

COMING OF AGE AS “THE THIRD GENERATION.” CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS IN BERLIN

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Migration research focusing on immigrants in Germany¹ has often stressed the adverse circumstances of an altogether unintended immigration process and the problematic effects of political ignorance that has prevailed in the field of integration for decades. Owing to the lack of political visions for full incorporation, the situation of the so-called second and third generations of immigrants in particular has been considered problematic. In this reading, the offspring of the immigrant population has been depicted for the most part as being trapped in a miserable structural conflict of living between two cultures. This perception insinuates that extraordinary personal and emotional crises are an inevitable part of their coming of age in Germany, forcing them to choose between competing cultures – if such a choice is deemed possible at all. This perspective is not restricted to any particular position in the fields of migration or integration policies. It has been disseminated, for instance, by (well-meaning) pedagogues, whose major aim is to assist children with migration backgrounds to catch up in German schools and to make good for their supposed deficits and disadvantages.² Although a number of authors have come to criticise these tendencies of culturalist reification in pedagogy since the late 1980s,³ it is still a powerful discourse. The situation of immigrant youths is interpreted on these grounds from the point of view of collective shortcomings in the cultural realm, and culture tends to be conceptualised as a stock of conventions acquired in childhood and governing the behaviour of a person thereafter. The scenario of inevitable crises resulting out of cultural

1 My research sample draws upon families that immigrated into the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)/West Germany. Hence, Germany refers to the FRG/West Germany whenever the period before 1990 is at issue.

2 See for example Mertens 1980; Jerusalem 1992; Schrader, Nikles & Griesse 1979. They understand enculturation as a phase of irreversible identity formation in primary socialization.

3 See Bukow & Llaroya 1988; Prengel 1993; Bukow 1996; Hamburger 1997.

clashes appears as an almost natural consequence.⁴ The rigid concept appears as a misrepresentation not only in view of recent findings in the scholarship of ethnicity but also in view of the adolescents' own views and personal experiences which I studied. Nevertheless, the hegemonic discourse of cultural difference will in some way influence their perceptions of self and other and shape their scopes of agency in contesting their identities.⁵ In other words, it will unquestionably be within the prevalent discursive "landscapes of group identities" (Appadurai 1991) that the children and grandchildren of immigrants have to negotiate their own possible identifications.

And yet, what does it mean to come of age in such a setting, being seen as the second or third generation of foreign immigrants? While the political discussion in Germany has recognised the necessity of future immigration for several years, little attention has been devoted to the ways in which immigrants and their children actually experienced their lives in Germany since the 1960s. From an anthropological point of view, this dimension is of particular relevance. Studying the ways in which indigenous majorities come to terms (or not) with immigrant populations and vice versa may reveal practical solutions developed through social interaction. This is impossible when assuming that in the course of primary socialization, "culture grows into *soma*" (Schrader, Nikles & Griese 1979: 58), as if a mental mould came to function as a behavioural prison.

This contribution presents empirical findings that challenge the established assumption of migrants' identity conflicts developed in the scholarship of cultural essentialism. In the study of ethnicity, there has been a growing number of works since the 1990s that falsify the traditional paradigm which defined ethnic identity as a given and, instead, illustrate the situational and contextual, hence fluid, character of ethnic as well as religious or other social identifications.⁶ Contrary to primordialist hypotheses, processes in social identification are far more complex. Identities can be internally heterogeneous and culture appears as an interactive field of discursive contestations.⁷ Evidently, the very falsification of cultural essentialism applies not only to the biographical situations of migrants. However, their certainties are challenged

4 This faction within "intercultural pedagogy" argues for the most part without presenting any corresponding empirical data (see Bründel & Hurrelmann 1995; Gemende et al. 1999; Czock 1993; Schepker & Eberding 1996). Multiculturalism is based on the same concept, in principle, i.e. considering people as representatives of a collective rather than as individuals. It does, however, invest the idea of distinctiveness with a positive rather than a negative bias. For a critique see Leggewie 1989; Radtke 1995; 1996; Bommers 1996; Baumann 1999. Treibel (2003) provides a systematic review of the different conceptual approaches to migration in German scholarship.

5 Mills 1997: 17.

6 See, e.g., Hall 1990; Eriksen 1993; Al-Azmeh 1993; Barth 1994.

7 See, e.g., Hall 1990; Schiffauer 1991; Hannerz 1992; Kaschuba 1995; Baumann 1996, 1999; Rogers & Vertovec 1995; Baumann & Gingrich 2004.

more often and to greater extents than those of indigenous populations whose cultural or ethnic particularities are hardly ever contested. Given the expectation that international mobility becomes more and more relevant in the future, it is therefore long overdue to consider the immigrant experience.

The essay deals with a number of adolescents from labour immigrant families in Berlin who developed various forms of transnational identification and displayed a notable competence in double cultural agency under the circumstances of a prevalent culturalist, and negatively biased discourse. To study these phenomena in context, I will briefly sketch the contradictory trends that mark the post-war history of immigration on the one hand, and the political ambitions to foster a post-national collective identity in the Federal Republic of Germany on the other. I will then look into the daily routines in a school as one prominent site where cohabitation norms are foregrounded in the lives of children and adolescents.⁸ Even if they reject what is suggested to them, the interaction is part of the dialectical process by means of which young people become familiar with hegemonic boundary concepts and define their own positions. In order to specify how educational norms may influence the process of social integration in general and to demonstrate the position of migrant minorities in relation to the indigenous German majority in particular, I shall review the general character of education for citizenship in Germany. Following an account of the normative agenda, the question of how immigrant diversity is handled practically in a school in Berlin will be introduced. Finally, I will present the identity-related practices applied by adolescents from immigrant families. How do these young people cope with the ambivalent messages regarding possible options of associating and dissociating themselves? Apparently, they partly conformed to and partly subverted the common narrations about them. I shall argue that such ways of conflating competing identity models are typical acts of transnationalization in that they refer to imagined "social fields that cross national boundaries," and thereby aim to "reconfigure space" when positioning themselves (Basch et al. 1994: 22, 28–34). This resourceful double agency unfolded, however, as stigma management, to cope with a lack of recognition. Moreover, it remains as yet tied to an imagined transnational space that differs from the dominant imagery of "us" and "them" in Germany. These limitations are discussed in the conclusion.

