

2.5 THE VECTORS OF POLITICAL POWER


What is the foundation of political power? More precisely, what is the capacity of actors to assert their interests in the political field of power against the potential opposition of others? This question has implicitly engaged political practitioners and theorists since the beginning of human history. However, it has been explicitly addressed for the first time relatively recently, by one of the most influential and controversial thinkers of modern times: Machiavelli.¹⁷⁶ The Italian political theorist, who gained considerable knowledge of political power not only in the academic sphere, but above all in his career as chancellor in Florence, distinguishes between the *internal* and *external* resources of actors: instinct and political wisdom on the one hand – networks and reputation on the other. Only through the clever combination of these factors can a ruler, as Thomas Schlöderle writes in his reprise of Machiavellian argumentation, be established “as a specialist in politics, as a craftsman of power.”¹⁷⁷

We do not intend to re-narrate Machiavelli’s system, but it serves as a guiding principle of our own analysis. According to our initial thesis, there are three types of political power resources: *power competence*, *power knowledge* and *instruments of power*. Power competence and power knowledge form the subjective, internal side of power capacity. These are the resources that are inseparably linked to the actor and that he or she has acquired through education, training and empowerment. We describe power instruments as the objective, external side of power capacity. These include the power tools that actors have at their disposal. This triad is characterized by the fact that no resource type can be substituted by another, no one alone is sufficient for political power. A knowledgeable actor has as little influence without political tools and practical competence as one who has instruments but no experience or knowledge to use them effectively and efficiently. Only when combined do the three resources form the foundation of political power. To underline this interdependence, we speak of power vectors. In the language of philosophical logic, one could say that all three resources are necessary and together are sufficient for political power.

176 A great overview of Machiavelli’s opinions as to the resources of power is offered by Schlöderle, Thomas (2002): *Das Prinzip der Macht*, Berlin/Cambridge: Galda + Wilch.; pp. 70-120.

177 Ibid.: p. 94.

Figure 6: The Interdependence of the Three Power Vectors



In a *first step* we conceptualize the basic categories – competence, knowledge and instruments – in order to distinguish them from one another. In a *second step* they are then substantiated with regard to the sphere of institutionalized political power, i.e. rule as understood by Popitz (see Chapter 1.2). This stepped approach allows the development of a precise system and prevents conceptual misunderstandings.

The terminological pair of competence and knowledge is basically a linguistic fallback position. In Greek antiquity, more than two thousand years ago, classic thinkers, above all Plato and Aristotle, developed a much more elegant taxonomy: *téchne* and *epistémé*.¹⁷⁸ *Téchne*, translated by us as *competence*, is the practical mastery of an activity, a craft, an art. Anyone who has, for example, played a good deal of soccer, knows intuitively what to do to pass their opponents, shoot flanks and push the ball into the net. The practice of playing soccer is something which they have embodied, in flesh and blood. As soon as they step onto the field, they have noted their opponents' positioning, identified points of attack, spotted weaknesses in the defense – and they act accordingly.

This does not mean that such athletes have even a trace of strong, theoretical expertise on how successful soccer playing works. There are countless examples of this. When asked how he managed a difficult 1-0 in a German Soccer Bundesliga match against numerous defenders in 2015, the young star Leroy Sané had a classic response ready: “I didn't think and just concentrated on putting the ball

178 Cf. Parry, Richard (2014): Episteme and Techne, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, [online] <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/episteme-techne/>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.; and Fantl, Jeremy (2012): Knowledge How, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, [online] <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

inside the net.”¹⁷⁹ The same approach applies to a baseball home run. As the baseball player David Ortiz said: “I’m not thinking home run, I just want to put a good swing on the ball. When you go looking for home runs, you get off of your swing. So you don’t think of homers when you go up to the plate.” Such cases sound banal, but they contain an important insight: someone who competently executes a complicated practice (playing football, painting, making music, etc.) is not automatically able to elucidate the right techniques and strategies to a layperson.

These are questions that belong rather to the *epistémé*. *Epistémé* is commonly translated as *knowledge*, but essentially the term is even more precise. It describes factual knowledge about persons, facts, processes, strategies and laws. Knowledge understood in this way is not practical know-how, but the reflected and communicable understanding of a specific subject area. Those who have a trained *epistémé* of playing soccer, for example, have in-depth knowledge of factors that are decisive for victory and defeat (weather, home or away game, physical fitness, motivation, etc.), know the advantages and disadvantages of specific training methods and know when and against which teams play should be offensive rather than defensive. At this point, it should be clear that an excellent sporting *epistémé* does not at all imply a good *téchne*. An outstanding game analyst and theoretical expert can be completely hopeless on the pitch.

Epistémé and *téchne*, knowledge and competence, are thus two categorically different assets. The philosopher Jeremy Fantl puts it in a nutshell: “Knowledge-how and knowledge-that are distinct kinds; to know how to do something is not just to know the right facts about how to do it, and to exercise knowledge-how you need not first implicitly or explicitly consider a fact about how to do it.”¹⁸⁰ We also acquire both assets different ways: *téchne* we obtain by practical action, i.e. by the continuous practicing of series of actions, by socialization and training; *epistémé*, on the other hand, is in the broadest sense book knowledge, which we gain through theoretical or scientific effort.

Pragmatically minded readers might note here that there is a clear hierarchy between the two assets: what counts first and foremost is practical competence. If you have the right instincts or good training and thus master difficult practices from the bottom, you do not have to worry about the theoretical substructure – it is not decisive for success and failure anyway. Exemplary for this attitude is the famous sentence by the German actor Siegfried Lowitz: “Critics are like eunuchs:

179 Bild (2015): Schalke feiert Torheld Sané, in: Bild from 27th September 2015, [online] <http://www.bild.de/sport/fussball/leroy-sane/schalke-feiert-torheld-sane-42697996.bild.html>, retrieved on 26.01.2018.

180 Fantl (2012): p. 1.

they know how it's done, but they can't do it." In other words, it is crucial that you *can do it*, and not that you *know how*. Despite all the witty insight of Lowitz, however, doubts are appropriate. Complex power fields such as politics are characterized by a highly differentiated mix of actors, procedural rules, processes, interests and issues. This cannot be mastered solely by practical competence in the above-mentioned sense. If you do not know which decision-makers have the say in legislation, which legal barriers constrain the room for maneuver of an institution and how the interpretative horizons of competing interest groups are composed, you will not get far even with political instinct and a well-schooled feel for power. In short, competence and knowledge are complementary and non-substitutable assets.

In comparison to the conceptual pair of knowledge and competence, the meaning of the key concept of the instruments is quickly explained. This encompasses all the material and immaterial resources of actors that are indispensable for the realization of their goals but do not directly belong to the actors themselves. For a craftsman or a soldier, for instance, these instruments include concrete material objects like hammers and measuring sticks, or weapons and armor, in the case of knowledge workers they are above all networks, sources of information, contacts and the social relationships they share with other persons. Instruments are therefore the objective complement to the subjective assets of the actors. Their quality and scope determine how successfully we can practically apply our competence and knowledge.

Thus the power-strategic foundations are laid to concretely determine and use the vectors in the field of the political. What we have at hand with the triad of competence, knowledge and instruments is no less than a universal system of order and explanation of the inherent logic of political power.

2.5.1 Power Competence and Training

From this starting point, let us first take a look at the vector of power competence. Our approach takes a historiographical-praxeological form (see Introduction), investigating in which historical phases prototypical, outstanding forms of power competence existed and what lessons are to be drawn from these models. This method not only offers a vivid and applied understanding of our subject matter. It also highlights important practical resources by benefiting from the experiences of previous generations.

The most impressive example of lived and traditional authority is the Roman Republic, which flourished from the fourth to the first century BC. The unique feature of Republican Rome is that over the centuries it was dominated by less

than two dozen senatorial families whose tradition, education and self-image were focused on a single purpose: to rule. Patrician families such as the Julia, Tullia, Claudia or Sestia not only stood at the top of the social pyramid of the republic for generations. They also exercised their power with the Roman public by having themselves elected to political offices and by having the people vote on their bills. The extraordinary complexity and competitive pressure of this mixed system of aristocracy and democracy can hardly be overestimated. Accordingly, political competition was, as the historian Johannes Keller writes, “the elixir of life” for the senate nobles.¹⁸¹ At the same time they acted in court as defenders and prosecutors, and they led the Roman legions on conquest campaigns. The members of the senatorial class were – in a word – all-rounders of political power.

The question as to how a small group of politician families managed to remain at the top of an aristocratic-republican state for generations, not only making Rome the undisputed leading power of antiquity, but also maintaining internal stability, has long occupied historians. In his very readable book, *Den Vätern folgen* (“*Following the Fathers*”) the historian Peter Scholz offers an answer that leads to the core of our research subject: through clearly regulated, functionally sequential levels of socialization all (male) family members were from early childhood taught a specifically senatorial style of thinking and acting through experience, skills and beliefs that together created an independent habitus.¹⁸² And, Scholz adds a few pages later, the dominant position of a few families lay in the fact that they, over several generations, understood the assumption of power as a traditional task of the family and passed on the associated ethos and commitment to the common good to the next generation.¹⁸³ The secret of the success of the republican elite was, in short, that it understood politics as both an ethical obligation to the Roman public and as a matter of training.

It is noteworthy, however, that this practice of growing into a ruling role took place in a high-ranking, literate culture, but was not supported by book-reading and theoretical instruction. The skepticism with which the Roman elite viewed the Greek sense of epistémé is paradoxically expressed by one of its more eloquent

181 Keller, Johannes (2004): *Römische Interessengeschichte. Eine Studie zu Interessenvertretung, Interessenkonflikten und Konfliktlösung in der römischen Republik des 2. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie, [online] https://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5172/1/keller_johannes.pdf, retrieved on 21.12.2017.; p. 48.

182 Scholz, Peter (2011): *Den Vätern folgen. Sozialisation und Erziehung der republikanischen Senatsaristokratie*, Berlin: Verlag Antike.; p. 13.

183 Ibid.; p. 31.

authors particularly well. Thus, Cicero writes in his treatise *De re publica*: “Think of me rather as one of the toga-wearing people, who has been given a liberal education thanks to his father’s kindly concern, and who has been fired from boyhood with a love of learning, but who has, nevertheless, been trained by experience and family sayings much more than by books.”¹⁸⁴ Our understanding of this great rhetor is that ruling is not something that we learn to understand on the basis of abstract principles and information, but through lived practice. Politics has to become ‘second nature’, literally running through our veins. For Cicero and for the Roman elite, the key to political power was first and foremost practical competence – *téchne*.¹⁸⁵

How was this power of authority acquired and passed on? At this point, the title of Scholz’s monograph (*Den Vätern folgen*) can be ungrudgingly praised for its brilliance: the offspring of the Roman patricians acquired their power competence by “following the fathers” – both metaphorically and in the immediate sense. *Firstly*, all members of the senatorial aristocracy understood themselves only as small links in a long family chain, whose ancestors – *the maiores* – were not only the object of cult worship, but also functioned as constant role models for political action. In order to achieve a lifestyle fitting to one’s rank, it was enough to practice remembrance of the important personalities of the family, the *domesticae laudis exempla*. Values and norms for one’s own actions were gained from the family’s past.¹⁸⁶ This culture of remembrance was cultivated by ritualized retelling of the heroic deeds of famous rulers in front of the portrait gallery of the ancestral home. Each narrative revolved around the cardinal virtues of the senatorial aristocracy, which at the same time formed the central elements of their power competence: self-discipline, rhetorical brilliance, soldierly courage, competitive strength,

184 Cicero, Marcus Tullius (1998): *The Republic. The Laws*, translated by Niall Rudd, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.; p. 18, our emphasis.

185 Of course, we should not go too far: it would be absurd to say that Roman culture ignored power knowledge (in the sense of *epistémé*) as a factor of power. But it is remarkable how much emphasis the senatorial families put on educating their sons to be political practitioners who could make decisions in a completely habitual way; cf. also Schlinkert, Dirk (1996): *Ordo Senatoris und Nobilitas. Die Konstitution des Senatsadels in der Spätantike*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

186 Schlinkert, Dirk (1996): pp. 140f. Remarkably, this kind of ancestral cult is found to be of great importance in the teaching of power competence not only in the Roman Republic, but also in ancient China; see the volume by Scheidel, Walter (ed.) (2015): *State Power in Ancient China & Rome*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

awareness of tradition and official dignity. Emulating them was the guiding principle of the *vita honesta* – the venerable life of every Roman patrician.

Secondly, however, this emulation focused not only on legendary ancestors who had moved to the hereafter, but also on the fathers of this day: the reigning *patres familias* of the patrician dynasties. From the ages of seven to sixteen, the senatorial offspring accompanied their fathers at every turn. The patrician sons were present when the family board received its adherents, the so-called *clientes*, and gave them legal counsel, political advice or financial support. They accompanied their fathers to the theater, to the forum, to banquets with influential friends, to the baths and even on campaigns. In this way, enriched by practical advice, anecdotes, instructions and minor assignments, they became acquainted with the entire political cosmos of the Roman Republic. Throughout these years of learning, the fathers' educational task was not to pass on abstract values and principles to the younger generation as isolated individual virtues, but to give them an awareness of the role they were to fill in the future, thus 'implanting' them with an ethos and specific patterns of rule.¹⁸⁷ Nowadays, this sort of passing on of power competence would probably be called 'on-the-job training.'

At the age of sixteen, the official political apprenticeship, the *tirocinium fori*, formally began. In this phase, the young patrician was entrusted to a senior, possibly an influential relative, in the office of a *quaestor*, *ensor* or even *consul*. Under his supervision, the youth entered day-to-day business. Among his duties was, among other things: the writing and joint rehearsals of speeches before the people and senate, the search for legal norms and precedents for legal proceedings, the drafting of bills, the preparation of election campaigns, continuous reporting on public political sentiment, and organizing local festivals to mobilize followers.¹⁸⁸ In all these activities friendships were formed, relationships cultivated, networks developed and, above all, one thing was learned: the competent exercising, protection and accumulation of political power in a system characterized by labor-intensive competition for political influence and distinguished offices. Parallel to this civilian political training was a probation in the mentor's military staff, the *tirocinium militiae*. Whenever the mentor took to the field against hostile states or barbarian tribes, he took his protégé with him, and not just to assist in administrative or strategic tasks. It was a matter of course that young patricians should prove

187 Scholz (2011): p. 96.

188 An impressive insight into the election campaigns of the Roman Republic and its extremely modern techniques and tactics is offered by Cicero, Quintus Tullius (2009): *Commentariolum petitionis*, translated by Günter Laser (ed.), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

themselves in close combat against the enemies of Rome, command troops and, if necessary, give their lives for the Republic; a politician without scars on his chest was viewed suspiciously in the Senate.

