

Part Two: How are Different Areas of Human Rights Law Referred to in International Criminal Jurisprudence?

Part Two of this book deals with three different areas of human rights and their use in international criminal law by way of example: the prohibition of torture, the protection of minorities and women's rights/gender issues. These three areas were chosen because they are, in themselves, elaborated to differing degrees in human rights law and they are understood and used to different degrees in international criminal law. This helps to highlight the spectrum of the use of human rights law in international criminal law. This approach makes it possible to explore, by way of comparison, under which circumstances judges are willing to refer to human rights law and to draw conclusions regarding the prerequisites necessary in order to facilitate such use. It also serves to examine whether human rights law is more likely to be referenced in areas where human rights law and the protected rights it contains overlap with what is likely to be prohibited under national criminal legal systems.

The limitations to these three areas of human rights law does by no means suggest that those are the only areas in which international criminal law benefits from human rights law. Other areas of international human rights law which have a relevance to international criminal law and in which international criminal law might to some degree depend on the findings and developments of human rights law included, but are, *inter alia*, the rights of children (see the prohibition of the enlistment and use of children under the age of 15 under Art. 38 Convention on the Rights of the Child²¹⁴ as well as the classification of such action as a war crime under Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) Rome Statute), the issue of hate speech (see first and foremost the case against *Ferdinand Nahimana and others* before the ICTR²¹⁵), the prohibition of slavery which can be a crime against humanity under Art. 7 (1) (c) and (g) Rome Statute, and the prohibition of arbitrary

214 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.

215 *Prosecutor v Nahimana (Judgment)* ICTR-99-52-T (3 December 2003).

deprivation of liberty, prohibited in various human rights instruments as well as in Art. 7 (1) (e) Rome Statute.²¹⁶

Chapter One: Prohibition of Torture and 'Other Inhumane Acts'

I. Where was the Prohibition of Torture Referred to at Ad Hoc Tribunals?

One of the areas of human rights law, which have had a clear impact on international criminal law is the prohibition of torture under human rights law. The ICTY and the ICTR have repeatedly resorted to the provisions established under human rights law to protect the individual from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The focus of the courts' and tribunals' attention is usually put on the CAT.

1. The Specific Elements in the Definition of Torture as a Crime against Humanity

The tribunals referred to the definition of torture in the CAT in order to identify how torture is defined under customary international law. The crime of torture as a war crime or a crime against humanity is not defined in their respective statutes (Art. 5 (f) ICTY Statute²¹⁷ and Art. 3 (f) ICTR Statute²¹⁸), and as the *ad hoc* tribunals, unlike the ICC, have not adopted 'elements of crimes' in order to assist the interpretation and application of the law, the judges often had and still have to consult sources outside their statutes in order to look for definitions for specific crimes.

216 See also Theodor Meron 'Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals' Fourth Marek Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%20documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov08.pdf> (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online); *Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment)* IT-97-25 (15 March 2002) paras 110–114.

217 UNSC 'Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia' UNSC Res 827 (1993) (25 May 1993) SCOR 48th Year 29.

218 UNSC 'Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda' UNSC Res 955 (1994) (8 November 1994) SCOR 49th Year 13.

In the following, the strategies of the ICTY and the ICTR in regard to the definition of torture will be outlined.

The references of the *ad hoc* tribunals to human rights conventions with regards to the definition of torture as a crime under international law are, however, partly contradictory and do not establish a clear picture of the definition of torture in international customary law. Common to the tribunals' analysis is the starting point of their argumentation, which is Art. 1 (1) CAT. Art. 1 (1) CAT reads follows

'[f]or the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions'.

a. Akayesu

The first judgement of the ICTR, the *Akayesu* judgement, used the CAT's definition without any modification and therefore held that the definition of torture pursuant to Art. 1 CAT was congruent to the definition of torture as a crime against humanity, without giving any reasons for its findings.²¹⁹ This approach has been repeated by other chambers of the ICTR in later cases.²²⁰

219 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para. 681.

220 Eg *Prosecutor v Musema (Judgment)* ICTR-96-13-T (27 January 2000) para. 285; the *Musema* Judgment even adopted the second sentence of Art. 1 (1) CAT ('It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions'.) as being part of the definition of torture under international criminal law, without undergirding its assumption with any reasoning.

b. Delalić and others (Čelebići)

The ICTY, on the other hand, established different approaches regarding the evaluation of torture under customary international law. The need for using human rights for guidance in interpretation is especially obvious when it comes to the ICTY. As the first international criminal tribunal since the end of World War II, the ICTY was primarily faced with defining the crimes under its jurisdiction within the boundaries of *nullum crimen sine lege*. In *Delalić and others*, the Court held, in a first step, that the prohibition of torture is recognized as being part of customary international law and *ius cogens*.²²¹ Then, in a second step, the court turned to the definition of the prohibited phenomenon and how torture can be defined under customary international law. The court held that the definition of torture contained in the CAT ‘includes’ the definitions contained in both the United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘Torture Declaration’)²²², which was used as a basis for the CAT and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture²²³ and ‘thus reflects a consensus which the Trial Chamber considered to be representative of customary international law’.²²⁴ The court also pointed to the number of ratification of the CAT (109 as of 1998) as an indication for its status as customary international law.²²⁵

After the court concluded that the CAT definition is representative of customary international law, the Trial Chamber considered, in a third step ‘in more depth the requisite level of severity of pain or suffering, the exis-

221 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 454; regarding the prohibition of torture being part of *ius cogens*, see also UN Commission on Human Rights ‘Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooijmans, appointed Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1985/33’ (19 February 1986) UN Doc E/CN.4/1986/15 para. 3.

222 UNGA Res 3452 (XXX) ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (9 December 1975) 30th Session Supp 34, 91.

223 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (done 9 December 1985, entered into force 28 February 1987) (1986) 25 ILM 519.

224 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 459.

225 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 453.

tence of a prohibited purpose, and the extent of the official involvement that are required in order for the offence of torture to be proven'.²²⁶

For this undertaking, the court turned to the jurisprudence of the HRC, the European Court of Human Rights ('ECtHR') and the European Commission of Human Rights ('ECommHR'), all of which do not apply the CAT, but other, at times conflicting definitions. In particular, the judgments in the *Greek Case*²²⁷ and the *Ireland v United Kingdom Case*²²⁸ to which the Trial Chamber refers, were rendered before the CAT was even adopted.

Even though the Trial Chamber mentioned the ECtHR's reference to Art. 1 (2) Torture Declaration in the *Ireland v United Kingdom Case*²²⁹ which reads '[t]orture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' the Trial Chamber omitted to mention that this was an opinion which the ECommHR did not share. The definition of torture applied by the ECommHR differs significantly from the one applied by the ECtHR. In the *Greek Case*, the ECommHR held that what distinguishes inhuman treatment from torture was that the latter required the infliction of severe pain or suffering for a prohibited purpose.²³⁰ The Commission held that

'[t]he word "torture" is often used to describe inhuman treatment, which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment'.²³¹

The Commission argued that what distinguished torture from inhuman treatment or punishment is not the intensity of the pain and suffering, but rather that the severe pain and suffering is inflicted for a prohibited pur-

226 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 460.

227 *Greek Case* (ECommHR App Nos 3321/67 [*Denmark v Greece*]; 3322/67 [*Norway v Greece*]; 3323 [*Sweden v Greece*]; 3344/67 [*Netherlands v Greece*]) (1969) 12 YECCommHR.

228 *Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECtHR) Series A No 25; *Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECommHR App 5310/71) (1976) Series B No 23-I.

229 *Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECtHR) Series A No 25 para. 167.

230 *Greek Case* (ECommHR App Nos 3321/67 [*Denmark v Greece*]; 3322/67 [*Norway v Greece*]; 3323 [*Sweden v Greece*]; 3344/67 [*Netherlands v Greece*]) (1969) 12 YECCommHR 168.

231 *Greek Case* (ECommHR App Nos 3321/67 [*Denmark v Greece*]; 3322/67 [*Norway v Greece*]; 3323 [*Sweden v Greece*]; 3344/67 [*Netherlands v Greece*]) (1969) 12 YECCommHR 168, 186.

pose.²³² This approach also prevailed amongst the drafters of the CAT, in which no mention of torture being an aggravated form of cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment was made.

The ECtHR, on the other hand, has taken a different approach, which does not focus on the purpose of the conduct, but rather on the intensity of the pain and suffering inflicted. In its famous Northern Ireland Case, it held that

‘the five techniques [interrogation techniques used by British security forces against suspect terrorists [...]] as applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the extraction of confessions, the naming of others and/or information and although they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood’²³³.

The Trial Chamber seems to elide contradictions and chooses the dogmatically flawed path of declaring the CAT definition of torture to be customary international law and subsequently using inherently contradictory definitions taken from other instruments and regional courts and treaty bodies cumulatively in order to fill in the gaps left open by the CAT definition. Furthermore, the court fails to explain how jurisprudence interpreting a regional convention which was not applicable on the territory on which the events before the court took place should be indicative of a pre-defined norm to be followed by the actors at the time.²³⁴ Regional jurisprudence

232 See more in detail under Part Two Chapter One I. 1. F. below.

233 *Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECtHR) Series A No 25 para. 167.

234 This paradox is becoming even more obvious in the case of the ICC. As of 2017, all but of the situations under investigation by the ICC is concerned with are within African States. However, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the IACtHR is developed to a much greater extent than that of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Therefore, if the ICC refers to human rights jurisprudence, it basically always refers to regional jurisprudence developed on another continent. Sheppard writes: ‘[T]he court [the ICC] tends to simply adopt reasons from the human rights courts that they find compelling. The Court may be entitled to do so, but in the context of locating quasi-constitutional norms, the Court should take care to explain on what basis it adopts the reasons of the European court interpreting a European convention as supportive of a paramount principle applicable to a set of cases that have arisen exclusively from Africa’; see Daniel Sheppard ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally Recognized Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 43-71, 54.

could, of course, be an indication of customary international law in a specific area, but the court makes no such assumption, but simply quotes regional case law to support the argumentation the ICTY choose to follow.

The acts before the ICTY did without doubt lead to severe mental or physical pain or suffering on part of the victims. They included beatings with various objects including baseball bats, shovels, metal chains, wooden implements;²³⁵ burnings with various objects including hot pincers and heated knives²³⁶; suffocation²³⁷ as well as forcible sexual vaginal and anal intercourse.²³⁸

However, by demanding cumulatively that the pain or suffering in question needed to be 'aggravated' in comparison to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and additionally for the aggravated pain or suffering to be inflicted for a prohibited purpose, the Trial Chamber unreasonably raised the requirements for torture both under human rights and international criminal law.

Additionally, the Trial Chamber does not scrutinize whether international criminal law actually requires torture to be inflicted by a State official. The court merely affirms that this is the case, adding, without any further examination that

'[i]n the context of international humanitarian law, this requirement must be interpreted to include officials of non-State parties to a conflict, in order for the prohibition to retain significance in situations of internal armed conflicts or international conflicts involving some non-State entities'.²³⁹

Thereby, it adds another requirement that has not been held to be a constituent element of torture under international criminal and humanitarian law by other chambers.²⁴⁰

235 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment)* IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras 23 and 26–28.

236 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment)* IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras 23 and 26–28.

237 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment)* IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras 23 and 26.

238 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment)* IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras 24–25.

239 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 473.

240 See eg *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 488–96.

Moreover, the court took recourse to human rights when deciding the question whether rape can be considered torture, a question which the court answers in the affirmative²⁴¹. Additionally, the ICTY looked into the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the ECommHR and the HRC again, mainly relying on the same points of arguments as in the torture discussion, when it defined inhuman treatment punishable as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions under Art. 2 (c) ICTY Statute.²⁴²

c. Furundžija

A different Trial Chamber more openly criticized the lack of doctrinal precision and reasoning taken in *Akayesu*. In *Furundžija* the Trial Chamber pointed out that the definition given in Art. 1 CAT was explicitly limited to the ‘purposes of this Convention’. The ICTY stated, however, that an extra-conventional effect may ‘be produced to the extent that the definition at issue codifies, or contributes to developing or crystallising customary international law’.²⁴³ The Court continued by scrutinizing whether the definition in the CAT can be said to reflect customary international law. The Court first stated that the definition given in the CAT, while being explicitly limited to the CAT, could be understood in a broader manner because it outlined ‘all the necessary elements implicit in international rules on the matter’.²⁴⁴ Here, the court did not consider whether the ‘international rules on the matter’ were the same ones, with the same reference points, pursuing the same goals, in both human rights and international criminal law. Given the differences in terms of goals and purposes in the different fields of law, it is questionable whether ‘the matter’ of torture can even be seen as congruent in both human rights and international criminal law. Surely, it would have been helpful to the dogmatic credibili-

241 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment)* IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras 475-497; See Part Two Chapter Three I. 2. below.

242 See paras. 534-42.

243 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 160; see also Fausto Pocar ‘International Criminal Tribunals and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law against Civilians and Prisoners of War’ in Manoj Kumar Sinha (ed) *International Criminal Law and Human Rights* (Manak Delhi 2010) 1-26, 8-9.

244 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para 160.

ty of the court to discuss at least whether the rules governing torture are understood to be the same in both fields of law.

Then the Trial Chamber examined other relevant documents on the subject, namely the Torture Declaration. The fact that the Torture Declaration was adopted within the UNGA by consensus and therefore no country did object to it was referred to by the ICTY as an indication of the support of the definition by all UN Member States.²⁴⁵ However, even though the definitions in the Torture Declaration and the CAT are similar, they are not identical. Art. 1 (1) CAT contains much broader requirements of the involvement of an official than the Torture Declaration.²⁴⁶ Furthermore, the CAT lists additional prohibited purposes for the infliction of severe pain of suffering which cannot be found in the Torture Declaration, namely coercion and discrimination of any kind'. Art. 1 (2) Torture Declaration does, moreover, explicitly state that '[t]orture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment', a sentence which was omitted under the CAT. Hence it cannot be said that the global consensus that was achieved with the adoption of the Torture Declaration does necessarily also consist with regard to the CAT.²⁴⁷ A few countries have in fact issued reservations or 'declarations of understanding' regarding the definition of torture in the CAT,²⁴⁸ to which a couple of other countries objected.²⁴⁹

245 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 160.

246 Art. 1 CAT: 'inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity'; Art. 1 (1) Torture Declaration: 'intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official'.

247 See also UN Commission on Human Rights 'Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooijmans, appointed Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1985/33' (19 February 1986) UN Doc E/CN.4/1986/15 para. 31.

248 Botswana and Qatar made reservations regarding the definition of torture; the USA has issued broad 'understandings' which in fact amount to reservations; see <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-9&chapter=4&lang=en> (31 October 2017); see also Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur *The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary* (OUP Oxford 2008) 50–51.

249 See the objections of Denmark, Norway and Sweden to the reservation of Botswana; of Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands Norway, Spain and Sweden to the reservation of Qatar; and of the Netherlands and Sweden to the understandings of the USA; <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-9&chapter=4&lang=en> (31 October 2017).

The Court further pointed to a substantially similar definition of torture used in the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and emphasizes that the CAT's definition is used by the Special Rapporteur on torture other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment²⁵⁰, the ECtHR²⁵¹, the ECommHR²⁵² and the HRC²⁵³.

This is, again a flawed analysis, because not two of these institutions or instruments use exactly the same definition and characterize the exact same actions as torture.

The ICTY in *Furundžija* concludes that the main elements of the definition of Art. 1 CAT are part of customary law, but notes that there are some specific elements which pertain to torture in the context of international criminal law, more specifically in the context of armed conflicts which are not necessarily spelled out in the CAT.²⁵⁴ The court emphasized that the 'general spirit of international humanitarian law',²⁵⁵ whose primary purpose is the safeguarding of human dignity, requires one of the possible reasons of torture to be the humiliation of the victim. The court does, however, also mention that the purpose of humiliation is close to one that is explicitly enshrined in the CAT, namely the purpose of intimidation of the victim.²⁵⁶ In fact, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights mentions humiliation as the one of the impermissible purposes for the infliction for severe pain and suffering in connection to charges of torture be-

250 See UN Commission for Human Rights 'Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooijmans, appointed Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1985/33' (19 February 1986) UN Doc E/CN.4/1986/15. The Special Rapporteur, in this first report, does however, not solely depend on the definition of the CAT and the Torture Declaration. He uses the definition of both instruments, but substantiates this definition by use of jurisprudence of human rights bodies like the HRC, the ECtHR and the European Commission of Human Rights; see paras 30–39.

251 *Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECtHR) Series A No 25 para. 167.

252 *Greek Case* (ECommHR App Nos 3321/67 [*Denmark v Greece*]; 3322/67 [*Norway v Greece*]; 3323 [*Sweden v Greece*]; 3344/67 [*Netherlands v Greece*]) (1969) 12 YECOMMHR 168.

253 UN HRC 'General Comment No 20: Replaces General Comment 7 concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)' (3 April 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 40, 193.

254 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) paras 161–62.

255 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para 162.

256 Further see Chad G Marzen 'The Furundžija Judgment and its Continued Vitality in International Law' (2010) 43 Creighton Law Review 505–27, particularly 517.

fore the commission.²⁵⁷ It stated that 'rape is considered to be a method of psychological torture because its objective, in many cases, is not just to humiliate the victim but also her family or community'.²⁵⁸ This is, however, not mentioned by the ICTY.

Furthermore, it is not evident how the 'general spirit of humanitarian law' requires humiliation to be recognized as a prohibited purpose in the context of torture whereas human rights law would not require such recognition. Torture constitutes 'the most brutal attack on human dignity and personality'²⁵⁹ and bears great resemblance to slavery as both crimes are characterized by an imbalance of power and complete powerlessness on part of the victim. This core aspect of the phenomenon of torture does not differ in situations of armed conflict, unrest or official peace. It is this imbalance of power that makes the vulnerable party prone to human rights abuses such as torture. It is hard to see therefore how the 'spirit of humanitarian law' should, in the context of torture, demand for an additional purpose to be included in the list of prohibited purposes different from the ones established in human rights law.

The court further emphasizes that 'at least one of the persons involved in the torture process must be a public official or must at any rate act in a non-private capacity, e.g. as a *de facto* organ of a State or any other authority-wielding entity'.²⁶⁰ The chamber fails to further specify the term 'authority-wielding entity', which cannot be found in any international convention dealing with torture. It does not specify whether it let go of the 'official' requirement as a whole or whether it includes into the term 'authority-wielding entities' only State-like authorities. In case of the latter, the court could have backed up its reasoning with the help of the CAT. Even though this is not as clearly pronounced in the CAT, the CAT does,

257 *Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru* Case 10.970 IACommHR Report No 5/96 (1 March 1996); a couple of years later, the Committee against Torture also explicitly listed humiliation as belonging to the prohibited purposes under Arrest. 1 CAT, see UN Committee against Torture 'Communication No 262/2005, *VL v Switzerland* (20 November 2006) UN Committee against Torture 'Report of the Committee against Torture 37th session (6-24 November 2006) 38th session (30 April-18 May 2007)' GAOR 62nd session Supp 44, 207 para 8.10.

258 *Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru* Case 10.970 IACommHR Report No 5/96 (1 March 1996) para. 3; see further under See Part Two Chapter Three I. 2. below.

259 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur *The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary* (OUP Oxford 2008) 76.

260 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 162.

however, include the term ‘other person acting in official capacity’, which leaves room for the inclusion of ‘de facto authorities’, private actors whose authority is comparable with that of State actors.²⁶¹

As for the forms of torture, the ICTY refers to human rights law in order to conclude that rape can constitute a form of torture. In particular, the ICTY referred to jurisprudence of the ECtHR²⁶² and the IACtHR²⁶³.

d. Kvočka

In *Kvočka*, the Trial Chamber started its legal findings on torture by stating that ‘[t]orture has been defined by the Tribunal jurisprudence as severe mental or physical suffering deliberately inflicted upon a person for a prohibited purpose, such as to obtain information or to discriminate against the victim’.²⁶⁴

In the *Kvočka* Judgment, the ICTY determined the required severity for torture as an offence under Art. 3 ICTY Statute (Violations of the Laws and Customs of War) and Art. 5 ICTY Statute (Crimes against Humanity),

261 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur *The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary* (OUP Oxford 2008) 77–79.

262 *Aydin v Turkey* (ECtHR) Reports 1997-VI <<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58371>> (31 October 2017); *Aksoy v Turkey* (ECtHR) Reports 1996-VI 2260.

263 *Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru* Case 10.970 IACommHR Report No 5/96 (1 March 1996; The treaty body of the CAT itself, the Committee against Torture, has later held that rape, when inflicted for one of the purposes mentioned in the convention, can constitute a form of torture (see UN Committee against Torture ‘Communication No 262/2005, *VL v Switzerland*’ [20 November 2006] UN Doc CAT/C/37/D/262/2005).

264 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) para. 137.

with reference to the HRC²⁶⁵, the ECommHR²⁶⁶ the ECtHR²⁶⁷, international legal scholars as well as a Report by the UN Special Rapporteur on

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- 265 *Ibid.* para. 146, referring to UN HRC 'Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Israel' (28 July 1998) GAOR 53rd Session Supp 40 vol 1, 45: 'The Committee notes also the admission by the State party delegation that the methods of handcuffing, hooding, shaking and sleep deprivation have been and continue to be used as interrogation techniques, either alone or in combination. The Committee is of the view that the guidelines can give rise to abuse and that the use of these methods constitutes a violation of article 7 of the Covenant in any circumstances' (at para. 19), see also UN HRC 'Communications No 623/1995, 624/1995, 626/1995 and 627/1995, *Domukovsky et al. v. Georgia*' (6 April 1998), UN Docs CCPR/C/62/D/623, 624, 626 & 627/1995, para. 18.6; UN HRC 'Communication No. 124/82, *Muteba v Zaire*' (25 March 1983) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 158; UN HRC Communication 194/85, *Miango Muiyo v Zaire*' (27 October 1987) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 219; UN HRC 'Communication 366/89, *Kanana v. Zaire*' (2 November 1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/49/D/366/1989; UN HRC 'Communication No. 11/1977, *Grille Motta v Uruguay*' (29 July 1980) UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/35/40) at 132; UN HRC 'Communication No. 52/1979, *Lopez Burgos v Uruguay*' (29 July 1981) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88; UN HRC 'Communication No 63/1979, *Sendic v Uruguay*' (28 October 1981) UN Doc No Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 114 (1982); UN HRC 'Communication No. 74/1980, *Angel Estrella v Uruguay*' (29 March 1983) UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 114 (1982); UN HRC 'Communication No. 147/83, *Arzuaga Gilboa v Uruguay*' (1 November 1985) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 176; UN HRC Communication No 159/1983, *Cariboni v Uruguay*' (27 October 1987) UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) at 184; UN HRC 'Communication 162/1983, *Berterretche Acosta v Uruguay*' (25 October 1988) UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 183; UN HRC 'Communication No 161/1983, *Herrera Rubio v Colombia*' (2 November 1987) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 192; UN HRC 'Communication No 176/1984, *Lafuente Peñarrieta et al v Bolivia*' (2 November 1987) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 201.
- 266 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) paras 142-4, referring to *Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECtHR) Series A No 25; the acts in question in the case at hand where the so-called 'five techniques' applied by members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary against alleged terrorist by the Irish Republican Army. The 'techniques' were wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep and deprivation of food and drink (see para. 96). The ECommHR concluded, however, that the cumulative use of this technique did not amount to torture but to inhuman treatment (see para. 167).
- 267 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) para. 150, referring to *Aksoy v Turkey* (ECtHR) Reports 1996-VI, 2260.

Torture²⁶⁸, and accordingly compiled a list of several acts which are *per se* severe enough to *per se* constitute torture and of those which can constitute torture depending on the circumstances.²⁶⁹ The Chamber stated that it is not possible to lay out a precise threshold for the severity of suffering but that it depends on objective as well as subjective criteria. Regarding objective factors, the Chamber concluded that '[b]eating, sexual violence, prolonged denial of sleep, food, hygiene, and medical assistance, as well as threats to torture, rape, or kill relatives were among the acts most commonly mentioned as those likely to constitute torture. Mutilation of body parts would be an example of acts *per se* constituting torture'.²⁷⁰ It also outlined a catalogue of helpful subjective factors which can be drawn, namely, 'physical or mental effect of the treatment upon the particular victim and, in some cases, factors such as the victim's age, sex, or state of health'.²⁷¹ In its definition of inhuman treatment, the court refers to a decision of the ECtHR which found that a long-lasting effect was not required for a mistreatment to fall within the ambit of Art. 3 ECHR.²⁷² Furthermore, the ICTY refers to the HRC's and the ECtHR's evaluation of inappropriate conditions of detention as inhuman and/or degrading treatment.²⁷³

268 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) para. 144, referring to UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Sir Nigel Rodley 'Question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' (3 July 2001) UN Doc A/56/156.

269 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 142–51.

270 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 144.

271 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 143.

272 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 159; *Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom* (ECtHR) Series A No 247 C.

273 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 169; UN HRC 'Communication No 188/84, *Portorreal v Dominican Republic*' (5 November 1987) UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/43/40) at 207; UN HRC 'Communication No 775/97, *Brown v Jamaica*' (23 March 1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997; UN HRC 'Communication No. 74/1980, *Angel Estrella v Uruguay*' UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 114 (1982); *Denmark, Norway and Sweden v Greece* (ECommHR App 4448/70) (1970) 13 YECCommHR 108; *Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece* (ECommHR App 3321-3323/67 and 3344/67) (1968) 11 YECCommHR 690; *Cyprus v Turkey* (ECommHR App 8007/77) (1979) 13 DR 85.

e. Krnojelac

In Krnojelac, the Court had, for yet another time, to deal with the question of the purposes for which the infliction of pain or suffering has to be inflicted to amount to torture. Here, the respective Trial Chamber does not follow the chambers in *Furundžija* and *Kvočka*. In contrast, it explicitly dismisses the argumentation followed in those two cases regarding humiliation as a potential purpose for torture. The Chamber invoked the principle of legality in order to argue that the purpose to humiliate the victim

'is not expressly mentioned in any of the principal international instruments prohibiting torture. Nor is there a clear jurisprudential disposition towards its recognition as an illegitimate purpose. There may be a tendency, particularly in the field of human rights, towards the enlargement of the list of prohibited purposes, but the Trial Chamber must apply customary international humanitarian law as it finds it to have been *at the time when the crimes charged were alleged to have been committed*. In light of the principle of legality, the proposition that "the primary purpose of humanitarian law is to safeguard human dignity" is not sufficient to permit the court to introduce, as part of the *mens rea*, a new and additional prohibited purpose, which would in effect enlarge the scope of the criminal prohibition against torture beyond what it was at the time relevant to the indictment under consideration'.²⁷⁴

The Trial Chamber does not, however, discuss or mention that the list in Art. 1 CAT and in other instruments is merely meant to be indicative and is not an exclusive catalogue.

f. Kunarac and others

The most sophisticated approach of an international criminal tribunal regarding the interrelation of the prohibition of torture under the international human rights regime and under international criminal law can be found in yet another case before the ICTY, the *Kunarac* judgement.²⁷⁵ The arguments put forward by the court in order to carve out the similarities and

274 *Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment)* IT-97-25 (15 March 2002) para. 186.

275 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 465–97; for the Trial Chamber's findings on torture see also Fausto Pocar 'International Criminal Tribunals and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law

systemic differences between human rights and international criminal law have been examined (and partially refuted) in Part One Chapter Three I. 2.

The Trial Chamber, after reaffirming the similarities of international criminal law and international human rights law in terms of goals, values and terminology, the Trial Chamber goes on to disentangle the two subjects and to look at their dogmatic differences. Even though the arguments brought forward can partially be refuted, the caution called for by the court because of the different dogmatic roots and considerations underlying the two areas of law is important. To what degree these dogmatic differences play out in practice has to be determined on a case-to-case-basis. This is necessary because, as examined above, human rights in themselves are such a heterogeneous conglomerate and the violations of specific rights is punishable by means of criminal law to very differing degrees. This is why the Court in *Kunarac*, after outlining the differences of the two subject, and concluding that international human rights law can only be transposed to international criminal law when taking into account the peculiarities which are inherent in this specific area of law²⁷⁶ carefully examines each element of a potential definition of torture in light of the jurisdiction of the court as a violation of the laws and customs of war as well as a crime against humanity.

The Trial Chamber in *Kunarac* then turned to examine the specific extra-conventional effect of the definition in Article 1 CAT. It noted that the specific limitation in Art. 1 and the statement in Art. 2 (1) according to which this article is ‘without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application’—thereby entitling individuals to a broader protection then enshrined in the CAT in the case broader definitions in other international conventions or national laws are applicable to the benefit of an individual—have to be kept in mind when applying the CAT definition in the context of international criminal law.

Subsequently, the Court consulted the relevant instruments in the context which, apart from the ones already mentioned above, also include provisions which prohibit torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, but do themselves not provide a definition. These instruments are Art. 5 Uni-

against Civilians and Prisoners of War’ in Manoj Kumar Sinha (ed) *International Criminal Law and Human Rights* (Manak Delhi 2010) 1-26, 9-11.

276 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 471.

versal Declaration of Human Rights²⁷⁷, Art. 3 ECHR, as well as Art. 7 IC-CPR. The ICTY looks at the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the ECommHR and the HRC to find out how torture is defined in the European human rights context. As explained above, however²⁷⁸, the definitions used by the ECtHR and the Commission differ significantly.

What the court does is that it looks at both the ECtHR and the Commission's understandings of the concept of torture cumulatively and extracts the basic preconditions for torture that they both use.²⁷⁹ This can, however, not be correct as the understanding of torture by the ECommHR and the ECtHR do not complement each other. Both institutions used definitions of torture which can lead them to draw different conclusions as to whether or not a specific action amounts to torture, like in the *Northern Ireland Case*, in which the techniques in question were qualified as torture by the ECommHR,²⁸⁰ but as inhuman and degrading treatment by the ECtHR.²⁸¹

The intention of the CAT drafters is more coherent with the approach taken by the Commission than with the one taken by the ECtHR. The decisive criteria for torture (distinguishing it from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment) 'is not the intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted but the purpose of the conduct, the intention of the perpetrator and the powerlessness of the victim.'²⁸²

277 UNGA Res 217 A (III) 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (10 December 1948) GAOR 3rd Session Part I Resolutions 71.

278 See under Part Two Chapter One I 1. b above.

279 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 478.

280 *Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECommHR App 5310/71) (1976) Series B No 23-I, 410; However, even if the Commission in its reasoning points to the 'systematic application of the techniques for the purpose of inducing a person to give information' its main point of argumentation lays in the combined application of the five techniques 'which prevent the use of the senses' and which 'directly affects the personality physically and mentally. The will to resist or to give in cannot, under such conditions, be formed with any degree of independence' (*Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECommHR App 5310/71) (1976) Series B No 23-I, 410). The Commission concludes that [a]lthough the five techniques —also called 'disorientation' or 'sensory deprivation techniques'—might not necessarily cause any severe after-effects the Commission sees in them a modern system of torture falling into the same category as those systems which have been applied in previous times as a means of obtaining information and confessions' (ibid).

