

3 Analytical Framework

To recap, the research question of this work is: How and under which conditions are transnational social movements successful in strengthening the human rights accountability of multilateral development banks? This question is analogous to and builds on existing works on socialization with a focus on causal mechanisms (Schimmelfennig, 2005; Zürn & Checkel, 2005). According to Zürn and Checkel (2005), “A common motive for invoking ‘mechanisms’ is to clarify what happens between a cause and its effect, that is, to analyze in detail how (emphasis added by the author) the former relates to the latter” (p. 1048). Researchers that work with causal mechanisms also highlight the importance of scope conditions. This is the under which conditions part of the question, as “the goal here is to identify the conditions under which” actors¹ “trigger certain mechanisms that lead to socialization” (Zürn & Checkel, 2005, p. 1055). This chapter presents the analytical framework for the analysis of my two cases. Specifically, it presents the parts necessary to construct a sound and empirically testable causal mechanism of social movement influence on MDBs. The aim of this chapter is to conceptualize each part of the mechanism and to theorize how these parts are connected. The chapter is structured along five sections. First, I elaborate on the outcome (O) of interest. This outcome is socialization, conceptualized as organizational policy and institutional reform toward comprehensive human rights accountability. I draw on the concept of “legalization” (Abbott et al., 2000) to theorize the scope and depth of such reforms. In section 3.2, I elaborate on the scope conditions under which movements may effect political and institutional change. Bridging IR and social movement scholarship, I structure these scope conditions according to properties of the actor seeking change, properties of the target organization, the issue, and the discursive opportunity structure. Among the scope conditions, one stands out: counter mobilization. I elaborate upon and differentiate counter mobilization by the MDB bureaucracy and that by MDB member states (3.3). This scope condition shares with all others that the success of TSM tactics depends on its occurrence and strength. Different from the other scope

1 In the quote from Zürn and Checkel, the *actors* are international institutions. However, my interest is in the influence of transnational social movements. Of course, different actors could turn into change agents, depending on the research interest and context.

conditions, though, counter mobilization represents the dynamic interplay between the TSM and the MDB. Thus, it is the only scope condition that is present along all parts of the mechanism. Next, I draw on rational choice (RCI) and sociological institutionalism (SI) with their corresponding logics of action to distill how exactly movement tactics translate into institutional change (3.4). While both, RCI and SI, are broad in nature and comprise a set of assumptions, I concentrate on those propositions relevant for my causal mechanism of social movement advocacy toward MDBs. The fifth section of this chapter then presents the synthesis of the preceding efforts, integrating socialization outcome and scope conditions with movement tactics (see Ch.2) to derive the full causal mechanism connecting social movement tactics to MDB socialization (3.5). To put an overview of this synthesis upfront, the following table summarizes the theorized causal mechanism connecting movement engagement and MDBs into comprehensive human rights accountability.

Graph 2: Overview – A Causal Mechanism of Social Movement Influence on MDBs

Socialization Process							Socialization Outcome
Cause	Causal Chain	Part 1		Part 2		Part 3	
		Part 1a →	Part 1b →	Part 2a →	Part 2b →	Part 3a →	Part 3b →
TSM Joint Activity	Actors and Activities	TSM	Decision-makers of Liberal MS	TSM	Decision-makers of Liberal MS	Decision-makers of Liberal MS	MDB BoD
		Disruptive tactics towards MDB	Worry about MDB legitimacy + open up	Convent. tactics towards liberal MS	Are persuaded by TSM demands	Threaten MDB to cut funding	Worries about funding cut and adopts Reforms
	Scope Conditions	- Org. Resources - Issue - Support from org. envt. - Counter Mobilization		- Access - Crisis - Moral/Epist. Authority - Counter Mobilization		- Power asymmetries - Counter Mobilization	
		Logic of Action	LoC		LoA		LoC
							Comprehensive Human Rights Accountability

Source: own illustration

The graph indicates that the final causal mechanism is composed of a cause (C), a socialization outcome (O), and a process involving three parts (Part 1-3) in between. In each part of the process, actors engage in certain activities that are in themselves causes (c) for the reactions of their targets, or intermediate outcomes (o). Each of the three parts of the mechanism thus involves an action (c), and a reaction (o). Whether the action (c) in fact causes the reaction (o) within each part of the mechanism depends on a specific set of scope conditions. Finally, reactions may involve different “logics of action” (i.e., a logic of consequences, or a logic of appropriateness).

3.1 MDB Socialization through Human Rights Accountability

I define human rights accountability as a set of human rights standards, transparency and sanctions in cases of noncompliance (see Chapter 1.1). To improve an MDB's human rights standards and transparency, policy reforms are necessary. The introduction of an effective, independent and permanent sanctioning mechanism, however, requires institutional reform. Heupel and colleagues (2015) pointed to the work by Grant and Keohane (2005) as well as Kingsbury and colleagues (2005) to argue that the literature on accountability in IR, as well as literature on global administrative law agree that binding and precise policies as well as effective, independent complaints mechanisms are cornerstones of comprehensive accountability (Zangl & Zürn, 2004). The concept of *legalization* (Abbott et al., 2000) captures these dimensions of *obligation*, *precision* and *delegation* and is hence of great analytical use in analyzing the accountability regime² of a given MDB. Building on the concept of legalization, I add the dimensions of *scope* to capture whether policies and complaint mechanisms enjoy wide or narrow application. In the following, I introduce the concept of legalization and show why it is useful for my analysis. Then, I present each of the listed dimensions—obligation, precision, scope of policies, delegation to a complaint mechanism, and scope of the mechanisms' jurisdiction—in more detail, with a specific focus on their importance for human rights accountability. Moreover, I group the dimensions according to a classical distinction in the literature of global administrative law between policies on the one hand, and institutional complaint mechanisms on the other (Grant & Keohane, 2005; Kingsbury et al., 2005). Regarding the former, obligation, precision and scope are relevant. With respect to the latter, delegation and scope matter. In principle, the failure to establish *any* accountability provisions is possible, too. Yet, I focus on two cases where the World Bank did establish accountability provisions. Throughout this section I hold that comprehensive human rights accountability is characterized by highly binding and precise (human rights and transparency) policies, a wide application of such policies across MDB operations, a high degree of delegation to an independent and effective complaints mechanism which also enjoys broad jurisdiction. In contrast, the ideal-typical limited human rights accountability regime consists of nonbinding, vaguely formulated policies that only apply to a fraction of MDB operations combined with an underfunded mechanism with few responsibilities and jurisdiction over only parts of the MDB portfolio.

The Concept of Legalization: Differentiating Hard and Soft Law

Abbott and Snidal differentiated between high levels of obligation, precision and delegation on the one hand, and low levels along these three dimensions on the other. Hard law and soft law are the two opposite poles, whereby the former represents high and the latter one low degrees of legalization along all three dimensions.³ On the continuum in between, particular arrangements may show different configurations of legalization

2 In contrast to the far more elaborate regime theory in IR, I refer to the "accountability regime" of an MDB in a more colloquial sense to designate the policies and institutions in place to secure accountability.

3 For classical realists and neo-realists, all international law is "soft," given the absence of an independent judiciary with supporting enforcement powers. Yet, I agree with Abbott and Snidal in that

among the dimensions. Abbott and Snidal underline that “international actors often deliberately choose softer forms of legalization” (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, p. 423) as soft law avoids some of the costs of hard law, while it also has independent advantages on its own (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). In particular, soft law comes at lower sovereignty costs for states, most notably in issue areas closely linked to state sovereignty (e.g., security), as it also lowers the “contracting costs”. This means it requires less resources and effort to create soft as opposed to hard law arrangements. Critically, soft law enables compromise where hard law requirements result in no common solution. This is highly relevant among actors with highly divergent interests, values and degrees of power and in areas where incentives for cooperation are low⁴. On the other hand, high degrees of obligation, precision and delegation have specific advantages, which are particularly suitable to guarantee minimum standards that are not negotiable. Thus, to avoid misunderstandings, I do not hold that “hard law” is better than “soft law” *per se*. As Abbott and Snidal correctly noted, the specific hard or softness of a legal arrangement may be more efficacious, depending on the issue, actor constellation and problems actors are trying to solve (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). However, I argued in Chapter 1 that human rights are the kind of nonnegotiable standards MDBs need to respect. Therefore when it comes to human rights protection, the specific advantages of hard law (a high sense of obligation, precise standards and a powerful sanctioning mechanism) outweigh those of soft law.⁵ Simply put, it matters whether standards and transparency policies entail a high degree of obligation and precision, or not. Similarly, it matters whether the ability to sanction misconduct is delegated—through institutional reform—to an independent oversight body, or not (also see: “critical reflections on the concept of legalization” below).⁶

Obligation, Precision and the Scope of Policies

First, comprehensive accountability provisions that seek to prevent wrongdoing are characterized by high levels of *obligation*, (i.e., a high degree of bindingness). In the case of human rights accountability, these prevention provisions are human rights and transparency policies. A first central advantage of a high degree of legal obligation of human rights standards is that it allows for credible commitments among all parties involved. Due to the heterarchic order of the international system comprised of overlapping spheres of authority that are not hierarchically ranked, the ability to make credible commitments is of paramount importance. Consider that it matters where one party to an agreement—the MDB in this instance—must carry out its side of a bargain (e.g., lend money on an understanding that human rights will be respected) before the other party—the borrowing state in this instance—has to perform (Williamson, 1989). In game-theoretical terms, credible commitments are of particular value in strategic

legalization is a matter of degree and that we in fact find great variance in terms of legalization in the international realm as well (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, p. 422).

