

Kashmiri nationalism. Thus, Kashmiri refugees impact the boundaries of citizenship and political community.

Pakistan as an External Factor in Kashmiri Nationalism

Pakistan's position on Kashmiri nationalism can be determined through its relation to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Lamb (1991) records that the first Indo-Pak war over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir culminated in the division of the state into two entities, with the bulk of the valley of Kashmir and Jammu, Ladakh, and a portion of Poonch coming under the Indian administration. The Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, living under the Pakistani administration.

Though Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has been projected as an independent state, however in effect, the government remains administered mainly by Pakistani officials. Theoretically, this part never joined the country, but the need for recognition internationally, regionally, and within Pakistan subsumed its status. Until 1948, the Azad Kashmir government appealed to international bodies like the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan for de-facto recognition of Pak as an independent state. However, it could not get recognition regionally or internationally, resulting in the further degradation of the local government to that of the local authority. Korbel (1954) notes that despite Pakistan's insistence that de-facto recognition be given to Azad Kashmir, UNCIP explicitly stated that the government there was like a local authority with responsibility for the area assigned to it under the ceasefire agreement.

The Karachi Agreement of 1949 concluded between the Government of Pakistan and the provisional Muslim Conference of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir and allotted control of the defence, foreign policy, negotiations with UNCIP, and the affairs of Northern Areas to the former, while local administration was handed to the latter. This indicated the broad canvas within which Pakistan-controlled Kashmir could exercise its autonomy in managing affairs. The United Nations also dealt restrictively with the Pakistan government on all Jammu and

Kashmir matters. This allowed Karachi to make binding decisions on Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and have an indefinite authority in regulating Kashmiri nationalism without having to consult the respective government.

Pakistan routinely used its local surrogates and its Ministry of Kashmir Affairs (MKA), its trusted agent, to assert itself. The MKA was also created to help the United Nations in its involvement in the Kashmir dispute, including conducting a plebiscite. Jalal (1990) writes that the first head of the ministry was Mushtaq Ahmed Gurnami, an ardent Muslim League leader, ubiquitous civil servant, and a redoubtable Punjabi. Gurnami's appointment again pitched the Punjabi identity over the regional Kashmiri Pahari identity. The MKA ensured complete instability in the region, aside from appointing seven presidents from 1950 to 1959. Saraf (1977) records MKA's manipulation, which meant that no President of Pakistan controlled Kashmir and could think of keeping himself in power when the government of Pakistan wanted him to quit. By the end of the 1950s, Pakistan's interference in the political, economic, and administrative affairs of PaK began to be seen as some internal colonialism.

Snedden (2012) notes that veteran Kashmiri leaders like Chowdhary Ghulam Abbas complained to President Liaqat Ali that MKA gave scant regard to region aspirations and often made decisions without consulting the local government. In effect, the joint secretary holding the MKA claimed to be the real head of the Pak government. Though a clear delineation of powers existed, regional aspirations were ignored entirely. At the time of the creation of the state of PaK, there was a tacit understanding that the state would facilitate a pro-Kashmir vision encompassing both parts of Kashmir, ensuring an immediate plebiscite and resolving the Kashmir dispute. Snedden (2011) writes that the dissolution of the local army contingent called the Azad Army and its merger into the Pakistan Army stifled any effort to oppose the benefactor country. Secondly, with no nation to turn to, people were dependent on Pakistan for their survival. It was also combined with the fact that there was no open hostility against Pakistan. In totality, one can say that the Pakistan military is the most important political actor in the politics and administration of PaK, a consequence mainly of its dominance in Pakistani politics.

More so, the region lacked sustained resources to wage the war against Pakistan. It had an excellent workforce, resources, and strategic depth to sustain. Puri (2012) notes that the lent officers from Pakistan controlled the administrative affairs of PCK, which had no legal approval. These officers were mainly Punjabi, leading to anger between the already rancorous Punjabi and local identities. Discouraged by this approach, the veterans of Kashmiri nationalism, like Sardar Abdul Qayoom, chose an independent way in 1951 to resume the war for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir. Pro-Pakistan political groups like the Muslim Conference equally exploited the situation. The Muslim conference had an irrendialist Pakistani position over Kashmir and refuted Kashmiri nationalism on all grounds. Bazaz (1954) writes immediately after the ceasefire, the Muslim conference maintained its monopolistic control of the Azad Kashmir government and secured exclusivity in the region. It was the only political organisation that Pakistan recognised. While it ensured the party's longevity, Karachi controlled any leftover power.

The Muslim Conference had a dictatorial majority in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir, and the expectation of a plebiscite soon blocked every possibility of establishing a participatory political system. The presence of the Muslim conference fanned divisive factionalism. I. Khan (1990) informs that the two main factions centred on Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, whose political career gave him power and prestige, and Ibrahim, whose position arose from his liberation credentials in southern Poonch. While Abbas had the support of people from eastern areas of Jammu, Ibrahim had Poonchis and Mirpuris rallying behind him. Apart from these, a third faction comprised ethnic Kashmiris led by Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah and later K.H. Khurshid. Within the Poonchis, the popularity of Sardar Qayum was also growing Saraf (1977) writes that for MKA and Gurmani, this situation was a boon. The factions could be played off, and the entire liberation movement would be divided. Pakistan did not seek to discourage these tendencies as no faction was ideologically opposed to Pakistan or the possibility of merging with Pakistan in case of a plebiscite.