281 *Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECtHR) Series A No 25 para. 168.

282 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur *The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary* (OUP Oxford 2008) 558; see also UN Committee against

The *Kunarac* Chamber compares the different definitions and their interpretation by the various courts and treaty bodies and concludes that the definition of the CAT does not reflect customary international law. It aims at an inter-State level, means to be applied to the responsibilities of States and does, furthermore, not prevent other, broader definitions in regional or national human rights instruments, which provide individuals with a more thorough protection.²⁸³ This is a valid conclusion. Apart from the arguable differences in the role of the State that the trial chamber identified, there seems to be not sufficient quantity of State practice and *opinio iuris* to conclude that the CAT definition of torture has prevailed to a degree that it is to be considered part of customary international law. The trial chamber would have nevertheless benefitted from a more thorough examination of the contradictions within regional human rights regimes as the analysis of the differing approaches taken by the ECommHR and the ECtHR show.

The trial chamber concludes that even though its definition does not constitute customary international law, the CAT can nonetheless be used by international criminal courts and tribunals as guidance and ‘interpretational aid’. It goes on to examine which parts of the CAT definition of torture can indeed be seen as customary international law ‘from the specific viewpoint of international criminal law relating to armed conflicts’.²⁸⁴ In this, it delves into analysis deeper than many other Chambers that rather use references to ‘inspiration’ or ‘interpretational aid’ as an excuse to pick and choose. The Trial Chamber identifies in that way three elements which are non-contentious and have become part of customary international law, namely the intentional (a) infliction of severe mental or physi-

Torture Special Rapporteur M Nowak ‘Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention: Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture (23 December 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/6.

283 *Kunarac* para. 482; the findings of the *Kunarac* Chamber in this respect were upheld on appeal and have been used as elements of crimes of some sorts by many other ICTY Chambers which cited them as the requirements of torture as a crime against humanity before the ICTY; see *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Appeal Judgment)* IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002 paras 142-148; see also eg *Prosecutor v Haradinaj (Judgment)* IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008) para. 127; *Prosecutor v Mićo Stanišić (Judgment)* IT-08-91-T (27 March 2013) para 47.

284 *Kunarac*, para. 488; see also *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 162.

cal suffering (b) for a specific purpose (c).²⁸⁵ Three other elements were, according to the Trial Chamber, still controversial. Those were the list of purposes with which the pain and suffering must be inflicted in order to come under the realm of torture; the question whether or not the act in question has to be committed in relation to an armed conflict; and finally whether the act has to be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.²⁸⁶ The Trial Chamber affirmed that the purposes listed in the CAT have become part of customary law, but left open whether any other purposes have been recognized as such, thereby not following the jurisprudence of the Chamber in *Furundžija*, which had assumed humiliation of the victim to be one of the possible purposes for the conduction of torture.²⁸⁷ Though all crimes over which the ICTY has jurisdiction have to have a nexus to an armed conflict, the court held that crimes against humanity under the ICTY Statute require a lesser degree of connection to the armed conflict than war crimes whose commission have to be 'closely related' to the hostilities.²⁸⁸

Regarding the third, the 'public official element', the trial chamber sees this as a result of the nature of the CAT as a human rights convention and the resulting direction of States as obligated parties or respondents.²⁸⁹ For the purposes of the ICTY, however, 'the involvement of the State does not modify or limit the guilt of the responsibility of the individual who carried out the crimes in question'.²⁹⁰ The Chamber outlines the difference between provisions which trigger State responsibility and provisions which provide for individual criminal responsibility, claiming that 'human rights norms are almost exclusively of the first sort.' On that basis, the Trial Chamber holds the presence of a State official or other authority is not necessary for the act to be regarded as torture under international humanitarian law, or for the personal culpability of the perpetrator.

285 *Kunarac* para. 483.

286 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para 484.

287 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 162.

288 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 487.

289 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 488-96.

290 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para 493.

However, human rights provisions dealing with torture do also oblige the State to sanction acts of torture.²⁹¹ This puts them in contrast to many other human rights which are mostly formulated as rights the individual has against the State rather than prohibitions whose violation results in criminal liability. Pursuant to Art. 4 (1) CAT, for example,

‘[e]ach State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law’. Furthermore, State Parties are obliged to make torture, as well as the attempt to commit torture and the complicity in torture, punishable by ‘appropriate penalties’.²⁹²

The Committee against Torture even goes as far as, in its contemporary jurisprudence, granting victims of torture a subjective right to have perpetrators of torture punished by appropriate penalties.²⁹³ These considerations make the Trial Chambers’ conclusion regarding the difference in nature of international human rights and international criminal law less convincing. Instead of concentrating on the perceived difference of the provisions prohibiting torture in human rights and international criminal law, the Trial Chamber could have easily found support for its position that torture does not necessarily require the involvement of a State official. The ICCPR, for

291 See explicitly on the CAT *Questions on the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal)* [2012] ICJ Rep 422 CAT para 95: ‘prosecution is an international obligation under the Convention, the violation of which is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility of the State’.

292 Art. 4 (2) CAT.

293 UN Committee against Torture ‘Decision 212/2002, *Guridi v Spain*’ (24 May 2005) UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/212/2002 para 6.7: ‘With regard to the alleged violation of article 4, the Committee recalls its previous jurisprudence to the effect that one of the purposes of the Convention is to avoid allowing persons who have committed acts of torture to escape unpunished. The Committee also recalls that article 4 sets out a duty for States parties to impose appropriate penalties against those held responsible for committing acts of torture, taking into account the grave nature of those acts. The Committee considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, the imposition of lighter penalties and the granting of pardons to the civil guards are incompatible with the duty to impose appropriate punishment. The Committee further notes that the civil guards were not subject to disciplinary proceedings while criminal proceedings were in progress, though the seriousness of the charges against them merited a disciplinary investigation. Consequently, the Committee considers that there has been a violation of article 4, paragraph 2, of the Convention.’ With the same reasoning, a violation of Art. 4 (1) CAT would trigger a subjective right to a victim of torture under the CAT; see Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur *The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary* (OUP Oxford 2008) 250–52.

example, does not contain any State official requirement. The HRC stated in its General Comment No. 20:

'It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity.'²⁹⁴

The CAT, by including the term 'other person acting in an official capacity' does also not restrict torture per definition to State officials. The phrasing opens the definition up to de facto authorities like rebel, guerrilla and insurgent groups.²⁹⁵

Hence the court in *Kunarac* contradicted the chamber in *Delalić* leading to the paradoxical result that within one and the same tribunal, torture as a crime under international law is punishable pursuant to different requirements: according to one Chamber, the perpetrator has to be a State official or acting with the consent or acquiescence of one, for another chamber, this requirement is not part of the definition of torture under international criminal law.

Nevertheless, the *Kunarac* approach is more convincing than the trial chamber's approach in *Delalic*. *Delalic* uses the ECtHR/ECommHR jurisprudence not for the definition of torture itself, but in order to fill the gap which the definition that the court deems to constitute customary international law, leaves open. *Kunarac*, on the other hand, uses other jurisprudence already on the level of the definition itself, in order to find out whether the CAT definition constitutes customary international law.

The *Kunarac* approach is methodologically more convincing as it examines the definitions used in other jurisdictions already in order to determine if the CAT definition is customary law. This makes sense, as the definitions of other instruments and the jurisprudence based on these can point to the existence (or the absence) of State practice and *opinio iuris*. In contrast it is not convincing to first claim that a certain definition is part of customary international law and to then subsequently use the jurisprudence of completely different bodies governed by a distinct treaty, in order to fill the holes that this definition leaves.

294 UN HRC 'General Comment No 20: Replaces General Comment 7 concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)' (3 April 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 40, 193 para. 2.

295 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur *The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary* (OUP Oxford 2008) 78–79.

Nevertheless, it is evidentially worrisome that the lack of a common dogmatic approach and a streamlined interpretation of the specific elements of the crimes over which the ICTY has jurisdiction lead to such an unequal application of the law.

g. Brđanin

In the aftermath of the *Kunarac* judgment, *Brđanin* employed the progressive nature of customary international law as an argument.²⁹⁶ Having been convicted of the aiding and abetting of torture, *Brđanin*'s defense council argued on appeal that the definition of torture under customary international law had changed since the *Kunarac* and *Furundžija* judgments and the threshold of pain to qualify as torture now had to be significantly higher. In defense of his arguments, he cited the so-called Bybee Memorandum of the Bush Administration according to which '[p]hysical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death'.²⁹⁷ This is an interesting invoking of instant custom by way of reference to legal memoranda of a single State. In its own argumentation, the Appeals Chamber emphasized the consistent reliance of the ICTY on the definition of the torture convention and rejected the notion that a change in custom can be the automatic consequence of the State practice of only one State 'no matter how powerful or influential'.²⁹⁸ It also dismissed the argument by reference to the drafting history of the CAT that showed that the drafters of the CAT sought to distinguish 'severe pain and suffering' from 'extreme pain and suffering' which requires a higher threshold and argues that ECtHR and other institutions, have endorsed the definition of the CAT. Whereas these are convincing arguments from a human rights point of view, the Appeal Chamber does not explain why the same arguments should be valid in the context of international criminal

296 *Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeal Judgment)* ICTY-99-36-A (3 April 2007) paras 244-252.

297 US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel 'Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President Re: Standard of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A' (1 August 2002) <https://www.aclu.org> (31 October 2017) 1.

298 *Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeal Judgment)* ICTY-99-36-A (3 April 2007) para. 247.

law and the fact that a definition has been repeatedly employed by authorities in international human rights law should have automatic effect on the development of a crime under international criminal law. Here, it would have been more convincing if the court left it at referring to the limited number of parties which endorsed that definition and not mixed human rights law and international criminal law at random and in a dogmatically unsound manner.

2. The Definition of 'Other Inhumane Acts'

Pursuant to Art 5 (i) ICTY Statute and Art 3 (i) ICTR Statute, 'other inhuman acts' are punishable as crimes against humanity. Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute contains a qualifying clause describing as punishable '[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health'. The blueprint for this kind of vague catchall provision can be traced back to the Nuremberg Charter, which listed 'murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before and during the war' under crimes against humanity.²⁹⁹

Determining the exact content of 'inhumane acts' can be more laborious than the definition of many other crimes under international law as the term is particularly vague and the definition of the adjective 'inhumane' involves a value judgment to a greater degree than it may be the case in many other crimes.

299 The Nuremberg Charter further mentioned persecution of on racial, political or religious grounds as a crime against humanity, albeit only in execution of or connection to any other crime under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; Charter of the [Nuremberg] International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 284; Inhumane acts were also listed in Art. 2 (1) (c) Control Council Law No10 ('Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity' [done 20 December 1945] [1946] 3 Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany 50), Art. 5 (c) Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East [19 January 1946] 4 Bevans 20) and Principle VI (c) Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal UNILC 'Report on Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal' (29 July 1950) GAOR 5th session Supp 12, 11 (Nuremberg Principles); see further Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 230.

The qualification contained in Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute as well as the Elements of Crime of ‘other inhumane acts’ clarify that the inhumane acts have to be of a similar character to the other crimes against humanity listed, meaning they must reach a similar degree of seriousness. This is the result of a line of jurisprudence that already started with *Tadić* which stated that ‘other inhumane acts’, must consist of acts inflicted upon a human being and must be of a serious nature.’³⁰⁰ The *Tadić* Chamber also cited the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which contains a similar reference to the required gravity of the acts, as well as a second requirement, namely the that acts ‘the act must in fact cause injury to a human being in terms of physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity.’³⁰¹

In the *Kupreskić* judgment, the Court delved deeper into defining what sort of acts were to be considered inhuman. In doing so, it takes recourse to human rights law. The Court examines the UDHR as well as the two covenants and concludes that there is a set of acts which are prohibited in these instruments which can be characterised as inhumane acts and prosecuted as crimes against humanity in the case the chapeau requirements are fulfilled.³⁰² Examples that the Court mentions are ‘serious forms of cruel or degrading treatment of persons belonging to a particular ethnic, religious, political or racial group, or serious widespread or systematic manifestations of cruel or humiliating or degrading treatment with a discriminatory or persecutory intent’ or forcible transfer of civilians.³⁰³ There are several problems with this approach: first, the Court does not clarify what the category of inhumane treatments adds in the case, for example, of degrading of persons belonging to a specific ethnic group with persecutorial intent. Why are those acts not simply prosecuted as persecution? Second,

300 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para 728; see also Stakić, in which counts of inhumane acts as crimes against humanity were dismissed as the chamber was not convinced that the acts in question had reached the necessary gravity: *Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment)* IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) para 723.

301 UN ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (1996) GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9, 103; *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para 729.

302 *Prosecutor v Kupreskić (Trial Chamber Judgment)* IT-95-16 (14 January 2000) para 566.

303 *Prosecutor v Kupreskić (Trial Chamber Judgment)* IT-95-16 (14 January 2000) para 566.

when seeking to define what inhumane acts in fact are, the court applies formulas, like 'cruel and degrading treatment' which are just as vague and in need of interpretation as 'inhumane acts' is. The Court ignores there that there is an elaborate discourse, at the ICTY and beyond, on how to fill, for example 'cruel and degrading treatment' with meaning and narrow it down to specific acts. Third, the court mentions the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, but then, when enlisting the acts which, in its opinion, constitute other inhumane acts, takes as examples the ICCPR, the CAT, the ECHR and the IACHR or from rules of humanitarian law. It also makes no mention why the prohibitions enshrined in these instruments should be applicable at all to the ICTY. As such, it gives the impression that the Court merely uses these instruments as buzzwords rather than engaging with them on a dogmatic level in order to deduce the meaning of the term 'inhumane treatment'. Lastly and intertwined with the earlier remark, the court uses no dogmatically coherent methodology to fill the term 'inhumane acts' with meaning. The Court states that cruel and degrading treatment is prohibited by certain instruments and that a certain act constitutes cruel and degrading treatment, albeit without referencing back to any of the instruments mentioned. As such, the Court pays lip service to human rights law and basically uses it as a backup for its preconceived notion that a certain action, which ought to be punishable fits under vague formula by substituting it with a different vague formula. As with torture, in the case of inhumane acts, human rights law is referenced in an incoherent way which fails to take into account the need for justification as to why it is applicable in the first place.

II. Where Could the Prohibition of Torture Have Been Referred to?

When it comes to torture, the problem lies in how it was referenced and the incoherence in the determination of customary international law. This lack of a coherent, common dogmatic approach can lead to practical inequality in the application of the law as seen in the cases of *Delalić* and *Kunarac*, where the respective chambers came to different conclusions regarding the State official requirement in the definition of torture.³⁰⁴ Un-

304 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 473 and *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 488–96; see Part Two Chapter One 1 b. and f. above.

derlying the prohibition of torture is the CAT, a high-profile, ‘robust’ and widely ratified convention.³⁰⁵ The prohibition torture is a part of *ius cogens*, and as such, emanates authority like not many other concepts in international human rights, which are, at times, dominated by vague terms, soft law or reluctant ratification practice. Furthermore, the system of the prohibition of torture in itself is coherent, particularly compared to other areas of human rights law. Where is the Link?

1. State Obligations Regarding the Prohibition of Torture under Human Rights Law

a) CAT

The CAT is the primary international instrument prohibiting torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It was adopted in 1984 and contains the most often quoted and referred to definition of torture. According to Art. 1 (1) CAT

‘[f]or the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions’.

Apart from providing for a comprehensive definition, from an international criminal law perspective, the CAT provides a number of relevant provisions. Arts 5–7 provides for universal jurisdiction in cases of torture.³⁰⁶

305 The CAT has 162 parties as of November 2017.

306 This means that the value protected by the CAT was seen by its drafters as so important that no connection in terms of territory, offer or victim is needed in order to prosecute the violation of said value. This places a double obligation on the States bound by the CAT: they have to make the violation of the prohibition of torture a crime enforceable in their national courts and effectively prosecute offenders when they have the possibility to do so; see further eg Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences Through National

Art. 5 (2) incorporates the principle of *aut dedere aut iudicare* into the CAT framework. Additionally, Art. 17 CAT establishes, its treaty body, the Committee against Torture, which receives and reviews individual communications as well as State reports. Its definition of torture in Article 1 is a standard-setting tool for interpreting other instruments that do not contain a definition and, as demonstrated above,³⁰⁷ it is frequently consulted to determine the customary definition of torture.³⁰⁸

The General Comments of Committee against Torture are not particularly helpful for international courts and Tribunals. Apart from the fact that it has only issued three general comments between 1998 and 2017, these deal with issues that do not concern international criminal law, like *non-refoulement* and the right to redress and rehabilitation for victims. Only General Comment No 1 on the implementation of Article 2 CAT, which sets out the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture could have been useful, albeit it was only published in 2008, when much of the problems surrounding the definition and the character of the prohibition of torture were already solved by the tribunals, at least to a degree that they simply relied on each other's previous decisions.³⁰⁹

b) Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration prohibits torture under Art. 5, albeit without defining what torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is. Interestingly, the Universal Declaration does not assume that torture, at the same time, always constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as it mentions the two in the alternative.

Courts' in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory *War Crimes in International Law* (Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1996) 233-249, 235-36.

307 See Part Two Chapter One I above.

308 Sandesh Sivakumaran 'Torture in International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: The Actor and the *Ad hoc* Tribunals' (2005) 18 *Leiden Journal of International Law* 541-556, 543.

309 UN Committee against Torture 'General Comment No 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties' (24 January 2008) UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2.

c) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The prohibition of torture is enshrined in Art. 7 ICCPR. It reads as follows:

[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.

As such, Article 7 ICCPR does not contain its own definition of what torture is. It has, however, been clarified by the ICCPR's treaty body, the HRC, that torture requires an act that intentionally inflicts severe physical or mental pain or suffering to fulfill a certain purpose, such as extortion of information or confessions, as punishment, intimidation or discrimination of a person.³¹⁰ If any of the elements are missing, the action can still be characterized as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.³¹¹ Unlike under the CAT, torture under the ICCPR can also be inflicted on a horizontal level.³¹² According to Art. 4 (2) ICCPR, no derogation from this provision is possible during a state of emergency. In its General Comment No 20, the HRC stated that prolonged solitary confinement can amount to a violation of Art. 7 ICCPR.³¹³ It has also held that longer periods of *incommunicado* detention amount to cruel and inhuman treatment; more than three years of *incommunicado* detention can be classified as torture.³¹⁴ As a universal

310 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N P Engel Kehl 2005); see also Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary (OUP Oxford 2008) 39-41.

311 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N P Engel Kehl 2005), 161, 163.

312 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 161.

313 UN HRC 'General Comment No 20: Replaces General Comment 7 concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)' (3 April 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 40, 193 para. 6; see also UN HRC Communication 'No 577/1994 *Polaty Campos v Peru*' (6 November 1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 para 9.

314 See eg UN HRC 'Communication No 1780/2008, *Aouabdia v. Algeria*' (22 March 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/101/D/1780/2008; UN HRC 'Communication No 1640/2007, *El Abani v The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*' (26 July 2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/99/D/1640/2007; UN HRC 'Communication No 1588/2007, *Benaziza v. Algeria*' (26 July 2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/99/D/1588/2007; UN HRC 'Communication No 1295/2004, *El Awani v. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, (11 July 2007)

and not merely a regional instrument, referring to the ICCPR and, in particular, the sophisticated 'jurisprudence' of its HRC can be immensely useful for the ICC in order to raise the legal weight of the judgment and the credibility of the court as a global and not merely a 'Western' or European institution.

d) Other Instruments Prohibiting Torture

The ECHR prohibits torture pursuant to Article 3. It states '[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'. Article 15 (2) ECHR, at the same time, emphasizes the importance of the prohibition of torture by proclaiming it one of the absolute, non-derogable rights. The Inter-American Convention follows the pattern of the ICCPR and the ECHR by providing for the prohibition of torture in Article 5 (2) (without defining acts of torture) while, in Art 27 (2) IACHR declaring that a derogation from the prohibition is not possible. Article 5 ACHPR combines the prohibition of torture with the prohibition of slavery and puts these two in systemic relation with the dignity of person. Article 5 ACHPR reads '[e]very individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.' Other regional thematic convention solely dedicated to the prohibition of torture are the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment³¹⁵ and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, which contains a substantially similar definition of torture.³¹⁶ The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment focuses on the prevention of torture by establishing a European Commission for the Prevention which, similar to the UN

CCPR/C/90/D/1295/2004, para. 6.5; communication No. 1422/2005; UN HRC 'Communication No. 458/1991, *Womah Mukong v Cameroon*' (21 July 1994) UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para. 9.4.

315 COE 'European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment' (done 26 November 1987, entered into force 1 February 1989) 1561 UNTS 363.

316 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (done 9 December 1985, entered into force 28 February 1987) (1986) 25 ILM 519.

Committee against Torture, also monitors the treatment of incarcerated persons. In contrast, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture goes further than that and again affirms the status of the prohibition of torture as an absolute prohibition under the penalty of law.

Hence, it is obvious that there are a number of instruments of international human rights law international Courts and Tribunals can draw from when adjudicating torture

2. The Prohibition of Torture under International Criminal Law

Acts of torture can be subsumed under different crimes under international law, and can constitute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. All crimes will be discussed as laid out in the Rome Statute as the prime instrument governing the permanent ICC of the future. In case of differing definitions in any of the *ad hoc* or the hybrid courts, these differences will be pointed out.

a) Genocide

(1) Causing serious bodily or mental harm (Art. 6 (b) Rome Statute)

Under the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, which has been taken on by the statutes of the *ad hoc* tribunals as well as the Rome Statute, and are reflective of customary international law,³¹⁷ there are several modalities under which actions constituting torture under human rights law can also be prosecuted as genocide. Art. 6 (b) Rome Statute (Art. II (b) Genocide Convention) states that genocide can be committed by ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’ as long as the *mens rea*, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, is given. The wording ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ reminds of Art. 1 (1) CAT which refers to ‘severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental’. Footnote 3 to the respective element in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes (Element 1 of Art. 6 (b) Rome

317 *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits)* ([2007] ICJ Rep 43 para. 161.

Statute) expressively states 'this conduct [the perpetrator caused serious bodily or mental harm to one or more persons] may include, but is not restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment'.³¹⁸

The only difference in the two definitions is 'serious harm.' It could, interpreted literally, refer to a permanent damage in comparison to 'pain or suffering'. However, two arguments can be brought forward against such an assumption. First, the ICTR has clarified in its jurisprudence that '[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group does not necessarily mean that the harm is permanent and irremediable'.³¹⁹ And second the definition of the word 'harm' in the English language merely refers to '[e]vil (physical or otherwise) as done to or suffered by some person or thing; hurt, injury, damage, mischief'.³²⁰ Genocidal intent, hence the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group' is not a purpose of torture *per se*. However, the intent to destroy a group requires a discriminatory intent, which is prohibited under Art. 1 (1) CAT. Furthermore, the prohibited intent does not have to be the only purpose for which the severe pain or suffering is inflicted. The perpetrator can have other motivations apart from the ones listed in the CAT. Hence torture inflicted with genocidal intent constitutes genocide.³²¹ The relation between genocide by inflicting serious bodily or mental harm and torture is also underlined in the first report on torture by the UN Special Rapporteur.³²² The same is true for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which is committed fulfilling the *mens rea* of genocide. As cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment can be defined as

318 Elements of Crimes (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B), footnote 3.

319 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998), para. 502; see also *Prosecutor v Kayishema and others (Judgment)* ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) para. 108; *Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgment)* ICTR-96-3-T (6 December 1999) para. 51; *Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Judgment)* ICTR-01-64-T (17 June 2004) para. 291.

320 Oxford English Dictionary www.oed.com/view/th/class/83601 (31 October 2017).

321 So eg *Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment)* IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) para. 516; *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits)* ([2007] ICJ Rep 43 paras 291-297; 319).

322 UN Commission on Human Rights 'Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooij-

‘the infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, by or at the instigation of or consent or acquiescence of a public official or another person acting in an official capacity. Such conduct can be both intentional or negligent, with or without a particular purpose’,³²³

For the crime of genocide, universal jurisdiction is recognized, even if not explicitly provided for in the Genocide Convention.³²⁴

- (2) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (Art. 6 (c) Rome Statute)

The prime example for this modality of genocide is deportation.³²⁵ However, there are other actions which fulfil the *actus rea* of ‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’. These might be, for example ‘placing a group of people on a subsistence diet, reducing required medical services’.³²⁶ These are techniques which, according to the ECommHR and the ECtHR can amount to torture, or at least constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, even more so if they are used simultaneously (see e.g. the *Ireland v United Kingdom* cases).³²⁷ Generally, the denial of a person’s basic needs can constitute torture when the required ‘severe’ thresh-

mans, appointed Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1985/33’ (19 February 1986) UN Doc E/CN.4/1986/15.
E/CN.4/1986/15 para. 26.

323 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur *The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary* (OUP Oxford 2008) 558.

324 Universal jurisdiction has also been recognized for crimes against humanity and war crimes, see Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘Prosecution of International Crimes by International and National Criminal Courts: Concurring Jurisdiction’ *Studi di Diritto Internazionale in Onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz* vol 3 (Editoriale scientifica Naples 2004) 2199-2209, 2200.

325 UN ILC ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session’ vol II part II UNYBILC 46.

326 William A Schabas ‘Article 6: Genocide’ in O Triffterer *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 143-157, 153.

327 See also UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs ‘Study on the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile’ (1965) UN Doc E/CN.4/826/Rev. 1. see already in 1965 (even though this interpretation was attributed to the ‘broad’ definition.).

old is reached.³²⁸ The ICJ has also included encirclement, shelling and starvation as examples of ways to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to bring about a group's physical destruction in whole or in part and ruled that these actions constitute genocide when they are accompanied with the necessary genocidal intent.³²⁹

(3) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group (Art. 6 (d) Rome Statute)

This modality of committing genocide covers acts such as '[forced] sterilization, compulsory abortion, segregation of the sexes and obstacles to marriage'.³³⁰

The Special Rapporteur on Torture has repeatedly mentioned sterilization conducted without informed consent and compulsory abortions within his mandate³³¹ and suggested that countries should review their anti-torture legislation in relation to these actions.³³²

328 J Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius *The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (Nijhoff Dordrecht 1988) 118.

329 *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits)* ([2007] ICJ Rep 43 paras 323-328.

330 William A Schabas 'Article 6' in Otto Triffterer *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 1143-157, 53, with reference to the travaux préparatoires of Art. II para. d Genocide Convention.

331 Eg UN Committee against Torture 'Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: China (12 December 2008) UN Doc CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 para. 29.

332 See eg UNGA 'Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' (22 July 2008) UN Doc A/63/175 paras 40-41.

b) Crimes against Humanity

(1) Torture (Art. 7 (1) (f) Rome Statute)

Torture has been recognized as a war crime since the 19th century.³³³ Additionally, it was mentioned at the report of the Commission of the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties as an example of a violation of the ‘laws against humanity’, albeit under the heading ‘violations of the laws and customs of war’.³³⁴ The Allied Control Council Law No 10 explicitly mentioned torture as a crime against humanity.³³⁵ As the prohibition of torture is commonly held to be a part of *ius cogens*,³³⁶ it is also uncontroversial under international criminal law, particularly as a crime against humanity and a war crime. What remains in dispute, as shown above, is rather the definition of the term torture for the purposes of the two crimes.³³⁷

In contrast to the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes, the Rome Statute provides for a definition of torture as a crime against humanity under Art. 7 (2) (e). It reads

“‘torture’ means the intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain of suffering arising from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions’.

This differs in various respects from the definition of torture under human rights law. The most conspicuous difference is that the Rome Statute does not refer to a purpose to be pursued with the infliction of pain and suffering.³³⁸ This is explicitly stated in the Elements of Crimes for torture as a

333 See Part Two Chapter One III. 2 c) below.

334 Commission of the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties ‘Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference’ (March 1919) (1920) 14 AJIL 95–154, 113.

335 Control Council Law No 10 ‘Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity’ (done 20 December 1945) (1946) 3 Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany 50.

336 See, with further references, Malcolm N Shaw *International Law* (6th edition CUP Cambridge 2008) 326.

337 See Part Two Chapter One I. 1.

338 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159–273, 254–5–.

crime against humanity. The respective footnote reads '[i]t is understood that no specific purpose need be proved for this crime'.³³⁹ This could mean an extension of the acts to be qualified as torture. However, the emphasis of no 'specific' purpose being necessary could, in a logical *argumentum e contrario*, also be interpreted in a way that Art. 7 Rome Statute requires some sort of purpose and indeed the footnote is said to have been introduced as such as the result of a political compromise.³⁴⁰ The Elements of Crimes also clarify that the question whether the pain or suffering reached the threshold of 'severe' pain of suffering is to be determined objectively and, hence, does not depend on the value-judgment of the accused. The Elements of Crimes clarify that '[w]ith respect to mental elements associated with elements involving value judgment, such as those using the terms "inhumane" or "severe", it is not necessary that the perpetrator personally completed a particular value judgment, unless otherwise indicated'.³⁴¹ Therefore, 'knowledge', which generally constitutes a necessary part of the mental element required for criminal liability under Art. 30 (1) Rome Statute, is not required when it comes to torture. It is enough that an accuse person intended to inflict severe pain or suffering.³⁴² The waiving of the requirement of knowledge is also a result of the criteria established by the ICTY jurisprudence which has been discussed above, in particular *Kunarac* and *Furundžija*.³⁴³

As such, the Rome Statute stands in explicit contradiction to the way intent was understood by the US Department of Justice during the Bush Administration. In their memorandum of 1 August 2002, Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee and Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo interpret the US reservation to the CAT according to which an act must 'specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suf-

339 Elements of Crimes (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B) Footnote 14.

340 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 255.

341 Elements of Crimes (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B) General Introduction para. 4.

342 See Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall in 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 252.

343 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 483; *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Appeal Judgment)* IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000) para. 111.

fering' in order to commit torture, to mean that the infliction of severe pain 'must be the defendant's precise objective.'³⁴⁴

Furthermore, there is no requirement of the pain of suffering being inflicted by a State official. However, and this is also in contrast to the ICTY jurisprudence which denied the requirement of an involvement of a State official for charges of torture as a war crime, Art. 7 Rome Statute does already include in its chapeau element the requirement that the attack against any civilian population has to be conducted 'in furtherance of a State or organizational policy' (Art. 7 (2) (a) Rome Statute). This provides for a rather high threshold for cases of crimes against humanity in general, and does also apply in cases of torture as a crime against humanity.

