

Two Birds, One Stone – War-to-Democracy Processes after Ethnic Conflicts

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Abstract: Ethnic conflicts continue to be the most common form of intrastate conflict. The international community makes efforts to transform war-torn societies into peaceful democracies, often overlooking that building peace can conflict with building democracy, and vice versa. Using findings of the rich literature of Institutional Engineering, this article aims to identify the institutions which have led to successful war-to-democracy processes after ethnic conflict. It is argued that institutions are most suitable if they provide for self-determination rights, cooperation and the diffusion of power. War-to-democracy processes are analyzed in 13 conflict cases worldwide between 1994 and 2016 with the help of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Results show that the inclusion of groups is the decisive key. The article contributes to ongoing discussions about which type of institutional design is best suited to achieve the twin goals of sustainable peace and durable democracy after ethnic conflict.

Keywords: Ethnic conflict, Conflict regulation, Democratization, Institutional Engineering, QCA

Stichworte: Ethnischer Konflikt, Konfliktregulierung, Demokratisierung, Institutionen, QCA

1. Introduction

Ethnic conflicts remain one of the prevailing challenges to international security in our time.¹ While most ethnic coexistences worldwide are quite harmonious, some have resulted in major armed conflicts, such as in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Ukraine or present-day South Sudan, to name but a few. In light of the enormous increase of ethnic conflicts after the end of Cold War, academia addresses not only causes and courses, but also effective remedies to alleviate or prevent violence between identity groups. The debate on institutional engineering has, based on the seminal works by Lijphart, Horowitz or Sisk led to various, critically discussed ideas on how to make institutions work for innerstate peace.² The ultimate endpoint of a fragile and conflict-affected society seems always to be clearly mapped out beforehand: it should move towards peace and democratic rule sooner rather than later. Since the 1990s, efforts of democratization have become an integral part of peace-building activities following intrastate conflicts.³ Peace and Democracy are the (un-)disputed panaceas for war-infected countries: *'Democracy and the hope and progress it brings are the alternative to instability and to hatred and terror [...] Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance'* as for example former US-President George W. Bush declared in London's Whitehall Palace just after the beginning of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003.⁴ The question how to reach those two noble goals is not only relevant for scholars, but of utmost importance for policy-makers. "Institutions matter" may be the most cited sentence in political science during the last decade.⁵ Not very surprisingly, this paradigm became a major issue in debates of peace-building activities after ethnic conflicts. Institutions can help to transform the zero-sum-logic of an ethnic conflict into a compromise by de-ethnicizing politics

while still addressing ethnic divisions.⁶ The mentioned debate has led to a number of conceptualizations: McGarry, O'Leary and Schneckener differentiate between eliminating, controlling and managing institutions.⁷ Basedau or Wolff and Yakinthou discussing the three main strands, that is "consociationalism" based on Lijpharts work, "centripetalism", based mainly on Horowitz and Sisks work and "power-dividing".⁸ The different concepts differ whether and to what extent it should be dealt with ethnicity on an institutional basis. There is general agreement on the importance of institutional design. But it remains unclear which institutions work best and how particular institutions might serve to pacify ethnic tensions. Some approaches have worked in regulating ethnic conflicts, others seem to be at odds with realities on the ground. As Ansorg and Kurtenbach specify, there is still huge uncertainty about the specific features of institutions, their formal or informal character, their relations to state and society, and their effects on societal conflicts and group divisions.⁹ The unresolved debate can be traced back to one fundamental question which is still not definitely answered: Is it better to recognize and accommodate ethnic cleavages or is it better to deny or overcome ethnicity as a factor in politics?¹⁰ The article analyses which institutions or combination of institutions work best on ethnic conflict situations. It broadens the current debate by taking both identified goals into account, peace and democracy. Scholars tend to focus on institutional elements, such as decentralization, ethnic federalism, specific electoral systems or power-sharing with regard to peace or democracy as dependent variable.¹¹ Since both goals are inseparably intertwined, conducting an integrative analysis of the whole set of institutions with regard to peace and democracy is a more fruitful and practically relevant approach. The article proceeds as follows: first, challenge of the "construction plan" are illustrated by pointing out why building peace after civil war

¹ Wolff and Cordell, The Routledge handbook of ethnic conflict
² Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies; Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Sisk, Power-Sharing and international mediation in ethnic conflict.
³ See further: Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy.
⁴ Bush and Dietrich, The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader, 173.
⁵ Some milestones are Lowndes and Roberts, Why institutions matter; Ersson and Lane, The new institutional politics or Acemoglu and Robinson Why nations fail.

⁶ Simonsen, Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building.
⁷ McGarry and O'Leary, The politics of ethnic conflict regulation; Schneckener, Auswege aus dem Bürgerkrieg.
⁸ Wolff and Yakinthou, Conflict management in divided societies; Basedau, Managing ethnic conflict.
⁹ Ansorg and Kurtenbach, Institutional reforms and peacebuilding.
¹⁰ Basedau, Managing ethnic conflict.
¹¹ See for a comprehensive summary Basedau, Managing ethnic conflict.

can easily conflict with building democracy and vice versa. After that, three mechanisms are introduced which are assumed to overcome this dilemma: self-determination, cooperation and the diffusion of power. Based on these theoretical assumptions, the most common institutional elements are selected and compared by using a fuzzy-set QCA. The final section summarizes the results and draws some basic conclusions for the war-to-democracy debate in the context of ethnic conflicts. The article finds support for the consociationalist strand in so far as inclusive institutions are more successful in producing peace and democracy after ethnic conflict.