From 1948 to the late 1960s, the Muslim Conference dominated the political landscape of PCK and acted as a facilitator for the Pakistan Muslim League. Asif (2007) notes that the Muslim Conference also played an essential role in bringing Pakistan's man to the president's office. Though other pro-Pakistan parties were present, pro-independence parties were practically barred from political processes.

During the time of General Ayub Khan, poor treatment of Kashmiris slightly improved as K.H. Khurshid reasonably influenced the position of Kashmiris but soon fell out with the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. Askari (1991), in his book, writes the reason for this disruption is the complex and uncooperative behaviour of K.H. Khurshid. The actual reason was displeasure with Kashmiri's direct contact with General Ayub Khan. By 1965, the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs successfully subordinated Pakistan Controlled Kashmir. The Government Acts of 1964 and 1968 further repudiated the government's position to a municipal committee.

During General Yahya's time, the agitated leadership of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir – Sardar Qayoom, K.H. Khurshid, and Sardar Ibrahim signed a joint declaration for reconstituting the government as a whole sovereign and a successor state to the Government of Maharaja Hari Singh. Thus, a rudimentary Constitution- the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Act, 1970- was granted, a significant victory for leadership. It provided a presidential system of government, a legislative assembly, and considerable autonomy. However, foreign affairs, defence, and currency remain under Pakistan's purview. The act of 1970 also acknowledged that PCK should not be seen as a part of Pakistan but should be brought into the mainstream of general administration. However, the contradictions did not cease to exist. As the interim constitution shows, all Kashmiris in the territory and all of their political parties have no choice but to be pro-Pakistan. The constitution of Azad Kashmir reads, "No person or political party in Azad Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against, or take part in the activities prejudicial or detrimental to the state's accession to Pakistan." These legal requirements obstructed the space of leaders who favoured an independent Kashmir and consequently shrunk spaces for Kashmiri nationalism.

Qayoom (1992) records that this deception of independence negated people's sacrifices to unite Azad Kashmir with Pakistan and diminished the concept of a united Muslim community joining Pakistan.

Bhutto introduced a new constitution that gave Pakistan a parliamentary system of government and influenced the leadership in PCK to create a similar system. So, the interim constitution of 1974 was promulgated. This opened up ways for Pakistan's People's Party to operate in Azad Kashmir and could have also paved the way in case the region had to be provincialised. Like its predecessor Act of 1970, this one was legally contradicting with sections related to Pakistan's superior position. In times of war, external aggression, or internal disturbances, the emergency powers rested with Pakistan.

During Zia's time, six amendments were made to the Interim constitution, further lowering Pck's position. Thus, in times of military dictatorships in Pakistan, martial law would be imposed in PCK. In times of civilian governments, Pakistan's elected leaders influenced the PCK politics through their membership of the Azad Kashmir Council. This was done by manipulating Azad Kashmir legislative assembly elections via constituencies for Jammu and Kashmir refugees located in Pakistan. The 1990 elections fully restored the Pck's prime ministerial system, which continued during Musharraf's time.

In totality, Pakistan has progressively subsumed the region through its Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. Pakistan failed to empower the people of Ajk as it could have stimulated the growth of Kashmiri nationalism, which was antithetical to the 'two-nation' theory. In addition to these formal control mechanisms, Pakistan appoints federal civil servants to top administrative positions in PCK.

The pattern of domination has evolved over the years, and Pck's politics are managed by acquiring and consolidating political space through material assistance.

The local leadership has frequently expressed desperation with the lack of political freedoms and the restrictions on political freedom. However, the vast military and economic dependence constrain possibilities for a different engagement. Moreover, no news about Pakistan-controlled Kashmir could go out as no printing press existed in the

region. A dozen newspapers run by Kashmiris or refugees from Jammu and Kashmir had offices located in the border districts of Punjab, which are within Punjab. This made timely news collection impossible. Bhat (1956) records how strict censorship was enforced on newspapers and how the non-conformists were tactically punished.

Puri (2009) writes that even today, candidates desirous of contesting elections must sign a declaration reaffirming their commitment to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. A report from Amnesty International records that thirty-two JKLF leaders were barred from contesting the polls for refusing to sign the declaration and were arrested while holding a protest rally. Economic and political underdevelopment, weak political institutions, and legal restrictions on freedom of association have undermined the development of civil society. The sensitive geography of the state is often used to limit the state for democratic reforms of contention. The maintenance of public order ordinance, which prohibits activities prejudicial to public safety, is frequently invoked to deter and suppress opposition.

Asif (2007) argues that Islamabad's relationship with Muzaffarabad is based on control rather than autonomy, with negative consequences for political and economic development. Although the patron-client nature of the relationship has structured political competition and rewards political compliance from local political actors, the relations between Islamabad and Muzaffarabad are far from frictionless.

Pakistan and Kashmiri Nationalism

The Pakistani position on Kashmiri nationalism is exceedingly determined by ethnic nationalism, determined through a rigorous religious commonality and filtered through socio-cultural traditions of the past and the present. The mainstream Pakistani position takes heavily from the group's common origin and connections formed by blood ties and relies heavily on the sense of uniqueness. This is done by valorising particular Islamic cultural attachments to capture the social base of the group, in this case, Kashmiris.