The requirement 'upon a person in custody or under the control of the accused' is also not explicitly included in the CAT definition of torture. However, it is clear from both the drafting history of the CAT and the Torture Declaration and the jurisprudence of the human rights treaty bodies, that one of the characterizing elements of torture is the helplessness of the victim and, necessarily, the control that the perpetrator has over the victim. Therefore, this element does not add a new requirement to the definition of torture.

- (2) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity (Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute)

These modalities of crimes against humanity are discussed in detail in Chapter Three below.

- (3) Enforced disappearance of persons (Art. 7 (1) (i) Rome Statute)

Forced disappearance, which had been associated in particular with dictatorial regimes in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, has been addressed as a human rights problem separate from the prohibition of arbi-

344 US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel 'Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President Re: Standard of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A' (1 August 2002) <https://www.aclu.org> (last accessed 1 October 2015) 3.

trary arrest by a number of international instruments and treaty bodies/courts. The UNGA, in 1992, adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance in 1992.³⁴⁵ Two years later, the Organization of American States adopted a regional convention addressing forced disappearance.³⁴⁶ Finally, in 2006, the UNGA adopted the International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance ('Forced Disappearance Convention').³⁴⁷

According to Art. 2 Forced Disappearance Convention, forced disappearance means

'the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law'.

The definition used in the Rome Statute is slightly different, but nevertheless contains all the elements set out in the Forced Disappearance Convention.

Like torture, forced disappearance is hence characterized by the helplessness of the victim and the complete control which the perpetrator exercises over the victim. Particular to cases of forced disappearance is that the State will not even acknowledge its responsibility for the person's arrest or his or her detention. This does naturally increase the risk of ill-treatment during detention, as, at the same time, the risk of the State being held accountable for ill-treatment decreases.

However, not only does forced disappearance and *incommunicado* detention increase the risk of torture, it can amount to torture itself. Already in 1981, the *Institut des droits de l'homme Du Barreau de Paris* issued a draft declaration in which it stated that forced disappearance undermines the 'physical, psychological and moral integrity or security of any per-

345 UNGA Res 47/133 'Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance' (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 207.

346 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (done 9 June 1994, entered into force 28 March 1996) (1994) 33 ILM 1529.

347 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010) GAOR 61st Session Supp 49 vol 1, 408.

son'.³⁴⁸ In 1983, the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances stated in its report that '[t]he very fact of being detained as a disappeared person, isolated from one's family for a long period is certainly a violation of the right to humane conditions of detention and has been represented to the Group as torture'.³⁴⁹ The HRC has mentioned *incommunicado* detention in its General Comment No 20 concerning prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment and urged State Parties to enforce provisions against this sort of detention, to hold detainees only in official places of detention and to keep a register with the place and the person responsible for detention publicly accessible to relatives and friends of a detained person.³⁵⁰ If this is not the case, *incommunicado* detention can be qualified as cruel and inhuman treatment or even even as torture.

The HRC has furthermore held in an individual communication that the applicant 'by being subjected to prolonged incommunicado detention [for more than three years] in an unknown location, is the victim of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment'.³⁵¹ In other cases, the HRC has accepted claims regarding violations of Art. 7 in forced disappearance cases, albeit those claims were not based on forced disappearance alone, but were supported by claims of further ill-treatment during detention.³⁵² The IACtHR

348 *Le Refus de L'oubli: La Politique de Disparition Forcée de Personnes* (Editions Berger-Levrault Paris 1981) 313 (translation by the author.).

349 UN Commission on Human Rights 'Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subject to any Form of Detention or Imprisonment: Question of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances' (21 January 1983) UN Doc E/CN.4/1983/14 para. 131.

350 UN HRC 'General Comment No 20: Replaces General Comment 7 concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)' (3 April 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 40, 193, para. 11; UN Commission on Human Rights 'Torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' Res 2003/32 (2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2003/32 para. 14.

351 UN HRC 'Communication No 440/1990, *El-Megreisi v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya* (23 March 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990 para. 5.4; UN HRC 'Communication No 540/1993, *Laureano Atachahua v Peru*' (26 March 1996) GAOR 51st Session Supp 40, vol 2, 42 para. 8.5.

352 eg UN HRC 'Communication No. 449/1991, *Mojica v Dominican Republic*' (5 July 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991 para. 5.7; UN HRC 'Communication No. 458/1991, *Womah Mukong v Cameroon*' (21 July 1994) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 para. 9.4; UN HRC 'Communication No. 428/1990, *Bozize v Central African Republic*' (7 April 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/

has also considered prolonged isolation and communication to be a violation of Art. 5 IACHR.³⁵³

Additionally, the ECtHR and the ECommHR have found violations of Art 3 ECHR regarding the relatives of 'disappeared' persons in Turkey³⁵⁴ and the HRC has held that the pain and suffering experienced by a disappeared persons' family amounts to a violation of Art. 7 ICCPR.³⁵⁵

- (5) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health (Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute)

The 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind contains a differently framed wording of this catch-all provision, namely 'other inhuman acts which severely damage physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and severe bodily harm'.³⁵⁶ Even though this addition was not included into the Rome Statute, it already shows that actions that fall under Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute can also be actions which are in the proximity of torture.

It will be interesting to see what sorts of actions the ICC will subsume under this provision, as many of the acts which have been held by the *ad hoc* tribunals to constitute 'other inhumane acts', like for example enforced prostitution or other sexual violence, are explicitly listed in the Rome Statute as separate crimes. One of the possible acts which have been held to constitute both torture and inhumane acts already during the Nuremberg Medical Trial are biological, medical and scientific experi-

428/1990 para. 5.2; UN HRC 'Communication No. 950/2000, *Sarma v Sri Lanka*' (6 July 2003) UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 para. 9.5.

353 *Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras (Judgment)* IACtHR Series C No 4 (29 July 1988) para. 156.

354 *Eg Cyprus v Turkey* (ECtHR) Reports 2001-IV 1 para. 157; *Kurt v Turkey* (ECtHR) Reports 1998-III 1152 paras 130–43.

355 UN HRC 'Communication No. 950/2000, *Sarma v Sri Lanka*' UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000, para. 9.5.

356 Art. 18 (k) UN ILC 'Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind' (1996) GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9.

ments.³⁵⁷ In the context of war crimes, biological, medical and scientific experiments are expressly punishable under Art. 8 (2) (a) (II) Rome Statute.

c) War Crimes

Within the context of war crimes, there are several provisions of the Rome Statute which prohibit torture under certain circumstances. As an in-depth analysis of the connections would go beyond the scope of this book, they are listed for the sake of completeness without further explanation.

(1) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions

- Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments (Art. 8 (2) (a) (II) Rome Statute)
- (1.2) Wilfully causing great suffering (Art. 8 (2) (a) (iii) Rome Statute)

(2) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict

- Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or persons (Art. 8 (2) (b) (x) Rome Statute)
- Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment (Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxi) Rome Statute)
- Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions (Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii) Rome Statute)

³⁵⁷ See *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No 10* (US Government Printing Office Washington DC 1952) vol I 16, vol II 182.

- Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions (Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxiii) Rome Statute)
- (3) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions
- Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture (Art. 8 (2) (c) (i) Rome Statute)
 - Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment (Art. 8 (2) (c) (ii) Rome Statute)
- (4) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law
- Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (Art. 8 (2) (e) (vi) Rome Statute)
 - Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or persons (Art. 8 (2) (e) (xi) Rome Statute)

IV. Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, it is clear that the *ad hoc* tribunals needed guidance on how to define torture and that the definition of the CAT was the most obvious place from which to seek said guidance. It is also clear that the tribunals were sympathetic towards the CAT definition and inclined to use it.

The reason for that is, at least partly, the well-established nature of the prohibition of torture in international law. It is a well-known component of national, regional and international protection of the individual. The CAT is a high-profile convention with a high number of ratification. The prohibition torture is a part of *ius cogens*, and as such, it emanates authority and it is easily accessible. It is also mirrored by a prohibition of torture that can be found in many national legal systems.

However, one cannot fully agree with Judge Pocar's statement that 'over multiple judgments and with concerted deliberate effort, the ICTY has contributed significant value to international criminal jurisprudence through honing in on a concrete definition of torture under international humanitarian law'.³⁵⁸ In the case of torture, one can observe frequent use in absence of a coherent methodology for said use. For one, the definitions applied by the different Trial and Appeals Chambers were not always congruent and, at times, were contradictory and mutually exclusive. And second, the dogmatic approaches applied, the extent to which international legal dogma was applied at all, varied so much between the different chambers that the overall record of the tribunals when it comes to a dogmatically convincing definition of torture for the purpose of international criminal and international humanitarian law can be labelled mixed at best.

Chapter Two: Minority Rights Law³⁵⁹

I. What is a Minority in the Context of Crimes under International Law?

The definition of the term 'minority' and the rights attached to minority status are often portrayed to be controversial.³⁶⁰

358 Fausto Pocar 'International Criminal Tribunals and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law against Civilians and Prisoners of War' in Manoj Kumar Sinha (ed) *International Criminal Law and Human Rights* (Manak Delhi 2010) 1-26, 12.

359 Chapter Two of this thesis is partly based and draws from on the author's master thesis entitled 'A Race between Education and Catastrophe? The Role of Minority Issues in the Prevention of Crimes under International Law' (Lund University 2006), available at <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1555279&fileId=1563606> (31 October 2017).

360 For the overview of minority rights in an historic context see Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum *Völkerrecht* Volume 1/2: *Der Staat und andere Völker-*

The definition which is most often used and referred to traces back to a study by Francesco Capotorti, then Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. According to Capotorti, a minority is defined as:

A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members-being nationals of the State-possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.³⁶¹

In recent years, it has, however, been more and more disputed whether members of a minority need to be citizens of the State in which they invoke their rights as members of a minority group, especially because modern globalized societies with influx of migrants might require to grant minority protection also to non-citizens.³⁶² One argument in favour of the expansion of minority definition to so-called ‘new minorities’ is that otherwise it would be much easier for governments to exclude groups by simply denying them citizenship. Historically, and in particular under the League of Nations, the term ‘minority’ has been understood as applying only to citizens.³⁶³ However, HRC stated that Art 27 ICCPR is applicable not only to State citizens, but also to aliens constituting a minority within

rechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung (2nd edition De Gruyter Berlin 2002) 271-3.

- 361 UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capotorti ‘Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities’ (1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1 para 568; see also a detailed critical discussion of the elements of Capotorti’s definition in Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum *Völkerrecht* Volume I/2: *Der Staat und andere Völkerrechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung* (2nd edition De Gruyter Berlin 2002), 276-281.
- 362 Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 647; see also Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘“New Minorities” as a Result of Migration’ in Caterine Brölmann, Rene Lefebvre and Marjoleine Zieck *Peoples and Minorities in International Law* (Nijhoff Dordrecht 1993) 153-166; Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum *Völkerrecht* Volume I/2: *Der Staat und andere Völkerrechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung* (2nd edition De Gruyter Berlin 2002) 278-9.
- 363 Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 645.

the meaning of the Covenant.³⁶⁴ Art 27 itself does not hint at the exclusion of foreigners from its protection, as it only speaks of ‘persons,’ not ‘citizens.’ However, mostly due to political realities, it might not be realistic or sustainable to grant or demand instant minority protection to actual cases of recent arrivals in a country.³⁶⁵

No matter which definition is the most appropriate when it comes to granting individuals minority rights in the strict sense, “[t]he existence of [minority] communities is a question of fact; it is not a question of law.”³⁶⁶ In the context of international criminal law, the protection of a group does not depend on its nationality, but rather on its vulnerability and need for protection. In this sense, even though minority rights law as obvious links to the provisions of international human rights law safeguarding equality and non-discrimination, the instruments of minority protection go beyond that as they have in common the assumption that formal equality and the prohibition of discrimination are not enough to address ethnic or religious differences on a legal level.³⁶⁷ The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter: the Genocide Convention) refers to the destruction of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such, and does not ask for any additional formal requirements. Clearly, it would be an absurdity to distinguish between nationals and non-nationals: the prohibition transcends the category.³⁶⁸ The same must be true for the other crimes under international law examined here, namely crimes against humanity and war crimes.

364 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 15: The Positions of Aliens under the Covenant’ (9 April 1986) GAOR 41st Session Supp 40, 117 para 7; UN HRC ‘General Comment No 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27)’ (8 April 1994) GAOR 49th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 106 para 5.1.

365 Gudmundur Alfredsson ‘Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: Definition of Terms as a Matter of International Law’ in Nazila Ghanea and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds) *Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination, Essays in Honour of Patrick Thornberry* (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 167.

366 *Greco-Bulgarian Communities* (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Series B No 17 22.

367 Stefan Oeter ‘Der Schutz nationaler Minderheiten im Völkerrecht’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) *Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung im nationalen und internationalen Menschenrechtsschutz* (Springer Berlin 2003) 187-214, 197-8.

368 Patrick Thornberry *International Law and the Rights of Minorities* (Clarendon Press Oxford 1991) 8.

II. Where Has Minority Rights Law Been Referred to?

In *Tadić*, the ICTY Trial Chamber discussed the take of the ILC Draft Code on the relationship between ‘the crime of “persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds” and that of “institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population”’.³⁶⁹ It clarifies that ‘[i]t is the violation of the right to equality in some serious fashion that infringes on the enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right that constitutes persecution, although the discrimination must be on one of the listed grounds to constitute persecution under the Statute’.³⁷⁰ This statement in its early-on case could have served as a gateway for minority rights to be incorporated into the tribunals’ analyses. Unfortunately, this has not been the case, and minority rights are scarcely referred to in both the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s decisions.

The *Krstić* Case is one of the rare examples where an *ad hoc* tribunal explicitly refers to instruments available under minority rights law in order to establish the groups protected by the prohibition of genocide. It was the first judgment in which the ICTY held that the events that happened in Srebrenica constituted genocide.³⁷¹ The decision was later upheld on appeal³⁷² and in the *Bosnian Genocide Case* of the ICJ.³⁷³ In order to establish the state of customary international law on genocide at the time of the events in Srebrenica took place, the ICTY refers to the Genocide Convention, the Rome Statute and the ICTR case law, as well as to the Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind³⁷⁴ and the two reports of the Sub-

369 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para 697; UN ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (1996) GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9, 98.

370 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 697.

371 *Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment)* IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) paras 539-599.

372 *Prosecutor v Krstić (Appeal Judgment)* IT-98-33-A (19 April 2004).

373 *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits)* ([2007] ICJ Rep 43 paras 231-376.

374 UN ILC ‘Commentary on the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9, in particular 106-114.

Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the UN Commission on Human Rights.³⁷⁵

First, the trial chamber establishes the *actus rea* of genocide, i.e. murder and serious bodily and mental harm had occurred. Then, the chamber turns to whether the *mens rea* existed in the actors, establishing whether they had the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. In order to define groups protected by the Genocide Convention, the court refers to minority rights law by establishing that the preparatory work conducted on the Convention and the work of the international bodies in relation to the protection of minorities “partially overlap and are on occasion synonymous”.³⁷⁶ The Chamber states that even though the European human rights instruments use the term ‘national minorities’ while universal documents more commonly refer to ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities,’ the two expressions appear to embrace the same goals.³⁷⁷ Furthermore, it establishes that

“[t]he preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a list was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what was recognised, before the second world war, as “national minorities”, rather than to refer to several distinct prototypes of human groups. To attempt to differentiate each of the named groups on the basis of scientifically objective criteria would thus be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.”³⁷⁸

The chamber further holds that Bosnian Muslims are a protected group under the Genocide Convention and that such a group cannot be limited to the Bosnian Muslim population in a specific geographical area.³⁷⁹ However, the court acknowledges that the destruction may target only a part of the geographically limited part of the larger group because the perpetrators

375 UN Commission of Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Nicodème Ruhashyankiko ‘Study on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ (4 July 1978) UN Doc E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/ 416; UN Commission of Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Benjamin Whitaker, ‘Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ (2 July 1985) E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1985/6.

376 *Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment)* IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para. 555.

377 *Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment)* IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para. 555.

378 *Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment)* IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para. 556.

379 *Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment)* IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) paras 559-60.

regard the intended destruction as sufficient to annihilate the group as a distinct entity in the respective geographic area.³⁸⁰

Furthermore, the court points out that genocide, as opposed to persecution as a crime against humanity, does require the intent to physically destroy a group and not merely eradicate its culture and identity as a distinct social entity.³⁸¹ It is however acknowledged by the tribunal that a physical or biological attack on a protected group is often accompanied by simultaneous attacks on cultural or religious property and symbols and the intent to deliberately destroy a minority's identity can therefore serve as evidence for the intent to physically destroy the group.³⁸²

The *Krstić* Judgment is exceptional in several ways: apart from the explicit reference to minority rights law in order to establish protected groups under international criminal law, the court touches on the concept of group identity and the eradication thereof in the context of both persecution and genocide. The notion that the attack of a minority group's identity can serve as evidence of intent to physically eliminate them shows the connection between the neglect of minority rights and the outbreak of violence against minorities. It also demonstrates how much a broad understanding of both concepts can positively affect the development of each of the two branches of international law.

III. Where Could Minority Right Law Have Been Referred to?

Minority rights law, like the international courts and tribunals in the areas of genocide or persecution as a crime against humanity, intensively concern themselves with the individual-group dichotomy.³⁸³ The need for us-

380 *Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment)* IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 590.

381 *Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment)* IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 574-575.

382 *Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment)* IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 580.

383 See for the historic development of this dichotomy: UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capotorti 'Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities' (1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1; Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 652-657; UN HRC 'General Comment No 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27)' (8 April 1994) GAOR 49th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 106; Carsten Stahn 'Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht' (1999) 3 Kritische Justiz 345; for decisions of the

ing minority rights for guidance in interpretation is especially obvious when it comes to the ICTY. From the time of its establishment, the tribunal's assignment was to punish large-scale violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.³⁸⁴ As the first international criminal tribunal since the end of World War II, the ICTY had to face a variety of problems regarding the doctrine of *nullum crimen sine lege*.

1. The Categorization of Groups Falling under the Ambit of Protected Groups Within the Definition of Genocide

In the first judgement of the ICTR, the *Akayesu* judgment, no such reference to minority rights law is made. This is all the more surprising when keeping in mind that genocide was the core crime the ICTR was established to deal with and the first couple of judgments still had to counter the predication that a genocide had not taken place at all.³⁸⁵ For this, the *Akayesu* judgment delves into the colonial history of Rwanda and explains how the categories of Hutu and Tutsi were exploited by the German and Belgian colonial powers and what before were fluid denominations attributed to individuals and referring to lineage and social class became stable categories attributed to groups.³⁸⁶ At the same time, persons also increasingly referred to themselves belonging to a stable group called Tutsi, as a result of the racial and racist considerations introduced by the colonial powers and based on, inter alia, physical appearance that set the taller, 'Tutsi' with fairer, more 'European' features apart from the majority population.³⁸⁷ Here, the court clarified that, according to the *travaux préparatoires* of the Genocide Convention, the convention seeks to protect any stable and per-

Human Rights Committee see eg UN HRC 'Communication No 167/1984, *Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada*' (26 March 1990) GAOR 45th Session Supp 40 vol 2, 1; UN HRC 'Communication No 197/1985, *Kitok v Sweden*' (27 July 1988) GAOR 43rd Session Supp 40, 221; UN HRC 'Communication No 511/1992, *Länsman v Finland*' (26 October 1994) GAOR 50th Session Supp 40 vol 2, 66.

384 United Nations Security Council Resolution 808, Article 1; United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, Article 2 UN Doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993.

385 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 112-129.

386 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 78-84.

387 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) para 83.

manent group.³⁸⁸ However, the court could have gained much from arguing with the help of minority rights law and how ethnic minorities are defined there. As, for example, the term ‘ethnic minority’, introduced by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in the 1950s, does not only encompass what had been known as ‘racial’ minorities but also contained cultural as well as historical elements, the narrative of the coming into existence of the Tutsi as a distinct ethnic group in light of colonial history would have strengthen the argument.³⁸⁹ Furthermore, other criteria such as subjective acceptance of membership or family ties of the person could have been employed as evidence of the Tutsi as an ethnic group in line with international law.³⁹⁰ The same goes for other ICTR judgments whose subjective approach focused on the perpetrators: Tutsi were an ethnic group because the perpetrators believed them to be one.³⁹¹ Even though the ICTR and referring to it, later the ICTY hold that the determination of the protected group has to be done on a case-by-case basis using objecting and subjective criteria, no reference to human rights law is made.³⁹²

388 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 511, 316; see also *Prosecutor v Musema (Judgment)* ICTR-96-13-T (27 January 2000) para. 162; See also *Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgment)* ICTR-96-3-T (6 December 1999) para. 57.

389 Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 649.

390 Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 653; see also *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 170-172 where the court included a large quote of an expert witness on how persons came to view themselves as a Tutsi ethnic group but no mention of international law on this subject is made; see also *Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment)* IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para. 683.

391 *Prosecutor v Kayishema (Judgment)* ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) para 98; see also *Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment)* ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 317; *Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Judgment)* ICTR-98-44A-T (1 December 2003) para 811; see also *Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment)* IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para. 683; in judgments where the affiliation to a group was based on the perception of the perpetrators, no mention was made of minority rights law, see also see also *Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment)* IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para. 683.

392 See *Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment)* ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 317; *Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Judgment)* ICTR-98-44A-T (1 December 2003) para 811; *Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment)* IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 684; *Prosecutor v Blagojević (Judgment)* IT-02-60-A (9 May 2007) para 667.

2. The Definition of Persecution

Whereas tribunals were able to take recourse to prior definitions in the case of torture, in one way or another, no prior definition was available for persecution as a crime against humanity. Even though persecution on political, racial or religious grounds was listed as a crime against humanity in Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter, it was not clearly defined in international criminal law or in the world's major criminal justice systems.³⁹³ It was also not defined in any statute or treaty prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998.³⁹⁴ The respective trial chamber in *Tadić* could therefore not draw guidance from international criminal law instruments when establishing the content of the crime of persecution. It found that the commission of the crime must involve discrimination on racial, religious or political grounds that is intended to infringe an individual's basic or fundamental human rights.³⁹⁵ At least when it comes to discrimination on racial or religious grounds, the prohibition of such forms of discrimination is set out clearly by the international instruments governing the rights of minorities. Furthermore, discrimination on these grounds with the intent to infringe an individual's fundamental human rights is, both generally and specifically in the context of the former Yugoslavia, a violation of the rights of minorities. Generally, the concept of persecution is very similar to that of gross and systematic violations of human rights.³⁹⁶ Additionally, persecution is the link between crimes against humanity and genocide 'in that acts that might begin as persecution of a minority group may lead, in the most extreme manifestation, to a plan for the intentional destruction of the group'.³⁹⁷ As such, at a lowest common denominator, they protect the same groups (even though persecution under the Rome Statute provides a wider range of protection in terms of groups than genocide), so that find-

393 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 694.

394 Machtheld Boot *Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes-Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court* (Intersentia Antwerp 2002) 284-5.

395 *Ibid.* 285 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) paras. 695-697; 712-713.

396 William A Schabas *The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute* (OUP Oxford 2010) 175.

397 William A Schabas *The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute* (OUP Oxford 2010) 175.

ings valid for the protected groups in the crime of genocide could also have served the court with regards to persecution.

However, the Chambers dealing with the definition of persecution as a crime against humanity did not take recourse to any of the instruments or cases dealing with minority rights law. In the *Kupreškić* Case, the Chamber emphasised that in order to define the crime of persecution, it cannot relate to the definition of persecution under human rights or refugee law, as the court deemed this a violation of the principle of legality.³⁹⁸ The Chamber concentrates on the definition of persecution set out in refugee law and concludes that it is based more on the perception and fear of being prosecuted than on factual and legal findings.

Despite this fact, the tribunal does not mention the instruments of minority protection that are closely connected to the concepts of persecution and non-discrimination and that could have been helpful for guidance in this matter.

Neither do other Trial Chamber which was faced with the need to define persecution and the intensity of the denial of rights necessary for an act to fall under the ambit of persecution. In particular, an instrument like the ICCPR, ratified by 169 States, and the products of its treaty body would have had considerable authority.³⁹⁹ In *Kvočka* (and later in *Krnjelac*), the Chambers, when faced with having to decide the threshold of persecution stated 'jointly or severally, the acts alleged in the Amended Indictment must amount to persecution'.⁴⁰⁰ But that did not mean that each discriminatory act alleged must individually be regarded as a violation of international law.⁴⁰¹ While it is certainly true that persecution can be established in cumulating many individual acts that, taken by themselves, do not reach the necessary threshold (as the *Kvočka* Chamber es-

398 *Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Chamber Judgment)* IT-95-16 (14 January 2000) para. 589.

399 Status of ratifications as of November 2017.

400 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) 186; see also *Prosecutor v Krnjelac (Judgment)* IT-97-25 (15 March 2002) para 434; see also Theodor Meron 'Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals' Fourth Marek Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%20documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov08.pdf> (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online) 29.

401 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) 186; see also *Prosecutor v Krnjelac (Judgment)* IT-97-25 (15 March 2002) para 434.

establishes referring to trials dealing with the persecution of European Jews before and during World War II), the Chamber overlooks that many of the acts it examines (e.g. acts of murder, rape, torture, humiliation and physical abuse) are in fact violations of minority rights law and therefore violations of international law.⁴⁰² It is unfortunate that the ICTY, established to contribute to peace and reconciliation in a conflict that centred largely on minority issues, missed the opportunity to show the interdependence between the crime of persecution and the protection of minorities.

3. The Definition of a Stigmatised Group within the Crime of Persecution

The ICTY fails to take recourse to minority rights law when defining a group subjected to persecution. In *Kvočka*, it characterizes genocide as ‘an extreme and most inhuman form of persecution’⁴⁰³ thereby acknowledging the systemic similarities between the two crimes, which, in turn, are closely related to the protection of minorities.⁴⁰⁴ The respective Chambers of the ICTY have repetitively used the criterion of stigmatisation instead. In *Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić*, for example, the Court refers to discriminatory measures directed solely towards the Muslim population like the requirement of *laissez-passers*, the restriction of accounts towards person of Muslim faith, the requirement to hand in weapons, summary arrests, detention, torture and massive transfer of civilians that incorporated a greater policy of ethnic cleansing.⁴⁰⁵

Even though the Court uses terms and principles of minority rights law, it does so without directly referring to the law, its instruments, and the scholarly work and findings. With this, the decisions lose legal weight and the court misses out on an opportunity to make use of an area of law closely interlinked with international criminal law. In *Jesilić*, for example, the court uses the term ‘national, ethnical and racial groups’ to established

402 Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 662-663.

403 *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) 636.

404 This approach has also been cited by the ICJ in *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits)* [2007] ICJ Rep 43 para 188.

405 *Prosecutor v Nikolić (Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence)* ICTY IT-94-2-R61 (20 October 1995) (‘the *Nikolic* Decision’), para. 27.

persecuted groups; however, this does not coincide with the use of the respective minority rights instruments or scholarly works in this area to give more weight to their interpretation.⁴⁰⁶ Although it is obvious that the concepts used by the Court are crucial i.e. the identification by others and the self-identification within the group, these conceptions are also considered in minority rights law and a discussion of these concepts would have increased the authority of the delivered judgment.

IV. Where is the Link?

1. State Obligations regarding the Protection of Minorities from Crimes under International Law

Minorities have always been a particularly vulnerable group and from the conception of the concept on, minority rights have been more closely linked to violent conflict than other categories of human rights.⁴⁰⁷ However, minority rights have been seen by some to be a cause and not a cure for conflict. Particularly, at the time the UDHR was drafted, after World War II, minority rights law was looked upon with scepticism due to the misuse of the concept by Nazi Germany and the fact that various instruments conceived by the League of Nations could not protect them.⁴⁰⁸ Minority rights have been portrayed as divisive, as they categorize groups of people and convey different rights to them according to their ethnic, religious, national or racial background.⁴⁰⁹ Many hoped that the new emphasis on human rights would resolve the problems associated with minority

406 *Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgement)* ICTY-IT-95-10 (14 December 1999) para. 70 et seq.

407 Minority Rights Group International 'Briefing: Why a minority rights approach to conflict? The case of Southern Sudan' (2008) <http://www.academia.edu/3622460/Why_a_minority_rights_approach_to_conflict_The_case_of_Southern_Sudan> (31 October 2017) 2.

408 Lyal S Sunga 'International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities' in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) *Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?* (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 256.

409 Minority Rights Group International 'Briefing: Why a minority rights approach to conflict? The case of Southern Sudan' (2008) <http://www.academia.edu/3622460/Why_a_minority_rights_approach_to_conflict_The_case_of_Southern_Sudan> (31 October 2017) 2.

rights by guaranteeing basic civil and political rights regardless of group membership.⁴¹⁰ The end of the Cold War and the decline of authoritarianism, which led to the outbreak of many previously suppressed internal (ethnic) conflicts made the international community rethink their stance on minority protection.⁴¹¹ Ignoring real grievances along ethnic lines seemed to not be the solution anymore.⁴¹² Hence, several universal and regional instruments for the protection of minorities were adopted in the early nineties that seem to focus on the resolution of intra-state conflict and the maintenance of peace and security.⁴¹³

However, even before that, the international community thought to protect the existence of minorities on several occasions in both universal and regional human rights and international law instruments. This section will focus on the most crucial instruments of under general human right law from which an obligation to protect minorities from crimes under international law can nevertheless be inferred.

Even though international provisions for the protection of minorities could be found long before the evolvement of modern international human rights law⁴¹⁴, the International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of the

410 Will Kymlicka *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory on Minority Rights* (OUP Oxford 1996) 2-3.

411 Helen Quane 'Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications of using Human Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies' (2007) 47 Virginia. Journal of International Law 463-523, 498.

412 Minority Rights Group International 'Briefing: Why a minority rights approach to conflict? The case of Southern Sudan' (2008) <http://www.academia.edu/3622460/Why_a_minority_rights_approach_to_conflict_The_case_of_Southern_Sudan> (31 October 2017) 2.

413 Helen Quane 'Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications of using Human Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies' (2007) 47 Virginia. Journal of International Law 463-523, 498.

414 E.g. in the religious treaties of peace treaties of Augsburg (Abschied des Augsburger Reichstages [Augsburger Friede] [25 September 1555] in K. Zeumer (ed) *Quellensammlung zum Staats-, Verwaltungs- und Völkerrecht* vol 2.1 *Quellensammlung zur Geschichte der Deutschen Reichsverfassung in Mittelalter und Neuzeit* [2nd edn Siebeck Mohr Tübingen 1913] 341) and Westphalia (Treaty of Peace between the Holy Roman Empire and Sweden and the Treaty of Peace between France and the Holy Roman Empire [signed and entered into force 24 October 1648] [1648-49] 1 CTS 198, 319 [these two treaties form the Westphalian Peace Treaty]) and the Peace Treaties following World War I.; System of Minority Protection set up by the League of Nations; Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 480.