2. Challenges of the Construction Plan

In democracies, political conflicts are managed based on formalized rules such as majority votes or consensual agreements. According to the democratic peace theorem democracies do not wage war against each other. Several studies also indicate that democracies have less frequent intrastate conflicts.¹² A basic democratic order has a civilizational and thereby conflict-reducing effect, both internally and externally. The undisputed democratic peace theorem gathered momentum in political science, withstood most criticism and was carried to extremes with the declaration of a democratic imperative: Promoting peace requires the promotion of democracy. Only if a democratization process can be triggered, peace can take root. Paradoxically, while fully-fledged democracies are associated with peaceful conflict management, the road towards peace and democracy is rocky. As pointed out by Mansfield, Snyder, Jarstad or Zürcher, democratization processes entail particular risks which enhance the probability of renewed fighting.¹³ According to Dahls polyarchy, the two centerpieces of democratic governance are participation and contestation.¹⁴ Democracy after ethnic conflict implies the rather unlikely assumption: ethnic groups previously fighting against each other are expected to participate peacefully in competitive elections and start solving their disputes on the basis of constitutional provisions, while feelings of enmity and revenge may still be present. Democratization processes modify institutional structures, especially the access to political power. Under autocratic rule the entry into the political arena has been restricted and is now open for contestation, which intensifies competition between the elites of the dominating group and its challenger. Democracy implies unpredictable political outcomes. The groups who lose, or fear losing, power or those who feel that they should benefit more in the new game under democratic rules fall easily back on violence in the context of weak stateness. Drawing on insights from institutionalist scholarship, it is assumed that ethnic conflicts as being a special form of intrastate conflict, are highly sensitive on institutions. Some of them will weaken the contestation between groups, others may have the opposite effect. The crucial question in this respect is: which institutions can help to transform societies emerging from ethnic conflict into peaceful and democratic countries?

Answering this question requires an understanding of what exactly has to be transformed. Ethnic conflicts are at their core cultural identity conflicts. A group sees its ethnic identity threatened by

another, mostly a more dominant group. According to Social Identity Theory (SIT), group members seek to achieve positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their in-group from a relevant comparison out-group on some valued dimension.¹⁵ When a social group with which an individual identifies is threatened with injustice and deprivation, there is a shift of the perceived problem from being a political issue to a personal affront. The person is mobilized into collective action because the social identity, the self, of the individual is threatened.¹⁶ Since membership in ethnic groups is most important for group members, it comes to highly emotional reactions if social identity is seen to be threatened by relevant comparison groups within the nation state. People have a need for a positive self-esteem, which motivates them to behave and react in ways that create, or in case of threat, protect or even restore the positivity of their social identity.¹⁷ If a group sees no other chance to do that, it will use a violent strategy against the identified perpetrator.¹⁸ Based on these socio-psychological assumptions, it can be concluded that of utmost importance for the positivity of ethnic identity is recognition through other relevant groups, that is the acceptance of cultural differences within a nation state. Recognition can be achieved through empowerment, by giving a group specific A) *rights for self-determination*. Equipped with political and cultural rights, a group is then able, to a certain extent, to manage its own vital affairs independently from a political or cultural dominant group. Self-determination rights must be granted on a permanent basis to ensure an actual change in group behavior. Therefore, institutions are needed. Institutions are understood as rules laid down in constitutions and laws governing the behavior of a set of individuals within a given human collectivity.¹⁹ Building multi-ethnic societies after conflicts requires some form of rapprochement between former adversaries. Academia proposes that institutions have potentially constructive effects in this respect.²⁰

They are able to change group behavior on the basis of formal or informal rules by creating incentives for B) *interethnic cooperation*. Special electoral inducements or territorial arrangements such as federalism or autonomy help to lower the zero-sum atmosphere and provide for political power. Thus, they are counteracting the mistrust between ethnic groups. At best, they address ethnic divisions but reduce their significance.²¹ Authors such as Horowitz, Reilly or Bermeo argue that institutions should C) *diffuse power* and, consequently, lower the costs of competition between groups.²² A major source of conflict between ethnic groups has to do with one group dominating central institutions at the expense of the other groups. Only if all involved groups have the chance "to win something" and institutions do not

¹⁵ Tajfel and Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.

¹⁶ Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears, Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action.

¹⁷ Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes; McKeown, Haji, and Ferguson, Understanding Peace and Conflict through Social Identity Theory.

¹⁸ Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.

¹⁹ Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Democracy, 5.

²⁰ Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; McGarry and O'Leary, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation; Elazar, Federalism and the Way to Peace; Bogaards, The Choice for Proportional Representation: Electoral System Design in Peace Agreements.

²¹ Simonsen, Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building, 298.

²² Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Bermeo, What the Democratization Literature Says-or Doesn't Say-About Postwar Democratization; Reilly, Democracy in divided societies: electoral engineering for conflict management.

¹² See further Hegre, Democracy and Armed Conflict.

¹³ Mansfield and Snyder, Democratization and the Danger of War; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Zürcher, Costly Democracy.

¹⁴ Dahl, Polyarchy.

give complete power to only one group, the conflict becomes less urgent and democratic procedures can be accepted as a framework in which the political arena is open regardless of specific group membership. From the basic theoretical considerations regarding ethnic conflict regulation outlined briefly above, I derive three criteria an institutional arrangement must provide for in order to achieve peace and democracy developments in ethnic war-torn nations, that is A) *self-determination rights*, B) *incentives for cooperation* and C) *the diffusion of power*. Institutions with these characteristics provide for the indispensable recognition of social identity. Furthermore, they serve as a basis for the restructuring of shatter intergroup relations into a peaceful co-existence. In the next section, I take a closer look on the “tool-box” of institutional engineering.

2.1 Unpacking the Tool-Box

The debate on institutional engineering offers various options to manage ethnic conflicts. The selection of the eligible institutions out of the “menu” of institutional engineering is made on the basis of their relevance in research literature as well as their frequency of occurrence in peace-agreements. Electoral measures, federal arrangements, power-sharing, cultural rights, parliamentarism and judicial provisions are not only widely discussed in academia but also the most commonly applied solutions according to the UCDP peace agreements dataset.²³ The institutions provide for either self-determination rights, incentives for cooperation or the diffusion of power (Table 1). Consequently, they require some closer investigation based on the theoretical considerations outlined above.

