

## From Competition to Cooperation in Promoting European Culture: The Council of Europe and the European Union since 1950

*Oriane CALLIGARO, Kiran Klaus PATEL*

The history of European cooperation and integration is replete with jargon and shibboleth. Non-specialists find it difficult to distinguish between the various acronyms and agencies in the institutional alphabet soup that characterizes the field. Students often confuse policies and bodies with similar names, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Europe's multilingual policy does not make things easier, turning for instance the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) into the PAC, the GAP, the GLB, and more recently also the KAП, the KAP, and the BŽÜP, amongst others, with the Ukrainian CCP being one of the most recent additions to the (linguistic!) family.

One of the most frequent confusions – and a minimal criterion for anyone seeking to speak about European cooperation and integration with expertise and authority – is mixing up the European Council with the Council of Europe. The problem is so recurrent that today the Council of Europe even has a section on its website that clarifies that it is not part of the European Union (EU).<sup>1</sup> Or so it is often claimed. On the contrary, this article argues that, for some policy fields, the relationship between the Council of Europe and the EU (together with its predecessors) has, at least at times, been very close, and has been characterized by intense interaction oscillating between cooperation and competition. This holds particularly true for fields in which the European Community (EC) traditionally lacked power and competences, but incrementally became a more important player.

Culture and cultural policy, as the focus of this article, are a case in point. As a policy domain, culture is notoriously difficult to define. Its borders are porous, intersecting with issues that fall into fields as diverse as education, citizenship, research, and even market integration. In this article, we do not start from a preconceived definition of cultural policy; instead, we are interested in the incremental emergence of a sphere of cultural policy at the European level, and more specifically in the role played by the interaction between the European Union's predecessors and the Council of Europe.

In this paper, we distinguish several periods: a first, from the 1950s to the early 1970s, can be summed up as a phase of coexistence. At the time, the Council of Europe was clearly in the driving seat and the EC developed few activities in this nascent European policy domain. The second phase, from the early 1970s to the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, saw a fundamental transformation. The EC increased its activities substantially. Until the early 1980s, the Council of Europe tried to uphold its self-

1. <http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused> [last accessed 15.11.2016].

perception of superiority. In the course of the 1980s, however, the EC clearly gained the upper hand, mainly for legal, financial and other reasons, as we will explain below in more detail. As during the first phase, the intensity of cooperation remained comparably low. A third period, that is still ongoing, started with the Maastricht Treaty and is characterized by growing cooperation between the two organizations. The EU, now equipped with official competences in the field of culture, increasingly sought this partnership, especially during and after its enlargement to Eastern European countries with which the Council of Europe was already collaborating. Most recently, the degree of cooperation has decreased slightly, though it still remains much higher than during the first decades of interaction.

In sum, therefore, the relationship between the two organizations has moved from coexistence and punctual cooperation in the first period to a phase dominated by outright competition, with the EC emerging as the more powerful actor in this policy domain. The Council of Europe, initially in a position of leadership in cultural policies in Western Europe, became the less important player. Building on this asymmetrical relationship, the third period has seen an intensification of cooperation, in which the EC is often formally in the lead and provides financial input, whereas the Council of Europe frequently contributes the necessary expertise.<sup>2</sup> This relationship between the two organizations is central to understanding the histories of both organizations in this policy field; at times, these inter-organizational dynamics were even more important as explanatory factors for changes in European cultural policy than were intra-organizational dynamics.

The existing literature on the contemporary history of cultural policy in Europe has mainly examined intra-societal developments or general trends across societies. In the few studies that have dealt with international organizations, the main focus has been on dynamics within such forums, and not on inter-organizational dynamics, such as between the Council of Europe and the EC. There are only few contributions that have assessed these processes on a robust primary basis.<sup>3</sup> In addition to filling an empirical lacuna, this article also raises an important concern at the levels of interpretation and conceptualization: existing works often follow the thread of the narratives created by the institutions under study.<sup>4</sup> If touching upon this topic at all, they tend to stress the harmonious and cooperative stance of interaction and do not examine the multi-faceted and complex forms of linkage and exchange. Other studies have emphasized the role of non-governmental organizations in promoting Western culture

2. For a typology of forms of interaction, see: K.K. PATEL, *Provincialising European Union: Co-operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective*, in: *Contemporary European History*, 22(2013), pp.649-673.
3. See, most importantly: J. BRUNNER, *Le Conseil de l'Europe à la recherche d'une politique culturelle (1949-1968)*, in: M. LEVY, M. SICARD (eds), *Les lucarnes de l'Europe. Télévisions, cultures, identités, 1945-2005*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2008, pp.29-46; O. CALLIGARO, *From 'European Cultural Heritage' to 'Cultural Diversity'? The Changing Core Values of European Cultural Policy*, in: *Politique Européenne*, 45(2014), pp.60-85.
4. See, for example, some of the contributions in: M. FALSER, W. LIPP (eds), *A Future for Our Past: The 40th Anniversary of European Architectural Heritage Year (1975-2015)*, Henrik Bäßler Verlag, Berlin, 2015.

during the Cold War.<sup>5</sup> In contrast, our interpretation focuses on inter-organizational relations, as well as the links that transnational policy entrepreneurs, networks, and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) had with international organizations since the 1950s. In particular, it highlights the more conflictual dimensions of the interaction between the two organizations.

The basis of our analysis is fresh archival research in the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence, digital archives of the Council of Europe and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, national archives in Great Britain and Germany, as well as several interviews and a broad variety of grey literature.

Culture, it should be added, is by no means the only policy field displaying an overlap in organization and expertise between the Council of Europe and the EC. Two other examples are human rights and regional networking, in both of which the Council of Europe originally also had the lead. Here, too, the EC incrementally gained competence and ultimately superseded the role of the Council of Europe. Moreover, inter-organizational dynamics played an important role in these policy fields too.<sup>6</sup> More research is needed to reveal broader patterns of interaction between the two organizations. It is clear, however, that the findings of this article are relevant beyond the field of cultural policies, and help to clarify the relationship between the two organizations more generally, as well as the various other ways in which international organizations have interacted in post-war Western Europe and beyond.<sup>7</sup>

---

5. See, for example, V. BERGHAHN, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002.
6. See, for instance: V.F. SORIANO, *Facing the Greek Junta: The European Community, the Council of Europe and the Rise of Human Rights Politics in Europe*, in: *European Review of History*, 24(2017), forthcoming; M. KOLB, *The European Union and the Council of Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013; F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, *Competition and Community: Constitutional Courts, Rhetorical Action, and the Institutionalization of Human Rights in the European Union*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2006), pp.1247–1264; B. SCHUMACHER, *The Influence of the Council of Europe on the European Union: Resource Exchange and Domains Restriction as Venues for Inter-Institutional Influence*, in: O. COSTA, K.E. JORGENSEN (eds), *The Influence of International Institutions on the EU: When Multilateralism Hits Brussels*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012, pp.186-206; L. NEUMAYER, 'Dépasser Trianon': les transformations du nationalisme hongrois, de la 'politique de la nation' à la protection des minorités dans l'UE, in: *Politique européenne*, 37(2012), pp.102-131; B. WASSENBERG, *Between Co-operation and Competitive Bargaining: The Council of Europe, Local and Regional Networking, and the Shaping of the European Community's Regional Policies, 1970s-90s*, in: *European Review of History*, 24(2017), forthcoming.
7. See W. KAISER, K.K. PATEL, *Multiple Connections in European Cooperation: International Organizations, Policy Ideas, Practices and Transfers 1967–1992*, in: *European Review of History*, 24(2017), forthcoming.

