

Building Communities?

Paternalistic Bonds and Religious Spaces

The comparative ethnography of entangled neighbourhoods has revealed that in the localised realm of neighbourhood boundary politics there are strong aspirations by urban elites to reinforce urban differences by defending old and imposing new forms of segregation. Although the visions upheld by municipalities tend towards mixed neighbourhoods, it is as yet unclear whether these will materialise. Elite neighbourhoods hence tend to be emptied of encounters with 'others', and if they do take place it is within the hierarchical and socially invisibilised work relations between employers and their domestic workers or security employees. What the chapters spoke little about is the venturing of the elite into the poor areas; mainly because it is quite rare. Only sometimes do employers visit their domestic workers in the township; they may go to express condolences to a distant relative in the *bairro* or they may make use of a cheap service offered by an informal business. In *cities of entanglements*, it is rather groups at the lower end of the social hierarchy that cross social boundaries into spaces dominated by those at the upper end of the social hierarchy, rather than the other way around. The same holds true in the following two chapters.

Chapters 5 and 6 will focus on two sets of urban spaces which entail the promise of something new; a promise of more equal spaces, of symmetrical relations and of the emergence of sociality and community across boundaries. On the one hand, this is the urban realm of religion, where, as the scriptures say, everyone should be the same in front of God, and it is the spaces of the shopping malls, where, apparently, it does not matter where you come from, as long as you know how to 'mall'. The two chapters examine the forms of encounters, the patterns of social relations and maybe even belonging (and exclusions) that emerge in these places, and the stories of hope, conflict and disappointments urban dwellers tell. The potential of religious spaces and malls to build urban communities is, as the two chapters will show, vexed and ambivalent.

Religion in Entangled Neighbourhoods

The significance of urban religion – as everyday routine, as ways of understanding and imagining the (urban) world, as a space of belonging and exclusion – has long been underestimated.¹ This is not least because many urban scholars stem from secular, Western backgrounds and have inhibitions or even a defensive attitude towards anything religious. Yet religious routines constitute a considerable part of the everyday life of many urban dwellers in Maputo and Johannesburg, as well as in many other cities across the world. Religious practices and experiences shape the imagination and the perception of cities, urban life and urban spaces. Orsi (1999: cover), for instance, claims that “[p]eople work on city spaces and realities in their religious practice, as the city works on them”. In Africa, the anthropologist Filip De Boeck and the photographer Marie-Françoise Plissart have famously shown that Kinshasa “contains many cities in one,” among them an invisible, spiritual city (Boeck and Plissart 2004: 16-17). As the editors to *Routes and Rites to the City* (Wilhelm-Solomon et al. 2017: 7) rightly point out, religion in Johannesburg has been little acknowledged and, if it was, then as a functionalist space where the poor could retreat to from what Murray calls a “heartless world” (Murray 2011: 171). In studies of Maputo there is also a lack of understanding of how much religion shapes urban lifestyles and social relations (an exception to this is Van de Kamp’s research on urban women and Brazilian Pentecostalism, e.g. Van de Kamp 2016). Many strands of Islam and Pentecostalism understand religious practice and values not simply as a separate sphere of everyday life, but as all encompassing. Analyses of the urban with no attention to its invisible, spiritual dimensions miss this.

In Maputo and Johannesburg, Christianity is the majority religion (71% in Maputo, 76% in Johannesburg). Muslims constitute a minority, but Islam has become more publicly visible in the last few years in both cities (1.7% in Johannesburg, 5% in Maputo, Statistics South Africa 2004: 24, from census 2001; Conselho Municipal de Maputo 2010: 29). South Africa is less diverse in religious terms than Mozambique where some provinces in the north have a Muslim majority and where Muslims constitute between 20 and 30 per cent of the national population (Morier-Genoud 2007: 240). In both cities, spiritual practices related to ancestry, witchcraft and local forms of medicine and healing are also constitutive of the invisible urban realm. For some, such practices, which are locally coined as ‘tradition’, are loathed in the version of the Abrahamic faith they follow, while for others they form a normal part of everyday life.

Racial segregation under apartheid left its imprint on the religious landscape of South Africa. During apartheid, there were no segregationist laws governing religious spaces, yet the Group Areas Act indirectly broke up integrated churches as it violently destroyed racially diverse areas. The segregated living and large travel distances produced racially segregated religious spaces (Christopher 2001: 145). Even burial grounds became segregated. The politically dominant former Dutch Reformed Church fragmented into racially separate entities. As many churches legitimised segregation in their discourses, many Africans rejected European forms of Christianity, which evoked the mushrooming of African Independent Churches (Anderson 2005: 70). Christianity

1 Parts of this chapter have been published in the journal *Anthropology Southern Africa* (Heer 2015b, ©Taylor & Francis) as well as in a German version (Heer 2013). I thank the publishers and editors for the permission to reprint them.

also profoundly shaped resistance to the racist regime and played a role in the democratisation of South Africa (see also Comaroff and Comaroff 1986).

Among the new additions to the religious landscape in Johannesburg are Charismatic or new Pentecostal churches which grew in line with the charismatic movement in the US. The development of these churches first occurred along racial lines in South Africa. They emerged first in White areas (1980s) and then in Black communities (1990s), with both the township and suburb version appealing largely to upwardly mobile milieus (Anderson 2005: 75–80, Balcomb 2004: 18). While the White Charismatics had strong connections to Western religious trends, the new Black churches developed quite distinct characteristics as a result of the struggle against apartheid (Anderson 2005: 88). The gap between Black and White Charismatics was and continues to be also a gap between rich and poor; the white, middle-class churches based in formerly White suburbia tend to be much larger and wealthier (*ibid*).

As Christianity is so prominent in all milieus in South Africa, there were many hopes about the integrating potential of churches after the end of apartheid (Ganiel 2006: 13). With the growth of black middle-class milieus, immigration from other African countries, desegregation and the formation of new lifestyles in Johannesburg, the landscape of charismatic churches is also changing. Nowadays, many of the formerly White suburban churches are positioning themselves as non-racial or multiracial and aim to attract both black and white believers, for example, the Jubilee Community Church in Cape Town (Ganiel 2006, 2007, 2008), the Rhema charismatic mega-church in Johannesburg (Balcomb 2004) and the Rivers Church in Sandton. This chapter will focus on the LRC Church in Linbro Park (at the time of fieldwork called London Road Church, then renamed Love Reaching Communities Church), also a formerly White Charismatic church which claims to be multiracial. Every Sunday, believers from the township Alexandra and the surrounding suburbs congregate at this Charismatic church to sing and pray together. It thus constitutes a space of encounter, a contact zone between diverse urban lifeworlds in the city, carrying the promise of symmetric encounters in a city shaped by inequality.

In Lourenço Marques, which is what Maputo was called during Portuguese colonialism, Catholicism was the official religion. During the socialist period religious organisations were first forbidden and then tightly controlled by the state.² The change from a socialist regime to neoliberalism and the ideal of multiparty democracy in the 1990s also involved the liberalisation of the religious market. Since the 1980s religious activities have been on the rise in Mozambique (Morier-Genoud 2007: 238). Liberalisa-

2 Socialist Frelimo first banned vernacular spiritual practices as well as religions like Islam and Christianity. Christmas became *dia da família* (family day). The early post-independence Frelimo government pursued an ideology which emphasised that in the new nation there would be "no place for racial, ethnic, 'tribal', regional or religious differences" (Bonate 2008: 643). The socialist Frelimo intended to erase 'obscurantist elements' which they perceived as 'backward' and contradicting the modernist norms of revolutionary 'scientific' socialism (Bonate 2007a: 57). Frelimo banned most practices related to the invisible, spiritual world, like initiation rites, and traditional healing and ancestor-related rituals, as well as religions like Islam and Christianity. Full religious freedom was only introduced with the democratic constitution of 1990. But already at the beginning of the 1980s, Frelimo reduced its anti-religious policies as they were generating negative international publicity (Morier-Genoud 2007: 234, Van de Kamp 2016). Frelimo also feared that the Renamo guerrilla movement might receive support from Arab or Muslim countries if they continued with religious repression (Morier-Genoud 2007: 242).

tion has also left its material imprint on Maputo's cityscape; large Brazilian Pentecostal churches and new ostentatious mosques have been built. Since the 1990s evangelical churches have proliferated, especially Brazilian ones forming part of the spread of transnational Pentecostalism (Van de Kamp 2016).

Islam plays an increasingly important role in the Maputo. Islam made inroads into the northern Mozambican coast in the 8th century and became associated with the Swahili ruling elites (Bonate 2007a: 56). Over the centuries, a locally and regionally rooted conception of Islam developed (Bonate 2006, 2008: 638). After 1900, Islam expanded, caused by the arrivals of Sufi orders at the end of the 19th century, the development of markets and infrastructure under the increased Portuguese presence, and the social and economic insecurities caused by the colonial domination (Bonate 2007b: 138, Morier-Genoud 2007: 235). Nowadays, the northern provinces are the stronghold of Islam in Mozambique. In the academic literature, this form of Islam is often referred to as African Islam or Swahili Islam, belonging to the Shafi'i Sunni school of Islam, with Sufi influences (Bonate 2007b).

In the course of urbanisation, which accelerated after independence in 1975 and during the civil war, many Muslims migrated from rural to urban areas, from small towns to cities, and from the northern provinces to Maputo in the south. Nowadays, there is a considerable Muslim population in Polana Caniço and other Maputo neighbourhoods. Muslims came to Polana Caniço as war refugees and economic migrants from the northern provinces, especially from Zambézia. In 1998, northerners constituted five per cent of the population in Polana Caniço (Costa 2007: 31); in the meantime, this has probably risen. Many settled on the inferior land in Polana Caniço subject to erosion, and hence some were relocated to the outskirts of the city in the course of the rehabilitation of Julius Nyerere Avenue (see also Vivet 2012).