Behind this practice stood the firm conviction, shared by all strata of Roman society, that power competence required probation in both political and military leadership. Anyone who was seen by the fathers and the electorate to fail in one of these leadership tasks was, without sentiment, excluded from a further career in public office – the *cursus honorum*.¹⁸⁹ Nepotism was largely alien to the Roman Republic. This rigorous training produced a highly specialized type of human being whose entire existence was tailored to a singular function. Scholz who, despite all scholarly detachment, cannot deny his great and contagious enthusiasm for the Roman patricians suggests that the “essential task [...] of the senatorial aristocracy consisted – sociologically speaking – in their political activities of coping with crises on behalf of the general public. [...] They constantly had to incorporate new unforeseeable difficulties and events in their political action, it was difficult for them to repeatedly resort to proven measures or routines when settling conflicts, they were often rather forced to venture something new and risky – and this seems to have become second nature to them.”¹⁹⁰

It is worthwhile to pause for a moment and reflect on what has been said. Critical readers might argue that so far we have not given any definition of power competence, but have analyzed only a specific historical phase of its evolution and tradition. This objection is understandable. But it misses the point by assuming that an abstract definition is even possible. As we initially stated, competence or *téchne* is not encyclopedic factual knowledge, but the habitualized mastery of a craft or an art. Power competence thus exists when the principles and mechanisms of political power have become second nature to actors, when – as Scholz aptly writes – they can dispel or settle conflicts over influence without resorting to “proven measures or routines.” Precisely because power competence is not merely an operational routine, but also the creative and experiential ability to successfully dare “new and risky things” in the sphere of political power, no schematic guidance or general definition can be given here. Instead, we can only outline the sociocultural framework under which power competence is acquired and passed on. Here, the Roman Republic is not just a prototype; because it so purposefully (and biasedly) focused on this power vector, it represents a world historical zenith of the *téchne* of the political.

189 For an analysis of the career path in ancient Rome, see Veyne (1992): pp. 339f.

190 Scholz (2011): p. 24.

Of course, this *téchne* is not irretrievably lost with the decline of the Roman Empire in late antiquity. It would be more appropriate to say that it overwinters and reconstitutes itself in various configurations adapted to various socio-cultural contexts – without, however, ever losing its basic logic.¹⁹¹ Accordingly, the later traditions of power in the Western world can be interpreted as contextualizations of the Roman model. In her pertinent historiography of the dynastic succession in the Empire of the Merovingians and Carolingians, Brigitte Kasten provides a medieval echo of the senatorial-patriarchal tradition: “The ‘good’ son and successor was basically the one in which the father lived on.”¹⁹²

In addition to this basic attitude, according to which power competence is essentially acquired through practical mimetic imitation of the paternal model, there are also parallels in the successive transfer of political responsibility. Numerous European rulers involved their descendants in ruling as soon as possible, on the one hand handing them their own territories during their lifetimes and, on the other, giving them command of independent military campaigns. These stages of development and tradition were sometimes even named analogously to the Roman model. Of course, they did not even approximate the orderly, ritualized form we know from the Roman Empire.

The deliberate adoption of Roman customs and practices, which was promoted mainly by spiritual advisers to the royal family, also contrasted with the “extraordinarily dangerous existence” in the medieval-courtly sphere of control.¹⁹³ These changed parameters of power competence had tangible practical consequences. While lack of a power instinct or a slow perceptive faculty often led to the loss of office and dignities in the Roman Republic, in the Middle Ages they could often mean the loss of life and limb. With a keen sense of excitement and drama, Kasten characterizes the monarchical power-cosmos as an environment in which power-hungry uncles tried to prevent their nephews from becoming kings with poison

191 The obvious question of which historical conditions ensured this transmission of power competence has no one answer. But the Catholic Church seems to have provided a decisive, epoch-spanning link between antiquity, the Middle Ages and the modern age; see. Cf. Pecknold, Chad C. (2010): *Christianity and Politics: A Brief Guide to the History*, Eugene: Cascade Books.

192 Literally in the famous letter from the royal advisor Alcuin to Charlemagne: “The father lives on in the son, [...] if dignity and noble wisdom exist in his successor”, see Kasten, Brigitte (1997): *Königssöhne und Königsherrschaft. Untersuchungen zur Teilhabe am Reich in der Merowinger- und Karolingerzeit*, Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung.; p. 7.

193 Kasten (1997): p. 33.

and daggers, newly wedded royal women strove to place their own children on the throne, and nobles from opposing camps planned to topple the royal family. Correspondingly, power competence was often demonstrated less in polished rhetoric or excellent networking, but rather in the cold-bloodedness of choosing the right time to draw a blade on a relative. In the Middle Ages, the creative ability to dare the “new and risky” praised by Scholz often took the form of the effective use of action power (see Chapter 2.1).

These conditions continue, as the great power pragmatist Machiavelli impressively described, even into European modern times. Nonetheless, in the transition between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, there was also a decisive innovation in the development of power competence compared to Roman antiquity: the playful mediation of strategic thinking through chess.¹⁹⁴ Thanks to deeper trade relations with the Islamic world, the ‘Game of Kings’, with its historical roots in India, gradually became part of the courtly culture of Europe. Already in the twelfth century, young nobles were systematically introduced to the art of opening gambits and mating moves; the influential polymath and royal personal physician Petrus Alphonsi even ranked the mastery of chess as one of the seven basic skills that makes a good knight.¹⁹⁵ The reasons are obvious: like no other game, chess trains strategic and tactical thinking, creative solutions, stress resistance and the ability to empathize with opponents in order to identify their strengths, weaknesses and goals; it ultimately embodies all the relevant elements of the political competition for power (see also Chapter 3.1). The study of the game prepared the young nobility not only for the dangerous microcosm of the court, but also for their tasks as political decision-makers and generals. Since that time, chess has not only been preserved as a training tool and a power tradition, but at the same time has enjoyed a global spread spanning all social and cultural spaces. It is without doubt one of the most important legacies of the medieval culture of power competence.

Before we speak of the further development of the Roman ideal of power competence in our present time, let us dare to take a detailed look beyond the horizon of Western culture – to pre-modern Japan.¹⁹⁶ This digression is not only important

194 Cf. Vale, Malcom (2001): *The Princely Court*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.; pp 170-179; for a historical overview, see also Eales, Richard (2002): *Chess: the History of a Game*, London: Hardinge Simpole.

195 Cf. Vale (2001): p. 171.

196 We consciously speak of ‘pre-modern’ Japan, because the classical occidental periodization of antiquity, the Middle Ages and modern times cannot be plausibly applied to Asia. Instead of a series of fundamental upheavals, historical continuity plays a much greater role in the Japanese cultural space. This only came to an end in 1853,

as a means to avoid a Western bias. It also illustrates that while the vector of power competence obeys, as it were, universal logics, it inevitably undergoes highly specific cultural adaptation processes. The period from the twelve to the nineteenth centuries was often marked by internal conflicts, external threats and dynastic changes along the Japanese archipelago, encompassing Honshu, Hokkaido, Shukiko and Kyushu. However, at the same time, it was characterized by a singular historical constant: the undisputed political and cultural dominance of the *bushi* warrior elite – better known to us as the samurai.¹⁹⁷ Jeffrey P. Mass, one of the most important Western authorities on Japanese history, describes the structure of the political order as “warrior government”.¹⁹⁸ Marius Jansen adds in his pertinent volume *Warrior Rule in Japan* from 2008: “Japan was ruled by warriors for the better part of a millennium. From the twelfth to the nineteenth century its political history was dominated by the struggle of competing leagues of fighting men.”¹⁹⁹

The supremacy of the samurai in pre-modern Japan was reflected in the strictly hierarchically ordered and impermeable social structure. At its head were the members of the warrior nobility, led by the *shōgun*, whose title can be translated as commander-in-chief or generalissimo. They were followed in rank by the peasants and artisans as productive layers of society. The lowest rank was occupied by the merchants, who according to Confucian doctrine made dirty money deals. Outside of this hierarchy lay the imperial house of the *tennō*, which at best assumed a representative role. Samurai Japan was first and foremost a military regime.

At this point, we would do well to put aside romanticizing Western glasses and not restrict the *bushi* to the role of sword masters or even Japanese ‘knights’. As the social historian Wolfgang Schwentker demonstrates, they were much more than that. In the Shogunat, they carried out the tasks of police forces, tax collectors, administrators and the masters of ceremonies of the Shinto state religion. In short, the samurai occupied all the nodes of political power for more than 600 years; they were also the only members of the community who were even allowed to have a

when the infamous ‘black ships’ of the US Navy ended the country’s self-imposed isolation and its partition from the West under threat of force; for more details on this topic, see Walworth, Arthur (1946): *Black Ships Off Japan: The Story of Commodore Perry’s Expedition*, New York: Knopf.

197 A recommendable introduction to this topic is provided by Schwentker, Wolfgang (2008): *Die Samurai*, Munich: C.H. Beck.

198 Cf. Mass, Jeffrey P. (1975): *Warrior Government in Early Mediaeval Japan: Study of the Kamakura Bakufu, Shugo and Jito*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

199 Jansen, Marius (ed.) (2008): *Warrior Rule in Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; p. vii.

family name and carry arms. Through this combination of functions and privileges, they embodied the idea of the Japanese state for all the lower levels of society. This understanding is codified in the *Shido* script of the famous seventeenth-century philosopher and military strategist Yamaga Soko: “The samurai leave business to the farmers, artisans and merchants and confine themselves to living the way. If anyone emanating from one of the three castes of the people is guilty of a moral violation, then the samurai punish him and thus uphold the moral principles of the land.”²⁰⁰ The samurai were thus not only warriors, but also cultivated educators and ethical points of reference.

The exceptionally long and successful maintenance of this monopoly of power in all relevant power spheres is due to a specific form of authority, the principles of which Schwentker concisely summarizes: “To rule and serve – both tasks coincided in the ideal samurai.”²⁰¹ The competitive element that distinguished the Roman Republic had no place in the understanding of the Japanese warrior nobility. Here the habitus was not based on the impulse to make a name in the political arena or on the battlefield, but on the core virtues of loyalty and conformity. Thanks to their conscious renouncing of individual happiness and an unconditional willingness to serve the lord, the samurai were predestined to be a ruling class.²⁰² They formed a highly cooperative power formation that was capable of concerted action – be this the implementation of administrative standards or a punitive military expedition.

Their concept of loyalty and the associated asceticism have their roots in Zen Buddhism, and similar elements are found in Chinese political philosophy (see Chapter 1.1). It is worth noting, however, the thoroughness with which the principles of Zen are incorporated in the *bushidō*, the code of conduct of the samurai. The *junshi*, in which the samurai followed their lord into death if there was no chance of victory on the battlefield, constitutes the most radical expression of the loyalty of a vassal to his master.²⁰³ But beyond ritual suicide, unconditional solidarity with one’s own power elite, while putting aside all of one’s own interests, formed the core element of the power logic of the samurai. The reference to Zen Buddhism is, however, highly relevant for us for another reason. In *Zen and the Way of the Sword: Arming the Samurai Psyche*, the theologian Winston L. King points out that the Japanese reception of this religious-philosophical trend is par

200 Cited after Brockers, Wolfgang (2014): *Karate – Essays*, Norderstedt: BOD.; p. 119.

201 Schwentker (2008): p. 92, as translated.

202 Ibid.: p. 93.

203 Ibid.: p. 80.

ticularly characterized by its prioritizing of intuition over reflective reason.²⁰⁴ Instead of problematizing the human relationship to the natural and social world or accumulating knowledge about this relationship, the disciples of Zen aspired to being at one with the cosmos. Only those who had achieved this unity through the abandonment of self-directed thinking and through overcoming the antagonism between subject and object could, according to the conviction of the samurai, rule selflessly and justly, and could succeed on the battlefield without a moment's thought. At first glance, this anti-intellectual impetus could be interpreted as the unequivocal primacy of the *téchne* over the *epistémé*.²⁰⁵ Upon somewhat closer inspection, however, a differentiated picture of Zen emerges: the dissolution of the boundaries between the two vectors, a merging into one another that escapes the strict dichotomy. In other words, through the overriding role of intuition – which the samurai sharpened through meditation and asceticism – *epistémé* becomes associated with or reflected in *téchne*. This also explains why reading books or studying theoretical content was very important for the life of the warrior nobility, especially from the sixteenth century. The *epistémé* did not play a priority role in their self-conception, but it nevertheless played an associated role.

The central virtues of the samurai and the associated habitual dispositions (“rule and serve”) were handed down from generation to generation within the warrior nobility. For Schwentker, the close relationship between the master and the student, which has an outstanding significance in both Zen Buddhism and Confucianism, is in the foreground.²⁰⁶ From the age of three, the warrior nobles were introduced to fighting techniques and tactics, first in the family home and a little later under the aegis of an older samurai, who always taught only one student. Military probation was practical – whether in defense against Mongol invasions or in the suppression of peasant uprisings. At the same time, however, there was also instruction in literature and statecraft, theology and philosophy. Underlying this curriculum was the understanding that “in addition to a mastery of warcraft, high literacy skills were fundamentally part of the competences of the warrior class.”²⁰⁷

204 Cf. King, Winston L. (1993): *Zen and the Way of the Sword: Arming the Samurai Psyche*, New York: Oxford University Press.; pp. 188f.

205 As to the anti-intellectualism of Zen, see Perez, Louis G. (1998): *The History of Japan*, Westport/London: Greenwood Press.; p. 34.