4 For an elaborate discussion on the costs and benefits of informal agreements, see Lipson, 1991.

5 Anticipating the empirical case studies here, this resonates with movement demands who, in both cases under investigation, sought comprehensive human rights accountability (i.e., a high degrees of legalization).

6 On the intimate connection between socialization into novel norms and the degree of legalization in global governance, see Zangl and Zürn, 2004.

interactions such as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” or the “Chicken game,” where assurance of both parties is essential to reach optimal outcomes.⁷ In addition, a high degree of legal obligation introduces a specific form of legal discourse to the issue at hand. Depending on the legal tradition, the resulting reasoning is either based on text and/or precedent and analogy. In both cases, a reliance on reproducible arguments and facts tends to counter arguments based on the pursuit of egocentric interests. Selfish rule-interpretation is considered even more illegitimate where also the process of dispute settlement itself is subject to high degrees of legalization. Because a central role of legal discourse also expands the need for legal experts (including NGOs doing legal work) among MDBs and borrowing countries alike, therefore the audience costs for noncompliance increases compared to arrangements where no such experts are involved. Next, high degrees of legal obligation facilitate rule-application, even where precision is not very high and delegation absent. This is because obligation sets boundaries for rule-interpretation, as proposals have to be integrated and be concordant to other existing rules within the arrangement. Yet, this effect enhances the more obligation meets precise rules. Analogous to regimes, legalization reduces the transaction costs of subsequent interactions. Compared to frequent renegotiation or coercion, legalization offers standardized institutional procedures for conflict resolution and thus incurs less material and reputational costs to enforce an agreement (Keohane, 1984). Thus, whereas legal commitments are seldom enforceable by third parties in a way that they are enforceable on a domestic level, a high degree of obligation is the principal method by which actors can credibly commit on the international level.

Moreover, high degrees of precision severely constrain self-serving interpretations of the entered commitments. The more precise human rights and transparency policies are, the more clearly detectable a violation. Violations of commitments in turn come at reputational costs, both internally and externally. Because reputational effects of a clear violation are generalizable to other commitments under the same regime (e.g., international law), an MDB that violates its own human rights commitment in a given project will likely also incur costs in the eyes of other potential borrowers and donors. Also, precise language in legal commitments enhances the capacity for enforcement, as clearly defined violations typically entail procedures for appropriate consequences for the violating actor⁸.

Third, and in extension of the concept of legalization, the scope of application of human rights and transparency policies matters. Notably, Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, & Snidal (2000) did not include this dimension in developing their concept of legalization. Yet, without paying attention to scope it is conceivable that major discrepancies emerge between the degree of legalization (e.g., of only some MDB policies) and the de facto human rights impact. In terms of policies, scope refers to the human rights

7 Or, in terms of game theory, “at the same coordination point.”

8 In his work, Hart (1995) also discusses the drawbacks of very precise regulations under conditions of incomplete information, risk and uncertainty. In particular under such conditions, writing complete contracts which forecast all possible circumstances is impossible. Also, attempts to account for even highly unlikely events will likely result in unnecessary rigid and thus counterproductive provisions.

provisions covered. Are all human rights covered, or only some? Similarly, a highly legalized sanctions mechanisms is only valuable to the extent that it has jurisdiction over all MDB activity (see below) ⁹. The more comprehensive human rights and transparency policies, that is, the more areas of MDB activity they cover, the less likely it is that the MDB violates human rights. Scope can be reduced where policies do not apply to all MDB activity, where they exempt organizational units or where they do not apply to all MDB staff.

Delegation and its Scope: Sanctions in cases of noncompliance

The principal mechanism to deal with complaints is delegation to independent third parties equipped with the authority to interpret the provisions. Precision of rules can thus be reduced if the powers of independent third parties are substantive and precisely defined. As a general rule, the more substantive and precise these third party responsibilities and the higher their degree of independence (here from management), the more we approach judicial institutions equivalent to courts in domestic settings. High degrees of delegation to third parties which monitor the application of legal arrangements further weaken the room for selfish, unilateral interpretations. Delegation thus increases fairness, as decision-making is removed from the realm of politics to the realm of law (Zangl & Zürn, 2004; Zangl & Zürn, 2011). On the other hand, less precise definitions of third party responsibilities are likely to result in non-judicial, informal conflict resolution mechanisms. Where borrowing countries incorporate legal provision of MDBs in their domestic legislation, the level of delegation is greatly enhanced, as those provisions are now enforceable by domestic courts. Abbott and Snidal (2000) conclude that actors should use hard forms of legalization “when the benefits for cooperation are great but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high,” to “increase the credibility of commitments when noncompliance is difficult to detect,” and where decision-makers seek to lock-in other organizational actors and/or subsequent executives (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). In addition to independent fact-finding and decision-making, the level of delegation increases with the teeth of these decisions. The more an independent complaints mechanism is able to issue “court like” decisions that are binding on the MDB as a whole, the more teeth the accountability mechanism possesses. Conversely, third parties who can only make nonbinding recommendations are characteristic of limited accountability. In parallel to preventive human rights and transparency policies, the scope of complaints provisions matters, too. In relation to third parties dealing with complaints, scope is relevant in two respects. First, the jurisdiction of the third party may be encompassing, covering violations of all human rights and transparency policies, or it may be limited, extending to only some human rights and transparency policies. Secondly, the scope of complaints provisions relates to its accessibility. This can be encompassing, accepting claims from affected individuals directly at both headquarter and country office. Alternatively, it may be limited, accepting complaints only by the state of nationality or residence of compliance constituencies and/or accepting complaints only at the level of headquarters (de Wet, 2010; Heupel & Hirschmann, 2017; Alter, 2013).

9 I thank my first supervisor for this remark.

Critical Reflections on the Concept of Legalization

Since the concept of legalization plays an important role for the analysis of my outcome, I should be explicit about the fact that the concept also invited critique. Perhaps most vocally, Finnemore and Toope (2001) criticized Abbott and colleagues (2000) for adopting a narrow understanding of international law, restricting it to formalized constraints while ignoring broader notions of law as “a broad social phenomenon deeply embedded in the practices, beliefs, and traditions of societies, and shaped by interaction among societies” (p. 743). Moreover, Finnemore and Toope criticized Abbott and colleagues for ignoring the relationship between legalization on the one hand, and compliance on the other. Both points of critique also concern the conception of my socialization outcome as comprehensive accountability.

Regarding the former point of critique, I do not attempt to capture the width of international law in my work. Instead, I consciously narrow my focus on the establishment of comprehensive accountability in virtue of relevant policy and institutional reform. Concerning the latter point of critique, Finnemore and Toope (2001) may have been wrong to accuse Abbott and colleagues for not being interested in compliance¹⁰. Still, Finnemore and Toope hinted at something important. Reviewing evidence on the diffusion of human rights norms among states, the transition from a prescriptive status of human rights to rule-consistent behavior has been described as the “bottleneck” of the boomerang model¹¹ (Jetschke & Liese, 2013, p. 26). To date, several studies point to the discrepancy between human rights norms and behavior among states (Liese, 2006), even in the context of established democracies (Liese, 2009). I admit that the focus on *formal* policies and institutional reform (instead of measuring compliance systematically) is a limitation of the present work. There are three reasons for this choice. First, the literature on human rights compliance stresses the important role of sanctions and enforcement in cases of noncompliance with human rights norms (Risse & Sikkink, 2013). Since the outcome of my work is “direct human rights accountability,” and since I define accountability partly in virtue of a possibility to sanction the violation of existing standards, sanctions and enforcement are already built into a high legalization of accountability norms and thereby inherently increase the likelihood for compliance. In line with that argument and adding nuance to the empirical evidence on the compliance gap above, studies do suggest a systematic relationship between legalization and socialization into novel norms (Zangl & Zürn, 2004) and specifically, between comprehensive human rights accountability provisions and *de facto* human rights protection (Heupel & Zürn, 2017).

10 In their rebuttal to the critique voiced by Finnemore and Toope, Goldstein et al. (2001) state that the critique was misleading, as one of their major hypotheses was that “a key consequence of legalization for international cooperation lies in its effects on compliance with international obligations” (Goldstein et al., 2001, p. 760). Goldstein et al. concede that the relationship is complex and that legalization cannot be associated with “consistently higher levels of compliance” (Goldstein et al., 2001, p. 760).

11 The spiral model was introduced by Risse and Sikkink (1999) to describe the process of state socialization into human rights. Specifically, these five steps include: repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior (Risse and Sikkink, 1999).

