

PESCO, Strategic Autonomy, and Ambition*

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Abstract: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is the means to achieve strategic autonomy, as demanded by the EU Global Strategy. The EU habitually downplays its own ambitions though, and appears beholden to the reticence expressed by its U.S. ally. In spite of its rhetoric, the capability implications of strategic autonomy have not actually been defined. As a result, PESCO is to some extent operating in a void. The EU should decide on the core tasks that it wants to be capable of performing alone, if necessary, and translate these into a list of operations that it should be able to conduct concurrently.

Keywords: EU, strategy, autonomy, defence

Schlagwörter: EU, Strategie, Autonomie, Verteidigung

1. Introduction: Rhetorical versus Practical Ambition

The activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) by the Council in late 2017, together with the creation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) by the Commission, is the most ambitious initiative in European defence since the EU launched its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999.¹ The year 2018 saw a quick succession of decisions to bring PESCO into practice,² including a first list of seventeen projects.³ In June 2016 already, the EU Global Strategy (which guides all EU external policies) had introduced strategic autonomy as an objective for the EU. PESCO is the way in which EU Member States can achieve strategic autonomy in the defence sphere. As the twenty-five participating Member States stated in the notification document announcing their intention to launch PESCO: “A long term vision of PESCO could be to arrive at a coherent full spectrum force package – in complementarity with NATO, which will continue to be the cornerstone of collective defence for its members”.⁴

“A coherent full spectrum force package” – that is truly ambitious. Yet, in the same breath the Member States felt obliged to refer to NATO, preventively defending themselves against any charges of stepping onto Alliance territory. This indicates that until now the EU and the capitals are perhaps not as convinced of their own level of ambition as they should be. Are the Europeans afraid of their own shadow?

* This article has been double blind peer reviewed.

1 Council of the European Union, *Council Decision Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Determining the List of Participating Member States*. Brussels, 8 December 2017.

2 For an analysis of the first steps, see Sven Biscop, “European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance”. In: *Survival*, Vol. 60, 2018, No. 3, pp. 161-180.

3 The full list of 17 projects encompasses the European Medical Command; the European Secure Software-defined Radio (ESSOR); the Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations; Military Mobility; the European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC); the European Training Certification Centre for European Armies; Energy Operational Function (EOF); the Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package; Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM); Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO); Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance; the Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform; Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security; the Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations; the Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle; Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery); and the EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC).

4 Participating States, *Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*. Brussels, 13 November 2017.

2. Conditional Ambitions

To an observer, it can indeed sometimes feel as if the EU spends more time explaining what it is not doing than what it is actually putting in practice. The High Representative, Federica Mogherini, set the example herself in a major speech just ten days after the activation of PESCO, at the annual conference of the European Defence Agency (EDA), when she once again repeated the mantra that PESCO is not about the creation of a European Army.⁵ This is the first caveat constantly being repeated. The second caveat is the one already quoted in the introduction: that PESCO will be complementary with NATO and will not encroach on the prerogatives of the Alliance. The third caveat is that there should not be too high expectations and that PESCO will take time to deliver.

There are good reasons for all three of these commonly referred-to caveats. First, the notion of a European army has become toxic in many corners, hence its use can be counterproductive. The best can be the enemy of the good: portraying an initiative as a step towards a European army may generate resistance to it that would otherwise not be there. When the European Commission and its President Jean-Claude Juncker refer to a European Army especially, it tends to fuel the negativity of those who were already eurosceptical. Second, Member States have but a single set of forces, hence care should, of course, be taken that the EU and NATO do not create contradictory or competing demands on those forces. Furthermore, as the means are limited, unnecessary duplications of tasks and structures should be avoided. These have been guidelines for European defence since the start of the CSDP. Third, expectations management is important. Many times in the past, both the EU and NATO have announced grand defence initiatives with a lot of fanfare, only to see them fizzle out quietly, without producing any significant results. Therefore it is understandable that many are sceptical today about yet another defence initiative, PESCO. At the same time, some are perhaps too enthusiastic and somewhat unrealistic in their expectations. It will take time before the Member States, through PESCO and the EDF, will substantially increase their military capacity and achieve a significant degree of strategic autonomy.

By overemphasizing these caveats, however, Europeans are at risk of undermining their defence initiatives even before they have fully taken off. A strategy should not set unrealistic goals.

5 Federica Mogherini, *Remarks by High-Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the 2017 Annual Conference of the European Defence Agency*. Brussels, 23 November 2017.