## 1. Emerging coexistence, 1950s to the early 1970s

Cultural policy has belonged to the Council of Europe's field of activity since its creation in 1949. Article 1 of its statute stressed that the Council of Europe aimed to "achieve a greater unity between its members", and among the fields in which "agreements and common action" were to be pursued, culture held a prominent position.<sup>8</sup> Soon after its creation, the Council of Europe launched several initiatives in the field of culture, broadly defined. Some of its early work focused on education and intellectual exchange between artists and scholars, as issues of international cultural co-operation that harked back to the work of earlier international organizations, for instance the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation during the interwar years.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, art exhibitions came to play an important role among activities of the Council of Europe, the first of which ("Humanist Europe", December 1954 to February 1955) was held in Brussels some five years after the organization's creation. The various programs in the field of culture remained rather disconnected from one another, however; there was no general policy that gave them consistency. Instead, the Council of Europe's cultural policy mainly developed through trial and error.<sup>10</sup>

Nonetheless, the Council of Europe quickly became the most prominent international organization in post-war Western Europe in the field of cultural policy. In 1954, for instance, it issued a European Cultural Convention that focused on the preservation of cultural heritage. The Convention was an important step forward, mainly in two respects. It made the Council of Europe the first European organization to formulate an official declaration on culture during the post-war era. Moreover, it highlighted the dimension of cultural heritage and described a working procedure for its preservation.<sup>11</sup> The next year, in 1955, the concept of "European cultural policy" came to describe the Council of Europe's work officially, and the organization soon tried to create a separate budget for its activities in this field – a goal it realized in 1958.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to these intra-institutional developments, task transfer from other international organizations was the second reason why the Council of Europe slowly emerged as the foremost Western European forum for cultural policies. Inter-organizational competition and transfer therefore already impacted on its profile before the

8. Council of Europe, Statute of the Council of Europe (1949), see online <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/treaties/Word/001.doc> [last accessed 15.11.2016]; on the wider context, see for example: A. TRUNK, *Europa, ein Ausweg. Politische Eliten und europäische Identität in den 1950er Jahren*, Oldenbourg, Munich, 2007, pp.64-81.
9. A. IRIYE, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2002, pp.21-34.
10. J. BRUNNER, op.cit., p.164.
11. European Cultural Convention (1954), see: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/018.htm> [last accessed 15.11.2016]; on the convention, also see O. CALLIGARO, *Negotiating Europe: EU Promotion of Europeaness since the 1950s*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp.82-83.
12. See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc.354: Christopher Hollis, Rapport de la culture, de la science et de l'éducation, 20.06.1955.

EC was created. In the decade before the Treaty of Rome, the Council of Europe was required to manage its relationship with two forums in particular. The first of these was UNESCO, which became an inspiration for some elements of the Council of Europe, and in part also a competitor. Due to its global geographical focus and its different function, the amount of overlap between the two organizations always remained limited, however.

The second organization, a more serious competitor, was the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU, originally established with the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, is best known as an intergovernmental security organization.<sup>13</sup> In its first years, however, it also promoted cultural and social cooperation, and it became particularly active in the field of education. In 1960, the WEU ceded these tasks to the Council of Europe – in a formal sense, the WEU did not abandon its competences in this field, but transferred them to the Council of Europe.<sup>14</sup> Contemporary sources and an older literature have argued that this was simply the result of an attempt to reorganize and rationalize the scene of European international organizations, and to reduce competence overlap and double work.<sup>15</sup> Despite the evidence supporting this claim, one should not overlook the fact that the Council of Europe explicitly pushed for this solution, using the very arguments of reducing “any duplication and confusion between the two organisations”<sup>16</sup> Inter-organizational policy transfer thus stood at the cradle of the Council of Europe’s rise to prominence in this field, just as the EC would later profit from initiatives originating in the Council of Europe as well as from co-operation.

While taking on some of the WEU’s tasks, the Council of Europe did not systematically endeavour to broaden its role *vis-à-vis* other European organizations. The best example of its cooperative stance goes slightly beyond the scope of cultural policies, even if it was closely linked to the concerns defining that field: the Council of Europe’s flag, officially adopted in 1955. To be sure, the flag, with its circle of twelve golden stars on an azure background, was introduced to deepen the institutional identity and visibility of this specific organization; it was meant to epitomize its values and symbolize its actions. Still, the Council of Europe encouraged other European organizations to adopt the emblem. In 1959, two years after the Treaty of Rome, the Council of Europe’s Secretary-General, Lodovico Benvenuti, wrote letters to the President of the European Parliament, Robert Schuman, and to those of the Commissions of Euratom and the European Economic Community (EEC), Étienne

13. S. ROHAN, *The Western European Union: International Politics between Alliance and Integration*, Routledge, New York, 2014; A. DEIGHTON, *Western European Union, 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration*, European Interdependence Research Unit, Reading, 1997.
14. TNA [The National Archives of the United Kingdom], FO 371/154539, e.g. Letter Bevan to Haigh, 20.05.1960 with attachment; with more details TNA, DG 1/83, e.g. WEU, Assembly, Relations between the Assembly of the WEU and the Council of Europe’s, Consultative Assembly, 1956.
15. See, e.g., HAEU [Historical Archives of the European Union], CEAB 4, 114, ECSC, High Authority, Note pour les membres de la Haute Autorité, 1959; P. REUTER, *Organisations européennes*, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1965, pp.152-154.
16. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 148 (1958); also see C. BROSSAT, *La culture européenne: définitions et enjeux*, Bruylant, Brussels, 1999, pp.314-317.

Hirsch and Walter Hallstein. Benvenuti stressed that the emblem suited all European organizations.<sup>17</sup> At the time, the three organizations, which together would form the EC a few years later, were not interested in symbolic or institutional emulation. The rapporteur of the committee put in charge of discussing the issue, the Dutchman Marinus van der Goes van Naters, argued that the symbol was clearly identified with the Council of Europe and could therefore not be taken over — “on ne peut exiger de personne de porter la cravate de l'autre club”!<sup>18</sup>

The main reason for the Council of Europe to propagate its symbol so proactively was the federalist undercurrent characterizing many of its activities and actors. Benvenuti, the Italian Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, was a militant supporter of European union and in steady contact with people like Altiero Spinelli.<sup>19</sup> Generally, Council of Europe cultural activity during the 1950s was characterized by a “messianic” streak.<sup>20</sup> The Council of Europe encouraged normal citizens to fly its flag “as a symbol of the belief” in a united Europe.<sup>21</sup> The hope of creating a federal Europe continued to loom, and as such, joint efforts with other European organizations were deemed more important than stressing the specific role of one’s own institution. Elements of this spirit lingered on until the 1980s. When the EC’s Adonnino Committee recommended the adoption of the Council of Europe’s flag in 1985, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers noted the move “with satisfaction”.<sup>22</sup> In an interview in the late 1990s, Paul Lévy, a high-ranking Council of Europe civil servant involved in the flag’s creation during the 1950s, still considered the EC’s adaptation of the flag “un grand succès du Conseil de l’Europe”.<sup>23</sup>

In contrast, the Treaty of Rome did not equip the EC with any explicit competence in the realm of culture. Cultural commodities and services were treated like any other part of the economy. The EEC Treaty only allowed some export restrictions for the “protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value”.<sup>24</sup> Other initiatives, such as the Commission’s university information policy and its promotion of European studies as a field of study, included educational and cultural dimensions.<sup>25</sup> Still, the EC touched upon culture only marginally, and chiefly through an economic lens.