Secondly, a high degree of legalization of human rights provisions (including human rights accountability) has instrumental value, as it tends to empower and systematically strengthen actors advocating for human rights (Risse et al., 1999; Liese, 2006). Finally, my second case of investigation is of such a recent nature, that no data on compliance yet exists. As the implementation of the new accountability system at the World Bank will take several years, we can expect to see first systematic indications of its effect about a decade from now¹². It is up to subsequent research to investigate more thoroughly which impact the legalization of human rights accountability among MDBs has in terms of compliance.

To summarize, high degrees of legalization plus an encompassing scope in the area of human rights accountability signifies comprehensive arrangements, whereas low levels of legalization and a restricted scope of application stand for limited arrangements. To reach high levels of legalization with regard to their human rights accountability, MDBs need to enact political and institutional reform. Specifically, they need to enact political reforms directed at binding, precise and encompassing human rights and transparency policies, while institutional reform is necessary to delegate oversight to an independent, encompassing, and effective sanctioning body in cases of noncompliance. The following table summarizes these dimensions, delineating the difference between comprehensive and limited accountability:

3.2 Scope Conditions of Movement Influence

In my work, I seek to evaluate whether the causal mechanism elaborated upon below was present, and whether it functioned as theorized. In the present section, I turn to the scope conditions of social movement influence. Given my theoretical interest and research question, I devote some space to thinking rigorously about the relevant scope conditions under which conventional and disruptive tactics work. My research question hints at two interrelated challenges: to establish *how* movements are successful and *under which conditions*. The “how” part in this question refers to TSM tactics and the causal mechanism triggered by them, the “under which conditions” part refers to the relevant scope conditions (Zürn & Checkel, 2005). The underlying assumption of this research question is that movement tactics applied under particular contextual circumstances trigger each part of a causal mechanism that ultimately causes MDB socialization. Thus, the theorizing of the causal mechanism and the scope conditions relating to each part of the causal mechanism are central to the analytical framework of this study. The goal of this section, then, is to identify those scope conditions under which movement tactics lead to organizational change. Following Falletti and Lynch (2009), I define scope conditions as the “relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) in which a set of initial conditions leads [...] to an outcome of a defined scope and meaning via a specified causal mechanism or set of causal mechanisms” (p. 1152). By way of illustration, a causal mechanism that enhances the growing of cardamom

12 Interview World Bank Legal Department, 2016

Table 2: Comprehensive vs. Limited Human Rights Accountability

	Comprehensive Accountability	Limited Accountability
Obligation	Binding Human Rights and Transparency policies	Nonbinding Human Rights and Transparency policies
Precision	Detailed and specific Human Rights and Transparency policies	Vague Human Rights and Transparency policies
Scope 1 (Policies)	Encompassing Human Rights coverage (substance) Encompassing application (Policies apply to all MDB activities)	Restricted Human Rights coverage (substance) Restricted application (Policies only apply to some MDB activities)
Delegation	Independent assessment of complaints Body authorized to take binding decisions	Third party is dependent on MDB Body makes nonbinding decisions/recommendations
Scope 2 (Complaints)	Encompassing Jurisdiction (third party investigations cover all MDB activity) Wide Access	Restricted Jurisdiction (third party investigations cover only fractions of MDB activity) Narrow Access

Source: own illustration

(e.g., an organic fertilizer) only works under certain climatic scope conditions (humidity, warm temperature but not direct exposure to the sun). If we try to grow cardamom in Sweden, the mechanism does not work, even though the fertilizer-mechanism is of supreme quality. Similarly, social movement strategies depend on a set of scope conditions which differ according to the movement's goals and the nature of their targets. A local movement that seeks to influence the politics of recycling waste in Buenos Aires will encounter the most important constraints at the communal, and to a lesser degree on the federal level. In contrast, TSMs engaging with MDBs face a different set of scope conditions, some emerging internally, others from the factors outside the MDB. If scope conditions differ greatly between two cases, we cannot meaningfully compare the effectiveness of TSM strategies, as we cannot say whether the difference was a result of strategy, or the difference in scope conditions. Scope conditions thus limit and define to which extent causal mechanisms are generalizable. Due to this quality, scope

conditions also matter for case-selection (see section on case selection below). The list of scope conditions for movement effectiveness in the literature on social movements and the IR literature on transnational advocacy networks is impressive and no list of scope conditions can be fully comprehensive. Thus, I limit myself to identifying those scope conditions from existing literature (see Chapter 2 above) that are most relevant to the causal mechanism at hand. On a general level, we can distinguish the following four clusters of scope conditions (Zürn & Checkel, 2005):

- properties of the actor who seeks change and triggers (a part of) the causal mechanism,
- properties of the target organisation that the movement seeks to influence,
- properties of the issue at stake, and
- properties of the broader discursive opportunity structure

I structure the following part along these four clusters and their respective scope conditions

Table 3: Clusters of Scope Conditions

Properties of...	Scope Conditions
...the actor	Moral / Epistemic Authority
	Organizational Resources
...the target organization	Access
	Power (a)symmetries
...the issue	Specific + generalizable issue
...the discursive opportunity structure	Degree of Support from the MDB Environment
	External Shocks / Crisis

Source: own illustration

Among these scope conditions, some are relatively stable due to their very nature. Examples of such enduring conditions include the IO's basic governance structure (specifically majority voting on the Board of Directors and the allocation of voting power according to shares) as well as TSM access to important member states (specifically access to Congress in the presidential democratic system of the United States). Despite their less enduring nature, several other scope conditions remained (largely) stable in my two cases, including the moral/epistemic authority of the TSM, its organizational resources, the issue they mobilized upon, the degree of support from the IO environment and the presence of an external shock (see Chapters 6 and 7 for an elaboration). In contrast, the degree of counter-mobilization as well as – to my surprise

(see Chapter 8) – the configuration of power asymmetries at the Board of Directors differed between both cases. To avoid that the choice and conceptualization of my scope conditions floats around without theoretical grounding, I situate them in the theoretical IR and social movement literatures, drawing on the theoretical models of Resource Mobilization (RM) and, in particular, that of Political Opportunity Structures (POS).

3.2.1 Properties of the actor seeking change

The most comprehensive account theorizing the impact of movement properties on outcomes is resource mobilization theory (RMT). At its origin, RMT sought to explain the emergence of movements in the first place, as “grievances are everywhere, movements not” (Japp, 1984, p. 316). Since widespread discontent with existing circumstances could not explain the emergence of social movements alone, RMT suggested that mobilization crucially depends on the availability of financial, human and organizational resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Subsequent works offered more fine-grained differentiation to include immaterial resources (Klandermans, 1998) or networks (Roose, 2013). More recently, the importance of collective identities has come to the fore in explaining movement activism (Daphi, 2011; Johnston, 2013; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Rucht, 2011). The focus of the works presented here is that adopting a classical RMT approach lies on processes inside the movement and on explaining movement mobilization. Works that focus more on effects on the outside world (beyond movement mobilization) identify different types of resources, including organizational as well as symbolic (e.g., cultural and moral) resources (McCarthy & Edwards, 2008). An emphasis on organizational and moral resources sits well with IR scholarship on advocacy networks (Busby, 2010; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). In addition, IR scholars highlight the value of expertise or “epistemic authority,” in addition to moral resources (Haas, 1992; Börzel & Risse, 2003). As a general rule, movements are more likely to be successful the more of these resources they possess. At the same time, movements may compensate for a lack of resources in one dimension by performing very well on another dimension (Müller, 2017). Below, I discuss organizational resources and high degrees of epistemic and moral authority as actor-related scope conditions that influence the effectiveness of movement tactics.

Organizational Resources

Several studies agree on the significance of *organizational resources*, defined as the availability of supporting networks and major organizations. For instance, studies show that possessing large numbers of supporters (supporting networks and organizations) partly explains why landless workers in Brazil (original term: “sem terra”), slum residents (Pit-house, 2006) or homeless people (Cress & Snow, 1996) have been successful in sustaining powerful movements and achieving their goals despite the lack of material resources.

Moral / Epistemic Authority

Moral authority can be defined as a voluntary deference of one’s judgement on the basis of the moral standing of another actor (Edwards and McCarthy, 2008). *Epistemic* authority refers to the voluntary obedience to someone’s judgement in virtue of that actor’s

expertise on a given issue (Zürn, 2015; Busch & Liese, 2017). Both forms of authority largely overlap, as the moral standing of an actor typically depends on his/her ascribed expertise in questions of moral relevance. Due to the fluid boundaries and high degree of interdependence among both forms of authority empirically, I group them together throughout this work. Still, they can be differentiated analytically. First, movements and transnational advocacy networks that have recognized experts among their ranks can be expected to fare better. Following the early work of Adler and Haas (1992) on “epistemic communities,” Börzel and Risse (2003) argued that movement actors with an authoritative claim to knowledge in virtue of their scientific credentials enjoy good standing in relation to target institutions. Thus, these actors enjoy *epistemic authority*. In particular, by providing scientific knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships in policy areas characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, epistemic communities enjoy a privileged status vis-à-vis target institutions to spread novel norms. This effect is amplified the higher the consensus within the (epistemic) community. By way of example, consider the high degree of consensus on climate change in the International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC; Haas, 1992).