Maputo is also home to an Indian Islam, upheld by (descendants from) immigrants from the Indian subcontinent. The Mozambican Indians are religiously diverse: Maputo is home to Catholics from Goa and a minority of Hindus. The majority, though, is Muslim, a minority belonging to an *Ismaili* orientation of Islam, and the majority belonging to the *Hanafi* Islamic school. Like the African Muslim milieus, the Indian Muslim orientations are also shaped by different movements, among them also Sufi tendencies (Pires 2008: 19). As in other countries, the influence of the Saudi Arabian schools of Islam has increased in Mozambique in the last few years, among them the so-called Wahhabism, creating new differentiations and increasing competition and conflicts within and between Indian and African Muslims.³

According to Bonate (2008: 652), most of the differences among Mozambican Muslims arose during pre-colonial and colonial periods, but those related to ethnicity and race in particular declined after independence and were replaced by a main ideological divide between Sufis and the so-called Wahhabis. At the local level of the neighbourhood and in the everyday life of Muslims in Maputo, however, denominational differences play an insignificant role, with local conceptions of race and culture as well as economic inequality being perceived as the main lines of division. The Muslims living

3 In 2017, violence emerged in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, perpetrated by groups which appeared to be inspired by violent Islamic extremist ideologies. This is having a considerable impact on the politics around Islam in Mozambique. The ethnography of this chapter is based on data collected between 2010 and 2012 and does therefore not include such new developments.

in Polana Caniço and Sommerschield II seldom used labels to refer to different Islamic movements. Because the denominational differences play a small role in their everyday life, knowledge about the complex denominational landscape constitutes specialist knowledge which they did not possess.

Until today, many members of Indian milieus live in the *Baixa*, the downtown commercial city centre of Maputo. In recent years, suburban living with a large house in a quiet neighbourhood has become fashionable among wealthy Indian milieus. Many moved to elite areas like Sommerschield II which nowadays has a considerable Indian Muslim population. In 2011, residents opened a Muslim prayer place, a *musallah* in a half-finished building in Sommerschield II. During its short existence (2011–2013) this Muslim prayer place was also frequented by some Muslims living in the adjacent Polana Caniço. This chapter provides insight into the religious relations between Muslim residents from Polana Caniço and Sommerschield II, based on interviews about visits to the *musallah* with its promise of entangling the different lifeworlds in less hierarchical ways.

Many religious practices follow a rhythm, and these rhythms again shape the rhythms of the city (Lefebvre 2010 [1992]), the spatial practices of urban dwellers, as well as public spaces and public life. Faiths bring together believers from different milieus on a weekly or even daily basis in the religious spaces where they collectively worship. On Sundays, the otherwise bustling city centre of Maputo calms down; the shops and offices are closed, there is little traffic and the passage ways also are empty as the informal traders stay at home, just like the many office employees, workers and shoppers whom they usually sell their goods to. The only people on the street are groups of men and women in formal clothes of Portuguese fashion (men in pants and shirts, women in skirts) on their way to one of the many churches. In a *bairro* like Polana Caniço, churches claim aural space through their singing; singing can be heard on the neighbourhood streets on Sundays, coming from the believers congregating in small buildings constructed of corrugated iron with a thatched roof and no electricity. Likewise, in Alexandra, the bustling street life calms down on Sundays and the distant sound of singing changes the township soundscape. While during the week the main traffic routes are used by working-class commuters wearing blue-collar overalls, on the weekends, churchgoers wearing differently coloured uniforms, indicating their membership of a specific congregation, take over the public spaces.

In downtown Maputo Islam is increasingly visible. Men and women in clothing marking their Muslim identity – among them white, long robes for men and diverse styles of veiling for women – drive and walk on the streets, stand in front of mosques and work in the many Indian-owned shops in the *Baixa*. Especially during Ramadan and on Fridays, men in prayer attire may be seen on their way to one of the five daily prayers at the mosque. In the evenings, the call of muezzins mingles with the noise of the traffic. More than twenty mosques, some of them large, new and prominently situated at major transport axes like the Masjid Taqwa on Eduardo Mondlane Avenue, claim the space for Muslims architecturally in the city. On Sundays, the Maputo Shopping Centre and a popular park, the Jardim dos Namorados, become transformed into spaces of Indian (Muslim) public life. During certain times of the year, like Ramadan or around Christmas, religious activities increase significantly, and religious rhythms may temporarily become more dominant in everyday life.

Christian church services on Sundays can take the whole day. For many women, Sunday services and prayer meetings during the week are the main social activities they engage in. Volunteer church groups have spiritual purposes like bible study, prayer and evangelisation, yet they are also support networks for church members: fellow church members visit sick neighbours, organise food for the destitute, provide moral and emotional support for each other in family conflicts or personal dramas. Besides the spiritual functions and social services, the churches are also safe spaces for sociality like the fostering of friendship and love relations, in a city perceived by many to be anonymous, shaped by self-interest and ill will. Young people who belong to church groups find friends there, and in Maputo especially, they may go out together to public parks, beaches or even a shopping mall. Many young people attend church. Here they find romantic partners with whom they share values and lifestyle. They may not, for example, drink alcohol, go out to bars or be gold diggers (*peessoas interesseiras*) who abuse friendship or love to gain access to resources. As Cecílio, a 22-years old resident of Polana Caniço, explained:

Nowadays, you can't trust anybody ... My friend can for example go after my girlfriend ... The friendships I want are not the friendships you can have nowadays. Friendships today are about personal interest, and if not about that, it's about drinking. I don't drink and I don't like *peessoas interesseiras* (Cecílio, resident of Polana Caniço, August 2012).

The narrowing of networks along the lines of religious denominations, the preference for socialising and falling in love with fellow churchgoers of the same age are practices of protection from social ills in African cities which are seen by religious urbanites as places full of dangers and vices. Yet the security is not all encompassing; a boyfriend met at the church may be found to be cheating, an apparently religious girlfriend turns out to be a gold digger after all. Christian interviewees told me that some people who use witchcraft pretend to be highly religious in order to deceive people about their 'dark' practices. In the elite areas of Sommerschield II and Linbro Park, religion plays less of a role in everyday life than in Polana Caniço and Alexandra. Property owners in Linbro Park and members of the Frelimo elite have generally had a Christian upbringing, but nowadays they attend a church service only on special occasions like Christmas or a wedding. The Indian Muslims in Sommerschield II are the most religious milieu among the elites studied in this ethnography.

Habit and routine are, besides imagination and judgement, a key element of agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Yet much research on African cities emphasises improvisation, fluidity and creativity and overlooks the routine aspects of African urban life. Urban religion and its related repetitive spatial movements, ritual practices and regular interactions contribute to the urban social order and consistency (Katsaura 2017: 12). Such religious routines become shaped by specificities of the religion as well as the urban form. Maputo is still characterised by a centre-periphery spatial form with central functions like formal jobs, services and commercial centres allocated to the city centre. Many workers living in Polana Caniço therefore frequent mosques in the *Baixa* during the day, where their workplace is situated, together with Muslims from other milieus and neighbourhoods, and in the evenings, they frequent the African Sufi mosque in their own neighbourhood that is less anonymous and less mixed. There are a few Muslims living in Polana Caniço who cross the neighbourhood bound-

aries and go and pray in the *musallah* in Sommerschild II. Indian Muslims living in Sommerschild II sometimes drive to the new mosque in the Bairro Triúnfo, a growing urban area along the coast, with gated communities, villas, shopping malls, hotels, offices spaces and now also a large mosque. The emerging polynuclear tendencies thus become reflected in religious routinised trajectories of affluent urban dwellers, impacting again on the forms of urban entanglements.

Many Muslim believers frequent a range of mosques and prayer places at different times of the day, depending on where their worldly responsibilities like work have taken them. People who are Christians tend to attend the same church over a long period, which is also the case in Johannesburg. For township dwellers transport costs can be high, so that practical concerns like the proximity of a church can be important. Churches on the boundary between suburb and township like the LRC Church are therefore attractive to township dwellers who have limited means yet are eager to circulate across boundaries and venture into spaces where they can meet new people. For affluent milieus in Johannesburg the location of a church is relatively less important, as they lead car-based lives and can better afford to drive considerable distances across the spread-out, polynuclear city. There are also township dwellers who are ready to take a long minibus taxi drive to get to church, but then it is usually a church they joined when they were living elsewhere. So there are multiple ways in which religion shapes urban life in these neighbourhoods in Maputo and Johannesburg: on the one hand, religious rhythms constitute urban spaces and urban times in ways which reflect and shape the spatial order of the cities. On the other hand, religion shapes urban sociality, be it social relationships between family members, friends or neighbours, entanglements across social boundaries within religious communities, and chance encounters between urban strangers. While bringing people together in new ways, the religious realm is at the same time also characterised by subtle and overt forms of division.

High Hopes and Deep Disappointments in Religious Encounters

All human beings are the same, be it across the sexes, the races, there is no difference, be it between black and white. Important about being a Muslim is to be good to the others, to be honest, to serve as an example for others, and not to hurt the next one (Senhor Jaul, local administrator of the Masjid Ioonus in Polana Caniço, July 2012).

God's kingdom is not, you know, for whites or blacks, it's just God's kingdom, we are all children of God (Terry, elder of LRC Church in Linbro Park, May 2012).

These statements by religious leaders in neighbourhoods in Johannesburg and Maputo claim that religion is an urban sphere where everyday differences – class, race or ethnic origin, gender – are dissolved.⁴ In front of God, the quotes assert, urban dwell-

4 The ethnography of Muslim religious relations in Sommerschild II and Polana Caniço is based on interviews with residents as well as visits to prayer places and mosques collected between 2010 and 2012. As both my field assistant Fernando Tivane and I were not Muslim, and me being a woman, our possibilities to participate and observe in these spaces was limited. The data for the LRC church case

ers whose differences usually shape their interactions in everyday life meet as equals, united by their faith. Christianity and Islam, both Abrahamic religions, ideologically promise equality to their believers (e.g. Renard 2011: 162-164). Both the notion of the Islamic *ummah* and the Christian church express the idea of an imagined religious community constituted by equals, coming together in religious encounters, here understood as interactions between co-believers. Religious spaces are sites of everyday urban rituals where spaces become routinely shared, where habitualised encounters with difference take place, and new connections may emerge (Katsaura 2017: 3, 10). The promises of equality in the *ummah* or the church by urban religions raises hopes for the transformational potential of such habitualised encounters, yet there are also risks of deep disappointments.