206 Cf. Schwentker (2008): p. 46.

207 Thus “there’s nothing more disgraceful than being illiterate”, comments Niehaus on the literacy of the warrior nobles in early modern Japan, see Niehaus, Andreas (2013):

This resource-rich and time-consuming training depended on one condition: the ‘productive’ estates of society, the farmers and craftspeople, had to be willing to co-finance the education of the elite through taxes. In the long run, this could only succeed if the *bushi* daily demonstrated their goals of integrity, erudition and military clout by virtue of practical action.

Privileged access to a highly specialized, practice-oriented training system from earliest childhood proves to be a leitmotif of power competence, which we already encountered in republican Rome, albeit under quite different cultural precedents. What the senatorial families and the *bushi* had in common was not a specific canon of values, but rather a highly efficient technique by which to pass on and monopolize political power, combined with their unconditional identification with the community and their practice of living as role models. The reproduction of power through practice can be considered in this context as a central formula of power competence. Undoubtedly, the *téchne* of the power of the samurai deserves a monograph in its own right, but we end here our digression into pre-modern Japan and return to our original narrative: the continuation and transformation of the Roman model of power competence through history.

Perhaps the most significant modernization of the Roman ideal of political power competence is found in the USA, from the seventeenth century to the present day. In his genealogical standard work, *America's Political Dynasties*, Stephen Hess identified a central common feature: the dynastic impulse.²⁰⁸ The US, one of the most competitive political systems in the world, is ruled by an electoral

“So gibt es nichts schändlicheres als illiterat zu sein” – zur Literalität der Kriegerklasse im frühmodernen Japan, in: Gesine Boesken and Uta Schaffers (eds.), *Lektüren 'bilden': Lesen – Bildung – Vermittlung*, Münster: Lit Verlag, pp. 199-216.

- 208 Cf. Hess, Stephen (2016): *America's Political Dynasties: From Adams to Clinton*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press.; p. 2. Of course, this does not mean that successful political dynasties are a unique feature of the US – John H. Fiva and Daniel Smith point out in detail that the dynastic tradition of political power is common in countries such as Germany, Ireland, Canada and Norway. Cf. Fiva, John H. and Smith, Daniel M. (2016): Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environment, *CESifo Working Paper Series*, 5757, pp. 1-46. Nevertheless, the US is the country in which the principle of modern electoral aristocracy has been perfected, see also Dal Bó, Ernesto, Dal Bó, Pedro and Snyder, Jason (2009): Political Dynasties, *Review of Economic Studies*, 76 (1), pp. 115-142.

aristocracy, which columnist Stewart Alsop once called “the people’s dukes.”²⁰⁹ The numbers speak for themselves: “Forty-four American families have had at least four members of the same name elected to the federal office, and in seventy-five families three members of the same name held national office.”²¹⁰ Politician families such as the Kennedy, Bush and Clinton clans, as well as past dynasties like the Roosevelts and Adams, have passed on and will continue to pass on positions in the House of Representatives and the Senate and even the Presidency to their children – with the express approval of the electorate.

The explanation for this extraordinary continuity is now familiar to us: the teaching of power competence from childhood by embedding it in a highly specialized and elitist learning environment. Anyone born into a US-American political family takes part in festive parades for the Fourth of July from their earliest childhood, accompanies their parents to fundraising events and rattles hundreds of doors with them, mobilizing the electorate. As they get older, the offspring make speeches at election campaigns, conduct debates in the halls of prestigious universities to promote their fathers or mothers – and in the medium term themselves. This socialization not only ensures an unprecedented understanding of political symbolism and the importance of shared rites (see Chapter 2.1). It also favors the development of empathy for the needs of voters and the unconditional ability to network. Last but not least, it allows these individuals to move confidently in a variety of social and cultural contexts. It opens, metaphorically speaking, the horizon beyond its own sociotope.

In the absence of an analytical study on the socialization of the US political elite we resort to a vignette. In his account of the consolidation of power in the Clinton dynasty, Hess comes to the political education of Bill and Hillary Clinton’s daughter Chelsea; and it is worthwhile citing the chronicler extensively: “[B]eing politically special, virtually from birth, creates a range of experiences that can turn the exceptional into the ordinary. When do you know which of your classmates are true friends and which are the ones who just want to hang out at the governor’s mansion? What gifts are appropriate and which are over the top? Is there public behavior that children without famous parents do not have to learn but for those like Chelsea is best learned young?”²¹¹ These lessons in the know-how of power strategy, which the Clintons’ daughter acquired, so to speak, in

209 Miller, Zeke (2013): Political Dynasties Return, in: Time from 5th March 2013, [online] <http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,2148168-3,00.html>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

210 Hess (2016): p. 3.

211 Ibid.: p. 590.

passing, were supplemented by rigorous but playful training in political communication. Hilary Clinton reminisces in her autobiography *Living History*: “Bill and I tried to prepare Chelsea for what she might hear about her father or, for that matter, about her mother. We sat around our dinner table in the Governor’s Mansion role-playing with her, pretending we were in debates where one of us acted like a political opponent who criticized Bill for not being a good governor.”²¹² It goes without saying that being introduced to the craft of power by two distinguished and exceptional politicians represents an extreme competitive advantage over competitors who have not profited from such training. In short, those who acquire power competence through a combination of talent and practical experience, have an excellent chance of passing it on to their families. Of course, the Clinton vignette is not an isolated case; it stands prototypically for dozens or hundreds of political biographies. For the research team around the economist Ernesto Dal Bó, who have worked intensively on the topic of dynastic rule in democracies, these findings can be summarized in a simple slogan: “Thus, in politics, power begets power.”²¹³

2.5.2 Power Knowledge and Strategy

With this, we conclude our discussion of power competence and turn to the second power vector, that of knowledge. We owe the term to the sociologist Max Scheler, who introduced the *terminus technicus* in his monograph *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, literally “Forms of Knowledge and Society.”²¹⁴ Scheler distinguishes power knowledge (also translated as “practical knowledge” and “knowledge that produces effects”) from cultural knowledge (or erudition) and salvation knowledge. While cultural knowledge aims to form and cultivate the individual personality, and salvation knowledge to create sense and a coherent world view (see also Chapter 2.3), power knowledge is directed towards the practical mastery of animate and inanimate nature as well as of fellow human beings. In the period after Scheler, the term underwent a normative narrowing and has unfortunately been reduced to the monopolization of political information by an elite operating in a supposedly clandestine fashion. We, on the other hand, want to take the term as literally as possible in the following discussion – that is, as a

212 Clinton, Hilary (2003): *Living History*, New York: Simon & Schuster.; p. 97.

213 Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder (2009): p. 1.

214 Cf. Scheler, Max (1980): *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge*, translated by Manfred S. Frings, London: Routledge.

collective term for all that knowledge or *epistémés* that is indispensable for the exercise of political power.²¹⁵

That knowledge is an important source of power is, of course, not actually an insight of Scheler's. Three hundred years earlier, Francis Bacon made the crucial connection between knowledge and power explicit in his scientific essay *Novum Organum Scientiarum*: "human knowledge and human power come together in one."²¹⁶ The scientist and philosopher Bacon focuses on human knowledge of (inanimate) nature and how to control it. But Bacon's dictum can easily be applied to the social world, especially the sphere of political rule: superior knowledge of the universal principles of power (Chapter 1.2), their forms (Chapter 2.1), conditions of legitimation (2.4.) and the mechanisms, strategies, tactics and issues of the political sphere signifies a clear competitive advantage in the war of interpretation over the common good. This knowledge is the knowledge of power.

Power knowledge, understood in this way, is divided into three forms of knowledge: *justification knowledge*, *leadership knowledge* and *administrative knowledge*. The first form of knowledge legitimizes the exercise of power through the continuous justification, defense and further development of a common political narrative. The second form is the formal knowledge of decision-makers about how political goals can be enforced against the opposition of competing interest formations, and how power devices – the positional fabric of rule after Popitz – can be controlled efficiently and effectively. The third type is bureaucratic expert knowledge and refers to concrete procedures and specific policies.

All three forms of knowledge forge an interdependent complex. Justification knowledge provides a structure of justification for why the common good is best enforced in this particular, concrete political system and why citizens should campaign for this order – but it must necessarily be complemented by leadership and administrative knowledge if it is to be permanently successful. In turn, leadership knowledge can only be translated into political power if, on the normative level, it corresponds to a plausible narrative and, on the implementation side, to an adequate understanding of topics and processes, i.e. when the administration recognizes the often superior leadership skills of decision-makers. But the decision-makers must also have learned to obtain and utilize knowledge from the bureaucracy. Administrative knowledge can only be exercised as political influence if decision-makers are in a position to select it expertly and to use it strategically. Otherwise, to put it rather bluntly, it gets stuck on the way up.

215 For further information pertaining to this approach, cf. Hamilton, Peter (2015): *Knowledge and Social Structure*, London/New York: Routledge.

216 Bacon, Francis ([1620] 1902): *Novum Organon*, New York: P.F. Collier.; p. 11.

In addition to this interdependence, all three forms of power knowledge are united in that they share an essential feature: they must be actively present, i.e. it must be possible for actors to retrieve or access them at any time. There is one obvious reason for this: power operates under conditions of scarcity of time and material. Delays, coordination problems, queries and research not only cost money – they cost power.

Subsequent to this outline of the three knowledge formats (justification – leadership – administrative) and their mutual relationships and similarities, we want to discuss these formats individually, starting with the concept of justification. Its indispensability stems from the fact that power is subject to a continuous, explicit and implicit need for legitimacy and constantly strives for validation, i.e. for normative justification. This principle applies to all forms of governance – regardless of whether we are dealing with the Stalinist regime of North Korea, the Chinese one-party state, the autocratic presidential system of Russia or the German representative democracy. The reason for this lies in a universal power principle, which we already discussed in Chapter 1.2: the purposive production of power. Because power relations are not nomologically necessary, that is, not determined by the laws of nature, but can be altered by humans, they are subject to the permanent reservation of being changed. Justification knowledge provides, in short, the answer to why power relations could be different but should not be. Those with justification knowledge can give normative answers to the following questions: Why do I rule (and not another)? Why does the political system have this (and not that) constitution? Why do I use this (and not that) policy? Why should citizens choose me (and not another candidate)? And so on. Power systems whose decision-makers can give no or only unsatisfactory answers to these questions are permanently unstable. Only justification knowledge has the motivational power to bind the members of a community in the long term to its established order (see our discussion of the normative justification and the pursuit of meaning in Chapter 1.3).

However – and this point is crucial – justification knowledge is not expert academic knowledge of political philosophy. It is not important to strictly and rationally deduce the legitimacy of the current political order using abstract, ethical and logical principles. Justification knowledge is rather knowledge of how to develop and interpret an all-encompassing *political narrative*.²¹⁷ Of course, such a

217 Cf. Mayer, Frederick W. (2014): *Narrative Politics: Stories and Collective Action*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. The importance of a narrative for the legitimacy of power is not only a recurrent theme of political theory, but also a mantra of campaign leaders and campaign strategists. Thus, e.g. Stan Greenberg, a policy guru of the US Democrats, follows the slogan: “A narrative is the key everything”; similarly, James

narrative is not an arbitrary fable, short-term fashion or legend with a political foundation. It is rather a communal understanding of the social world and the localization of the community in this world, based on a shared history, shared values and shared symbols – “a shared means of making sense of the world [...] grounded in assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions and capabilities.”²¹⁸ This principle is pertinently expressed in the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s essay *Is Patriotism a Virtue?*²¹⁹ According to MacIntyre, successful political narratives describe communities as intrinsically valuable, multi-generational projects whose identities are fixed by “special features, merits, and achievements, which in turn are reflected in distinctive political, cultural and religious norms and practices.”²²⁰

There are three factors that should be emphasized in this context. *Firstly*, this narrative permeates *all levels of political action* and affects (directly or indirectly) all members of the community. It creates a synchronous and diachronic unity in the multiplicity of political institutions and activities by locating them in the context of the overarching history and idea of the state. A particularly powerful example of such a narrative, its interpenetration and the way it provides unity, is that of the French *grande nation*, the guardian of the republican values of freedom, equality, and fraternity. This idea, dating back to the year of the revolution, 1789, has since become the one fixture of French history, in relation to which all other events and political decisions are ordered. Thus, the idea not only allows Napoleon’s military expansion to be described as the triumphant advance of modern liberalism, and to place the secularism of post-revolutionary France on an Enlightenment foundation; it also makes it possible to view Vichy’s collaboration regime as the mere ‘slip-up’ of an indomitable, freedom-loving people. At the same time, this idea of the state legitimates the Fifth Republic and is enshrined as a guiding principle in the constitution. The triad of freedom, equality and fraternity can be found on the facade of every French town hall, on flags, coins and stamps. Accordingly, the slogan and narrative it embodies is the normative foundation for France’s political elites, on which they can and must build their agenda – preserving and evolving the narrative. It is therefore only logical that the motto is used by the right-wing *Front National*, France’s Socialists and the *En Marche* movement

Carville: “We could elect somebody from the Hollywood Hills if they had a narrative to tell people about what the country is and where they see it”, cited according to Polletta, Francesca (2011): *Storytelling in Politics, Contexts*, 7 (4), pp. 26-31.

218 Dryzek (2000): p. 18.

219 Cf. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1984): *Is Patriotism a Virtue?*, Kansas: University of Kansas Press.

220 MacIntyre (1984): p. 85.

of President Emanuel Macron, elected in May 2017. The controversy between the power actors is thus not based on whether the three fundamental values of the *grande nation* are the guiding principles of the French narrative, but on what they mean for the political present-day of the citizens, through which policies they can best be realized and which actors can offer the most plausible interpretation of the great national narrative.²²¹ Anyone who knows how to seize upon this narrative (or a comparable narrative in other states) is thus capable of comprehensibly and accessibly ordering every political event in a normative framework and thus of presenting a holistic justification of political rule.

Secondly, the *project character* of the community, described by MacIntyre, comes to fruition in the political narrative and creates a sense of belonging among members – including identification with previous generations and long-dead ancestors.²²² The shared narrative is not just an account of the genesis, telos and development of the community; it is an interactive story in which every member is called to participate. In this way, it takes account of the human need to be part of a larger whole whose meaning outlives individual existence. This explains the immense motivational power of the great political narratives and the importance of justification as a guarantor of political stability. The question of concrete participation and commitment is obviously dependent on the nature of the narrative, its dramaturgy and its design. The spectrum ranges from mere compliance with the law and authority by ordinary citizens to the unconditional sacrifice of the patriot for his or her country.

