

## 8. Government formation with radical right parties in the nascent post-Communist party systems

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This chapter analyses government formation with radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe during the time before the first third-generation elections (Pop-Eleches 2010; see also Chapter 4), a period which largely corresponds to the first post-Communist decade. In accordance with good practice in QCA, the investigation contains separate analyses of radical right parties' inclusion in, and exclusion from, government, each of which examines the necessary and sufficient conditions for the respective outcome.

### 8.1 Explaining the government participation of radical right parties

#### 8.1.1 Analysis of necessity

The first step of a comparative analysis with QCA, the search for necessary conditions, starts with an examination of the consistency, coverage, and relevance (RoN) of the five conditions (and their negations) specified in the analytical model. Table 8.1 presents the parameters of fit for the period before the first third-generation elections. These indicate that proximity to the formateur on the socio-economic (LRECONPROX) and the socio-cultural (GALTANPROX) dimensions qualify as necessary conditions for the inclusion of radical right parties in government. These conditions have the highest possible consistency score (1.00), indicating that ideological proximity to the formateur on both dimensions was present in all seven cases in which the radical right entered government in the transformational decade. High RoN and coverage scores establish that neither factor constitutes a trivial necessary condition.

None of the other conditions or their negations reach a consistency of 0.9, the minimum requirement for necessary conditions. High fragmentation of the party system (FRAG) and a small seat share of the radical right (~SEATS) are the only conditions that come close to passing this threshold. Their low RoN score, however, signals that the relatively high consistency results from both conditions being present

in almost all instances of government formation with radical right parties before the first third-generation elections, regardless of whether these parties enter government or remain in opposition. Hence, no factors other than the socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity between radical right parties and the formateur qualify as necessary conditions. In order to confirm whether the causal relationship indicated by the parameters of fit exists, the following section assesses these conditions in more detail.

*Table 8.1: Parameters of fit necessity: Government participation of radical right parties (before first third-generation elections)*

Condition	Consistency	RoN	Coverage
LRECONPROX	1.00	1.00	1.00
GALTANPROX	1.00	1.00	1.00
SEATS	0.14	1.00	1.00
FRAG	0.86	0.13	0.46
SAMESIDE	0.57	1.00	1.00
~LRECONPROX	0.00	0.50	0.00
~GALTANPROX	0.00	0.50	0.00
~SEATS	0.86	0.13	0.46
~FRAG	0.14	1.00	1.00
~SAMESIDE	0.43	0.36	0.30

Source: Created with QCA Package for R (Duşa 2019).

In the case of the ERSP's participation in the Estonian government of 1992, the issue of Russian-speaking minority rights dominated the political debate. In the newly independent country, the parties of the Estonian majority had already introduced an electoral law which stipulated that only the citizens of the inter-war Estonian state, and their descendants, had the right to vote in the 1992 parliamentary elections. Other residents of the country could only obtain citizenship after a three-year naturalisation process (Raun 1994, 74). Because these requirements were impossible for most non-ethnic Estonian residents to fulfil prior to the election, they could neither run for office nor vote in 1992. Thus, a large part of the Russian-speaking population was excluded from electoral politics and, consequently, the parliament consisted only of parties that favoured an ethnic model of democracy (Lagerspetz and Vogt 2013, 66; Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019, 438). Under these circumstances, the inclusion of a party that disagreed on the pivotal ethnic issue would

be hard to imagine. Hence, socio-cultural proximity between the radical right ERSP and Pro Patria, the formateur of the 1992 coalition, was indeed a necessary condition for their cooperation.

In addition to similar positions on the ethnic question, all parties which entered the Estonian parliament in 1992, including the radical right ERSP, shared the desire to rapidly establish a market economy (Pettai 1993; Pettai and Kreuzer 1998). Thus, the ERSP's socio-economic proximity to Pro Patria also facilitated the party's participation in government. Moreover, demarcating the Estonian majority from the Russian-speaking minority, and their kin state Russia, united the socio-cultural and the socio-economic dimensions, because this issue entailed both support for an exclusionary ethnic construction of nationhood in politics and society as well as the immediate introduction of a market economy, which promised economic cooperation and security through integration into Western alliances. The alignment of the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension in the Estonian party system suggests that the simultaneous proximity between ERSP and Pro Patria on both dimensions was a necessary condition for the government participation of the Estonian radical right in 1992.

In Romania the issue of state- and nation-building, and national identity, particularly with regard to the rights of the Hungarian minority in the country, figured prominently in the 1992 general election campaigns. The two radical right parties, PUNR and PRM, were extremely hostile to the Hungarian minority. These parties, and organisations close to them, even orchestrated, or condoned, violent incidents (Shafir 1999). The Communist successor party, FDSN, formateur of the governments with radical right parties in Romania in the early 1990s, was slightly more moderate in this respect. Due to international pressure, the party quickly distanced itself from acts of physical violence (Vachudova 2005, 101–2). Otherwise, however, it shared many of the radical right's positions. The importance of socio-cultural proximity for government participation is further illustrated by the early termination of the government in 1996. The coalition disintegrated after President Iliescu of the PDSR—formerly the FDSN—signed a neighbourhood treaty with Hungary, which caused the PUNR to leave the coalition (de Nève 2002, 335).

