

What is unfortunate – in my opinion – is the fact that the main part of the work is purely based on E. Wüster's philosophy of concepts and their relationships. We find again a concept defined as "an element of thinking" (a totally subjective thing then?) and as a "mental representation of individual objects", a statement which is, however, contradicted already in the following two paragraphs (cf.3.3), where it is said that qualities and actions can also become objects of concepts as well as concepts "without regard of reality". Concept relationships are again specified as either logical, ontological or "of effect". Definitions are only distinguished as being intensional and extensional. Concept systems follow only the so-called logical and ontological relationships, although in at least one of their demonstrations in the form of diagrams a faceted subdivision must have been in the mind of the designer (cf.3.521.5). Notabene: The description of the diagram under 3.522.2 is misplaced, it should go under Example I on the following page. Another misprint concerns an article by my son that has been wrongly attributed to me, namely p.111: Dahlberg, W.: Towards a geometry of basic concepts.

Practical work with this manual in building concept systems and establishing vocabularies and thesauri will prove whether the theoretical basis for it as provided by Wüster is really so very practice oriented and helpful as claimed. Classification theory has shown that concepts to be used for the representation of the real world through propositions must be categorised according to the functional relationships existing between concepts, the results of which are then faceted concept/classification systems. It is impossible to go into more detail here about this.

Notwithstanding these remarks I wish to congratulate Helmut Felber on this huge work which should – by no means – be restricted to the English language alone but become a basis for translation into the major languages of our world in order that at least this knowledge may be spread more widely!
Ingetraut Dahlberg

BÜLOW, Edeltraud: Der Wortschatz des Ethischen und die Grundwerte-Diskussion. (Ethic Vocabulary and the Discussion of Fundamental Values). Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verl. 1984. 407 p., ISBN 3-87808-231-2.

It is the aim of this extensive survey to take stock of and to give a content structure of ethic vocabulary as found in the period between 1970 and 1980 and, at the same time, to point out changes in ethic vocabulary in these years. The authoress comes to the conclusion that the concept inventions, ascertainable in ethic vocabulary, indicate a new understanding of fundamental values and of the ethic problem situation as a whole and that therefore a relevantly modified theory of ethics is necessary to do justice to the shift of emphasis in the ethical awareness of the public.

The book is divided into three chapters with an appendix which not only comprises a vocabulary index, but also a synopsis of the more important basic concepts with exact bibliographical details of the material from which they are taken.

The first, very long chapter (pp. 1–184) takes a look at ethic vocabulary. In accordance with her thesis that ethic vocabulary falls into three categories – "Basic concepts of classical ethics", "Central terms of the Federal German Constitution", and "Standard language vocabulary used as central ethic terms" – Bülow takes as her material basis not only relevant (mainly philosophic) specialist literature, but also public comments, speeches and statements made by politicians and other public figures, as well as relevant commentaries from some of the leading daily and weekly newspapers in the German Federal Republic.

The wealth of the material can only allow a short appreciation of some of the more important aspects here.

In her examination of the philosophic approach to ethics, Bülow looks into and elaborates on the essential basic terms in the theories of Kant, Hegel, Scheler, and N. Hartman, and in the moral conceptions of such contemporary writers as K.-O. Apel and J. Habermas. Three terms in particular are singled out of the public ethic discussion: "work", "life", and "environment". Bülow clarifies the semantic status and the semantic field of these terms, analyses changes in terms and in meanings, and points out the relevant ethical problems. She shows how the traditional idea of work as 'toil' and 'harrassment' has given way to the idea that work is a form of self-realization, an idea which has, as a parallel development, placed new requirements on occupation and work. As a change in the associated semantic field of the word "work", the authoress establishes that economic crisis and imminent unemployment have, in particular, brought the phrase "the right to work" to the fore. The semantic field of the word "life", which at the present moment is marked by such expressions as "the right to life", "the protection of unborn life", "the quality of living standards", "a life in human dignity", and "survival", reflects such contemporary ethical problems as abortion, medical ethics, and ecology. Ecological problems and their ethical dimension have introduced a completely new semantic field to the vocabulary of ethics, illustrated by terms like "environment", "environmental protection/conservation", "ecological awareness".

Although Bülow's investigation of ethic vocabulary is interesting and informative in parts, this chapter of the book does have nevertheless its shortcomings. In the first place, there is an overload of material, which is particularly irritating as the authoress gives hardly any summaries of interim results so that her 'stock-taking' appears rather unsystematic and confusing. What is more, she neglects to separate the presentation of the philosophic approach to ethics from the material taken from the public sector, the result being that philosophic theories are analysed 'in one breath' with declarations of ethical principles from the public sector and with problems of public life. This has led Bülow in some instances to confuse vocabulary changes in ethic theories with vocabulary changes in public usage, and in others, rashly to infer vocabulary changes in the public sector from those in the philosophic sector, which is problematic in that certain terms within the framework of ethic theories have often a somewhat different meaning from those in public usage. (c.f., e.g. pp. 32, 33; in particular pp. 46, 47, where Bülow first of all gives a review of J. Haber-

mas's discursive ethics, in which the term "communication community" plays an important role, and then, after some remarks on the ubiquitousness of the term "communication community" in public ethic vocabulary, suddenly goes on to speak about the changes in this vocabulary brought about by the pidgin forms of German introduced into the language by foreign workers and refugees from the Third World).