Uncovering Inequality in the Post-apartheid Rainbow Church

According to the leadership of the LRC Church, the roots of the church lie in the late 1980s when Rigby Wallace, a white South African who would later become the lead elder, founded a multiracial pre-school in Lombardy West, a suburb in the vicinity of Linbro Park and Alexandra. The fact that the school was open to all races is still considered worth mentioning on the website of the school, which nowadays exists as a private Christian school adjacent to the LRC Church, and leaders highlight this fact when telling the history of the church. In 2012, about 400 people were regularly attending the Sunday service according to Terry, who was one of the church elders in 2012. The church had about eight to ten ministries including children's and youth groups, a coffee shop run by the church, group-based bible study, and a social ministry called *Malukhanye* in which food was donated to the poor (see below). In 2012, the elders were planning to open a church branch in Alexandra; this was put in place in 2014. The church leaders call the church's denomination Charismatic. The church was aligned to the New Covenant Ministries International (NCMI), a group of allegedly loosely linked churches (New Covenant Ministries International 2005). NCMI belongs to the new Pentecostal churches which emerged in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, in response to the charismatic movement in the US.

The LRC Church is situated on the southern fringes of Linbro Park. Churchgoers from nearby Alexandra walk to the church, which is situated close to the entrance of the suburb, along a main road, London Road. More affluent believers, usually coming from their homes in the suburbs, take the London Road off-ramp from the N3 highway to reach the church by car, often driving past fellow churchgoers from Alexandra who are on foot. The LRC Church was not always based in Linbro Park. The church moved several times in the northern suburbs until affordable land was found in Linbro Park in 2000. The church leadership saw the opportunity of being close to Alexandra as a chance to expand their church and tap into new religious markets.

entailed more participation and observation; the ethnography is based on many visits to Sunday services and the *Malukhanye* feeding scheme, as well as interviews and informal conversations with churchgoers, volunteers and the church leader Terry. Both the LRC church and the Muslim prayer place in Sommerschield II have changed rapidly and considerably since then. The LRC church opened a branch in Alexandra and united with a church in Boksburg. The *musallah* in Sommerschield II only existed between 2011 and 2013.

If you look over that way, it's incredible how close we are to Alex. And if you look there [towards Sandton] it's a crazy thing. I suppose it's not unique in the world at all, but there you have the affluence and riches of Sandton – some of the best properties and prices for properties are there in Sandton – and right below that is Alex. We always felt that God has not just placed us here for nothing. We really felt we must have some footprint in Alex, because that's why we are here. We could have been anywhere, but we felt that this is where God was leading us. So that's the kind of church we are (Terry, elder of LRC Church, May 2012).

The proximity of wealth and poverty which characterises this part of Johannesburg became interpreted by the church leadership as their religious calling and their location in Linbro Park an expression of God's will that they should evangelise in Alexandra.

It is noteworthy, though, that on the LRC Church website, the proximity to Alexandra is not mentioned in the description of the location, although there is ample reference to neighbouring affluent suburbs (London Road Church 2013, Love Reaching Communities Church 2015). This omission is an expression of the ambiguity that characterises the church leadership's stance towards their township constituency; while they do have the goal to include black township milieus, they are also afraid of alienating affluent suburbanites (for more details see Heer 2015b). This is also the reason for several changes to their name. First named Waverly New Covenant Church in reference to the suburb in which it was then located, the leadership renamed it with the Zulu name *Duduza* ('to comfort'), because they wanted to attract residents of the township where African languages dominate everyday life. As the name seemed to imply a black school and a township church, they eventually became afraid of losing suburban churchgoers and changed the name to London Road Church, referring to its new location on London Road. However, the London Road offramp from the N3 highway, which is on the border between Linbro Park and Alexandra, suffers from a reputation as a crime hotspot. Because the proximity to Alexandra comes with negative connotations, the leadership removed the reference to the locale and changed the name after my fieldwork in 2012 to Love Reaching Communities Church.

In 2012, the majority of churchgoers at the LRC Church were from middle class and elite milieus living in formerly White suburbs like Linbro Park or Lombardy West, as well as the new gated communities and townhouse complexes in north-eastern Johannesburg. While the majority of affluent churchgoers were white, there was also increasing numbers of Indian and black middle-class families, as well as a number of racially mixed couples attending the church. This reflects the growing black middle classes in Johannesburg and the increasing desegregation and diversification of Johannesburg since the 1990s (Crankshaw 2008, Southall 2016). In our interview, church elder Terry remarked, "We love the fact that we are 35 per cent black, and the rest white, roughly, because that's what it should be (Terry, May 2012). The LRC Church did not keep official registers of attendees during the period of my research, so these numbers are estimations. My informal conversations and interviews showed that black churchgoers tended to belong to the suburban middle classes, were domestic workers living in the surrounding suburbs and/or were township dwellers from nearby Alexandra. Many churchgoers from Alexandra started to frequent the church because they were recipients of food donations and prayers in the Malukhanye scheme. Many were unemployed and dependent on social grants and piece jobs. Some Alexandra residents

were better off but could not afford to move out of the township and considered the church a space where they could expand their social horizons. This is quite typical of the new Pentecostalism: many charismatic churches have a strong appeal to upwardly mobile and aspirational milieus (Anderson 2005: 67).

In its organisational culture, the LRC Church displays the three dimensions typical of the globalisation of Charismatic Christianity (Coleman 2000). Among them are the use of mass media like the internet and video clips to communicate its ideas, a social organisation with strong transnational links and management ideas derived from corporations, plus a global Charismatic meta-culture (Anderson 2005: 66-7). On the website, they portray the LRC Church as a 'bunch of ordinary people'. This reflects the discourses employed by the NCMI, the group of churches they were aligned to in 2012. The mission statement (New Covenant Ministries International 2005) with the telling title *Who are these guys?* claimed that their churches know no internal hierarchies, but rather worked based on 'teams', 'partnerships' and 'relations'. This discourse of egalitarianism and informality, which downplays hierarchy, is encountered throughout statements by the leadership and in texts on their website. Like many other charismatic churches, their theology is shaped by the prosperity gospel (Coleman 2000), both rooted in and reflecting the middle-class lifestyles of urban Johannesburg. Status symbols like iPads, ostentatiously used by the preachers for reading their sermon, and sporty, yet pricy, brand clothes play an important role in the religious performances. This may also be the reason why aspirational township dwellers attend the church; the sermons had little to do with the realities of township living, as the church leaders constructed for them the ideal, suburban consumer world to which they were aspiring and hoped one day to belong. At least on Sundays, they could be part of this world and build bonds with people whose lifestyles they aspired to.

Brian, a 30-something musician, grew up in Alexandra. In 2011, when he attended the LRC Church, he was living in Tsutsunami, a new section of Alexandra just across the highway from Linbro Park. Although his identity and everyday life were rooted in Alexandra, his lifeworld as a successful musician extended well beyond the township and he had professional and personal networks in the television and music industry. As a volunteer in various organisations, he knew many government employees and politicians. In 2012, his livelihood consisted of rental income from a flat that he had acquired through illegal occupation, irregular music gigs and by working for a Community Work Programme, a government scheme targeted at under- and unemployed people. His steady rental income as informal landlord and his broad social networks put him in a better social position than, for example, rural migrants working as domestic workers who had to pay rent and who did not know anybody whom they could ask for help. Brian's mother was a devout Christian. Unlike many other young people in Alexandra who started drinking early, Brian did not drink alcohol for a long time, not least because of his mother's strong Christian orientation. But when his step-father started to throw him out of the house at night when he was about 18, he had nowhere else to go but nightclubs and thus started drinking. After a turbulent time of drug abuse and crime, Brian started to go to the LRC Church in his early twenties, not only because he was living nearby, but also because he was curious to experience a different kind of church.

Bertha, a 30-year-old resident living in the River Park section of Alexandra at the time, was unmarried and taking care of a foster child and her sister's children whom

she was living with. Bertha and her sister owned a house and supplemented their income by renting out shacks in their backyard. They had received the house from the government after they had been internally displaced due to township violence between hostel dwellers belonging to rival political parties in the early 1990s (Bonner and Nief-tagodien 2008: 359). Although Bertha had no other income, the household itself was financially sound due to the monthly rents, her sister's salary from an office job and social grants. Worrying that she had not yet found a husband, Bertha has been going from church to church seeking spiritual support. Bertha can be described as a church shopper (Brunn, Jetton and Palmquist 2015), trying out different spiritual remedies. When LRC volunteers came to evangelise in River Park in the 2000s, she decided to attend a church service: "[I went there] because I love to observe too much, I love to learn too much, so I went there. And it was incredible" (Bertha, June 2012).

For both Brian and Bertha, interacting with people from diverse milieus at the LRC Church was something desirable and exciting: a key motivation to join the church was their desire to cross the boundaries of their everyday lives. They perceived the church in a very positive light as a space enabling them to become entangled with other urban lifeworlds to which they were otherwise little connected.

I went to the church because I just wanted to experience a different environment. I grew up in a church, you know, but now, I just wanted to see how white people praise. Do they accept black people or they pretend like they do? Because you know, we are from the apartheid era, some of us still don't exactly accept the rainbow nation, you know (Brian, resident of Alexandra, June 2012).

For Brian and Bertha, the promise of multiracialism at the church, the coming together of white and black urban dwellers, raised the hope and expectation that the church would finally be a space where new forms of sociability (what the Anglican theologian Desmond Tutu called the 'Rainbow Nation') would be possible.