The ideological proximity between the radical right parties and the FDSN also entailed redistributive and protectionist socio-economic positions. For example, in the early 1990s the FDSN prioritised slowing down the economic transformation. The PRM shared the FDSN's scepticism towards privatisation and free market economy. The PUNR was more moderate in this regard but it did not favour rapid economic transformation either (Gabanyi 1997; Gallagher 1997; Shafir 1999; Bugajski 2002; Pop-Eleches 2008; see also Chapter 6.4).

Overall, the Romanian party system of the 1990s was characterised by a strong bipolar opposition based on the legacy of Ceaușescu's specific brand of national Communism. The successors of the old regime, including the FDSN, the PRM

and, to a lesser degree, the PUNR (Shafir 1999, 214; Grün 2002; Pop-Eleches 2008), adhered to economic protectionism and nativism, while the oppositional camp held rather liberal socio-economic and socio-cultural views. Thus, similar to the Estonian case, cooperation between FDSN and the radical right in Romania also required simultaneous socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity.

In Slovakia, the radical right SNS became a junior partner in two coalitions led by Vladimír Mečiar's HZDS in 1992 and 1994. In 1992, the independence of the Slovak state was at the centre of the political debate. Mečiar and his party campaigned for greater Slovak autonomy because of their opposition to the neoliberal economic policies imposed by the federal government in Prague, along with broader centre-periphery conflicts. The radical right SNS voiced ethnic nationalist resentment against the Czech population and demanded the complete dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation. Later on in the campaign, Mečiar adopted the radical right's narrative, as well as the demand for an independent Slovak state, in order to win popular support (Szomolányi and Mesežnikov 1997; Fisher 2006; Mesežnikov 2008). Thus, HZDS and SNS agreed on the key socio-cultural issue of that time, which facilitated the formation of a joint government.

Although the 1994 elections took place in an independent Slovak state, the salience of state- and nation-building remained high. On the one hand, Hungary's nationalist policies fuelled increasing scepticism, and even open hostility, towards the Hungarian minority in the country. On the other hand, the two governing parties set out to build an autocratic and clientelistic state that seriously endangered Slovakia's democratic consolidation and integration into Western alliance systems, particularly the EU. While the SNS focused on the former aspect, Mečiar's HZDS concentrated on the latter. In principle, however, the parties continued to agree on crucial socio-cultural issues, and these shared positions constituted the foundation of their renewed cooperation in the 1994 government.

The ideological platforms of the SNS and the HZDS combined nationalism with economic protectionism. The HZDS attempted to slow down the economic transformation set in motion by the central government after Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution. The SNS also supported national-protectionist economic policies in principle, but somewhat less vehemently than the HZDS or their Romanian brethren (Szomolányi and Mesežnikov 1997, 143; Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov 2015, 229–30; see also Pirro 2016). Unlike in Romania, the SNS was not the only potential junior partner that shared the formateur's fundamental socio-economic position. The socio-economic platform of the reformed Communist successor party, SDL, was similar to that of the HZDS as well. However, Mečiar preferred a coalition with the SNS, which was ideologically closer to his party on the socio-cultural dimension and ultimately enabled his autocratic rule. Thus, the Slovak case further substantiates the assumption that both ideological proximity conditions are necessary for government partic-

ipation, even in a party system where the two dimensions are not reinforcing each other.

These empirical observations corroborate that small socio-economic and socio-cultural distances are of great importance for the participation of radical right parties in government during the period before the first third-generation elections (Hypothesis 2a). The analysis demonstrates that the concurrence of socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity is a necessary condition for government participation. The parameters of fit for the conjunction  $LRECONPROX * GALTANPROX$  are equal to 1.00 and therefore support this conclusion. Hypothesis 2a also includes the possibility that radical right parties could enter government regardless of their ideological distance to the formateur if they are situated on the same side of a bipolar opposition. Because the joint presence of socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity is a necessary condition for government participation, however, this implies that radical right parties never entered government if their ideological positions differed substantially from those of the formateur. Thus, bipolar opposition in the party system never overshadowed ideological distance, indicating that socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity are more important for government participation of radical right parties than initially expected.

### 8.1.2 Analysis of sufficiency

The analysis of sufficient conditions, the second step in a comparative analysis with QCA, begins by compiling the truth table from the 14 cases of government formation with radical right parties in the transformational decade. Table 8.2 shows that only four of the 32 possible combinations of the five conditions have been empirically observed in this period. The truth table includes no contradictions, which means that each row covers only cases in which radical right parties either entered government or remained in opposition. All rows that contain cases of government participation of radical right parties have a perfect consistency of 1.00, so this value is used as the consistency cut-off value for the computer-assisted minimisation process. The outcomes in rows 1–3 are coded 1, indicating that they are cases of radical right government participation, while row 4 covers all cases in which the radical right did not enter government, and they are coded 0.<sup>1</sup>