Despite such modest beginnings, the Council of Europe repeatedly voiced concerns – which also reflects its own precarious situation, since it did not live up to the

17. On the letter, see: M. GÖLDNER, *Politische Symbole der europäischen Integration. Fahne, Hymne, Hauptstadt, Paß, Briefmarke, Auszeichnungen*, Lang, Frankfurt, 1988, p.93; also see HAEU, BAC 118/1986\_1980, Staderini to Benvenuti, 19.02.1960.
18. European Communities, Parliamentary Assembly, Debates, 19.11.1960, p.87; on the general context, see: M. GÖLDNER, op.cit., pp.85-99.
19. D. PREDA, *Verso l’Europa unita. Il ruolo di Lodovico Benvenuti nella costruzione della Comunità europea*, in: *Clio*, 35(1999), pp.449-503.
20. J. BRÜNNER, op.cit., p.169.
21. Quoted in M. GÖLDNER, op.cit., p.90.
22. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, CM/Del/Concl (86)393, Item 4.
23. HAEU, INT 616, Interview with Paul Michel Gabriel Lévy, 04.11.1998-20.05.1999, p.12.
24. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Article 36.
25. O. CALLIGARO, *Negotiating Europe...*, op.cit., pp.19-25.

original hopes associated with it – and by the late 1950s, some actors felt it required fundamental reform.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, some of the EC's initiatives raised questions: in 1961, it started planning cooperation between the universities of its member states and discussed setting up a European university in Florence. The Council of Europe reacted with a Recommendation from its Parliamentary Assembly that proposed integrating this effort into an existing Council of Europe framework. The Parliamentary Assembly critiqued stand-alone EC initiatives and stressed the superiority of the “greater Europe” represented by its eighteen member states.<sup>27</sup> In the course of the next few years, the tone became less anxious – simply because the EC achieved little. The Council of Europe remained the key European actor in the field of cultural policy.<sup>28</sup>

At the time, the European Communities remained reluctant to embrace cultural policy whole-heartedly, mainly for three reasons. Firstly, the member states continued to see culture as their *chasse gardée*. Given the strong role culture and cultural policies had played historically in the rise of national identities and nation-states, they were reluctant to transfer extensive competences in this realm to the international level.<sup>29</sup> Secondly, this was even more the case due to the EC's supranational elements and the federalist tendencies associated with it. During the decade of the Gaullist challenge to the EC, a transfer of competences in a field as sensitive as culture was therefore particularly unlikely.<sup>30</sup> Thirdly, the sheer existence of the Council of Europe and its range of activities paused plans to extend the EC's functions in this field. For staunch supporters of a national prerogative in cultural policy, the Council of Europe was less threatening than the EC thanks to its strictly intergovernmental character. Even if not in a consistent manner, the member states time and again sought to reduce overlap of competences and the work between international organizations – exactly as they had done with regard to the WEU and the Council of Europe a few years earlier. To be sure, the Council of Europe always had many more member states than the EC, and therefore, the argument of overlap never worked perfectly. Still, it would be wrong to overemphasize the difference in geography and geometry. During the second half of the 1960s, the Council of Europe had eleven more members than the EEC, but four of them (the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Ireland) applied to join the Community, and most of the remaining states were rather small (Sweden, Greece, Turkey, Iceland, Austria, Cyprus, Switzerland and Malta). Hence, the idea of avoiding a duplication of work was not without substance.

---

26. For a very critical assessment of the Council of Europe's work at the time see: PAAA [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin], B 20-200/95B, Feine, Vertretung der Bundesrepublik beim Europarat an Auswärtiges Amt, 15.05.1957.
27. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 301 (1961).
28. C. BROSSAT, op.cit., pp.320-321.
29. K.K. PATEL, *Introduction*, in: K.K. PATEL (ed.), *The Cultural Politics of Europe: European Capitals of Culture and European Union since the 1980s*, Routledge, London, 2013, pp.1-15.
30. See on these legal differences and their consequences for European cultural policies: B. DE WITTE, *Cultural Linkages*, in: W. WALLACE (ed.), *The Dynamics of European Integration*, Pinter, London, 1990, pp.192-210.

In sum, cultural policy remained a very minor policy field for all European organizations from the 1950s to the early 1970s, with the Council of Europe as the most important player. Contacts with the EC remained extensive.

## 2. Competition and a change of power balance: Early 1970s to the late 1980s

In the fifteen years after the Hague summit of December 1969, the EC made deeper inroads into cultural policy, and on this basis, turned into the most important institutional actor by the first half of the 1980s. The end of the Gaullist challenge to the EC, the societal changes often associated with “1968”, the Community’s enlargement in 1973 and the dramatic changes in the architecture of internationalism in the Western world at the end of the Bretton Woods regime led to a profound discussion about the EC’s future perspectives. The 1972 Paris Summit announced that economic integration was not an end in itself. In 1973, the Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity celebrated the integration process and emphasized that it was based on common values and the “diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization”.<sup>31</sup> A growing sense of institutional crisis and an erosion of the permissive consensus that had carried integration thus far also formed the background of the Tindemans report of 1975. Under the headline “A positive solidarity”, it argued that “European Union must be experienced by the citizen in his daily life. It must make itself felt in education and culture”. Culture clearly entered the EC’s radar.<sup>32</sup>

Such declarations, one could argue, consisted primarily of grandiloquent words. But there were also some concrete advances. In line with its focus on market integration, two European Parliament (EP) resolutions in 1974 and 1976 called for the abolishment of obstacles hampering the exchange of cultural artifacts and workers in this sector. Seconded by European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law, the Commission approached cultural action primarily from the vantage point of market liberalization and hence through an economic lens. Other initiatives went even further, for instance the Commission’s 1977 proposal arguing for “European rooms” in national museum showcasing artifacts in order to provide citizens with “a broader view of European culture”.<sup>33</sup> While it continued to stress that it did not pursue cultural policy in the strict sense of the term, the EC certainly broached new boundaries.<sup>34</sup>

---

31. Document on European Identity (1973) published in: C. HILL, K.E. SMITH (eds), *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents*, Routledge, New York, 2000, p.94.
32. L. TINDEMANS, *Report on European Union*, in: *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/76, p.12; in general, also see O. CALLIGARO, *Negotiating Europe...*, op.cit., pp.82-87.
33. *Official Journal*, COM(1977) 560 final.
34. U. STAIGER, *The European Capitals of Culture in Context: Cultural Policy and the European Integration Process*, in: K.K. PATEL (ed.), *The Cultural Politics of Europe...*, op.cit., pp.19-38; R. CRAUFURD SMITH, *The Evolution of Cultural Policy in the European Union*, in: P. CRAIG, G. DE BURCA (eds), *The Evolution of EU Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp.869-895.