The political narrative of the German people differs significantly from other national narratives in Europe. Because of its historical breaks and the ominous

-
- 221 The situation with, for example, the guiding principles of the US narrative: the 'American dream' and 'manifest destiny,' is quite similar. These principles are understood as a postulate of free personal development and advancement in a community characterized by a historical sense of mission and pioneering spirit. Again, the point of contention between the power actors is exclusively how these principles are to be interpreted politically and what their practical implications are for policymaking. While democratic liberals, for example, classify social redistribution as a condition of self-fulfillment, libertarian republicans see this as improper state intervention in the autonomy of the individual; see Hochschild, Jennifer L. (1996): *Facing up to the American Dream. Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 222 At this point it is appropriate to remember the ancestor cult of the Roman patricians (see Chapter 2.5.1): the recourse to the maiores as ancestors of an unbroken tradition of republican power practice creates a frame of reference from which the following generations can draw legitimacy.

shadow of Nazi crimes against humanity, this contemporary narrative is dominated, above all, by the critical examination of one's own past (see our remarks on power, symbolism and coping with the past in Chapter 2.1). According to the post-National Socialist narrative, the slogan: "Never again!" is the motivation for citizens to commit to a system. This suggests that the political order in Germany owes its legitimacy first and foremost to the prevention of new crimes against humanity committed under the banner of racism and nationalism. It should, however, be questioned whether this justification scheme, which feeds solely on the conscious breaking with the criminal past, is sufficient for a positive sense of being, for solidarity and civic engagement. Without complementary reference to the tradition of the German nation of culture, the great thinkers of the Enlightenment, such as Kant and Leibniz, and the literary genius of Goethe and Schiller, such a narrative can neither unfold the motivational power of other national narratives nor can it fulfill its unifying function. It follows that the current strengthening of right-wing populist tendencies in the Federal Republic of Germany has its roots – at least to a certain extent – in the unresolved lack of positive content in the German national narrative.

Finally, *the third point* is that the narrative has to be *constantly justified, defended, cultivated, further developed and symbolically (or even religiously) charged by all those involved*. Opponents and enemies of the ruling actors constantly challenge it by telling their own narrative or interpretation, and cast doubt on the rationale of their counterparts. A look into the recent past brings to mind the propaganda skirmishes of the Cold War, in which not only economic systems, intelligence services and the military, but above all the great political narrators and meaning-makers fought for domination of the globe. These confrontations also had a significant Manichean trait, creating a simple good-bad scheme from the issues behind the narrative – Capitalism or planned economy? Democracy or communism? Competition or socialist performance principle? A similarly simplistic confrontational image of macro-narratives is now offered by the repeatedly cited clash of Occident and Orient, Christianity and Islam, used by extremists on both sides to cast doubt on the legitimacy of moderate, non-confrontational powers.

The constant questioning of the legitimacy of power by counter-narratives renders the substantiation of political narratives one of the most important leadership tasks in the political sphere of influence. Therefore, let us take a look at the sources from which any political narrative feeds. In doing so, four fundamentals can be identified, which determine each other to differing degrees. The *first source* comprises *political experience in a maximum of three generations*. The shared experience and remembrance horizon of these generational cohorts is staked out by key events or circumstances that have either been directly experienced or made present

through the oral transmission of eyewitnesses. We deliberately want to broadly define the term “political experience”: it not only refers to formal political processes, but also to symbolically relevant events. With reference to the German present, it includes, for instance, not only the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1950s and 1960s, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the refugee crisis of 2015, but also the soccer “Miracle of Bern” of 1954 and the flight of the (East German) cosmonaut Sigmund Jähn in 1978. All of these happenings – insofar as they are continually present to the members of the community and play an outstanding discursive role – are central resources for the narrative. Power actors can and must refer to them if they want to anchor their narratives in the political everyday discourse and in the practical reality of the citizens. Narratives that use motifs solely from the distant past run the risk of appearing antiquated and out of date; they lose their binding effect because they do not give the impression of having anything to do with our present day.

On the other hand, political narrative that fails to remember history cannot guarantee the continuity and narrative cohesion that are central to great narratives. This leads us to the *second source*, the *collective memory and the culture of remembrance* of the entire political community. Even if there are overlaps with the direct experience horizon of the generational cohorts already mentioned, the focus of the collective memory is on the past of the community which has not been directly experienced by its living members. The majority of the history of political communities is rendered present to their members only through literature, art and architecture, and to a lesser extent, through photography, sound recordings and film. Nevertheless, the ‘remembrance’ of these events – not understood as the mental recalling of one’s own subjective experiences, but as an exegesis of interpretive testimonies of the past (see Chapter 2.1) – is decisive. It allows, in MacIntyre’s words, the community to be conceived as a project uniting generations and centuries, whose essence and value is not exhausted in the present or simply in the sum of its living members. Collective memory is kept alive by the continual interpretation of past testimonies, and it is this that makes talk of cultural traditions, of moral obligations to the ancestors, of historical guilt and historical achievement possible. However, as the cultural scientist Aleida Assmann notes, the past that is thus interpreted is neither a mere backdrop on which to project present (power) interests nor an autonomous sphere detached from the present: “The past is a mirror in which we perceive ourselves beyond the moment and in which we repeatedly put together what we call the self. This mirror can heroize and throw back one’s image in double size, but it can also highlight negative and shameful features. Although the past does not have an autonomous ontological status and relies on our devotion to it, it is much more than a dependent variable

of our needs and inclinations. It exceeds individual and collective access; it can neither be monopolized nor conclusively evaluated.”²²³

This circumstance – the fact that the past cannot be monopolized and needs to be continuously reassessed and questioned – does not detract from the immense power potential of collective memory. The explosive power of historical memory is clear from the example of the Battle of Amsfeld on the plains of Kosovo, the national-historical myth of the Serbs. On June 28, 1389, the army of the Ottoman Sultan Murat I, advancing on the Balkans near Pristina, met the Orthodox Christian defenders of the Serbian Prince Lazar. After a long battle, during which both commanders lost their lives, the armies wiped each other out. This military stalemate did not change the fact that the Ottomans were able to subjugate the Balkans in the following years. These are the barren facts. Then, still in the fourteenth century, the legend began. The fallen Serbian fighters were transformed into black-birds after the battle – in testimony of their sacrificial deaths in defense of Christianity. This is the birth of the political narrative of Serbia as a community that stood up as the defender of the Occident against the Orient, a defender characterized by the will to fight against overpowering enemies. The stage of this great narrative has remained Kosovo ever since, the declared ‘heartland’ of the Serbian people. This narrative was taken up over 600 years later by the President of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, on the one hand to underpin the special status of Serbia as an independent nation oppressed by Tito’s League of States and, on the other hand, to establish a claim to power over Kosovo. Milošević’s strategy proved extremely successful in the medium term. The nationalist narrative and its real political implications were enthusiastically received by his compatriots. They set the starting signal for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Serbia’s reach for supremacy in Southeastern Europe. The long-term consequences are well known: the military escalation between the republics finally ended with NATO forcing the capitulation of Serbia and Kosovo’s independence. It would be wrong to put the myth of the Amsfeld at the beginning of the chain of causes of the Yugoslav war; such a reading is inappropriate for this multi-causal conflict situation. Nonetheless, the episode makes it clear how collective memory can be an effective and destructive catalyst if it is put to clever political use.

Moving beyond immediate experience and political experiences passed on through collective memory, *the third source* is the analysis of academic and scientific evidence to justify the narrative. This includes, on the one hand, the great historical investigations by authors of the type of Theodor Mommsen, Oswald

223 Assmann, Aleida (2007): *Geschichte im Gedächtnis. Von der individuellen Erfahrung zur öffentlichen Inszenierung*, Munich: C.H. Beck.; p. 10. (Our translation)

Spengler and Ernest Gellner, who use historical methods to trace the genesis and development of communities; and on the other hand, the outstanding work on state theory that has found its expression in constitutions, legal systems and value systems. In order to avoid too great a focus on historiography in our discussion of justification knowledge and political narratives, we will now focus on the latter. Anyone who has been led to believe that the theory of the state and political philosophy is a purely academic endeavor without no impact on real politics and the great national narratives of history, is recommended to take a walk in the Paris Pantheon. There, in the crypt, in the company of literary greats such as Voltaire and Victor Hugo, lies the resting place of Rousseau – and if you look closely, you can notice a stylized hand clenching a lit torch, apparently slowly pushing aside the coffin lid. The imagery of this symbolic staging is unmistakable: in the memory of France, the Swiss philosopher, always sickly during his lifetime, is as vital as ever, ready to pave the way for future generations or to rekindle the fire of the revolution. Without Rousseau's *Contrat Social*, the French Revolution as the birth of the narrative of the *grande nation* is just as unthinkable as, for example, the American narrative without the *Federalist Papers* by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.²²⁴ Both can be considered the intellectual founding documents of the internal and external understandings of the French and American nations. Where Rousseau campaigned for republican unity, general will and absolute popular rule, the US founding fathers argued for federalism, representative democracy and the separation of powers. Both argumentative directions have not only shaped, indeed dominated, the intellectual debates of their communities, but also their institutional organizations. They are the state-theoretical touchstones which the political elites of the present are still dealing with.

Anyone who is in search of a comparable intellectual foundation for the German narrative, superimposed by fractions and controversies as it is, will most likely find what they are looking for in Hegel's philosophy of law.²²⁵ Whatever the controversies about his historical significance, the Stuttgart thinker can be classified as the Prussian political philosopher par excellence. His political writings

224 See Rousseau ([1762] 2012) and Madison, James, Hamilton, Alexander, and Jay, John (2002): *The Federalist Papers*, Richard Beeman (ed.), New York: Penguin. Of course, the influence of these political thinkers was by no means limited to France or the USA alone. As Sylvain Fort notes, Rousseau's oeuvre was intensely and controversially received by the German Enlightenment experts as early as the eighteenth century; see Fort, Sylvain (2002): *Les Lumières françaises en Allemagne. Le cas Schiller*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

225 Cf. Hegel ([1821] 2003).

all revolve around the core idea of not only reconciling the principle of free will with the necessity of political order, but of inextricably intertwining the two. This cumulates in the monarchical administrative and corporate state as the final realization of the historical telos of the German people. Noteworthy is Hegel's anti-revolutionary slant, which seeks not to change existing relations in favor of an ideal long-term goal, but rather calls for the recognition of the given order. The human pursuit of perfection, a reading of Hegel can suggest, cannot in any case be achieved in the power field of the political: the necessity for compromise is too great, the competition between interest groups is too intense, and external world history is too unpredictable. Rather, perfection can be more readily redeemed in the internal sphere, in art, religion, and finally in philosophy. Admittedly, this astonishingly pragmatic way of thinking, which after Hegel was intensively received by hundreds of thousands of lawyers, administrators, politicians and academics, has not remained unchallenged in Germany. We can certainly read the subsequent writings of German state theorists, above all the Marxists and the Frankfurt School, as vehement attempts at refutation. This very circumstance, nevertheless, tends to underpin the status of the Hegelian work as the intellectual core document of the German political narrative, with which the following generations have continuously wrestled.

We wish to leave discussion of the scientific and academic source and turn to the fourth and final source: the *religious-sacral element*. It is evident that religions play a key role in the foundation of political narratives in all – or almost all – communities. As Böckenförde states in his essay on political theory and political theology, they have held this function, unrivaled among humankind, for thousands of years.²²⁶ There are three central reasons for this. First, viewed from a historical point of view, constitutional thinking originated within the realm of religion,²²⁷ as the most striking concepts of the modern age (and indeed the pre-modern era) are indeed secularized theological concepts.²²⁸ In other words, given that the contemplation of legitimacy has always been historically mixed with religious and in particular theological thinking, sacral schemata form a far from negligible, if not always considered, essence of justification knowledge. This does not mean that all

226 As to this reciprocal relationship, see Böckenförde, Wolfgang (1983): *Politische Theorie und politische Theologie. Bemerkungen zu ihrem wechselseitigen Verhältnis*, in: Jacob Taubes (ed.), *Der Fürst dieser Welt. Carl Schmitt und die Folgen*, Religions-theorie und politische Theorie Vol. 1, Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, pp. 16-25; p. 16.

227 *Ibid.*: p. 18.

228 Schmitt (1934): p. 49.

narrative justifications of political power are always explicitly or implicitly referenced to the assumption of a deity, but it does signify that their concepts and above all logic forms always possess a sacral pedigree.

Second, as stated in our discussion of the religious field of power (see Chapter 2.3), religions offer a coherent worldview and self-image as well as ethical orientation for rulers and the ruled alike.²²⁹ Presupposing belief in an otherworldly, sacral order, there is evidently no better justification for a secular, profane order than the simple slogan: “Deus vult” – “God wills it.” Throughout the course of history the notion of God’s will being embodied in political systems is repeatedly seen in the logics supporting the founding of the systems of rule: from the Assyrian Priest-Kings to the Chinese God Emperors to the European, absolutist monarchs by God’s grace to the self-proclaimed Caliph of the terrorist Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Of course, not every religion-based, political narrative culminates in theocratic rule. Even democratically authorized rulers resort to the use of religious motifs when legitimizing their power and creating a narrative frame of meaning – be it by citing the God-given exceptionalism of their nation and its missionary consciousness, like the neo-conservative government under US President George W. Bush, or by declaring common Christian values to be the link between European nations, like former French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Shared beliefs thus create as strong a cohesion and a sense of us among people as having a shared history, and these accordingly flank the historical sources of the political narrative with norms and meanings that go beyond history.

Third, we should not forget that religions – like political narratives – have the character of great, continuing stories. As a rule, they are not static, but eschatological. They tell a history of salvation and of the world with a clearly defined starting point (the creation) and end point (the last judgment).²³⁰ The founding of the Muslim *umma*, the political community of the faithful under the Prophet Mo

229 Appropriately recognized by Böckenförde (1983: p. 19) in relation to the Christian faith when he states that Christian religion is not only the worship of God in the form of a cult, but also extends its lessons into almost all walks of life and interprets the surrounding reality of human life. This inevitably leads to statements / doctrines that concern the orders of political coexistence, their status, tasks and areas of competence as well as their legitimacy.