The empirically observed cases are clustered in very few truth table rows, so the conservative solution yielded by logical minimisation with the fsQCA software is the

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1 Another criterion for coding the outcome is the number of cases represented in a truth table row. As this study involves a rather small number of cases, the frequency cut-off is set to 1, which means that every row that represents at least one empirically observed case is not considered a logical remainder (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 152–53).

product of a single minimisation step:<sup>2</sup>

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{c} LRECONPROX * GALTANPROX * \sim SEATS * FRAG \\ + \\ LRECONPROX * GALTANPROX * SEATS * \sim FRAG * \sim SAMESIDE \end{array} \right\} \rightarrow GOVPART$$

Because this solution is parsimonious enough to allow for a reasonable interpretation of the results, and the primary goal of this study is to explain the government formation of radical right parties in the empirically observed cases (see Chapter 4.1), there is no need for further minimisation with the help of logical remainders.<sup>3</sup>

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- 2 The standard analytical procedure in the fsQCA software yields three solutions, depending on the inclusion or exclusion of different types of logical remainders (see Chapter 4).
  - 3 The parsimonious solution, including all logical remainders that contribute to parsimony, is either  $LRECONPROX \rightarrow GOVPART$  or  $GALTANPROX \rightarrow GOVPART$ , depending on the choice between these two tied prime implicants (Ragin 2018). Neither of the two solutions includes the complete necessary condition identified above, which highlights that the parsimonious solution is often based on untenable assumptions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). This observation further supports the author's choice to build the analysis on the conservative solution.

Table 8.2: Truth table: Government participation of radical right parties (before first third-generation elections)

	LRECON- PROX	GALTAN- PROX	SEATS	FRAG	SAMESIDE	GOV/PART	Raw consistency	Number of cases	Cases
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.00	4	RO_1992_PRM RO_1992_PUNR RO_1994_PRM RO_1994_PUNR
2	1	1	0	1	0	1	1.00	2	EE_1992_ERSP SK_1994_SNS
3	1	1	1	0	0	1	1.00	1	SK_1992_SNS
4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.00	7	CZ_1992_SPR-RSČ CZ_1996_SPR-RSČ RO_1996_PRM RO_1996_PUNR RO_1999_PRM RO_1999_PUNR SK_1998_SNS
5	0	0	0	0	1	?	?	0	
6	1	0	0	0	1	?	?	0	
7	0	1	0	0	1	?	?	0	
8	1	1	0	0	1	?	?	0	
9	0	0	1	0	1	?	?	0	
10	1	0	1	0	1	?	?	0	

11	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	?	?	0	
12	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	?	?	0	
13	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	?	?	0	
14	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	?	?	0	
15	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	?	?	0	
16	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	?	?	0	
17	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	?	?	0	
18	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	?	?	0	
19	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	?	?	0	
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	?	?	0	
21	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	?	?	0	

22	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	?	?	0	
23	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	?	?	0	
24	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	?	?	0	
25	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	?	?	0	
26	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	?	?	0	
27	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	?	?	0	
28	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	?	?	0	
29	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	?	?	0	
30	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	?	?	0	
31	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	?	?	0	
32	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	?	?	0	

Source: Created with fsQCA 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2016).

The solution coverage and consistency reach the maximum value of 1.00 (see Table 8.3). Thus, the solution explains all of the empirically observed cases of government participation of radical right parties in this period, and none of the cases covered by the solution refers to a radical right party that remained in opposition. Hence, these parameters of fit suggest that the conservative solution term qualifies as a sufficient condition for the government participation of radical right parties in the period before the first third-generation elections. In order to substantiate this claim, the remainder of this section goes back to the cases and examines in more detail whether the two sufficient paths that constitute the solution term offer theoretically sound explanations for government participation of radical right parties.

Before doing so, the two previously identified necessary conditions (LRECONPROX and GALTANPROX) can be factored out, as they are present in both of the sufficient solution paths. This operation results in the following term, the content of which is identical to the term above and in Table 8.3:

$$LRECONPROX * GALTANPROX (\sim SEATS * FRAG + SEATS * \sim FRAG * \sim SAMESIDE) \rightarrow GOVPART$$

This term reveals that LRECONPROX and GALTANPROX are indeed necessary parts of both solution paths but that these two conditions alone are not sufficient for the outcome to occur. Since the role of socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity between radical right parties and the formateurs has already been discussed, the following remarks focus on the additional conditions in the two solution paths.

Table 8.3: Sufficient conditions for the government participation of radical right parties (before first third-generation elections)

Conservative solution					
Solution paths	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency	Cases	
LRECONPROX*GALTANPROX*~SEATS*FRAG	0.86	0.86	1.00	RO_1992_PRM RO_1992_PUNR RO_1994_PRM RO_1994_PUNR EE_1992_ERSP SK_1994_SNS	
LRECONPROX*GALTANPROX*SEATS*~FRAG*~SAMESIDE	0.14	0.14	1.00	SK_1992_SNS	
Solution coverage: 1.00; Solution consistency: 1.00					

Source: Created with fsQCA 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2016).

