral

organizations, not only had the objective of weakening Russian society overall, but resulted in an underfunding of the Armed Forces, thus in the operational sphere.

At the same time, the Afghanistan and Iraq War, and other American/NATO military interventions made Putin conclude that the West is dangerous and unpredictable. Besides, the transatlantic community, especially the United States, uses instruments of irregular warfare such as NGOs, multilateral institutions (the IMF and the World Bank), to destabilize Russia. As a result, the view that Russia is constantly facing threats from the outside became mainstream in Russia. In the face of these threats, Russia considers itself to be a fragile country. Putin, and those in his inner circle, understand that Russia's economy is too dependent on oil and gas. As a result, there is not enough energy for expansion. At the same time, it needs to maintain its regional influence by all means. Since there are many factors outside Russia's control, Putin believes that external factors can influence internal ones, and could result in Russia's crash.

This explains why Russia is engaged in stopping Ukraine from moving closer to the West. At the same time, Putin is convinced that defending his and his inner circle's private interests and beliefs is paramount for defending Russia's national interests. Thus, any attempt to make Russia more transparent, democratic, tolerant, is considered to be not only a personal attack against him and his allies, but against Russia as a state. In addition, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to respond to conventional aggression, including at the regional level. That is why NATO must develop a more pragmatic approach towards Russia, and at the same time must be ready for increasing instability on Europe's borders. That is why it is important to increase the presence of NATO in border states such as the Baltics. It should also continue to engage in diplomatic talks with Russia to promote disarmament and ban the use of nuclear weapons.

The answer to these threats must be based on the concept of asymmetric warfare. In the Russian case, it has two meanings. First is the classic one, where the weaker fights the stronger. Russia considers itself the weaker partner. Second is the asymmetry resulting from the different views of what is, and what is not, acceptable in warfare. Russia is ready to go much further than what might be acceptable to the West. In this case, the weaker partner inverts the asymmetric relationship, since it is able to explore the stronger partner's unwillingness to cross its own red lines. At this moment, NATO's and Europe's greatest challenge is to establish a feasible strategy to cope with this, without jeopardizing their own values.



Dr. Bērziņš serves as the director of the Center for Security and Strategic Research (CSSR) at the National Defense Academy of Latvia in Riga. He is also a senior fellow at the Potomac Foundation. He works on New Generation (Hybrid) Warfare, Russian Military Thought, Strategic and Security Issues, and Defense Economics.

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