230 Remarkably, eschatological elements are found not only in the Mosaic-Monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam), but, e.g., also in Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism and in the Old Slavic religion; for an overview see Walls, Jerry L. (ed.) (2008), *The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

hamed, stood under the auspices of the imminent judgment of the world by which the pious would be rewarded and the sinners punished. Corresponding motifs and political prophecies can already be found in ancient Egypt in the second millennium BC. Localizing communities on a historical timeline that can be interpreted theologically as well as strategically makes it possible to place all political events – wars with other states, internal unrest, but also economic, scientific and cultural successes – in a religious context of explanation. In this way, state crises can be interpreted as divine tests to be passed, military conflicts as predetermined defensive struggles against heathens and apostates, and the continuity of a dynastic rule or political elite can be explained as the fulfillment of a great divine plan.

Critical readers might argue that not all major political narratives encompass this sacred, eschatological component – and in fact, we have already referenced the atheistic-secular narrative of the *grande nation* several times.²³¹ However, this component (or at least its logic and motifs) could indeed be much more widespread than may at first appear. This can be seen in the political narratives of socialist-communist states in the twentieth century: the ideological core of this narrative, Marxism-Leninism, with its prediction (or prophecy) of a classless society at the end of a historical struggle between workers and capitalists, has all the features of a classic salvation story. This is not surprising, considering that Marx's understanding of history as a teleological process that must go through a necessary series of historical epochs, is directly inspired by Hegel. And again, he stood firmly on the ground of Christianity.

All sources of the political narrative and at the same time the most important foundations of justification knowledge have been identified. The obvious question of how individual actors can make concrete use of these sources in order to legitimize their position of power in a specific community has, of course, not yet been answered. However, as this is so contextually specific and can only be addressed against the background of the narrative resources of the respective communities, no universal answer can be given here. In addition thereto, as mentioned repeatedly, this point also plays into the sphere of political leadership and strategy issues

231 The French revolutionaries, however, did not want to abandon religion completely: parallel to the enforced dechristianization, Robespierre introduced a *Culte de l'Être suprême* ("Cult of the Supreme Being"), centering on worship of the allegory of reason. However, this attempt to create a liturgical hybrid of enlightenment pathos and quasi-sacral staging failed due to the lack of interest among the population and was quickly shelved after the end of Jacobin rule; see Culoma, Michael (2010): *La religion civile de Rousseau à Robespierre*, Paris: L'Harmattan.

and cannot be discussed separately from them; which leads us now to the second great form of power knowledge: *leadership*.

The first and most obvious key aspect associated with the core concept of leadership is that of *political strategy*.²³² The notion of strategy is a definitional ‘perennial.’ Its definition is as controversial among experts as those of power, the political and the common good. Nevertheless, we can approach the concept of strategy by delimiting it from the related concept of *tactics*. Both tactics and strategies are mental constructs or instructions that players consciously utilize to achieve their goals in competitive situations – be it in chess, on the battlefield, in marketing or in the political arena. The difference is that tactics are always oriented to the situation or to the current time. They determine how actors behave and respond when faced with a specific situation (such as a battle behind enemy lines or a heated political debate with critical discussion partners). Strategy is always cross-situational. It does not guide the behavior of actors in a concrete action context, but it can, for example, determine *what situations the actors create, which opponents they seek disputes with and which not, and which allies they attempt to win in order to realize their goals efficiently and effectively*. The occurrence of unforeseen events that conflict with the interests of an actor is a sign of strategic failure, but not an indication of wrong tactics. We can make this distinction even clearer by means of a military example. Whether the decision of the Central Powers during the First World War to counterattack the Entente at the twelfth Isonzo Battle in October 1917 was correct, is a question of tactics.²³³ Whether their decision to build the Isonzo Front at all and thus to risk a war of position against Italy was expedient, is a question of strategy.²³⁴ The first question concerns the achievement of a local, situational goal: winning a battle. The second question, on the other

232 Cf. Raschke, Joachim and Tils, Ralf (2008): *Politische Strategie, Forschungsjournal NSB*, 21 (1), pp. 11-24.; and Raschke, Joachim and Tils, Ralf (2011): *Politik braucht Strategie – Taktik hat sie genug*, Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus.

233 The answer is yes. The counterattack of the Austrian and German armies led to the collapse of the Italian defenders. However, this did not change anything in the course of the war or the looming defeat of the Central Powers.

234 The answer is no. The total of twelve Isonzo battles on the territory of today’s Slovenia are a dramatic testimony to the strategic failure of the top military commanders. Not only did they tie up considerable troop contingents without achieving any significant territorial gains, they also cost countless lives and led to increasing war fatigue.

hand, is about achieving a global, cross-situational goal: winning the First World War.²³⁵

Based on this distinction and drawing on the work of Joachim Raschke and Ralf Tils, strategies can all be summarized as “success-oriented constructs based on cross-situational, goal-means-environment calculations.”²³⁶ This definition applies universally, regardless of whether we are in the field of sports, economics, warfare or politics. However, what constitutes a successful political strategy and what components it comprises is another matter. Raschke and Tils have already laid important foundations for this topic²³⁷ which we take as a starting point and develop into an independent system enriched by practical and theoretical insights. According to our core thesis, a successful political strategy has four components: *strategy foundations*, *strategy capability*, *strategy development* and *strategic steering*.

Figure 7: Components of Successful Political Strategy



235 The decision as to whether a specific construct of action must be classified as tactics or strategy is, of course, not always easy. However, this has nothing to do with the vagueness of our concepts, but with the different connotations and usage contexts. Specifically, it is about whether we grasp a decision framework as a singular situation or as a cross-situational sequence of events and act accordingly. This is not primarily a theoretical but rather a genuinely practical question, because the standard to be applied is ultimately always success and failure. For a more in-depth discussion, see also Strachen, Hew (2005): *The Lost Meaning of Strategy, Survival*, 47 (3), pp. 33-54.

236 Raschke & Tils (2008): p. 12.

237 Ibid. as well as Raschke, Joachim and Tils, Ralf (2007): *Politische Strategie. Eine Grundlegung*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

The *foundations* of political strategy are found in the appropriation of a specialized view of the social world that Foucault aptly calls ‘governmentality’ – a neologism that combines the terms ‘govern’ and ‘mentality.’²³⁸ Those who master governmentality have, on the one hand, systematically absorbed the phenomenon of power in its various principles, forms, fields and conditions of legitimacy (see Chapters 1.2 to 2.4) – whether through political experience, theoretical reflection or, ideally, by virtue of a combination of both. On the other hand, they have developed a powerful political scheme of orientation. The latter, as can be elucidated with Raschke & Tils, is an “empirically based model that has been further developed and systematized from the starting point of the orientation parameters of strategic players.”²³⁹ As the expression ‘model’ suggests, this orientation scheme is not an exact illustration of political reality, but rather an abstraction. It brings together the central parameters of the political: time horizons of policy decisions and processes, policies, topics, organizations, persons, symbols and the public.²⁴⁰

Through the combination of power penetration and the orientation scheme, strategic actors can rasterize social reality, isolate the important from the unimportant and gain an overview of the decision-making environment. At this point, we wish to prevent a possible misunderstanding: governmentality is not a cognitive *déformation professionnelle*, because of which actors would perceive their environment, other persons, institutions and topics only in the context of success-oriented purpose-means relations. Instead, it is a specific mindset that everyone can acquire and use purposefully by virtue of cultivating political skills and areas of knowledge – Foucault also speaks of the “techniques of the self.”²⁴¹ The strategic systematization and orientation of governmentality is best illustrated by the following comparison. If a botanical layperson roams a forest with a PhD forest scientist, the former sees one thing above all: many trees; the latter sees not only spruce, pine and ash, but also ecological problems, management potentials and landscape developments. The sensory data are the same for both persons, but the conclusions drawn from this data differ dramatically. Analogously, the political-strategic layperson perceives the political power field primarily as a confusing mingling of politicians, parties and talk shows. However, those with sophisticated

238 Cf. Lemke, Thomas (2001): The birth of bio-politics: Michael Foucault’s lectures at the College de France on neo-liberal governmentality, *Economy and Society*, 30 (2), pp. 190-207.

239 Ibid.: p. 15.

240 Raschke & Tils (2007): p. 162.

241 Cf. Foucault, Michel (1984 [1990]): *The Use of Pleasure*, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, translated by Robert Hurley (ed.), New York: Random House.; p. 11.

governmentality at their disposal see a differentiated multilevel system, constituted by formal and informal relationships between decision-makers, stakeholders, institutions and issues, whose function revolves around the legitimation, allocation and exercise of power. The skilled eye recognizes the powers of competing and allied actors, identifies opportunities and risks. Indeed, it is this view that makes successful strategy development and implementation possible.

The second component is that of strategy *capability*. It describes the ability of the power actor to implement strategic decisions effectively and efficiently – under real conditions of political competition in which other protagonists pursue conflicting political strategies. This faculty is based on seven factors or, as we will say below, strategic powers. As a rule of thumb, we can state that the greater the strategic powers of the actor, the greater his or her strategic ability and thus chances of successfully implementing a strategy.

The deciding factor here is, first of all, the degree of *organizational capability*, i.e. the ability to set clear strategic goals and to make corresponding decisions. On the one hand, this presupposes the institutional establishment of a hierarchy of decisions in which internal powers, management tasks, responsibilities and control functions are defined and linked with specific roles or offices. On the other hand, it requires the preliminary clarification of the political direction or, as Raschke and Tils aptly summarize, the establishment of a corridor that defines the content of the interest formation – through topics, positions and symbols.²⁴² This creates a common understanding of the politics and internal coherence. The relevance of these interrelated aspects is immediately evident: without political leadership, a strategic actor is unable to act; without a clear political direction, he is aimless.

While organizational capability represents an actor's intrinsic strategic potency, the second factor, *mobilization capability*, refers to the actor's relationship to his or her strategic environment. Political mobilization is a form of communication and action that enables organizations of the political power field, such as parties, associations, companies, NGOs, trade unions and churches, for example, to activate a variegated group of people (voters, members, customers, believers, patients, etc.) in order to assert their respective strategic interests. It thus functions as a social catalyst in which the mobilized make their voices and faces available to the organization and become active in working for the organization's goals.²⁴³ A key instrument of political mobilization is the campaign. Given that very different actors each with their own policy goals initiate campaigns, and the instru-

242 Raschke & Tils (2008): p. 18.

243 Speth, Rudolf (2013): *Verbände und Grassroots-Campaigning*, in: Rudolf Speth (ed.), *Grassroots-Campaigning*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 43-59.; p. 43.

ment is used in both advertising and in political communication, it is necessary to specify the function of a campaign very accurately. Campaigns are aimed at the (re)election of a president or chancellor, the boycott of products or companies, the adoption or withdrawal of laws and regulations, the support or rejection of infrastructure projects, etc. Ulrike Röttger offers a now classic definition providing good orientation. Campaigns are “dramaturgically designed, thematically limited, time-limited communicative strategies for producing public attention [...], they draw on a set of different communicative tools and techniques – promotional means, marketing-specific instruments and classic PR measures. Attracting attention is the minimum goal of campaigns of all kinds. The aim is moreover to generate confidence in the credibility of the organization and approval of one’s own intentions or follow-up actions.”²⁴⁴ This dense description makes clear that convincing campaigns or the ability to mobilize involves not only a plausible and captivating political discourse – with a starting point, climax and end point and continuous tension – but also a set of methods, fed by the media and journalism. These instruments are flanked by a resource that we described and discussed in Chapter 2.3: data power. Since successful campaigning is today unthinkable without detailed knowledge of the respective target group and their interests, political mobilization stands and falls not least with the effective use of instruments such as data mining and data targeting. Algorithm-based data analysis not only enables precise target group preferences to be determined, but also allows the development of a tailor-made approach and motivation: on the one hand through targeted dialogue communication on platforms, in social networks and via e-mails, but on the other hand through classical analogue instruments such as personalized letters or visits. The strategic potency of mobilization capability is thus based on a combination of dramaturgical wit, communicative skills, technological know-how and tightly conducted campaign management. The significance of the latter for success can hardly be overestimated. This is particularly clear in the United States, where the management of election campaigns has an almost military organizational structure. The great art perfected by US campaigners is to develop a fully organized top-down campaign that citizens nonetheless perceive as a motivating grassroots movement.

The third factor of strategic potency, *network capability*, also refers to the relationship between the power player and the environment. However, this is specifically about the ability to forge alliances with other organizations and interest

244 Röttger, Ulrike (2009): Campaigns (f)or a better world?, in: Ulrike Röttger (ed.), *PR-Kampagnen. Über die Inszenierung von Öffentlichkeit*, 4th revised and expanded edition, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 9-26.; p. 9.

formations to increase the reach of the actor's own concerns or to achieve greater credibility. Political networks of this type can only be established if there is a sufficient intersection between the potential allies. For example, alliances between environmental organizations such as the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), NatureServe and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) are much easier forged than between the automotive industry and the Alliance for Biking and Walking.

Not only shared themes and goals but also common habitus and practices and shared interpretative horizons of the common good (see Chapter 2.4) are decisive for the formation of effective, permanent alliances.²⁴⁵ One example is the development of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the trade unions from the late nineteenth to the twenty-first century. At the time of the 'working-class Pope' Leo XII, who in 1891 wrote the most influential political encyclical of recent history with *Rerum Novarum*, the Catholic Church and the organized workforce agreed surprisingly often on core political questions.²⁴⁶ Leo's partisanship on issues such as equal pay and employee protection met with great approval from labor leaders; and they in turn left no doubt about their support for the Pope's theological and moral program. However, as the unions turned to atheistic socialism and the Catholic Church withdrew from 'wordly affairs', this alliance eroded rapidly. This circumstance seems all the more remarkable when one considers that core issues of Catholic social teaching, such as solidarity with underprivileged sections of society or the principle of subsidiarity, are still highly compatible with trade union discourse. It makes clear, however, that thematic convergence is not sufficient for alliance formation if a consensus as to (at least) the basic values becomes impossible among the different power actors.