While for white suburbanites visiting the LRC was moving through familiar territory, churchgoers from the township like Brian and Bertha had to cross everyday social boundaries to get there. I call such practices of crossing everyday boundaries *circulating*, drawing on Simone (2005b: 519), who defines circulation as "practices that enable residents to navigate and engage diverse spaces, actors, sensibilities and activities across the city in its entirety, or at least across domains larger than the quarters where residents work and/or live". For many economic and social reasons, urban dwellers circulate beyond their everyday world to actively seek encounters at the LRC Church with residents from other social backgrounds. Some do this in, amongst others, the hope of creating new connections which could help them to find a job. Circulation is, therefore, a key urban practice for the creation of new urban entanglements.

For Bertha and Brian, the LRC Church was initially unknown territory and their first visits entailed some degree of uncertainty. Both had interacted with white people before, but not as congregants of the same religious space. As Bertha recalled, "I was there and I was a *black* person in front of *white* people. So I didn't know how to react and I didn't know what to do" (Bertha, June 2012). Yet, when I asked each of them about their first visit to the church, both Brian and Bertha were nostalgic. Bertha declared that "It was wonderful. I loved it," whilst Brian proclaimed, "I felt great, you know, because it was for the first time that I was among all the South African races" (Brian,

June 2012). They associated their co-presence with white churchgoers with the ideal of the post-apartheid society, what Brian referred to in the quote above as 'rainbow nation'.

With time, they learnt to move securely through this new social environment, which they both evaluated as a personal achievement. But the initial fascination and enthusiasm soon diminished when they became better acquainted with the church and its believers and began to feel that they were being dealt with differently to the white churchgoers. Hoping to experience encounters shaped by symmetry, they were disappointed when they felt that the broader historical and contemporary inequalities nevertheless made their inroads into the entanglements emerging at the church. Positive experiences therefore became juxtaposed with feelings of exclusion whenever they felt that they were being treated as 'others'.

One type of situation sometimes causing disappointment was the manner in which they were greeted when arriving at the church. Before Sunday morning church services, elders and volunteers usually stood at the entrance of the church to greet the churchgoers, performing friendship and familiarity in an informal, casual manner. Brian and Bertha sensed that the people welcoming them to the church felt restrained towards them, in a similar manner to how they had felt when they visited the church for the first time. Both found that the greetings between black and white churchgoers were shorter than between whites. Brian noted that white churchgoers only looked briefly into his eyes and then quickly looked away. Bertha had observed the practice of complimenting young mothers on their beautiful babies and emulated it. She noticed, however, that when she made such a compliment, the young white mothers tended to move on from her relatively quickly, while the same compliment would lead to a much longer conversation if both churchgoers were white. Bertha and Brian both concluded that their white interlocutors did not feel 'comfortable' in their presence and possibly even felt scared. As Bertha remarked, "When we hug them or talk to them, you can see that ... white is white. Like they are afraid" (Bertha, June 2012).

According to Goffman (1959: 9), social actors create common ground in a shared situation by coming to a temporary agreement on their social reality and on the roles and identities that each will assume (see also Crossley 2011: 29). The situational definition created in the LRC greeting ritual entailed a definition of equal partners in a religious relationship marked by informality and familiarity. Situational definitions also have a moral character (Goffman 1959: 13) which, in the LRC Church, created a context in which Brian and Bertha expected to be treated in the same manner as white churchgoers. Goffman (1959: 53-55) points out that each participant's belief in the authenticity of how the other participants presented themselves could easily be jeopardised. Thus, the insecurity and discomfort which Brian and Bertha sensed in the white churchgoers (whether true or not) highlighted for them a contradiction between the performance of equality and friendliness and their experience of insincerity. They came to interpret the interaction as an inauthentic show which Brian described cynically in the following exchange:

Brian: If you are there for the first time, they make sure that they cover [up] all the negativities that you may see. But when you go there continuously, that's when these scandals or illnesses start to now reveal themselves. Barbara: Can you give me an example?

Brian: Racism ... When times goes by, you see that, no, [these] people, they are not really comfortable amongst black people (Brian, resident of Alexandra, June 2012).

In terms of urban entanglements, these greeting rituals constitute on one level of experience, namely the situational definition, a transgression of the spatial and racial boundaries shaping life in the city, yet on another level of experience, the perception of discomfort felt by the 'other' leads to a reaffirmation of the very same boundaries. What emerges are, therefore, entanglements with contradictory meanings, shaped by a tension between the new and the old, between being together and remaining apart.

Bertha and Brian also drew on other situations in the church in their critical evaluation of the performances of white churchgoers and elders. Brian, for example, noticed that the same white churchgoers who would greet him so warmly at the church entrance had driven past him as he was walking to church without offering him a lift. In his view, this would be a moral obligation if they were indeed equal partners in a religious community:

No one stops and gives you a lift. If it has been raining, and if the road has got potholes, you will get sprinkled by the water. They just pass by. Some even hoot or lift their hands to show you that they can see you. Then at church, when you enter, now they start smiling at you (Brian, resident of Alexandra, June 2012).

On the terrace outside the church building, the church leadership put up a table where churchgoers could help themselves to free coffee and tea after the church service had ended. Inside the building, the church had opened a coffee bar with comfortable couches which sold expensive cappuccinos or latte macchiatos. Here people who visited the service for the first time were invited to a free cup of coffee as well as cake to ensure that they would stay for a while and chat with church volunteers. Yet, the creation of two social spaces shaped the distribution of believers across the church building and thus the manner in which they interacted. The apparently well-intended act of providing free drinks in a site that was spatially separated from the coffee bar that offered drinks for sale meant that churchgoers of the suburban middle class congregated inside the church while those who availed themselves of the free drinks, usually poorer township congregants, would socialise on the terrace outside. Brian recounted his memories of his first visit to the church:

If you are coming for the second time, on the second week, what they will do is, if you can't afford the cappuccino and the espresso, then you will have to go outside the building and just watch and make yourself the cheap coffee (Brian, resident of Alexandra, June 2012).

This informal micro-segregation created a form of social mingling after the church service which reminded one of apartheid racial segregation: the outside crowd tended to be black, the inside crowd white. Brian believed that the church leadership had purposefully made this arrangement to protect white churchgoers from the discomfort he felt they were clearly experiencing in the co-presence of black believers. The church leadership, aware of the micro-segregation, also interpreted it like Brian, in terms of racial categories. This quote by the elder, Terry, for instance, shows that in his inter-

pretation of the micro-segregation was about black and white churchgoers who do not mingle because of their race:

You may see on a Sunday that many of the black folk are sitting here, in the sun, talking to each other. And then you look in there [at the coffee bar] and it looks like there are very few black guys after church, because they are all mingling here. We thought: "No, this is wrong, they must mingle." And then we realised ... we can't force things! So if that's the way people feel comfortable ... We love everybody in the church, we see them as brothers. But if they are meeting here, and that's the way they wanna meet on a Sunday, and the white guys wanna sit there, then so be it! (Terry, elder of LRC Church, May 2012).

Like Brian, Elder Terry regarded the micro-segregation as a personal issue that resulted from churchgoers' desire to create comfort zones around them, spatially separated from those belonging to what were perceived as different racial groups. Since the church leadership framed it as voluntary self-segregation, they did not regard it as their responsibility to interfere. In practice, though, they could have easily altered the spatial arrangements of the two spaces and lowered the prices of the coffee sold to remove the economic exclusivity of the coffee bar. However, as church structures were dominated by middle-class white males, it was their norms and values, rooted in a suburban middle class, which were taken as given and implemented. It was not an absence of sensitivity by the church leadership to race, but rather a lack of attention to class difference which produced this micro-segregation. Both Bertha and Brian stopped attending this church, not least for these reasons. Their high hopes of new forms of entanglements at the church turned into deep disappointment.

Colonial Images in the Postcolonial Mosque

Senhor Justino originates from the province Zambézia in northern Mozambique, and was living in a simple house in Polana Caniço, relatively close to Casas Brancas and Sommerschild II. During the civil war, when he was studying to become a teacher, he was conscripted to the army, and he was never able to return to finish school. Deprived of the possibility of social mobility through education, he nevertheless decided against the harsh rural life of the field (*machamba*) in Zambézia, and when he was released from the army in 1992, he set off for Johannesburg to work on the mines. However, like many others on their journey to Johannesburg, he was stranded in Maputo and eventually decided to stay there. In 1996 he was able to buy a little house in the unplanned section of Polana Caniço A. Since then, he had developed strong networks in the neighbourhood and was well known, yet he retained a rural orientation and was planning to return to Zambézia when he is old. His wife returned to Zambézia in 2009 and since then he had been living in Maputo without her, with three of his children and other relatives. His house had become the entry point and initial safe haven for family and kin from Zambézia who wanted to start a life in Maputo, where economic prospects are greater than in the north.

His everyday life in 2010 and 2012 was shaped by the rhythms of the household, the rhythms of the world of commerce in the Baixa and the Islamic rhythm of prayer routines. He was working as a stockman at a trading company owned by a Muslim family of Indian descent in the city centre. Because life was increasingly expensive, he

preferred to walk instead of taking public transport. During the lunch break, he would sometimes go to pray at one of the mosques in the Baixa. Senhor Justino usually did his grocery shopping at the local market in Polana Caniço, the Mercado Compone. He did not frequent bars or restaurants but, like many men of his age (he was around 47), he preferred to drink alcohol in the private space of the home, where his drinking could not be seen by others; not least because as a Muslim he was not supposed to drink. On the weekends he sometimes took a minibus taxi, a *chapa*, to visit friends in other *bairros*, friends who typically were fellow Zambezians, co-workers or former neighbours.