2.2 Federalism

About one quarter of all ethnic peace agreements contain some form of federal arrangement.²⁴ Federalism is one of the most prominent institutional elements.²⁵ The implementation of a federal system implies the diffusion of power by creating several stages of political authority. Federal systems, be they symmetric, asymmetric or containing some form of political autonomy, put at least some political power beyond the control of the state. In a federal system, a specific group may be a minority at the state center, but be able to rule at sub-state level, and this concession might mitigate its limited influence at the central level. The stakes of often highly dangerous national elections are lowered by offering stakes in several regional elections. This reduces incentives to resist democratization processes. The vertical separation of powers prevents hegemonic control by one group

over others. Furthermore, each sub-unit is provided with some kind of political autonomy. This means, if sub-units coincide with ethnic settlement areas, a group enjoys some self-determination rights to protect its vital interests and manage its own cultural affairs without the fear of a direct veto by the majority. According to Stepan or Elazar, “Coming-together-federations” are creating a balance between self-rule and shared-rule within the framework of an existing nation state.²⁶ Additionally, a federal setting can lead to a cooperation-friendly atmosphere. As some authors argue, iterative cooperation might socialize former belligerents into compromising and moderate decision-making.²⁷

2.3 PR electoral systems

The electoral system determines how votes are translated into political mandates. It regulates the gateway to power in a democratic regime.²⁸ For this reason, scholars and policy-makers have come to see elections as an important tool for ending intrastate conflict. In over one third of all peace-agreements the conflicting parties agreed to the holding of elections.²⁹ Horowitz, for example, argues that “the electoral system is by far the most powerful lever of constitutional engineering”.³⁰ But as outlined before, competitive elections can easily generate further violence. They take on the character of a “census” and constitute a zero-sum game: one group wins, and others consider themselves to be losing everything.³¹ Many case studies have shown that different types of elections have rather different effects in multi-ethnic societies.³² Thus, it is assumed that the type of electoral system is highly relevant to peace and democracy building after ethnic conflict. As argued by Lijphart, Horowitz, Reynolds or Brancati, especially majoritarian electoral systems increase the likelihood of dangerous interethnic competition.³³ In “the winner takes it all” contests, parties have no incentives to cooperate. Group differences are emphasized, which easily reopens old wounds. Numerically smaller groups have less of a chance to gain political power. Proportional representation (PR), however, ensures adequate representation and tends to avoid ethnic marginalization and polarization. In PR electoral systems, legislative seats are allocated in rough proportion to vote shares. Thus, hurdles for smaller groups are lower.³⁴ Inclusion of ethnic minorities makes interethnic coalition governments more likely, implying that ethnic parties are mutually dependent on the votes of other ethnic groups. In conclusion, a PR electoral system makes cooperation between groups more likely, since the power is not concentrated in the hands of one ethnic majority. Costs of elections may seem intolerable if many voters feel blocked from participation and power in a majoritarian system.

²⁶ Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics*; Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*.
²⁷ Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*; Horowitz, *The Many Uses of Federalism*; Erk and Swenden, *New Directions in Federalism Studies*.

²⁸ See different democracy conceptions as Dahl, *Polyarchy*; Alvarez et al., *Classifying Political Regimes*; Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* or Merkel, *Embedded and Defective Democracies*.

²⁹ Högbladh, *Peace agreements 1975-2011 – Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset*.

³⁰ Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa*, 163.

³¹ Bertrand and Haklai, *Democratization and Ethnic Minorities*, 7.

³² See further: Sisk, *Electoral System Choice in South Africa*; Sisk and Reynolds, *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa*; Howe, *Electoral Institutions and Ethnic Group Politics in Austria*.

³³ Lijphart (1984), Horowitz (1985), Reynolds (2002) or Brancati (2006).
³⁴ Gherghina and Jiglaü, *Playing Their Cards Right*.

²³ A frequency analyses is provided on basis of the variables “Elections”, “Shagov”, “Aut”, “Fed”, “Shaloc” and “Cul” in the UCDP peace agreement dataset. Around 60 percent of all agreements provide for justice measures, around 30 percent for elections, around 25 percent for federalism, 20 percent for cultural rights and 10 percent for political power-sharing within the executive. Parliamentary systems are not explicitly mentioned in the UCDP dataset but are considered due to their prominent position in the academic debate.
²⁴ According to the UCDP peace agreements dataset; Högbladh, *Peace agreements 1975-2011 – Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset*.
²⁵ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa*; Ghai, *Autonomy and Ethnicity*; Anderson, *Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems*.

2.4 Political power-sharing

Stabilizing democracy in ethnically heterogeneous countries is inseparably linked with the groundbreaking studies of Arend Lijphart.³⁵ His model of consociational democracy is based on shared political power among all relevant groups. This mode of institutionalized conflict management was soon adopted to regulate urgent conflict situations such as Cyprus, Northern Ireland or Bosnia Hercegovina.³⁶ Over the years, it has become one of the most prominent and widely adopted instruments for ethnic conflict regulation. Today, one in ten peace-agreements contains a major power-sharing deal.³⁷ The basic logic is simple: sharing power guarantees political inclusion for all relevant ethnic groups in government. This, as a result, implies self-determination, cooperation and the diffusion of political power at the same time. Within a power-sharing arrangement, no group has to worry about being dominated by another. The danger of escalation due to a security dilemma is thereby significantly reduced. Claims for recognition are directly transformed into political influence. If the key ethnic interest for recognition is secured, incentives to take up arms again are reduced.³⁸

Due to power-sharing, former belligerents are becoming negotiating partners. A framework of cooperation is created, which might help former opponents to solve upcoming political disputes by compromise.³⁹ As Mukherjee argues, shared power can produce moderate political attitudes and collective state interests.⁴⁰ This will help to create a stable political system. Although some critics as Roeder, Rothchild, Jung, Shapiro or Andeweg, warn quite plausibly against dangers of permanent political deadlocks, it is argued in this study that the implementation of a power-sharing arrangement increases the probability of a peaceful democratization process after ethnic conflict.⁴¹

2.5 Parliamentary system

Regarding the government system, the typical differentiation is made between parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential systems. The difference derives from the question whether the government is responsible to the elected legislature and if the head of state is elected by the population for a fixed period of time. If the government is not dependent on a legislative majority, a system is classified as presidential. If the government depends on a legislative majority and the head of state is elected by the population, a system is called semi-presidential. All systems in

³⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*; Lijphart, *Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*; Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy*.

³⁶ Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*; Walter, *Committing to Peace*; Mukherjee, *Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?* Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace*; Mattes and Savun, *Fostering Peace After Civil War*.

³⁷ Högbladh, *Peace agreements 1975-2011 – Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset*.

³⁸ Walter, *Committing to Peace*; Rothchild, *Reassuring Weaker Parties after Civil Wars*; Lemarchand, *Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa*.

³⁹ Jarstad and Sisk, *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, 17.