The first solution path (LRECONPROX\*GALTANPROX\*~SEATS\*FRAG) explains six of the seven instances of government participation. Here, ideological proximity to the formateur on the socio-cultural and socio-economic dimension is accompanied by a small seat share of the radical right and high levels of fragmentation in the party system. In this situation, the formateurs needed to cooperate with at least two, and in Romania even three, other parties in order to secure a parliamentary majority for the cabinet.

The interplay between the ideological and numerical factors is best illustrated in the Slovak and Romanian cases. After the 1994 Slovak parliamentary elections, the HZDS won more than 40 per cent of the seats in a parliament consisting of an effective number of 4.4 and a total number of six parties. Being so close to a majority, the party could have formed a two-party majority coalition with four of the other six parties in parliament. The result, however, was a government of the HZDS with the two smallest parliamentary parties, one of them being the radical right SNS. Mečiar initially negotiated with the SDL and the Christian democratic KDH about forming a coalition, but ideological differences prevented these negotiations from succeeding. Only afterwards did Mečiar turn to the SNS and the ZRS, with whom he reached an agreement (Malová 1995). Due to the simultaneous socio-cultural and socio-economic proximity between the formateur and the radical right party, as well as the availability of another small party in the fragmented Slovak parliament, the SNS entered government in 1994 despite its low seat share. Thus, a small number of seats did not exclude the SNS from government, but it should not be considered an unequivocal advantage either. The sequence of coalition talks suggests that formateurs prefer coalitions with larger junior partners, even in fragmented party systems, and they turn to smaller parties only if it results in an ideologically homogeneous government.

In Romania, the Communist successor party, FDSN, won more than one-third of the seats in the chamber of deputies in the 1992 general elections. Both governments that formed during this legislature included two radical right parties, PUNR and PRM. In 1992, the Romanian party system was even more fragmented than the Slovak one in 1994, featuring a total of seven parties and an effective number of 4.4 parties in parliament. From a purely office-seeking perspective, there was only a single two-party coalition that would have controlled a majority of seats. This hypothetical coalition of the FDSN and the CDR, the electoral alliance that emerged from the forces outside the Communist Party that fought the Ceaușescu regime, was ruled out due to the regime divide which structured party competition and shaped the parties' policy positions at the time. Therefore, the FDSN depended on ideologically compatible parties in its own camp to form a parliamentary majority, despite their low seat share. In the highly fragmented parliament, all four parties in this camp were required to form a majority. Even the support of the PRM, which held less than five per cent of the seats in parliament, was vital for the FDSN minority government

to assume office. The PRM remained a support party until the government collapsed in 1996, whereas the PUNR, which was ideologically closer to the PDSR and controlled a larger number of seats, received cabinet posts the government re-formed in 1994 (Gallagher 1994, 30–32; Shafir 1999, 216; Autengruber 2006, 70–71). This case provides further support for the argument that majority governments require more parties in fragmented than in compact party systems, which increases the chances for small parties to gain executive power. Hence, only the interplay of all four conditions in the first solution path explains the government participation of the PRM and the PUNR.

The last case covered by the first solution path is the government participation of the ERSP in 1992. With 5.9 effective parliamentary parties, the fragmentation in the Estonian party system was even higher than in Slovakia and Romania. Pro Patria emerged victorious from the parliamentary elections but controlled less than 30 per cent of the seats in parliament. The party thus needed at least two more parliamentary parties to form a majority government. The seven parties represented in the 1992 Estonian parliament, including the ERSP and Pro Patria, held quite similar views on the economic transformation of the country and the rights of the Russian-speaking minority. Alongside this socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity, the fragmentation of the party system contributed to ERSP's government participation. The formation of a coalition that did not involve more than three parties was helped by ERSP's seat share. The party controlled 9.9 per cent of the parliamentary seats and could therefore make a more substantial contribution to the parliamentary majority of the government than the radical right parties in Romania or Slovakia. Hence, this case further illustrates that governments in fragmented party systems include a larger number of (small) parties. At the same time, however, Pro Patria formed a government that consisted of no more than three parties, suggesting that formateurs still try to keep the number of junior partners as low as possible. Thus, the radical right ERSP benefitted from the fragmentation of the Estonian party system, and its near-ten per cent seat share further improved the party's bargaining position.<sup>4</sup>

The second solution path (LRECONPROX\*GALTANPROX\*SEATS\*~FRAG\*~SAMESIDE) covers the government participation of the SNS in 1992. The unique coverage of this path indicates, however, that this case is not covered by the first solution path (see Table 8.3). Hence, the second path contributes to the understanding

4 Lowering the threshold for large radical right parties from 10.0 to 9.9 per cent, so that the ERSP's set membership changes from 0 to 1, would alter the result only marginally. The result of the minimisation would then be LRECONPROX\*GALTANPROX\*~SEATS\*FRAG + LRECONPROX\*GALTANPROX\*SEATS\*~SAMESIDE → GOVPART, whereby the case of the ERSP would now be covered by the second solution path together with the SNS in 1992. The fact that such a minor change of the threshold does not lead to substantial changes in the QCA solution is an indicator of the robustness of results in QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 287–91).