A second group of movement constituencies that can be expected to be relatively more influential are principled issue networks commanding *moral authority* (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Here, the basis for authority (the voluntary deference of judgement) is based on the unique moral standing of the actor in authority. Moral authority is assigned to movement actors who are either directly affected by the very harm they rally against¹³ as well as to those who have proven their credentials in virtue of sustained moral behavior. The latter group of actors is perceived by the wider public to represent progressive, or morally superior, political claims (Hall & Biersteker, 2002, p. 215). In line with previous research (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Edwards and McCarthy, 2008; Keck and Sikkink, 1998), I hold that moral and epistemic authority greatly increases a movement's likelihood to engage in effective persuasion.

3.2.2 Properties of the targeted organization

A different avenue of research was pursued by scholars looking at the circumstances under which tactics mattered, often proposing a mixed approach combining conventional and disruptive tactics. Notably, Button (1978) investigated riots in U.S. cities during the 1960s. Button concluded that excessive disruption was counter-productive, since it risks alienating decision-making elites. Yet, Button saw value in disruption where the public was sympathetic to movement goals and where combined with conventional tactics (Button, 1978). In contrast to advocates of resource mobilization theory (RMT), Button and other scholars began working with the concept of *political opportunity structures* (POS), thus situating movement tactics and outcomes in a given political and institutional context. The first explicit use of this theoretical framework was Peter Eisinger's (1973) study, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” where he argued that the degree of openness of a political system determined movement tactics. Building

13 In the language of the movement under investigation, these movement constituencies are referred to as “affected communities”

on Eisinger, Tilly (1978) argued that a range of opportunities build the background conditions against which movements choose their tactics, introducing the notion of “repertoires of contention” to designate a spectrum of possibilities at the disposal of movement actors. In his later work, Tilly emphasized the important role of demographic and economic shifts as well as the openness of political institutions as the most important scope conditions for action (Tilly, 1995). Some of the opportunities (or scope conditions) discussed by Tilly (1995) and Button (1978) relate to properties of the target institution, while others refer to properties of the issue or properties of the discursive environment in which movement advocacy takes place (see properties of the discursive environment below). From this line of movement research, I distill three scope conditions with regard to the target institution which have not only been identified as particularly relevant in social movement studies, but also in scholarship on TAN: access (Busby, 2010; Risse-Kappen, 1995), power asymmetries (Cress & Snow, 2000) and the degree of counter mobilization (Kolb, 2007). Among them, the third scope condition stands out: Since the reaction of movement opponents matters along the whole socialization process, the degree of counter mobilization is an integral component of each part in the causal mechanism, capturing the dynamic interplay between movement actors and their target along the way.

Access

Access has been well-established as a relevant scope condition for TSM activity (Busby, 2010; Jasper, 2014; Risse-Kappen, 1995). The amount and quality of access-points to a political order is principally shaped by the design of its most important institutions and their relationship (Piven & Cloward, 1979; Risse, Risse-Kappen, Ropp, & Sikkink, 2013; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). In the context of a state, the institutional order is typically spelled out in a constitution, defining the responsibilities of the executive, legislative and judicial branches and the basic rules guiding their actions. Specifically, cross-national comparisons seem to confirm the intuition that liberal democratic systems are more open to influence (e.g., Liese, 2006; Simmons, 2009). This institutional order shapes the degree to which social movements can access the decision-making process. For instance, the ability of legislatures to influence the behavior of member states toward IOs is heavily shaped by legal systems. Specifically, it matters for movement access whether a member state is a presidential, semi-presidential or a parliamentary democracy (Kitschelt, 1986). Also international organizations provide for different degrees of access, recently assessed in terms of “openness” (Tallberg et al., 2013). In general, it is hypothesized that more access points provide social movements with more potential “arenas of contention” in which they can challenge their targets, which in turn is associated with a higher likelihood for success (Amenta et al., 1992; Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Tallberg et al., 2013). Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999, 2013) have shown that the lack of access in one context (e.g., an authoritarian state) can be compensated for by reaching out to liberal democratic states taking up the issue and demanding human rights compliance. Yet, such a “boomerang effect” (Risse et al., 1999) is dependent on the power of the liberal democratic state to influence the more vulnerable target state (see scope condition on power (a)symmetries below).

Power (a)symmetries

Yet, even where counter mobilization is high, particularly powerful member states might use their economic power to push their favored policies. This hints at the importance of power (a)symmetries among decision-makers within target organizations, whether the target is a state or an IO. Also, even though more access-points are generally preferable, broad access to decision-makers is not strictly necessary where like-minded decision-makers are ultimately able to coerce the rest. Hence, the degree of power (a)symmetries among member states is a crucial scope condition for movement success to effect organizational change (Börzel & Risse, 2009). If a single actor is in a position to induce compliance by providing incentives and/or threatening sanctions, TSM can—in principle—focus their efforts on that actor. Different from other international organizations based on the principle of one member, one vote, hegemony over specific MDBs is possible due to the allocation of voting power on the basis of shares. As MDBs depend on capital subscriptions from their member states, the higher the shares of a member state, the higher the MDB's degree of dependency. Consider the example of the World Bank. The United States has traditionally enjoyed such a high degree of donor leverage with the World Bank that a threat to withhold or even cancel funds has proven enough to “keep the banks in check” (Babb, 2009, p. 37). Next to financial shares *inside* the MDB, I include the economic power of member states outside the institution as a secondary criterion. Consider that the relative power of actors in a negotiation process is highly contingent on their respective “best alternatives to a negotiated agreement” (Ury, 1991, pp. 21-22). Thus, not capturing alternatives to the MDB in question risks losing out of sight an important dimension of power among MDB member states.¹⁴

3.2.3 Properties of the issue

In the literature on transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 2013), as well as in social movement studies (Benford & Snow, 2000), properties of the issue are well-established as a scope condition of movement influence.

Issue Characteristics

Issue characteristics may relate to form or substance. In terms of *form*, research has shown that a high degree of specificity is conducive to tangible movement successes. In the case of activism toward MDBs, movements could attack the whole regime of international financial institutions (IFIs) for not being democratic. Such general critique needs to be distinguished from a claim made against basic principles and policies upon which a particular institution operates (e.g., structural adjustment programs entailing privatization and market liberalization). On the next level climbing down the ladder toward issue specificity, a concrete project of a particular MDB may be in focus of the critique. In general, the more direct the link between the target's behavior and a clearly

14 The notion of economic power resources that lie outside the MDB, but influence MDB decision-making, was also recurrent among preliminary conversations with NGO and World Bank representatives.

defined movement demand, the greater the movement's influence. A short causal chain (between MDB actions and harm caused) is thus conducive to exercise pressure (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 27). For instance, sexual abuse committed by UN Peacekeepers links IO conduct to very harmful outcomes in a more direct way than structural adjustment projects. In the former case, a campaign for increased accountability in peacekeeping operations was successful, while the comparatively long chain of actors between World Bank and IMF credit policies and their outcomes on an individual level impeded campaigning (Heupel & Zürn, 2017).

In terms of *substance*, different issues matter in relation different international organizations, which are more or less vulnerable to specific issues by virtue of their mandates. For instance, human rights are at the core of the identity of the United Nations, while it is less central for NATO (Heupel & Zürn, 2017). Overall, however, some more general trends regarding substance exist. While TSM have been relatively successful on issues centering on human rights, particularly women rights, and environmental protection, they have been significantly less successful advocating for issues involving sovereignty costs to states (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Tallberg, 2013). In particular, previous studies have suggested that the influence of social movements is greatest on issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals and on matters involving the legal equality of opportunity, since the salience of both these issues is particularly high across cultural contexts (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 27).

3.2.4 Properties of the discursive opportunity structure

In line with Koopmans and Olzak (2004), discursive opportunities can be defined as aspects of the public discourse that determine a message's chances of diffusion (p. 202). According to this conception, public discourse is a bounded space characterized by a high level of competition. Similarly, it has been argued that the discursive environment (Krebs & Jackson, 2007) or the stock of cultural myths (Snow & Benford, 2000) shape not only which messages diffuse, but more specifically how likely is the advent of frame resonance. Scope conditions that emerge from properties of the discursive environment include the degree of support from the organizational environment and, critically, the presence of crisis or an external shock to the MDB.

Degree of Support from the Organizational Environment

Rather than existing in isolation, international organizations are embedded within a complex and dynamic environment composed of a variety of norms and actors (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Seabrooke & Sending 2015). Sociological institutionalism highlights how norms, ideas, and institutional templates diffuse among organizations in the same environment, irrespective of their functional values (Meyer & Rowans, 1977). Goodman and Jinks (2013) pointed to acculturation as an important mechanism explaining the spread of human rights norms among actors in the same environment specifically. Some actors in this environment are very close to the movement's target in question, either due to its shared identity and/or in virtue of close working relationships. To illustrate this point for MDBs, the African Development Bank (AfDB) shares its development mandate, governance structure and regional membership with the Asian Development

Bank (ADB), the European (EBRD) and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The shared identity of a “regional development bank” accounts for mutual observation and exchange flanked by initiatives to work closely together (e.g., the recent “Trade Finance Program” between ADB and AfDB). But also other actors which are not IOs can, depending on the IO’s identity, be important member of the reference group. For instance, the IMF is arguably closer to large commercial banks than they are to the UN (despite being a member of the UN family), while the World Bank considers other multi- and bilateral donors in development, such as DFID in the UK or GIZ in Germany as part of their in-group. Underlying this scope condition is the notion that group pressures are exercised on MDBs in virtue of a shared in-group identity with those already conforming to the norm. Importantly for the mechanism developed here, movements may benefit from an organizations desire to belong and strategically refer to the practices of other organizations to increase the leverage of its tactics. In addition, member states of IOs use the behavior of other organizations in the same environment as anchors to evaluate the performance of the MDB in question (Dingwerth & Weise, 2012). This may in turn be useful for TSM, as they can refer to best-practices of other IOs vis-à-vis member states. The talk and action of organizations in the MDB’s immediate environment (i.e., those with a shared in-group identity) thus constitute a discursive opportunity.