He did not always conduct the obligatory five prayers per day, one of the five pillars of Islam, but especially on Ramadan, the rhythm of praying, fasting and breaking the fast would dominate his routines. Since about 2007, he had been going to a neighbour's backyard where a group of Muslims assembled to pray together. Recently, the group leader had managed to receive a generous donation by a wealthy Muslim woman from South Africa, and he constructed a mosque in Polana Caniço, with the name *Masjid Ioonus*. Since 2012, Polana Caniço has had a new, bright green painted mosque with arches and decorations alluding of small minarets, architecture which expresses the mix of Arab and African influences so typical of the northern parts of Mozambique. It is probably one of the most representative buildings in the whole *bairro*, where most of the residents cannot usually afford to invest in plastering or painting their simple houses. In comparison to the new inner-city mosques, it is, nevertheless, still a very modest construction and blends neatly into the neighbourhood. Here Senhor Justino would come in the evenings during Ramadan for a simple *Iftar*, the communal meal shared at the mosque when the fast is broken after sunset. From 2011 till 2013, Senhor Justino also frequented the prayer place (*musallah*) in nearby Sommerschild II, a couple of hundred metres from his house, just across the *Rua do Cravo*. Because of this proximity he would sometimes cross the social and spatial boundaries between Polana Caniço and Sommerschild II, and pray there, side-by-side with residents from this adjacent elite area.

One of these residents is Senhor Ismail. He is a Muslim of Indian descent and a business owner. He bought a house in Sommerschild II in 2009 and moved there after a Muslim Indian architect had refurbished the house to make it suitable for hosting an extended Muslim Indian family. In 2010 and 2012, he was living there with his wife and children and regularly hosted his parents and siblings for prolonged periods. At 60 years old, this household head was suffering from high blood pressure, which is why he had to disconnect himself from the stressful business rhythm of the city. Instead, his everyday life and everyday trajectories through the city in 2010 and 2012 were shaped by the needs of his body, the rhythm of praying as well as the rhythms of meetings with the various religious and political organisations he was involved in.

Senhor Ismail aspired to go to the mosque daily and to pray five times a day. He often used to get up early in the morning for the first prayer and then went back to sleep. For the second prayer around midday, he would take a drive to the beach to pray at the new impressive mosque *Abdurrahman Bin Aufin* in the Bairro Triúngo. For the third prayer in the later afternoon he would attend a mosque wherever he was at the time, for example the *musallah* in Sommerschild II, a mosque in the Baixa or a mosque close to his office in the inner-city neighbourhood Alto-Maé. The two evening prayers he often did at home. He would meet many friends and acquaintances at the mosques

and chat before and after the prayer. Yet there were also many people, especially at the inner-city mosques, praying side by side with him who were strangers to him.

Senhor Mattar, the 55-year-old administrative head of the Muslim prayer place, explained that Muslim families in Sommerschield II had developed the need for a prayer place in the neighbourhood because friends and relatives had become victims of kidnappings, and driving around came to be considered a risk. With a prayer place in the neighbourhood, it was also easier to perform the five prayers:

We saw that from here [the neighbourhood] it is a bit far away [from the mosques in the city centre], which makes you lazy to go and pray, but we have to pray. So that's how the idea came up (Senhor Mattar, resident in Sommerschield II, August 2012).

An Indian Muslim property investor who was building several new houses in Sommerschield II offered the Muslim families a room in a half-finished house which they could use as a prayer place until it was sold. Senhor Mattar explained that the owner of the building would pay for electricity. When smaller expenses needed to be made, Senhor Mattar would ask the thirty-odd families involved to contribute. The *musallah* was located in the rear section of the neighbourhood, basically on a construction site, so only informed insiders knew that it existed. In spatial terms, the *musallah* constituted part of the invisible city, only visible to those who knew about its existence. Men would come here to pray, and in the afternoon the room would be used as *madrasa*, as a place for the religious teaching of children. According to Senhor Mattar, residents from Polana Caniço prayed there, but only a few, "as they have their own mosque there" (Senhor Mattar, resident in Sommerschield II, August 2012).

While the LRC Church in Johannesburg becomes a site for entanglements between the suburb and the township, the *mussalah* in Sommerschield II does so less for reasons related to the specificities of Islamic religious practices and more as a result of the spatial form of the city. Maputo continues to be characterised by a centre-periphery model with central functions focused on the city centre. This monocentric urban form shapes religious spatial practices and the spatial location of encounters: neighbourhood mosques tend not to attract urban dwellers who live elsewhere, as they either attend a mosque close to where they live or in the city centre. Senhor Justino worked in the city centre where he prayed during the day, and only sometimes in the evenings did he attend the *mussalah* in Sommerschield II, as his house in Polana Caniço was very close to the boundary between the two. The majority prefer to visit Polana Caniço's own mosque because of its spatial and social proximity. In general, the Muslim interlocutors in Maputo were less bounded to one specific religious space than the churchgoers in Johannesburg: believers attend various mosques and Muslim prayer places at different times of the day, depending on where their worldly responsibilities like work take them to.

Religious Ideals and Urban Reality

In Islam, everybody is equal, be it between the sexes and the races. There are no differences, be it black or white. Central for being Muslim is to do good to other people, to be honest, to be a good example, and not hurt others. Islam means peace. Unfortunately,

some people don't follow these rules (Senhor Jaul, local administrator of the Masjid Ioonus in Polana Caniço, July 2012).

A striking feature of the conversations Fernando Tivane and I held with leaders of local mosques and prayer places was their pointedly positive portrayal of their religion and of Islamic values. They were eager to explain to us the importance of normative prescriptions on how Muslims should live their everyday lives, like the five pillars of Islam. Many would emphasise that their religion is benevolent and based on values like humility, modesty, equality, non-racialism and tolerance. The emphasis of benevolence and non-violence in the conversations with us as non-Muslims may have been a defensive strategy against stereotypes which equate Islam with terrorism. Also, the Muslim urban dwellers we interviewed sometimes referred to Muslims who they saw as very conservative and potentially under Saudi Arabian influence as people with long beards (*homens de barba grande*) or, jokingly, as *Al-Qaeda*.

Mozambican Muslims tend to be characterised as deeply divided, with different factions competing with regard to proper Islamic doctrine, the Islamic calendar, the right to represent the Islamic community, political influence and access to resources, both of the state and of transnational Islamic organisations (Alpers 1999, Bonate 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2010, Morier-Genoud 2000, 2007). This stands in contrast to the extent to which Muslim leaders and ordinary Muslims downplay differences among them and emphasise their equality, despite cultural and other differences. Islam, we were told by various religious leaders on the neighbourhood level, does not know the separation of races, classes or cultures, but for prayer, everybody would come together. The emphasis of values like equality by Muslim leaders also shares similarities with and is maybe also influenced by the Frelimo discourses of socialist times when regional, racial or ethnic differences were not supposed to be acknowledged, and when wealth should neither be accumulated nor shown conspicuously.

The Muslims from Polana Caniço referred to themselves as 'black', 'African' or 'from this land' (*da terra*), while they categorised the Muslims living in Sommerschield II as 'white', 'Indians' and/or 'merchants' (*comerciantes*). Unlike in Johannesburg, racial terms (*negro*, *branco*) were used only in a few informal situations in Maputo, as people feel they have a colonial baggage and negative connotations. In the following exchange with Senhor Mattar, who was responsible for the prayer room in Sommerschield II, I brought up my observation about the differences in the local forms in which people articulated notions around race in Maputo and Johannesburg.

Barbara: There is a huge difference in how people talk about race here. In South Africa people are very used to speak of black and white, while here people don't really use these terms so often. Senhor Mattar: Here we don't really have this [segregation] a lot. Here we laugh together, we are always together. We for example sit in the mosque next to our employee who is Muslim, who is black and prays with us, eats with us at the time for eating during Ramadan, and is there with us. It makes no difference in colour (Senhor Mattar, resident in Sommerschield II, August 2012).

In this conversation, Senhor Mattar brought up the example of praying together in an inner-city mosque to illustrate that Mozambican society is less racially segregated than South Africa used to be. He portrayed the co-presence of 'black' and 'white' Mus-

lims in the moment of praying as something especially noble and valuable about Islam. When we asked Senhor Adil, a 25-year-old religious teacher at the mosque in the *bairro* Costa do Sol, a neighbourhood adjoining Polana Caniço, about what categories of believers attend his mosque, he explained that Islam is actually a world religion which does not belong to a specific race, but: “I don’t want to diminish nobody’s status, but I can say that the people who come here are all of the black race” (Senhor Adil, July 2012).

Feelings of cultural belonging and cultural distance play an important role here. Locally, these differences are articulated as different ‘origins’ or ‘upbringing’, and sometimes also as ‘race’. In the following exchange, Fernando and I asked Senhor Justino, a Muslim resident of Polana Caniço, to compare his perception of the *musallah* in Sommerschield II with the Masjid Ioonus in Polana Caniço. Senhor Justino, who sometimes went to this specific *musallah*, responded:

For example, if I die, a white man can come here [for mourning] but he will not spend the whole night. It will be my ... let’s say, the people of my race which will accompany my family. They [the Indians] will assist them, help them, but they won’t drink tea. One also feels more comfortable side by side of the brothers. In the Qur’an, apartheid does not exist, but well ... (Senhor Justino, resident of Polana Caniço, August 2012).

In this conversation, Senhor Justino expresses the physical and emotional experience of difference using the notion of ‘comfort’. Like other Muslim interviewees, he compares social distance at the mosque to apartheid South Africa and not to Portuguese colonialism. This is perhaps because apartheid existed 20 years longer than Portuguese colonialism, was much stricter in terms of the segregation of races, and because it was more directly accessible to the experience of the interviewees who had travelled before to South Africa.

As a visitor to the *musallah*, the Muslim prayer place in Sommerschield II, Senhor Justino became acquainted with some of the Muslim residents from the elite neighbourhood. These encounters with co-believers were, however, somewhat fleeting, restricted to being present in the same space, praying next to each other and exchanging greetings. The experience of praying together can nevertheless be understood as a liminal phase in which ordinary social hierarchies and differences are dissolved in a temporary *communitas* (Turner 1991 [1969]) of praying. The temporary anti-structure and the spiritual liminal experience of equality, though, is limited to these moments and do not change social structures and social boundaries.