8 The empirical data were collected during ten months of fieldwork in a secondary school in Berlin-Neukölln during the 1996/97 term, and from interviews I conducted with young people from migrant families (15–17 and 20–22 years of age) between 1998 and 2001. The interviewees had been pupils in the above mentioned school while I was doing research there. The initial fieldwork was part of the research project, "State, School, and Ethnicity" funded by the Volkswagen Foundation 1996–1999. All direct citations, whether single terms or whole sentences are those of the people who interacted in the setting of this school. Given the limited space, they cannot be portrayed here as individuals and the findings are only quoted very briefly. For more details see Schiffauer et al. 2004.

Background: The reception of labour immigrants in postwar Germany

Although the hiring of foreign labourers has been part and parcel of the economic and social recovery of West Germany after World War II, immigration has never been acknowledged favourably by German politics and society in general. Instead, the project of hiring labourers from abroad on a temporary basis gradually developed into *de facto* immigration, unintended on the part of both Germans and so-called “guestworkers.” The resulting demographic multinationalization has therefore only waveringly begun to enter *collective consciousness*.⁹ The ambivalence is reflected in the prevalent conceptualization of migrants and immigration in Germany. It also influences the circumstances under which children of immigrants come of age in Germany. Even though we are talking here not only of the sons and daughters but meanwhile also of the *grandsons* and *granddaughters* of the first generation “guestworkers,” these offspring are still perceived – e.g. in media discourse and in school textbooks – as “second and third generations” of foreigners rather than as equal fellow citizens. The following brief account will illustrate the historical background of this perception scheme.

Beginning in the early 1960s, West Germany suffered a dramatic shortage of labour because the closing of the border between the two German states prevented people in the Eastern parts from entering the Western zones or commuting in between them. To solve this problem, the recruitment of foreign “guestworkers” (*Gastarbeiter*) was seen as necessary and useful. Labour immigration was supposed to work by rotation, with eventual repatriation being taken for granted – both by the German public and by most migrant workers as well. When Germany’s economy took a downward turn in the early 1970s, the federal government favoured reducing the number of foreign workers. A recruitment freeze and return incentives were introduced, but this resulted, contrary to the intentions, in increased immigration since many people used the remaining window of opportunity for the immigration of relatives, fearing that more restrictions would follow.¹⁰

Irrespective of the actual settlement of the “guestworkers” in West Germany, the official political doctrine that Germany was not an immigration country continued until the end of the 1990s. The fact that a considerable number of foreign nationals had become part of the population surely needed to be dealt with; however, no concepts were developed regarding any long-term incorporation of immigrants, and state authorities continued to respond on an *ad hoc* basis. The outcome was a mixture of partial inclusion and exclusion. The legal foreigner status entailed restrictions, particularly in terms of rights to formal political participation. With regard to most requirements and routines of daily life however – the job market, civil society institutions, the

9 Schiffäuer 1993: 195–198.

10 Münz, Seifert & Ulrich (1997) provide a detailed account.

education system and most welfare benefits – few exclusions were made. Hence, the presence of foreigners acquired a form of normalcy despite the lack of official efforts encouraging the former “guestworkers” to remain in the country and become German nationals. West Germany was thus “[...] not only an ambivalent *de facto* immigration country with an inclusive welfare policy and an exclusive citizenship policy. The foreign population developing out of the earlier “guestworker population” had unexpectedly and without any corresponding convergence on the part of the obstinate immigration country developed into an immigration situation” (Bade 2000: 338).

There are reasons to criticise this unsystematic handling of the situation, as evidenced by political omissions and failure to take the initiative in responding to a *de facto* immigration process. Yet in spite of the range of missed opportunities to improve the immigrants’ reception in Germany through political and legal measures, it seems inadequate to conceive of this immigration history in terms of failure. The present situation does not correspond to the goal of temporary residence that once motivated both German politics and the labour migrants themselves. Yet their extensive inclusion into German civil society and their near equal entitlement to the benefits of the welfare state has had the effect that the immigrant population in Germany has achieved high levels of societal participation. In some respects this surpasses what countries with more inclusive integration policies, such as the Netherlands, have accomplished.¹¹ While most immigrants remained excluded from formal political citizenship in Germany, they were included on nearly all other informal levels of participation in public life. State school education is a good example of this ambivalent situation.

Education for citizenship under pressure

Schools function as important communication channels between the state and its citizens as well as between various social groups. Schools are a relay point between generations, between public and private and, last but not least, between majorities and minorities. It is hence an important site for integrating social differences, for transmitting shared rules and restrictions, civic norms and values and for promoting a collective imagery of one’s own group vis-à-vis others. Among other things, school teaches children how merit can be earned, how conflicts should best be handled and how participation in the polity should be practised in a given society. As part of this education for citizenship, schooling promotes particular ideals from preferred argumentative styles to the norms and limits of the country’s civil and political culture; in brief, it functions as a force for enculturation.¹² Because of this role in organising socialization in accordance with the principles of the common social and politi-

11 Thränhardt 2000.

12 Bourdieu & Passeron 1977; Gellner 1983; Harker 1984; Baumann 2004.

cal order, schools are excellent places to study the projections and also the changes in how a nation defines itself and others.

Historically, state citizenship education followed a nationalist programme, which both reflected and produced “cleavages based on nation and language” (Finaldi & Shore 2000: 2). This model of projecting and creating collective identities as national ones has been highly effective in constructing, shaping, and reproducing nations and “their” states as reified actors of early modernity.¹³ Social cohesion was created by stressing collective traits of one’s own nation in contrast to those of other nations. However, several developments have led to an undermining of the conventional nation-state arrangement combining social and civic rights with territorial consolidation and the political sovereignty of its “imagined community,” as Benedict Anderson has phrased it (Anderson 1991). In the field of education across Europe, major changes resulting from increased societal heterogeneity, whether intended or not, and of the political project of transnationalization within the European Union can be noted. In theory, this eases the incorporation of newcomers.

Twentieth century Europe has undergone various processes that might be regarded as instances of denationalization: increased immigration has made populations more multi-ethnic and multi-national; the project of European unification qualifies the national nature of collective identities; and, as has been said for Germany, many forms of legitimate representation as well as political participation are no longer tied to the formal condition of nationality.¹⁴ In the wake of these changes, schools must initiate new cognitive processes: whether their pupils are German nationals, long or short term residents, recently arrived refugees, with or without expectation of repatriation – in short, irrespective of their students’ origins – schools are expected, at the very least, to prepare adolescents for their lives as possible future citizens. Their aim of enculturation has thereby come to relate to the political culture of civil society, rather than to the nation-state itself:

[N]ation-state schools are no longer schools of nationalism, yet we continue to recognize that state-directed schooling is always related to identity-shaping purposes within the framework of the nation-state. [...] Civil enculturation in its currently observable form strives hard at managing the seemingly paradoxical: to inculcate pupils with a civil culture that is nationally specific, yet normatively open to all regardless of their backgrounds, identifications or possible loyalties (Baumann 2004: 10–13).