Against this backdrop, tension between the EC and the Council of Europe increased, but the Council of Europe still felt it could call the shots. In the context of the EC's first enlargement, it stressed in 1971 that it was "more important than ever to insist on the Council of Europe's special task in the field of culture and education".<sup>35</sup> Two years later, when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had emerged as another international forum (and potential competitor), the Council of Europe adopted a resolution emphasizing its primacy in the field of "cultural co-operation, reform of education and European youth policy".<sup>36</sup>

When seeing its superiority threatened, the Council of Europe thus stressed its antecedence and accused the EC of not sticking to an established division of labour. The EC responded to this criticism by denying any overlap and duplication. It acknowledged the role of the Council of Europe. In the aforementioned 1974 resolution, for instance, it adopted a concept of European cultural heritage as originally propagated by the Council of Europe and UNESCO.<sup>37</sup> Also on several other occasions, the EC admitted that it built on the Council of Europe's efforts or was inspired by it. Moreover, the EP in particular called for more cooperation between the two organizations.<sup>38</sup> In 1979, the European Commission told the EP that "cooperation" with the Council of Europe was central and well-established. But the Commission representative added a remark that summarized the new self-perception by the EC:

"La collaboration que nous entretenons avec le Conseil de l'Europe est bonne. Celui-ci doit poursuivre ses efforts pour créer des bases d'action. Il doit rester en contact avec nous. Parfois nous pourrons prendre le train en marche, à d'autres moments nous pourrons financer certains projets qu'il ne peut financer".<sup>39</sup>

At first glance, therefore, the Council of Europe remained in the driving seat. But incrementally, the EC discovered one of the main sources of its power in this policy domain. Whereas the Council of Europe's budget on cultural affairs remained notoriously limited, the EC could use parts of its regular budget for cultural activities – provided it flagged their role for the common market and framed arguments economically. This asymmetry of resources soon impacted massively on the relationship between the two organizations. At the time, however, contacts and conflicts between the two institutions continued to be rather superficial. The EC's advances in the field remained limited, while for the Council of Europe in general, the 1970s was a difficult period.<sup>40</sup> It did not manage to expand its activities in substantial ways, which would have helped to tackle the challenge presented by the EC.

35. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 1971, 23<sup>rd</sup> session, 12<sup>th</sup> sitting 1971, Doc 3017.

36. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 704 (1973), see also, e.g., Recommendations 607 (1975) 940 (1982).

37. *Official Journal*, C 62, 30.05.1974.

38. C. BROSSAT, *op.cit.*, pp.321-325.

39. EC, European Parliament, Débats, Séance du 18 January 1979, p.212.

40. J. BRUNNER, *op.cit.*, p.44; on the Council of Europe more generally during this period, see: B. WASSENBERG, *Histoire du Conseil de l'Europe (1949-2000)*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2012, pp.217-301.

The balance between the two institutions tipped during the early 1980s, when the EC's initiatives that had been launched in the 1970s gained momentum and when new ones were added. The 1983 Stuttgart Declaration on European Union included a long list on how to strengthen "cultural cooperation", including the "closer cooperation between establishments of higher education" and "joint activities in the dissemination of culture, in particular as regards audio-visual methods".<sup>41</sup> During this period, heritage protection turned into a field of EC action.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the EC's national Ministers of culture started to meet informally, and just months after the Stuttgart declaration, at the second of their gatherings, they decided to launch the European Capital of Culture program.<sup>43</sup> In sum, the EC started to develop into a dynamic force in cultural policy.

Actors in the Council of Europe quickly felt that they were losing ground. A recommendation by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly noted in 1982 "the new initiatives for extending European Community activity in the general field of culture and education", while "regretting" that these EC texts "only specifically refer to cultural cooperation at the level of this Community". Council of Europe actors felt excluded and challenged in their organization's primacy.<sup>44</sup> An attempt to increase its budget and expand its cultural programs to counter the EC's activism failed. By the mid-1980s, the Council of Europe had gone a good way in accepting defeat: discussions now revolved around the question of whether the EC could be treated similarly to a Council of Europe member state. The reason for these legal and political acrobatics was simple: the Council of Europe hoped that such integration would keep the EC from developing its own line of cultural policies.<sup>45</sup> For the EC, however, such subordination was unacceptable. Cooperation with the Council of Europe was deemed possible, but the EP in particular pushed for "the gradual creation of a Community policy in the cultural sector".<sup>46</sup>

In the late 1980s, the "constant tendency of the stronger – the European Community – to invade the territory of the weaker" became ever more visible.<sup>47</sup> To avoid being marginalized, the Council of Europe continued to call for more cooperation between the two organizations, and its Parliamentary Assembly repeatedly criticized the Community's reluctance to clarify their respective roles.<sup>48</sup> In October 1984, only a few days after his nomination, the new Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Marcelino Oreja, met the Secretary General of the Commission, Émile Noël, to dis-

41. Bulletin of the European Communities, *Solemn Declaration on European Union: European Council, Stuttgart, 19 June 1983*, p.28.
42. O. CALLIGARO *Negotiating Europe...*, op.cit., pp.79-90.
43. K.K. PATEL (ed.), *The Cultural Politics of Europe...*, op.cit.
44. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 940 (1982); also see the debate in Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 34<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session, 3<sup>rd</sup> sitting, 27.04.1982: Doc. 4868.
45. C. BROSSAT, op.cit., p.329.
46. *Official Journal*, C 342/130, Resolution on Stronger Community Action in the Cultural Sector (Fanti Report), Doc. 1-927/83), 18.11.1983.
47. B. DE WITTE, op.cit., p.203.
48. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 994 (1984).

cuss ways to improve their organizations' cooperation.<sup>49</sup> Noël remained wary, arguing that a "qualitative jump" was hardly achievable.<sup>50</sup>

There was obviously a discrepancy between the Council of Europe's and the EC's expectations. While the Council of Europe, increasingly losing ground, sought greater cooperation, the EC's Commission, aware of its power, largely ignored these efforts. In 1985, at the request of the Council of Europe, both institutions appointed high-level contact groups "to explore the feasibility of making further progress in cooperation".<sup>51</sup> Two years later, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers decided to call upon the EC more formally and assigned the Secretary General Oreja to prepare concrete proposals. These proposals mainly concerned improved communication and more transparency within the two organizations' respective projects.<sup>52</sup> The President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, politely welcomed the Council of Europe's initiative. However, this agreement only took the form of an exchange of letters and had no binding effect.<sup>53</sup> The positive reaction of the EC was little more than a diplomatic move to assuage the Council of Europe's fears. Council of Europe officials felt that their colleagues from the EC Commission treated them with contempt; as if the Council of Europe was "an institution which has ideas but no means to implement them".<sup>54</sup> If not contempt, EC officials at least tended to be disinterested in the Council of Europe's hopes for greater cooperation.