But setting goals that are too modest in relation to the available means, but also in view of the importance of the interests to be defended and the threats and challenges to be faced, means risking defeat. Therefore, the usual caveats have to be put in context.

A European army is, in fact, a very good idea. Had the six Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) gone through with their plan to create a European Defence Community and merged their armed forces into a single European force in the 1950s, things would have looked very different today. It is indeed advisable to avoid the use of the words “European army”, but the EU should stress that the aim of PESCO is to make a real leap forward in European defence. If it ends up as just another small step in the right direction, like so many of the schemes that preceded it, PESCO will effectively have failed. The necessary giant stride will not be possible just by stepping up cooperation between Member States armed forces. What this effectively demands is European military *integration*. National combat units must be anchored into permanent multinational formations, with permanent multinational command and control arrangements, supported by permanent multinational enablers. In many areas, multinational structures will have to replace national structures. The low-hanging fruit has already been plucked; now it is time to start chopping off superfluous branches in order for the tree to grow stronger.

Complementarity between the EU and NATO is a concern, but it should not be allowed to become a constraint. In fact, complementarity is more or less automatic, since the purpose of PESCO is to generate military capability. And all additional military capability that the EU Member States acquire by means of PESCO and the EDF, whether it be operated on a national or on a multinational basis, ipso facto enters the balance sheet of NATO as well, as (except for one) these states are all members or partners of the Alliance. In fact, PESCO most likely is the *only* way through which NATO can expect really significant increases in European capability in some of their key areas, notably strategic enablers. The reason is that even if all European allies would spend 2% of GDP on defence, they would still not be able to afford capital-intensive enablers if they would all spend these sums separately – they could only do so if they pool their defence effort. NATO does not have a mechanism for that, but in PESCO, the EU now has one. This directly serves both the Union and the Alliance.

Finally, scepticism should not turn into cynicism. There are good reasons to expect more from PESCO than from any previous initiative, because it is a fundamentally different scheme. First, it truly is Member State-driven: if France and Germany had not initiated it, and then gathered the support of other Member States, PESCO would not have been activated. Second, it has been institutionalised and therefore cannot simply fizzle out and disappear: it is part of the EU machinery now, and every year the Council will assess the National Implementation Plans that Member States will have to draw up.⁶ Third, for the first

time Member States that take the initiative can be rewarded with co-funding from the EU budget, thanks to the Commission’s EDF. There is, of course, no guarantee that PESCO will deliver: Member States have equipped themselves with the tool, now they must put it to good use. But certainly there is a very good chance to do so.

Obviously, capability projects do take a long time. The Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which has been extensively discussed, is a case in point. If this Franco-German project for a next generation European combat aircraft materializes, it would be an emblematic achievement for PESCO and European defence. But FCAS will not be operational before the 2040s at the earliest, if work on it would start today. That is precisely the point to be emphasised: it is because of the long timelines that work must be started in earnest as soon as possible. This will be the benchmark against which the success or failure of PESCO will be judged: will significant capability projects have been launched in the first three to five years after its activation?

3. Fear of our Ally

If in spite of all this many Europeans remain all too shy about PESCO, that is also due to the position their main ally, the U.S., has taken. After half a century of American strategic leadership, it still is an engrained habit of many Europeans to defer to Washington. Unfortunately, the US position is remarkably negative: not just sceptical of PESCO’s chances of success, which is understandable given the history of European defence initiatives, but downright critical of it. That is far less understandable, for the US has been calling on Europe to increase its defence efforts for many years, if not decades. Europeans feel that through PESCO they are answering that call, hence their surprise at Washington’s reaction.

What seems to grate most on the US is the link between PESCO and strategic autonomy. When the Global Strategy put strategic autonomy forward, that went mostly unremarked in Washington. Now that PESCO promises or, in the eyes of the US, threatens to make a degree of strategic autonomy a reality however, it appears that Washington has woken up. Fundamentally, the US will always be suspicious of any organisation of which it is not a member, including the EU.⁷ The US position on European defence has always remained somewhat ambiguous, therefore, even though since the last years of the second George W. Bush administration it has been more positive. The primary concern is that Europeans acquire more capability; whether they do so under a NATO or an EU flag has become a secondary matter. But between the lines one could always read that the US expected the Europeans to put those capabilities to use where Washington would deem it most useful. However, that is ignoring the political logic that dictates that when an actor acquires more capabilities, it will inherently desire more of a say on the use of those capabilities.