Political alliances – between parties, companies, NGOs, churches or other organizations – are highly effective tools of political strategy. Nonetheless, their formation must actually be oriented towards or correspond to the strategic goal. Two dimensions of evaluation are crucial for this: quality and quantity. When it comes to achieving a highly focused goal that attracts little public attention with a small, specialized circle of decision-makers and stakeholders – such as the amendment to a pharmaceuticals directive – then an alliance with a few, highly competent partners is preferable. Here the exchange of information, the pooling of expertise and professional reputation are in the foreground. The situation is different with a

245 Cf. also Beamish, Thomas D. and Luebbers, Amy J. (2009): Alliance-Building Across Social Movements: Bridging Difference in a Peace and Justice Coalition, *Social Problems*, 56 (4), pp. 647-676.

246 Cf. Leo XIII. (1891): Circular issued by our Most Holy Father Leo XIII, by Divine Providence Pope, on the Labor Question. *Rerum Novarum*, Munich: Herder.

broad strategic goal in that it not only involves numerous power fields and interest groups, but also holds immense public mobilization potential – such as the conclusion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US. The deal failed significantly because supporters had not established a broad alliance that integrated various organizations and layers of society, underscoring public interest in the cause. Instead, the impression of a shielded, exclusive and elitist clique of political decision-makers whose rulings were contrary to (alleged) popular will became established in the various sectors of the European public. Conversely, the TTIP opponents were able to forge an EU-wide coalition of globalization opponents, environmentalists and animal rights activists, but also right-wing *and* left-wing populists, and kick off a protest wave of enormous proportions with simple slogans such as “TTIP kills” or “Tango vs. TTIP.”²⁴⁷ The sheer number of voices and the emotionalization of the subject made recourse to content-related expertise and to the reputation of experts practically useless; the credibility trap was inescapable.

The cases discussed make two things evident. First, despite all differences, the potencies of mobilization and network capabilities are often closely intertwined in practice; second, the public factor in alliance formation is always a strategic risk or opportunity that requires consideration and evaluation. To be sure, the cases mentioned here – the amendment of a single directive on the one hand and the conclusion of a free trade agreement on the other – are in some ways extreme examples of political and strategic goals. In most cases, actually, neither quantity nor quality alone can be seen as being crucial to the formation of a goal-oriented network, but rather a balance between the two dimensions. Therefore, we can state that the potency of network capability is based not only on the ability to create nodes or intersections (in terms of themes, practices, habitus), but also on judgment that allows the envisaged alliance to be balanced in terms of quality and quantity.

Nevertheless, the best alliance is strategically ineffective if its members are unable to communicate key messages credibly and with a lasting effect to the addressees. This challenge leads us to the fourth strategic potency: *mediation capability*. This is the ability to convey those concerns, interests and opinions that are relevant for the strategic achievement of goals to other persons and institutions. We would do well to take the word ‘mediating’ literally: it does not just involve

247 For a good overview, see Bauer, Matthias (2016): The Political Power of Evoking Fear: The Shining Example of Germany’s Anti-TTIP Campaign Movement, *European View*, 15 (2), pp. 193–212.

making a message intelligible, i.e. its translation into the language of the addressee, but also involves being convincing. Anyone who successfully conveys a request, for example, creates a rational and empathetic connection in dialogue – he or she is recognized as a trustworthy communication partner worth listening to. There are two key factors here that at first glance seem to conflict: truthfulness and rhetorical finesse.

Being truthful does not mean that our statements must be beyond doubt and always true. Such a requirement is far too sophisticated from an epistemological point of view because it presupposes an infinite cascade of meta-knowledge and imposes unrealistically high standards of self-examination on those communicating a message. Rather, truthfulness means that statements and practical actions coincide, that is, that discourse and practice are consistent. Power actors in whom discourse and practice in no way agree are perceived by their addressees either as erratic or as bigoted. They are implausible. And even if their arguments are convincing, they will generally be opposed.²⁴⁸

How devastating this divergence between saying and doing can be for the achievement of strategic goals can be seen, for example, in the failed ‘Remain’ campaign by ex-British Prime Minister David Cameron aiming to ensure the continued membership of Great Britain in the EU.²⁴⁹ Cameron’s political ascent was not only due to acrimonious agitation against Brussels institutions and migrant workers from neighboring EU countries, but also to his announcement that the British were to vote on leaving the European Union. When the referendum was scheduled, the prime minister nevertheless advocated that the country remain in the EU – with the well-known result. The crux is that a politician who has done everything to stir up aversion against the EU among his constituents cannot credibly promote staying in it. Such mediation is not truthful and can therefore hardly promise success. The election campaign of US presidential candidate Hilary Clinton offers a similar picture. The Democratic politician, who had maintained strong relationships with the US financial sector for decades, and raised more than \$ 20

248 At this point there is a close connection between the strategic potency of mediation and the first format of power knowledge, justification knowledge: thus, as we shall show below, truthfulness is a necessary condition of the justification structure of power in the political system.

249 For a captivating and informative treatment of this topic, see McTague, Tom, Spence, Alex, and Dove, Edward-Isaac (2016): How Cameron Blew It, in: *Politico* from 25th June 2016, [online] <http://www.politico.eu/article/how-david-cameron-lost-brexiteu-referendum-prime-minister-campaign-remain-boris-craig-oliver-jim-messina-obama/>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

million in donations from hedge funds, banks and insurance companies in 2015,²⁵⁰ attempted to build on the capitalism-critical narrative of her in-party opponent Bernie Sanders. She called for a storm on Wall Street. As a result of this all-too-obvious divergence between discourse and practice, Clinton lost both left-leaning young voters and pro-business voters – and ultimately the election.

Political cynics might argue that truthfulness is only a crucial factor in mediating ability if power actors are unable to adequately disguise the discrepancy between their statements and actions. This objection should be taken seriously. There are two things to say about this. *Firstly*, of course, concealment and secrecy are part of any political strategy. This fact is already evident in the initial intrinsic connection between knowledge and power. An advantage in power knowledge brings a clear advantage in power, and this in turn significantly increases strategic chances of success. Therefore, withholding information from rivals, critics and potential adversaries, leaving them unaware of one's own abilities and goals, is a strategic imperative. *Secondly*, however, the capacity for concealment has practical limits, no matter how much a power actor has perfected it: the greater the discrepancy between discourse and practice, the easier it is to identify and the harder to disguise. In addition, caution is needed for another reason: the global, digitally networked communication spaces of our day offer greater investigative potential than ever before in world history. This is not changed by the current debates about fake news. Due to the exponential increase in the risk of being exposed as erratic or bigoted, in short, not truthful, such a concealment tactic may well be unsuccessful, at least in the long term.

The second factor of mediation, rhetoric, seems to clash with the principle of truthfulness. However, the impression that these two conflict is due to a conceptual narrowing – on the one hand of the concept of mediation, on the other hand of rhetoric. Prominent critics, including intellectual historical figures such as Plato, Goethe and Bismarck, like to characterize rhetoric as a technique of adept persuasion, but not one of convincing, and they decry it as a tool of demagogues and pied pipers. The enlightened Kant even spoke of a “deceitful art”²⁵¹. We see this crushing verdict, however, as a distortion of the great tradition of political rhetoric, which – when used responsibly and well understood – revolves around

250 Cf. Rubin, Jennifer (2016): Hillary Clinton, blind to her own greed, makes another blunder, in: Washington Post from 4th February 2016, [online] https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2016/02/04/hillary-clinton-blind-to-her-own-greed-makes-another-blunder/?utm_term=.2605df8f25ad, retrieved on 22.01.2018.

251 Kant, Immanuel ([1790] 2002): *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, London: Cambridge University Press, p. 205.

three major guiding principles: *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos*.²⁵² True rhetoric addresses the passions of the listeners as well as their reason and judgment, and reflects the speaker's veracity and integrity as discussed above. Behind this triad is an equally simple and plausible anthropological assumption: as a political creature, as *zoon politikon*, humankind is never merely rational or sentimental, and is not motivated solely by selfish or altruistic reasons. Rather, human beings seem to be creatures traversed by various impulses and motives. Political mediation, if it is to succeed, must address all this.

This assessment also speaks against an exaggerated intellectual and elitist image of political mediation, as we know it from the Frankfurt School, in particular Habermasian discourse ethics.²⁵³ Adherents of this line of thought suggest, concisely put, that the mediation of political content has to be strictly rational and dispassionate because any other procedure is manipulative and detrimental to the truth. Now it is open to debate whether politics should really be seen as analogous to a university seminar or a judicial process and classified as primarily aiming to discover the truth (for more on this, see Chapter 2.4). Considerable doubts seem appropriate. But all that is in the end irrelevant. Habermas' discourse-ethical model of political mediation is unfit for practice and thus at best interesting as a theoretical exercise in thought. Let us remember that the potency of mediation capability is part of a political-strategic complex and thus comes into play in a situation in which strategic actors compete for power. In such a scenario, the renunciation of rhetoric in favor of a strictly rational and dispassionate style of argumentation is an unprecedented competitive disadvantage. In short, because rhetoric is the art of convincing and inspiring listeners alike, and because any power actor who does not use this tool loses political influence, the model of discourse ethics is simply irrational from a power theory perspective.²⁵⁴ Accordingly, the approach we propose, combining truthfulness and rhetoric, is not only founded in the historically proven tradition of thought leaders such as Aristotle and Cicero, but is also based on pragmatism.

252 Cf. Aristotle (1959) *Ars Rhetorica*, W. D. Ross (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.; Cicero, Marcus Tullius (1986): *De oratore*, David Mankin (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press.

253 Cf. Habermas (1984).

254 Significantly, this finding is also reflected in the more recent deliberative theory of democracy, which has developed a much more open and constructive relationship to political rhetoric, see, e.g. Dryzek (2000); and Mansbridge, Jane et al. (2012): A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy, in: John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge (eds.), *Deliberative Systems*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-26.

Complementary to mediation capability, there is another potency, which is also closely linked to the public: *fame*. Those who are famous enjoy a specific form of public attention that sets them apart from other actors and enables them, by virtue of their reputation, to strategically influence the political power field. Their words have weight, their actions inspire people, their names are on everyone's lips. Now, fame – and political glory in particular – is not synonymous with *sui generis* attention.²⁵⁵ Social media personalities, YouTubers and pop stars may have millions of followers on digital platforms and enjoy significant economic leverage, for instance through product recommendations. They are, in the diction of marketing, highly effective influencers. Still, this influence cannot be translated into strategic political potency. The reason is that even their followers do not usually attribute political skills to these people, but rather, e.g., artistic brilliance or an outstanding sense of fashion and trends. Here, in our estimation, is the *differentia specifica*: fame consists of the attainment of public attention combined with the attribution of power competence, power knowledge and power itself. Not without reason does one think of the word 'fame' first of all with respect to personalities such as Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon or Winston Churchill. They all gained world-historical prominence while serving as outstanding power strategists.²⁵⁶ At the same time, this list makes it clear that fame is not necessarily linked to a good reputation or to a sense of mutual esteem. Autocrats such as Vladimir Putin may be far more feared than valued, especially in the Western world. Nevertheless, it does not detract from their fame. Even the greatest critic of the Kremlin would not hesitate for a second to classify the Russian president as an exceptional political figure and as a person whose words and deeds attract the eyes of the world.

Now, it is one thing to define fame as strategic potency, and quite another to determine the foundations on which it is based and how it is obtained. There is no

255 See also Franck, Georg (1998): *Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit: Ein Entwurf*, München: Hanser. Franck classifies fame as an independent form of attention alongside prestige, prominence and reputation. For a concise English-language summary, see Franck, Georg (undated): *The Economy Of Attention*, [online] <http://www.t0.or.at/franck/gfeconom.htm>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

256 A vivid example of a decision-maker who received great political attention, but who failed to be attributed with political capability, is the former French President Francois Hollande. Thanks to his private escapades, his clumsy political tactics and failed reforms Hollande was in the headlines throughout his tenure, but just as an 'inglorious' example of a statesman. This circumstance was also reflected in Hollande's low power strategic potency.

general guide to fame – too great are the historical, sociological and cultural differences between the political communities and too decisive factors such as personality and esprit that cannot be influenced. Instead of sufficient conditions, therefore, only a series of favorable conditions can be cited: birth, money, achievement and symbolic dexterity.

Those who grow up in a wealthy nation as part of the upper or middle class have far greater prospects of bringing their power competence and power knowledge into the limelight than anyone from the slums of Nairobi or Calcutta. It is a sobering but significant fact that the great majority of the glorious power actors in history have always been recruited from the resource-rich states and classes. Monetary resources, like the correct place of birth, are not a guarantee for fame, but they are crucial in the social struggle for attention. The media scientists Georg Franck and Jörg Bernardy underline the insight that attention – especially in modern media companies – is a highly sought after and extremely scarce commodity, for which more and more players compete with ever greater capital expenditure.²⁵⁷ Consumers are constantly oscillating between countless publications, news programs, websites, feeds, newsletters etc. Those who want to assert themselves permanently in this fight must invest in their public and media presence; otherwise they suddenly lose the attention of their audience. The aspect of performance in this context is decisive: it feeds the narrative of fame. Only if power actors have actually achieved political merit – whether by winning a war, reforming a state, reviving the national economy or reconciling warring ethnic groups – does their self-staging also have political substance. Undoubtedly, in the course of history, charlatans and braggarts have repeatedly achieved fame. But glory without substance is fragile. In the above-mentioned digitally networked communication space of our present time, the risk of being exposed as a liar is constant. The last and perhaps most important requirement is symbolic dexterity. For attention to become fame, it must be charged with symbolism. The conditions under which the public looks at a person can be controlled by gestures, metaphors and signs. One might think of Willy Brandt's spontaneous kneeling before the memorial for the dead of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1970, or of the handshake between Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand at Verdun in 1984. However, one of the great historical masters of symbolic staging was unquestionably Napoleon Bonaparte. In an attempt to expand his position of power in republican France, the Corsican strategist

257 Cf. Franck (1998): S. 49f. and Bernardy, Jörg (2011): Attention as Bounded Resource and Medium in Cultural Memory: A Phenomenological or Economic Approach?, *Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication*, 2 (2), pp. 241-254.

initiated the invasion of Egypt in 1798.²⁵⁸ From a purely military point of view, the expedition was unsuccessful, but this circumstance played no part whatsoever in public judgment: Napoleon, accompanied by numerous chroniclers throughout, not only founded the Cairo Institute d'Égypt and laid the foundation for modern research into antiquity, he also reformed the Egyptian administration, had the entire country mapped, eradicated the bubonic plague and introduced book printing. In short, Napoleon used the military expedition as a stage to present himself to the local audience and the world as a promoter of the arts and sciences, a reformer, and a nation builder. Upon his return to Paris, he was enthusiastically welcomed by huge crowds. Five years later, he was emperor.