of government formation with radical right parties in the early years of the post-Communist transformation, even though it describes only one individual case. This case differs from the previous six in that it represents the only example of a radical right party with a large seat share entering government. Unlike in the following election, the SNS won a relatively high number of seats in the 1992 Slovak parliament (10.0 per cent). Moreover, the parliament consisted of only five actual and 3.2 effective parties, which was unusually compact at that time. Of the two numerical factors, however, the low fragmentation of the party system was more decisive in this specific case than the SNS' high seat share. The HZDS, as the formateur and the strongest party, held 74 of the 150 seats in parliament. Thus, a two-party coalition of HZDS and any of the other parliamentary parties would have controlled a majority. Due to the low fragmentation, however, Mečiar's choice of potential junior partners was much smaller than in 1994. Among the four available parties, the SNS turned out to be the ideologically most compatible partner, because it largely agreed with the HZDS on the central socio-economic and socio-cultural policies, such as an incremental and clientelistic transformation of the economy and Slovak independence based on nativism. The negation of the *SAMESIDE* condition signals that the formation of the 1994 Slovak government was not constrained by strong bipolar opposition. Unlike in Romania, for instance, the regime divide did not structure Slovak politics in the early 1990s (Grzymała-Busse 2001, 98).

Based on this discussion of the cases, the two solution paths can indeed be considered sufficient conditions for the government participation of radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe before the first third-generation elections. In addition to the crucial importance of socio-cultural and socio-economic proximity, the results illuminate the role played by the two numerical factors. For instance, the high fragmentation of Central and Eastern European party systems helps electorally weak radical right parties come to power. The case of the SNS in 1992 shows that radical right parties can also gain cabinet posts in less fragmented party systems. Since the HZDS came very close to a majority of its own, the ideological proximity of the two parties and the low fragmentation of the party system that enabled the formation of a two-party majority coalition turned out to be more relevant explanations for the government participation than the SNS' large seat share in this case.

These findings confirm the theoretical assumptions regarding the numerical factors in the transformational decade. With one exception, it is indeed electorally weak radical right parties in fragmented party systems that entered government in this period (Hypothesis 1b). The coalition involving the Slovak SNS in 1992 diverges from the dominant pattern but it does not fundamentally contradict the theoretical expectations regarding the connection between parliamentary strength and the fragmentation of party systems, because the only configuration that should prevent radical right parties' from entering government is a small seat share in compact party systems (Hypothesis 1a).

Hypothesis 2a posits that radical right parties should enter government if they hold similar socio-economic and socio-cultural positions and/or are on the same side of a bipolar opposition in the party system as the formateur. The simultaneous presence of socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity even constitutes a necessary condition for government participation. The presence of the *SAMESIDE* condition, however, which indicates that the radical right party and the formateur are on the same side of a bipolar opposition—in this period most likely rooted in the regime divide—does not occur in either of the two solution paths. Thus, Central and Eastern European radical right parties did not have to be on the same side of the regime divide as the formateur in order to enter government.

However, the analysis demonstrates that the regime divide still affected government formation with radical right parties in the 1990s indirectly as text and context (Minkenberg 2009; see also Chapter 2). In case of the government participation of the PRM and PUNR in Romania, for instance, the party system was shaped by strong bipolar opposition based on the regime divide and the ideological positions of FDSN, PRM, and PUNR were strongly influenced by the legacy of the national Communist Ceaușescu regime. In Estonia, the regime divide was intertwined with the ethno-linguistic divide. It provided a reference for central socio-economic and, in particular, socio-cultural positions of political parties. Due to the restrictive electoral law introduced before the 1992 elections, however, the regime divide did not produce bipolar opposition in the party system that constrained government formation. Since large parts of the Russian-speaking minority did not receive active and passive voting rights after Estonia's independence from the Soviet Union, this pole of the divide was not represented in parliament (Raun 1994; Saarts 2011; Lagerspetz and Vogt 2013). Hence, the constraining effect of the regime divide on party competition in Estonia unfolded before the post-electoral stage. The regime divide was much less prominent in Slovakia. Here, the confrontation between the Communist regime and the oppositional forces was less violent than in the Czech lands. In addition, the Slovak Communist successor party, SDL, undertook credible reforms and the representatives of the former regime joined various parties, including the HZDS, which at the time was a successor organisation to the oppositional alliance, Public Against Violence (Grzymała-Busse 2001, 98–100; Bugajski 2002, 311).

Further conclusions can be drawn regarding the composition of governments. The analysis confirms Hypothesis 3a, showing that radical right parties always entered government as junior coalition partners, or as support parties of minority governments, but never as members of an oversized coalition. In Romania, both the PRM and the PUNR were involved in a minority government as support parties after the first free elections. The PUNR later became a full-fledged junior partner in the coalition and received ministerial posts. In Estonia in 1992 and in Slovakia in 1992 and 1994, the ERSP and the SNS, respectively, served as junior partners in minimal winning coalitions.