The fickleness of the current US president, Donald Trump, obviously complicates the issue. Trump does not seem to care much for either the EU or NATO, and some of his policies directly undermine Europe’s economic and even security

⁶ Institutionalisation is more important than the fact that the PESCO commitments are legally binding, which in itself does not guarantee that Member States will abide by them. There are many legal obligations that Member States do not (completely) fulfil, but institutionalisation means that the PESCO commitments will not disappear, and that Member States will at least have to explain themselves before their peers.

⁷ To quote a close friend and former American diplomat.

interests. The understandable reaction on the part of many in Europe is not to rock the boat even more and to try and humour the president. That, however, is a vain undertaking, quite simply because the man's humour can change from one moment to the next, and because in the way he operates, facts do not matter much. Trump's decisions are based on ideology and emotion; facts that run counter to what the president feels he has to do, are simply ignored. The NATO Summit in Brussels on 11 July 2018 proved as much. Many had feared that Trump would blow up the meeting and walk away, as he had done at the G7 meeting in Canada in June. Instead, he created his own reality and came out of the summit declaring that thanks to him, the Europeans were now doing America's bidding. The other heads of state and government, wishing him on his way to the ensuing visit to the UK, preferred not to contradict him. However, as this is but a self-fabricated image of NATO, Trump may just as easily fashion another reality next time he has to address the issue.

The Europeans have no interest in escalating the tensions with the Trump administration, but they should also not downplay the initiatives that they have embarked upon for good strategic reasons simply to appease Trump, because given his character durable appeasement simply is impossible. Europeans should calmly stand their ground, therefore, pursue strategic autonomy and implement PESCO as they have decided it, and continue explaining what they are doing and why. Eventually, if PESCO works, the facts will speak for themselves. The president may not care much for facts, but the Pentagon (still) does, as does NATO.

Indeed, Trump's capriciousness is an additional argument pleading in favour of European strategic autonomy rather than against it: if Europe can no longer be certain what US policy is, it should better have the capacity to defend its own vital interests. But the EU needs to ensure its strategic autonomy regardless of who occupies the White House. The world order has returned to what, in the light of history, is normality, i.e. multipolarity. There are at least four great powers today: actors whose decisions shape world politics – the US, Russia, China, and the EU itself. None of these can decide global issues by itself; all of them compete and cooperate with each other at the same time. In this context, Europe and the US still share many interests, but they may prioritise them differently, as dictated by geopolitics, for example. At times European and American interests may also be contradictory rather than complementary. Of course, the EU has a major interest in maintaining the transatlantic alliance – but as an alliance of equals, who pursue their interests together whenever they can, but separately when they must, including in the area of security and defence.

4. An Ambiguous Level of Ambition

The introduction of the concept of strategic autonomy in the 2016 Global Strategy was a crucial step in EU strategic thinking. However, the EU has thus far not defined in any detail what strategic autonomy means, neither in general nor in the field of defence specifically. The military capability implications thus also remain undefined.

PESCO may be the instrument to achieve strategic autonomy in defence, but the Council decision activating PESCO states only that PESCO members have made commitments to each other “with a view to [preparing for] the most demanding missions, and contributing to the fulfilment of the Union level of ambition”. In quantitative terms, the EU's military level of ambition has not been updated since 1999. This is when the EU adopted the (land-centric) Helsinki Headline Goal: the capacity to deploy, and to sustain for at least one year, 60,000 troops, with concomitant air and naval support, for expeditionary operations. The Headline Goal has been fine-tuned in qualitative terms, but quantitatively, the objective has remained unchanged. The objective of strategic autonomy is the latest qualitative change to the Headline Goal. In military operational terms, strategic autonomy could be understood as the capacity to undertake certain military tasks at all times. This implies that, if necessary, the EU must be capable of performing these tasks alone, in cases where no support from allies or partners is forthcoming.

At the same time as introducing strategic autonomy, the Global Strategy also added a new task to the assignments of the CSDP: the protection of Europe. This is another qualitative change, for originally the CSDP had been created for expeditionary purposes only. The idea is not for the EU to take charge of collective territorial defence, even though there is a legal basis for this in the Lisbon Treaty; that will remain the prerogative of NATO.⁸ There are multiple contingencies, however, that fall below the threshold of NATO's Article 5, in which the armed forces have a mostly supporting role to play, and which the EU is arguably better placed to address, such as homeland security (with regard to terrorism in particular), cyber security and border security.