The sixth factor of strategy capability we want to discuss is financial potency. This factor has already been mentioned in discussion of the other powers. Therefore, we can keep our discussion short. Obviously, the ability of power actors to effectively and efficiently implement strategic decisions ultimately also depends on their financial resources. All previous factors – organizational capability, mobilization capability, network capability, mediation capability and even fame – already presuppose the availability of monetary resources. Good and reliable personnel have to be paid, campaigns have to be financed, and of course the same applies to technological and communicative tools as well as the necessary infrastructure.

Financial potency is necessary for strategy capability. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is sufficient or that every power player needs equivalent resources to pursue his or her strategic goals. The first point is obvious. If an actor has sustained lasting reputational damage this strategic disadvantage can often not be compensated by the most expensive campaigns. A striking example is provided by the global exhaust gas scandal of the German automotive industry in 2016 and 2017, in which automobile companies had obscured the emission values of their diesel vehicles by means of illegal devices. Uncovering this process led to a diesel sector crisis that is still having an effect today and that even multibillion-dollar global companies can no longer control.²⁵⁹

The second point requires a certain amount of explanation: actors in the political power field whose strategic goals are seen by widespread public opinion as having a high altruistic quality, such as environmentalists, human rights activists

258 Cf. Cole, Juan R. (2008): *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.; and Burleigh, Nina (2007): *Mirage: Napoleon's Scientists and the Unveiling of Egypt*, New York: Harper Collins.

259 Cf. Bowens, Luc (2016): The Ethics of Dieselgate, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 40 (1), pp. 262-283.

or development workers, have a strategic resource that can be termed moral capital – based on Bourdieu (see also Chapter 2.3). Their objectives are compatible with the ethical convictions of broad social classes. Moral capital provides a strategic competitive advantage over actors whose goals are not perceived as being equally altruistic – and, more importantly, compensates to a certain degree for financial capital. It is e.g. easier, and therefore less costly, to attract people to a cause that they either explicitly or implicitly agree with out of ethical conviction, rather than one that they first need to be convinced of. To put it bluntly, human rights sell better than nuclear power. Moreover, for actors whose strategic goals are inextricably linked to a moral narrative, in individual cases substantial financial resources may even prove to be a burden because they may give the impression of superiority or venality. In spite of everything, however, the principle remains that power actors without financial power cannot make use of the other strategic powers, for the reasons mentioned above. So here it is not a question of whether, but a question of how much. Financial power remains the *conditio sine qua non* of strategy capability.

The seventh and final strategic potency is the willingness to make a sacrifice. This term, which may at first sight appear martial, refers simply to the will of power actors and their supporters to accept deprivations in pursuit of the strategic goal and to take risks (also concerning their own well-being). The development, implementation and management of a political strategy is never a risk-free or effortless project. Strategies cost time, money, nerves and above all strength. The imponderables of the power field inevitably bring setbacks. They can go hand in hand with the loss of money, prestige, friendships, and even life and limb in the case of strategies that challenge the established order (such as revolutions or organized civil disobedience against dictatorships). Actors who are not sufficiently motivated to take and also to bear these risks are clearly inferior to actors willing to make sacrifices. To underline this point, we do not need to recall historically exceptional figures such as the Indian statesman Mahatma Gandhi, who was ready to sacrifice the integrity of his own body for his strategy of pacifist rebellion against the British Empire.²⁶⁰ The long and extremely exhausting day-to-day work

260 Incidentally, we deliberately speak of Gandhi's pacifistic strategy and not of a philosophical attitude. The Indian revolutionary used non-violent resistance deliberately as a strategic means against the colonial troops, so as to clearly show the world the 'barbarism' of the occupiers. In the later conflict with Pakistan, Gandhi clearly favored a military option; see Tønnesson, Øyvind (1999): Mahatma Gandhi, the Missing Laureate, [online] https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/themes/peace/gandhi/in

of a political leader – especially during election campaigns – suffices as an example to show what willingness to make sacrifices can mean in terms of political strategies.


At this point we want to conclude discussion of strategy capability and turn to the third component of the political strategy: *strategy development*. Successful strategy development is based, as Raschke and Tils put it in an interesting mathematical analogy, on correct calculations.²⁶¹ In the broadest sense, such calculations are benefit evaluations. By virtue thereof, actors define their cross-situational goals in the context of available resources or their own power assets, system conditions and the power resources of political opponents, and thus derive a plan of action. In short, actors play through the various causal paths that can lead to their goal, and choose the one that is characterized by the optimal relation between probability of success and expected effort. The ideal objective is to identify a path with maximum effectiveness and efficiency, i.e. the greatest possible chance of success with the smallest possible use of resources. At this point, however, Raschke and Tils' mathematical analogy reaches its limits, for unlike arithmetic operations that are based on universal axioms, strategic calculations are not logical inferences, but probabilistic operations based on empirical knowledge.²⁶² They have the following general form: from the empirically based assumption that I can mobilize resource r , the political environment follows development path d and the political opponent performs action a , there is a probability of $x\%$ that I will reach my goal. Such calculations, because they anticipate future actions and events, are characterized by a risk of unpredictability. This increases with the time horizon of the strategy and the number of variables and constants.

dex.html, retrieved on 21.12.2017.; and Freedman, Lawrence (2013): *Strategy: A History*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.; p. 247.

261 Cf. Rasche, Joachim & Tils, Ralf (2011): p. 113.

262 To be precise, mathematical calculations are a priori; they are not based on empirical knowledge, but – if we follow Kant – in pure reason. Strategic calculations are a posteriori, they have their basis and justification in our knowledge of the world.

Figure 8: Strategic Calculations



To put it another way, whoever carries out a strategic calculation strikes a balance (*a*) between their strategic goal and their available means of power; predicts (*b*) the future behavior of political opponents and allies as well as the occurrence of policy-relevant events and political developments; (*c*) recalls their past experience of the political power field, its actors, processes and constraints in order to (*d*) identify the ideal causal path towards the goal. This highly condensed recapitulation readily makes it clear that strategy-building is a very complex process.

Although the influencing factors for strategy formation can be extremely numerous and difficult to survey in any particular case, they can still be systematized and thus made manageable by utilizing a few categories. As a first step, we can divide the entire spectrum into two basic categories: *strategic constants* and *strategic variables*.

With *constants*, we refer to all those factors that are extremely difficult to change – either because they are stable, cross-cultural principles or habitual, firmly anchored patterns of action of the respective communities.²⁶³ These include basic economic laws, such as principles, which state, e.g. that a high demand for

263 Our concept of strategic constants is inspired by the historiographical core concept of the *longue durée*, which Ferdinand Braudel, as one of the most important representatives of the Annales School, introduced into historical science. Cf. Lee, Richard E. (2013): *The Longue Duree and World-Systems Analysis*, New York: State University of New York Press.

low supply leads to price increases, but it also encompasses the universal principles of power and anthropological constants, such as humankind's vulnerability.

Furthermore, this category can also encompass the constitutional and procedural norms of the community in which the strategy is to be implemented. This includes, among others, political and civil rights, electoral systems, forms of horizontal and vertical separation of powers, and involvement in supranational institutions such as the EU or the Commonwealth of Nations. These norms describe the formal rules of the game of competition for political power and demarcate the limits of the legal and legitimate use of strategic power resources. A caveat is appropriate, of course, because these rules are not universal but historically contingent and can indeed be changed or abolished by humans. However – and this is crucial – they are protected by extremely demanding procedural hurdles (for example, two-thirds majority clauses in both US Houses of Congress and both German chambers) and deeply rooted elements of their respective political practices. Therefore, strategies rarely target constitutional and procedural norms (or their modification), but operate within the scope of those norms.

This statement is generalizable: constants of strategy formation are influencing factors due to their longevity and minimal variability, and they have to be taken into account in calculations – but they are usually not the object or goal of the strategy. The practical consequence of this statement is, firstly, that power actors must know which constants are relevant to their strategic goal and which ones are not. Secondly, they must be able to assess how the constants affect the ideal causal path and what interactions exist between them. Thirdly, there is virtually no need to observe and evaluate constants during strategy implementation and control. The reason for this is their expected stability. Once you have identified all the constants of your strategy and included them in the goal-means-environment calculation, you can devote yourself to the strategic variables for the remaining time.

The category of strategic *variables* includes all factors that are decidedly changeable – be it through deliberate action, through natural events or as a non-intentional consequence of uncoordinated collective behavior.²⁶⁴

Firstly, we can distinguish the strategic variables *directly attributable to the strategy-making actors themselves*: their strategic capability and strategic goal.

264 Classic examples of variables that can be changed by natural events (rain, flood, drought, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.) are crops or visitor numbers in tourist destinations. Examples of variables that may change as a result of non-coordinated collective behavior are, for example, the flow of traffic or the prices of speculative objects.

Obviously, actors have to take their own powers into account in strategy formation, assessing them realistically and, if necessary, supplementing them. If you have strong network and mediation skills, but neither fame nor great financial power, you are well advised either to seek a suitable ally or to increase these potencies yourself. Classifying the strategic goal itself as a variable, means that actors in strategy formation have to reflect on whether their goals are realistic in terms of their own capabilities and resources, or whether they need to be adapted or even abandoned. Classic questions here are: Can I pursue the goal at all, without giving up my mediation capability, that is, without making myself untrustworthy? Do I have sufficient organizational skills to realize a complex goal with a long time horizon, or do I need to focus on a simpler, shorter-term goal? Is the pursuit of my goal beneficial or detrimental to maintaining existing alliances? Is my goal x in conflict with my goal y, and if so, which is the priority? The list continues of course, as this short sketch implies.

Secondly, we can summarize all the factors that affect the realm of political allies. These are: number, strategy skills and goals of the partners. Obviously, the strategy-forming actor can influence all these variables only indirectly, but they are directly relevant to one's own goal development and to the corresponding choice of means. As already indicated in our discussion of network capability, the relationship between the quantity and the quality of a political alliance is essential for strategic calculation. Nevertheless, the goals and preferences of partners are also decisive. An example of this is one of the most controversial construction projects in recent German history: the construction of a bridge through the UNESCO-protected Dresden Elbe Valley. The Saxon state government, which strongly advocated and promoted the construction, opposed an alliance of radical environmentalists and moderate citizens' initiatives. Both partners in this alliance agreed on their rejection of the bridge. However, while local representatives of the two environmental groups categorically rejected any form of Elbe crossing, the citizens' initiatives agreed on an Elbe tunnel as an alternative to the construction of the bridge. This internal dissent led to such a massive weakening of the anti-bridge camp that the state government was able to implement its project and gained the support of large parts of the Dresden population.

The *third* class of strategic variables includes the *number, strategic capabilities and goals of political opponents*. All of these variables have a massive impact on strategic calculation, both in terms of goal definition and the choice of strategic and alliance partners. If you have to contend with political opponents whose strategic goals are diametrically opposed to your own, and who have a high level of strategic capability, then in case of doubt you are well advised to modify your goals and transform some of your opponents into allies.

A legendary example of this form of calculation is provided by the French statesman and bishop Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, who played a major part in French politics from 1780 to 1838, spanning five regime changes.²⁶⁵ He began his career as a general agent of the royalist French church and deputy to the Estates General (clergy, nobility, third estate). During the upheavals of 1789, however, Talleyrand broke away from the monarchist orientation of the clergy, which had no chance of success in view of the decline of the *ancien régime*. Instead, he sought an alliance with moderate revolutionaries like Mirabeau and spoke, following the spirit of the time, in favor of the nationalization of church property. Nevertheless, he remained faithful to the core interests of the liberal clergy, supporting the continuation of the church within the framework of a French civil constitution. Talleyrand's ability to forge strategic alliances and incorporate changes in power into his own calculations was enough to make even Jacobins like Danton his supporters. This ability also led to the statesman serving under the five-member Directory after the end of Jacobin terror, then under the Empire and finally in post-Napoleonic France. Talleyrand's flexibility earned him the reputation of being a wryneck among contemporaries, and Napoleon himself dubbed him a pile of "shit in silk stockings."²⁶⁶ Nevertheless, this assessment does not change the fact that his work is virtually prototypical of strategy building with maximum efficiency and effectiveness, oriented to the power capacities of political antagonists and fully comprehending strategic goals as a flexible entity.

The *fourth* and final class of variables includes all those changeable factors that form the extended context of *strategy development and implementation*, and thus cannot be assigned to the previous three classes. In the following, we will thus talk about *contextual variables*.²⁶⁷ This section covers aspects such as public opinion, national and international macroeconomic developments (wars, revolutions, peace agreements), natural phenomena and technical disasters (floods, droughts, nuclear disasters), the aforementioned consequences of uncoordinated collective behavior (real estate collapses, recessions, depressions, mass panic) and technological innovations (printing press, gunpowder, the internet). All of these

265 Schell, Eric (2010): *Le bréviaire de Talleyrand*, Paris: Horay.

266 Cf. Scurr, Ruth (2006): He quipped while Napoleon quaked, in: Telegraph from 17th December 2006, [online] <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/3657043/He-quipped-while-Napoleon-quaked.html>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

267 These variables are also referred to as wild cards by prognostic researchers. Cf. Steinmüller, Angela and Steinmüller, Karlheinz (2004): *Wild Cards. Wenn das Unwahrscheinliche eintritt*, expanded and updated edition of 'Ungezähmte Zukunft', Hamburg: Murmann.

factors can have a positive as well as a negative impact on strategic success, but they are – with the limited exception of public opinion – generally speaking hardly predictable and difficult to influence. The meltdown of the reactor of Fukushima in 2011, for instance, proved a strategic turning point for the success of the anti-nuclear movement. Under the impact of this severe accident, the already small proportion of nuclear power supporters in Germany fell from 34% to 26% within a few weeks, while the share of the anti-nuclear force increased from 64% to 72%.²⁶⁸ The political context had changed in such a way that the strategic goal of a nuclear exit and energy transition could be implemented with the greatest possible public support.