Crisis

Last, but certainly not least, the presence of *crisis* to initiate institutional change can hardly be overestimated. Among the scope conditions discussed so far, the presence of crisis is the most important result of disruptive tactics. Moschella (2015) put it succinctly in relation to the change of international financial institutions when she wrote:

“It is possible to say that [...] the basic dynamic driving ideational change is now reasonably well-identified. Specifically, a great deal of empirical evidence points to the prevalence of a pattern that can be summarized as follows: an exogenous shock, such as a financial or economic crisis, opens up a window of opportunity that allows elite or non-elite actors to recast the terms of previous debate by introducing new ideas that, in turn, create the conditions for bringing about policy change.” (p. 445)

In my conception of crisis, I follow Jones and colleagues (2009) who argued that “systems characterized by friction remain stable until the signals from outside exceed a threshold, and then they lurch forward” (Jones et al., 2009, p. 867). While external shocks may be sudden events (e.g., the terrorist attacks of 9/11),¹⁵ they can also have a longer history. In both cases of gradual and sudden development, a critical threshold of external pressure is crossed at a given point in time, which constitutes the critical juncture. Importantly for the causal mechanism theorized in the present work, the origin of external shocks is not necessarily located at the level of structure (e.g., a financial crisis). As the example of the 9/11 terrorist attacks already points to, actors may purposefully provoke crisis at target institutions (in this case the U.S. government). It is this insight that actors may create a crisis that subsequently enables change, which is at the heart of

15 Arguably, the events of 9/11 lead to a paradigm shift in US foreign policy from isolationism to crusading liberalism (Widmaier 2007, p. 792).

disruptive movement tactics. In this sense, through disruptive tactics movements seek to (help) create the scope conditions that enable their very success.¹⁶ In the context of nation states, crisis typically means that the general public doubts whether the state has the ability to govern effectively (e.g., protect its citizens from terrorist attacks).

In sum, shocks suddenly signify to members of the institution and the outside world that the institution's "business as usual" does fit any longer. Shocks magnify uncertainty, as actors cannot confidently predict future events any longer. Such uncertainty then requires institutional actors to open up for new ideas and interpretations to make sense of their surroundings. Thus, uncertainty following shocks is critical to the emergence and spread of novel ideas (Broome, 2010). Applied to the context of MDBs (and thus organizations that are highly dependent on their member states), crisis refers to skepticism concerning the MDB's legitimacy among decision-makers in important member states, or, more indirectly, among the general public in important member states, which then exercises pressure on their decision-makers. I will come back to this differentiation below.

3.3 Counter Mobilization as continuous MDB - TSM interaction

"One cannot not communicate", this is perhaps the most famous quote of psychoanalyst Paul Watzlawick (2007). This quote captures that TSM engagement towards their addressees, independent of the tactics used, provoke a reaction on behalf of the addressee - even if that reaction on behalf of the addressee is to remain silent. On the one hand, this dynamic interplay between TSM and their addressees is represented in the co-constitution of action and reaction within each part of the mechanism - the TSM actions (a) and the reactions by the respective addressees (b). To provide an example, the TSM engages in tactic X (a) and then the addressee reacts with Y (b) (see graph at the beginning of chapter 3 above). In addition to that, the dynamic interplay of TSM and the MDB is captured in the scope condition "counter mobilization". This scope condition is the only one that is present at all steps of the mechanism¹⁷. As the MDB is the ultimate target of TSM engagement, counter mobilization may either come from the MDB bureaucracy, or from MDB member states at the Board of Directors.

On behalf of the MDB *bureaucracy* including its president, management and administrative staff (see Chapter 1.1), counter mobilization may take direct, explicit forms such as an open rejection of TSM demands, but it may also come in more subtle ways, as the MDB bureaucracy is formally not allowed to take a strong, active political stance. Christine Oliver was among the first to develop a systematic typology of organizational reactions to demands from their environment, differentiating acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation (Oliver, 1991). Among these strategies, avoidance,

16 I thank Angela Heucher for pointing this relationship out to me.

17 There are different ways to conceptualize a dynamic relationship. In my work, the focus is on causal mechanisms and TSM engagement for human rights accountability. Therefore, counter mobilization needs to be translated into the logic of the causal mechanism. From the perspective of the movement, it appears as a perpetual scope condition on its way to movement success.

defiance and manipulation are potential dimensions of counter mobilization, whereas acquiescence and compromise imply an acceptance of external demands and would result in (at least partial) TSM success. *Avoidance* is a passive form of counter mobilization, a strategy aimed at escaping or having to deal with the demands. Avoidance is likely to prevail as long as TSM engagement remains below the threshold of peril. In contrast, defiance and manipulation are more active forms of counter mobilization. In the context of a MDB bureaucracy's counter mobilization, *defiance* may involve explicit as well as more subtle counter mobilization or "repertoires of reaction" (Anderl & Daphi, 2016, p. 2), designed to mitigate, silence or delegitimize social movement critique (Deitelhoff, 2012; O'Brien, 2000). Among the more subtle tactics of counter mobilization, MDBs may seek to *coopt* movement critique by involving them in problem-solving activities for pre-defined problems and without actually yielding decision-making power (Coy & Hedeén, 2005). Already in the late 1970s, Piven and Cloward identified cooptation as a powerful elite strategy of using apparently cooperative practices to absorb those who seek change – to make them work with the elites without giving them new advantages (Piven and Cloward, 1979). MDB bureaucracies specifically have been found to organize façade deliberations that result in little to no substantial change, create parallel institutional structures and diffuse responsibilities (Anderl, 2018; Weaver, 2008). *Manipulation*, finally, refers to the strategic influence of the organization's environment to change external demands and to mitigate pressures (Oliver, 1991). While defiance is counter mobilization in the *direct interaction* between MDB and TSM, manipulation unfolds its effect on TSM via changes in the (e.g. normative or legal) environment structuring MBD-TSM interactions. Manipulation is thus an indirect means of exercising influence (on the conceptualization of direct vs. indirect power or influence, see Barnett & Duvall, 2005). MDB bureaucracies seeking to mitigate TSM critique may seek to influence rules and norms regulating MDB – TSM interaction or align with allies outside the MDB bureaucracy that support its goals (including governments of MDB member states).

On behalf of *MDB member states*, counter mobilization is typically voiced at the MDB Board of Directors. To begin with, member states only get involved when TSM have reached a certain threshold of relevance with their demands so the BoD has these demands on the agenda. Still, even then not all states are equally involved. At the Board of Directors, states with large shares maintain their own Executive Director's (ED) office, while states with fewer shares group together appointing one ED as a representative for all of them. Despite this mode of organization, the sheer workload at the Board of Directors means that generally only few EDs take special interest in a particular topic, while several other ED's may not invest their political capital on the issue (van Putten, 2008). Stoicism or very low levels of resistance among decision-makers opposing the norm make movement success more likely. In turn, ample evidence suggests that social movements cannot be successful if key decision-makers on executive boards jointly oppose their demands "en bloc" (Stearns & Almeida, 2004). Moreover, given that MDBs seek consensus in their decision-making, counter mobilization can be very harmful for TSM efforts, even if only voiced by member states with little voting power on the Board of Directors. In contrast to the MDB bureaucracy with its considerable knowledge creation and agenda-setting powers (see Chapter 1.2), member states on the BoD have

the ultimate decision-making power relating to MDB policy and institutional reform. Accordingly, member state counter mobilization typically involves behind closed door negotiations among EDs paired with the use of financial leverage (Park, 2010; van Putten, 2008; Shihata, 1994). Next to seeking direct influence on the vote at the Board of Directors, member states may also choose more indirect ways of counter mobilization by expressing their dissent in public through (e.g. through their EDs or their respective national governments).

3.4 Two Logics of Action and Organizational Change

The causal mechanism I seek to test below involves several parts (see above). In each part, actors engage in activities. These activities within each part are causes (c) that produce an outcome (o). The outcome of a part in the mechanism in turn paves the way for the next part, until the final socialization outcome (O) is reached. To produce these effects within each sequence, we need assumptions about the logics of action that translate activities into effects. I draw on rational choice (RCI) and sociological institutionalism (SI) and their corresponding ‘logics of action’ to render different parts of my causal mechanism plausible.