The format of governments with radical right parties corresponds to the dominant type of coalitions in the respective country. In Romania, minority governments are a frequent phenomenon, whereas in Estonia and Slovakia, minimal winning coalitions are the most common coalition format between 1990 and 2014 (Bergman, Ilonszki, and Müller 2019a). This pattern is somewhat less clear when considering only the governments formed before the first third-generation elections. In Romania and Slovakia, the format of governments with radical right parties does not diverge much from the overall pattern in these countries in the 1990s. In Estonia, however, the 1992 Pro Patria-ERSP government is the only minimal winning coalition during the first post-Communist decade. Minimal winning coalitions emerge as the dominant type of government in Estonia only after the turn of the millennium.<sup>5</sup> However, a single government of this type does not warrant the conclusion that the format of governments with radical right parties diverges from the general pattern in the country.

## 8.2 Explaining the exclusion of radical right parties from government

In QCA, the analysis of the negative outcome—the exclusion of radical right parties from government—is carried out separately because, as a set-theoretic method, it is fundamentally based on the assumption of asymmetric causality (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 81–83; see also Chapter 4). This can be illustrated with the help of the two ideological dimensions. The first half of the analysis confirms that the combination of socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity is a necessary condition for the participation of the radical right in government. However, this result does not imply that ideological proximity on both dimensions must be absent in cases where radical right parties failed to enter government. Rather, as the positive outcome occurs only in the joint presence of both factors, the absence of either one could prevent it from happening. Put more generally, asymmetric causality means that the explanation of the negative outcome is not necessarily the exact opposite of the explanation of the outcome.

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5 The formats of the governments formed before the first third-generation elections are distributed as follows in the three countries: Estonia: 1 minimal winning coalition, 3 minority governments and 2 oversized coalitions; Romania: 2 minimal winning coalitions, 5 minority governments and 5 oversized coalitions; Slovakia: 3 minimal winning coalitions, 2 minority governments, 1 oversized coalition (Bergman, Ilonszki, and Müller 2019a).

### 8.2.1 Analysis of necessity

The analysis of the negative outcome begins with the search for necessary conditions. Table 8.4 contains the parameters of fit necessity to determine whether or not the individual conditions and their negations qualify as necessary conditions. Five conditions, FRAG,  $\sim$ LRECONPROX,  $\sim$ GALTANPROX,  $\sim$ SEATS, and  $\sim$ SAMESIDE, show consistency scores above 0.9. However, the RoN values for high party system fragmentation (FRAG) and low seat share ( $\sim$ SEATS) are so low that they must be considered trivial necessary conditions. They do not develop any causal traction for explaining the negative outcome because they are present in most of the cases, regardless of whether radical right parties entered government or remained in opposition in the first post-Communist decade.  $\sim$ SAMESIDE reaches higher coverage and RoN scores, but they are still too low for this factor to qualify as a non-trivial necessary condition.

*Table 8.4: Parameters of fit necessity: Exclusion of radical right parties from government (before first third-generation elections)*

Condition	Consistency	Coverage	RoN
LRECONPROX	0.00	0.00	0.50
GALTANPROX	0.00	0.00	0.50
SEATS	0.00	0.00	0.93
FRAG	1.00	0.54	0.14
SAMESIDE	0.00	0.00	0.71
$\sim$ LRECONPROX	1.00	1.00	1.00
$\sim$ GALTANPROX	1.00	1.00	1.00
$\sim$ SEATS	1.00	0.54	0.14
$\sim$ FRAG	0.00	0.00	0.93
$\sim$ SAMESIDE	1.00	0.70	0.57

Source: Created with QCA Package for R (Duşa 2019).

The negations of socio-economic ( $\sim$ LRECONPROX) and socio-cultural proximity of the radical right party to the formateur ( $\sim$ GALTANPROX), however, both clearly qualify as non-trivial necessary conditions with a coverage and RoN of 1.00. This finding corresponds to the directional expectations with regard to these two conditions in the period before the first third-generation elections. Hypothesis 2a implies that ideological distance on the socio-economic or the socio-cultural di-

mensions should prevent radical right parties from entering government. The data show, however, that all radical right parties who remained in opposition held distant socio-economic and socio-cultural positions to the formateur. However, in light of the necessary condition for government participation ( $LRECONPROX^*GALTANPROX$ ) and the corresponding theoretical assumptions, here the negations of both individual factors are considered as necessary conditions for the exclusion of radical right parties from government. The interplay of these two conditions and the other explanatory factors will be examined in more detail in the analysis of the sufficiency.