In order to serve this purpose, educational representations of nationhood and their collective symbols have undergone remarkable changes in Western Europe in the second half of the 20th century. With the integrative forces at work in the European Union, the traditional fortifications of the nation concept appear to have been rethought. Although adhering to locally and nation-

13 Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991.

14 A sampling on this topic from the social sciences might include Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994; Joppke 1998; Koopmans & Statham 1999; Kastoryano 2002.

ally specific understandings, there is a general trend towards a "Europeanization" of issues.¹⁵ Symbols of national identities or national "heroes" figure less prominently than they did 50 years ago. Present-day teaching materials throughout Western Europe clearly demonstrate a retreat from the notion of national identities revolving around fixed sets of attributes, traditions and cultural heritages.¹⁶ Negative stereotypes of other European nations have also been largely removed from these media. Furthermore, increasing emphasis is put on broadly defined ideals such as those of the Enlightenment and liberal democracy. Abstract principles are stressed of democracy, human rights and social justice in order to foster a European identity in the schools.¹⁷

In (West) Germany, the trend towards denationalization of civic education took a variety of forms since the end of World War II. The totalitarian experience left nationalism so discredited that the only feasible projection for regaining a positive self-image and some political influence after 1945 was placed in the European context. This can clearly be seen in the normative agenda to guide socialization in state institutions. The federal state of Berlin, for example, features a rejection of national arrogance in its constitutional preamble, and this tone is noticeable throughout the educational programme of the city-state. Already in the seventh grade teaching of geography¹⁸ many topics are related to the common economic, political and social space of the European Union. Europeanization and globalization are treated as "World Studies" in grades 9 and 10, which combines social studies, history, civics, geography and economics.¹⁹ Children are to be given an introduction to European and global interrelatedness, international dependencies and migration issues, all of which are meant to contribute to the students' abilities to participate in democracy "in a society of rapid social change," and irrespective of their nationalities.²⁰

However, such lofty ambitions are difficult to translate into practice, and it does not make matters easier that education policies are ideological battlefields in themselves. Moreover, curricula and textbook supervision fall into the legislation of the respective federal states in Germany and are subject to a

15 This is one result of the project, "Rethinking Nation-State Identities in the New Europe: A Cross-National Study of School Curricula and Textbooks" (www.one-europe.ac.uk, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK 1999–2002), in which I was involved as a Research Officer. Our study was focused upon history and civics textbooks and curricula from four European case countries since the 1950s. The idea of Europe has entered teaching programmes extensively as a theoretical concept while the specific appropriations vary from country to country. For examples from the French and the German case-studies see Bertilotti, Mannitz, & Soysal 2005.

16 See Bertilotti, Mannitz & Soysal 2005.

17 See Pingel 1995: xi–xii, 2001.

18 Geography Curriculum: Rahmenplan Erdkunde 7, 2001.

19 World Studies Curriculum: Rahmenplan Weltkunde 9 & 10, 2001.

20 Syllabi of Political Education: Zur Zielsetzung und Praxis Politischer Bildung in der Berliner Schule, 2001.

diversity of funding measures, meaning that schools are located not only in very different social, but likewise in very different institutional and financial environments. The extent to which revised textbooks can actually be found in schools depends on a number of variables also. In most of Berlin's schools the equipment is substandard and outdated, since the city-state has been near bankruptcy for many years. Many of the textbooks used in the school where my research took place dated from the early 1980s, and some were unchanged reprints from even older editions. Thus, the impressive normative rhetoric at the official level as well as with regard to the latest textbook editions is not implemented at the level of school socialization.²¹ Furthermore, the ambition to strengthen a European rather than a national consciousness seems to be limited by the fact that the vision of an integrated Europe is far from the everyday experience of school children.

The gap between the normative discourse in favour of transnationalization in civic education planning on the one hand and social reality on the other is noteworthy. Yet, it does not render the overall tendency obsolete. Lessons have been drawn from the experience of nationalist hubris in Germany, so that children are no longer being socialised in terms of the "banal nationalism" (Billig 1995) in its traditional meaning of spreading nationalist symbols of identity by way of everyday routines. Nevertheless, the nation-states are still important. They act as gatekeepers for the brokerage of rights, they constitute social sites for agency and are the most tangible interlocutors for the civil public. Young people need to learn how to pursue their interests within this national public in which the relevant argumentative methods are as particular as the national political cultures and their civic conventions. Indeed, the study on "State, School, and Ethnicity" carried out in various European countries²² was able to confirm that pupils are socialised within nationally specific fields and standards of discourse, which are, however, understood now as being compatible with the broader concepts of Europeanness.²³ In the German case, especially, collective self-reference is no longer based on any nationally codified concept but on the post-war conception of being part of the Western world of democracies. In other words, a shift has taken place from explicit nationalism to implicit, more instrumental forms of establishing collectivity. This shift has not simply ruled out the relevance of national boundaries. It instead produces its own peculiar boundary effects.

The fact that parts of the agenda are denationalised while others are not results in a complex set of competing expectations. The main tension stems from the fact that, "the nation-state school has [...] [in the meantime] taken on two missions at once: it is expected to perpetuate a sense of nation-state continuity but also to integrate non-nationals and first-generation citizens into the democratic project of equalizing chances" (Baumann 2004: 1). The different

21 Leclercq 1995: 13–14.

22 See note 12 for more information on the study.

23 Schiffauer et al. 2004.

layers of belonging, entitlement and incorporation are thus multiple and somewhat contradictory. Diversity and the crossing of national borders appear to be cherished on the rather abstract and vague level of a desirable European community formation. With regard to concrete labour immigrant populations, they are received less enthusiastically, especially when the immigrants are not (considered) Europeans. As a result, adolescents can be expected to come to terms with competing discursive strands today which delineate and assess diversity from different angles.²⁴ Even though being nationally specific, these fields of discourse must not be mistaken for any straightforward pressure towards, e.g., "Germanization." After all, young foreigners also participate in and influence the interaction taking place. Besides, owing to the particular ambiguity prevailing with regard to immigration in Germany, no programmatic assimilation policy has been developed here.