At the time of the interview in 2012, Senhor Justino had never engaged with his Muslim neighbours from Sommerschield II, except from praying together at the *musallah*. African Muslim interviewees hence tend to report closure of Indian social networks; Indian parents are said to oppose to intercultural marriages of their children, business partners are usually kin and the spaces of public life like the Maputo Shopping Centre are seen as being ‘dominated’ by Indians, rather than allowing for co-presence (see chapter 7). So the social networks which are strengthened through praying together usually follow ethnic or cultural boundaries: Indian and African Muslims socialise separately from each other, also at the mosque. The entanglements which emerge are hence tenuous, ephemeral, and more related to a sense of shared belonging to a religious *ummah* than to actual moments of togetherness.

The reason for keeping up the rather rigid boundaries between 'Indian' and 'African' Muslims, as seen locally, is not so much an 'origin', 'race' or denominational orientation, but rather extreme economic inequality. When Fernando asked about the differences between African and Indian Muslims, Senhor Justino responded: "Not religious ones. They may exist for economic and financial reasons" (Senhor Justino, interview conducted by Fernando Tivane, March 2013). Using an array of strategies, many Indian merchants managed to expand their businesses even during the socialist regime and entered the economic elite of the country (Bastos 2005, Carvalho 2008). Many Indian Muslim residents own printing, clothing or household supply businesses and are considerably well off. Muslims in Polana Caniço, in contrast, are mostly engaged in a daily struggle for survival, like the majority of Maputo's population. They either have low paid jobs or try to make a living in the informal sector.

The workplace thus turns out to be a key space for everyday interactions and encounters between these diverse lifeworlds where specific forms of entanglements and mutual attitudes become shaped. The Indian business owners depend on cheap labour and offer jobs which the African Muslims need in order to sustain their families. As already mentioned, Senhor Justino, our key informant from Polana Caniço on these matters, was employed as stockman in a trading company owned by a Muslim Indian family in the Baixa. During the interview in 2010, when asked about his employers, Senhor Justino inclined his head in the direction of the villas of the neighbouring Sommerschield II: his employer did not live in Sommerschield II, but Senhor Justino assigned them to the same social category, namely wealthy Indian merchants (*comerciantes*).

These decade-old asymmetric entanglements between African Muslims and Indian Muslims at the workplace, lasting from colonial to socialist to neoliberal times, produced mutual stereotypes and prejudices which again feed into religious entanglements. Indian Muslim interviewees refer to their African workers as lazy, uneducated, unreliable and lacking responsibility, which is why, as they explained us, they need close supervision at work. Indian Muslims, on the other hand, have the reputation of being abusive employers who pay higher salaries to their employed kin than to African workers. These stereotypes observed today are clearly still shaped by the colonial work relations between the *Asiáticos* who occupied an intermediary position in the colonial hierarchy and the Natives, the colonial subjects. "They are big religious people, but also big tribalists" (Senhor Justino, interview conducted by Fernando Tivane, March 2013). Inside the mosque, Indian Muslims pretend to be brothers and good people, Senhor Justino claimed, but in the economic realm they only look after themselves and their kin.

The economic inequality between African and Indian Muslims is also related to politics. Indian and other Muslim elites have increased in political and economic power and risen in civil society (Morier-Genoud 2007). Urban dwellers often talk about the political influence of wealthy Indians in terms of corruption; referring to stereotypes about *comerciantes* and the hidden and illegitimate influence which they allegedly have.

Our employers pay us after two months only and even call us monkeys. This is all against Islam. If they had come here because of Islam, they would have changed these behaviours. But they are showing off the money they have. And they are showing this

country how weak the governments are (Jorge, visitor to the Masjid Ioonus in Polana Caniço, July 2012).

Jorge questions the legitimacy of Indian Muslims' claims to religious leadership in the Mozambican *ummah*, maintaining that they came to Mozambique with economic intentions, and not to practise Islam. African Muslim milieus in Maputo, in contrast, have a marginal political position. The northern Mozambican Muslim leadership has not been able to play a significant role in the official Islamic public sphere (Bonate 2007a: 57). In Maputo, the African Muslim milieus constitute a regional and religious minority. They are seen as people stemming from the 'north' and are called *Xingondo* by many, which is a derogatory designation for an ethnic group from the north, the *Macondo*. Common stereotypes about people from the northern provinces or *Xingondos* entail lack of education and, more importantly, sympathy for the former rebel movement and contemporary opposition party, Renamo.

Islam presents hegemonic ideologies of equality, providing values and norms with regard to the equality of human beings before godly powers, which African Muslims take up in order to make normative claims about how they expect to be treated by Indian Muslims. Yet at the same time, they point out the large discrepancies between ideals and reality. Like the churchgoers from the township, the leaders of the mosques and the Muslim residents of poor neighbourhoods do not hesitate to point out the hypocrisy inherent in discourses of egalitarianism and discriminating practices by the more powerful members in their religious community. Interactions between co-believers as equals inside the religious space, enacted before, during and after the actual worshipping, lead to troubled entanglements, characterised by a hope for symmetry, and the disappointment caused by the reaffirmation of unequal structural positions.

Faith-based Charity and Paternalistic Bonds

Muslims living in *bairros* and the New City (*Nova Cidade*), despite all their differences, share a religious rhythm of five daily prayers, which may bring them together in routinised, yet largely impersonal, encounters in mosques, especially in those in the inner city. Similarly, in Johannesburg, suburban life and township life come to intersect at Sunday services, in friendly interactions between acquaintances. Yet, besides bringing people together for praying and worshipping, religions also work on urban relations by creating specific religiously embedded forms of economic relations: more precisely, faith-based charity practices lead to specific forms of religious entanglements between less entitled and affluent urban dwellers. Bringing together an apparently benevolent person who gives and an apparently thankful person who receives, this asymmetric and hierarchical form of entanglement creates paternalistic bonds across economic and other divides. These relations are accompanied by specific behaviours and expectations that express themselves in these encounters.

Practices of Zakat in Maputo

There is a time of the year, Ramadan, in which they [the Indians] are generous. They distribute food to all the mosques, groceries for the people to eat at sunset. I don't have the money for this, I have to ask for it, write letters to ask the *direções* [city centre mosque administrative bodies] to send groceries. So, they send them here for the community. At the end of the month, five days before Ramadan ends, they will send more groceries to distribute to the people as *zakat*. *Zakat* is a tribute which you have to pay every year (Senhor Jaul, local administrator of the Masjid Ioonus in Polana Caniço, July 2012).

During Ramadan in particular, small mosques like the Masjid Ioonus in Polana Caniço A and the mosque in the neighbouring *bairro* Costa do Sol receive food donations from Indian Muslims for the *Iftar*, the festive, communal meal eaten together after the sunset. The *Iftar* served in mosques in the city centre also attracts destitute Muslims to break the fasting there. In the early evenings during Ramadan, Muslims, whose ragged clothes indicate their economic hardship, walk through the gleaming hallways of the Maputo Shopping Centre on their way to the Muslim prayer place on one of the upper floors where food will be served. The prayer place at the mall is funded by the mall owner, Bachir, a controversial and wealthy Muslim businessman. Muslim interviewees report that public figures like him sometimes pay for the *hajj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca and the fifth pillar of Islam, for Muslims who cannot afford it themselves. Offering *Iftar* to those in need and paying for the *hajj* are considered morally highly valued acts of charity.

Islamic charity practices even shape the rhythms of the city and the spatial practices of destitute urbanites. After the most important prayer of the week, the prayer at lunch time on Fridays, Muslims are expected to give voluntary alms (*sadaqah*) to the poor. Hence, on Fridays, elderly people with no support system, orphans, the disabled and other destitute people go to the Baixa, the commercial area of the city centre. They seat themselves strategically in front of the mosques or next to Muslim-owned businesses, hoping to be the beneficiaries of this religiously grounded acts of charity. Senhora Maria, an old woman living in a reed building in Polana Caniço which a church built for her, walks the long distance to the Baixa on Fridays, hoping to get alms. Strategically capitalising on the Muslim obligation to help the needy, people depending on alms thus adapt their weekly routine to the Muslims' religious rhythm (see also Capurchande 2004).

Senhor Ismail, the Muslim Indian business man living in Sommerschield II, supports an Islamic NGO which funds the construction of housing for people in need in the northern provinces. Charitable funding, social projects and emergency relief programmes are a recent institutionalised form of *zakat* charity, which give the money transfers a national and very often a transnational dimension (Kochuyt 2009: 103). Charity is a central value in Islam (ibid: 99), as *zakat* is the third of the five pillars of Islam, which should be upheld in order to be a good Muslim. *Zakat* is a commandment to care for the poor (ibid: 99). As Senhor Jaul, the religious teacher from the mosque in the neighbouring *bairro*, Costa do Sol, explained, Muslims are obliged to pay a certain percentage not of their income but of their assets. The poor (*os que não tem condições*) are exempt from this obligation, however. Other religions like Christianity also endorse charitable practices in a similar way, but Islam, according to Kochuyt, is quite unique

in its codification and elaboration of charity as the mandatory *zakat*, which even has similarities to a tax system (ibid). Practices of *zakat* vary greatly across contexts and milieus, based on differing interpretations of the Qur'an, different patterns of local institutionalisation and differences in how Muslims live it.

Humility, modesty and charity (*caridade*) are Islamic values which Muslim interviewees repeatedly brought up in the conversations with us, reflecting Islamic discourses about almsgiving for the fulfilment of religious norms and duties (Weiss 2007: 5).

Not to have a good car teaches you to be humble. If you have and the other doesn't have, it doesn't mean that you can stop being humble. I give you an example. We annually pay a tax of 2.5 per cent. If all the Muslims in the world followed this general rule, there would be no poverty, there would be no hunger. But we as human beings are subject to failure and weaknesses (Senhor Mattar, resident of Sommerschield II, August 2012).