Originating from the discipline of sociology, rational choice and sociological institutionalisms have become established theories in international relations (IR) that offer distinct perspectives on institutional design and change. Both institutionalisms rest on distinct logics of action – a *logic of consequences* (LoC) in rational choice institutionalism and a *logic of appropriateness* (LoA) in sociological institutionalism. In their article “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe,” Börzel and Risse (2003) discussed the likelihood of reforms on a national level due to Europeanization and connect RCI and SI to their corresponding logic of action when theorizing institutional change. According to Börzel and Risse (2003), one can conceptualize the adaptation processes in response to Europeanization in two ways, “which in turn lead to different emphasis concerning facilitating factors [...], rational choice institutionalism, on the one hand, and sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism, on the other” (p.59). I follow their approach to link RCI and SI to their respective logics of action and a different set of relevant facilitating factors (or scope conditions) for change. According to this understanding, RCI and SI make different assumptions about the way change comes about. Importantly, socialization is not inherently connected to sociological institutionalism alone (Börzel & Risse, 2003; Zürn & Checkel, 2005). According to Fearon and Wendt (2002), the divide between meta-theoretical camps can be framed in at least three different ways¹⁸. First, there is an ontological reading according to which both theories entail different assumptions about the nature of social life. Following this reading, both theories are incompatible. In a second reading, the disagreement refers to empirics. As the authors put it, this is “a disagreement about substantive issues in the world, like how often actors follow a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness” (Fearon &

18 Fearon and Wendt make this argument about the constructivism – rationalism divide. Yet, the same argument holds for that between SI and RCI as well (see preceding Footnote above).

Wendt, 2002, p. 52-53). According to the third reading, the dispute is merely one between analytical tools that are helpful to theorize about international affairs (Fearon & Wendt, 2002). I follow this third reading, which is well-grounded in Thomas Kuhn's (1962) philosophy of science. In his seminal work, Kuhn argued that theories represent different concepts and models, in short: perspectives, to look at the empirical world. Theories are thus incommensurable.¹⁹ Similarly, Zürn and Checkel (2005) argued that it "adds more to our understanding when both constructivist and rationalist lenses are used" to explain real world phenomena (p. 1070). In principle, this combination of both theoretical paradigms (and their corresponding logics of action) can be done in two ways: the first is to adopt a *domain-of-application* approach according to which logics of action unfold under a distinct set of circumstances (Jupille et al., 2003, pp. 21-22). Alternatively, one might adopt a *temporal-sequencing* approach according to which different logics are dominant at different phases of a causal process explaining an overall outcome (Börzel & Risse, 2003; Gheciu, 2005; Risse et al., 1999). Corresponding to my focus on the strength of conventional and disruptive tactics respectively, I adopt a temporal-sequencing approach (see Section 3.6 on the causal mechanism for an elaboration). Specifically, I draw on rational choice theories of institutional change to explain Part 1 and 3 of my causal mechanism. In the first part of the causal mechanism, movements use their resources strategically to expose and question the legitimacy of the MDB in question by using disruptive tactics. In Part 3, the influence that powerful member states exercise on MDB behavior can only be explained with a *logic of consequences*. Analogous to neo-realists, rational choice institutionalists view states as "self-interested, goal-seeking actors whose behavior can be accounted for in terms of the maximization of individual utility" (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997, p. 23). They hence believe that states make instrumental use of IOs as long as it serves their preferences (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005; Krasner, 2001). While cooperation is possible, powerful member states remain in a position to influence the policies and institutional design of international organizations to a considerable degree. Rational choice institutionalism and neo-realism thus point to the role of compulsory power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Keohane, 1984) in the direct interaction between powerful member states and international organizations.²⁰ While power may be exercised through different means (Baldwin, 1993, 2013), the use of economic incentives and sanctions is particularly relevant in the relations between member states and MDBs (Park, 2017). Incentives and sanctions turn into member state coercion where MDBs are so vulnerable and dependent on the member state(s) in question that it does not effectively possess realistic action alternatives (Anderson, 2008). Arguably, the strength of rational choice institutionalism lies in the recognition that cooperation is possible while not losing sight of the immense influence powerful principals may exercise over their agents – the IO in question.

19 see Zürn and Checkel, 2005 on this interpretation of Kuhn and the resulting preference to build bridges between both theoretical camps.

20 In their seminal essay, Barnett and Duvall (2005) distinguish four types of power – compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. Decisive for these types is whether power is exercised through interactions or through social relations of constitution, and whether it is exercised in a direct or diffuse manner (for an elaboration, see Barnett and Duvall, 2005).

Where rational choice institutionalism rests on a “logic of consequences,” sociological institutionalism (SI) rests on a “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1998). According to this logic of action, which explains Part 2 of the causal mechanism, actors are guided by considerations of what constitutes socially accepted (appropriate) behavior. Appropriateness is relative to the formal and informal norms that are inter-subjectively shared in a given collective. These norms also influence which goals actors seek to pursue and even what they perceive as “rational.” Sociological institutionalism offers two potential explanations for change in institutions – be they states or international organizations. The first explanation is structuralist in nature. According to this version of SI, institutions in a similar “organizational environment” that frequently interact tend to compare and copy each other in terms of institutional design, resource allocation, and practices. Over time, this leads to “institutional isomorphism” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The second explanation is more agency-centered and focusses on norm entrepreneurs (Börzel & Risse, 2003). Since I am interested in the change TSMs can bring about in MDBs, I focus on this latter.²¹

Specifically, TSMs engage in socialization efforts and persuade MDB member states to redefine their interests and identities in accordance with their frames (Checkel, 1999). Member states can thus be socialized into (human rights) norms that apply to MDBs and thereby become “members of (international) society in good standing” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 908). While TSMs can also exercise pressure on member states and thereby strategically increase the cost of certain courses of action (which would fall under a logic of consequences), they typically lack the material means to sanction or coerce member states into a given behavior. Hence, norm entrepreneurs need to rely primarily on strategic framing and persuasion – communication that becomes effective in virtue of shared norms of appropriateness (Börzel & Risse, 2003; Risse, 2000). Thus, sociological institutionalism complements rational choice institutionalism by highlighting that actors’ behavior is often guided not by cost-benefit calculations, but by considerations of appropriateness. This helps explaining why powerful member states may adopt the frames of social movements, even though TSMs lack the material resources to enforce them.


In sum, the focus of my work is on transnational social movement *actors* as change agents (or norm entrepreneurs). Rational choice and sociological institutionalism with their corresponding logics of action help to explain organizational change. They complement each other, as both theories of action highlight different and equally valuable aspects of the nature of institutions. Importantly, the two logics of action are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they may unfold sequentially, with one logic dominating at a given part of the mechanism.

21 While socialization research has predominantly focused on the socializing effects of institutional structures (e.g., formal and informal norms) on actors, the focus in this work is on actors as agents of socialization.

3.5 A Causal Mechanism of Movement influence

In the following, I present the causal mechanism that guides the analysis of my two cases. Building on the literature reviews above (see Chapters 1 and 2) and the analytical framework developed so far, I argue that a specific causal mechanism connects TSM activity and the policy and institutional reform at MDBs. In a simplified version, the mechanism involves three sequences: disruptive movement tactics toward the MDB (part 1), conventional movement tactics (i.e., persuasion) toward member states (part 2), and member state incentives/coercion toward MDB (part 3). Between each part, different logics of action are dominant. At the beginning of this mechanism, TSMs use disruptive tactics to produce crisis at the MDB in question. At a certain threshold of disruption, the movement creates a legitimacy crisis of the MDB in the eyes of MDB member states. This crisis in turn opens up access to member states. In part 2 of the mechanism, TSM use this access and turn to the state channel. They persuade representatives of MDB member states through inside channels and conventional tactics to push for a specific reform. Following a logic of appropriateness, especially liberal, democratic MDB member states realize the normative force of TSM demands for enhance human rights accountability. In Part III of the mechanism, member state representatives (the principals of MDBs) use their financial leverage to effect the policy making of their agents (the MDBs). Though I do not preclude that MDBs could be moved by a logic of appropriateness under certain circumstances, they are (pre-dominantly) moved by a logic of consequences in part III of the causal mechanism presented here. The following graph illustrates this sequence in brief.

Graph 3: Steps in the Causal Mechanism by Logics of Action



Source: own illustration.

3.5.1 The Power of Disruptive Tactics (Part I)

In the long-term, all governance actors depend on some degree of empirical legitimacy—the ascribed right to rule—to be effective (Schmelzle & Stollenwerk, *forthcoming*). MDBs are no exception to that. Different from states, MDBs do not command means of coercion to back up their governance and thus almost entirely depend on notions of empirical legitimacy by their member states, and the relevant publics in these member states). To justify what they do, MDBs need to provide reasons for their actions. It is critical to keep the governance structure of MDBs in mind, particularly their dependence on member state support. It is those member states which, in form of their executive

directors (EDs) on the board of directors,²² call the shots regarding MDB funding and with regard to political and institutional MDB reform. There are two principal routes to produce crisis at the MDB: (a) through tackling decision-makers in member states directly, or (b) more indirectly, through mobilizing public opinion in important member states.