In the second chapter, which is also very long (pp. 185–305), the amassed vocabulary is reappraised from the linguistic point of view and examined for "inner organization" and "basic semantic structures" (p. 184). Bülow's method of approach conforms to Weisgerber's content-referred linguistic analysis, i.e. the analysis of the form, content, performance, and effect aspects of a given word. Her reappraisal of the content of ethic vocabulary is based on the principles of composition, opposition, and comparison. The principle of composition is used to gather information on the formal characteristics of the vocabulary and to work out the essential semantic relations. First Bülow uses this principle in an analysis of those expressions formed from the words "Grund-(basic)", "Wert-(value/worth)", and "Sinn-(sense/meaning)", which in her opinion form the basis of a primary ethic vocabulary. Then she examines word-formations with the prefixes "mit-(with/fellow)", "Zusammen-(together/co-)", with the nouns "-schutz (protection/ conservation)", "-hilfe (help/aid)", "-sicherung (safeguarding/securing)", with the lexeme "-sicher-(safe/secure)", and the morpheme "-sorg-(care)", in order to obtain a further scope determinant for the vocabulary.

Bülow considers the principle of opposition, i.e. the analysis of opposites, highly important within the framework of her investigation as in her opinion the polarity of terms is a very important element in the field of ethic terminology. (e.g. The fundamental opposition of "good" and "evil" as the basis of most ethical judgements. c.f. p. 253). The semantic structuring of the words "work", "life", "environment" in particular are analysed with the aid of this principle.

The principle of comparison, i.e. the comparing of the different degrees of comparison of adjectives, is, for Bülow, especially with a view to an analysis of the comparative, particularly instructive as far as ethic vocabulary is concerned though she clearly makes less use of this principle than of the principles of composition and opposition.

What must be criticized in this second chapter is the fact that the presentation of the various linguistic approaches is not very lucid. More specifically, it would have been helpful if Bülow has clearly stated her own position with regard to method. Furthermore, the authoress fails to elucidate the criteria used to establish relations between the phrases/expressions and the ethic vocabulary, which creates the impression that many of the relations are merely based on an intuitive understanding of ethics. (c.f., e.g. p. 187 where Bülow writes,

as an explanation of her method, that "with the attribute of ethics the semantic characteristic is isolated in order to mark the main relations of the appurtenant words from which all other semantic relations may be classified".) What the "attribute of ethics" actually is, is not defined.

In the third, concluding chapter, Bülow presents a content structure of ethic vocabulary based on the following seven basic semantic relations under each of which specific terms are ordered: 1) Man ↔ fellow-men (illustrated with the aid of such concepts as "charity", "humanity/considerateness", "brotherliness"); 2) Fellow-men ↔ personal (human) collective (examples: "State under the rule of law [Rechtsstaat]", "constitution", "basic/fundamental right"); 3) personal (human) collective ↔ collective of living things (e.g. "protection/conservation of life", "nature conservancy", "environmental protection"); 4) personal (human) collective ↔ collective of mankind ("maintenance of peace", "disarmament and détente", "poverty in the world"); 5) collective of living things ↔ collective of mankind (e.g. "survival of mankind", international understanding", "world hunger aid"); 6) man ↔ property ("affluence", "social advancement"), and 7) man ↔ transcendence (e.g. "contemplation", "meditation", "redemption", "self-denial") (cf. pp. 311–316).

The weakness here lies in the fact that the points according to which the relations have been selected require a much more intensive elucidation and, above all, justification than Bülow offers, all the more, as e.g. the difference between relation 4) personal (human) collective ↔ collective of mankind, and relation 5) collective of living things ↔ collective of mankind, is not sufficiently clarified as practically synonymous concepts are ascribed to both relations and there is an obvious overlapping of terms. (The concept "survival of mankind" appears in both relations, cf. p. 315.)

Finally, Bülow comes to the conclusion already discussed above that her vocabulary analysis also has its implications for philosophic ethics. As a replacement of concepts attributable to a change in problem awareness and to a new store of ethical problems is manifest in ethic vocabulary, a new form of ethics should take this development into account, a form of ethics which, apart from an ecological orientation, must also bear in mind such "macro-ethical" problems as the maintenance of peace, disarmament, and the combatting of hunger.

To sum up it can be said that the authoress must undoubtedly be given credit for a comprehensive reappraisal of ethic vocabulary in the academic as well as in the public field. The inter-disciplinary character of the book makes it of interest for the linguist and the philosopher alike.

Herlinde Studer

Fr. Dr. H. Studer
Universität Graz. Institut für Rechtsphilosophie
Universitätsstr. 27/11, A-8010 Graz