⁴⁰ Mukherjee, *Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?*

⁴¹ Criticism is voiced by for example Jung and Shapiro, *South Africa's Negotiated Transition*; Andeweg, *Consociational Democracy*; Roeder and Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace*; Horowitz, *Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems*.

which the government depends on a legislative majority and the head of state is not elected by the population are defined as parliamentary.⁴² It is, however, not completely clear how the government system affects democracy and peace building processes. Schneider and Wiesehomeier, for example, find that presidential systems increase the risk of civil war.⁴³ This result is contested by Gleditsch, Strand or Wimmer who show that presidential systems are neither associated with full-scale civil war nor with lower-intensity armed conflict.⁴⁴ In this study, I am following the advocates of parliamentarism such as Lijphart or Linz, arguing that presidential systems are less suitable for building peaceful and democratic multiethnic societies. Presidential systems, and – to a somehow lesser extent – semi-presidential systems, guarantee one single group almost complete executive power. This results in ethnic hegemony and will eventually provoke countermeasures by the losing group. In parliamentary systems, the legislative and executive branches are mutually dependent and intertwined. A broader range of parties can be represented within the executive. Thus, groups have a higher chance of being heard in the political arena. If this chance is not given, groups may show hostility towards the newly implemented democratic rules. This may cause them to withdraw from electoral competition and to engage in confrontational strategies instead. Legislatures are clearly legitimated arenas in which compromising can take place. Thus, it is assumed that a parliamentary system is more suitable to achieve peaceful democratization after ethnic conflict than a presidential or semi-presidential system.

2.6 Cultural rights

Ethnicity is a social construction, based on cultural elements such as language, religion, tradition or historicity.⁴⁵ Based on SIT, it is argued that ethnic conflicts are at their core the attempt of a group to restore its positive social identity. Therefore, the implementation of cultural rights is of utmost importance to avoid further violence. Special provisions such as language rights satisfy a group's vital interest in cultural self-determination and prevent further actions against the cultural dominance of another group. Minority rights are the basic form of recognition and the oldest strategy for creating a peaceful multiethnic coexistence, already implemented in the 15th century for the Transylvanian Saxons by the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus or, most famously, with the millet-system practiced in the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁶ Today, around 20 percent of all peace-agreements contain some form of cultural rights regime.⁴⁷ Cultural rights are a rather soft instrument with comparably low obstacles for a central state to implement. The implementation of cultural rights for a specific group neither alters the state structure nor does it provide for executive competences. Nonetheless, minority rights are often an adequate response to the call for recognition as many cases

⁴² Clark, Golder, and Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics*, 459.

⁴³ Schneider and Wiesehomeier, *Rules That Matter*.

⁴⁴ Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand, *Democracy and Civil War*; Wimmer, *Waves of War*.

⁴⁵ Croissant et al., *Kulturelle Konflikte seit 1945*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

⁴⁶ Coakley, *Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict*.

⁴⁷ See UCDP peace agreement dataset; Högbladh, *Peace agreements 1975-2011 – Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset*.

worldwide show.⁴⁸ Cultural rights should therefore weaken the incentives for violent action. As Beissinger argues, cultural rights are beneficial to the development of a democracy if the demands of ethnic groups are satisfied and the groups thus demobilize and accept institutionalized forms of multiethnic engagement.⁴⁹ If the peace agreement provides for minority rights, respective actors will be more likely to accept the new set of institutions, which takes their group interests into account.

2.7 Transitional justice

After a violent ethnic conflict has come to an end, it has to be decided how to deal with atrocities. The international community and non-state actors usually express the need for a transitional justice mechanism. Once quite rare, transitional states are increasingly implementing measures such as tribunals, truth commissions, reparations or amnesty.⁵⁰ Measures such as prosecuting former elites which are suspected to have committed gross violations, establishing truth finding commissions to record wrongdoings or paying reparations to victims have become a central pillar of peace-building activities. Around 60 percent of peace-agreements today contain justice provisions.⁵¹ The predominant view in literature is that transitional justice has a positive effect on democratization and contributes to a peaceful state order.⁵² They might help to transform the antagonistic perceptions of ethnic groups into harmonious and cooperative relations. Achieving the identified criteria of cooperation is inconceivable without a certain level of reconciliation. The implementation of transitional justice measures implies that an interim government responds to domestic claims in acknowledging past wrongdoings, in establishing reparation funds or initiating rehabilitations. Responsiveness of state institutions is crucial for democracies. As Linz, Stepan or Mihr argue, support for democracy is based on the citizens' belief that legislature and judiciary protect and provide freedom and equality rights.⁵³ Transitional justice helps to develop the rule of law as another corner stone of a democratic regime and an independent judicial branch. Such measures can strengthen legitimization of the new regime by de-legitimizing the old one.

3. Conditions

Based on the three theoretically derived mechanisms (self-determination, cooperation incentives and power diffusion)

⁴⁸ See for some cases Rechel, Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe; Hofmann and Caruso, Minority Rights in South Asia; Barten, Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-Determination.

⁴⁹ Beissinger, A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization, 90.

⁵⁰ ICTJ, What Is Transitional Justice Brewer and Hayes, The Influence of Religion and Ethnonationalism on Public Attitudes towards Amnesty; Southern, Conflict Transformation and Truth-Seeking; Muvungi, Donor-Driven Transitional Justice And Peacebuilding.

⁵¹ UCDP peace-agreement dataset; Austin, Fischer, and Giessmann, Advancing Conflict Transformation; Aiken, Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice; Sriram, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground.

⁵² Van der Merwe, Baxter, and Chapman, Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice; Buckley-Zistel et al., Transitional Justice Theories; Federking, Putting Transitional Justice on Trial.

⁵³ Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation; Mihr, Transitional Justice.

six different institutions (parliamentarism, ethnic federalism, PR electoral systems, power-sharing arrangements, cultural rights and transitional justice measures) are selected on basis of their theoretical and practical relevance. The important role of institutions for conflict regulation is widely accepted in literature.⁵⁴ From an institutionalist point of view it can be argued that it is institutions which set the framework and rules for peaceful and cooperative intergroup behaviour. However, as Basedau points out, most studies in this regard investigate armed civil conflict in general rather than specifically taking the ethnic character into account.⁵⁵ Given the high rate of conflicts being ethnic in nature, this is a major shortcoming. This paper complements the literature and argues that institutions might be suitable to regulate ethnic conflicts, if they provide for the recognition of ethnic identity through empowerment as well as a re-organization of the inter-group relationship through cooperation incentives or the diffusion of political power. Although empirical results remain rather mixed for particular institutions and the two outcomes, the selected institutions can nevertheless be seen as at least possible options insofar as the decisive group level is taken into account. They all provide at least for one of the identified criteria (Table 1).