UDHR, the ICCPR and the IESCR, only specifically mentions minorities in Article 27 ICCPR.

All major human rights treaties are in their substantive part preceded by general non-discrimination clauses. Art. 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights in so far served as a blueprint for all major international and regional human rights conventions.⁴¹⁵

Art. 2 UDHR reads ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’ The same is repeated, in substance, in Arts. 2 (1) ICCPR, Art. 2 (2) ICESCR, Art. 2 (1) CRC and Art. 2 ACHPR coining the reference to a ‘common Art. 2 of international human rights instruments on the prohibition of discrimination’.⁴¹⁶ The same approach can be found in Art. 1 ACHR and Art. 14 ECHR. Apart from Art. 14 ECHR, none of the provisions deal with the status of a national minority explicitly in the context of non-discrimination. All of them do, however, include a protection against discrimination on a similar basis as the Genocide Convention, namely on the grounds of race, religion, national origin.⁴¹⁷

a) Charter of the United Nations

The Charter of the United Nations (‘UN Charter’) does not deal with minorities explicitly. Amongst the purposes of the UN’s foundation are the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of

415 Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘The Prohibition of Discrimination in International Human Rights Treaties: The Development from an Accessory Norm to an Independent One’ in Dirk Hanschel and Others *Mensch und Recht: Festschrift für Eibe Riedel* (Duncker und Humblot Berlin 2013) 2009-2019, 2012.

416 Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘The Prohibition of Discrimination in International Human Rights Treaties: The Development from an Accessory Norm to an Independent One’ in Dirk Hanschel and Others *Mensch und Recht: Festschrift für Eibe Riedel* (Duncker und Humblot Berlin 2013) 2009-2019, 2012.

417 Though ethnicity is not covered in the range of protection, the reference to ‘race’ partially covers the same groups. A reference to ‘ethnicity’ does, however, include a wider range of groups than the controversial ‘race’ as, on top of biologically or physically recognisable attributes, it also covers cultural and historical elements; see; Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 649.

friendly relations amongst nations and the promotion and protection of human rights.⁴¹⁸ The main governing principles on which the United Nations are based are the principle of State sovereignty (Article 2 (1) UN Charter) and the prohibition of the use of force, stipulated in Article 2 (4) UN Charter. Article 55 UN Charter expresses the aim of promoting “universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” The Member States pledge themselves to take joint and separate actions to achieve the aims set out in Article 55.⁴¹⁹ This is the framework in which minority protection within the United Nations takes place.

Regarding the protection of minorities against crimes which are committed against them outside of a State’s own boundaries, the prohibition of the use of force outlaws the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of other states. Force is only permitted in well-defined exceptions, namely for the purpose of self-defence under Article 51 and when the Security Council decided to take action pursuant to Articles 39 and 42, as acknowledged by the Responsibility to Protect according to which the Security Council is prepared to take collective action, including under Chapter VII UN Charter, to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.⁴²⁰ There has been much discussion and controversy about a third exception, humanitarian intervention, but it cannot be said to have crystallised into an exception to Article 2 (4) under international law.⁴²¹ It has been argued that as a consequence of the Responsibility to Protect, in some extreme cases of mass violence against a population, the international community has an obligation to intervene and

418 Article 1(1), 1(2) and 1(3) Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 16.

419 Article 56 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 16.

420 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005) GAOR 60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 para. 139; see also Anne Peters ‘Article 24’ in Bruno Simma, Daniel Khan and others *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary* (3rd ed OUP Oxford 2012) 761-786, 766-767 see Part Two Chapter Two IV. 1 e) below.

421 See Christine Gray ‘The use of force and the international legal order’ in Malcolm D Evans (ed) *International Law* (3rd ed OUP Oxford 2010) 621-623.

that in these cases, the use of veto power on part of a member of the Security Council should be considered illegal or invalid.⁴²²

Things are much less clear when it comes to the treatment of populations by their own State. Even though the UN Charter sets out some standards in the field of human rights, for example on non-discrimination in Articles 1 and 55 regarding self-determination or in chapters XI-XIII, it does not contain a bill of rights. The initial proposal of several States to include a declaration of rights analogous to national constitutions was dropped under pressure of the major powers and the issue was essentially postponed.⁴²³ For this reason, one has to look further into the instruments adopted under the auspices of the United Nations and within other international and regional organisations to see the extent to which minorities are protected within the state they are living.

b) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Article 27 ICCPR reads:

‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language’.

The formulation ‘persons belonging to such minorities’ emphasises that Article 27 sets out an individual right and not a group right, even though it is the collective enjoyment of the right that is protected.⁴²⁴ Article 27 is the only provision in the ICCPR that is formulated in a negative way, which shows that the first State obligation towards minorities is to refrain

422 Anne Peters ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 EJIL 513-544, 536-540.

423 William A. Schabas *Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for the United Nations* (Minority Rights Group International London 2006) <https://epirints.mdx.ac.uk/7840/1/MRGGenocideReport.pdf> (31 October 2017) 7.

424 UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capotorti ‘Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities’ (1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1, 35; Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N. P. Engel Kehl 2005) 655-657.

from interference and to practice tolerance.⁴²⁵ Particularly prohibited are all measures directed against or threatening the existence of ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities.⁴²⁶ In this respect, General Comment No. 29 of the HRC is of particular importance as it states that:

“...the international protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities includes elements that must be respected in all circumstances. This is reflected in the prohibition of genocide under international law, the inclusion of a non-discrimination clause in Article 4 itself (paragraph 1), as well as in the non-derogable nature of Article 18.”⁴²⁷

However, the obligation set out in Article 27 goes beyond the mere prohibition of discrimination of minorities. Instead, it contains an element of a right to *de facto* equality, to positive protection against discrimination.⁴²⁸ It can require legislative, judicial or administrative- measures to be taken in order to guarantee the rights set out in Article 27, a fact that has been made clear by the HRC in its General Comment No 23.⁴²⁹ This means that State at least have an obligation to prosecute acts that qualify as genocide.⁴³⁰

Another provision that can be invoked in the protection of minorities is Article 20 (2) ICCPR. According to this provision, States have an obligation to protect minorities against national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.

425 Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 657-658.

426 Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 662.

427 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 29: Derogations from Provisions of the Covenant during a State of Emergency (Art. 4)’ (24 July 2001) GAOR 56th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 202..

428 Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 500; critical as to the practical significance of Art. 27 ICCPR and the reluctance of the HRC to interpret Article 27 in a wider and more progressive manner: Stefan Oeter ‘Der Schutz nationaler Minderheiten im Völkerrecht’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) *Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung im nationalen und internationalen Menschenrechtsschutz* (Springer Berlin 2003) 187-214, 196.

429 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 15: The Positions of Aliens under the Covenant’ (9 April 1986) GAOR 41st Session Supp 40, 117 para 6.1.

430 Peter Finell *Accountability under Human Rights Law and International criminal law against Minority Groups Committed by Non-State Actors* (Åbo Akademi Institute for Human Rights, Åbo/Turku May 2002) 20.

In order to preclude genocidal policies to be executed through legally binding court judgements, Article 6 (2) ICCPR stipulates that death sentences must not contravene the Genocide Convention and that in any killing which constitutes genocide, the State Party is not allowed to derogate from its obligations under the Genocide Convention (Article 6 (3)).⁴³¹

c) United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities

On 18 December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UNDM)⁴³², which, although not legally binding, has been regarded as an important step forward in the internationalisation of minority rights.⁴³³ It can be applied to render States politically accountable for how they treat their minorities.⁴³⁴ The Declaration was ‘inspired by’ Article 27 ICCPR.⁴³⁵ It builds up on, specifies and adds to the rights enshrined in the ICCPR and in the other two documents that together make up the International Bill of Human Rights.⁴³⁶ The rights contained are set out as rights of individuals, whereas

431 See also Carsten Stahn ‘Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht’ (1999) 3 Kritische Justiz 343-355 at 346.

432 UNGA Res 47/135 ‘Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 210.

433 Patrick Thornberry, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observations, and an Update’ in Alan Phillips/Allan Rosas (eds) *Universal Minority Rights* (Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights/Minority Rights Group International Turku/Åbo and London 1995) 13-76, 14.

434 Helen Quane ‘Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications of using Human Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies’ (2007) 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 463-523 501.

435 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2 para. 3.

436 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2 para. 4.

duties of the State are in part formulated as duties towards minorities as a group, which means that even though only individuals can claim the rights, the State cannot fully implement them without ensuring adequate conditions for the existence and identity of the group as a whole.⁴³⁷

In terms of minority protection from crimes under international law, the preamble of the UNMD is of particular importance. The preamble sets out the principle goals and purposes that the declaration is meant to achieve and can, in accordance with Article 31 (2) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, be drawn upon to establish the meaning of the operative provisions.⁴³⁸ Preambles have been used in treaty interpretation by the ICJ '(i) in order to elucidate the meaning of clauses the purpose of which otherwise would be doubtful' and '(ii) to indicate the judicial 'climate' in which the operative clause should be read, whether for instance liberally or restrictively, broadly or strictly'.⁴³⁹ In the case of the UNMD, the preamble refers to, amongst other things, the promotion of the principles set out in, *inter alia*, the Genocide Convention.

The preamble also acknowledges that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to a minority contributes to the political and social stability of the countries in which they live.⁴⁴⁰ Furthermore, they acknowledge that strengthening minorities' positions by providing them with the rights set out in the operative articles is a way not merely to improve their individual well-being or that of the group they belong to, but is a way to contribute to the stability of the whole state or region. The

437 UN ECOSOC 'Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities' (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2 para. 14.

438 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331.

439 Gerald G Fitzmaurice 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points' (1951) 28 *British Yearbook of International Law* 28 1-28, at 25; Sir Gerald G Fitzmaurice 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points' (1957) 33 *British Yearbook of International Law* 203-38, at 227; see *Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru) (Judgement)* [1950] ICJ Rep 266, 282; *Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v United States of America)* [1952] ICJ Rep 176, 196.

440 '[...]Considering that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to the political and social stability of States in which they live'.

preamble also emphasises again the close relationship between the prohibition of genocide and the protection of minorities.⁴⁴¹ This relationship is also addressed in the operative part of the Declaration, namely in Article 1(1), which starts: ‘States shall protect the existence ... of minorities’. From this article, a basic right to be protected from genocide is inferred; although the right to existence is not expressly mentioned in the Genocide Convention itself, the key General Assembly resolution on which the Convention is based states that genocide is ‘a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups’.⁴⁴² The Commentary of the working group on minorities to the Declaration explicitly mentions the prohibition of the elimination of minorities within the context of Article 1.⁴⁴³ The Working Group also states that not only the physical destruction of minority group is covered by the requirement of protection in Article 1(1). States must also protect minorities from attempts to deliberately weaken them (e.g. by forced transfer of population).⁴⁴⁴ Additionally, the

Independent Expert on Minorities, created by a Human Rights Commission’s resolution focuses on the link between minorities and conflict as a key element and promotes the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.⁴⁴⁵

441 William A. Schabas *Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for the United Nations* (Minority Rights Group International London 2006) <<https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/7840/1/MRGGenocideReport.pdf>> (31 October 2017) 456.

442 UNGA Res 96 (I) ‘The Crime of Genocide’ (11 December 1946) GAOR 1st Session Part II Resolutions 188; Thornberry in Alan Phillips/Allan Rosas (eds) *Universal Minority Rights* (Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights/Minority Rights Group International Turku/Åbo and London 1995) 40.

443 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2 paras 21 and 24.

444 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2 para. 24.

445 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2005/79 ‘Rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities’ (21 April 2005) E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.14,.

d) Responsibility to Protect

The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is part of the Outcome Document adopted at the United Nations summit in September 2005 by representatives of the United Nations member States, mostly heads of States or governments. It accepts that:

‘[E]ach state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary measures’.⁴⁴⁶

The document also affirms that the international community has the responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means under Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter to protect populations against these crimes and show willingness to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII, if peaceful means are inadequate.⁴⁴⁷ It further acknowledges that the promotion and protection of minority rights contributes to the social and political stability.⁴⁴⁸ The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was later reaffirmed by the Security Council.⁴⁴⁹ In 2009, the UN Secretary-General issued a report reaffirming the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and outlining a three-pillar approach in which the first pillar focuses on the States’ primary responsibility in protecting its own populations, the second pillar deals with international assistance and capacity-building in this area and in the third pillar, timely and decisive action by the international community is described as an obligation in cases States fail to fulfil their protection obligations.⁴⁵⁰

Even though the outcome document does not mention minorities explicitly, acknowledging the responsibility of States to protect their own populations from crimes under international law is a step forward in the protection of minorities. The kinds of scenarios that trigger the responsi-

446 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005) GAOR 60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 para. 138.

447 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005) GAOR 60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 para. 139.

448 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005) GAOR 60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 para. 130.

449 UNSC Res 1674 (2006) (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/Res/1674.

450 UNGA ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report by the Secretary-General’ (19 January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677.

bility to protect are those situations in which minorities are the most likely victims. Worthy of mention in this context is also the appointment of a Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide by the UN Secretary-General based on a Security Council Resolution.⁴⁵¹ The mandate of the Special Advisor does not only refer to genocide but also to mass murders and other large-scale human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing.⁴⁵²

e) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)⁴⁵³ is concerned with discrimination based on affiliation to a specific racial group.

Article 1 ICERD defines racial discrimination as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’. As such, the ICERD emanates from a broad list of criteria which must not be used for unequal treatment and can circumvent a definition of and limitation to the controversial term ‘race.’⁴⁵⁴ In the context of Article 1 ICERD, Minorities are the natural victims of racial discrimination in most States and have been frequently discussed within the General Recommendations issued by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the reporting procedure under the Convention.⁴⁵⁵ The notions of (racial) discrimination and minority protection have

451 UNSC Res 1366 (2001) (30 August 2001) SCOR [1 January 2001–31 July 2002] 283.

452 Asbjørn Eide and Rianne Letschert, ‘Institutional Developments in the United Nations and at the Regional Level’ (2007) 14(2) *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 299–332 at 305.

453 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (opened for signature 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195.

454 Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘Das Verbot der Diskriminierung aufgrund von Rasse, Herkunft, Sprache oder Hautfarbe im Völkerrecht’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds) *Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung im nationalen und internationalen Menschenrechtsschutz* (Springer Berlin 2003) 215–231, 221–2.

455 Patrick Thornberry *International Law and the Rights of Minorities* (Clarendon Press Oxford 1991) 272; see eg. UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘General Recommendation XXVII on Discrimination against Roma’ (16 August 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 18, 154; UN Committee on the

been regarded as twin concepts that both make up the principle of equality.⁴⁵⁶

This is also the approach of the CERD Committee, the ICERD's treaty body which recognized ethnic cleansing as a violation of ICERD and ethnic discrimination as a first step to future ethnic cleansing⁴⁵⁷

f) Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities ('Framework Convention')⁴⁵⁸ was agreed on after the Heads of States and Government of the Council of Europe Member States adopted the Vienna Declaration in 1993. There, they expressed 'awareness that the protection of national minorities is an essential element of stability and democratic security in our continent' and resolved to enter 'into political and legal commitments relating to the protection of national minorities in Europe and to instruct the Committee of Ministers to elaborate appropriate international legal instruments'.⁴⁵⁹ It is the first binding international instrument which focuses only on the protection of national minori-

Elimination of Racial Discrimination 'Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Romania' (2001) UN Doc CERD/C/304/Add.85 paras 10-11, 14-15; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 'Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Azerbaijan' (2005) UN Doc CERD/C/AZE/CO/4 para 14.

456 Warwick A McKean *Equality and Discrimination in International Law* (Clarendon Oxford 1983) p 159.

457 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 'Annual Report' (20 September 1995) GAOR 50th Session Supp 18 para. 219; see also David S Weissbrodt 'The Approach of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to Interpreting and applying International Humanitarian Law' (2010) 19 Minnesota Journal of International Law 327-62, 345.

458 COE 'Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities' (opened for signature 1 February 1995, entered into force 1 February 1998) 2151 UNTS 243.

459 COE 'Vienna Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Council of Europe on the Reform of the Control Mechanism of the ECHR, on National Minorities, and on a Plan of Action against Racism' (9 October 1993) (1993) 14 HRLJ 373-76.

ties.⁴⁶⁰ The Framework Convention aims at addressing ‘unstable minority-majority relations that have a clear potential to destabilize peace and security in Europe’.⁴⁶¹

The preamble of the Framework Convention mentions the protection of the existence of national minorities as one of the aims treaty. It refers to the upheavals in European history, which have shown that the protection of national minorities is essential to the stability, democratic security and peace in Europe. The preamble reflects the concern of the Council of Europe and its Member States about the risk to the existence of national minorities and is inspired by Article 1 (1) United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.⁴⁶²

g) Other Instruments Relevant to the Protection of Minorities from Crimes under International Law

At the international level, further provisions concerning the rights of minorities can be found in Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child⁴⁶³ and Article 5 (c) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention against Discrimination in Education.⁴⁶⁴ Art 7(2) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples explicitly spells out that indigenous peoples ‘shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group’.⁴⁶⁵

460 UN ‘Pamphlet No 8 of the UN Guide for Minorities’ available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinorities8en.pdf> (31 October 2017) 2.

461 Rainer Hofmann ‘The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: An Introduction’ in Marc Weller (ed) *The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* (OUP Oxford 2005) 1-24, 6.

462 Council of Europe ‘Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ (1995) H (95) 10, para. 24.

463 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.

464 Convention against Discrimination in Education (adopted 14 December 1960, entered into force 22 May 1962) 429 UNTS 93.

465 UNGA Res 61/295 ‘United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (13 September 2007) GAOR 61st Session Supp 49 vol 3, 15.

On the regional level, Article 14 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (or European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR) contains a provision regarding minorities.⁴⁶⁶ Protocol 12 ECHR is also of importance to the protection of minorities as it deals with the prohibition of discrimination.⁴⁶⁷ Within the context of the OSCE, the appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities⁴⁶⁸ and the adoption of the Copenhagen Document that emphasises the importance of the protection of national minorities to 'justice, stability and peace in the participating States'⁴⁶⁹ and introduces far-reaching provisions regarding their rights.⁴⁷⁰

The African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) does not mention minorities explicitly, although it contains a prohibition of discrimination.⁴⁷¹ In 1994, the Heads of States and Governments of the African Union's (AU) predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), passed the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations in which they called for the protection of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of minorities.⁴⁷²

The American Convention on Human Rights and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man also lack an explicit mentioning of

466 COE 'Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221.

467 COE 'Protocol No 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' (signed 4 November 2000, entered into force 1 April 2005) CETS No 177.

468 Created at the CSCE Summit on 9-10 July 1992 in Helsinki; CSCE 'Helsinki Summit Document: The Challenges of Change' (10 July 1992) (1992) 31 ILM 1385.

469 CSCE 'Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE' (29 June 1990) (1990) 29 ILM 1305 para. 30.

470 CSCE 'Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE' (29 June 1990) (1990) 29 ILM 1305 para. 30-39; Johannes Binder *The Human Dimension of the OSCE: From Recommendation to Implementation* (Verlag Österreich Vienna 2001) 38.

471 Art. 2 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (Banjul Charter).

472 Article 4 Organization of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government 'Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations' Thirtieth Ordinary Session, Tunis, Tunisia, 13-15 June 1994 available at <<https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/INTAFN.htm>> (31 October 2017).

minorities.⁴⁷³ Nevertheless, they contain several provisions that are of particular importance to minorities, most importantly the principle of non-discrimination and the right to culture as stipulated in Article XIII of the American Declaration.

2. Protection of Minorities under International Criminal Law

The following chapter examines different international crimes according to the minority issue inherent in them. Minorities have always been especially vulnerable to the violation of their rights, from small-scale interference with their rights to culture, religion, language to mass violence against them. The commission of crimes under international law directed against minorities is the ultimate violation of their rights. Even though there is little mention in the texts of international criminal law of 'rights', as the law aims for the condemnation or 'criminalisation' of acts, the context of the criminal prohibition makes it clear that the reason why a particular conduct is regarded as criminal is precisely because it violates a fundamental right.⁴⁷⁴

All the crimes examined in the following are crimes as laid out in the Rome Statute. If necessary, the differences between the crimes as set out by the Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals⁴⁷⁵ and the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR are explained. The examined crimes have been selected because of their special interconnection with minority protection and the violation of minority rights. This does not in any way infer that the crimes examined are the only crimes that minorities are particularly vulnerable to.

a) Genocide (Art. 6 Rome Statute)

'The fact of genocide is as old as humanity. To this day, there has been no society protected by its structure from committing that crime. Every case of

473 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (10 December 1948) (1949) 43 AJIL Supp 133.

474 Patrick Thornberry *International Law and the Rights of Minorities* (Clarendon Press Oxford 1991) 58.

475 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 1946) 4 Bevans 20.

genocide is a product of history and bears the stamp of the society which has given birth to it.⁴⁷⁶

The Genocide Convention can be seen as the first of the post-World War II general conventions which has any bearing on minority protection and is listed by the United Nations secretariat as the one of the international instruments which provide special protective measures for ethnical, religious, or linguistic groups.⁴⁷⁷

The Genocide Convention is based on General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) of 1946, which was adopted in the aftermath of World War II and was clearly influenced by the genocide committed by Germany against national minorities within its own territory and the occupied, allied or annexed territories.⁴⁷⁸

When the Genocide Convention was adopted in 1948, the deliberate intent of its drafters was to derive the scope of criteria from the 'already well-recognized concept in international law then known as "national mi-

476 Jean-Paul Sartre 'On Genocide' in Richard A Falk, Gabriel Kolko and Robert Jay (eds) *Crimes of War* (Random House New York 1971) 534.

477 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277.

478 UNGA Res 96 (I) 'The Crime of Genocide' (11 December 1946) GAOR 1st Session Part II Resolutions 188; see also comment by John Maktos Chairman UN Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide 'Summary Records of the Fifth Meeting' (8 April 1948) UN Doc E/AC.25/SR.5; in the statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, crimes that which would now be labelled genocide were prosecuted under the heading of crimes against humanity. However, in the drafting of the IMT Statute, the term genocide was already discussed and the concept of the term as a violation of the rights of minorities was clearly spelled out. Justice Robert Jackson, at the beginning of the London Conference in 1945, compiled a 'Planning Memorandum' explaining the evidence to be brought before the Tribunal. In this memorandum, Jackson mentioned '[g]enocide or destruction of racial minorities and subjugated populations by such means and methods as (1) underfeeding; (2) sterilization and castration; (3) depriving them of clothing, shelter, fuel, sanitation, medical care; (4) deporting them for forced labour; (5) working them in inhumane conditions' see United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials Robert H Jackson 'Planning Memorandum' (US Government Printing Office Washington 1949) 6; see also HG van der Wilt, J Vervliet and others (eds): *The Genocide Convention: The Legacy of 60 Years* (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2012) 5-6.

norities,”⁴⁷⁹ This interpretation was confirmed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in its *Krstić* judgment where the court said:

National, ethnical racial or religious groups are not clearly defined in the [Genocide] Convention or elsewhere. In contrast, the preparatory work on the Convention and the work conducted by international bodies in relation to the protection of minorities show that the concepts of protected groups and national minorities partly overlap and are on occasion synonymous. (...). The preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a list [of protected groups] was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what were recognized, before the second world war, as ‘national minorities’, rather than to refer to several distinct prototypes of human groups.

The requirement of permanence of a group affiliation which cannot or only with difficulties be changed or challenged by the members of the group themselves, finds its reflection in the term ‘minorities’: even though there is no generally accepted definition of the term, it is generally required that it contains, besides a subjective element and an individual sense of belonging to a group, certain objective criteria which differ from the rest of the population and are usually permanent and stable.⁴⁸⁰

Furthermore, the Genocide Convention and Article 6 of the Rome Statute protect ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious’ groups. Similarly, Article 27 ICCPR refers to ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’.⁴⁸¹ This already shows a high degree of overlap between the concept of a minority under international human rights law and the groups protected by the prohibition of genocide, especially when considering that ‘ethnic’ in Article 27 ICCPR is open to a broad interpretation and therefore covers, *inter alia*, what is referred to as racial and national minorities.⁴⁸² Even if

479 William A Schabas ‘Developments relating to Minorities in the Law of Genocide’ in Kristin Henrard and Robert Dunbar *Synergies in Minority Protection: European and International Law Perspectives* (CUP Cambridge 2008) 192.

480 UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capotorti ‘Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities’ (1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1. 28.

481 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.

482 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 492.

the two protected groups/right holders are not completely synonymous, the clear link between minorities and genocide has also been confirmed by the HRC, which in its Article 29 stated that ‘the international protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities includes elements that must be respected in all circumstances. This is reflected in the prohibition of genocide under international law...’.⁴⁸³

Even though the individual is clearly a victim of genocidal measures, the perpetration of the act extends beyond its actual commission. The murder of a particular individual, for example, must therefore be committed for the realization of an ulterior motive, namely the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious group.⁴⁸⁴ This group element does again bring the prohibition of genocide into the clear vicinity of the system of minority protection, which has been struggling since its beginnings with the individual vs collective dichotomy and has been described as a bundle of ‘individual rights, but with a group reference’.⁴⁸⁵ Resolution 96 (I) United Nations General Assembly already emphasized the group element inherent in the crime of genocide by stating that ‘genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings’. The Genocide Convention as well as the Rome Statute protect against the commission of acts by both State officials and private persons.⁴⁸⁶

In conclusion, the fact that the Genocide Convention itself does not apply the term ‘minorities’ can simply be seen as an acknowledgment of the

483 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 29: Derogations from Provisions of the Covenant during a State of Emergency (Art. 4)’ (24 July 2001) GAOR 56th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 202; see also Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘Das Verbot der Diskriminierung aufgrund von Rasse, Herkunft, Sprache oder Hautfarbe im Völkerrecht’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds) *Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung im nationalen und internationalen Menschenrechtsschutz* (Springer Berlin 2003) 215-231, 218, where the Genocide Convention is listed as the first international convention dealing with a specific aspect of racial discrimination.

484 See eg *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998)* para. 522.

485 Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum *Völkerrecht* Volume I/2: *Der Staat und andere Völkerrechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung* (2nd edition De Gruyter Berlin 2002) 279, translation by the author.

486 Art. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277; Art. 25 (1) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90.

fact that a numerical inferiority is not legally necessary in order to gain the protection of the Genocide Convention. This does, however, not challenge the fact, which had also been acknowledged by the drafters of the convention, that minorities are ‘genocide’s most frequent targets’⁴⁸⁷ and ‘natural victims’⁴⁸⁸ of genocidal measures and therefore the prime beneficiaries of the Genocide Convention and Article 6 of the Rome Statute which protect minorities against physical destruction.

b) Crimes against Humanity/Persecution

The gap in minority protection with regards to the criminal prosecution of acts directed against minorities which fall short of genocide was, on a global level, partly remedied only with the adoption of the Rome Statute. The concept of crimes against humanity had before been inserted into the Statutes of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the Military Tribunal of the Far East⁴⁸⁹. The insertion of crimes against humanity into the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal was done in an attempt to cover the crimes committed by Germany against its own minorities.⁴⁹⁰

(1) Important Developments in Terms of Minority Protection

In the context of minority protection, the development from the international military tribunals after World War II to the *ad hoc* tribunals established in the 1990s and finally to the Rome Statute and the ICC brought two major developments which ought to be highlighted: first the disappearance of the link between the crime and an armed conflict as a requirement; and second, the expansion of international jurisdiction to both State and non-State actors.

487 UN Secretary-General ‘Address to the Commission on Human Rights’ (7 April 2004) <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sgsm9245.doc.htm>> (31 October 2017).

488 Patrick Thornberry *International Law and the Rights of Minorities* (Clarendon Press Oxford 1991) 59.

489 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 1946) 4 Bevens 20.

490 Lyal S Sunga ‘International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities’ in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) *Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?* (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 270.

(1.1) Crimes against Humanity and Armed Conflict

Control Council Law No. 10,⁴⁹¹ issued by the Control Council for Germany on 20 December 1945, omitted the restriction of crimes against humanity to acts connected to war from the definition of such crimes. However, this does not mean that crimes against humanity as defined in the Nuremberg Charter can be considered the cornerstone of a system of international criminal law equally applicable in times of war and peace, protecting the human rights of inhabitants of all countries, ‘of any civilian population’,⁴⁹² against anybody, including their own states and governments. According to its preamble, Council Law No. 10 was enacted to give effect to the Nuremberg Charter, which was mentioned in Article I as an integral part of Council Law No. 10.⁴⁹³ This link was thought to give the definition of crimes against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10 the same connotation as in the Nuremberg Charter.⁴⁹⁴ Therefore, even though the Nuremberg Trials were an important contribution to minority protection and the evolution of international criminal law, crimes against humanity as interpreted in Nuremberg aimed to ensure that inhumane acts in violation of general principles of the law committed in connection with war should be punished. Crimes against humanity were treated as ‘accompanying’ or ‘accessory’ crimes to either crimes against peace or war crimes.⁴⁹⁵

Article 5 ICTY Statute explicitly links the concept of crimes against humanity to the existence of an armed conflict of an international or national character, whereas according to Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, the crime must be committed on national, political, ethnic, racial or political

491 Control Council Law No 10 ‘Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity’ (done 20 December 1945) (1946) 3 Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany 50.

492 Egon Schwelb ‘Crimes against Humanity’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International Law 178-226, 206.

493 Egon Schwelb ‘Crimes against Humanity’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International Law 178-226, 218.

494 Patrick Thornberry *International Law and the Rights of Minorities* (Clarendon Press Oxford 1991) 89; Egon Schwelb ‘Crimes against Humanity’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International Law 178-226 217-8.

495 Egon Schwelb ‘Crimes against Humanity’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International Law 178-226, 206; Kriangsak Kittichaisaree *International Criminal Law* (OUP Oxford 2001) 87.

grounds, linking crimes against humanity more closely to the protection of minorities. This additional requirement of discriminatory intent in each of the enumerated crimes is omitted in the Rome Statute. This does not, however, mean that the relevance towards minority issues has been neglected at the Rome Conference. On the contrary, the delegations felt the need to avoid an onerous and unnecessary burden for the prosecution while at the same time not excluding other forms of crimes against humanity that can be committed without a discriminatory motive.⁴⁹⁶ Nevertheless, with the notion that not *all* crimes against humanity require a discriminatory motive, the drafters of the Rome Statute also acknowledged that the (vast) majority of these crimes are indeed committed out of a discriminatory intent.