As the literature review on movement tactics revealed, there is consensus in that conventional tactics proceed within established channels of interaction, while disruptive tactics are applied outside these channels (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017). Prominent components of disruptive tactics include riots, acts of civil disobedience, acts of sacrifice (e.g., hunger strikes) and the mobilization of public opinion (i.e., through newspaper articles, social media, documentaries, and protest campaigns; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017; Dür & Mateo, 2013; Hadden, 2015). Such tactics are disruptive in that they distort the everyday routines of their targets. Due to this quality, disruptive tactics are instrumental in creating crisis. Creating crisis at MDBs typically means to seed skepticism among *decision-makers of important member states* (including their EDs), that the organization in question performs effectively. In particular, if movements achieve exposing a systematic discrepancy between the talk of an MDB (i.e., its self-proclaimed mission and goals) and its action (i.e., its actual performance), EDs as well as decision-makers in member states will develop some skepticism regarding the institution's effectiveness. Sustained skepticism regarding institutional integrity and performance bear high potential to cause crisis at the MDB. Consider that MDBs—like all other institutions—need to be perceived as legitimate to achieve certain goals. As Keohane (2007) argued, if an institution's "practices or procedures thwart the credible pursuit of the very goals in terms of which it justifies its existence [...] we have reason to believe that key institutional agents are either untrustworthy or grossly incompetent, that the institution lacks correctives for these deficiencies, and that therefore the institution is unlikely to be effective" (p. 7). Mobilizing the public in important MDB member states ultimately uses the same leverage, yet in an indirect fashion over public opinion that translates into skepticism and concern among decision-makers in member states. For the most part of their history, MDBs (like all IOs) operated under the radar of public opinion in most countries. Where people were aware of their existence, IOs could mostly rely on favorable or at least neutral member state publics. Yet since the 1990s, there has been a growing awareness that transcends the small elite circle of engaged activists, increasingly leading to a politicization of international organizations among the general publics around the world (Zürn et al., 2012). For social movements, this increasing awareness regarding the governance of MDBs means an asset, as the potential mobilization of public opinion provides them with additional routes of engagement (e.g., Amenta, 2006; Costain & Majstorovic, 1994; Olzak & Soule, 2009). To recall, disruptive

22 At times, MDBs make a separation between member states and EDs. Formally, EDs represent the MDB as an institution, not their member states. Yet in practice, it is well understood by MDB and movement representatives that EDs are first and foremost representatives of their respective member states, at least where they represent one state only (as it is the case for the most influential member state EDs). The degree of proximity to national interests further increases, the more an issue is politicized.

tactics vary according to context, but typically range from demonstrations, mobilizing public opinion (e.g., through campaigns, walk-outs or by leaking information to the media), civil disobedience, and riots. While disruptive movement tactics involve violent as well as nonviolent means, disruption is more effective if it achieves to expose legitimacy deficits of their target without using violence. According to signaling theory (Lohmann, 1993), all protest offers signals to decision-makers. Yet, large scale demonstrations provide signals to policymakers about sentiments of a wider public only if the protest is led by moderate citizens. In the same vein, coverage by mainstream media of the TSM demands signals' wide-spread acceptance and thus, relevance. Larger incidents of movement violence, on the other hand, not only threaten to alienate the wider public, but also "signal" to policy makers that the protest is led by "extremists," decreasing the likelihood of decision-makers to respond positively. Thus, decision-makers carefully evaluate whether protest reaches a certain threshold and whether it is led by moderates, or extremists (McAdam & Su, 2002). While movements address the MDB directly in part 1 of the causal mechanism, they indirectly communicate with decision-makers in MDB member states. If movements do not delegitimize themselves (e.g., through excessive violence), their mobilization of public opinion is likely to have disruptive effects on their targets, as decision-makers in liberal democratic states care deeply about public opinion.

An important scope condition for this part of the mechanism is the issue characteristics at stake. As previous works have shown, salience among the global public is particularly high on issues involving bodily harm to innocent individuals as well as on issues involving legal equality of opportunity, as both resonate with normative convictions in most countries around the world. Where issue salience is not as high originally, movements need to craft skillful frames connecting their demands to widely shared beliefs (e.g., linking free trade agreements to animal welfare, health and cultural heritage) to increase issue salience. An important catalyst of movement critique and demands for change is mass media coverage (Kolb, 2007). Hence, disruption via the mobilization of public opinion in important MDB member states typically proceeds from movement activity over mass media coverage to public opinion. Irrespective of the path to create crisis, it is at the level of important member states that an MDB crisis translates into enhanced movement access to decision-makers. If decision-makers in member states start to question the MDB's credibility, competence and/or effectiveness, decision-makers will open up for movement input to provide their (alternative) perspective. Access to the state channel is thus the result of crisis at the MDB and, simultaneously, an important scope condition for conventional movement tactics.

The next scope condition that determines the effectiveness of disruptive tactics is the degree of *counter mobilization* to movement demands. Faced with critique, the MDB may respond in different ways (see Oliver, 1991 regarding the five types of reaction discussed above). At first, when critique is still in its infancy, there is no evident need to respond, and MDBs may avoid both, with the actors voicing critique as well as its content. If critique is sustained, the MDB may engage in defiance and openly reject or oppose criticism. A more proactive, long term strategy is "manipulation," according to which the MDB seeks to influence and change external demands (Oliver, 1991). While manipulation refers to attempts at changing the resource base of an organization, Barnett

and Coleman (2005) introduced “strategic social construction” as an attempt to redefine the broader normative environment of the organization. “Manipulation” and “strategic social construction” are rarely viable in reaction to immediate, pressing movement demands. A final route consists in opting for acquiescence or compromise to mitigate critique (Oliver, 1991). Depending on the nature of acquiescence or compromise, movements may reach their goals directly, without a detour over member state persuasion and member state pressure vis-à-vis the MDB. Yet, acquiescence and compromise are very costly for the MDB, as both typically involve organizational reform. Theoretically, immediate acquiescence and compromise of movement demands should be extremely rare, given organizational preferences for sustained routines and standard operating procedures (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Thus, we have good reasons to expect some attempt at (partial) compromise that seeks to calm critique, but falls short of movement demands. In all of these reactions, the more and the more refined the means of counter mobilization the MDB possesses, the higher the likelihood that MDBs manage to disarm movement critique. For instance, deliberations with movement representatives may signal a willingness to compromise. Yet, sending a sign of good will also buys time, time until the movement’s window of opportunity to induce change is closed. Thus, the MDB may react in different ways to movement critique, with reactions ranging from full rejection over ignorance to full adoption of the reform demand. If any of these reactions are effective, movement critique has either been successful right away, or scattered and the mechanism interrupts. If, however, neither of these reactions proves fruitful, movements will sustain their critique and the threat of MDB de-legitimation remains. In fact, this threat is even higher the more MDB responses failed to mitigate critique, as it reveals the inability of the MDB to deal with the issue in an appropriate manner.

If, despite MDB reactions, the mobilization of public opinion is sustained and the threat of de-legitimation is high, MDB daily routines are disturbed. If movements are successful with their disruptive tactics, they force it onto the defensive and achieve nervous, hectic, and inappropriate reactions while maintaining the pressure. Such a combination of sustained pressure and mismanagement sheds a bad light on the MDB as a whole and causes member states to worry about the MDB’s reputation as well as their own, given that all IOs are ultimately funded with the tax money of member state citizens. Given this pressure and the perspective of an even greater legitimacy crisis, representatives of MDB member states perceive an urge to respond, typically by paying increased attention to the MDB and by increasing access to movement actors (see below). In sum, if the issue addressed scores high on salience and the public’s policy preferences are congruent with movement demands, movements can effectively mobilize public opinion to produce a legitimacy crisis at the MDB. This in turn worries decision-makers in MDB member states, thus paving the way for increased movement access.

3.5.2 The Power of Conventional Tactics (Part II)

Once disruption reaches a certain tipping point and the MDB sincerely recognizes that it faces crisis, I draw on social movement literature to argue that movements proceed to

use conventional tactics via the state channel. As elaborated upon above, conventional tactics involve direct interaction with decision-makers. In the context of social movement activism toward member states, examples of such tactics include private meetings with decision-makers, “offering policy expertise and informing decision-makers about the views and needs of the constituencies which lobbyists represent” (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2016, p. 6), providing expert briefings in private and, crucially, in parliamentary hearings. Yet, why employ conventional tactics toward member states and not the MDB directly? The short answer is: because parliaments and governments of like-minded and powerful MDB member states are typically the better change agents for human rights oriented policy and institutional change than MDB management, given the latter’s imperatives to represent all member states (including those in favor and those against movement demands) as well as the incentive structure they face to be promoted (Park, 2017). Hence, social movements need to persuade decision-makers in MDB member states through communicating novel information and sound arguments. The disruption of MDB daily routines, if successful, creates uncertainty also among MDB member states. Once movements exposed the MDB’s incompetence or unwillingness to deal with existing problems in an appropriate manner, this has two interrelated effects: (a) MDB member states open up for alternative perspectives, and (b) they create enhanced access for movement representatives. The critical scope condition for this mechanism is hence access to member state channels. At the end of the day, all movement activity short of revolution eventually needs to go through institutional channels to translate into policy. Access, in turn is contingent on member state systems, such as whether they are constituted as presidential democracies with parliaments commanding budgetary power (Kolb, 2007), powerful states are parliamentary democracies, or states of a non-democratic nature. Once access to decision-makers in MDB member states is secured, whether or not these decision-makers are convinced by TSM persuasion depends on the issue salience, the degree of counter mobilization, support from the organizational environment for TSM demands, and the moral or epistemic authority of movement representatives. To begin with the latter scope condition, crisis at the MDB paired with moral and epistemic authority on behalf of the movement greatly increases the likelihood for persuasion. In times of uncertainty, decision-makers look out for credible advice (Haas, 1992).