	Self-determination rights	Cooperation	Diffusion of power
Federalism	Yes	Yes	Yes
PR electoral system	No	Yes	Yes
Power-Sharing	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parliamentary system	No	Yes	Yes
Cultural rights	Yes	No	No
Transitional Justice	No	Yes	No

Table 1: Selected institutions with regulation mechanisms

The current debate is dominated by studies analyzing how single institutions, for instance, federal structures (Hartzell et al. 2001), electoral systems (Bogaards 2013) or power-sharing arrangements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) promote peace after war.⁵⁶ What is missing, though, is a systematic comparative analysis, which institutions or combination of institutions should be chosen to compile a fruitful "concert" in order to push on the development of peace and democracy.

4. Selecting the Cases

Introducing democratic practices in the wake of civil conflict has become a standard procedure. Since the end of the Cold War and conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda or Angola, democratization is an integral part of international peace-building missions. Democracy and peace are promoted equally in ethnic war-torn societies, but are mostly considered separately from another in the institutionalist literature.⁵⁷ The related phenomenon is referred to in the literature as war-to-democracy transitions.⁵⁸ A

⁵⁴ See for a comprehensive summary Ansorg and Kurtenbach, Institutional Reforms and Peacebuilding; Basedau, Managing Ethnic Conflict.

⁵⁵ Basedau, Does the Success of Institutional Reform Depend on the Depth of Divisions?

⁵⁶ Hartzell, Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War; Bogaards, The Choice for Proportional Representation; Hartzell and Hoddie, Institutionalizing Peace.

⁵⁷ Exceptions for non-ethnic conflicts e.g. Hartzell, The Art of the Possible or summarizing: Binningsbø, Power sharing, peace and democracy.

⁵⁸ Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy, 20 f.

transition is defined as the interval between one political regime and another and mainly used to describe an autocratic system changing towards a democratic system.⁵⁹ For the purposes of this study, this definition is too broad, since it is unrealistic to expect that a fully democratic system develops shortly after ethnic war. For those reasons, the term “war-to-democracy processes” (WtD processes) is used here. The term refers to the first stage of the transition. It is defined as significant and simultaneous improvements in peace and democracy after intrastate conflicts. Analytically, WtD processes start with the implementation of a peace-agreement as the formal end of combat operations. Therefore, all full peace-agreements of the UCDP Peace Agreement- Dataset are selected which were preceded by a violent ethnic conflict according to the Ethnic Power Relations-Dataset and which were de facto implemented after 1990.⁶⁰ In order to be able to analyze regime changes, the cases in which democracies have already developed at the time of the peace agreement implementation were excluded. If there was more than one peace agreement to end the same conflict within a five-year-period, only the latest agreement was taken into account.⁶¹ The procedure led to a sample of 13 cases (Table 2).⁶²

Case	Ethnic Group	Name of Peace Agreement	Year
Angola I.	Ovimbundu	Memorandum of Understanding	2002
Angola II.	Cabindans	Memorandum of Understanding	2006
Bangladesh	Jummas	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord	1997
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croat/Serb	The Washington Agreement / The Dayton Agreement	1994/95
Cote d’Ivoire	Dioula, Senoufo, Youcuba	Accra II	2003
Croatia	Serb	The Erdut Agreement	1995
Djibouti	Afar	Accord de reforme et concorde civile	2001
Georgia	Abkhaz	Declaration on measures	1994
Indonesia	Acehnese	Memorandum of Understanding	2005
Liberia	Krahn, Mandingo	Accra Peace Agreement	2003
Macedonia	Albanian	The Ohrit Agreement	2001
Niger	Tuareg	Ouagadougou Accord / ORA	1994/95
Philippines	Moro / Mindanao	Mindanao Final Agreement/ Agreement on Peace	1996/2001

Table 2: Selected cases

Democracy scores are measured on basis of the V-Dem electoral democracy index.⁶³ Electoral competition is the core element of democracy and a prerequisite for any broader concept such as a liberal, participatory or deliberative democracy. Since only improvements and not full-scale transitions or consolidation

processes shall be analyzed here, a minimal concept of democracy is used. Improvements regarding peace imply a reduction of conflict intensity. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) provides a method which allows detecting changes of conflict intensity. Ethnic conflicts can be classified as disputes, non-violent crises, violent crises, limited wars or wars, whereas the latter three constitute the category of violent conflicts.⁶⁴ A successful WtD process implies that a country has made significant progress towards peace and democracy after ethnic war without any major setbacks. It does, however, not mean a country has developed into a full democracy. It is analyzed under which circumstances these two analytically distinguishable processes go hand in hand, which probably leads to the development of a full democracy, and under which circumstances both processes fail. Figure 1 illustrates the argument plotting data for the cases Croatia and Bangladesh.

The Erdut-Agreement, signed in November 1995, provided a fertile ground on which peace between Croats and Serbs could be established. At the same time, Croatia has successfully evolved into a democracy. In contrast, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, signed in December 1997, did not end the conflict between ethnic Jummas and the government of Bangladesh. Although the conflict was of low intensity for quite a while, it escalated again in 2010 and 2014.⁶⁵ Bangladesh underwent no successful democratization process. Can such diverse developments after ethnic conflict be explained with the implementation of different institutions in peace-agreements? The hypothesis states that successful WtD-processes (POSWTD) hinge on one or more of the selected institutions, because those institutions address the core of ethnic conflict by providing for self-determination, cooperation and power diffusion. In the next step, the identified institutions are operationalized and calibrated for the QCA-analysis.