Furthermore, since the Arab Spring and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, events that contributed to the shaping of the Global Strategy, the instability in Europe's periphery has greatly increased. The traditional expeditionary role of the CSDP has thus become a lot more challenging. At the same time, in view of the rise of China, Europe's attention has increasingly been drawn to Asia, in particular from the point of view of maritime security. In view of the increasing geopolitical competition between the great powers (the US, China, and Russia), free access to the global commons (the seas, space, air space, and cyber space) is becoming a challenge. The contingencies that the EU may have to face exist on a continuum: homeland security may require defeating an enemy abroad, such as the Islamic State, in addition to patrolling the streets at home; border security may be conditional upon creating a safe and secure environment in Europe's neighbouring countries; and cyber security may be the theatre of confrontation that replaces, or precedes, warfare between the regular forces of the great powers.

8 Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, the so-called Mutual Assistance Clause, states that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power”. The clause has been activated once, at the request of France following the 13 November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, but this was mostly a symbolic move. See Sven Biscop, “The European Union and Mutual Assistance: More than Defence”. In: *The International Spectator*, Vol. 51, 2016, No. 2, pp. 119–25.

5. A Lack of Numbers

Following the adoption of the Global Strategy, the Council of Ministers provided a definition of the operations that the EU should be capable of, in November 2016, in the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence.⁹ The focus is on expeditionary operations, for which the plan lists an ambitious range, covering the full spectrum, including combat operations: from “joint crisis management operations in situations of high security risk in the regions surrounding the EU” and “joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations”, through air security and maritime security operations, to capacity-building. However, the Implementation Plan has not been quantified. It does not specify the desired concurrency: how many operations should the EU be able to conduct simultaneously? Nor does the Plan specify the envisaged scale of these operations: is the EU thinking in terms only of battalions (such as the existing EU Battlegroups, which are but a reinforced battalion and its enablers), or is it envisaging deploying brigades or even divisions? As a result, the Implementation Plan’s list of operations seems already to have been forgotten; military staffers in Brussels refer to it as “the annex of the annex”.

Numbers have subsequently been proposed in the context of one of the first PESCO projects, the Crisis Response Operation Core (CROC), a Franco-German idea to facilitate force generation by developing a generic contingency plan for a crisis response operation and derive a force package from it.¹⁰ The Franco-German food-for-thought paper on the CROC stated that eventually such a force package, in order to achieve just the *existing* Headline Goal, should amount to a corps headquarters, three divisions and nine to twelve brigades. The CROC project seems to have been superseded, however, by French president Emmanuel Macron’s European Intervention Initiative (E2I). Signed by nine countries on 25 June 2018, the focus of E2I is not on establishing force packages but on strategic foresight and intelligence sharing, scenario development and planning, support to operations, and lessons learned and doctrine.¹¹ It is not clear whether and when the CROC project will be implemented.

The reality is that Member States were not willing to open the debate about numbers, because doing so would have revealed that the existing Headline Goal is actually insufficient to achieve a significant degree of concurrency of sizeable operations. Member States have, of course, not fully achieved the existing Headline Goal: they could scrape together 60,000 troops, but they could only deploy and sustain them if the US were willing to provide the strategic enablers. Furthermore, Europe would de facto also have to count on the US for its strategic reserve, for once 60,000 troops would be deployed, little additional deployable capacity would be left to extricate or reinforce the already deployed forces if operations went awry. Today, the military autonomy of the EU is fairly limited, therefore. Only

9 Council of the European Union, *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*. Brussels, 14 November 2016.

10 *Food for Thought Paper on the CROC*. Prepared by France and Germany, September 2017.

11 *Letter of Intent Concerning the Development of the European Intervention Initiative (E2I)*. Signed by France, Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia, Spain and Portugal, Paris, 25 June 2018.

smaller-scale operations (up to brigade-size) can be mounted without the US, if several Member States contribute enabling and supporting capabilities. Major operations without the US would require a lot of improvisation and thus incur a lot more risk.

6. Strategic Autonomy

The starting point, if the EU were to define strategic autonomy in more detail, are the vital interests of the EU, as defined in the Global Strategy: to maintain security, prosperity and democracy in Europe, which in turn requires a rule-based global order.