### 8.2.2 Analysis of sufficiency

The analysis of sufficient conditions for the exclusion of radical right parties from government is based on the same truth table used previously (see Table 8.2 above), but the outcome is different ( $\sim GOVPART$ ). This outcome can be coded 0 in rows 1 – 3 and 1 in row 4. Because all observed cases of the exclusion of radical right parties from government in this period are clustered in a single truth table row, no minimisation is possible without using logical remainders. Thus, the configuration of this truth table row also represents the conservative solution, which is reported in Table 8.5. Since this row contains no contradictory cases and covers all observed instances of radical right parties that remained in opposition, the coverage and consistency of this solution equals 1.00. Due to the clustering of cases and because a solution term with only one path can be interpreted easily, the conservative solution serves as the basis for the interpretation.<sup>6</sup>

The solution indicates that radical right parties were excluded from government if they had a small seat share in a highly fragmented parliament, and they were neither socio-economically nor socio-culturally proximate to the formateur.  $\sim SAME\text{-}SIDE$  indicates that the radical right party was either not in the same camp as the formateur in the presence of bipolar opposition or that there was no bipolar opposition in the party system that constrained government formation to coalitions within one camp. The two numerical factors, small seat share and high fragmentation, appear in the same configuration that was observed when most radical right parties entered government in this period, reflecting the fluidity of party systems in the nascent post-Communist democracies. The analysis of government participation demonstrates that a small seat share does not constitute a substantial disadvantage for radical right parties in fragmented party systems when they are ide-

6 The parsimonious solution generated with the fsQCA software is either  $\sim LRECONPROX \rightarrow \sim GOVPART$  or  $\sim GALTANPROX \rightarrow \sim GOVPART$ , depending on the researcher's choice between these two tied prime implicants.

ologically proximate to the formateur. If they are not, however, as in all the cases observed here, radical right parties remain on the opposition bench.

On the socio-economic dimension, all seven cases show a medium ideological distance of 3.5 to four points, but the radical right party and the formateur are always located on opposite sides of the spectrum. SPR-RSČ, SNS, PRM, and PUNR all hold—more or less distinct—national-protectionist positions. When they were excluded from government, these parties faced formateurs that emerged from the anti-Communist opposition camp in their countries, such as the Czech ODS, the Slovak SDK, and the Romanian CDR. These parties and coalitions unanimously advocated liberal pro-market economic policies.

Table 8.5: Sufficient conditions for the exclusion of radical right parties from government (before first third-generation elections)

Conservative solution				
Solution paths	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency	Cases
~LRECONPROX*~GALTANPROX*~SEATS*FRAG*~SAMESIDE	1.00	1.00	1.00	CZ_1992_SPR-RSC CZ_1996_SPR-RSC RO_1996_PRM RO_1996_PUNR RO_1999_PRM RO_1999_PUNR SK_1998_SNS
Solution coverage: 1.00; Solution consistency: 1.00				

Source: Created with fsQCA 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2016).

On the socio-cultural dimension the formateurs occupied rather centrist positions. The ODS and the SDK leaned slightly towards the green-alternative-libertarian (GAL) end of the scale. Within the Czech ODS, the conservative forces that were to set the tone for the party in later years had not yet gained the upper hand (Bugajski 2002). The situation of the Slovak SDK was quite similar. Here, the liberal, pro-democratic and pro-European forces also dominated the conservative ones in the late 1990s. After all, they had formed this alliance explicitly in opposition to the illiberal and autocratic Mečiar regime (Bugajski 2002, 301; Fisher 2006, 162–64). Thus, the distance between ODS and SPR-RSČ in the Czech Republic in 1992 and 1996 and between SDK and SNS in Slovakia in 1998 was substantial, including positions on opposite sides of the GALTAN spectrum.

The Romanian CDR faced rather towards the traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) end. However, the distance between the Christian democratic PNȚCD, the strongest member of the alliance, and the two radical right parties, PRM and PUNR, clearly exceeded 2.5 points, the threshold for ideological proximity. Even though nationalism was not completely absent within the CDR in general, and the PNȚCD in particular, it differed in kind from the aggressive nativist positions of the radical right parties. This difference was most evident in the parties' positions towards the Hungarian minority in Romania. For the PUNR and the PRM, the Hungarian minority and their kin state served as arch enemies, whereas the PNȚCD sought national reconciliation and even included the Hungarian minority party, UDMR, in the coalition formed after the 1996 election (Gabanyi 1997, 218–20).

In addition to these two party-level ideological factors, the solution includes the negation of the SAMESIDE condition. Yet, there are significant differences between the cases with regard to the two alternative sources of  $\sim$ SAMESIDE. The formation of the governments in Romania in 1996 and in Slovakia in 1998 was constrained by strong bipolar opposition in the party system. In Romania, the regime divide structured party competition in 1996. Here, the camp of the former opposition to the Communist regime, joined by the reformed Communist successor party, PD, managed to gain power for the first time since the fall of the Ceaușescu regime (Autengruber 2006, 72–74; see also Gabanyi 1997; Pop-Eleches 2008; Ștefan 2019). While the intensity of the regime divide was decreasing by the end of this legislature, cross-camp cooperation among political parties was absolutely impossible in the context of the 1996 Romanian general elections and the subsequent government formation.