At the time, the EC focused on fighting to establish its projects at the EC level and hence spent little time thinking about its relationship with the Council of Europe.<sup>55</sup> By and large, the EC intensified its cultural policy initiatives during the second half of the 1980s. The first European Capitals of Culture took place in Athens in 1985 and swiftly developed into a flagship EC program.<sup>56</sup> In general, the Delors Commission (1985-1995) put culture high on its agenda and launched several initiatives in this field. As well as the European Capitals of Culture, the EC became engaged in various other initiatives, including the safeguarding of heritage and audio-visual policy.<sup>57</sup>

---

49. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 36<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session, Official Report, 20<sup>th</sup> Sitting, 3 October 1984, Speech Oreja, p.582.
50. HAEU, EN 874, European Commission, Émile Noël, Note de Dossier, 26.10.1984; Entretien avec Monsieur Oreja, Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Europe, 09.10.1984 (own translation from French).
51. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1017 (1985).
52. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Resolution 5(85), 25.04.1985.
53. Exchange of letters between the Council of Europe and the European Community concerning the consolidation and intensification of cooperation, 16.06.1987, in: *Official Journal*, L 273, 26.09.1987, pp.35-39.
54. Interview with Raymond Weber, Director for Culture and Heritage, Council of Europe (1991-2001), by phone, 03.11.2014.
55. Interview with Jean-Michel Baer, Director "Cultural Action and Audio-visual Policy", European Commission (1994-2004), by phone, 31.10.2014.
56. K.K. PATEL (ed.), *The Cultural Politics of Europe...*, op.cit.
57. O. CALLIGARO *Negotiating Europe...*, op.cit., p.42.

This quick extension of EC activity eventually led to an intense competition with the Council of Europe in one field in particular: the regulation of broadcasting. As on so many other issues, the Council of Europe took the first initiatives, which later inspired the EC. In this particular case, a specific dynamic fuelled the rivalry between the two organizations: some governments of EC member states, most importantly those of the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark, favoured the less binding legal instruments proposed by the Council of Europe and thus hoped to block the EC Commission's more interventionist proposals on regulation. They therefore argued that the Commission's "Television without Frontiers" directive proposed in April 1986 was superfluous, since the Council of Europe's idea of a Convention on Trans-frontier Television was already well advanced.<sup>58</sup> This tactic turned into a "regulatory race" between the two organizations.<sup>59</sup> In the end, however, experts studying these proposals in both arenas worked hard in order to make them compatible with one another. In 1989, the EC adopted a directive which was significantly less protectionist than the original draft and largely emulated the Council of Europe's Convention, which had been established a few months earlier.<sup>60</sup> Clearly, the Council of Europe impacted on the evolution of the EC's cultural action in more than one way: while some promoters of EC policies in this field drew their inspiration from Council of Europe's initiatives and strove to adapt them at the EC level, others used the Council of Europe to block cultural initiatives in the EC which they felt were too ambitious.

In this period, the EC even started to take the lead in some projects—which also points at the fundamental shift in the power balance between the two organizations. Again, audio-visual policies can serve as an example. In 1986, the Commission launched its pilot project MEDIA, aiming at the development, promotion, and distribution of European audio-visual works.<sup>61</sup> The program excluded the support of production (i.e. subsidies for the production of audio-visual works through member state funds were forbidden) as the compromise struck between the various camps within the EC.<sup>62</sup> In 1988, the Council of Europe created EURIMAGES, with the task of facilitating European cinematographic co-productions.<sup>63</sup> EURIMAGES was based on a partial agreement: Council of Europe member states were not obliged to participate and the project's budget was constituted by voluntary contributions from the

---

58. See K. K. PATEL and O. CALLIGARO, *The True 'EURESCO'? The Council of Europe, Trans-national Networking, and the Emergence of EC Cultural Policies, 1970–90*, in: *European History Review*, 24(2017), forthcoming.
59. D. KREBBER, *Europeanisation of Regulatory Television Policy: The Decision-Making Process of the Television Without Frontiers Directives from 1989 and 1997*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2002, p.104.
60. K.K. PATEL, O. CALLIGARO, op.cit.
61. European Commission, COM(86)255 final, "Action programme for the European audio-visual media products industry, 26.04.1986.
62. R. COLLINS, *Broadcasting and Audio-Visual Policy in the European Single Market*, John Libbey, London, 1994, pp.94-100.
63. Council of Europe, CM 88(164), Committee of Ministers, Resolution (88)15 setting up a European Support Fund for the co-production and distribution of creative cinematographic and audio-visual works "EURIMAGES", 26.10.1988.

various parties involved. The Council of Europe and the EC explicitly discussed the division of labour in the framework of MEDIA and EURIMAGES, particularly under the auspices of the European Year of Television and Cinema in 1988, which they co-organized.<sup>64</sup> In this context, decision-making mechanisms mattered: while the EC's Council took its decision by unanimity, the Council of Europe's Cultural Convention allowed the signature of partial agreements. Since unanimity in favour of a support for production could not be reached in the EC's framework, the countries willing to create this fund moved their project to the Council of Europe as the more flexible institutional venue. This was a case of "European variable geometry": EC member states resorted to another European organization in order to achieve goals unachievable within the EC, while at the same time, the EC confirmed its role as the forum with the more legally binding form of governance.<sup>65</sup>

While competition thus formed the main characteristic of the inter-organizational relationship, the late 1980s also saw some attempts to increase friendly cooperation. Such efforts did not lead to much, however. One of the elements of the agreement reached between Oreja and Delors in their letter exchange of 1987 was the organization of regular high-level quadripartite meetings, bringing together the Council of Europe's Secretary General and the President of its Council of Ministers and, for the EC, the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council. Actual meetings held on this basis revealed the asymmetry between the two organizations. Both Presidencies were always represented, but while the Secretary General of the Council of Europe also always attended, the Commission usually sent a subordinate official. Moreover, these meetings tended to be short, formal, and superficial. They were even discontinued between 1991 and 1995.<sup>66</sup> In her reports from 1989/1992, Secretary General Catherine Lalumière regretted that very little progress had been made:

"the Secretary General expressed disappointment that there were only rare examples of projects carried out jointly by the Council of Europe and the European Community as envisaged in the arrangement of 1987".<sup>67</sup>

She also "stressed the need to develop the practice of more formal meetings held at a high level, particularly in fields such as culture and education, environment and heritage, youth and the audio-visual sector". At the highest level, the relations between the two organizations were improving, with more regular communication between Lalumière and Delors, who were personally acquainted and had both served in the French Socialist government in the early 1980s. However, disinterest was deeply rooted in the administrative culture of both organizations, particularly in the

---

64. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 887 (1987) on European Cinema and Television Year; *Ibid.*, CM/Del/Concl(88)420, Committee of Ministers, Conclusions of the 420<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, 24-26.10.1988.
65. R. COLLINS, *op.cit.*, pp.130-132.
66. M. KOLB, *op.cit.*, p.50.
67. Council of Europe, CM90 (136), Committee of Ministers, Cooperation between the Council of Europe and the European Community (January-June 1990), Report of the Secretary General, Mrs Catherine Lalumière, pp.4-5; CM(92)190, Cooperation between the Council of Europe and the European Community (January-July 1992), Report by Lalumière, p.6.

EC. While the European Community cultivated its “superiority complex”, the Council of Europe suffered from a “inferiority complex”.<sup>68</sup>

During this period, the only regular form of cooperation in the field of cultural policy focused on the European Heritage Days, where the EC contributed financially to one of the Council of Europe’s initiatives. This cooperation commenced in 1991.<sup>69</sup> The EC accepted the Council of Europe’s request for financial support because the initiative was in line with its own ambitions in the sector, as a Commission official put it in a recent interview:

“Our common goal was to highlight the unity of European culture. European culture did not stop at the frontiers of the EC. So it was a way for the EC to support the promotion of European culture at a larger scale. It made Europe visible at a time and in territories in which the EC could not be visible”.<sup>70</sup>

For the EC, cooperation with the Council of Europe was thus seen as a means to play an ever more important role. The division of labour and the supremacy of the Council of Europe, that had characterized the inter-organizational relationship up until the early 1980s, had long ceased to exist.