Immigrant Diversity in a Berlin School

Although all children encounter axiomatic rules and social concepts most systematically at school, this does entail special consequences for those from immigrant families. For one thing, they are confronted personally with dominant conceptualizations and evaluations of collective difference. These take their most tangible form in the treatment of migration-related topics in teaching and in the practical handling of immigrant diversity in everyday school life. In both respects, the site of my study in Berlin was marked by assessments that run counter the quoted programme ideal in "world studies," which largely represents the vision of "one-world" without prejudices.

The history and geography textbooks used in the school I studied depict a world of harsh differences. When dealing with migration and the most relevant emigration countries²⁵ the latter are frequently qualified as underdeveloped and divided by acute inner conflicts, a negative performance often related to parochial cultural traditions such as the caste system in India²⁶ or clan loyalties in sub-Saharan Africa²⁷. An example that affects the image of Turkish immigrants explicitly is the grade 8 geography textbook. The chapter dealing with Turkey starts with the statement that the country suffers from severe development contrasts. It goes on to explain that the people who made their

24 See Mannitz 2004.

25 Geography textbooks tend to present selected countries because of their emigrant populations these days. This has the twofold motivation (1) to improve knowledge about the immigrants and enhance mutual understanding and (2) to facilitate identification by pupils of migrant origin with the teaching programme. Both of these intentions may be counteracted by the stereotypical way in which the emigration countries are presented, that is, largely in terms of shortcomings and deficits (see Lütke & Klüter 1995; Stöber 2001).

26 Brodungeier et al. 1996: 99.

27 Krauter & Rother 1988: 44.

way to Germany beginning in the 1960s came from the least developed parts of Turkey. Different from their fellow nationals in Istanbul, these migrants are said to have very little in common with Central Europeans:

Inhabitants of Istanbul have more in common with Central Europeans than with the inhabitants of eastern Anatolian villages. [...] In the 19th century, [...] most reforms remained restricted to Istanbul and the western parts of the country. [...] The Turkish Republic tried to overcome its inferiority in relation to the European industrial nations independently. [...] The extreme imbalance was to be levelled out. However, the new state's limited economic power prevented any considerable success. [...] Finally, a rural migration drift started. Urban conglomerations like Istanbul and the Marmara region were the main destinations of this internal migration. After 1961, many migrants tried to find work in the industrialised countries of Central and Western Europe (Krauter & Rother 1988: 56–59).

In the same vein, migration is portrayed in many cases as being triggered mostly by push factors. Pull factors are hardly ever mentioned. While migrants are thus associated with poverty and other problems intrinsic to the country or the region of origin, the permanent presence of immigrants in Germany is presented as having imported problems. This is an issue brought forward in subjects like history or social studies also. In the history textbook used at the school of my research, it reads as follows in the volume for grade 9:

Other difficulties resulted from the large number of immigrants, of foreigners and returning emigrants [*Aussiedler*] of German descent from Eastern European countries, who streamed into the Federal Republic. Almost five million foreigners lived here in 1990 including 1.5 million Turks. Many came because they expected better living conditions than in their home countries. Others requested asylum because they were being persecuted for political or religious reasons at home. *They were all looking for housing and work. Additionally, there are language barriers, the clash of cultural differences and problems of integration* (Ebeling & Birkenfeld 1991: 109; emphasis added).

In other words, immigrants appear as recipients who reap advantages from being in Germany, while Germans are not explained how they gain from the presence of immigrants. From these elements a problematic causal chain suggests itself: The immigrants' cultures of origin involve poverty and backwardness, these being the cause of both emigration and the burden which immigrants bring with them. Thus, an implicit concept of culture as a fixed collective disposition lacking internal diversity may legitimise a low opinion of the others, who altogether appear to represent backward mentalities.²⁸ Theo-

28 More details are discussed in Mannitz & Schiffauer 2004. Our findings have been confirmed by other research projects. See, e.g., the study by Hormel & Scherr 2004, or the reports on the study "Images of others" carried out at the University of Frankfurt/Main. The latter analysis shows that the image of immigrant youths as betwixt and between (*zwischen zwei Stühlen*) is an established metaphor in teaching materials for social studies in junior secondary schools

retically, this negative message is still open to discussion and even invalidation through critical use of textbook representation in teaching. But my participant observation carried out in classrooms over a period of ten months did not reveal many instances of such a critical approach.

The secondary school in the Berlin borough of Neukölln had large numbers of pupils from various foreign nationalities, those from Turkish, Lebanese and (former) Yugoslavian families being most numerous. How was their presence understood to affect daily school life? The briefest answer is that they were considered a major problem. Many teachers expressed the view that the "oriental pupils in particular" posed great difficulties because of their "completely different" upbringing and culture. In the same vein, these students' knowledge of other languages was not seen as any asset or useful skill but rather as a handicap that hindered their participation, social integration, and individual chances for success in German society. The immigrant parents, moreover, tended to be perceived by most of the teaching staff as mere sources of obstruction. They were believed to follow a counter-productive agenda, focusing all of their attention on their own cultural milieu instead of taking part in the wider society and assisting their children to do the same in school. The negative cliché of migrant youth occupying a space "between," or even as "torn between" different cultures was reproduced in many instances. A number of teachers went a step further and complained about the altogether negative impact of the large number of foreign pupils on their German peers, the effect being a "reactionary assimilation process" among German pupils, as one teacher put it. According to him, the German pupils were adapting to a higher level of aggression and other bad habits introduced by the foreigners. He argued that the Germans had behaved better and had achieved more when the foreigners had been less numerous.

To contextualise this negative appraisal, one needs to take into consideration that schools with high rates of pupils from immigrant families are often situated in socio-economically weak or "high risk" neighbourhoods. This is also the case in Berlin. A combination of high rates of unemployment and welfare recipients, bad housing conditions and populations consisting of many and rather poorly skilled immigrants characterised the outlying districts of Berlin where most pupils resided. Such difficult social conditions render an impact on school since pupils from underprivileged families of whatever nationality tend to lack linguistic and social skills, which are important prerequisites for successful schooling. Yet, quite different from approaches chosen in other European countries – e.g. in France, the UK or in Sweden – where additional resources are allocated to counterbalance negative circumstances from home and cope with the particular challenges immigrants are facing, in Germany most schools in "high risk" neighbourhoods are usually not better but even more poorly equipped than average. This issue has received increased at-

(Höhne, Kunz & Radtke 1999, 2000). As regards the negative image of migration and nomadism see Treibel 2003: 43 ff.