In the context of the 1998 Slovak elections, the gulf between the pro-democratic alliance of SDK, SDL, and SMK on the one side, and the autocratic nationalist camp of the HZDS and SNS on the other, was at least as deep. Despite different political views, the oppositional alliance was united in their goal of toppling the Mečiar government—including the radical right SNS—and putting Slovakia back on track towards democracy, the rule of law, and EU membership (Pridham 2002; Hloušek

and Kopeček 2008; Vachudova and Hooghe 2009). Hence, in these two instances of government formation, ~SAMESIDE refers to a situation in which bipolar opposition structures the party system, but the radical right party does not belong to the same camp as the formateur. Under these circumstances, even the fragmentation of the Romanian and Slovak party systems in the late 1990s did not help the electorally weak radical right parties. Although both the 1996 Romanian and the 1998 Slovak government included a high number of parties, there was neither an ideological nor a numerical incentive for the formateurs to consider the radical right parties as potential partners in government.

In the Czech Republic in 1992 and 1996 and in Romania in 1999 ~SAMESIDE refers to a different situation. Here, the party system is not characterised by a bipolar opposition that constrains government formation to alliances within one camp. Party competition in the Czech Republic was dominated by socio-economic divides, but until the mid-1990s, there were also other salient, cross-cutting divides. Hence, at that time, the Czech party system features multi-polar oppositions rather than a clear-cut bipolar one (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 226–30; Grzymała-Busse 2001; Vodička 2005; see also Balík and Hloušek 2016; Mansfeldová and Lacina 2019). In Romania, the regime divide had cooled considerably towards the end of the transformational decade, not least due to a reorientation of the PDSR. The party increasingly distanced itself from national Communism in the second half of the 1990s in order not to jeopardise Romania's accession to the EU, which was popular among Romanian voters (Pop-Eleches 2008, 470; Vachudova 2008, 871; see also Ştefan 2019). These changes led to an erosion of the barriers between the PDSR and its former allies in the PD, and eased the relation between the PDSR and the constituent parties of the CDR as well. The minority government that formed after the 2000 general elections under the leadership of the PDSR was already supported by the oppositional PNL and the UDMR (Popescu 2003, 332). In these three cases, the ideological distance between radical right parties and formateurs was not reinforced by membership in opposite camps. In both countries, party systems were quite fragmented and governments comprised three or more parties. However, cooperating with small ideologically distant parties of the radical right was not an option for the formateurs, who preferred coalitions with other less radical parties. In fact, the positions of the SPR-RSČ and the PRM were considered so radical that all of their competitors had come to rule out cooperation with them (Čakl and Wollmann 2005, 48; Cinpoes 2015, 288). Hence, while there was no bipolar opposition that constrained coalition formation in these cases, the cordon sanitaire constituted a serious constraint for the two radical right parties in these countries.

In sum, a small seat share did not prevent radical right parties from entering government in the fragmented party systems of Central and Eastern Europe, but it did not help them either if they were ideologically distant from the formateur on the socio-cultural and the socio-economic dimensions. In some cases, the exclusion of

radical right parties from government is further aided by the fact that the party system was structured by bipolar opposition, and they were not in the same camp as the formateur. In others, the ideological distance was not reinforced by bipolar opposition, indicating that the two necessary conditions,  $\sim$ LRECONPROX and  $\sim$ GALTANPROX, have the greatest impact on the exclusion of radical right parties from government, even though these conditions alone are not sufficient for this outcome.

### 8.3 Summary

The empirical analysis provides support for many of the hypotheses on the formation of governments with radical right parties in the period before the first third-generation elections. With only one exception, small radical right parties in fragmented party systems entered government in the emerging post-Communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). However, this same configuration of factors has been observed for radical right parties which remained in opposition. Hence, it can be concluded that due to the high fragmentation of Central and Eastern European party systems during this transformational decade, the poor electoral performance of radical right parties did not prevent them from joining government coalitions.

Ultimately, however, ideological factors play the more important part in explaining why radical right parties make it into government or not. More precisely, simultaneous ideological proximity between radical right parties and the formateur on the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions is necessary for them to be included in government. Alternatively, radical right parties that remained in opposition always lacked ideological proximity on both dimensions (Hypothesis 2a). The presence, or absence, of these conditions constitutes a necessary condition for radical right parties' inclusion in, or exclusion from, government. Thus, the findings even suggest a linear causal relationship between the government participation of radical right parties and their socio-economic and socio-cultural proximity to the formateur in the period before the first third-generation elections. If party systems are characterised by bipolar opposition, then the position of radical right parties in the same, or opposite, camp can reinforce ideological proximity, or distance, respectively. Bipolar opposition, and particularly the regime divide, constrained government formation to coalitions within one camp less frequently than expected. However, the regime divide informed parties' socio-cultural and socio-economic positions and thus affected the necessary conditions for radical right parties' inclusion in, and exclusion from, government. From a broader perspective, the crucial role of the party-level ideological factors in the process of government formation also supports the argument that ideological party competition already existed in the

early phase of the transformation in Central and Eastern European party systems (Hloušek and Kopeček 2010; see also Chapter 2.2).

As regards the composition of governments with radical right parties, the empirical observations confirm Hypothesis 3a: Radical right parties were never involved in oversized coalitions—they only served as junior partners in minimal winning coalitions or as support parties of minority governments. The format of governments with radical right parties tends to correspond to the dominant patterns within each respective country. Whether this initial finding applies to governments with radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe more generally, however, will be evaluated in the analysis of the consolidating decades in following chapter.