Article 7 (1) (h) Rome Statute dismisses any link of the concept of crimes against humanity to an armed conflict. The majority of delegations believed that such a limitation would have rendered crimes against humanity largely redundant, as they would have been subsumed in most cases within the definition of war crimes.⁴⁹⁷ This is of capital importance to minority protection as many attacks on minorities are committed in situations where the intensity of violence falls short of the definition of an armed conflict,⁴⁹⁸ particularly in cases of crimes perpetrated against minorities by their own governments.⁴⁹⁹

Despite this major contribution to the protection of minority groups, one has to keep in mind that the threshold for crimes against humanity is still a very high one. The acts listed in Article 7 must be ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.’ Therefore, even though the omission of a nexus between the commission of crimes against humanity and an armed conflict is a big step forward in the prevention of crime perpetrated against minorities, numerous organized crimes perpetrated against

496 Darryl Robinson ‘Defining “Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43-57, 46-47.

497 Darryl Robinson ‘Defining “Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43-57, 46-47.

498 Lyal S Sunga ‘International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities’ in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) *Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?* (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 271.

499 Darryl Robinson ‘Defining “Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43-57, 46.

minorities still fall short of the high requirements necessary for labelling a crime an international ‘crime against humanity’.

(1.2) Crimes Against Humanity and Non-State Actors

According to Article 7 Rome Statute, crimes against humanity can be committed by both State and non-State actors. Similarly, both the ICTY and the ICTR held that their jurisdiction covers action by non-State actors as well as actions committed by State actors.⁵⁰⁰ On the one hand, it obviously seems to be an improvement of their situation if they are protected from crimes committed by both State and private actors. On the other hand, it is to be feared that governments use the ICC to get rid of insurgents and rebel forces while at the same time drawing attention away from their own human rights violations.⁵⁰¹ As the ICC was established to deal with such (State) actors that typically go unpunished as opposed to non-State actors, which, once the State can catch them, are exposed to its full force, this is a worrying development.⁵⁰² It needs to be kept in mind when following the ICC’s investigations that they so far mostly concentrate on cases transferred by co-operative governments concerning rebel forces and members of previous governments.⁵⁰³ Yet it is still also worth noting that a State which refers a situation to the ICC cannot pick and choose which actors the court is going to focus on. This means that, at least theoretically, there is a possibility that the Prosecutor of the ICC will in fact expand his investigations to cover State as well as non-State actors, a fact that the former Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, repeatedly emphasized.⁵⁰⁴ Keeping

500 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997). para. 654; *Prosecutor v Kayishema (Judgment)* ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) para. 126.

501 William A. Schabas *Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for the United Nations* (Minority Rights Group International London 2006) <<https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/7840/1/MRGGenocideReport.pdf>> (31 October 2017) 24.

502 William A. Schabas *Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for the United Nations* (Minority Rights Group International London 2006) <https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/7840/1/MRGGenocideReport.pdf> >2 (31 October 2017) 24.

503 Situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Uganda, and the Central African Republic.

504 Eg in an interview with the Coalition for the International Criminal Court <http://www.iccnw.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=1841> (last retrieved October 2015).

in mind the ICTR's experience, however, which was faced with Rwandan refusals to co-operate once it mentioned the possibility of investigating atrocities committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (now: Rwandan Patriotic Army) backed by present Rwandan government, such a development seems to be unlikely.

Nonetheless, some of the most prominent cases, before the ICC, the situation in Darfur and Libya, which were referred to the ICC by the Security Council and the situation in Kenya, which was initiated by the Prosecutor using his *proprio motu* powers, are an exception to this pattern. Furthermore, the ICC is keeping situations in further countries under preliminary examination (e.g. Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq/UK, Nigeria and Ukraine), including a variety of both State and non-State actors.⁵⁰⁵ Therefore, it is still to be seen whether the ICC will continue to focus its efforts on the prosecution of non-State actors, a development that would be regrettable.

(2) Specific Crimes and Their inherent Minority Element

(2.1) Murder/Extermination

Murder as listed in Article 7 (a) Rome Statute and extermination (Article 7 (b)) cover the widespread or systematic targeting of a minority group that falls short of the definition of genocide.⁵⁰⁶ What distinguishes murder from extermination is that extermination requires an element of mass destruction that is not imperative for murder.⁵⁰⁷

505 See <https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx?ln=en> (31 October 2017).

506 Lyal S Sunga 'International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities' in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) *Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?* (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275.

507 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 591.

(2.2) Deportation or Forcible Transfer of Population

The crimes of deportation and forcible transfer of population were often used in the past by ultra-nationalist governments in their attempts to ethnically cleanse the territory of its minority population.⁵⁰⁸

Deportation or forcible transfer of populations is defined under Article 7 (2) (d) as ‘forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from an area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law’. Article 7 (d) Rome Statute, as opposed to Article 5 (d) ICTY Statute and Article 3 (d) ICTR Statute, refers to ‘forcible transfer of population’ as an alternative offence. ‘Deportation’ is defined as the forced removal of people from one country to another, whereas ‘forcible transfer of population’ means the compulsory movement of people from one area to another within the same state.⁵⁰⁹ This reflects the experiences in conflicts such as the former Yugoslavia, where the victims were transferred within the territory of Yugoslavia as a part of a greater policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’.⁵¹⁰

(2.3) Rape, Sexual Slavery, Enforced Prostitution, Forced Pregnancy, Enforced Sterilisation, or any other Form of Sexual Violence of Comparable Gravity

In comparison to the ICTY and the ICTR Statute, Article 7 (g) Rome Statute takes a much wider approach on sexual violence. Whereas Articles 5 (g) ICTY Statute and 3 (g) ICTR Statute mention only rape, the drafters of the Rome Statute seemed to have learned from past experiences, especially of the two *ad hoc* tribunals, which for a long time tended to marginalise sexual violence. It acknowledges that sexual violence as a crime against humanity can be committed through various actions. Sexual

508 E.g the deportation of more than 1 million Armenians by Turkish authorities between 1915 and 1917, see Adam Jones *Genocide* (Routledge London 2006) 107.

509 M Cherif Bassiouni *Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law* (2nd ed Kluwer Law International The Hague 1999) 301.

510 Even though there is no formal legal definition of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’, it is often conducted through means of forcible transfer, deportation or persecution and was labelled a form of genocide by the UN General Assembly in UNGA Res 47/121 ‘The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (7 April 1993) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 44.

violence is often used as a means to demoralise minority populations by committing acts on individuals that are said to affect the ‘honour’ of the group as a whole. Furthermore, this form of violence can be used in the context of ethnic violence to destroy minorities by forcing their female members to give birth to babies that are considered to belong to a different ethnic group in order to ‘pollute and water down the blood line’,⁵¹¹ which can constitute an act of genocide.⁵¹² However, it should be noted that the way international criminal and international humanitarian law has dealt with sexual violence against women, concentrating on concepts of honour of the community rather than the physical harm caused to an individual, has been heavily criticised by feminist scholars (see also under Part Two Chapter Three).⁵¹³ In this respect, the Rome Statute with its expansion of the perception of sexual violence as a crime against humanity beyond rape is a positive development in the protection of women’s physical individual integrity.

(2.4) Persecution as a Crime against Humanity with a Particularly Prominent Minority Element

The crime of persecution is a criminal offence which minorities are particularly prone to. The crime as defined in the Rome Statute covers a broad range of actions. Article 7 (1) (h) Rome Statute contains persecution ‘against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender (...) or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law’ as a crime against humanity. Furthermore, in Article 7 (2) (g) Rome Statute the term is defined to mean ‘the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reasons of the identity of the group or collectivity.’ The Rome Statute is the first international criminal instru-

511 Amy E Ray, ‘The Shame of it: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries’ (1997) 46 *American University Law Review* 793-840, 805-6.

512 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 688.

513 Eg Judith Gardam and Hilary Charlesworth ‘Protection of Women in Armed Conflicts’ (2000) 22(1) *Human Rights Quarterly* 148-166, 159.

ment defining persecution.⁵¹⁴ However, its definition derives in part from the jurisprudence of the ICTY, which dealt with large-scale persecutions of minorities during the conflicts that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia. According to the ICTY, whose judgments can shed light on the interpretation of Articles 7 (1) (h) and (2) (g) Rome Statute, 'it is the violation of the right to equality in some serious fashion that infringes on the enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right that constitutes persecution (...) on one of the listed grounds to constitute persecution under the Statute',⁵¹⁵ 'the gross and blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5 [ICTY Statute]'.⁵¹⁶ The *Tadić* definition roots in the descriptive explanations of the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind which states that persecution is aimed at subjecting 'individuals or groups of individuals to a life in which enjoyment of in which enjoyment of some of their basic rights is repeatedly or constantly denied'.⁵¹⁷ The commentary to the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes stated that the common denominator of persecution was the denial of the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which every individual is entitled without distinction as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 1 and 55) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 2).⁵¹⁸

The notion of persecution as such contains a group element, and includes the targeting of individuals because of their group membership as well as targeting the group as such.⁵¹⁹ Persecution as a crime against humanity encompasses acts from killing to limitations on the type of profes-

514 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 256.

515 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 697.

516 *Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Chamber Judgment)* IT-95-16 (14 January 2000) para. 621.

517 UN ILC 'Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind' (1991) vol II part II UNYBILC 79, 104.

518 UN ILC 'Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind' (1996) GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9.

519 See Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 217.

sions open to targeted groups⁵²⁰ and acts of physical, economic or judicial nature in violation of an individual's right to equal enjoyment of basic rights.⁵²¹ As such, the prohibition of persecution in international criminal law supplements the general principles of equality and non-discrimination in international human rights law in a common effort to protect minorities in heterogeneous societies. Generally, the acts prohibited can be grouped into 'serious bodily harm and mental harm, infringements upon freedom and attacks against property'⁵²² and therefore cover a wide range of threats against minorities.

The acts must be carried out with the intent of depriving the victim of the political, social or economic rights enjoyed by members of the wider society for reason of his or her membership in a particular protected group⁵²³. One recent development of particular importance to minority protection is the categorizing of systematic hate speech against minorities as persecution by the ICTR⁵²⁴. The deprivation of rights which are a result of the act of persecution include fundamental rights from which no derogation is permitted. However, the list of acts enlisted in the Rome Statute shows that also acts from which States are generally allowed to derogate can constitute persecution.⁵²⁵

As examined, a large variety of acts committed against minorities can be subsumed under the heading of 'persecution'. Generally, what is commonly referred to as 'cultural genocide' is indeed mostly covered by the notion of persecution. The legal concept of crimes against humanity thus constitutes a useful tool capable of covering many of forms of attacks against minorities, including on their cultural heritage.

520 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 704.

521 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 710.

522 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 258.

523 *Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Chamber Judgment)* IT-95-16 (14 January 2000) para. 634.

524 *Prosecutor v Nahimana (Judgment)* ICTR-99-52-T (3 December 2003).para. 1072.

525 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 263.

(2.5) Enforced Disappearance of Persons

The delegations at the Rome Conference agreed that enforced disappearance, which was previously identified as a crime against humanity only in international instruments⁵²⁶ but not in the statutes of any of the international tribunals, was an inhumane act similar to the other acts in character and gravity, which warranted specific acknowledgement.⁵²⁷ It is punishable pursuant to Article 7 (1) (i) Rome Statute. The practice of enforced disappearance has been employed by governments on many occasions to rid the country of political opponents and to silence dissidents over such issues as greater autonomy for minority groups.⁵²⁸

(2.5) The Crime of Apartheid

In general terms, apartheid refers to the racial segregation and discrimination policies enacted by a government against a part of its own people.⁵²⁹ Historically, the term evolved from the segregation policies institutionalized by the government of South Africa from the late 1940s until 1994. It has been a punishable crime against humanity since 1976, when the United Nations Apartheid Convention entered into force.⁵³⁰

Article 7 (1) (j) Rome Statute chooses a broader approach than the one taken by the Apartheid Convention. Whereas the latter states that Apartheid includes “similar policies and practices of racial segregation

526 UNGA Res 47/133 ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’ (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 207; Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (done 9 June 1994, entered into force 28 March 1996) (1994) 33 ILM 1529; UN ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (1996) GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9.

527 Darryl Robinson ‘Defining “Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43-57, 55.

528 Lyal Sunga ‘International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities’ Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) *Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?* (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 272.

529 Claire de Than and Edwin Shortt *International Criminal Law and Human Rights* (Sweet & Maxwell London 2003) 110.

530 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (adopted 30 November 1973, entered into force 18 July 1976) 1015 UNTS 243.

and discrimination as practised in southern Africa” (Article II), the Rome Statute does not contain that phrase and instead, in Article 7 (2) (h), defines apartheid as:

‘inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime’.

This expands the scope of application of that prohibition and eliminates the connection to the South African apartheid system that was unique in the sense that it was a minority which oppressed the majority. The fact that in many cases a minority group is suppressed can be inferred from the commentary by the working group on minorities to the UNDM Minorities in which apartheid is expressively mentioned as a way to exclude minorities from society.⁵³¹

c) ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in International Criminal Law

Targeting of minorities is often associated with the term ‘ethnic cleansing’. However, ethnic cleansing is not a technical term used or defined in the Rome Statute or any of the statutes of international courts or tribunals. Nevertheless, it is an often-used term, in the media as well as in the international arena, especially during the conflicts following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia⁵³². Ethnic cleansing ‘was used initially as a euphemistic expression to describe a variety of practices undertaken with the objective of expelling or inducing the departure of persons who did not belong to a particular group from a defined area’.⁵³³ The UN General Assembly has expressly linked ‘ethnic cleansing’ to minority protection and

531 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2 para 25.

532 Eg in UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005) GAOR 60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 paras 138-140, in which the responsibility of a State to protect ‘its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ was set out.

533 William J Fenrick ‘The crime against humanity of persecution in the jurisprudence of the ICTY’ (2001) 32 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 81-96, 89.

racial discrimination in its resolution 48/91 on 'Ethnic Cleansing and Racial Discrimination'⁵³⁴.

The ICJ in the case of the *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* defined ethnic cleansing as 'rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area'⁵³⁵. Ethnic cleansing often comes hand in hand with other gross violations of human rights, as it may be conducted, *inter alia*, by means of forcible transfer, deportation murder or rape. Therefore, the legal categorization of the term is highly controversial and the additional value that the term brings compared to the use of already acknowledged legal terms is disputed. Nevertheless, the term has often been referred to by the ICTY, also in indictments, and has been linked to crimes against humanity in general⁵³⁶ and also, more particular, to the crime of persecution⁵³⁷.

But not only crimes against humanity, also genocide has been associated with the term 'ethnic cleansing'.⁵³⁸ However, compared to the acts covered in the Genocide Convention, 'ethnic cleansing' seems to pursue a different goal, namely the expulsion of an ethnic minority and its culture from a given area as opposed to the extinction of that minority. One frequent component of 'ethnic cleansing', namely forcible population transfer, was, like the destruction of a minorities' cultural life, deliberately ex-

534 UNGA Res 48/91 'Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination' (20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Supp 49 193.

535 *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits)* ([2007] ICJ Rep 43 para 190; see also UNSC 'First Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Paragraph 2 of UNSC Resolution 780 (1992) (9 February 1993) UN Doc S/25274 (1993) para. 55 and M Cherif Bassiouni and Peter Manikas *The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia* (Transnational Publishers Irvington-on-Hudson 1996) 608.

536 *Prosecutor v Kupreškić* (Trial Chamber Judgment) IT-95-16 (14 January 2000) para. 606.

537 *Prosecutor v Sikirica et al* (Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit) IT-95-8-T (3 September 2001) para. 90.

538 See UNGA Res 47/121 'The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49, 44 and the UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly Ndiaye 'Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (6 October 1996) UN Doc A/51/457, para. 69.

cluded from the Genocide Convention. This is true at least if it is not paired with a genocidal intent and done in circumstances ‘calculated to bring about its [the group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part’.

Additionally, already the Nuremberg Charter grouped the acts committed in crimes of the ‘murder type’ and crimes of the ‘persecution type’⁵³⁹, which suggests that the crime of persecution is not typically committed through the killing of individuals (even though it may well lead to it), but through their systematic discrimination in public life. This categorization of crimes by the Nuremberg Trials has later been upheld by the International Law Commission and the ICTY.⁵⁴⁰ Looking at the above-mentioned definition of ethnic cleansing by the ICTY, ethnic cleansing seems not to fall under the ‘murder type’ of crimes against humanity (which at Nuremberg also covered what is now known legally known as genocide) as envisaged by the Nuremberg Trial. Therefore, an equation of ethnic cleansing with genocide seems to be inaccurate.

In conclusion, ‘ethnic cleansing’ seems to be, at least partly, subsumed by the above-discussed crime of persecution (Article 7 (1) (h) Rome Statute) and the more specific means by which an area is rendered ‘ethnically homogenous’ are mostly punishable as crimes against humanities by themselves (see e.g. murder and extermination as enshrined in Article 7 (1) (a) and (b) Rome Statute or the prohibition of deportation or forcible transfer of population in Article 7 (1) (d) Rome Statute).

539 See *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 694.

540 UNILC ‘Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, with commentaries’ in (1950) vol II UNYBILC 375-378, para. 120; *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) paras 651 and 694.

d) War Crimes (Art. 8 Rome Statute)

The law of war as set out in its fundamental instruments, the 1907 Hague Regulations⁵⁴¹, the 1949 Geneva Conventions⁵⁴² and their 1977 Protocols,⁵⁴³ does not refer to minorities as such, but provides specific protection to especially vulnerable groups in conflicts, like civilians or prisoners of war. Therefore, in this context, minorities are only protected as victims of a conflict, even though they are indirectly shielded by the underlying principles of the law of war, impartiality and non-discrimination.⁵⁴⁴ Furthermore, the principle of non-discrimination is also enshrined in many articles within the Geneva Conventions, for example Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions.⁵⁴⁵

The most essential problem in terms of minority protection and war crimes is deciding in which situations a certain act constitutes a war crime. Traditionally, the instruments governing the law of war, with the exception

541 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, annexed to the Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) (1907) 205 CTS 277.

542 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (Geneva Convention I); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Geneva Convention IV).

543 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609.

544 Peter Finell *Accountability under Human Rights Law and International criminal law against Minority Groups Committed by Non-State Actors* (Åbo Akademi Institute for Human Rights, Åbo/Turku May 2002) 44.

545 Peter Finell *Accountability under Human Rights Law and International criminal law against Minority Groups Committed by Non-State Actors* (Åbo Akademi Institute for Human Rights, Åbo/Turku May 2002).

of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, deal with international armed conflicts fought between one state and another. Consequently, war crimes as enshrined in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters related to crimes committed during international armed conflicts. However, after World War II, the international community has perceived a shift from international, conventional wars, to internal guerrilla style conflicts and civil wars between non-state actors and states.⁵⁴⁶ Since 1945, more than 250 internal conflicts and abuses of repressive regimes resulted in an estimated 86 million casualties.⁵⁴⁷

As a result, most of the crimes under international law that have been committed within the context of a conflict occurred within an internal, not an international armed conflict. This is particularly true for crimes committed against minorities because they are, as previously discussed, particularly vulnerable against attacks from their own governments and the governments of the countries they live in respectively. In the situation of the former Yugoslavia, crimes were committed as part of an internal or internationalized armed conflict. For this reason, the ICTY Statute covers war crimes both as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions relating to international armed conflicts (Article 2) and ‘violations of the laws and customs of war’ (Article 3) which has been held to cover any serious violation other than grave breaches irrespective if it occurs within an international or an internal armed conflict.⁵⁴⁸

Out of these experiences, many delegations at the Rome Conference, supported by a wide range of NGOs, insisted that the ICC should have jurisdiction not only over crimes committed in inter-state wars but also over those atrocities that occurred within the context of an internal armed conflict.⁵⁴⁹ This view ultimately prevailed and accordingly Article 8 (2) Rome

546 See e.g. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen *Patterns of Major Conflicts 1997-2008- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security* (OUP Oxford 2007).

547 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights’ in M Cherif Bassiouni (ed) *Post-Conflict Justice* (Transnational Publishers Ardsley New York 2002) 6.

548 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree *International Criminal Law* (OUP Oxford 2001) 132-3; *Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-I-AR72 (2 October 1995)* paras. 86-94.

549 Sunga in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) *Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?* (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 273.

Statute distinguishes among four categories of war crimes:⁵⁵⁰ Concerning international armed conflicts, Article 8 (2) Rome Statute defines war crimes as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article 8 (2) (a) Rome Statute) and secondly, ‘other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law’ (Article 8 (2) (b) Rome Statute). As for non-international armed conflicts, Article 8 (2) defines war crimes as serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (Article 8 (2) (c)) and secondly, ‘other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international armed character, within the established framework of international law’ (Article 8 (2) (d))⁵⁵¹. The minority aspects in most of the war crime containing such an aspect have already been discussed, in a different form, under the heading of crimes against humanity. The issues discussed there are just as valid for war crimes, albeit taking account of the specific prerequisite for armed conflict for each of the provisions. Therefore, the provisions with a minority aspect will be simply listed here for the sake of completeness.

(1) International Armed Conflicts

Provisions especially relevant to the protection of minorities in international armed conflicts include, *inter alia*;

(1.1) Article 8 (2) (a) Rome Statute: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention Protecting Civilian Persons in Times of War:

The prohibition of wilful killing (Article 8 (2) (a) (i)) Rome Statute;

- The prohibition of torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments (Article 8 (2) (a) (ii)) Rome Statute;
- The prohibition of wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body and health (Article 8 (2) (a) (iii)) Rome Statute;

550 Sunga in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) *Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?* (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 273.

551 Sunga in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) *Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?* (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 273.

- The prohibition of unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement (Article 8 (2) (a) (vii)) Rome Statute.

(1.2) Article 8 (2) (b) Rome Statute: Other serious violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in International Armed Conflict, within the Established Framework of International Law:

- The prohibition of attacks against the civilian population (Article 8 (2) (b) (i)) Rome Statute;
- The prohibition of deportation or forcible transfer (Article 8 (2) (b)(vi-ii)) Rome Statute;
- The prohibition of attack of religious, charitable, scientific, cultural objects (Article 8 (2) (b) (xi)) Rome Statute;
- The prohibition of sexual violence (Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)) Rome Statute.

(2) Non- International Armed Conflicts

When it comes to internal conflicts, the most crucial provisions on terms of minority protections are:

(2.1) Article 8 (2) (c) Rome Statute: Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949

The prohibition of violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture (Article 8 (2) (c) (i) Rome Statute);

The prohibition of outrages on human dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment (Article 8 (2) (c) (ii)) Rome Statute;

(2.2) Article 8 (2) (e) Rome Statute : Other Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts not of an International Character, within the Established Framework of International Law:

- The prohibition of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities (Article 8 (2) (e) (i) Rome Statute);
- The prohibition of intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives (Article 8 (2) (e) (iv) Rome Statute);
- The prohibition of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in Article 7 (2) (f) Rome Statute, enforced sterilisation and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) Rome Statute);
- The prohibition of ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand (Article 8 (2) (e) (viii) Rome Statute).

V. Concluding Remarks

As one can see from the above analysis, recourse to minority right is scarcer than, for example, reference to torture under human rights law. There are several reasons for this, which are to be found both in the system of minority rights law as a concept of human rights as well as in the crimes which contain an element of minority protection. As a first reason, minority rights law are much less established than the prohibition of torture is. The instruments governing it contain few concrete provisions, the content of rights actually granted to minorities is often contested and the legal nature of many of these rights is controversial on a national level as well as internationally. While minorities are protected through provisions in major international and regional conventions, the rights are frequently misunderstood, looked upon with suspicion by many States for reasons that rooted in history or practical policy, which is mirrored by

reservations issued to Article 27 ICCPR.⁵⁵² This makes minority rights less accessible and too abstract, in particular for judges who do not have a background in public international law. Secondly, those crimes under international law which contain an element of minority protection, like genocide or persecution, do often have no or no well-established counterpart in national criminal codes. Therefore many instances in which recourse to minority rights would have made the judgments more convincing or would have facilitated the Chamber's arguments remained idle.

Chapter Three: Women's Rights/The Prohibition of Gender-Based Violence

The concept of gender-based crimes has experienced a rapid development in international criminal law within the last decade. They went from being an overlooked, side-lined issue linked to family honour to one of the most discussed and researched areas in international criminal law today. Gender-based crimes also triggered prosecutorial creativity in dealing with those crimes under a variety of other concepts (e.g. rape as torture, genocide, outrages against personal dignity, enslavement, sexual slavery or persecution). The degree to which sexual crimes are prioritized and properly included in indictment does, however, vary considerably between the respective tribunals and seems, to a large degree depend on the persistence and experience of investigators in that field.⁵⁵³ The developments of gender-based crimes are also mirrored in the general development of the human rights of women in international human rights law and of the understanding and conceptualisation of violence against women and gender-related violence in particular. Like gender-based crimes under international

552 See the Declarations of France, Turkey Declarations and Reservations of the States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtldsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (31 October 2017).

553 See further Alison Cole 'International criminal law and sexual violence: an overview' in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro *Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Routledge Abingdon 2010) 47-60 and Doris Buss 'Learning our lesions: The Rwanda Tribunal record on prosecuting rape' in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro *Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Routledge Abingdon 2010) 61-75.

criminal law, violence against women has for a long time not been seen as an issue relevant to human rights law and its instruments.

According to feminist theory of international law, the reason for this is that the human rights system and international criminal and humanitarian law, are built, like all other legal systems, primarily by men, privileges their experiences and consequently protects humans from violations which predominantly men are likely to suffer from.⁵⁵⁴ International humanitarian law has long been in the line of criticism of feminist international legal scholars as a legal system which either relegates women to the status of victims, or accords them legitimacy only in their role as child-bearers.⁵⁵⁵ As a consequence of that, international human rights law protects first and foremost violations within the 'public' sphere, violations committed by the State or its agents. Persons who typically suffer from these sorts of violations are active in the public sphere. Women, in contrast, are often confined to the private sphere. Therefore, international human rights law as it was conceived after World War II does often not meet the realities of their existence and therefore also does not protect them. Violations women traditionally suffer from are committed within this private sphere, often by private persons. However, the conceptualisation of human rights law as horizontal rights which put obligations solely on States and, ultimately, makes the State the only responsible for violations.⁵⁵⁶ The actions of non-

554 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright 'Feminist approaches to international law' (1991) 85(4) *American Journal of International Law* 613-645, 625-634; Helen Durham and Katie O'Byrne 'The dialogue of difference: gender perspectives on international humanitarian law' 92 (2010) *International Review of the Red Cross* 31-52, 34.

555 Helen Durham and Katie O'Byrne 'The dialogue of difference: gender perspectives on international humanitarian law' 92 (2010) *International Review of the Red Cross* 31-52, 34; Gardam and Jarvis point out that of 42 provisions in the Geneva Conventions and the related Protocols which specifically deal with women, almost half of them address them in their capacities as mothers, while the other predominant theme of specific protection of women, with regards to sexual violence, is centred on notions of modesty and chastity: Judith Gardam and Michelle J Jarvis *Women Armed Conflict and International Law* (Kluwer Law International The Hague 2001) 96-7; a modern understanding of sexual violence places an emphasis rather on the violation of the victim's 'physical and moral integrity', see eg *Prosecutor v Češić* (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-10/1-S (11 March 2004) para. 53.

556 See eg Robert McCorquodale 'Non-state actors and international human rights law' in Sarah Joseph and Adam McBeth (eds) *Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law* (Elgar Cheltenham 2010) 97-114, 100, 101.

State actors can only lead to 'State responsibility in cases of human rights violations in exceptional circumstances'⁵⁵⁷. Within these exceptions, the due diligence standard of State responsibility is particularly momentous for recognizing violence against women as violations in the context of human rights law.⁵⁵⁸ That way an act which is 'not directly imputable to a State'⁵⁵⁹ because it was, for example committed by a private person, can nevertheless trigger the responsibility of a State 'not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation'.⁵⁶⁰ This concept opened the door for a more creative use of human rights law in order to protect women from systematic violence, usually committed by private persons, in times of peace, and, simultaneously, makes human rights law in this area an obvious source to be consulted by practitioners of international criminal law dealing with issues of gender-related violence.

International human rights documents increasingly mention armed conflict and mass atrocities as situations where women's human rights are endangered and use concepts developed by international criminal or humanitarian law in areas of violence against women. Non-binding human rights documents such as reports by special rapporteurs or by the UN Secretary-General have pointed to a certain violation of women's physical and/or psychological integrity during an armed conflict as 'crimes of a very serious nature with a wide range of severe effects on the victim'⁵⁶¹. Hence, there is a relatively high degree of reference to international criminal and humanitarian law permeating human rights documents and discourse in the area of sexual violence. This trend might be fuelled as modern international criminal courts and tribunals increasingly gain experience with judging sexual violence. At the ICTY, as of September 2016, 78 individu-

557 UN ILC 'Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts' (2001) GAOR 56th Session Supp 10, 43.

558 See further Alice Edwards 'Everyday rape: International human rights law and violence against women in peacetime' in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro *Re-thinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Routledge Abingdon 2010) 92-108, 102-104.

559 *Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment)* IACtHR Series C No 4 (29 July 1988) para 172.

560 *Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment)* IACtHR Series C No 4 (29 July 1988) para 172.

561 UNSC 'Annex II: Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)' (27 May 1994) UN Doc S/1994/674.

als (48% of the accused) had sexual violence charges included in their indictment.⁵⁶² However, only 32 of the accused have been convicted for acts of sexual violence.⁵⁶³ The prosecution of the ICC was heavily criticised for not bringing charges of sexual violence against *Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, instead focussing solely of charges of enlisting and conscripting child soldiers.⁵⁶⁴ With the case against *Germain Katanga*, the ICC had a case which focused on sexual crimes. In March 2014, Katanga was convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes but he was acquitted of all modalities related to sexual crimes (rape and sexual slavery) as the court held that even though it found beyond reasonable doubt that the crimes had been committed, Katanga's responsibility had not been adequately proved.⁵⁶⁵ However, the majority of cases active before the ICC now include charges of sexual violence and in those in which sexual violence is not included, the prosecutor often explicitly stated that sexual violence continues to be investigated.⁵⁶⁶

562 ICTY 'Crimes of Sexual Violence: In Numbers' <http://www.icty.org/sid/10586> (31 October 2017).

563 ICTY 'Crimes of Sexual Violence: In Numbers' <http://www.icty.org/sid/10586> (31 October 2017).

564 See *Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the confirmation of charges)* ICC-01/04-01/803-tEN (29 January 2007); Brigid Inder 'Reflection: Gender Issues and Child Soldiers – The Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo' The Lubanga Trial at the International Criminal Court (31 August 2011) <http://www.lubangatrial.org/2011/08/31/reflection-gender-issues-and-child-soldiers-the-case-of-prosecutor-v-thomas-lubanga-dyilo-2/> (31 October 2017).

565 http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr986.aspx (31 October 2017).