5. Operationalization and Calibration

To find out which institutional elements should be chosen out of the menu of institutional engineering, I use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA has rarely been used in the field of ethnic politics.⁶⁶ However; such a systematic comparative technique is well-suited for the purpose of this study since it is targeted at investigating causal factor combinations within medium n-samples. As mentioned above, looking at single institutions and their effect on peace or democracy has not taken us any further. QCA’s strength is to identify combinations of conditions and to take causal complexity into account.⁶⁷ Causal complexity covers conjunctural causality (the causal role of a single condition may unfold only in combination with other conditions), equifinality (one outcome can have several

⁵⁹ O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*.

⁶⁰ UCDP peace agreement data set, Högbladh, *Peace Agreements 1975-2011 – Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset*; Girardin et al., *GROWup – Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform*.

⁶¹ The “Declaration of Fundamental Principles for the Inter-Congolese dialogue” in the DR Congo from 2001 fulfils these criteria but had to be excluded due to the lack of reliable data.

⁶² A case is classified as “full democracy” if the electoral democracy index was higher 6 at the time of the implementation of the peace-agreement. The pre-conflict-year is the year of the implementation of the peace-agreement, the post-conflict years is 2016.

⁶³ Teorell et al., *Measuring Electoral Democracy with V-Dem Data*; V-Dem Institute, *V-Dem. Varieties of Democracy*. Global Standards, Local Knowledge.

⁶⁴ HIIC, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research; Trinn and Wencker, *Introducing the Heidelberg approach to conflict research*.

⁶⁵ HIIC, *Conflict Barometer 2010, 2015*; Mohsin, *Conflict and Partition*.

⁶⁶ QCA is still a method in the developing. However, there is a growing number of works in post-conflict research literature in general e.g. Richter and Basedau, *Why do some oil exporters experience civil war but others do not?*; Bara, *Incentives and opportunities or Bretthauer, Conditions for Peace and Conflict*.

⁶⁷ Schneider and Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences*, 78 f.




Figure 1: Successful and non-successful WtD processes

explanations) or multifinality (the same condition can produce a different outcome, depending on the context in which it occurs). For the calibration of the fuzzy scores, the indirect method of calibration is used.⁶⁸ For the first condition, *federalism* (FED), each case is classified into a four-value fuzzy set (0, 0.33, 0.67, 1) based on the following criteria: a highly decentralized state structure with a special sub-unit for the ethnic group, executive competencies for the group and separate elections within the sub-unit for regional institutions. All cases in which some form of territorial autonomy with extended executive rights for a group was established receive full memberships. Federal systems without a special sub-unit receive partial set-membership (value = 0.67). Weakly decentralized cases with some administrative rights for the group receive the value 0.33. Highly centralized unitary states are obviously not members of the set (value = 0). A full membership (value = 1) in *PR electoral systems* (PR) is granted if the national legislature is elected based on a proportional electoral system according to the data of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.⁶⁹ Additionally, elections must be considered to be mainly free and fair by Freedom House and the respective ethnic parties have to be represented in national parliament.⁷⁰ If one of the latter criteria is not met, the case receives partial membership (value = 0.67). If both are not met, the case is coded with 0.33. If the peace-treaty didn't provide for a PR electoral system, the case is not member of the set (value = 0). The dichotomous condition of *power-sharing* (PS) is calibrated on basis of the Power-Sharing Event Dataset by Ottmann and Vüllers, which provides information, if the peace treaty provided for implementation of political power-sharing (value = 1) or not (value = 0).⁷¹

The set of *parliamentary systems* (PAR) includes political systems, in which the government is responsible to the legislature and the head of state is not elected for a fixed term (value = 1). Semi-presidential systems are coded as "more in than out" (value = 0.67), since such systems fulfill the criteria of legislative responsibility and phases

⁶⁸ Rihoux and Ragin, *Configurational Comparative Methods*.

⁶⁹ IDEA, *Electoral System Design*.

⁷⁰ Freedom House, *Freedom House. Country Reports*.

⁷¹ Ottmann and Vüllers, *The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED)*; Ottmann and Vüllers, *Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) Codebook*.

of cohabitation are mostly easily managed.⁷² The special case of Bosnia Hercegovina in the sample is coded 0.33. Presidential systems are not members of the set (value = 0). The condition of *cultural rights* (CUL) is notoriously difficult to measure. It is therefore qualitatively calibrated on basis of two questions: does the agreement provide for education rights in the groups language? Is the group allowed to use its own symbols and able to pursue its own traditional interests? Both is highly important for a positive group identity and cultural self-

determination. The coding is based on the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples.⁷³ If both aspects are met, the dichotomous condition is coded 1. If not, or the group faces severe discriminations, the condition is coded 0. Regarding the condition of *transitional justice* measures (TJ), the debate in the literature revolves mainly around two questions: should justice and rule of law be prioritized by implementing tribunals or healing and reconciliation by implementing truth commissions?⁷⁴ However, it can be assumed that a combination of both has the biggest effect (value = 1) on peace and democracy. If the peace treaty provided for tribunals or truth commissions, the case is coded 0.67. If only soft measures such as amnesty or reparations were granted, cases are seen as "more out than in" (value = 0.33). If the peace treaty provided for no transitional justice measures, the case is coded 0. The data are taken from the Transitional Justice Database.⁷⁵ The outcome variable, that is WtD-processes, is an aggregation of two factors, peace and democracy. It is coded on basis of the relative improvements of the democracy (V-Dem electoral democracy index) and conflict intensity scores (HIK) since the adoption of the peace treaty (Table 3) as well as the conflict level in year 2016. To ensure that all countries had some time to develop peace and democracy, I consider only agreements with a duration of a minimum of ten years.⁷⁶ Considering the distribution along the continuum of changes, each case is classified as having seen a "major" change ($x \geq 2.5$, fuzzy-score 1), a "medium" change ($x \geq 2$, fuzzy-score 0.67), a "small" change ($x \geq 1$, fuzzy-score 0.33) or "no" significant change in democracy and peace ($x > 1$, fuzzy-score 0). To pass the crossover point (0.5), the conflict intensity in 2016 was no higher than a crisis.

⁷² See for example the studies by Elgie, *The Perils of Semi-Presidentialism*; Cheibub and Chernykh, *Are Semi-Presidential Constitutions Bad for Democratic Performance?* or Elgie and McMnamin, *Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation under Semi-Presidentialism*.

⁷³ *Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples*.

⁷⁴ See for example Federking, *Putting Transitional Justice on Trial*.