### 3. The Maastricht Treaty and beyond: increasing cooperation boosted by EU enlargement

The Maastricht Treaty substantially increased the EU’s competences on culture. Its Article 128 stated that the Community and its member states should foster cooperation with competent international organizations in the sphere of culture, chiefly with the Council of Europe. From 1993 onwards, contacts between the EU and the Council of Europe intensified significantly. This was mainly due to a change in the EU’s attitude, for which there were two reasons. For one, the EU felt it had to strengthen its relationship with Eastern European countries in a post-Cold War world. In the field of culture, this new attitude led to joint initiatives with the Council of Europe, which regularly spearheaded cooperation with Eastern European countries. For another, the Maastricht Treaty’s legal basis allowed the EU to develop its first fully-fledged cultural programs. To conceive these, however, it needed the experience of the Council of Europe.

The first of these two factors reflected the new world of the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War. The conclusions of the EC’s Copenhagen Council of 1993 called

---

68. Interview with Catherine Lalumière, Secretary General of the Council of Europe (1989-1994), by phone, 03.12.2014.

69. Council of Europe, CM90 (136), Committee of Ministers, Cooperation between the Council of Europe and the European Community (January-June 1991), Report by the Secretary General, Mrs Catherine Lalumière, pp.23-24.

70. Interview with Aristotelis Bouratsis, Director Unit “Audio-visual Policy, Culture and Sport” DG X, European Commission (1994-2000), by phone, 06.11.2014.

for programs to be opened up to Central and Eastern European countries.<sup>71</sup> The long-term perspective of enlargement made the Council of Europe a crucial partner for the EU, since the Council of Europe had already started to gather experience by incorporating these states while the EU was not yet ready to do so. Many countries of the former Communist bloc entered the Council of Europe between 1993-1995, giving it a lot of experience in dealing with these nations. The EU was interested in taking advantage of these contacts and of the Council of Europe's expertise to pursue its own agenda in this region.<sup>72</sup> The first EU-Council of Europe joint programs of the 1990s were mainly focused on democratization and legal reform in ex-Communist countries.<sup>73</sup> At a more modest level, both organizations also set up joint initiatives in the field of culture. Between 1993 and 1995, several schemes were financed largely by the Commission and managed by the Council of Europe. These included cultural heritage programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the initiative "Aid for libraries in the East", and the restoration of Sofia's Cathedral.<sup>74</sup> Cooperation on these projects did not always run smoothly at the administrative level. Some Council of Europe officials felt that the relationship was too asymmetrical and that the EU in fact "subcontracted" the Council of Europe.<sup>75</sup> EU officials, on the other hand, argued that the contribution of the EU was not made visible enough. Despite such quarrels, these projects initiated a long-lasting cooperation of the two organizations in Eastern Europe. Both the Maastricht Treaty (as the EU's springboard for new activities on culture) and the challenges of the transition into the post-Cold War era were therefore necessary in order to trigger substantial cooperation between the Council of Europe and the EU.

However, it was not just the Council of Europe's easier access to Central and Eastern European countries that explains the new forms of cooperation. In order to become more active in the field, the EU also depended on the Council of Europe's expertise and its long-lasting relations with government representatives, cultural networks, and experts. In 1994/1995, the newly created Directory General in charge of information, culture, and education invited Council of Europe officials from the Cultural Heritage division to discuss the Commission's proposal on future cultural programs.<sup>76</sup> Again, personal networks help to explain the intensification of cooperation at certain moments. In 1994, Oreja, who had served as Secretary General of the

71. European Commission, SN 180/1/93 REV 1, The European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22.06.1993, Conclusions of the Presidency – Copenhagen.
72. European Commission, COM (1989) 124 final, Communication on Relations Between the Community and the Council of Europe, 7 2(ii); COM (1995) 567 final, Communication on the European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy: From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond, p.23.
73. T. JORIS, J. VANDENBERGHE, *The Council of Europe and the European Union: Natural Partners or Uneasy Bedfellows?*, in: *Columbia Journal of European Law*, 1(2008), pp.2-40, here pp.23-25.
74. Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, 15<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Culture Committee of the Council for Cultural Cooperation (30 September-2 October 1997), Report by Mr George Lycourgos, p.3.
75. M. KOLB, op.cit., p.38.
76. Council of Europe, CM(96)41, Committee of Ministers, Cooperation between the Council of Europe and the European Community (August-December 1995), Report by the Secretary General, pp.26-27.

Council of Europe during 1984-1989, was appointed EU Commissioner for Culture. As officials from both organizations underline, his personal knowledge of the Council of Europe and its activities facilitated their cooperation.<sup>77</sup> In a similar vein, the European Parliament in 1995 invited Council of Europe officials to discuss a Commission proposal.<sup>78</sup> Cooperation thus intensified at several levels.

During the period between the early 1970s and late 1980s, the Council of Europe had expressed its fear of being marginalized. It had repeatedly demanded to be involved or at least better informed about the EU's initiatives. It was therefore highly interested in this new form of cooperation, all the more so since the EU now had a dedicated budget for cultural programs. The Council of Europe hoped to benefit from these new financial resources that the EU had received on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty. The very nature of the two organizations explains the precise form of their cooperation. Because of its lack of resources and its intergovernmental setup, the Council of Europe was above all a laboratory of ideas. In interaction with governmental and non-governmental actors, it produced knowledge, know-how, and transnational contacts dedicated to culture.<sup>79</sup> The European Commission, responsible for developing the EU's cultural programs, had broader legal competences, more resources, and a different administrative culture that left less space and time for conceptual work. As the Commission official in charge of the Cultural programs in the 1990s put it in a recent interview:

“We at the Commission, we are managers, we are under pressure, we have less time to think. The Council of Europe has the possibility to develop reflections on a larger scale”<sup>80</sup>

The Council of Europe's expertise thus served as a resource on which the EU could draw. This is also true for the identification of and dialogue with cultural stakeholders, which became an important dimension of post-Maastricht EU cultural policy. Since the 1980s, the Council of Europe had helped to create transnational networks representing different cultural industries and artistic activities.<sup>81</sup> In its exchanges with the European Commission, the Council of Europe had always stressed the importance of such networks in developing a more democratic and efficient European cultural policy.<sup>82</sup> From the second half of the 1990s onwards, and even more since the 2000s, the European Commission has involved these networks in designing and implementing its cultural policy. Because of its financial resources and the fast extension of its competences, the EU became the main interlocutor of most of these networks, which had previously worked mainly with the Council of Europe. In this process, the EU

---

77. Interviews with Raymond Weber, Catherine Lalumière and Jean-Michel Baer.

78. Council of Europe, CM(96)41, Committee of Ministers, Cooperation between the Council of Europe and the European Community (August-December 1995), Report by the Secretary General, p.27.

79. L. TERRILLON-MACKAY, *Ten Years of Cultural Co-operation in Europe 1989-1999: An Outside View Analysis*, Conseil pour la coopération culturelle, Strasbourg, 2001, p.5.