566 This is for example the case in the situation in Libya brought before the ICC by the UN Security Council. Even though the charges are limited to murder and persecution as crimes against humanity (and sexual violence could also be included under the heading of persecution), the Prosecutor explicitly and repeatedly stated that sexual violence is one focus of the continuous investigations, see eg International Criminal Court The Office of the Prosecutor 'Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)' (2 November 2011) <<http://www.iccnw.org/documents/StatementICCProsecutorLibyaReporttoUNSC021113.pdf>> (31 October 2017) paras 14-17, 22. Currently, the majority of cases before the ICC include charges of sexual violence.

I. Where Were Women's Human Rights Referred to?

1. Sexual Assault as Persecution

Reference to human rights law in international criminal jurisprudence is scarcer. However, there are instances in which human rights law is referenced, albeit often in a general and incomplete matter which does not examine human rights law thoroughly and often gives the impression that a reference to human rights law is somewhat expected and the 'human rights box' has to be ticked before judges can turn to comparative law in this area. This, for example, happened with 'enforced prostitution and painful circumcision'.⁵⁶⁷ Those offences are mentioned by the ICTY in *Milutinovic* as possible examples of sexual assault other than rape. The ICTY was faced with the problem of determining whether the court has jurisdiction over 'sexual assault' and whether it can qualify as persecution, as this is not clear from looking at the ICTY Statute. The tribunal therefore looked at several other documents, for example its Rules of Procedure and Evidence⁵⁶⁸, which contain specific rules for dealing with victims of sexual assault, a fact from which the Chamber defers a will of drafters to prosecute and punish such acts.⁵⁶⁹ Furthermore, the tribunal examined its own case law.⁵⁷⁰ First and foremost, however, the tribunal consulted 'other authorities' in the area of human rights law, such as the Final Report by the Commission of Experts cited above and the Report of the Secretary-General, which mentioned 'widespread and systematic rape and other sexual assault' as crimes against humanity over which the ICTY should have jurisdiction.⁵⁷¹

Nevertheless, the Chamber did not resort to 'hard law' like CEDAW. It concluded that '[t]he term "sexual assault" is not explicitly used in any international human rights treaty. The Convention on the Elimination of All

567 UNSC 'Annex II: Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)' (27 May 1994) UN Doc S/1994/674.

568 UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 'Rules of Procedure and Evidence' (as amended 10 December 2009) IT/32/Rev. 44.

569 *Prosecutor v Milutinovic* (Judgment) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para. 185.

570 Particularly at *Prosecutor v Furundžija* (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) and *Prosecutor v Stakić* (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003).

571 UNSC 'Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)' (3 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704.

Forms of Discrimination Against Women does not mention sexual assault, although it makes reference to the prohibition on “exploitation of prostitution”. The same is stated by the Trial Chamber in *Furundžija*, where it held that “[n]o international human rights instrument specifically prohibits rape or other serious sexual assault”⁵⁷². In both cases, the Chambers then resort to human rights provisions safeguarding physical integrity. In *Furundžija*, the ICTY Trial Chamber refers to the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in Art. 7 ICCPR, Art. 5 Banjul Charter and Art. 5 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, reference is made to Art. 4 Banjul Charter which prohibits violations of the right to integrity of a person and the jurisprudence of the ECommHR (*Cyprus v Turkey*⁵⁷³) and the ECtHR (*Aydin v Turkey*⁵⁷⁴) which deals with rape committed by State officials, acts that the Court and the Commission classified as a violation of Art. 3 of the ECHR. In *Milutinovic*, the Chamber holds that “[t]he right not to be sexually assaulted has (...) been subsumed under more general fundamental rights relating to physical integrity”⁵⁷⁵. The Chamber is here referring to the above-quoted explanation in *Furundžija* and does not give its own explanations on the matter.

While it remains true that the ‘sexual assault’ is not explicitly used in any human rights treaty, the Chamber fails to look at the interpretation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) by its treaty body, the Commission on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.⁵⁷⁶ How and to what extent the jurisprudence and the general recommendations of this quasi-judicial body could have been of help to the ICTY is examined below (under Part Two Chapter Three).

572 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 170.

573 *Cyprus v Turkey* (ECommHR App 6780/74 and 6950/75) 4 EHRR 482.

574 *Aydin v Turkey* (ECtHR) Reports 1997-VI <<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58371>> (31 October 2017); the case of *Aydin v Turkey* is referred to by several other Chambers as well, for example in *Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)* IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 145.

575 *Prosecutor v Milutinovic (Judgment)* IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para. 188.

576 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13.

2. Rape as Torture

In the first case at the ICTR, *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, the court argues that 'rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts'⁵⁷⁷. This mirrors, as the chamber explicitly mentions, an approach central to the CAT, which 'does not catalogue specific acts in its definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual framework of state-sanctioned violence'.⁵⁷⁸ The Chamber furthermore compares rape to torture in terms of the purposes the acts serve and the violation of personal dignity, leading to the conclusion that rape indeed constitutes torture 'when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity'.⁵⁷⁹

In *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case)*, the ICTY was faced with the need to determine whether rape could be considered torture in violation of the Geneva Conventions.⁵⁸⁰ After examining the provisions under humanitarian law, which prohibit rape and other forms of sexual assault and after concentrating on the definition of rape, the chamber discussed the jurisprudence of international judicial bodies on the issue of rape as torture. Reference was made by the court to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the *Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru* Case⁵⁸¹ and the ECtHR in *Aydin v Turkey*⁵⁸². The Trial Chamber uses these two cases to determine the constituent elements of torture and also to outline the difference between torture on the one hand and inhuman or degrading treatment on the other. In *Aydin v Turkey*, the ECtHR held that the difference between torture and inhuman or degrading treatment was 'to allow the special stigma of "torture" to attach only to deliberate inhuman treat-

577 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) paras 596, 687.

578 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 687.

579 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 597-.

580 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998).

581 *Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru* Case 10.970 IACommHR Report No 5/96 (1 March 1996); see *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) paras 481-486.

582 *Aydin v Turkey* (ECtHR) Reports 1997-VI <<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58371>> (31 October 2017); see *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) paras 487-489.

ment causing very serious and cruel suffering'.⁵⁸³ The ECtHR, as well as the responsible ICTY Trial Chamber in *Celebići*, concludes that rape does involve such a severe level of suffering that the crime can be categorized as torture. To this end, the ICTY Chamber also refers to a similar oral statement by the Special Rapporteur on Torture⁵⁸⁴ and a statement by the Commission of Experts outlining the physical and psychological suffering experienced by victims of rape.⁵⁸⁵ Finally, the ICTY examined whether any of the prohibited purposes necessary for the act to be classified as torture are given. To this end, the Chamber considered the prohibited purpose of discrimination and pointed to the report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict and, albeit indirectly, also to the work of the CEDAW Committee. In its Report on 'Contemporary forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict' the Special Rapporteur cites the CEDAW Committee saying that 'violence directed against a woman because she is a woman, including "acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering", represents a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits the ability of women to enjoy human rights and freedoms'.⁵⁸⁶ The ICTY fails to clarify that the CEDAW Committee sees gender-based vio-

583 *Aydın v Turkey* (ECtHR) Reports 1997-VI <<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58371>> (31 October 2017) para. 82; see also *Ireland v United Kingdom* (ECtHR) Series A No 25, para. 167.

584 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 491, referring to the oral introduction of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr P Kooijmans, to his 1992 report to the Commission on Human Rights according to which rape or other forms of sexual assault against women in detention were a particularly ignominious violation of the inherent dignity and the right to physical integrity of the human being, they accordingly constituted an act of torture' UN Doc E/CNA/1992/SR.21 para.35. See UN Commission on Human Rights 'Question of the human rights of all persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment, in particular: torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley' (12 January 1995) UN Doc E/CNA/1995/34.

585 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 492, referring to UNSC 'Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994): Annex IX' (9 December 1994) UN Doc S/1994/1405, Section D.

586 UN Commission on Human Rights 'Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur' (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13,

lence explicitly in the context of State parties obligations and defines discriminatory and therefore illegal gender-based violence broadly, not only as violence committed against a woman because she is a woman, but also violence which affects women disproportionately⁵⁸⁷ as discrimination prohibited by CEDAW. Here, the court fails to acknowledge that discrimination, which it has earlier identified as one possible of the necessary prohibited purposes in torture, manifests itself in the mass occurrence of violence against women. States can be in breach of CEDAW in this case, either when they do not live up to the due diligence standard of prevention and punishment of violent acts against women or if the perpetrators are State agents. These findings of the CEDAW Committee are directly relevant to many cases of sexual violence under international law and open an entry point for prosecutorial innovations. By cutting the CEDAW Committee's definition in half and taking the definition of gender-based violence that arguably has the higher threshold and is harder to prove (violence is committed against a woman because she is a woman) the court limited the application area of the definition in cases of crime requiring discrimination like persecution or torture. The reason why the ICTY chose to only employ part of the CEDAW Commission's definition could be that the Court thought itself on safer ground in terms of the customary nature of the definition when using the more narrow part of the definition. However, the approach to place all violence against women in the context of discrimination has been established years before the *Celebići* judgement and supported by a variety of institutions and UN agencies. In 1993, the UNGA adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women ('DEVW'), which acknowledges in its preamble that

'violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the

para. 55; see also UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 'General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women' (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 6.

587 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 'General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women' (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 6.

crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men'.⁵⁸⁸

Article 1 DEVW states

'[f]or the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.'

These provisions seem to suggest that the terms violence against women and gender-based violence are used basically used as synonyms, even though the CEDAW Committee uses gender-based violence both in a broader and in a narrower sense than violence against women.⁵⁸⁹ It is broader than the term violence against women because the former also encompasses violence in which gender is not the 'main or sole determinant' of the violence committed.⁵⁹⁰ It is also narrower than the term gender-based violence as violence against women obviously excludes any violence committed against men or intersex persons in which gender is the decisive factor.⁵⁹¹ However, the DEVW states that both terms refer to actions rooted in systematic oppression and discrimination. As the ICTY case at hand concerns the rape of women, the events fall under the application area of both terms, even if they are not congruent. Furthermore, the approach of the CEDAW Committee was endorsed by the Special Rapport-

588 UNGA Res 48/104 'Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women' (20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 217.

589 See also Alice Edwards *Violence against Women under International Human Rights Law* (CUP Cambridge 2011) at 20, where she states that, even though the two terms are used interchangeably in international law, international human rights instruments tend to prefer the term 'violence against women' while the 'jurisprudence, guidelines and policy statements of the broader UN' favor 'gender-based violence'.

590 Alice Edwards 'Everyday rape: International human rights law and violence against women in peacetime' in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro *Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Routledge Abingdon 2010) 92-108, 97-98.

591 Alice Edwards 'Everyday rape: International human rights law and violence against women in peacetime' in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro *Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Routledge Abingdon 2010) 92-108, 98.

teur on Violence against Women from her first report of 1994 on.⁵⁹² The decision of the court to limit the definition to the first part is even less conceivable as it is accompanied with no further analysis in the findings. The court merely states that two women were raped because they were women, without further analysis to back up this statement.⁵⁹³ Furthermore, the court lets slip the opportunity to link back to the fundamental treaty in the area of gender-related violence and discrimination against women and to strengthen its argumentation by reiterating the fact that rape, particularly when committed by State officials, can constitute a breach of CEDAW.

The court could also have referred to the elaborate description of the scope of the DEVWD in Article 2 and the modalities in which violence against women can be committed.⁵⁹⁴

Finally, the Court cites, without further analysis, the Special Rapporteur's report: '[i]n many cases the discrimination prong of the definition of torture in the Torture Convention provides an additional basis for prosecuting rape and sexual violence as torture'.⁵⁹⁵ As explained, the court takes 'discrimination' to be an additional purpose which is pursued by the

592 UN Commission on Human Rights' Special Rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy 'Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45' (22 November 1994) E/CN.4/1995/42 para. 29; see also UN ECOSOC Res 1996/12 (23 July 1997) UN Doc E/RES/1996/12 and UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/52, Addendum 1: International, regional and national developments in the area of violence against women 1994-2003' (27 February 2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/75/Add.1 paras 5, 56; several Special Rapporteurs have repeatedly also used a variation of the phrase 'violence and other forms of discrimination against women' see eg UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Yakin Ertürk 'Integration of the human rights of women and the gender perspective: Violence against Women; The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its causes and consequences' (20 January 2006) E/CN.4/2006/61 para. 97; UNGA 'Advancement of women: Note by the Secretary-General' (1 August 2011) UN Doc A/66/215 para 13.

593 See *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) paras 941 and 963.

594 See Part Two Chapter Three III e below.

595 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 493; UN Commission on Human Rights 'Systematic rape, sexual

intentional inflicting of severe mental or physical pain or suffering. This is in line with Art. 1 (1) CAT. The court strengthens its argument by referring to the CEDAW Committee. Its reasoning is sexual violence constitutes discrimination which is one of the purposes with which the severe mental and physical harm must be inflicted in order to constitute torture. The equation of gender-based violence with discrimination is one of the cornerstones of the modern human rights jurisprudence on gender issues. The CEDAW Committee issues two General Recommendations (No 12 and No 19) which state that CEDAW obliges Member States to protect women from violence and that '[g]ender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men'⁵⁹⁶ thereby bringing violence against women under the ambit of CEDAW.

In its findings and after the analysis of the human rights provisions discussed, the Trial Chamber enumerates four constituent elements of torture:

- (i) There must be an act or omission that causes severe pain or suffering, whether mental or physical,
- (ii) which is inflicted intentionally,
- (iii) and for such purposes as obtaining information or a confession from the victim, or a third person, punishing the victim for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
- (iv) and such act or omission being committed by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, an official or other person acting in an official capacity.⁵⁹⁷

The most remarkable conclusions which the Court draws after having resulted the jurisprudence and other documents of human rights law, are that a. the court takes into account not only the physical but also the psychological suffering that rape causes and also states that b. 'it is difficult to

slavery and slave-like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur' (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, para. 55.

596 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 'General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women' (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1 para 1.

597 Unlike this definition and art. 1 CAT, Art. 7 (1) (f) Rome Statute does not require any 'specific' purpose, see Part Two III 2. (b) (2) above.

envisage circumstances in which rape, by, or at the instigation of a public official, or with the consent or acquiescence of an official, could be considered as occurring for a purpose that does not, in some way, involve punishment, coercion, discrimination or intimidation. In the view of this Trial Chamber this is inherent in situations of armed conflict'.⁵⁹⁸ The Trial Chamber therefore concludes that whenever the aforementioned criteria are fulfilled, rape constitutes torture. This approach has been followed by several other Trial and Appeals Chambers, which refer to the *Celebići* -approach and usually, in a footnote, also to the Trial Chamber's reference to 'reports and decisions of organs of the UN and regional bodies'.⁵⁹⁹

II. Where Could Women's Human Rights Have Been Referred to?

1. Genocide

The case of *Jean-Paul Akayesu* at the ICTR was the first time an international criminal tribunal held that rape, under certain circumstances, can amount to genocide.⁶⁰⁰ The initial indictment to the case, which was submitted by the Prosecutor on 13 February 1996 and confirmed on 16 February 1996, did not contain any acts of sexual violence.⁶⁰¹ It was only during the proceedings when the judges started asking questions to a witness who had mentioned that her daughter had been raped during the genocide, that the prosecutor investigated those crimes and the indictment was subsequently amended in June 1997.⁶⁰² The Court heard many more accounts of rapes and other forms of sexual violence and based on them held Akayesu responsible for rape as genocide, as the court found that the rapes were committed solely against Tutsi women and with the intent of destroying

598 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 495.

599 See *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Appeal Judgment)* IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002) para. 151 (fn 206); *Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment)* IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para. 485 (fn 1265);.

600 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998).

601 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Amended Indictment)* ICTR-96-4-I (June 1997) para. 6.

602 See for example the account by one of the Judges to the case: Navanethem Pillay 'Protection of the Health of Women through International Criminal Law: Can International Criminal Law contribute to Efforts to Improve the Health of Women?' (2008) 22 *Emory International Law Review* 15–28, 17–18.

the Tutsi group as a whole.⁶⁰³ The Chamber affirmed that rape and sexual violence ‘constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such’.⁶⁰⁴ The judges further stated that ‘[t]hese rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole’.⁶⁰⁵ However, the *Akayesu* judgement does not cite any other international criminal law or human rights law documents or instruments supporting its finding that rape and/or sexual violence can constitute genocide, even though such (soft law) documents can be found in the realm of international human rights law. The classification of rape as genocide did not start during the *Akayesu* proceedings. The foundation is obviously to be found in the Genocide Convention. The key element for actions to be characterized as genocide is the genocidal special intent.

The notion of rape as genocide had come up in human rights documents years earlier; it was, for instance, mentioned in para. 145 (d) Beijing Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, which called upon governments to ‘[r]eaffirm that rape in the conduct of armed conflict constitutes a war crime and under certain circumstances it constitutes a crime against humanity and an act of genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’.⁶⁰⁶ Furthermore, the Platform for Action pushed for investigations of those acts and prosecution of those responsible.

Another document which points to the relation between rape and genocide is the Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict of June 1998 which affirms the importance of the correct legal classification of acts of sexual violence and slavery as ‘international crimes of slavery, crimes

603 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 706, 724, 731–34.

604 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 731.

605 *Ibid.*

606 Fourth World Conference on Women ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action’ in ‘Report’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4.

against humanity, genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, war crimes or torture'⁶⁰⁷

Referring to these soft law documents as indicators of customary international law would have at the same time strengthened and facilitated the courts arguments. The developments in *Akayesu* led to more indictments and/or convictions for rape as genocide in the ICTR and ICTY. Even though the link between rape and genocide is not explicitly drawn in the Rome Statute itself (by way of including sexual violence of one of the acts through which genocide can be committed), the ICC's Elements of Crime contain a footnote to Element No 1 to Art. 6 (a) dealing with genocide committed by causing serious bodily or mental harm. The footnote states that '[t]his conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment'.⁶⁰⁸

2. Definition of Rape

Prior to the establishment of the ICTR and the ICTY, there was no commonly accepted definition of rape in international law. As *Akayesu*, the first case before the ICTR, as mentioned above,⁶⁰⁹ included charges of rape, the tribunal was forced to define the term. In order to do so, the ICTR considered the definitions found in 'certain national jurisdictions'⁶¹⁰ without specifying which jurisdictions it was referring to and arrived at the conclusion that those jurisdictions defined rape as 'non-consensual intercourse', while some included acts 'which involve the insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexual'.⁶¹¹ The Court went on comparing rape to torture under international human rights law and stated

'[t]he Chamber considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description

607 UN Commission on Human Rights 'Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur' (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, para. 8; see also para. 34.

608 Elements of Crimes (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B), footnote 3.

609 See Part Two Chapter Three I. 2. above.

610 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para. 596.

611 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para. 596.

of objects and body parts. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment does not catalogue specific acts in its definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual frame work of state sanctioned violence. This approach is more useful in international law. Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.⁶¹²

The Chamber did not, however, look at any instruments available regarding women's rights. It goes on defining rape as 'a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive'. Additionally, the ICTR holds sexual violence, which it states includes rape, to be 'any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive'.⁶¹³ This definition of rape which is used is a very wide one and does lead to new ambiguities, for example when it comes to the question what an 'invasion' consists of.

The approach taken by the ICTR in *Akayesu* was nevertheless subsequently confirmed by the ICTY in *Delalić*.⁶¹⁴ There, the chamber dealt solely with charges of rape as torture as a crime against humanity and not with accusations of genocide. The court did not include any own reasoning of the definition of rape, but simply cited the one used in *Akayesu* and stated that it saw no reason to depart from that approach.⁶¹⁵ The court then went on to examine the state of international jurisprudence of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies on the issue of rape as torture. In particular, the tribunal considered the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the ECtHR on the matter.

In *Furundžija* the ICTY held that due to the principle of specificity and the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*, in order to define the elements of rape in international law, one had to resort to a comparison of the different national jurisdictions and analyse what elements they see as a prerequisite for establishing rape. The court in *Furundžija* deemed that necessary be-

612 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 597; see also para 687.

613 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001), para. 598.

614 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998).

615 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) 478–79.

cause it held that 'no elements other than those emphasized may be drawn from international treaty or customary law, nor is resort to general principles of international criminal law or to general principles of international law of any avail. As the chamber held that, even though rape and sexual assault is expressly prohibited under international humanitarian law and courts and tribunals have convicted accordingly,⁶¹⁶ no human rights instrument specifically prohibited rape and sexual assault, the Trial Chamber therefore considered that, to arrive at an accurate definition of rape (...) it is necessary to look for principles of criminal law common to the major legal systems of the world. These principles may be derived, with all due caution, from national laws'.⁶¹⁷ The Chamber did, however, acknowledge an implicit protection from rape and sexual assault by provisions protecting physical integrity, which the chamber saw as 'undeniably part of customary law'.⁶¹⁸ As such, human rights provisions, concepts and discourse indirectly found their way into the definition of rape used in *Furundžija*.⁶¹⁹ It also goes to show that judges often feel the need to demonstrate that norms developed under international criminal law or international humanitarian law conform with human rights law and how international criminal law, through shaping the customary law in this area, might also contribute to furthering a definition of rape under human rights law.⁶²⁰

616 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998), para 168.

617 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998), paras 168-171, 177.

618 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998), para 170; that sexual violence in armed conflict violates a number of basic human rights had been stated in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993: 'Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict are violations of the fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. All violations of this kind, including in particular murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, require a particularly effective response'; UN World Conference on Human Rights 'Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action' (25 June 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 para 38.

619 Theodor Meron 'Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals' Fourth Marek Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%20documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov08.pdf> (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online) 23.

620 Theodor Meron 'Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals' Fourth Marek Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%20documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov08.pdf> (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online) 23.

The *Furundžija* Trial Chamber's definition of rape, deducted from general principles of criminal law common to the major legal stems of the world was the following. The objective elements of rape were 1. a. the sexual penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or b. of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 2. by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.⁶²¹

In *Kunarac*, a comparison of different national jurisdictions was undertaken in order to determine the scope and the limits of consent with the result that one of the elements of rape were not established. The Trial Chamber in *Kunarac* had to engage in such a comparison because the definitions which had been developed earlier by the ICTR in *Akayesu* and the ICTY in *Furundžija* were too unspecific for the former and too narrow when it comes to the latter for the case in question. The Chamber was of the opinion that in the specific case in question, a narrow definition of consent as applied in *Furundžija* would neglect other factors which 'would render an act of sexual penetration *non-consensual or non-voluntary* on the part of the victim'⁶²²

In *Furundžija*, the Trial Chamber took recourse to rather unorthodox arguments in order to affirm its jurisdiction over sexual violence. For instance, it stated that forced oral penetration constituted rape even though the Chamber held that there might not be sufficient State Practice to substantiate this claim under customary international law. The reason for this, according to the Trial Chamber, was that in the context of an armed conflict, the conduct in question was aggravated into aggravated sexual assault.⁶²³ Therefore, the Chamber held that no violation of *nullum crimen sine lege* occurred. In this, the Court very much acted as a lawmaker driving a creative, yet risky line of argument without sufficient backing from legal doctrine. The Court cannot argue that State practice of *some* States

0documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov08.pdf > (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online) 23-4.

621 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 185.

622 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (22 February 2001) para. 438.

623 *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para 184; Mia Swart 'Judicial Lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of the Sources of International Law and "Adventurous Interpretation"' (2010) 70 *ZaöRV* 459-486, 467-8.

(but not enough) categorize forced oral intercourse as rape and that the context of the of an armed conflict somehow helps to bridge this gap by making any prohibited act somehow more grave so that therefore the act falls into the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.

Here, referring to human rights instruments regarding violence against women would have greatly facilitated the court's argumentation. As we will see below, even though violence against women is not specifically dealt with in any of the major human rights treaties, General Recommendation No 19 of the CEDAW Committee brought gender-based violence within the ambit of CEDAW. Gender based violence is defined as 'violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty'.⁶²⁴ As such, the General Recommendation transformed CEDAW 'from an anti-discrimination treaty into a gender-based violence treaty'.⁶²⁵ Using this argumentation, the court would have been on more solid doctrinal ground as the CEDAW Committee provides authoritative interpretation of the CEDAW.

The legal nature and relevance of the general recommendations (or 'General Comments' as they are called in some of the treaty bodies) is disputed. Some commentators see them as authoritative interpretations,⁶²⁶ while others ascribe them mere advisory character and regard it as apt if they are merely taken into consideration or even deny them any legal weight altogether.⁶²⁷ It seems hard to argue that the General Recommendations/Comments, can be more than non-binding soft law. Already the

624 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 'General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women' (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1,.

625 Alice Edwards, 'Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) 18 *Texas Journal of Women and the Law* 1–54.

626 See eg Manfred Nowak *U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary* (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 49; Nowak does, however, emphasize that the General Comments (of the HRC) cannot be more than non-binding interpretations; nevertheless, the HRC—and this argumentation can be conferred to the other treaty bodies as well—has, in his opinion, the authority to interpret the ICCR and he underlines the 'authoritative and universal character of these interpretations'.

627 See Philip Alston 'The Historical Origins of the Concept of "General Comments" in Human Rights Law' in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Vera Gowlland-

terms ‘recommendations’ or ‘comments’ point to their non-binding character. The text of CEDAW itself does not contain anything to the way that the CEDAW Committee should be invested with judicial authority the States Parties explicitly subordinated to.

Nevertheless, the General Comments of the CEDAW Committee constitute a valuable, even an indispensable source of interpretation of CEDAW (as the General Recommendations/Comments of the other committees do for their respective treaties). This is because all human rights treaties are by necessity formulated in a very broad manner that leaves a lot of room for interpretation. As already Cesare Beccaria has pointed out (quoted by Philip Alston), “rights” and “obligations” are, in some respects at least “abbreviated symbols of the rational argument” rather than ideas themselves’.⁶²⁸ This vagueness of terms leads to insecurity on the side of the rights-holders and provide those who are obliged to guarantee and protect the rights with an opportunity to manipulate them and deprive them of their content. This is where General Recommendations by the experts sitting in the treaty bodies comes in. The development, at the international arena, of jurisprudence, which elaborates on and clarifies the normative content and the obligations and implications deriving from a specific treaty provision, decreases the possibilities for Member States to interpret their obligations in a way which would essentially deprive them of their purpose. Even though the General Recommendations are not binding in a strict legal sense, they constitute a powerful tool as the interpretation by the ‘guardian of the convention’, a Committee made up of independent experts from all over the world whose recommendations on a specific issue are of great weight and cannot easily be disregarded by national courts and State officials. This is even more so because, until now, all the General Recommendations of the Committee have been adopted by consen-

Debbas *The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality: Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab* (Nijhoff The Hague 2001) 763-776, 764.

- 628 Philip Alston ‘The Historical Origins of the Concept of “General Comments” in Human Rights Law’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Vera Gowlland-Debbas *The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality: Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab* (Nijhoff The Hague 2001) 763-776, 767; Cesare Beccaria *On Crime and Punishment and Other Writings* (Cambridge University Press 1995) 12.

sus,⁶²⁹ (even though this is no requirement stipulated in the Rules of Procedure of the CEDAW Committee).⁶³⁰ Hence, one cannot look at CEDAW isolated from the consideration of its interpretation and clarification by the CEDAW Committee. If the ICTY looks at CEDAW in order to establish the extent to which sexual assault constitutes the denial of fundamental rights, it should also consider the limits and fields of application assigned to the convention by its treaty body.

The CEDAW Committee deals with violence against women on a structural level, as 'group-based harm, a practice of social inequality carried out on an individual level'.⁶³¹ Gender-based violence is seen as systematic and endemic and in this respect, the legal and sociological language used is very similar to the mass-scale crimes international criminal law is dealing with. In this respect, international criminal law has a lot to gain from the jurisprudence and the General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee as well as other treaty bodies when it comes to gender-based crimes prosecuted on an international level. The discourse of the CEDAW and the CESCRC on the one side and the international criminal courts and tribunals are similar. As we will see, many more opportunities to put endemic violence against women within the context of discrimination and therefore persecution could have been realized had the Chambers referred to the available instruments and discussions.

629 Email correspondence with two members of the CEDAW Committee, Professor Ruth Halperi-Kaddari (16 September 2010) and Professor Niklas Bruun (17 September 2010).

630 Rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the CEDAW Committee stipulates: '1. The Committee shall endeavour to reach its decisions by consensus. 2. If and when all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted, decisions of the Committee shall be taken by a simple majority of the members present and voting' UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 'Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women' (2001) UN Doc A/56/38 Annex I.

631 See Alice Edwards, 'Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) 18 *Texas Journal of Women and the Law* 1–54, 25.

3. Persecution

As mentioned above, the *Milutinovic* judgment was the first judgment in which the court had to explore the issue of sexual assault as persecution. As the ICTY Statute did not provide for persecution on gender grounds to be charged, the Court, even though it does not explicitly state so in the judgment, discusses persecution on political, racial and religious grounds by rape and sexual assault of ‘Kosovo Albanians, in particular women by forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia.’⁶³² In the judgment, the responsible ICTY Chamber states that ‘[t]he term “sexual assault” is not explicitly used in any international human rights treaty. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women does not mention sexual assault, although it makes reference to the prohibition on “exploitation of prostitution”’. While this remains a true statement, the Court overlooked that ‘sexual assault’, like rape, has indeed been characterized as one of the modes of violence against women, which is outlawed by CEDAW. In General Recommendation 19 of 1992, the CEDAW Committee stated that ‘[t]he Convention in article 1 defines discrimination against women. The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention violence’.⁶³³ The committee explicitly refers to the correlation between sexual assault and armed conflict in emphasizing that ‘[w]ars, armed conflicts and the occupation of territories often lead to increased prostitution, trafficking in women and sexual assault of women, which require specific protective and punitive measures.’⁶³⁴ Furthermore, the CEDAW Committee urges States Parties to

632 *Prosecutor v Milutinović* (Judgment) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para 183; generally on rape and sexual assault as persecution see paras 183-203.

633 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 6.

634 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 16.

‘ensure that laws against family violence and abuse, rape, sexual assault and other gender-based violence give adequate protection to all women, and respect their integrity and dignity’.⁶³⁵ The committee additionally states that gender-based violence, (which includes sexual assault), ‘which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention’.⁶³⁶ One of the rights mentioned by the committee, the enjoyment of which is impaired or nullified by gender-based violence is ‘[t]he right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of international or internal armed conflict’.⁶³⁷

Instead of or in supplement to the Court’s arguments regarding sexual assault constitution torture and therefore a denial of a fundamental human right, the Court could have also referred directly to sexual assault as a form of gender-based violence constituting discrimination prohibited under Art. 1 CEDAW. The analysis conducted by the CEDAW Committee in its General Recommendation would in this respect have been of great value to the judges.