tention since the publication of the latest OECD PISA study (Baumert et al. 2001). Children from immigrant families proved to be significantly less skilled than their German peers in reading and comprehension of the German language. And they came up much worse than pupils from comparative immigrant groups in other countries of the OECD survey. This results in a serious disadvantage. For the pupils concerned, opportunities are limited if they lack the basic prerequisite of mastering the residential country's *lingua franca*. Conversely, Germany obviously missed chances of making good use of its human resource potential.²⁹

In Berlin, the poor material situation of the school and the substandard living conditions at home created stress for both teachers and students. It resulted in many teachers willingly accepting the thesis of cultural differences as the outstanding explanation for the difficulties encountered. The cultural otherness of their "oriental pupils" easily ruled out alternative explanations such as the impact of social class or individual problems, be it in the context of a student's social behaviour, his or her lack of progress in class, or a girl's refusal to join a class outing. Aggressive behaviour was less interpreted as indicating pressure deriving from deprived living conditions but more as expressions of role models rooted in "other cultures." One of the teachers explained to me as follows why the presence of the "oriental pupils" had negative effects in his view on the overall situation in school: "Especially among foreign pupils, behaviour is following backward role models. [...] There is almost no possibility of solving conflicts verbally, no willingness to compromise. And with our large proportion of oriental students, there are many failings in the area of tensions between male and female teenagers."

A more empathetic colleague of his judged that these pupils were victims of circumstance:

Turkish parents fail insofar as little value is placed on acquisition of the German language. Our students' Turkish parents throw their children into the German school system without any assistance. Turkish boys especially are often confronted with such unreal expectations from their parents that many are in danger of breaking down. This pressure naturally produces behaviours that we feel to be very unpleasant. [...] My opinion is that the Turkish Parents' Association fails completely.

A third teacher, reacting to two Turkish students whom she heard talking in their mother tongue, was explicit on why integration of the Turks in Germany failed: "You speak Turkish, you stay in your own circles, you go shopping only in Turkish shops. Integration cannot work like that!"

29 The causes of this lose-lose-situation are numerous but experts agree that the socio-economic origin of a child determines school success to an extraordinarily high degree in the German school system. If their social backgrounds are substandard, pupils from migrant families seem to be subject to twofold processes of systemic discrimination of the disadvantaged and of the institution's incapability to cope with heterogeneity as such.

As these examples show, the foreign students, and especially the "oriental" immigrants among them, were perceived as incapable of fulfilling the model proposed for them. In the view of the quoted teachers, the Turkish families represented the cultural antipode to modernity and civilization, and as such were assumed to reproduce outdated gender roles, condone oppressive educational methods and authoritarianism, and insist on maintaining various peculiar cultural traditions – all of which were regarded as irreconcilable with the ambitious aspiration to follow the universalistic ideals of Europeanised Germany.

To some degree, this juxtaposition of the underdeveloped Orient vis-à-vis the advanced Europe sounds familiarly similar to arguments compiled thirty years ago in defining orientalism.³⁰ But unlike the ambivalence of conventional orientalism, which combined negative stereotyping with an idealization of the mysterious and fascinating Orient, comments and assessments made by numerous German teachers contained no positive connotations at all. Whenever labour immigrants and their children were at issue, a self-evident cultural hierarchy prevailed: the "oriental" immigrants were seen as a specific group of foreigners, whose different cultures were reminiscent of earlier stages in communal life, resulted in social divisions and a backlash in the "host society" – namely the quoted "reactionary" influence of German peers. According to many teachers' understanding "the orientals," more so than other immigrant groups, were basically reluctant to adopt anything of the modern German lifestyle. They may not even be wrong in some of their assessments of individual students or families. However, such judgements were readily transferred to larger groups of foreigners, i.e. "the Turks" or "the orientals." The collective image of these others was that of notorious troublemakers, the reason being their different cultural backgrounds.

The teachers' integration efforts were, however, not directed in favour of any "culture" flagged as German either. From their side³¹ there was clearly no sympathy with narratives of German (or any other) national culture and traditions. Their ideals drew upon the universal value of social modernity, rationalism, liberalism and pluralism, nothing particular to Germany. Nevertheless, since these ideals were perceived as being rooted in the historical experience of central Europe, in the shape of the Enlightenment and the European spirit of overcoming a terrible nationalist past, the "orientals" not sharing this experience seemed destined to remain a negative contrast group.

30 Said 1978.

31 Many of the teachers had been influenced by the anti-authoritarian student revolts and the social movements that followed in the 1970s. Negative evaluation of Germanness is not restricted to this political generation but it appears as a strong common outlook. Besides, the revolts may have contributed also to establishing reserved views of the nation in the wider society. By the end of the 1990s, a representative survey on German national identity noted an altogether "strong push in a negative direction" (Rossteutscher 1997: 624).

Yet in effect, the ill-famed children from migrant families appeared to be both insiders and outsiders at the same time. While they represented essential otherness in the dominant narration, the routine of everyday life implied that one had to come to terms with them as *de facto* fellow citizens. This led to expectations among teachers that their “foreign” pupils would somehow have to surmount their otherness. And again this carried ambivalent implications: How can an individual overcome his or her cultural otherness when this is understood as being a “mentality” or an iron cage of a collective cultural disposition? Opinions and expectations of teachers and peers varied on this point. Each possible positioning meant social compliances and breaches, and pupils could hardly avoid or remain disengaged from such confrontations. These combined factors make school a place where interactions take place at different levels of integration and disintegration: standards of articulating one’s position are established within the existing power relations whilst being subject to continuous contestation also.

Creative conflations:

The foreigner experience as an asset

Neither the experience of relatively consistent negative stereotyping of their own backgrounds, nor the overall critical representation of Germanness prevented my young interlocutors in Berlin from remaining both in the foreigner category and from becoming German in some ways. I shall try to explain why.