Senhor Mattar mentions the ambivalence between Islamic values and lived reality. The obligation to pay *zakat* has transformative and redistributive potential, yet the implementation fails due to 'human nature'. *Zakat* is hence related to Islamic normative ideas about wealth and appropriate attitudes towards inequality. In the *Qur'an*, wealth is described as being given by God (not earned as in protestant ethics); as Allah is generous to the wealthy, they also have to be generous to others, Senhor Mattar explained. Ramadan is seen by many of the Muslim urbanites in Maputo as a time in which the wealthy, through the practice of fasting, experience hunger, which is an everyday, physical and emotional experience of a large part of Maputo's urban dwellers. By sharing this experience, fasting is supposed to make people humble and empathetic to the lot of poor fellow Muslims.

These same values also entail prescriptions on how Muslims should display their wealth: "People can enjoy these riches as long as they do not become a source of pride, envy or greed" (Kochuyt 2009: 100). In Maputo, young men, mostly the children of wealthy Indian merchants, own Japanese racing cars and hold car races and driving skill competitions at night on public roads. When asked about these *corridas*, many of the (African and Indian) Muslim urbanites we talked to expressed their disapproval of these practices. Senhor Jaul liked to watch these races himself but, he emphasised, only the legal ones taking place on the race track of the local automobile club, the ATC. Such races are not against Islamic doctrine, he explained, as long as they are not done on public roads. Not so much because it is against the law and dangerous, but because it is a form of conspicuous consumption.

Senhor Jaul: On public roads, you are showing off. Barbara: What do you mean by that?

Senhor Jaul: To show 'I have'. For us, this is not a good quality. One should limit one's expenses; one should not exaggerate while others are suffering. One has to remember the have-nots. Because of that, fasting is good as it makes the haves learn how it is to suffer, they feel it, they take on the place of the poor and he feels how it feels not to eat nor drink, and he starts to be more sensible (Senhor Jaul, local administrator of the Masjid Ioonus in Polana Caniço, July 2012).

It is common knowledge that the cars, the motor tuning, the paintwork and the tyres which get burnt at each race are extremely expensive. Racing them on public roads is hence criticised as a form of 'showing off'.

Fasting and practices of *zakat* are thought to contribute to the construction of the Muslim *ummah* despite the economic divides. The general rules of *zakat* prescribe that receivers may not be members of the nuclear family. This means that, similar to the incest taboo (Lévis-Strauss 1968), the mandatory *zakat* obliges Muslim believers to create social relations outside the nuclear family. It obliges the better-offs to create some sort of connections to those who are poor and marginalised, people whom they would not normally encounter in their own social networks. *Zakat* therefore gives Islam a transcending drive and is an important practice for the creation of a sense of belonging to the *ummah* despite the social, economic and cultural cleavages in other spheres of life. "Through the *zakat* the centrifugal forces of economic inequality are checked and balanced so that they do not lead to a disintegration of the Muslim community" (Kochuyt 2009: 105). It is also prescribed that *zakat* may only be given to Muslims; hence, *zakat* reinforces the boundary with non-believers. This type of entanglement, which pulls the diversity of Muslims together, is nevertheless based on an insider–outsider distinction, namely, between those who deserve to receive and those who don't.

Zakat can be conceptualised as a form of gift exchange which follows the rules of reciprocity (Mauss 1990 [1925]). Gift giving is not as altruistic as it might appear, as it is also guided by the self-interest of the parties involved (Rössler 2005: 194). Applying Mauss's approach, one may distinguish three phases, namely, giving the gift, accepting the gift and giving a counter-gift. Through acceptance of the gift the receiver agrees to enter a relationship with the donor in which he now owes a counter-gift. If the counter-gift is not of a similar quality and quantity to the initial gift, the balance of power shifts between giver and receiver, resulting in an asymmetrical relationship. In charity like *zakat*, the counter-gift is hidden, as charity has more the character of a *Geschenk* than a *Gabe*. What the receiver is expected to return is not of material quality, but a social attitude towards the relationship with the giver: an attitude of gratitude and acceptance of the own inferior position in the relationship. In practice, the receivers do not take on such a passive role as the normative expectations and the description of the ideal type imply; those in need of resources make active use of this norm of charity for their own purposes, like the alms seeker who go to the Baixa each Friday. In order to find funds for the construction of the Masjid Ioonus, Senhor Jaul, its leader at the time, wrote a project proposal and sent it to wealthy individuals who were known for their charitable practices and to Islamic organisations. Through these networks their proposal came to the attention of a Muslim Indian widow from South Africa, who was looking for a project to which to donate part of the inheritance of her deceased husband.

Happily, there was a woman of your race [addressing the white anthropologist], she is Muslim. She lost her husband and inherited that money. But she wanted to do something with the money that the deceased would also benefit from ... There is this promise from the Creator of the World in which he says that for everyone who does good actions on earth, there will be a place called paradise. So that's how our mosque was created, for the benefits of the Muslims of the neighbourhood and, notwithstanding, for the

benefit of the deceased husband. This is the spiritual field (Senhor Jaul, local administrator of the Masjid Ioonus in Polana Caniço, July 2012).

The deceased donor of the money for the construction of Masjid Ioonus receives a divine recompense: he becomes considered *halaal*, purified of sins, and guaranteed a space in paradise (Kochuyt 2009: 108). So, the donation by the widow was beneficial for everyone: the Zambebian Muslims in Polana Caniço received a mosque and the good deed would, on a spiritual level, ensure her deceased husband a good afterlife in heaven.

Zakat, as Kochuyt pointedly argues, is thought to transform potential social revolutionaries or criminals, which the poor could turn into, into obedient and loyal members of the *ummah* who accept their inferior position because they receive (ibid: 106-7). Faith-based charity and the entanglements it creates does not strive for real redistribution leading to the transformation of the social hierarchy. Rather, in the entanglements emerging from faith-based charity, the status quo is maintained while creating feelings of solidarity and gratitude between rich and poor (ibid: 106), which makes it easier for both sides to cope with these ambiguous entanglements embedded in structural inequality.

Food Donation and Prayers in Johannesburg

The ethnography of the LRC Church in Johannesburg shows the same, important characteristic of paternalistic entanglements based on exchange. While faith-based charity pulls people closer together, it also draws a boundary between them and the outsiders who do not deserve to take part. The LRC Church runs many different programmes for its believers in addition to the weekly Sunday service. One of them is a programme called *Malukhanye*, instituted to make an “impact on poor communities” (Love Reaching Communities Church 2015). This ‘ministry to the poor’, as they call it, consisted of a weekly event aimed at the ‘needy’ in the church (Terry, elder of LRC Church, May 2012). In 2012, it took place on Tuesday mornings in the church building. The *Malukhanye* ministry started with bible study and prayer, and then church volunteers distributed plastic bags filled with bread and vegetables to the attendees. Church volunteers collected these food donations from church members and from nearby supermarkets. Such food programmes and other charitable activities are widespread among Christian churches in Africa and, specifically, among progressive Pentecostal congregations (Freeman 2012, Heuser 2013, Swart 2012).

The *Malukhanye* events I attended between April and June 2012 were led by two middle-aged white church volunteers. They led the morning’s proceeding, standing, like the elders at the Sunday services, in front of the audience who consisted of about 50 to 80 people. No technology, not even a microphone, was used, which was in stark contrast to the Sunday services. With enthusiastic friendliness the two greeted everyone, aiming to foster a jolly, energised atmosphere. Their voices tended to be high-pitched and shrill, and sometimes they cracked. At the same time, they were observing everything restlessly with suspicious eyes, as if they were worried that something could go wrong at any minute.

A couple of grey-haired, elderly white women, one of whom had initiated the food programme years previously, were usually seated in the first row. On my first visit, one of these older women called me to sit in front with them and not with the recipients of

the food. She did not explain her request, but she assumed it was obvious to me, too, that the beneficiaries and the representatives of the donors (which she had categorised me as based on my white skin) had to sit separately. What resulted was a separation of black and white churchgoers in the hall, not actually based on race but based on the different positions they had within this setting. On the one hand there were the white, affluent givers and on the other hand the black, poor receivers, connected by the paternalistic bonds being constructed and performed at this Malukhanye event, which were in many ways similar to the relationships witnessed in other settings in Linbro Park. These older ladies did not take an active part, unlike the many younger volunteers hovering around. Yet they were visible to everyone in the first row and acted as role models. They enthusiastically proclaimed 'amen' during the prayers and diligently consulted their bibles, thus showing the township dwellers how they were supposed to act. These older women also policed the audience with scrutinising looks: sometimes they threw chastising gazes at the mothers of children who were too noisy. If the gazes were not enough to keep order in place, they sometimes indicated with a slight nod of their head to one of the volunteers that they should approach the mother in person and tell her to keep her children in check. The interactions within this setting were extremely troublesome for everyone, shaped by mutual distrust and tension.

The receivers of the food donations during the Malukhanye events I attended consisted of two groups: there were the regulars, mainly pensioners and a few young people who attended the LRC Church on a regular basis, not just the Malukhanye event, and who were familiar with the setting and its rules and the volunteers. Many of them usually sat close to the front and had a bible with them, which they paid visible attention to. They moved around comfortably, knowing the premises and the volunteers. When I arrived for my second visit, many of them greeted me in a friendly way. The second group, though, seemed to be outsiders in this space. This group consisted mainly of young women, somewhere between 18 and 30 years old, many of them accompanied by children too young to be at school. Many of them were wearing very old, ragged, long skirts and worn-out shoes. Some were very thin and had unhealthy glassy eyes, most did not have extensions in their hair. With their ragged clothes they appeared to belong to the poorest of the township dwellers, a style of dressing very different from the stylish, yet inexpensive clothes many of my female friends from Alexandra liked to wear. They usually sat in the back rows where they chatted to each other and looked after their children instead of listening; anyway, because the sound system was not on, one could hardly hear the volunteer's preaching among the children's voices, and many of these women had not mastered English well enough to understand the sermon. They obviously did not feel at ease, and they were constantly looking around, as if they were not sure about what was going on and what was expected of them.