In *Milutinovic*, the Trial Chamber also dealt with the question whether the term ‘sexual assault’ encompasses acts, which can also include rape or whether it only refers to acts, which fall short of the definition of rape. Even though the court finally and rightly decides that ‘sexual assault’ can include, but is not limited to, rape, the Chamber disregarded human rights documents that substantiate this position. The Committee on the Rights of the Child, for instance, stated in its General Comment No. 3 that ‘[v]iolence, including rape and other forms of sexual abuse, can occur in the family or foster setting or be perpetrated by those with specific responsibilities towards children’.⁶³⁸

635 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 24 (b).

636 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 7.

637 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 7 (c).

638 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 3 (2003) (17 March 2003) UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/3 para. 34.

Not only equality was seen as a foundational principle of the CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee argued that the prohibition of gender-related violence should be one as well.⁶³⁹ This approach was affirmed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which states in its General Comment No 16 :

‘[g]ender based violence is a form of discrimination that inhibits the ability to enjoy rights and freedoms, including economic, social and cultural rights, on a basis of equality. States parties must take appropriate measures to eliminate violence against men and women and act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, mediate, punish and redress acts of violence against them by private actors’.⁶⁴⁰

It was also repeated by the Secretary General in its 2006 report of violence against women where he stated that

‘Evidence gathered by researchers of the pervasive nature and multiple forms of violence against women, together with advocacy campaigns, led to the recognition that violence against women was global, systemic and rooted in power imbalances and structural inequality between men and women. The identification of the link between violence against women and discrimination was key’.⁶⁴¹

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also repetitively discussed violence against women as a matter of inequality between

639 Alice Edwards ,*Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies* (2008) 18 *Texas Journal of Women and the Law* 1–54, 23.

640 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2005) ESCOR [2006] Supp 2, 116, para. 27.

641 UNGA ‘In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence against Women: Report of the Secretary-General’ (6 July 2006) UN Doc A/61/122/Add.1, para. 30; see also the very first sentence of the executive summary of the publication version ‘Violence against women is a form of discrimination and a violation of human rights. (...)The scope and extent of violence against women are a reflection of the degree and persistence of discrimination that women continue to face’, UNGA ‘In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence against Women: Report of the Secretary-General’ (Publication Version) (6 July 2006) <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/publications/English%20Study.pdf> (31 October 2017) i and further UNGA ‘Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women Report of the Secretary-General’ (4 August 2008) UN Doc A/63/214 para. 6.

men and women within its jurisprudence on many occasions.⁶⁴² The approach of the HRC on the matter is less clear. In its General Comment No 28 entitled 'Equality of Rights between Man and Women', the HRC stated that the 'full effect' of Art. 3 ICCPR is impaired 'whenever any person is denied the full and equal enjoyment of any right'.⁶⁴³ The HRC mentions, *inter alia*, rape, domestic violence and abduction as actions which impair the full and equal enjoyment of human rights for women. But it does not explicitly mention that gender-based violence constitutes sex discrimination. In its jurisprudence, however, the HRC also often discusses violence against women as infringements of certain rights within the ICCPR in relation to inequality.⁶⁴⁴ The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination had issued a General Recommendation in which it affirmed that racial discrimination can affect men and women differently and that, *inter alia*, sexual violence against members of a certain ethnic group or coerced sterilization of indigenous women, constitutes discrimination banned under ICERD.⁶⁴⁵

This will however still leave the problem of defining what discrimination in relation to persecution is. In terms of criminal law there is also the dilemma that if one categorizes sexual violence as discrimination, the perpetrator must also have fulfilled the *mens rea* of discrimination and not only that of rape or other forms of sexual violence.⁶⁴⁶ Another point arguing for caution when charging or deciding discrimination focused counts is that possibly the language of torture as a violation of physical integrity and basic human dignity is stronger than the language of discrimination. In human rights law, however, where torture, sexual violence and discrim-

642 See Alice Edwards, 'Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) 18 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 1–54, 24.

643 UN HRC 'General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (Art. 3)' (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133.

644 See Alice Edwards, 'Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) 18 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 1–54, 25.

645 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 'General Recommendation XXV on Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination' (20 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 18, 152, para. 2.

646 See partly See Alice Edwards, 'Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) 18 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 1–54, 27; see *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 816.

ination can fall under the heading of crimes against humanity, war crimes or even genocide, it seems less of a danger that the respective crimes carry markedly different levels of perceived wrongness with them.

Even though these arguments can lead to the prosecution deciding against using discrimination-based charges, such a decision can only be made on a case by case basis and the judges as well as the prosecution should possess the knowledge necessary to use this argumentation if it fits the facts of the case.

III. Where is the Link?

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on women and security, which highlighted the role of women in conflict and peace building.⁶⁴⁷ Together with UNSC Resolution 1820, in which the Security Council stated that States, in times of conflict, have an obligation to protect their population against sexual violence as part of their responsibility to 'protect and ensure the human rights of their citizens',⁶⁴⁸ this resolution explicitly stressed the relevance of CEDAW the obligations of States not only in peace time but also during conflict.⁶⁴⁹ At the same time, CEDAW outlines concrete actions and obligations necessary to achieve the commitments of Resolutions 1325 and 1820 one of which is the protection of women and girls from gender-based violence.⁶⁵⁰ Resolutions 1325 and 1820 highlight the interrelation between CEDAW as a human rights instrument with commitments to protect women in conflict and punish perpetrators of gender-based violence. On the other hand, the Resolutions demonstrate the vagueness with which this interrelation is often hinted at, characterized by the insecurity regarding how CEDAW and other human rights instruments tie in with these commitments. This approach is symptomatic for bodies dealing with the mass commission of sexual crime in the context of conflict: reference to human rights law is somewhat expect-

647 UNSC Res 1325 (2000) (31 October 2000) SCOR 55th Year 177.

648 UNSC Res 1820 (2008) (19 June 2008) SCOR [1 August 2007–31 July 2008] 154.

649 UNIFEM 'CEDAW and Security Council Resolution 1325: A Quick Guide' <<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/cedaw-and-security-council-resolution-1325-a-quick-guide/>> (31 October 2017) 4.

650 *Ibid.*

ed and so lip service is paid to human rights, while an insecurity on the content, the authorities to be consulted and the general usefulness of human rights law to the area of gender-based crimes can be detected.

In the following, human rights instruments are analysed concerning their gender-based crime content and intersections are pointed out where reference would foster gender-based crime cases. In turn, crimes under international criminal and humanitarian law are scrutinized regarding their potential for being used to punish gender-based crimes.

1. State Obligations regarding Violence against Women

The concept of special human rights for women is a relatively recent phenomenon, which has long been neglected on the agenda of universal human rights. This neglect has a variety of reasons. First, the legal inequality of men and women has for a long time been completely accepted in domestic legal systems and has not even been questioned by those striving to implement a system of universal human rights protection. Second, even the ones who were sympathetic to legal equality for both sexes at the time of the drafting of the Universal Bill of Rights meant to achieve this purpose by creating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and (as envisaged in the early stages of drafting the Covenants) a legally binding document mirroring the Declaration, which would encompass fundamental rights of all of humankind independent of sex. At the time of drafting the Universal Bill of Rights, the approach that prevailed opted simply for including equality and non-discrimination clauses into the respective instruments. The UDHR, for example, reaffirms the belief 'in the equal rights for men and women' in its preamble. Art. 2 UDHR contains a non-discrimination clause, which also prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex. Finally, Art. 16 UDHR enshrines equal rights for both sexes regarding marriage. Several provisions regarding non-discrimination and equality can also be found in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. However, these provisions are very general and focus on treating all people 'equal' by seeking to guarantee, through the implementation of non-discrimination, that human rights are accessible for all persons alike. Such a 'fits all' approach to human rights has in the years that followed been held as disregarding the special needs, specific situation and vulnerabilities of individuals belonging to particularly disenfranchised groups such as minorities, disabled people, children or women. Subsequently, a strand in the field of

human rights prevailed which recognized the importance of legally acknowledging the different needs of different groups, partly also advocating special measures in order to achieve true equality and the full enjoyment of human rights by these groups. In the field of protection of women's human rights, these instruments include the Convention on the Political Rights of Women,⁶⁵¹ the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages⁶⁵² as well as several treaties by the International Labour Organisation on aspects of women and work.⁶⁵³

In recent years, the approach of creating 'special protection schemes' for particular groups has been criticised by scholars and activists within these groups as contributing to side-lining these groups in major discussions and disregarding them in fields and conventions in which they are not explicitly mentioned. Particularly with regards to women's rights, some scholars have suggested that 'the price of the creation of separate institutional mechanisms and special measures dealing with women within the UN system has typically been the creation of a "women's ghetto", given less power, fewer resources and a lower priority than "mainstream" human rights bodies'.⁶⁵⁴ As much as there is some truth to the argument that it is easier to disregard special groups in 'mainstream' discussions with reference to a special protection regime which is dealing with a certain group and as much as the question should be allowed which groups 'deserve' a special protection regime and whether the reason why such a regime is established for one group but not for another can be legitimately raised, it can be doubted whether the complete absence of special protection regimes and the fostering of those groups' rights through more generally applicable measures would be a promising approach. It is more likely that women's concern would have continued to, as Chinkin and

651 Convention on the Political Rights of Women (adopted 20 December 1952, entered into force 7 July 1954) 193 UNTS 135.

652 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (adopted 7 November 1962, entered into force 9 December 1964) 521 UNTS 231 (Marriage Convention).

653 See also Hilary Charlesworth 'Inside/Outside: women and the International Human Rights System' in Aristotle Constantinides and Nikos Zaikos *The Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K Koufa* (Nijhoff Leiden 2009), 382–98, 386.

654 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin *The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis* (Manchester University Press Manchester 2000) 219.

Charlesworth put it, 'to be submerged by what are regarded more "global issues"''.⁶⁵⁵

a. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The ICCPR contains several provisions with respect to women's rights which can be of relevance in the context of international criminal law.

First, the ICCPR contains a number of provisions, which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. Art. 2 (1) ICCPR provides that

'[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'.

Article 3 is solely dedicated to the equal enjoyment of civil and political rights by both men and women and reads '[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant'. The HRC also has issued a specific General Comment on Art. 3 ICCPR (General Comment No. 28),⁶⁵⁶ in which it enlists State obligations regarding several articles in the ICCPR in light of the obligation to equality enshrined in Art. 3 ICCPR. Several of these obligations are relevant in the context of international criminal law. The HRC does, for example, discuss issues like rape, female genital mutilation and forced abortion and sterilization in the context of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art. 7 (and also under Art. 24 ICCPR dealing with the rights of the child).⁶⁵⁷ It also explicitly acknowledges that women are particularly vulnerable in armed conflict and requests States Parties to

655 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin *The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis* (Manchester University Press Manchester 2000) 219.

656 UN HRC 'General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (Art. 3)' (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133.

657 UN HRC 'General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (Art. 3)' (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133 para 11.

inform the HRC about measures taken in these situations ‘to protect women from rape, abduction and other forms of gender based violence’.⁶⁵⁸

Furthermore, the HRC requires information on national laws outlawing these actions, on preventive measures and on legal remedies for victims; rape cases are also mentioned in para. 20 as an example of the violation of the right to privacy by taking into account a woman’s sexual life when determining her scope of legal protection.⁶⁵⁹ The Committee also states that parties are under an obligation to inform the HRC about measures taken ‘to eliminate trafficking of women and children, within the country or across borders, and forced prostitution’ under Art. 8 ICCPR which deals with the prohibition of slavery. Furthermore, the Committee addresses several issues, which could be relevant in the case of establishing persecution on gender grounds. For instance, the HRC asks States to provide information on clothing requirements for women in public (at para. 13), marital or parental powers over women (at para. 16), whether the right to fair trial and access to courts under Art. 14 ICCPR can fully be exercised by women, (at. Para 18), the degree to which women can enjoy the right to be recognized as persons before the law (at para. 19).

Art. 4 ICCPR, which deals with the possibility of derogation from certain rights in times of emergency states that

in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.

A state of emergency can, for example, be proclaimed in case of internal disturbances, civil unrest or an armed conflict of an international or non-international character. This means that some of the scenarios which call for a public emergency coincide with the situations in which was violations of human rights law and crimes under international law are extraordinarily often committed.

658 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (Art. 3)’ (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133, para. 8.

659 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (Art. 3)’ (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133, para 20.

Finally, Art. 24 ICCPR deals with the rights of the child and again prohibits any discrimination on the basis of gender. It states ' [e]very child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.' According to General Comment No. 18 of the HRC, 'discrimination' as understood by the ICCPR is similarly construed as the same term in CEDAW or the ICERD.⁶⁶⁰

Art. 23 ICCPR deals with the right to found a family. Art. 23 (2) states that man and women of marriageable age shall have a right to marry. Art. 23 (3) ICCPR makes clear that '[n]o marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses'. This provision is the direct human rights equivalent to the prohibition of forced marriage. Forced marriage as a crime against humanity has been recognised by the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a crime against humanity and has been subsumed under 'other inhumane acts' (Art. 2 (i) Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone⁶⁶¹). The Rome Statute can charge 'forced marriage' either as an inhumane act (Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute) or as the Special Rapporteur of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery as enslavement (Art. 7 (1) (c) Rome Statute) or, more precisely, sexual slavery (Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute).⁶⁶²

Even though the HRC discusses many of these issues in terms of structural discrimination of women in its General Comment 28, the HRC has generally been hesitant to employ discrimination terminology and to address issues of prevalent harmful ideologies and structural causes for the

660 UN HRC 'General Comment No 18: Non-Discrimination' (9 November 1989) GAOR 45th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 173, para. 7.

661 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (concluded 16 January 2002; entered into force 12 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 145.

662 UN Commission on Human Rights 'Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur' (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 para. 8: 'In addition, this report emphasizes that practices such as (...)forced, temporary "marriages" to soldiers; and other practices involving the treatment of women as chattel, are both in fact and in law forms of slavery and, as such, violations of the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery'.

violation of women's human rights.⁶⁶³ Rather, the HRC Committee's focus, when addressing States Parties obligations generally or in Concluding Observations, has been on measures of criminal law, on 'the investigation, prosecution and punishment of these crimes'.⁶⁶⁴ In this, the HRC can again draw from a more refined system of criminal law and international criminal law and humanitarian law. This approach certainly offers more hands-on practical advice to States Parties and also more concrete ways of addressing problems which makes it easier and more likely for States Parties to adhere to the HRC's evaluations. On the other hand, the HRC misses out on opportunities for contributing an own approached focussed on a more long-term resolution in the field of women's human rights. As van Leeuwen put it 'the Committee only requests state parties to address the symptom of the disease, the manifestation of physical violence, but not the disease itself: gender inequality.'⁶⁶⁵

b. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

The realm of the ICESCR is, at first glance, further removed from international criminal law than the ICCPR, which protects, *inter alia*, the right to life and physical integrity, rights which are often primarily at stake in situations in situations of armed conflict and mass turmoil. At second glance, however, the ICESCR enshrines the claim of certain rights which are crucial to the full participation and enjoyment of everyday life on a non-discriminatory basis. Art. 2 (2) ICESCR set out that the rights in the Covenant will be exercised without discrimination to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.⁶⁶⁶ Art. 3 ICESCR mirrors Art. 3 ICCPR in

663 Fleur van Leeuwen *Women's Rights are Human Rights: The Practice of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (Intersentia Antwerp 2010) 143.

664 Fleur van Leeuwen *Women's Rights are Human Rights: The Practice of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (Intersentia Antwerp 2010) 143.

665 Fleur van Leeuwen *Women's Rights are Human Rights: The Practice of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (Intersentia Antwerp 2010) 143.

666 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3.

that it states that the parties to the ICESCR 'undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.' The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) clarified in General Comment No 16 that Arts 2, Arts 3 and 2 (2) ICESCR (and Arts 2(1) and 3 ICCPR) are not stand-alone provisions and, unlike Art 26 ICCPR, have to be read in conjunctions with the specific rights set out in the Covenants.⁶⁶⁷

Furthermore, in Art. 7 ICESCR, which outlines the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, Art. 7 (a) (i) obliges States parties to guarantee '[f]air wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work'. A grave violation of this right to guarantee the right to work to both sexes equally and not to disregard women when it comes to the conditions of work and its remuneration, could subsequently be an indication for persecution on gender grounds. A flagrant example, in which a grave violation of the right to work was one of many evidence of gender-based persecution, was the issuing and the subsequent enforcement of edicts prohibiting all but a few women to work outside home under the Taliban regime.⁶⁶⁸

What has been said above for the HRC⁶⁶⁹ is also true when it comes to interpretation of the ICESCR by its treaty body, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The Committee prefers to not concern itself so much with the structural routes of inequality, but rather calls for measures of criminal law to be applied in order to punish and redress violence against women. For example in its General Comment No 16 on the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights, the CESCR states '[g]ender based violence is a form of discrimination that inhibits the ability to enjoy rights and freedoms, including economic, social and cultural rights, on a basis of equali-

667 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 'General Comment No 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant)' (11 August 2005) ESCOR [2006] Supp 2, 116, para. 2.

668 Widney Brown and Laura Grenfell 'The International Crime of Gender-Based Persecution and the Taliban' (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 347–75, 350, 365–66.

669 See Part Two Chapter Three 1 a above.

ty. States parties must take appropriate measures to eliminate violence against men and women and act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, mediate, punish and redress acts of violence against them by private actors'⁶⁷⁰

Generally, the CESCR, more so than its counterpart, the HRC, outlines, in its General Comments Nos 3 and 20, the nature of State obligations towards the fulfilment of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR. In General Comment No. 3, the Committee on ESCR clarifies that the progressive realization of the ESC-rights only covers the result, the realization of the respective rights. In contrast, the States have an obligation to act towards the fulfilment of the rights 'within a reasonably short time after the Covenant's entry into force'.⁶⁷¹ The Committee goes on explaining that this obligation to act covers, in particular, the adoption of legislative measures (see also Art. 2 (1)), especially in the area of discrimination. Discrimination, according to the Committee, 'may be difficult to combat ... effectively in the absence of a sound legislative foundation for the necessary measures'⁶⁷² Discrimination is defined by the ESCR Committee in its General Comment No. 20 as 'any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of Covenant rights'.⁶⁷³ The Committee also points to the importance of adopting legislation to combat discrimination in para. 37 General Comment No 20. The ESCR Committee also reserves the right to consider, which measures are 'appropriate' in the meaning of

670 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 'General Comment No 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant)' (11 August 2005) ESCOR [2006] Supp 2, 116, para. 27.

671 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 'General Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations' (26 November–14 December 1990) ESCOR [1991] Supp 3, 83, para. 2.

672 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 'General Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations' (26 November–14 December 1990) ESCOR [1991] Supp 3, 83, para. 3.

673 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 'General Comment No 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)' (2 July 2009) ESCOR [2009], 118 para. 1.

Art. 2 (1) and calls on States parties to indicate in their reports not only the legislative measures towards the realization of ESC rights, but also to show why these measures are the most appropriate (see para. 4). General Comment No 20 additionally offers clarification on the evolving definition on 'sex' as a prohibited ground for discrimination. It states that since the ICESCR was adopted, the notion of the term has evolved to cover not only 'physiological characteristics but also the social construction of gender stereotypes, prejudices and expected roles, which have created obstacles to the equal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights'.⁶⁷⁴ This again can be helpful specifically for persecution on gender ground which is punishable pursuant to the Rome Statute. The considerations by the ESCR Committee might be helpful in order to determine whether a State policy of systematic discrimination rising, e.g., to the level of a crime against humanity of persecution, is or has been taken place. The failure of a State to adopt legislation shielding specific groups from discrimination can also, in some exceptional instances, be seen as a State policy which is 'consciously aimed at encouraging' an attack against a civilian population.⁶⁷⁵

However, it is important to note that '[t]he existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organizational action'.⁶⁷⁶ The ESCR Committee's General Comment No. 3 contains more content which can be of help for the international criminal court or tribunals. While the ESCR Committee also elaborates on specific grounds of discrimination potentially relevant in the context of international criminal prosecutions, such as race, colour, religion or sex, the ESCR Committee's specific General Comment on discrimination (General Comment No. 20) is more concerned with the issues of special measures and direct v indirect discrimination in the area of economic, social and cultural rights. While these are no doubt important issues in the field of human rights law, the human rights abuses which trigger international

674 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 'General Comment No 20 Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)' (2 July 2009) ESCOR [2009], 118 para. 20.

675 See footnote no 6 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B).

676 See footnote no 6 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B).

criminal prosecution are so flagrant and the threshold for the crimes is so high that the subtleties of anti-discrimination law will probably not be of much assistance to practitioners in defining persecution as a crime against humanity.

c. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women

In 1979, the CEDAW was adopted as the first of a number of major ‘special’ human rights conventions. CEDAW fulfils the initial intention by the drafters of the ICCPR and the IESCR to create a covenant which contains civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. CEDAW therefore transcends the divide between those two areas and includes a far-ranging set of rights covering issues from political participation to education of healthcare.⁶⁷⁷

Art. 1 CEDAW contains a definition of the terms ‘discrimination against women’ which is held to mean

any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social cultural, civil or any other field.

Taken the ICTY’s jurisprudence on the crime of persecution, according to which persecution is ‘the violation of the right to equality in some serious fashion that infringes on the enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right’⁶⁷⁸ and Art. 7 (2) (g) Rome Statute which states that persecution is ‘the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’, the definition set out in Article 1 CEDAW can provide a guideline for courts, in particular for the ICC, when faced with determining the core of persecution on gender grounds. In order to establish whether a ‘violation of the right to

677 See also Hilary Charlesworth ‘Inside/Outside: women and the International Human Rights System’ in Aristotle Constantinides and Nikos Zaikos *The Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K Koufa* (Nijhoff Leiden 2009) 382–98, 386.

678 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 697.

equality in some serious fashion' has taken place, the ICC or any other court or tribunal recognizing the crime of persecution in gender grounds, can also resort to the list of State obligations set out in Art. 2 CEDAW. These obligations range from enshrining the principle of equality in national constitutions (Art. 2 (a) CEDAW) to repealing national penal provisions which discriminate against women (Art. 2 (g) CEDAW). However, it should not be forgotten that CEDAW is subject to more reservations than any of the other major human rights treaty and its content as well as the innovative interpretation by its treaty body has been looked upon with suspicion by many Member States, which makes it harder for practitioners who want to refer to it in the context of substantive international criminal law but are unsure about the customary nature of some of its provisions.⁶⁷⁹

A provision in CEDAW which is linked to crimes under international law is Art. 6, which provides that 'States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women'. This provision is connected to the crimes of sexual slavery and enforced prostitution as a crime against humanity under Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute. It is important to note here that the term 'forced prostitution' in itself has been heavily criticised. For one, it has been argued that sexual slavery 'encompasses most, if not all forms of enforced prostitution'⁶⁸⁰, a term which has been defined as 'conditions of control over a person who is coerced by another to engage in sexual activity'.⁶⁸¹ Additionally, the term 'prostitution' trivializes the experience of the victim, as 'prostitution' contains a connotation of an exchange (sexual acts against money) and downplays the suffering and the coercion involved.⁶⁸²

679 Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman (eds) *International Human Rights in Context: Law Politics Morals* (3rd edition OUP Oxford 2008) 185.

680 UN Commission on Human Rights 'Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur' (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 para. 31.

681 UN Commission on Human Rights 'Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur' (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 para. 31.

682 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 212; see

However, CEDAW does not address one of the most pressing issues, namely violence against women. This disregard of violence against women concerns domestic violence as well as violence committed in armed conflict or any other setting in which crimes under international law can be committed. According to Hilary Charlesworth, the causes for this neglect may lay in the fact that at the time CEDAW was adopted, ‘the global extent of violence against women was not well-understood, or because violence was not analysed as a matter of discrimination’.⁶⁸³ A contributing reason is within the group of State experts drafting the convention, the predominant was governed by the dichotomy between ‘public’ acts exercised by the State and regulated through international treaties and ‘private’ acts by individuals, which were generally seen as being detracted from the field of international law. This dichotomy is one of the main criticisms of feminist legal theory towards traditional international legal thinking, as it downgrades many of the experiences and actions of females to the realm of the ‘private’ and hence withdraw them of the control of the State as well as of the competent jurisdiction of the international community.⁶⁸⁴ Be it as it may, violence against women has since then been addressed by the treaty body established under CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee. The CEDAW Committee issued two General Recommendations regarding violence against women. While General Recommendation No. 12 is very short and generally framed⁶⁸⁵, General Recommendation No. 19 clarifies that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination coming under the realm of CEDAW ‘which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or

also Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice in the International Criminal Court ‘Recommendations and Commentary for December 1997 PrepCom on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (1–12 December 1997) WC.5.6-9, 6–10.

683 Hilary Charlesworth ‘Inside/Outside: women and the International Human Rights System’ in Aristotle Constantinides and Nikos Zaikos *The Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K Koufa* (Nijhoff Leiden 2009), 382–98, 386.

684 See eg Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin *The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis* (Manchester University Press Manchester 2000).

685 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation No 12: Violence against Women’ (1989) Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 6 at 237 (2003).

under human rights conventions'.⁶⁸⁶ As Alice Edwards puts it, this approach '[i]n many ways (...) transformed the CEDAW from an anti-discrimination treaty into a gender-based violence treaty'.⁶⁸⁷ General Recommendation No. 19 included within the scope of these human rights and fundamental freedoms affected by gender-based violence:

- (a) The right to life;
- (b) The right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
- (c) The right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of international or internal armed conflict;
- (d) The right to liberty and security of person;
- (e) The right to equal protection under the law;
- (f) The right to equality in the family;
- (g) The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health;
- (h) The right to just and favourable conditions of work.

Therefore, General Comment No. 19 refers to several issues of relevance to international criminal law and the protection of women against crimes under international law which primarily or frequently affect them. In the context of international criminal proceedings, albeit giving due consideration to the differences of the two regimes, judges would gain from referring to the jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee to underline the fact that violence against women is seen not only as a crime against the women's physical integrity, but also as an indication and stemming from a system discrimination against women. In proceedings which deal with gender-based discrimination, the ICC can refer to the authority of the CEDAW Committee in order to establish grave violations of the prohibition of violence against women as one of the signs for the grave denials of human rights which constitutes persecution.

However, the fact that the single most important universal instrument on women's rights does itself not explicitly mention violence against

686 Para. 7 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 'General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women' (30 January 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1.

687 Alice Edwards, 'Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) 18 *Texas Journal of Women and the Law* 1–54.

women does doubtlessly diminish its value for application by judges seeking to ensure they are on the safe ground of customary international law.

d. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination

In 2000, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination published General Recommendation 25 which dealt with specific aspects of racial discrimination which do not affect men and women in the same way.⁶⁸⁸ In it, the Committee ties in with sexual violence against women in the context of international criminal law, for instance sexual violence committed against women of a specific ethnic or racial group in armed conflict or during detention or forced sterilization of indigenous women.⁶⁸⁹

e. UNGA Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women

In 1993, the UNGA adopted the DEVW, which acknowledges in its preamble that ‘violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men’.⁶⁹⁰ Article 1 DEVWD states ‘[f]or the purposes of this Declaration, the term “violence against women” means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of

688 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘General Recommendation XXV on Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination’ (20 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 18, 152.

689 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘General Recommendation XXV on Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination’ (20 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 18, 152, para 2.

690 UNGA Res 48/104 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’ (20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 217.

liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.’⁶⁹¹ The Declaration includes a detailed description of its scope in Article 2 which provides that

Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;

(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution;

(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.⁶⁹²

In 1994, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 1994/45, which established a Special Rapporteur on violence against women, including its causes and consequences,⁶⁹³ who also reported specifically on violence against women committed within the context of armed conflict.⁶⁹⁴

f. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Banjul Charter)

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) contains a very broad provision obliging Member States to ‘ensure the elimi-

691 UNGA Res 48/104 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’ (20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 217.

692 See Art. 2 UNGA Res 48/104 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’ (20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 217; the same definitional has been used in para. 113 UN World Conference on Women (4th) ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4 and later in UNGA Res 61/143 ‘Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate all Forms of Violence against Women’ (19 December 2006) GAOR 61st Session Supp 49 vol 1, 326.

693 UN Commission on Human Rights Res 1994/45 (4 March 1994) ESCOR.

694 UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy ‘Violence against women perpetrated and/or condoned by the State during times of armed conflict (1997-2001)’ (23 January 2001) Un Doc E/CN.4/2001/73.

nation of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions' (Art. 18 Banjul Charter).⁶⁹⁵ Placing this provision in the context of Art. 18, which mainly deals with the protection of family life, outlining the family as the 'custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the community' (Art. 18 (2) Banjul Charter) shows that the drafters of the Banjul charter drew on very traditional gender roles, portraying women as wives and mothers, and therefore as acting in the private sphere rather than in public life, as employees or in the political field for instance. This is also shown by the grouping together of 'women and children' emphasizing their vulnerability (as mothers) rather than portraying women as individuals claiming rights which they are correctly entitled to. As Hilary Charlesworth puts it '[v]iolations of women's human rights are typically presented as an aspect of women's inherent vulnerability, as if this attribute were a biological fact'.⁶⁹⁶

The provision is also extremely vague, defining neither the term 'discrimination' nor the conventions and declarations which protect the rights of women. It is therefore doubtful how much real authority can be drawn from such a stipulation. Nevertheless, the ICC could possibly escape some criticism of being Eurocentric in its applied and cited sources on the one hand and having neo-colonial tendencies, focussing solely on one continent, on the other hand, by citing this provision.

g. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action

The outcome document of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1994 contains a part on violence against women which systematically defines and describes modes and circumstances of violence against women.⁶⁹⁷ The language of the Beijing Platform for Action frames violence against women in terms of systematic and widespread hu-

695 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (Banjul Charter).

696 Hilary Charlesworth 'International human rights law: A portmanteau for feminist norms?' in Gülay Caglar, Elisabeth Prügl and Susanne Zwingel *Feminist Strategies in International Governance* (Routledge Abingdon, Oxon/New York 2013) 21-37, 27.

697 Fourth World Conference on Women 'Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action' in 'Report' (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4.

man rights violations which are a manifestation of unequal power relations and cultural patterns and happen throughout societies.⁶⁹⁸ It differentiates between three kinds of violence: in the family, in the general community and condoned by the State⁶⁹⁹ and highlights that women's human rights are particularly at risk in the context of armed conflict and/or when women belong to a minority group.⁷⁰⁰ The Platform for Action also contains a section on women and armed conflict which highlights that violations of women's rights are violations of fundamental human rights and that the perpetrators of mass human rights violations such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes have to be punished.⁷⁰¹ The actions to be taken by governments differ somewhat from the usual human rights approach to violence against women in that they do not only call for investigation and criminal prosecution of perpetrators but also undertake to change harmful perceptions of women in society in order to change the role of women and break the cycle of systematic subordination which promotes violence

2. Protection of Women against Gender-Based Violence in International Criminal Law

Sexual violence can be committed in many different forms. It can amount to different crimes, keeping in mind the specific circumstances of the case in question. Before the *ad hoc* tribunals and hybrid courts, sexual violence, including rape, has so far been classified as

- rape as a crime against humanity or a war crime;
- torture as a crime against humanity and as a war crime:

698 Fourth World Conference on Women 'Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action' in 'Report' (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4 paras 112-3, 117, 118.