Children from migrant families do not only encounter the idea of cultural differences and collectively attributed mentalities in school. At home, many are confronted with similar concepts when their parents insist on preserving certain cultural boundaries in relation to “the Germans,” boundaries that are stressed out of fear of losing their children in a cultural sense as a minority. Having grown up with these complementary ideas, discourses, practices, and expectations relating to cultural difference, the adolescents I met in Berlin reproduced the hegemonic concept frequently. They claimed that different cultural collectivities based on nationality or religion were matters of fact and articulated this assumption through contrasting comparisons. The range varied though: in some cases the “individualist Western lifestyle” was pitted against “our countries that are bound to religion, customs, and tradition,” or “modern Muslims” were contrasted with “traditional Muslims.” In other cases what mattered most was the difference between “Christian Europe” and “the Muslim world,” or that between Christian and Muslim foreigners in Germany. Yet another contrasting dualism was that between Germans from West Berlin and “the Nazis from the East.” In spite of these bold and generalising classifications, the students’ personal experience of cultural distance and their own identifications differed from situation to situation. Being a foreigner, being from West Berlin, being a Muslim or a Turk had different meanings under different social circumstances. Sometimes the Germans served as the main con-

trast group, sometimes the same person who had just quoted the boundary between Turks and Germans as significant described the own family with strongest feelings of alienation, like 19-year-old Mehabad: "I come home and everything is completely different from outside. At home the things that matter are basically very unimportant to me, really very, very unimportant and of no significance!"

Despite the apparent confusion, a general argumentative pattern marked these narrations: although the view that cultural differences existed between the home and German public spaces was widely conformed to, the children of immigrants themselves did not want to be forced into any exclusive category. The reason for this was that switching between the two "worlds" or "cultures" and acting in both was not regarded as a trap or a major problem. The overwhelming majority did not see themselves as victims of circumstance but as protagonists of an unforeseen interim stage. There was a shared feeling that none of the pre-defined characteristics attributed to them matched their own mixed experiences. Thus, students from immigrant families of all kinds often preferred to resort to the vague common identity of being "foreigner." While being also aware of their friends' various origins, the national or ethnic differences tended to be levelled out within this residual in-group of "the foreigners." In one discussion involving young people from Turkish, Palestinian, Greek, Albanian, Croatian and Sri Lankan families, participants all agreed that their "foreign parents" had raised them differently than Germany parents had raised their peers. The main boundary was hence drawn along the line of nationality yet it was understood as being related to processes of cultural reproduction.

The home and the social world outside seemed to represent a discrepancy of expectations to all children from migrant families, yet one that could be handled according to situation. The "foreign" adolescents agreed that they encountered difficulties now and then, requiring extra competence in mediation and placing considerable demands on them psychologically when they refused to fulfil the role their families expected of them, namely that of future guardians of their parents' original culture in the diaspora. Nevertheless, confidence in their own capacity to ultimately master these expectations prevailed over frustration. They made a virtue of commuting between diverse spheres, of managing stigmatization and were very well aware of their competence with regard to double "cultural" agency. The fall-back category of the "foreigner" served this purpose on numerous levels: It functioned to appease their parents' fears of the next generation's Germanization by stressing a certain distance from "the Germans." At the same time, it was a means of maintaining a distinct position vis-à-vis the indigenous German population while not stressing one's own *particular* origin, i.e. possibly one's special stigma if belonging to the "oriental" category of immigrants. The extended concept of "the foreigners" also fostered solidarity among the different national minorities. As a common denominator, it allowed its members to take a joint stand substantiated by similar, shared experiences of exclusion.

While many pupils in the multi-national networks of “foreigners” had no objections against the general assessment that national groups possessed different mentalities, they did not take this personally. Truly problematic cultural otherness was, in their view, embodied by their elders and relatives “back home.” They generally found it hard to bear their parents’ home environments for more than short periods of time. 20-year-old Hashim explained his feelings of alienation this way:

Living here in Germany, we see many things differently. When I try to question some things over there [i.e. in Kosovo], I am always told, ‘No, we don’t do that, that doesn’t suit us, it’s not our tradition and culture, that’s a matter of honour, we don’t do things like that...’ Living in Germany has given me a different way of thinking. When I imagine what I would have been like, had I grown up in Kosovo..., I would have had a completely different idea of the world, absolutely! The people there think completely differently.

Similar to this young man, many other children of immigrants saw their very competence in questioning matters, discussing and searching for compromise as the core of a cultural change that their own generation but not the one of their parents had undergone in Germany. A girl from a Greek family put it like this: “I am in any case convinced – and that is exactly what my parents mean by ‘behaving German’ – that you must also be able to compromise, otherwise it doesn’t work.” About her parents she thought: “They are not used to discussing things or finding interim solutions.”

Personal development and the ability to tolerate controversy, to discuss and solve conflicts by accepting compromise was seen as a chance, which their parents had never had, let alone family members who had not emigrated, because these attributes were conceptualised as typical of German life. In the words of a girl from a Tamil family, “One can develop much better here than in our own countries.” Accordingly, the notion of mentality recurred regularly when these young people spoke about their parents’ countries of emigration where they regarded socialization circumstances as being altogether limited. In effect, the emigration societies appeared as if frozen in a state of timeless traditionalism, not allowing for any dynamic change.

The “narrow-mindedness” of relatives who had never been abroad and their “weird expectations and distorted ideas” about life in Germany bothered many young people and gave them the impression that the “authentic” cultures of the emigration countries were, in fact, as backward as the German school textbooks portrayed them to be. Hashim once commented that, “countries that are economically weak are always bound to religion, customs, and tradition.” This nexus of culture as a locational factor for poor economic circumstances, which in their turn are assessed as being responsible for conflicts and instability, sounds quite familiar: It is one of the recurrent lines of argument followed in the teaching about underdeveloped countries, traditional culture and the push-factors for migration. The pupils had obviously got the message and applied it to the countries of their families’ origin. Just as their own

parents and relatives were judged as holding on to traditional norms and being unable to discuss controversial subjects, their original national societies were regarded as a whole as carrying the same deficiency. Traditions appeared hence as a kind of "tied and tagged baggage" (Baumann 1999: 94), which limits the scope for possible development. Given the rather negative evaluation attached to cultural traditions, my interlocutors showed hardly any interest in them. However, since the young people saw themselves as "foreigners" in Germany rather than as representatives of a particular national, ethnic or religious group, the suggested parochialism of traditions was of no real concern for their own self-images.