⁷⁵ Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, *Transitional Justice in Balance*.

⁷⁶ The difference between the oldest (Washington Agreement in Bosnia and Hercegovina and ORA in Niger) and the youngest (Memorandum of Understanding 2 in Angola) is only ten years. Agreements implemented after December 2006 e.g. the Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Uganda from 2008 or the Addis Ababa Agreement in Sudan from 2011 are not considered due to limited duration.

Case	Improvements in Democracy	Reduction of Conflict intensity	Current conflict intensity	WTD-Fuzzy score
Angola (ANG1)	Small (+0.4)	Small (-1)	Dispute	0.33
Angola (ANG2)	Small (+0.5)	Major (-4)	Dispute	0.67
Bangladesh (BAN)	No (-1.46)	No (+1)	Crisis	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BOS)	Small (+1.7)	Major (-4)	Dispute	0.67
Cote Ivoire (COT)	Small (+0.53)	Small (-2)	Crisis	0.33
Croatia (CRO)	Major (+4.2)	Major (-4)	Dispute	1
Djibouti (DJI)	Small (+0.3)	Small (-1)	Crisis	0.33
Georgia (GEO)	Major (+4)	Major (-3)	Non-violent crisis	1
Indonesia (IND)	Major (+3.8)	Major (-3)	Dispute	1
Liberia (LIB)	Major (+2.9)	Major (-5)	No Conflict	1
Macedonia (MAC)	No (-0.35)	Major (-4)	No conflict	0.33
Niger (NIG)	Small (+0.83)	Major (-3)	Dispute	0.67
Philippines (PHI)	No (-0.4)	No (+2)	Limited war	0

Table 3: Outcome fuzzy-scores

6. Analysis

6.1 Successful WtD

The first step in QCA is the analysis of necessary conditions. In fuzzy-set logic necessary means that the outcome Y is a subset of the condition X, or $Y < X$.⁷⁷ The so-called consistency assesses the degree to which the empirical data is in line with this statement of necessity. Testing the conditions, no single condition passes the recommended threshold by Schneider and Wagemann of 0.9.⁷⁸ Testing for all possible combinations of conditions leads to 25 different configurations. These results show no clear picture and are thus not of substantive interest for this study. The search for sufficient conditions is of greater importance for the research question. A condition is deemed to be sufficient, if, whenever the condition is present, the outcome is also present ($X < Y$). Which conditions lead consistently to the same outcome? The test for sufficiency moves away from looking at single conditions, and aims to identify configurations that are sufficient for successful WtD-processes (POSWTD). A truth table is built, which shows all logically possible configurations of conditions (Table 4, appendix). Rules of Boolean algebra and the Quine-McCluskey algorithm are used for logically minimizing the various sufficiency statements of the truth table. The consistency-threshold is first set at 0.75.⁷⁹ Since I have outlined clear expectations about the relationship between the conditions and the outcome, the so-called intermediate solution term is used. The result points to two equifinal pathways that have led to successful WtD: a parliamentary system with a PR-electoral system and extensive cultural rights

as well as federalism in combination with a PR-electoral system, transitional justice measures and extensive cultural rights. Thus, the solution formula for successful WtD processes is $PAR*PR*CUL + FED*PR*TJ*CUL \Rightarrow POSWTD$ (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Configurational model of successful WtD

The results remain robust with higher thresholds (0.8., 0.85). To receive the complete picture, determinants of failed WtD processes also have to be analyzed. The next section repeats the analysis with the negated outcome (poswtd).

6.2 Failed WtD

The analysis of necessity shows again that none of the conditions is neither in its presence nor absence necessary for the negated outcome (poswtd). For the analysis of sufficiency, the parsimonious solution is used, since no clear expectations were formulated. Again, the consistency-threshold is set at 0.75. The logical minimization process leads to the following results (Figure 3): The absence of a PR electoral system together with the absence of political power-sharing let both democracy and peace-building fail after ethnic warfare. The solution formula ($pr*ps \Rightarrow poswtd$) has a consistency of 0.820 and a coverage of 0.529. It is represented by the cases of Djibouti, Bangladesh and Philippines. A slightly higher threshold of 0.85 unravels the formula $ps*cul + fed*pr*ps \Rightarrow poswtd$, represented by the cases of Djibouti and Bangladesh.




Figure 3: Configurational model of failed WtD

6.3 Results

The analysis discovered two different paths to success: the peace-agreement provided either for a parliamentary system with proportional electoral rules and extensive cultural rights or for a federal state with proportional electoral rules, transitional justice measures and extensive cultural rights. None of the identified institutions is itself a necessary or sufficient condition, if at all they are INUS- conditions. There is clearly no panacea to reach

⁷⁷ Ragin, The Comparative Method.
⁷⁸ Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences, 278.
⁷⁹ Ibid. 279.

both goals – peace and democracy. It has been widely accepted in research that the success of institutional engineering is not independent from the specific character of diversity and the specific conflict situation. The solution is always a complex and tailored one. Neither federalism is inevitably the key for democratic peace and nor is parliamentarism. However, the analysis indicates that all of the selected institutions are important for WtD, although power-sharing is missing in the solution formula with the consistency thresholds used. Both solution formulas for the positive outcome contain self-determination rights, incentives for cooperation and measures for the diffusion of power. By contrast, the solution formula for the negated outcome contains neither of them. Thus, it can be concluded that the theoretically derived criteria indeed play a role for the institutional regulation of ethnic conflicts. However, more case research is needed to unravel the concrete causal paths. Looking at the cases, it can be assumed that the way self-determination, cooperation and power diffusion is achieved, is highly context sensitive – in some cases decentralization of the state structure is the key, in others an executive branch, which derives its legitimacy from the legislature, in others accompanying truth commissions or tribunals are needed. It is however remarkable that both solution terms contain proportional representation voting systems (PR) and extensive cultural rights for the respective group (CUL). Both conditions are the most essential elements for successful WtD-processes. Ethnic conflicts are identity conflicts. As pointed out above, they can only be regulated peacefully if cultural differences are accepted by dominant groups. Extensive cultural rights enable a group to manage its own cultural affairs. This leads to empowerment and ethnic recognition. The most common trigger of ethnic conflict is the political dominance of some groups over others. The lack of political power strengthens the incentives to use violence to alter the relations between superiors and inferiors. Proportional electoral systems facilitate the entry of smaller ethnic parties into parliament and thus open access to the political arena for ethnic groups. Political power again leads to empowerment and ethnic recognition. How can heterogeneous societies with highly problematic group relations become peaceful and democratic members of the international community? In all successful cases, rebelling groups were given a voice in the political system. To put it in a nutshell, political inclusion seems to be the key, whereas political exclusion leads to the contrary effect. If neither proportional representation nor power-sharing was implemented, groups were excluded and things were moving in the wrong direction, as the cases of Djibouti, Bangladesh and Philippines show. In these cases, neither democracy nor peace were achieved after ethnic warfare. This finding is in line with an influential research branch in political science arguing that ethnic groups are more likely to engage in violent conflict when they are excluded from the political arena and therefore unable to pursue their interests in a peaceful way.⁸⁰ The institutionalist literature, which already deals with postconflict democratization, for instance, Hartzell and Hoddie (2015), Mattes and Savun (2009) or Fjelde and Strathairn (2012), can thus be supplemented at least with regard