Apart from two volunteers organising the event and the elderly women who were from white, middle-class milieus, the majority of volunteers at this event themselves came from Alexandra. These volunteers organised the tea break and the food distribution in a laid-back manner and did not show the same overemphasised friendliness as the volunteers in charge did in their interactions with the recipients. Nevertheless, these volunteers were constantly and critically observing the food recipients and explained the rules to them, if necessary. This emphasis on order and rules was especially remarkable, as in the same church space on Sundays, church leaders and volunteers distinctly aimed to create an atmosphere of informality, belonging and lack of

hierarchy in the way they greeted churchgoers, and also in the sermons. The Malukhanye events, by contrast, were marked by mutual distrust and discomfort.

This became especially apparent after the coffee break at one Tuesday event. The volunteers took a moment to explain the rules of the event, specifically for the people who they felt were not behaving appropriately. People who disturbed the sermon by arriving late would not be given food, they explained. Women with little children should sit close to the exit and they should leave the church quietly if the children were crying. These rules were more important than the previous bible reading for the functioning of Malukhanye: while the volunteers in charge had read the bible in English, the volunteers from Alexandra talked to the food recipient in Sotho or Zulu, translating what the volunteers in charge had told them. The volunteers from Alexandra hence took on the role of 'go-between' (Goffman 1959: 151), explaining what role the food receivers were expected to play in this performance. The instructions were mainly aimed at the young mothers, and not the regular visitors who seemed to have learnt the rules of the game and who were usually there without children.

Besides noise and being on time, a further worry of the Malukhanye organisers was about the respectability and legitimacy of the food recipients, whether they were actually 'poor'. The category 'poor' was not institutionally defined and access to the event was not controlled: anybody could participate, as long as they abided by the rules of the event and as long as the volunteers could agree that they belonged to the 'poor'. The participants had to disclose their identity by writing down their name and phone number in a register. According to Scott, such collection of information about the subjugated is an important instrument of control for institutions that exercise power (Scott 1999). The volunteers sometimes doubted the authenticity of the poverty, and suspected that some of the people present had a 'dark secret' (Goffman 1959: 141) incompatible with their performance, namely, that they were not as poor as they appeared to be. On my third visit, volunteers told me that they had heard that some of the young women had actually sold the food donations once back in the township instead of using it for their families. For the volunteers, this was an act of treachery and it confirmed their suspicion that some of the donation receivers were not so poor after all. By selling the food the young women exerted agency and decided for themselves what they wanted. With the money made from selling the food, they could buy different groceries, clothes or school books. For the volunteers, however, selling the food donation was incompatible with their own expectations of how the good 'poor' should act; they should be passive, thankful and humble about what they received, and not actively take charge of what they did with the charity they benefitted from.

A further worry of the volunteers was that the attendees only came to get the food donations and were not interested in the religious aspects. Hence, the attendees were obliged to be present at nine o'clock for the bible reading and prayer, and they were not given food if they arrived late and missed the prayers. This highlights a problematic contradiction and ambivalence characterising certain faith-based charity projects as they link power over resources to evangelisation. On the one hand, the church claims that they feed the 'poor' but on the other hand the volunteers demand that the receivers participate in the bible teaching and even expect the receivers to be intrinsically committed to the praying.

The encounters between the destitute township dwellers and the church volunteers were hence characterised by mutual distrust, suppressed and sometimes open con-

flict caused by misunderstandings, disappointed expectations and diverging interests. The interactions and relations enacted at the Malukhanye event stood in sharp contrast to the Sunday church services where the working consensus was that the co-present churchgoers stood in an equal, friendly and informal relation to each other. Malukhanye was a performance of charitable gift giving enacted by the benevolent middle-class white donors, facilitated by diligent black volunteers, and aimed at poor Alexandra residents who were expected to thankfully and passively receive both material and spiritual support. The volunteers with white, middle-class backgrounds still attempted to show equality through their dramatised friendliness in the interactions, which may be typical for such paternalistic relations. Yet they also expressed a clear expectation of obedience and subjugation. Many of the attendees were thus extremely careful and even fearful in their interactions with the volunteers. When I tried to chat to some of the mothers who did not know me during the coffee breaks, they looked away and responded shyly and in low, scared voices, assuming that I was a volunteer. On one such Tuesday, I left the event before it ended, and I saw a group of these mothers sitting outside the church on the grass. They were chatting freely to each other, laughing and watching their children. The interactions inside the church hence had a frontstage character for these young women where they aimed to foster the impression of being submissive, poor young mothers. At this moment, the churchyard was a backstage where they could shed their roles as beneficiaries. The tension that seemed to stiffen their bodies inside the church seemed to be gone.

In contrast to the paternalistic relationships typical of the labour entanglements around domestic work in Linbro Park, which were characterised by intimacy, the entanglements around charity at the Malukhanye event were somewhat impersonal and, as some of the food recipients only came irregularly, ephemeral. In the relationship between a domestic worker and an employer, the routine of proximity and feelings of affection can ease some of the existing tension because of the hierarchy structuring their relationship. In the more anonymous religious setting of Malukhanye, the volunteers as powerful actors resorted to rules and control as a reaction to insecurity and their need to draw boundaries. This shows that paternalism, hence relations of giving and receiving, is a repeating pattern in urban entanglements, even though it can take diverse forms.

Conclusion

Some researchers have observed a religious turn in urban studies (Wilhelm-Solomon et al. 2017) and the intersection between religion and urban spaces has received more attention recently (Becker 2011, Cimino, Mian and Huang 2012, Desplat 2012, Garnett and Harris 2013, Pinxten and Dikomitis 2009). The religious dimensions of urban life are nevertheless still marginal in the mainstream of urban studies; urban religion being largely absent from recent paradigmatic handbooks (Bridge and Watson 2013b, Parnell and Oldfield 2014). In times of terrorism threats and 'religious' wars, religion becomes portrayed in public debates, especially in Europe, largely as a problem and as a source of conflict. Religious leaders, as exemplified in this chapter, tend to paint a rosy picture of religion as a source of peace, tolerance and equality. In this context of increasingly polarised debates about religion, the importance of academic, empirical

research which studies religious practices from a non-normative stance, unravelling what believers make out of religion through their agency, becomes even more apparent.

Religious practices and religious spaces impact on the way urban dwellers use and experience the city and how they become entangled with others. In Maputo and Johannesburg, religion provides discourses of equality, which urban dwellers utilise to make normative claims about religious socialities, even though the resulting everyday encounters are still shaped by the memory of colonial and apartheid racial separation, which become reactivated especially in moments of competition and conflict. Religious spaces are increasingly important spaces of encounter in entangled cities, yet the unequal power distribution within these spaces complicates and limits their potential for creating new forms of conviviality and can lead to open or hidden conflict. Within religious spaces, this is partly dealt with through religiously embedded charity. Alms giving and alms receiving create social ties, paternalistic bonds, across class and ethnic boundaries. Practices of *zakat* among Muslims in Maputo and schemes like food distribution in Johannesburg integrate socially and spatially diverging milieus not despite but because of the inequality between them.

The LRC Church and the Muslim spaces in Maputo are deeply urban spaces. They bring people together in repetitive, rhythmic ways, yet many remain, to a large degree, strangers to each other. In both the LRC Church and the *musallah* in Polana Caniço, there is coexistence and intersection of diverse socialities. These religious spaces become crystallisation points for dense social networks consisting of close relatives, neighbours, friends and co-workers, as well as the acquaintances with whom one socialises on other occasions and whom one may have come to know there. But parallel to this, there are also many strangers in these spaces with whom one has only one thing in common, namely, that one shares a faith and happens to pray or worship together in the same religious space from time to time. The stories by the interviewees about encounters in religious spaces then usually refer to interactions with acquaintances and the experiences, hopes and disappointments they bring about, be it the disappointment of not being offered a ride in their car, the sense of a large social divide expressed by specific looks from a distance, or the feelings of discomfort experienced in a space shared with those whom they see as culturally distinct. Nevertheless, the instances of praying together are meaningful, powerful symbols for these urban dwellers, encounters full of promises for a more equal urban world. Against all odds, these moments of togetherness create feelings of belonging, even though they become easily ruptured in situations of conflict and disappointment where urban dwellers refer to the old models for imagining society – the ghosts of racial apartheid and colonialism – to explain what is going on.

The paternalistic entanglements across the economic divides created through faith-based charity are of a more mediated, more distant quality than the paternalistic relations between domestic workers and their employers, which are deeply personalised and intimate. In these religious spaces the paternalism tends to be impersonal, more like between the state and its citizens, between a programme and its recipients, and less like that within a (post)colonial family. Givers and receivers may not know each other well, yet the social effects of paternalism are similar to those in domestic work: it creates social ties across economic divides not despite but because of them, turning the social positions into complementary, interdependent interests. Paternalistic entanglements create positive feelings like thankfulness and the sense of doing

something good, yet they are also imbued with potentially disappointed expectations, mistrust and hidden conflict.

It is important to emphasise that philanthropic practices in South Africa and elsewhere are not at all restricted to the wealthy and powerful who give to the 'poor'; giving practices are commonplace in poor communities like Alexandra as well (Everatt et al. 2005). There is, however, a qualitative difference in between charity relations entangling people across economic divides and relations constructed through self-help initiatives in which the givers conceive of themselves as belonging to the same lifeworld with similar living conditions to the receiver (which are by definition not entanglements). Charity relations crossing economic divides often involve the construction of the poor as 'other' (Spivak 1985), which is less prominent in the self-help initiatives as encountered, for example, in Alexandra township. This is also why entanglement is not a synonym for relationship, but a specific type, namely, a relationship in which the actors see themselves as different. *Cities of entanglements* claims that these specific sets of relations crossing social and spatial boundaries are key to understanding urbanity in cities characterised by inequality and, hence, key for urban theory.



©Fernando Tivane, Maputo, 2012