And yet, in situations of conflict between "foreigners" and "Germans," the allocation table with the reified categories turned out to reach a dead end. The underlying imbalance in power relations suddenly became visible when the so-called foreigners felt they were being provoked to justify themselves or their supposed original cultures. While German students were able to use the negative bias of "traditional cultures" against "the foreigners," the latter in turn had difficulty in defending concepts they could not fully subscribe to, nor were they willing to accept the stigmatization for themselves. If their German peers saw no necessity to seek intersecting commonalities, such situations were prone to result in a breakdown of communication and to reconfirm the *cliché* of the Germans being a bounded contrast group, even in the eyes of those "foreigners" who represented supposedly German ways of behaviour at their homes.³²

In line with the stereotypes prevailing at school, many pupils from migrant families accused their parents indeed of insisting on the maintenance of group boundaries and traditions that had lost any meaning among their own peer-group. Being different from "the Germans" did not imply identification with any particular group of origin and vice versa. This was a matter of family conflict. To some extent many of the young "foreigners" felt they had, in fact, become "Germanised" as their parents noticed with displeasure. Yet any direct identification with "becoming German" was inconceivable. This was not just because their German peers denied them access to their in-group but also due to the ambivalent feelings about Germanness in itself. As one young woman explained: "One cannot feel one is a German, and somehow I don't *want* to think of myself as German, since the idea of being 'typically German' is a deterrent in itself!"

It appears the "foreign" adolescents were thoroughly enculturated into the prevailing discursive conventions of German self-reflection and had fully internalised its negative connotations. The latter make identification as German difficult for native Germans as well as for immigrants. Since hybridity is not (yet) foreseen in the conceptualization of Germanness, immigrants are, however, confronted in the public with an either/or option with regard to their identification as Germans and as members of a nation they or their parents

32 See Mannitz 2001.

originated from. The boundaries of Germanness cannot be blurred or shifted as easily as is the case, for example, with Britishness.³³ And the option of Europeanness remains a restricted category for most of the “foreigners” not only because of its remoteness from daily business, but also because it continues, in its dominant interpretations, to exclude those denizens with “oriental” origins.

The self-positioning as being “foreigners in Germany” is a remarkable way out of this conceptual dilemma for it draws upon assumed otherness as a resource, which the Germans do not have at their disposal to deal with the altogether negative meanings of Germanness. In one classroom discussion one Kurdish girl explicitly described this as an advantage: “Since we, the foreigners, also know another mentality, another culture, we can decide which one is better or appeals to us more. As a result, there is always this longing for the culture that one likes best. I think Germans do not have this choice.”

One of her classmates, a girl from a migrant family as well, commented on the same issue: “Sometimes one feels, like, Where do I belong ultimately? Should we have to found a new state for all who are ‘half German,’ or what?!”

This was not the only positioning strategy; partial identification with various other factors was another solution. Among such factors were the identification with the neighbourhood they lived in, with certain groups like the “good” anti-fascist, pro-immigrant Germans, with the old West before German unification; and with the economic success of West Germany, to name just a few.³⁴

The everyday reality of the children with migration backgrounds was obviously far more complex than what the concept of clearly delimited cultures was able to convey, in spite of the fact that everybody made use of it. The “foreign” pupils had learned to conceive of themselves as being the others in Germany, while at the same time being insiders in everyday social life and, what is more, insiders on the level of the conceptual and argumentative “tool kit” (Swidler 1986), they used in making themselves understood. The ways in which the adolescents made sense of the world, voiced their arguments and handled the notions of cultural difference reflected the discursive assimilation

33 Legal amendments regarding nationality only took effect in the year 2000 and it will take time before they are integrated in the public self-image. With the new laws, a civic understanding replaced the ethno-national tradition that bolstered the popular understanding of Germanness as an equation of *demos* and *ethnos* “with higher evaluation of the *ethnos*” (Hoffmann 1996: 252). Before the amendment, naturalization of immigrants was exceptional unless they could demonstrate ethnic German ancestry. The current conditions are explained under www.einbuengerung.de.

34 For more examples see Mannitz 2004. In her study on the ways in which young migrants handle the particular burden of German history, Viola Georgi (2003) has likewise documented the difficulties inherent in the latent German integration demands.

process they had undergone growing up in Berlin. They were able to deploy available discourses on and about themselves, both conforming to and subverting the existing narratives. Their difficulty was thus not in handling the multi-level reality of their lives, but in coping with the fact that their creative conflation, which went beyond the conventionally imagined communities of national societies, found no apt recognition, neither from their families nor from their German surroundings; at home, as much as in school, they were expected to show sentiments of *unambiguous* identification and commitment. Yet even though nationality was in this way associated with culture, emotional ties and collective identity on all sides of the hegemonic categorization, this did not quite match the mixed experience of distance and simultaneous belonging of many adolescents. Their way out of this situation was the “foreigner” identity that makes use of the existing terminology but equips it with new meanings of transnational experiences.

Owing to the then rather restrictive German nationality legislation, most of the “foreign” pupils were in fact foreign nationals at the time of my fieldwork. Their own classifications, although citing the familiar reifications of alterity, were, however, fluid enough to transcend the rigid container model of national groups and “their” cultures, which still occupies the dominant imageries despite the decline of explicit nationalism. The following quote is a typical illustration of this conflation. It was made by one of the young women I continued to meet for interviews after she had left school. Her family had emigrated from Sri Lanka in the 1980s and she had come to Berlin at primary school age. When reflecting upon her coming of age in Berlin, her argument presupposes a classical model of multi-cultural diversity with distinct cultural communities, yet the underlying notion of otherness is reassessed positively as meaning a collective resource in terms of enrichment that entails special opportunities in learning tolerance: “We had the advantage of enrichment through all the cultures. I have got to know so many cultures in school, [...] and therefore I will never be able to claim that I have something against somebody from this or that culture. After all, I got to know these people; they had the same problems I had, and we could talk to each other about that!”

From this point of view, the immigrants appear as indispensable agents of social change because they embody plurality in society. This young woman was not the only one to discover such a positive side in the ascription of otherness. In search of possible ways out of the nationally codified dilemma of conceptual exclusion, the “foreign” youth made a virtue out of the attribute of being others with different cultures. It was thus the very diversity in a “multi-cultural” school setting as the emic vocabulary labelled it – which their German teachers regarded as a major source of distress and problems – that had made these pupils accept the relative meaning of difference to such an extent that they could reassess the collective value of heterogeneity and conclude, in the words of a teenage girl from a Greek family, that “every person is different. That has nothing to do with nationalities.”

Conclusion

Although cross-border relations mark the contemporary world to an unprecedented degree and may in the long run further undermine the nation concept, the boundaries of nationally defined societies, cultures, and citizenship models are still powerful categories in terms of perceptions, recognition and access to privileges. West Germany has always been a country of immigration, but the presence of immigrants has largely remained a white space in the collective imagination. Not even the large scale *de facto* consolidation of the former “guestworker” immigration had led to any straightforward policy of formal inclusion in Germany till the end of the 1990s. Until a Social Democrat-Green coalition supplanted the conservative coalition in 1998, much of the normative political discourse depicted labour migrants in Germany as foreigners destined to return to their home countries rather than as immigrants expecting to somehow become part of the permanent denizenry. Owing to this long-standing policy of denial, the conceptualization of the immigrants recruited in the heyday of the booming economy developed at a different pace than that of much of the societal inclusion process, which Germans and foreign residents were experiencing together in West Germany. Yet even this situation was left surprisingly uncontested for most of the past forty years. Looking back, it seems as if both indigenous Germans and immigrants preferred to practice a “muddling through” (Lindblom 1959; Geertz 1973) instead of taking positive action and risking public strife.