Conventional tactics – which are always applied in direct interaction between the movement and their counterparts – build on the insight that not only material entities or actions (e.g., a physical demonstration) possess causal force; rather, communicative ‘actions’ can unfold causal leverage in explaining outcomes in the material world as well. I thus align with constructivist approaches assigning discourses a causal status (Checkel, 1998; Deitelhoff, 2009; Holzschleiter, 2010; Risse, 2000), emphasizing movement “power in discourse” (Draude, Schmelzle, & Risse, 2012, p. 10). Specifically, it is through language that we develop our conceptions of reality, of what is good and desirable. In fact, arguments alone may alter the behavior of actors without, or even despite opposing material factors. As reality is socially – that is, discursively – constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Engelkamp, Glaab & Renner, 2012), the strategic use of language thus constitutes an important source of power (Klein, 2013). As language can never be neutral, emotions play a decisive role (Koschut, 2017). Given that human beings are al-

ways emotional and thinking beings at the same time, the use of conventional tactics (persuasion) involves the strategic reference to the emotional component of concepts, arguments and demands (Kratochwil, 1989; Legro, 1997; Hawkins, 2004; also see Chapter 2).

Once access is guaranteed, framing literature from psychology and communication studies helps explaining when persuasion toward member state decision-makers is likely to work. Specifically, Kahnemann and Egan (2011) theorized that “*cognitive ease*” is a relevant factor in influencing our emotional reaction toward an idea. Where decision-makers are confronted with ideas that they already know underpinned with values they already believe in, they experience cognitive ease and find it easier to believe in the veracity of the frame. In several experiments, it could be shown how positive emotions associated with cognitive ease trump facts. For instance, frames that are too complex by building on too many arguments at once are more likely to be questioned than those relying on the central premise, argument, and conclusion. In a similar vein, internal contradictions or shades of grey within an argument cause suspicion. Even the worst dictator will make sure that the ideology his rule rests upon provides a coherent set of beliefs. Passing the hurdle of a minimum degree of consistency therefore belongs to the necessary requirements of a frame. In sum, an effective frame needs to possess cognitive ease. That is, it needs to be clear, simple, and internally congruent. If continuously repeated, frames sink into individuals’ cognitive apparatus by providing cognitive schemas that can be reactivated easily. Closely related, frames are more powerful if they are not too abstract, but rather establish congruence with the life-world of decision-makers – a quality referred to as “*experiential commensurability*” (Benford & Snow, 2000). The critical question here is whether frames are commensurable with the personal, everyday experiences of the target, or whether they are “too abstract and distant from the lives and experiences of the targets” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 621). According to several authors (Zuo & Benford 1995; Goodman & Jinks, 2013), the more experientially commensurate the frame, the greater the likelihood for frame adoption. To illustrate, Heitlinger (1996) argued that the lack of experiential commensurability explains why the frames of Western European feminism centering on equal work opportunities did not work in post-Communist Czech Republic, where women pursued paid labor for decades.

In addition, the salience or centrality (Goodman & Jinks, 2013) of the internalized value in question triggered by the issue matters. Research on values and beliefs indicates that they are typically arrayed in a hierarchy. The more salient a given value for an addressee, the more central it is for his/her identity, which in turn increases the salience of the frame (Benford & Snow, 2000). Hence, an effective approach is to connect demands to underlying, fundamental values that are widely accepted and shared by decision-makers (Wehling, 2014). Because states care about their sovereignty, they prefer to delegate tasks to IOs at the lowest sovereignty costs possible (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Tallberg et al., 2013). Hence, the higher the sovereignty costs of the movement demand, the lower the chances for an effective use of the state channel.

Due to the relevance of discursive structures surrounding each semantic battle over interpretations, it is crucial for TSM relying on persuasion to be aware of the respective discourse environments including the talk and actions of other MDBs sharing an in-

group identity with the MDB in question. If organizations in the *MDB environment support* TSM demands, decision-makers of MDB member states may use them as anchors to evaluate practices of the MDB in question. If another organization already practices what the movement demands, decision-makers in member states may experience “narrative fidelity” (i.e., a correspondence between the demand and an already familiar and established practice; Benford & Snow, 2000). In contrast, if decision-makers are opposed to movement demands and engage in *counter-mobilization*, the likelihood for frame resonance is less likely. If persuasion is successful, however, member state representatives take up TSM demands and carry it to the MDB. This is where part III of the mechanism kicks in: whether TSM demands translate into MDB reform ultimately depends on the power of the member state representative carrying forward TSM demands.

3.5.3 Member State Incentives, Sanctions and Coercion (Part III)

In a final step, convinced member state parliamentarians and governments need to mobilize political support for reform at the MDB's board of directors—the highest decision-making body. In this part of the mechanism, power asymmetries among member states are of great importance, as not all member states are equally equipped to influence MDB policy making. To be explicit here, this part of the mechanism follows a principal-agent model prominent in rational choice approaches to institutional change (Hawkins et al. 2006; see also Chapter 3.4.1). According to the model, states (the principals) delegate certain tasks to international organizations (the agents). A central component of such a contract is the permanent oversight and control of agents by their principals (Moravcsik, 1998). Several authors have rightly questioned the assumption whether such a degree of control is possible and pointed to the autonomy of IOs (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Busch & Liese, 2017). Surely, the question to what extent IOs are autonomous agents, and to what extent they are instruments of member states remains a hot topic among scholars of international institutions (Martin & Simmons, 2013). With Sauer and Masala (2017), I acknowledge the value of theoretical pluralism that enables different perspectives on institutions. Against that background, I hold that the rationalist principal-agent model explains best the kind of member state involvement towards MDBs I have in mind at part III of the causal mechanism. In this third part of the mechanism, executives or legislatures with budgetary power exercise their influence toward the IO directly, by providing monetary incentives or threatening sanctions in cases of noncompliance. Incentives and threats may be communicated through mere rhetoric or by passing corresponding laws. In extreme cases, parliaments of states may even threaten to cut their funding altogether. In such incidents, the threat becomes existential to the IO and effectively coerces it into compliance. In another variant, parliamentarians shape the national discourse about the relationship between IO operations and human rights protection, thereby influencing their government's position, which then exercises its influence on the IO. The U.S. Congress is a prime example of a parliament with considerable leverage in foreign policy matters. Among its responsibilities is the draft of foreign policy legislation, to provide financial resources to IOs, to ratify international treaties (U.S. Senate) and even to appoint administrative personnel

to IO. Goodman and Jinks (2013) cited the “U.S. Foreign Assistance Act” which denies foreign aid to human rights-violating states, and thus provided considerable financial incentives to comply with human rights. In relation to IOs, the United States sought to use its influence to enhance IO accountability vis-à-vis member states through the introduction of auditing, monitoring and evaluation procedures (Grigorescu, 2010). As Kaya (2015) rightly holds, the power of U.S. Congress in relation to an IO is dependent on the IO’s issue area and governance structure. In relation to MDBs, the U.S. Congress has particularly high leverage. This is a result of the combination that the U.S. Congress enjoys budgetary power and the fact that member state influence in MDBs is allocated according to financial shares. Thus, across MDBs with U.S. participation, U.S. influence is traditionally high (Park, 2017). What is more, U.S. Congress also has a reputation for making use of this financial leverage to pursue its policy goals (Babb, 2009; Heupel & Hirschmann, 2017). Still, to be precise, it is the executive of an influential member state that needs to push for MDB reform. Even in the case of the United States, where Congress has budgetary powers, the path to change occurs through the Treasury, which in turn instructs the U.S. EDs to push for change. As stated before, EDs on the Board of Directors primarily represent their respective member states. Still, they also fulfil an important mediating role between member state executives and the MDB. As a collective, EDs and the MDB president (together making up the Board of Directors) may worry about the MDB’s legitimacy and funding. To put it directly, the same ED can threaten funding cuts in her function of a MS representative, and yet worry about these same funding cuts in her role as a MDB Board member. To reconcile both pressures, this ED will push the whole Board to adopt those reforms necessary to mitigate critique within one’s own member state. Thus, if the Board of Directors worries about MDB funding cuts it may, following a logic of consequences, collectively react to these incentives by adopting the required political and institutional reforms.

Importantly, this part of the mechanism refers to the relationship between powerful member states and the MDB in question. For the movement, the critical issue is to get decision-makers of liberal member states to exercise their leverage in favor of movement demands. Thus, social movements may also operate in nondemocratic states and seek to influence their executives who then, in this part of the mechanism, exercise power over the MDB.