699 Fourth World Conference on Women 'Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action' in 'Report' (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4 para 113.

700 Fourth World Conference on Women 'Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action' in 'Report' (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4 paras 114, 116.

701 Fourth World Conference on Women 'Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action' in 'Report' (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4 para 131.

- genocide (in the alternative of causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the targeted group or by imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group);
- persecution as a crime against humanity;
- enslavement as a crime against humanity;
- Other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity;
- outrages upon personal dignity and inhumane treatment as war crimes.⁷⁰²

In 2008, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1820 dealing with violence against women in conflict, in which it stated that violence against women could constitute a threat to international peace and security, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and that States have an obligations to protect their population against sexual violence as part of their responsibility to ‘protect and ensure the human rights of their citizens’.⁷⁰³

a. Genocide

The acts amounting to genocide listed in Article 6 Rome Statute, Article 4(2) ICTY Statute and Article 2(2) ICTR Statute, are a verbatim copy of the ones listed in Article II of the Genocide Convention. The groups protected are national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, gender is not mentioned as a factor.

Even though opinions have been voiced during the Rome Conference and outside, to include other stable groups into the extent of protection⁷⁰⁴

702 See also United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations *Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Light of Security Council Resolution 1820* (United Nations New York 2010), 25.

703 UNSC Res 1820 (2008) (19 June 2008) SCOR [1 August 2007–31 July 2008] 154.

704 It can be argued about how stable a group the term ‘gender’ denominates if one refers to the commonly used definition of gender being socially constructed. However, the definition used in Article 7(3) Statute, which is valid for the whole of the Rome Statute, refers to gender as ‘the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society’ and arguable conveys to the term more stableness than usually attributed to it; see more in detail under Part Two Chapter Three III 2 c. (2) below.

it is unlikely that gender will be seen as within its jurisdiction by the ICC or any other international criminal tribunal in the near future. However, 'femicide' or 'gendercide' are increasingly discussed, particularly in social sciences, but also for example by the World Health Organization, which discusses the term under four rough categories, intimate femicide, murders in the name of 'honour', non-intimate femicide and dowry-related femicide.⁷⁰⁵

Less controversial is the acknowledgement that sexual violence committed with genocidal intent against members of an explicitly protected group is genocide. Some of the acts of sexual violence fall under Art. 6 (d) Rome Statute as 'measures intended to prevent births within the group', when, for example, women are deliberately raped and impregnated to give birth to change the ethnic composition of a population or to break female members of a group to a point where, after the rape, they do not wish to have any children.⁷⁰⁶ The ICTR's *Akayesu* judgment in 1998 explicitly acknowledged rape as such to be genocide under the modality of causing seriously bodily or mental harm, when committed with the necessary intent.⁷⁰⁷ The Chamber held that rape was 'one of the worst ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm.'⁷⁰⁸

705 World Health Organization: Understanding Violence against Women: Femicide (World Health Organization 2012) 1-3 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/77421/1/WHO_RHR_12.38_eng.pdf (28 July 2015).

706 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) paras 507-8.

707 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 731; see also *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para 172; *Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Judgment)* ICTR-01-64-T (17 June 2004) para 292; *Prosecutor v Muhimana (Judgment)* ICTR-95-1B-T (28 April 2005) paras 513, 517; *Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgment)* ICTR-96-3-T (6 December 1999) paras 50, 280, 292.

708 *Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)* ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 731; *Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)* IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para 172; see also Catharine A MacKinnon 'Rape, Genocide and Women's Human Rights' (1994) 17 Harvard Women's Law Journal 5-16; Sherrie L Russell-Brown 'Rape as Genocide' (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 350-374.

b. Crimes against Humanity

(1) Sexual Violence

Pursuant to Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute a multitude of acts of sexual violence are punishable before the ICC. These are '[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity', making the list non-exhausting. In this, the Rome Statute seeks to remedy omissions in the statutes of the ICTY/ICTR according to which rape could be charged under Art. 5 (g) ICTY Statute and Art. 3 (g) ICTR Statute but no other forms of sexual violence were explicitly mentioned under Art. 5, even though the ICTY indeed convicted persons for acts of sexual violence as crimes against humanity under the headings of torture⁷⁰⁹, persecution,⁷¹⁰ enslavement⁷¹¹ and inhumane acts.⁷¹² The concept of 'forced pregnancy' has already been used in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and subsequently in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action before it was incorporated in the Rome Statute and in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.⁷¹³

Additionally, the ICC can prosecute persecution on grounds of gender pursuant to Art. 7 (1) (h) or sexual violence as torture pursuant to Art. 7 (1) (f) Rome Statute.

(2) Persecution

Article 6 (c) MT Charter contained 'persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated', Article 5 (c) Charter for the Inter-

709 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998).

710 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment)* IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998).

711 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001).

712 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment)* IT-94-1 (7 May 1997).

713 William A Schabas *The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute* (OUP Oxford 2010) 174.

national Military Tribunal for the Far East contained the same provision with the exception of religious grounds which were omitted.

Article 5 (h) ICTY Statute and Article 3 (h) ICTR Statute list persecution on persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds under crimes against humanity (with regards to the ICTY the crime has to be committed in the context of an armed conflict). However, as highlighted above, the ICTY also acknowledged persecution on gender grounds⁷¹⁴ and stated very early on that '[c]rimes against humanity may be committed on discriminatory grounds other than those enumerated in art 5(h) [of the Statute of the ICTY], such as physical or mental disability, age or infirmity, or sexual preference'⁷¹⁵

Article 7(1)(h) Rome Statute makes persecution punishable as a crime against humanity. Article 7(2)(g) Rome Statute defines persecution as 'the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reasons of the identity of the group or collectivity'. The Rome Statute is the first international criminal statute which defines the crime of persecution. It is also the first statute which provides for the possibility of a conviction for persecution on gender grounds, whereupon Art. 7 (3) clarifies that the term 'gender' 'refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The definition in the Rome Statute is the product of a compromise in the drafting of Article 21 (3) which prohibits adverse distinction of the application and interpretation of the law on several grounds, including gender.'⁷¹⁶ While some States insisted on such a clause, and argued that not including, in particular, gender, would be a step backwards as gender was included in numerous human rights and humanitarian law instruments⁷¹⁷ other States did not want such a non-adverse distinction clause to be included.⁷¹⁸ As a compromise, a definition of gender was included, which is applicable to the whole of the Rome

714 *Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment)* IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para 941.

715 *Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal Judgment)* IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para 285.

716 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 273.

717 See Cate Steains 'Gender Issues' in Roy S Lee (ed) *The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute* (Kluwer Law International The Hague 1999) 357-390, 372.

718 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall 'Article 7: Crimes against Humanity' in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 273.

Statute.⁷¹⁹ This definition is characterized by a ‘constructive ambiguity’⁷²⁰ that appeases a multitude of negotiation parties and has to be further specified by interpretation by the practitioners which apply it.

This definition seems to conflate the two terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’, but ‘within the context of society’ leaves room for the differentiation between ‘sex’ as referring to biological differences between men and women and ‘gender’ as the socially constructed identities and roles. The definition commonly used in the UN refers to gender as a social construct and can be used by the ICC in the future to fill the wide definition in Article 7 (3) Rome Statute with legal content. For example, the Secretary-General, in his report ‘Integrating the gender perspective into the work of United Nations human rights treaty bodies’, defines ‘gender’ as ‘the socially constructed roles of women and men that are ascribed to them on the basis of their sex, in public and in private life’ whereas ‘sex’ refers to ‘the biological and physical characteristics of women and men’.⁷²¹ Here, human rights law has a lot to offer to the development of international criminal law regarding the prosecution of gender crimes. Interestingly, the definition in Article 7(3) Rome Statute could, in contrast, also significantly change the approach to gender in international human rights law. As the definition employed in the Rome Statute is vague enough to serve as a compromise and not to agitate States fearing a too rapid or too progressive development in this field, the definition is more appealing to these States than the more specific notions usually employed at the United Nations.⁷²² As ob-

719 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 273 citing Barbara Bedont and Katherine Hall-Martinez ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 6 *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 65-85, 68.

720 Valerie Oosterveld ‘The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the International Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?’ (2005) 18 *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 55-84, 81, referring to Anthony Aust *Modern Treaty Law and Practice* (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2000) 184.

721 United Nations International Human Rights Instruments ‘Integrating the gender perspective into the work of United Nations human rights treaty bodies: Report by the Secretary-General’ (3 September 1998) UN Doc HRI/MC/1998/6 para 16.

722 Valerie Oosterveld ‘The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the International Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?’ (2005) 18 *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 55-84, 83.

served by Oosterveld, the Rome Statute definition has already been employed to define the notion of 'gender' in the Durban Declaration and Platform of Action that is part of the Report on the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.⁷²³ So far, the Rome Statute definition has, however, not prevailed, and most major UN agencies and programs, first and foremost UN Women, use a definition of gender which emphasizes its socially constructed nature.⁷²⁴ As mentioned, the notion 'within the context of society' gives the court leeway for various interpretation. The question that poses itself is what constitutes the 'society' Art. 7(3) Rome Statute speaks of? One area international criminal law could draw guidance from in this respect is refugee law, which considers not only the domestic, but also the international construction of gender within the international community.⁷²⁵ This provides the possibility for the Court to extensively refer to the standards in non-discrimination of women under CEDAW. As such, there is room for ICC jurisprudence to develop the vague definition in a more progressive direction in line with the definitions most commonly used at the United Nations.

Additionally, even if the Court may decide that a certain crime cannot be subsumed under persecution on gender grounds as the term is defined in the Rome Statute, the crime could still be characterized as within the

723 UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance 'Report' (2001) UN Doc A/CONF.189/12 75 Note 1.

724 UN Women 'Concepts and Definitions' <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsanddefinitions.htm> (31 October 2017).

725 UNHCR 'Guidelines on International Protection No 1: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees' (2002) UN Doc HCR/GIP/02/01; UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion No 39 (XXXVI) 'Refugee Women and International Protection' (1985) UN Doc HRC/IP/2; UNHCR 'Guidelines on Refugee Women' (1991) UN Doc EC/SCP/67, all as cited in Valerie Oosterveld 'Gender, Persecution, and the International Criminal Court: Refugee Law's Relevance to the Crime against Humanity of Gender-based Persecution' (2006) 17 *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 49–89, 76 and Valerie Oosterveld 'The Definition of "Gender" in the Rome Statute of the International Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?' (2005) 18 *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 55–84, 59 (fn 25) and 67–8 (fn 70); UNHCR 'Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines for Prevention and Response' (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2003).

jurisdiction of the Court as persecution on ‘other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law’.⁷²⁶

(3) Enslavement/ Sexual Slavery

Enslavement and sexual slavery, albeit different provisions in the Rome Statute (Arts 7 (1) (c) and 7 (1) (g) are intrinsically related in that sexual slavery is a specific form of slavery.⁷²⁷ The grouping of the crime with other crimes of sexual violence show that on top of exercising powers attached to ownership over a person, the perpetrator caused the person over whom he exercised those powers to engage in acts of a sexual nature.⁷²⁸ Slavery, including sexual slavery, are a part of *ius cogens*.⁷²⁹

In the *Kunarac* Case before the ICTY, the accused were convicted for enslavement as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5 (c) and acts of sexual and non-sexual nature were likewise considered to fall under enslavement as a crime against humanity.⁷³⁰ The court extensively referred to human rights instruments dedicated to eliminating slavery,⁷³¹ to general human rights treaties and instruments containing a ban of slavery⁷³² as well as to jurisprudence on the matter by the ECtHR and the ECommHR

726 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 220.

727 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 211.

728 See Elements of Crime of Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute.

729 *Prosecutor v Brima et al (Trial Chamber Judgment)* SCSL–2004–16–T (19 July 2007) para. 705.

730 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 518-543, in particular para. 543.

731 Slavery Convention (adopted 25 September 1926, entered into force 9 March 1927) 60 LNTS 253; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (adopted 7 September 1956, entered into force 30 April 1957) 266 UNTS 3; ILO ‘Convention No 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour’ (adopted 28 June 1930, entered into force 1 May 1932) 39 UNTS 55; ILO ‘Convention No 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour’ (adopted 25 June 1957, entered into force 17 January 1959) 320 UNTS 291.

732 Art. 4 UDHR; Art. 8 ICCPR; Art. 4 ECHR; Art. 6 ACHR; Art. 5 ACHPR.

(and other international criminal tribunals).⁷³³ The Court also made extensive reference to provisions under international humanitarian law.⁷³⁴ The court did, however, not make any mention of instruments dealing explicitly with human rights.

c. War Crimes

The mentioned neglect of gender issues in the area of human rights protection was mirrored by a disregard of the gendered dimension international humanitarian law. The Hague Conventions did not explicitly mention any form of sexual or other gendered violence, even though it contains, in Article 46 of the regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention the vague provision stating that '[f]amily honour and rights [...] must be respected'.⁷³⁵ At the 'cradle' of modern international criminal law, at the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal⁷³⁶ ('NIMT') and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East⁷³⁷ ('IMFE'), neither rape and other forms of sexual violence, nor gender-based persecution were mentioned in the respective statutes as crimes against humanity or war crimes. Subsequently, even though evidence of rape and other forms of sexual violence was introduced by the French and Russian prosecutors, these acts are not mentioned in the final judgment, which does not in great detail enlist the single acts that constituted wither crimes against humanity or war crimes, but, in contrary, generally emphasizes that 'war crimes [...] were attended

733 *Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium (Decision of 5 July 1979 on the admissibility of the application)* (EComm App 7906/77) D/R 17, 59; *Van der Mussele v Belgium (ECtHR) (Judgment)* (1983) 6 EHRR 163; *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 522-527.

734 *Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)* IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 528-532.

735 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War by Land and its Annex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed 29 July 1899, entered into force 4 September 1900) (1898-99) 187 CTS 429; Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) (1907) 205 CTS 277.

736 Charter of the [Nuremberg] International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 284.

737 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 1946) 4 Bevans 20.

by every conceivable circumstance of cruelty and horror'.⁷³⁸ Even though not enlisted in the Statute, rape was repetitively referred to in the main judgement of the IMFE, under 'Chapter VIII: Conventional War Crimes (Atrocities)'. Most prominently, the judgement recapitulates the events following the Japanese capture of the Chinese city of Nanking in 1937, which have commonly become known as the 'Rape of Nanking'.⁷³⁹ In the final findings, the majority of the judges does, however, only very generally state that crimes under Count 54 (ordering, authorising and permitting the commission of conventional war crimes) and Count 55 (to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of conventions and laws of war in respect of prisoners of war and civilian internees) have been committed without specifically demonstrating through which acts the crimes were committed.⁷⁴⁰ Furthermore, the IMTFE failed to prosecute the abduction, enslavement and rape of approximately 200.000 Chinese women in brothels principally frequented by Japanese soldiers.⁷⁴¹

Rape was included within the acts that could constitute crimes against humanity under Art. II (1) (c) Control Council Law No. 10, which was issued by the Control Council for Germany on 20 December 1945.⁷⁴²

In the following years, the awareness for gender issues and non-discrimination on account of sex rose, which is reflected in the inclusion of

738 *The United States of America et al v Göring et al (Judgment and Sentences of the International Military Tribunal) (Nuremberg)* (1 October 1946) (1947) 41 AJIL 172–333, 224.

739 *The United States of America et al v Araki et al (Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the far East)* (12 November 1948) reprinted in BVA Röling and CF Rüter (eds) *The Tokyo Judgment* (APA University Press Amsterdam 1977) 389–93.

740 *The United States of America et al v Araki et al (Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the far East)* (12 November 1948) available at http://www.worldcourts.com/imtfe/eng/decisions/1948.11.04_IMTFE_Judgment.htm (31 October 2017).

741 See eg AW Brown and L Greenfell 'The International Crime of Gender-Based Apartheid and the Taliban' (2003) 4 *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 347–75, 354.

742 Control Council Law No 10 'Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity' (done 20 December 1945) (1946) 3 *Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany* 50.

non-discrimination provisions in the Geneva Conventions.⁷⁴³ Article 27 (2) Geneva IV also prohibits sexual violence against women, stating that '[w]omen shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.' The focus of this provision was put on rape as a crime against honour, personal honour and that of the extended family, therefore coching it 'in terms of chasity and modesty of women'⁷⁴⁴ and not in terms of violation of physical integrity or the infliction of physical or mental harm.⁷⁴⁵ For this reason, and the failure to include rape within its 'grave breaches', the way the Geneva conventions address sexual violence has been heavily criticized.⁷⁴⁶ This protection is supplemented by Art. 3(1)(c) Common to all Geneva Conventions, which protects against 'outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment'.

Finally, Art. 76(1) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts states that '[w]omen shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and

743 See Art. 12 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (Geneva Convention I); Art. 12 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (Geneva Convention II); Art. 14 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Geneva Convention III); Art. 27 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Geneva Convention IV).

744 Helen Durham and Katie O'Byrne *The Dialogue of Difference: Gender Perspectives on International Humanitarian Law* (2010) 92 *International Review of the Red Cross* 31-52, 35.

745 Helen Durham and Katie O'Byrne *The Dialogue of Difference: Gender Perspectives on International Humanitarian Law* (2010) 92 *International Review of the Red Cross* 31-52, 35.

746 Judith Gardam and Michelle Jarvis, *Women Armed Conflict and International Law* (Kluwer Law International The Hague 2001) 96-97; see also Helen Durham and Katie O'Byrne *The Dialogue of Difference: Gender Perspectives on International Humanitarian Law* (2010) 92 *International Review of the Red Cross* 31-52, 35 fn 13 for further references.

any other form of indecent assault.⁷⁴⁷ Art. 4(2)(e) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts prohibits ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault’⁷⁴⁸

However, rape in the Geneva Convention context did not rise to a ‘grave breach’ nor is it listed as a violation of the laws and customs of war in any of the Conventions.⁷⁴⁹ Therefore, at the ICTY, which has jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions pursuant to Article 2 and violations of the laws and customs of war under Article 3, rape was not explicitly mentioned as a violation of international humanitarian law. The ICTR, having international humanitarian law jurisdiction only over violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, can charge rape as a particular outrage upon personal dignity explicitly mentioned in Article 4 (e) ICTR Statute.

In the beginning of the 1990s, momentum was gained for the recognition of rape as a war crime. Monumental in this change were the events in the former Yugoslavia and later in Rwanda, where rape and other forms of sexual violence were systematically used against women and men. The ICRC clarified in 1992 that the grave breach of ‘wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body and health’ in Article 147 Geneva Convention IV covers rape.⁷⁵⁰ Influential States like the USA also categorized rape and sexual assault as grave breaches.⁷⁵¹ Around the same time, the international community as started paying more attention to violations of women’s rights in conflicts and the gendered nature of crimes under inter-

747 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3.

748 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609.

749 Sherrie L Russell-Brown ‘Rape as Genocide’ (2003) 21 *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 350-374, 357.

750 International Committee of the Red Cross ‘Aide-Mémoire’ (3 December 1992) as cited in Theodor Meron ‘Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law’ (1993) 87(3) *American Journal of International Law* 424-428, 426.

751 US Department of State ‘Letter from Robert A Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Arlen Specter’ (27 January 1992) as cited in Theodor Meron ‘Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law’ (1993) 87(3) *American Journal of International Law* 424-428, 427.

national law. At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, States spoke out against gender-based violence and systematic rape in conflict situations and) called for the integration of the 'equal status of women' into the mainstream of UN activity⁷⁵². They also reaffirmed that sexual violence in conflict is a violation of fundamental human rights.⁷⁵³ Two years later, at the Fourth World Conference on women in Beijing, the governments agreed on the undertaking to 'integrate a gender perspective in the resolution of armed conflict and foreign occupation'⁷⁵⁴ in order to protect women living in situations of armed and other conflict and foreign occupation'.⁷⁵⁵

In the Rome Statute, the term 'war crime' is defined as 'traditional' grave breaches, which are listed (Article 8(2)(a) Rome Statute), and '[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law' (Article 8(2)(b) Rome Statute). In this list, 'rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions' are expressly listed in Article 8(2)(b)(xxii).

Traditionally, as Charlesworth (Copelon) points out, the dichotomy between peace time and conflict, between the applicability of human rights law and the applicability of humanitarian law, promoted IHL, as the law of war, to focus on the 'warrior caste' and to neglect persons traditionally outside that group.⁷⁵⁶ World War II brought with it the realization that

752 Cate Steains 'Gender Issues' in Roy S Lee (ed) *The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute* (Kluwer Law International The Hague 1999) 357–390, 360; see also UN World Conference on Human Rights 'Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action' (25 June 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 Part I, paras 18 and 28, and Part II, para. 37.

753 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action' (25 June 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 Part I, paras 18 and 28, and Part II, para. 38.

754 UN World Conference on Women (4th) 'Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action' (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4, para. 142(b.).

755 UN World Conference on Women (4th) 'Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action' (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4, strategic objective E.1; Cate Steains 'Gender Issues' in Roy S Lee (ed) *The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute* (Kluwer Law International The Hague 1999) 357–390, 360.

756 Hilary Charlesworth 'Feminist Methods in International Law' (1999) 93 *American Journal of International Law* 379–394, 386.

rules on warfare must contain rules on the treatment of protected persons and non-combatants. The events in the 1990s together with the evolution of women's rights in human right law and in many nation States, brought this realization to a next level, acknowledging that men and women are affected differently in armed conflict, on the one hand, and, sexual violence, which women are the main victims of, can be used in a systematic and strategic manner in conflict. Therefore, in order to effectively protect both men and women, sexual violence has to be recognized as a war crime and its commission has to be effectively prosecuted.

IV. Concluding Remarks

The analysis of women's human rights in the context of sexual violence in international criminal law and humanitarian law give way to the following conclusions: in general, human rights law, particularly in the area of women's rights, presents itself as a rich field for international criminal law to benefit from. The language of CEDAW and its treaty body is, at times, very similar in fact to the language employed when defining crimes against humanity. Mention is made of structural and systematic actions which are environments similar to the ones in which crimes against humanity and other mass crimes are committed.

However, even though reference to human rights law in the context of gender-based crimes is frequently made, the references just as often scratch merely on the surface and an in-depth analysis of human rights law in the area is abandoned for the sake of dismissing human rights law as a helpful denominator of the law. Often, chambers then move on to comparative law which they deem more useful.

Several reasons for this phenomenon can be brought forward. Some lie in the nature of human rights law as such, whereas others can be contributed to a lack of understanding on part of the practitioners applying the law.

First, generally, the field of women's human rights, like minority protection but unlike the prohibition of torture, does not exclusively deal with areas which are of interest to criminal prosecution. Most of the provisions in CEDAW, for example, are centred on non-discrimination and equality of women in fields such as health, education and employment. Second, the biggest deficit of the women's rights scheme is the merely scarce protection of women from violence. As explained above, violence against women is not explicitly mentioned in the most prominent instrument for wom-

en's rights, namely in CEDAW. This is surely one of the reasons why the reference to women's rights instruments in the context of international criminal proceedings has been scarce. An explicit prohibition of violence against women, whether committed by private actors but with acquiescence of the State or by State actors themselves, whether in the state of 'peace' or within an armed conflict or whether committed inside a State or by State agents abroad, would have certainly made it easier for judges to refer to CEDAW. However, as indicated above, CEDAW is not the only instrument which can be cited in this context. Whereas the drafters of CEDAW can surely be criticised for their narrow reading of the term 'discrimination', a reading which did not cover physical or psychological violence against women, the CEDAW Committee made clear, in its General Comment No. 19, that CEDAW does in fact prohibit gender-based violence as a manifestation of discrimination. Such violence does also include sexual violence, therefore providing a valuable point of reference for judges in international criminal courts and tribunals.

Third, another hindrance to women's human rights instruments serving as sources of inspiration of supporting the authoritative findings of international courts and tribunal in the weakness of their language. Comparing it for example with ICERD, which entails many immediately binding obligations, CEDAW gives considerably more discretion to States, as most of the obligations enshrined therein require States parties simply to take 'all appropriate measures'.⁷⁵⁷

Another set of reasons for the Courts' and Tribunals' reluctance, however, can be countered or at least weakened by fostering understanding of the different concepts, aims and instruments in this area. When it comes to gender-based crime and sexual violence, international criminal law and international humanitarian law are often more sophisticated and further developed than international human rights law. Nevertheless, a tendency can be observed for judges to at least *pro forma* refer to human rights law. Due to the fragmentation in this field, the partly controversial subjects and the differing nature of the instruments and bodies dealing with the subject, judges tend to refer to human rights law in this area rather superficially and to not deal with the multitude of soft law that shapes this area of human rights law in particular. This is because when it comes to torture or

757 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin *The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis* (Manchester University Press Manchester 2000) 220.

even minority rights, the law is a ‘classical’ 1st generation right which deals with public participation of life, liberty and protection of physical integrity from State violence. These are more accessible and more obvious also to judges who are not human rights experts than the soft law instruments that set out women’s human rights and their protection from violence. Also, the approach of subsuming gender-based violence under the heading of discrimination is innovative but at the same time, controversial and judges might not feel comfortable in terms of consulting these kinds of ‘activist’ human rights provisions.

When a crime which has no equivalent in national law (persecution) and is formulated very vaguely⁷⁵⁸ meets a concepts which is not yet very established in human rights law (protection from gender-based violence as a human right) the biggest problems in terms of reference to human rights law can be expected because these sort of crimes pose problems to criminal law experts and public international law experts alike.

Nevertheless there is an undeniable potential in women’s rights instruments to be untapped. Especially the ICC, with its newly included ground of gender-based persecution, has the opportunity to draw from CEDAW itself as well as the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations regarding non-discrimination and equality of women. The question which remains is, of course, whether the court will be aware of this work and whether, if it is, it sees the potential which lies in it.

Chapter Four: Conclusions Drawn from Case-Law Analysis

The degree of recourse to international human rights law in international criminal law can generally be called scarce. Often, judges refer to human rights law in passing, almost as a box that has to be ticked before moving on to more promising fields of law in the search for substantive elements of crimes, for example comparative law. Sometimes, human rights law is referred to when it supports the Chamber’s view rather than examining it as a mandatory step in the process or examining the available law. The examination of three areas of human rights and international criminal law shows that, despite vast crossovers in the selected areas, there is scarce

758 Jonas Nilsson ‘The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’ in Olaoluwa Olu-sanya *Rethinking International Criminal Law: The Substantive Part* (Europa Law Publishing Groningen 2007) 35-64 at 39.

reference that follows no clear system or dogmatic approach. However, there are degrees of distinction between the selected areas. From the three areas examined, it is the reference to torture that is the most elaborate in terms of the variety and depth of the dogmatic consideration the bench engaged in. A reference to minority rights in order to strengthen the legal argument is less common and women's rights and instruments dealing with gender issues are discussed most infrequently.

The sub-chapters above explored the reasons for a lack of reference stemming from the law itself and its development for each area as well as the, often unused, potential that human rights law offers. But what conclusions can be drawn generally from this examination?

First, the nature of the instrument is decisive. This means on the one hand its status in the international legal order (legally binding or not? universally applicable or not?) and on the other hand the (legal and otherwise) authority as well as the publicity of the body which decided on or adopted it.

Second, the nature of the norm itself is of crucial importance. Provisions (or instruments) containing legal sanctions or provisions which generally relate to actions falling under the realm of criminal law and have a counterpart in national criminal law, rather than purely public law/ constitutional law are much more likely to be used before international criminal courts and tribunals. This can be seen in the comparison of the frequent use of the CAT as compared to other provisions of human rights.

The third and fourth conclusion are intertwined: it is decisive whether the protection of the right in question is controversially discussed within the international community. As the protection of minorities has been somewhat abandoned as a project by the international community after World War II, it has become less of an obvious choice for practitioners of international criminal law that do not have an in-depth knowledge of international criminal law. Even where the existence of rights as well as the general potential connection to international criminal law can be assumed, as it is the case with women's rights and sexual crimes, the extend of the rights, the international instruments governing them and the bodies applying them are not always grasped. This is also partly due to the fragmentation of protection regimes which can be (like the regime governing women's rights) confusing and include various international and regional bodies that produce documents which are binding to varying degrees.

The analyzed examples show that currently, there exists no convincing doctrine and methodology dealing with the use of human rights law in in-

ternational criminal law. A call for a solid methodology in this respect is not a mere theoretical undertaking. The unequal interpretation of the law has a pressing practical component, as it can lead to the problem that, as shown above, the same conduct is deemed punishable by one Trial Chamber and not punishable by another Trial Chamber of the same court/tribunal.

As international criminal law is a rather new area of law, it is unsurprising that it entails gaps which have to be closed by taking recourse to other areas of law. Such a recourse without a solid methodology to follow, is problematic with regards to the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*; it can, due to differing interpretation of the law and the extent to which recourse can be taken, result in conflicting definitions of crimes and ultimately criminal conduct, even before the same court.

This can jeopardize the already challenging undertaking of international criminal justice and opens it up to yet another criticism it needs to invalidate.

Furthermore, if international criminal courts and tribunals are said to themselves create customary international law as international organizations or organs of international organizations, contradicting case law impedes this creation.⁷⁵⁹ A streamlined education for judges, including training in criminal law and human rights/humanitarian law, together with the establishment of a methodology which is driven by theoretical understanding of both concepts, their goals and values rather than by experimenting in a legal vacuum, would counter this problem.

However, it is difficult to see any forum that possesses the necessary authority for such an undertaking. In a relatively recent area, as international criminal law, the lack of a central authority and the decentralized norm interpretation and production poses a particular difficulty to the legitimacy and therefore the future of the whole project. To counter this, while realistically taking into account the lack of a solid legal and moral authority in international law in general and international criminal law in particular, it would at any rate be desirable to work towards an improved exchange and coordination between the different courts and tribunals, as well as between the different chambers within the courts. Such a mechanism of prevention of conflicting case law by prior checking of draft judg-

759 See also KS Gallant 'International Criminal Courts and the Making of Public International Law: New Roles for International Organizations and Individuals' 2010 The John Marshall Law Review 603–34, 609.

ments does, for example exist within the ECtHR.⁷⁶⁰ Such a common network of knowledge would foster the understanding of different basic legal concepts and could in that way contribute to a more streamlined jurisprudence.

760 The Case Law Conflict Prevention Unit under the authority of Jurisconsult checks draft judgments and flags potential contradictions with existing case law; see further David Harris, Michael O’Boyle and Others *Law of the European Convention on Human Rights* (OUP Oxford 2014) 126-7.