80. Interview with Aristotelis Bouratsis.

81. A.M. AUTISSIER, *L'Europe de la culture, Histoire(s) et Enjeux*, Actes Sud, Paris, 2005, pp.299-319.

82. Interview with Raymond Weber.

took up ideas, long harboured by the Council of Europe, of a more locally-rooted cultural policy that built on the cooperation with professionals from the field.<sup>83</sup>

During the first decade of the new millennium, cooperation between the two organizations deepened further and their approaches to culture converged somewhat, mainly as a result of the EU's Eastern enlargement. The April 2001 Joint Declaration on Cooperation and Partnership was an important step in this direction, since it allowed for a more systematic approach to joint programming and priority-setting. Cultural programs became part of the pre-accession strategy of the EU, and in implementing this approach, the EU sought to collaborate with the Council of Europe. The new intensity of cooperation also rubbed off on the EU's definition and use of culture. For the Council of Europe, culture was chiefly a tool to spread Western standards in the fields of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Candidate countries needed to live up to these standards before entering the Council of Europe. The EU basically adopted this approach.<sup>84</sup> A fitting example of this is the Regional Program on Cultural and Natural Heritage in South East Europe, launched in 2003 as a cooperation between the European Commission and the Council of Europe. The program focused on the post-conflict Balkan area: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo, as well as Bulgaria and Romania until their EU accession in 2007, and it stressed the role of heritage in cooperation and reconciliation processes.<sup>85</sup> This approach was strongly influenced by the Council of Europe, particularly by its "Value of Cultural Heritage for Society" concept, which eventually led to the Faro Convention of 2005.<sup>86</sup> Aside from this social dimension, heritage was attributed a "Europeanizing" effect: the program proposed a European approach to heritage in terms of standards and practices and defined the regional heritage at stake as specifically European.<sup>87</sup> Again, this method reflected the traditional approach of the Council of Europe, which was in charge of managing this project. In the wider EU/Council of Europe partnership on heritage in South East Europe, which still exists today, the Council of Europe was mainly in charge of conceptualizing and implementing, while the European Commission acted primarily as a funder. In doing so, however, it implicitly embraced the Council of Europe's approach at the level of contents.

The EU Eastern enlargement and its increased cooperation with the Council of Europe urged both organizations to further clarify and institutionalize their relationship. They thus strove to avoid the discontent that had arisen during the 1990s. In 2004, more than half of the member states of the Council of Europe joined the EU, which completely changed the balance of power between the two organizations. EU

83. A.M. AUTISSIER, op.cit., pp.339-345.

84. T. JORIS, J. VANDENBERGHE, op.cit., pp.12-14.

85. C. VOS, *The Ideals and Pragmatics of European Heritage. The Policy and Practice of the Regional Heritage Program in Serbia*, in: K.K. PATEL (ed.), *The Cultural Politics of Europe...*, op.cit., pp.179-197.

86. Council of Europe, CM(2005)164, Committee of Ministers, Faro Declaration on the Council of Europe's Strategy for Developing Intercultural Dialogue, 945 Meeting, 9 November 2005, p.7.

87. C. VOS, op.cit., p.180.

member states were now able to reach the majority of votes within the Council of Europe, thus undermining the latter's independence. The Council of Europe reacted to this new constellation in 2005 by organizing a summit of its heads of states and governments, to which it invited the EU. The summit explored ways to strengthen the inter-organizational links, especially in areas of common interest, including culture. The negotiations ultimately culminated in a memorandum of understanding, signed in 2007.<sup>88</sup> This memorandum offered a new framework of cooperation and political dialogue, especially designed to help EU member states to make better use of the Council of Europe's instruments and institutions. The new members of the EU, which had all become members of the Council of Europe before their EU accession, were familiar with the Council of Europe's setting of standards, which had played an important role in their democratization processes and, indirectly, in their paths to become EU members. As a result, these new member states brought with them their "fresher" knowledge and experience of the Council of Europe's norms and methods, hence encouraging enhanced cooperation.<sup>89</sup>

This institutionalization of Council of Europe-EU relations had a strong impact on cultural policy. In its 2006 decision on the Culture program, the EU introduced for the first time an article on joint programs with other international organizations, mentioning UNESCO and the Council of Europe in particular. This decision finally provided a legal basis for practices which had been going on already for a number of years. Moreover, personal networks again came to play an important role. In 2006, Robert Palmer, who had worked with the European Commission on matters of cultural policy for many years, became Director of Culture and Heritage at the Council of Europe. As an independent consultant, Palmer had been key in developing the EU's flagship program on Capitals of Culture during the 1990s.<sup>90</sup> In the reverse path of Oreja a decade previously, he now brought to the Council of Europe his first-hand knowledge of the EU's cultural policy. The inter-organizational mobility of experts and officials contributed to a better mutual understanding and enhanced collaboration between the two organizations. Finally, the EU started to have expertise that were of interest to the Council of Europe.<sup>91</sup> In this sense, the EU became more dominant, and it appears that the relationship now developed more smoothly than during the 1980s and early 1990s.

These different developments explain why the cooperation between the EU and the Council of Europe made a qualitative jump after 2007. While in the previous decade, it was usually the Council of Europe which solicited the support of the EU

---

88. Council of Europe, CM(2007)74, Committee of Ministers, 117<sup>th</sup> Session of the Committee of Ministers (Strasbourg, 10-11.05.2007) – Memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union.

89. E. CORNU, *The Impact of Council of Europe Standards on the European Union*, in: R.A. WESSEL, S. BLOCKMANS (eds), *Between Autonomy and Dependence : the EU Legal Order under the Influence of International Organisations*, Asser Press, The Hague, 2013, pp.113-129, p.204.

90. K.K. PATEL, *Integration by Interpellation: The European Capitals of Culture and the Role of Experts in EU Cultural Policies*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(2013), pp.538-554.

91. Interviews with Raymond Weber and Jean-Michel Baer.

for programs it had designed, the EU now became increasingly proactive. The EU's 2004 enlargement goes a long way in explaining this new approach. The resulting dynamics can be observed in the EU's Eastern Partnership, which concerned Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Since 2007, the Council of Europe had developed cultural cooperation programs in these countries, under the so-called Kyiv Initiative, and immediately sought support from the EU. A pilot project for the Rehabilitation of Cultural Heritage in Historic Towns was jointly launched in 2009 with the European Commission. Once this pilot phase had been completed, the initiative was integrated in the EU's Eastern Partnership Culture Program, which implied a much stronger involvement of the EU. In 2015, both organizations launched their joint program COMUS (Community-Led Urban Strategies in Historic Towns) in the region. Since it was part of its Eastern Partnership Culture Program, the EU did not simply act as a funder here, as it often had done in the past. It co-managed the project, which followed the norms and objectives of its neighbourhood policy, in partnership with the Council of Europe.

The intensification of the collaboration between the EU and the Council of Europe did not materialize only in Eastern Europe, but also in the very definition of culture in the policies undertaken. In 2000, the Council of Europe adopted a Declaration on Cultural Diversity, confirming its commitment to cultural plurality in Europe. Its cultural program had always given more importance to the integration of migrants and minorities in the cultural life of European societies in comparison to the EU's approach.<sup>92</sup> The successive territorial enlargements of 2004 and 2007 dramatically increased cultural diversity within the EU, with the accession of member states holding variegated religious and historical heritages and including important minorities, especially Roma populations. In the face of this change, the EU had to revise the conceptual bases of its cultural policy, which had so far constituted an essentialist vision of European culture, conceived in terms of high arts and common historical heritage.<sup>93</sup> The promotion of diversity gained in importance, and culture was increasingly associated with social and political functions, especially in the development of a more inclusive understanding of European citizenship.<sup>94</sup>

One of the concepts used to design this renewed cultural policy was "intercultural dialogue", an approach with which the Council of Europe had been working since the early 2000s.<sup>95</sup> In 2004, the newly appointed EU Commissioner in charge of Education and Culture proposed the organization of a European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (EYID) in 2008. Once again, the EU relied on the expertise of the Council of Europe, which contributed significantly to the conceptual background of the event,

---

92. See, for example: K. ROBINS, *The challenge of transcultural diversities – Final report of the transversal study on the theme of cultural policy and cultural diversity*, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2006; Interview with Raymond Weber.