to ethnic conflicts with further institutions. The current focus on power-sharing needs to be widened and the whole concert of institutions taken into account. The analysis clearly indicates when institutions are sufficiently inclusive to overcome salient differences between ethnic groups and hence reduce grievances and (perceived) marginalization, the first steps towards peace and democracy were undertaken. This finding supports generally the consociational school of thought (e.g. Lijphart 1977). Exclusion, in contrast, generates grievances that can motivate civil war and endanger both processes.⁸¹

7. Conclusion

Nearly twenty years ago, William Zartman criticized that “*most writing focuses on the causes and processes going into the conflict; more attention needs to be directed towards getting out of it*”.⁸² Since then, international peacebuilders have become increasingly engaged in institutional reforms designed to foster the nonviolent management of conflicts and to prevent a renewed conflict escalation. The underlying assumption is mostly that adopted measures will automatically lead to peace and democracy. Although the role of institutions is widely recognized, their specific features are contested. It is rather unknown which type of institutional design may be best suited to achieve the (West’s) twin goals of sustainable peace and durable democracy after violent ethnic conflicts. This study steps into this research gap and analyses the whole concert of institutions and their effect on simultaneous improvements in peace and democracy with introducing an emerging method in this field. It argues with SIT and from a group perspective that institutions should provide for self-determination, cooperation incentives and power diffusion. These mechanisms address the core of ethnic conflicts as being cultural identity conflicts. It is shown that the implementation of institutions such as parliamentarism, ethno-federalism, PR electoral systems or cultural rights fulfilling those criteria indeed led to significant improvements in peace and democracy. The results may therefore be interpreted that institutional configurations which promote political inclusion are beneficial for peace and democracy. However, no single necessary or sufficient condition can be detected. There is no panacea. The rather vague results of the QCA draws attention to the fact that further comparative analysis should take the specific contexts into account. For instance, power-sharing might not work in highly divided nations, regional autonomy not for territorially dispersed groups. Economic development, political culture or the previous conflict intensity could make the difference. High-intensity ethnic conflicts may decrease the chances of successful WtD-processes right from the outside. Furthermore, strong international engagement in those processes such as in the cases of Bosnia or Liberia needs to be taken into account.⁸³ Research has provided a rich menu of theoretically

⁸¹ Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities; Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War.

⁸² Zartman, Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again, 317.

⁸³ Previous research has shown that external actors are highly important for durable peace and democratization after violent conflict (cf. Doyle and Sambanis 2006). This finding needs to be tested for the dual outcome in multiethnic surroundings.

⁸⁰ Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Gurr, Peoples versus States; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? ; Call, Why Peace Fails; Wucherpfennig et al., Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War.

helpful institutions. What is missing to improve knowledge about which options work best under which framework conditions is systematic comparative research on context-specific institutions working towards peace and democracy. Further research should be aimed at the interplay between inclusive institutions and various contextual factors in problematic multiethnic societies. It can be concluded that the selection of institutions must be based on inclusion. If the respective groups were excluded, neither democracy nor peace were achieved. Inclusion gives a group access to political power and the ability to manage its own affairs on a regular basis. Groups from such institutions have low incentives to work against democratic institutions and to take up arms again. This is an important note for future peace missions, since in contrast to most other factors institutions can be altered to increase the likelihood for a peaceful and democratic development after armed conflict.

Appendix

CASE	FED	PR	PS	PAR	TJ	CUL	POSWTD
ANG1	0.33	0.33	1	0	0	0	0.33
ANG2	0.33	0.33	1	0	0	0	0.67
BAN	0.33	0	0	1	0.67	0	0
BOS	1	1	1	0.33	1	1	0.67
COT	0	0	1	0	0.67	0	0.33
CRO	0.33	1	0	0.67	0.67	1	1
DJI	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	0	0.33
GEO	1	0.67	0	0.67	0	1	1
IND	1	0.67	0	0	1	1	1
LIB	0	0	1	0	0.67	0	1
MAC	0.33	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	1	0.33
NIG	0	0.67	0	0.67	0.33	1	0.67
PHI	0.67	0.33	0	0	0.67	1	0

Table 4: Truth table



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Wandel sozialer Menschenrechte in den 1990er-Jahren



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Die Autorin untersucht die Frage, wie sich angesichts einer Welt mit mehr als 190 anerkannten Staaten eine Universalisierung sozialer Menschenrechte (Art. 22–25 AEMR, Art. 6, 9, 11 UN-Sozialpakt) mithilfe empirischer Indizien nachvollziehen lässt. Die Auslegung dieser Normen basiert auf den Primärdokumenten aus der Entstehungszeit der AEMR und des UN-Sozialpaktes, Staatenberichten der Mitgliedstaaten des UN-Sozialpaktes sowie Verfassungen, nationalen gesetzlichen und programmatischen Regelungen sowie nationaler Rechtsprechung für fünf Staaten der Welt (Deutschland, Mexiko, Russland, China und Indien). Mithilfe der durchgeführten Datenanalysen zeigt die Arbeit Hinweise für eine Universalisierung sozialer Menschenrechte am Beispiel sozialer Grundsicherung auf, und zwar konkret ab dem Beginn der 1990er-Jahre.



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