In view of the threats and challenges against these vital interests, strategic autonomy in the realm of defence would, at a minimum, require the EU and its Member States to be capable of three core tasks:

- Protecting Europe in contingencies that fall short of NATO’s Article 5.
- Containing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood, making sure that it does not threaten the vital interests of the EU (for example, by a spill-over of violence onto EU territory, by cutting of major routes for trade or energy supply, or by provoking unmanageable migratory flows).
- Protecting the freedom of access to the global commons in Europe’s neighbourhood and in the “middle spaces” (such as the Gulf and the Indian Ocean) that link this neighbourhood to the world.¹²

This is a view on what the EU and its Member States should, if necessary, be capable of doing alone. In addition, they must of course contribute to collective territorial defence through NATO.¹³

These three core tasks can then be translated into a more detailed level of ambition: which operations, at which scale, should the EU and the Member States be capable of conducting simultaneously. For example:

- long-term support to border security.
- long-term capacity-building (CBSD) in several neighbouring states.
- long-term cooperation activities with states across the globe, including in the maritime domain, and notably in Asia.
- two long-term stabilisation operations (before or after a conflict), of a brigade each, in Europe’s periphery.
- two long-term contributions to UN peacekeeping operations (before or after a conflict), of a battalion each, beyond Europe’s periphery.

12 Luis Simón, “Securing the ‘Middle Spaces’: Geography, Strategy, and the Future of European Power”. In: *Commentaries*, Brussels, Egmont Institute, 21 March 2016.

13 In the long term, if PESCO works out as planned and leads to an ever more integrated set of European armed forces, which would de facto constitute the European pillar of NATO, perhaps Europeans should also think about strategic autonomy in territorial defence. Not with the idea of abandoning NATO, but with a view to reconfiguring it as a bilateral alliance between the US and the EU as such. If the EU emerges as an effective strategic actor, it would only be logical that the EU also acts in NATO rather than the individual Member States who, each separately, can no longer exert strategic influence on world politics.

- three long-term maritime operations (before, during, or after a conflict) in Europe's periphery.
- one evacuation operation of EU citizens, of a battalion, anywhere in the world.
- one combat operation, of several brigades and/or air force squadrons, in Europe's periphery.

Putting forward such a level of ambition is not the same as saying that in each and every contingency Europeans must act under the EU flag and through the CSDP. In certain scenarios, EU Member States may wish to operate via NATO, or the UN, or create an ad hoc coalition. But regardless of the framework for deployment, Member States must have an idea of the required scale and concurrency of operations, in order to shape a force package that is fit for purpose. Creating that force package they will do through the EU, making use of PESCO and the EDF.

7. Conclusion

To this day, Member States have been unwilling to revise the Headline Goal upwards. The result is that to a certain extent PESCO and the EDF operate in a void. There is a missing link between the grand strategy, the EU Global Strategy, and the military activities (capability development and operations) that the EU carries out through the CSDP: a defence strategy that would spell out what exactly the EU wants to be capable of in an autonomous manner, and would derive the capability implications from that redefined level of ambition. Of course, in the first instance PESCO can carry on even so, because the shortfalls in Europe's arsenals are well-known, and have just been re-prioritised by the EDA in the 2018 Capability Development Plan. But eventually, if no clear level of ambition is defined, the current approach will reach its limits. How can one define "a coherent full spectrum force package" if one does not know which tasks, at which scale, it should be capable of?

The idea of defining a new Headline Goal is often dismissed as unnecessary: what good would it do to increase the level of ambition if Member States have not even realised the existing one? But that is a serious strategic error. The reason that the existing Headline Goal has not been achieved is not that Member States do not have the means – a collective of states that spends more than €200 billion per year on defence and has over 1.5 million people in uniform is capable of generating a lot more output with this input than it currently does. Giving up on this debate and rationalising the existing level of ambition just because it is what Member States have so far been willing to accept, means permanently condemning the EU to underperform – and creating the risk that the Union will not be able to defend its vital interests.



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Seit Implementierung der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie im Jahr 2003 ist die Ukraine-Krise die erste sicherheitspolitische Krise in der direkten Peripherie der EU. Die Studie von Rainer Böhling begibt sich auf die Suche nach der Strategie im Handeln der Europäischen Union. Hierbei arbeitet der Autor den Integrationskonflikt zwischen Moskau und Brüssel um die Ukraine auf. Beschrieben werden sowohl der Weg in die Krise als auch detailliert die Reaktion der EU während der Krise. Es offenbart sich, dass die nationalen Befindlichkeiten der Mitgliedsstaaten überwiegen. Obwohl die Administration der EU eine Vielzahl von Möglichkeiten bieten würde, einem Krisengeschehen zu begegnen, dominieren fast ausschließlich intergouvernementale Gremien das Geschehen. Das Ergebnis ist ein von Ad-hoc-Reaktionen geprägtes, intergouvernementales Vorgehen. Eine mögliche EU-Krisenstrategie unter Rückgriff auf bestehende, supranationale Institutionen der GASP/der GSVP findet sich nicht.



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