93. O. CALLIGARO, *From 'European Cultural Heritage' ...*, op.cit.

94. U. STAIGER, *New agendas? Culture and citizenship in EU policy*, in: *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 1(2009), pp.1-16.

95. J. ENDRES, *Das Konzept des «interkulturellen Dialogs» bei Europarat, Europäischer Union und UNESCO: eine Bestandsaufnahme*, Staatssekretariat für Bildung und Forschung SBF, Bern, 2010.

especially with its White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue published in 2008 on the occasion of the EYID.<sup>96</sup> This paper emphasized the role of cultural initiatives in the management of diversity and the integration of minorities in European societies. In the wake of the EYID, the EU and the Council of Europe agreed on joint action to be taken on these issues. An important domain of cooperation was the promotion of Roma culture, with the European Academic Network for Romani Studies created in 2009 as an initiative of the European Commission, and the program “Cultural Resources for Roma inclusion” launched in 2013. These joint projects relied heavily on the results of the work on Roma education and inclusion carried out by the Council of Europe, and on their existing networks.<sup>97</sup>

Most recent developments have seen a certain divergence in terms of policy content, however. In 2008, the two organizations set up the Intercultural Cities program on managing diversity in urban contexts.<sup>98</sup> The Commission did not renew its financial support after the pilot phase of 2008-2011. It disliked that in the program’s implementation, culture, understood in terms of artistic activities, played a marginal role. Instead, social and economic concerns took centre stage, for example in the program’s promotion of social cohesion and its efforts to integrate and represent migrants in different fields of city life.<sup>99</sup> Another reason for this recent tendency to loosen the links between two organizations is the ongoing reform of the Council of Europe, which has been the main priority of Thorbjørn Jagland, its Secretary General since September 2009. One of the objectives of this reform, which started in 2010, is to “concentrate the Council of Europe’s work on fewer projects, selected according to the highest added value and comparative advantage”.<sup>100</sup> In this process, the weight of culture has significantly decreased. Until 2011, there existed a dedicated Directorate of Culture and Cultural and Natural Heritage. The organizational chart was then simplified through the creation of three main axes, highlighting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as the organization’s priorities. The new Department of Democratic Governance, Culture and Diversity was placed under the democracy axis, the priorities of which are the promotion of democratic governance and sustainable democratic societies. This re-organization, which involved a decreased budget for cultural projects, subordinated culture to other political goals.<sup>101</sup>

Seen against the backdrop of longer developments, this recent reform leads to a paradox and an irony: the Council of Europe, the first European organization with

96. O. CALLIGARO, *From ‘European Cultural Heritage’...*, op.cit., pp.75-79.

97. See “European Academic Network on Romani Studies” on the Council of Europe’s website: [http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/romastudies/Default\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/romastudies/Default_en.asp) [last accessed on 15.11.2016].

98. “Intercultural Cities programme” on the Council of Europe’s website: <http://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/> [last accessed on 15.11.2016].

99. Interview with Irina Guidokova, Head of Division “Cultural Policy, Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue”, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 06.02.2014.

100. “Council of Europe reform” on the Council of Europe’s website: [http://www.coe.int/t/reform/timeline\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/reform/timeline_en.asp) [last accessed on 15.11.2016].

101. Interview with Irene Weidmann, former Project Manager “Art Exhibitions of the Council of Europe”, now Project Manager “Culture Project Roma”, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 06.02.2014.

fully-fledged cultural competences, is now reducing its involvement in this field, while the EU, largely absent from the field of cultural policy until the 1980s, has become the most influential actor in this policy domain at the European level. And, ironically, the Council of Europe now stresses much more social and political goals, whereas the EU insists on keeping artistic activities in its definition of culture, despite the strong economic and instrumental spin the EU has always given to cultural policy programs.<sup>102</sup>

## Conclusion

From the 1950s to the 1990s, cooperation between the Council of Europe and the EC/EU on culture developed slowly. The very different nature of the two organizations and their respective approaches to culture explains long periods of coexistence with a low intensity of exchange. Over time, the Council of Europe turned into a laboratory of ideas for the EU and after the end of the Cold War, it helped to create cultural contacts with the EC/EU's Eastern European neighbours. The reasons for the changes in this relationship lie in the competences specific for each of the two institutions, their decision-making mechanisms, their legal setup, concrete initiatives, but most importantly in their respective material resources. Cooperation hinged on functional needs as well as on personal networks, whereas open competition was always dampened by a commitment—particularly on the part of the Council of Europe—to a larger, “trans-organizational”, common European good. The Council of Europe, in the field of culture like in others, has long played the role of standard-setter. The EU, through its new powers and enlargement, turned into the main actor in the field of European cultural policy. Its financial resources did not just make it attractive to stakeholders on the ground, but also to the Council of Europe, which increasingly has to rely on joint programs with the EU to conduct its cultural initiatives. Certainly the Council of Europe's expertise remain relevant and recognized. Over the past three decades, however, the EU has developed a fully-fledged cultural policy with its own norms, practices, priorities and networks. From being a latecomer in the field of cultural policy, it has turned into the new standard-setter—at the expense of the Council of Europe.

102. K.K. PATEL (ed.), *The Cultural Politics of Europe...*, op.cit.

# Studies on the European Union

Edited by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels



## The New Politics of the European Union Budget

Edited by Stefan Becker,  
Univ.-Prof. Dr. Michael W. Bauer and  
Alfredo De Feo

2017, vol. 12, 297 pp., pb., € 64.00  
ISBN 978-3-8487-3500-6  
eISBN 978-3-8452-7803-2  
[nomos-shop.de/28265](http://nomos-shop.de/28265)

In recent years, the EU budget has become more controversial, more flexible and more fragmented. This volume brings together contributions from scholars and practitioners that take stock of EU fiscal policy against the backdrop of the Lisbon Treaty and the financial and economic crisis.



## Differentiated Integration at the EU Member State Level

An Empirical Comparison of European Integration Theories

By Dr. Thomas Duttle  
2016, vol. 11, 248 pp., pb., € 59.00  
ISBN 978-3-8487-3155-8  
eISBN 978-3-8452-7525-3  
[nomos-shop.de/27492](http://nomos-shop.de/27492)

This book breaks new ground by providing the first large-N analysis of the extent of legal differentiation at the level of EU countries, by carrying out an empirical comparison of the major European integration theories, and by providing systematic hypothesis testing based on the new EUDIFF datasets.



Academic research and scholarly publications are also available on our online platform:  
[www.nomos-elibrary.de](http://www.nomos-elibrary.de)

To order please visit [www.nomos-shop.de](http://www.nomos-shop.de),  
send a fax to (+49) 7221/2104-43 or contact your local bookstore.  
Returns are at the addressee's risk and expense.