However, the 1990s brought several catalytic moments that drew attention to the question of how cohabitation could be improved. Above all, the German unification put issues of national identity onto the agenda, triggering discussions on internal cohesion in German society, on membership, belonging, and entitlements within the polity and on the place of unified Germany in the project of an increasingly integrating Europe. In the wake of these debates, the post-war trend towards the denationalization of German self-definitions was reconfirmed, its most tangible expression being the amendment of the nationality laws in the year 2000. Debates on how to manage and organise immigration have nevertheless remained a site of ideological battles where fears of different cultures and traditions that immigrants might bring with them have repeatedly resurfaced along with fears of the economic charge that a decided integration policy would imply. Compared to neighbouring immigration countries, the German public appears to be not only little experienced in facing the challenges of diversity, it also seems little confident in its own integrative potential.

The characteristic uneasiness which Germans display vis-à-vis immigrant others takes the shape of a culturalist discourse. This discourse is negatively biased and it poses particular constraints on the project of integration by way of the civic socialization in school, which is post-national in theory but continues to reflect ethno-national boundaries in the face of a “multicultural” reality. In fact, coping with immigration and furthering ideas of post-national-

ism do not appear as two sides to the same coin but as separate projects in the German setting. Despite the fact that Germanness has lost credit with the experience of dreadful nationalism, cultural heterogeneity is hardly deemed a positive alternative vision, neither in public discourse on the whole nor in the topical discussions concerning the presence of immigrant children in schools. Owing to the difficulties in promoting Germanness and furthermore enhanced by the absence of a clear policy in favour of immigration, the struggle in reconciling the ambitions in favour of post-nationalism with the desire of enculturating newcomers within the bounds of the national society may be more complicated here than in other European countries.

While the European nation-states continue moving towards some form of transnational commonality (and by doing so may in future shift the imagined boundaries to fence Europe off), national concepts of sameness still matter in the articulation of internal collectivity. Even though the symbolic boundaries of national communities have been recast by the project of Europeanization, the nation-states have not become altogether insignificant. Shifts towards universalistic learning contents and participation-oriented methods have gained importance, but each nation follows its own distinctive path of fitting its self-definition into the European framework. Consequently, the layers of discourse regarding nationality, social identities and viable options for collective as well as individual positioning have both multiplied and become more contested. Normative orientations toward desirable modes and balances of social, national, and international integration compete with and partially they also contradict one another. This is not restricted to the tense moments between the national and the transnational layers of citizenship in the contemporary European Union but likewise appears to affect the terms of recognition within national societies.

The complexity of these competing projects no doubt influences the processes of socialization of both children with and without immigrant backgrounds. The young people whose practices I studied in Berlin constructed their identifications using strategic elements from many topical areas, from the debates over East and West Germany and the issue of internal unity to the distinctions between Europe and the Orient, Christianity and Islam, urban Berlin and rural Turkey and so forth. Yet their self-positioning was not expressed through taking offensive positions *in favour* of one particular group allocation. Instead, the young “foreigners” defined themselves through various forms of “othering” (Abu-Lughod 1991) – fencing oneself off, stressing cultural but also individual differences which is not part of the image of clearly bounded groups. In the desire to define their place *within* German society they went beyond existing social boundaries and ultimately confirmed their identification with the more fluid and intersecting categorization of the “foreigners” than with either of the conventional nation-state informed concepts. By deploying this identity, one escapes the supposedly self-evident recourse to nationally defined groups or cultures and opts directly into the intersecting cleavages. As a mode of identification, this strategy refuses to meet

the expectation that immigrants would have to acquire national identity first in order to qualify as members of a post-national community thereafter. Nearly all students whom I interviewed declared themselves to be both German and “foreign” to some degree, thus both subverting the existing classifications while simultaneously making use of them. The “third generation” of immigrants thus appeared as embedded agents of a much larger shift towards the transnationalization of identities and lifestyles than is foreseen in education programmes focused upon the construction of a post-national sense of citizenship.

According to the young people’s accounts, their mixed attitude was not particularly welcome by their parents, many of whom felt the need to preserve some cultural distinctiveness. But it was no less problematic for many German teachers who felt responsible for promoting the values and standards of liberal democracy in Germany and had difficulties with their pupils’ concept of maintaining their ties with the other home culture at the same time. For both teachers and parents, the notion of a genuine emotional – albeit situational – identification with selected aspects of both groups was beyond imagination. It questioned the certainties they had grown up with themselves. Identification with the national collectivity was traditionally supposed to link the political system of the state with its people as loyal custodians and sovereign of “their” nation-states. Blurring national identities, of course, challenges this basic premise; yet it also entails opportunities to overcome various forms of polarization resulting from the categorical concept of different nationalities with distinct cultures co-existing, at best, side by side.

The way in which the adolescents included in this research came to terms with the competing assessments and discourses deserves acknowledgement as a form of self-empowered agency. Creating a transnational space for either imagining or escaping collectivity is an important first step toward developing new codes of coexistence. Of course, while pacifying animosities based on national differences within the “foreigner” community, the core identification with attributed otherness does little to erase the persistent conceptual divide between indigenous Germans and the immigrant population. Ultimately, many of those who see themselves – in cultural terms – as foreigners in Germany are also foreigners in the formal judicial sense, which still qualifies the spectrum of possible claims and political rights. As long as the German majority does not make comparable efforts to transcend the conceptual limitations underlying this very imbalance in hegemonic discourse and societal practice, the offspring of the immigrant population will be left alone with their stock of knowledge. To put it the other way round, when continuing to exclude certain migrant citizens from being part of integrating Europe, and hence from equal recognition and entitlements in the polity, the indigenous majorities do not only extrapolate otherness over generations but likewise spoil chances of living with and possibly overcoming differences. After all, the fact that people develop their sense of belonging in the social routines of daily life means that

the role of state institutions like schools is limited anyway to promoting a normative frame for personal (inter)agency.

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