In view of the low predictability of context variables and the difficulty of influencing them, combined with their great level of impact, two strategic principles for calculations can be identified: *exploit* and *arm*. On the one hand, successful calculations must be flexible enough to identify and exploit unforeseen contextual variables (such as the Fukushima meltdown mentioned above) as strategic opportunities. And on the other hand, they must be predictive and robust enough to avert any risk from contextual variables, or at least to mitigate it.

In summary, we can state that power actors must take account of political constants (power principles, economic laws, procedural norms, etc.) as well as four classes of variables (their own goals and potencies, the goals and potencies of allies and opponents, contextual variables, etc.). Given this complexity, it does not come as a surprise that Raschke and Tils classify strategy formation as a “great cognitive and creative challenge.”²⁶⁹ We would do well to clearly distinguish between the two aspects of this challenge, the cognitive and the creative. On the one hand, the development of a goal-oriented and efficient strategy involves immense informational effort, and it also involves the need to systematize the information collected and, in the case of variables, to keep it up-to-date. On the other hand, we have to realize that the use of this information in the form of goal-means-environment calculations is a process that is not just about induction and reflection, but also intuition. In the development of strategies, those who always navigate in accordance with plans of action that have been successful in the past, strictly adhering to them, will wind up being just as shipwrecked in the medium term as those who assume an overly intellectualistic view of the political power field. Successful calculations are always also a question of gut feeling, of power competence, of

268 WIN-Gallup International (2011): Impact of Japan Earthquake on Views about Nuclear Energy, [online] <http://www.gallup.com.pk/JapanSurvey2011/PressRelease-Japan.pdf>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

269 Raschke & Tils (2008): p. 19.

political *téchne* (see Chapter 2.5.1). Without the much-vaunted ability to dare the “new and risky,” fed by an intuitive intimacy with political power, political strategy remains predictable, uninventive and, ultimately, unsuccessful. Thus in a core element of political strategy, *épistème* and *téchne* may be seen to overlap one another. On the one hand, actors take a conscious step back from the concrete context of action in order to reflect on goals, means and conditions of success on the basis of their power knowledge. On the other hand, the final decision to make a strategic choice must nevertheless be fed by power competence which thus, as a creative impulse, breathes life into strategic thought.

Let us now turn to the fourth and final component of political strategy: strategic steering. As a guiding principle, we can state that strategies are not sure-fire successes; their realization can only be achieved through targeted practical implementation, which adapts dynamically to the requirements of the respective action contexts.²⁷⁰ Although strategies are cross-situational constructs, they are necessarily realized through sequences of actions that either proceed as planned or are influenced by unforeseen events or the actions of other protagonists of the political field (allies, opponents, neutral actors).

This circumstance brings with it two implications, Firstly, strategic steering always has a tactical component in so far as it requires a “use-oriented approach to peculiarities of the situation which falls through the – coarser – grid of strategic orientation.”²⁷¹ In short, because the implementation of a strategy can never be planned down to the last detail, the actor requires not only a strategic understanding of the field, but also a tactical sense of the specific requirements of individual situations and the ability to take them into account in the short term. This tactical sense, too, is ultimately part of the governmentality introduced at the beginning of our strategy discussion. It arises – analogous to the understanding of strategy – from a penetration of the political power field and its principles, and from reflection on its practices, habitus and interpretive horizons.

Second, strategic steering requires a continuous review of the relationship between the strategic plan and the actual situation. Those who implement strategies blindly are not only predictable, they are also unable to adequately respond to new

270 Raschke & Tils (2011: p.190) describe strategic steering as ‘dynamic navigation.’ This nautical metaphor is quite apt: on the one hand, it establishes the reference to a plan that guides action or a strategic map. On the other hand, it makes clear that the navigator must adapt to the changing, volatile conditions of the terrain and, if necessary, modify the planned route.

271 Ibid.: p. 191.

strategic challenges, such as a dramatic change in contextual variables, abandonment by a supposedly loyal ally, or a sudden slump in their own power resources.

What characterizes an adequate response depends on the severity of the strategic challenge. Raschke and Tils, for example, find that moderate strategy changes are necessary if the real-world developments differ recognizably from the envisaged plan concept that was developed diverges recognizably from developments in the real political environment; surprising interventions and changed constellations can demand that strategy actors *modify* the strategy without creating a ‘new’ one.²⁷² If in the course of implementing the strategy, the strategic variables have changed in such a way that the intended goals can no longer be reached in an efficient and effective manner, then mere modification of the strategy will not suffice. At this point, Raschke and Tils see the need to revise the strategy, i.e. for a “correction of central components of the strategic concept,”²⁷³ including a readjustment of goals and means and a repositioning within the power field. Surprisingly, this list leaves out a third option, which nevertheless is worth discussing: the abandonment of the strategy. If, in the course of practical implementation, a strategy turns out to be fundamentally wrong, either because its conception did not take into account the power resources or goals of political opponents, or because the context of realization changed unpredictably, giving up the strategic project can be a rational option. The reasons are obvious: a lost battle not only depletes the financial power of the power actor unnecessarily, but it also impairs other assets such as fame, mediation capability and networking capability. Those who cling to a doomed strategy against their better judgment lose not only the confidence of their allies, but also their credibility in the future mediation of strategic concerns. Admittedly, acknowledging strategic failure requires that power actors reflect on their own mistakes, and demands considerable courage.²⁷⁴ However, this then creates an opportunity for a fundamental improvement in one’s own strategic skills and in the cultivation of governmentality.


272 Ibid.: p. 194, our accentuation.

273 Ibid.

274 From Samuel Beckett’s novel *Worstward Ho* (1984, New York: Grove Press) comes the much-cited sentence: “Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better.” This quote has become the mantra of a new trend in debates on corporate and political leadership, focusing on the positive side of failure as a catalyst for innovation, growth and strategic change. An excellent introduction is offered by Danner, John and Coopersmith, Mark (2015): *The Other ‘F’ Word. How Smart Leaders, Teams, and Entrepreneurs Put Failure to Work*, Hoboken: Wiley.

Nonetheless, even if a strategy is successfully implemented without requiring adaptive modifications or fundamental change, a final element of strategic steering remains: the retrospective evaluation of the completed strategy – What has been achieved? With what effort? What worked and what did not work? etc. This serves to underscore the success achieved to allies and one’s own interest group. However, above all, it should also strengthen strategic foundations, improve strategy capabilities and provide an opportunity to revise possible deficits and develop advantages, finally perfecting future strategy development. Retrospective evaluation thus sets in motion a cascade of strategic improvements that permeates all aspects of the successful political strategy and initiates a reciprocal optimization of the respective components. By now it should be quite clear that the four components we distinguished – strategy foundations, strategy capabilities, strategy development and strategic steering – cannot be regarded as strictly separate but form dynamic aspects of a holistic overall complex. Understanding political strategy as a central aspect of power knowledge thus also means keeping all components simultaneously in view and considering their interdependence.

Figure 9: Interdependence of the Components of Political Strategy



The immense importance of political strategy undeniably justifies the lengthy discussion that we have devoted to this area. At this point, however, we want to draw this topic to a close. Leadership does not exhaust itself in strategic knowledge. If policymakers want to successfully design and implement policies, they must rely on motivated, loyal and competent staff or subordinates within their power structure. Determining motivation and loyalty and, on that basis, distributing positions and competences is difficult enough, but still manageable with experience and

common sense. The true crux is, at first glance, substantive expertise. This is a problem that we term the *paradox of experts*.²⁷⁵ This paradox has two parts. *Firstly*, in forming concrete opinions and decision-making, political leaders rely on recommendations from experts (health, finance, military, infrastructure, education, etc.) because they themselves lack the appropriate expertise or because the acquisition of such knowledge is too time-consuming. *Secondly*, given that the leadership lack the necessary expert knowledge, they are, *eo ipso*, not reliably able to differentiate between true experts and swashbucklers or people with partial knowledge. In short, the lack of substantive expertise makes it necessary to turn to actual experts but one must be an expert oneself to be able to recognize experts.²⁷⁶ If this paradox were correct, it would amount to a ‘catastrophe’ of leadership knowledge. So the question is, is there anything like meta-expertise and, if so, what does it consist of? If meta-expertise exists, it is the second pillar of leadership knowledge alongside strategy knowledge.

In his clever, hands-on essay *Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?* the epistemologist Alvin Goldman takes up the fight against the problem of the paradox of experts.²⁷⁷ His findings are directly relevant to our discussion. Goldman’s thesis is that even laypersons can make a well-informed choice between supposed experts if they consider a number of heuristics and cognitive criteria. The first measure is to identify potential conflict of interest or bias (prejudice and resentment, their own agenda, benefits resulting from certain policy decisions, etc.) among the supposed experts; this applies in particular when a number of persons claim to have expertise and make opposing assessments of a situation. Goldman pragmatically sums up the principle: “If two people give contradictory reports, and exactly

275 Cf. Hardwig, John (1985), Epistemic dependence, *Journal of Philosophy*, 88, pp. 693–708.

276 Of course, this paradox is already addressed in Weber ([1921] 1978). Weber insists that the modern administrative state profits above all from the knowledge advantage of its highly specialized civil servants; but he readily admits that their selection is an extremely demanding and error-prone process.

277 Cf. Goldman, Alvin (2001): *Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63, pp. 85–111. For an application of Goldman’s results to political theory, see Blum, Christian and Zuber, Christina I. (2016): Liquid Democracy: Potentials, problems, and perspectives, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 24 (2), pp. 162-182.

one of them has a good reason to lie, the relative credibility of the former is seriously compromised.²⁷⁸ The *second* criterion relates to the track record of the supposed experts. This approach is ultimately an inductive inference: the better the previous findings of the putative expert (whether successful consultations on past policy developments, concise and universally recognized reports or accurate predictions), the greater the likelihood that the person will continue to provide the right advice and guidance. The *third* criterion is perhaps the most obvious. It is based on getting the informed opinion of other experts you trust, either because you have worked with them successfully or because they meet the first two criteria above.

None of these heuristics is guaranteed to succeed, but their compliance ensures that decision-makers can gain meta-expertise without having to become experts themselves. Here, too, another factor is crucial, which is difficult to pinpoint but is best described with the key concept of insight into human nature. Experienced decision-makers who are proficient in the game of political power are often able to reliably recognize bullshitting in the sense of Frankfurt (see Chapter 2.4), because they have experienced it often enough during their long career. To be sure, this ability is not an epistemic but rather an intuitive, habitualized faculty. Accordingly, it falls primarily in the area of the first power vector, that of competence.

The notion of (bureaucratic) expert knowledge has already been mentioned several times in our discussion of meta-expertise. But now we want to turn directly to this central form of power knowledge. The most important author here is an old acquaintance for our readers: Max Weber. It is worthwhile quoting Weber's classic *Economy and Society* here in more detail in order to accentuate the importance of expert knowledge as a factor of power: "Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge. This is the feature of it that makes it specifically rational. This consists on the one hand in technical knowledge which, by itself, is sufficient to ensure it a position of extraordinary power. But in addition to this, bureaucratic organizations, or the holders of power who make use of them, have the tendency to increase their power still further by the knowledge growing out of experience in the service. For they acquire through the conduct of office a special knowledge of facts and have available a store of documentary material peculiar to themselves. While not peculiar to bureaucratic organizations, the concept of 'official secrets' is certainly typical of them.[...] It is a product of the striving for power."²⁷⁹

278 Goldman (2001): p. 104.

279 Weber ([1921] 1978): p. 225.

If we want to decompress this dense description, it makes sense to begin with the implicit distinction between leadership and expert knowledge. While leadership as we have discussed in detail is a form of how-to knowledge (*How* do you best achieve a strategic goal? *How* do you best choose people for strategically relevant tasks?), bureaucratic expertise is what-knowledge, that is, “technical knowledge” in Weber’s diction. Anyone who has such expertise, as a member of the administrative arm of the power apparatus, knows in detail *what* the content of a legislative amendment on tobacco regulation consists of, *which* specific regulations for railway tunnels by marine waters apply, what the fiscal impact of 5% tax relief for lower income groups is, etc. This is decidedly substantive knowledge with respect to a specific sub-field of the political. As Weber points out, the power potential of this knowledge arises first and foremost from its being “completely indispensable.”²⁸⁰ Governmental rule can only endure (recall here Popitz) if it is institutionalized through a process of political division of labor and specialization (see Chapter 1.2).²⁸¹ This means that the establishment of state power brings with it the establishment of a type of political specialist who, in a narrowly tailored field of knowledge, becomes an almost unrivaled expert. Because their expertise is essential for the exercise of political power, and because they are the only people with such expertise, they are indeed indispensable. In other words, the political generalists with leadership knowledge – the ‘masters’ of the political, in Weber’s somewhat antiquated terms – need the political specialists; not just to design and implement strategies, but also to keep the power apparatus itself running.

Do the political specialists also need the generalists? The crux is right here. From a political or macro perspective, leadership and expertise are obviously dependent on one another to shape political rule for the common good. But if political leaders and bureaucratic specialists are understood as potentially competing power and interest formations, each with its own habitus, practices and interpretive horizons, the situation is different. In this case, bureaucratic expertise proves to be a resource of instrumental power (see Chapter 2.1), which the bureaucracy can use in a targeted fashion against the political leadership. Let us remember: instrumental power is the ability to control other people’s behavior through credible threats or promises – in this case, by withholding indispensable specialized knowledge. Weber, whose enthusiasm for the efficiency and effectiveness of the

280 Ibid.: p. 223.

281 Cf. For an administrative-scientific perspective, see Derlien, Hans-Ulrich, Böhme, Doris, and Heindl, Markus (2011): *Bürokratietheorie. Einführung in eine Theorie der Verwaltung*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.; p. 88.

bureaucratic apparatus can be noted in every line, is nevertheless among its sharpest critics. His corollary has been included in the literature as the Independence Thesis. It states in a nutshell that due to the fundamental differences between the roles of the specialized civil servants who have their power base in expertise, and the politicians who have their power base in leadership knowledge, the two drift apart, to the extent of open antagonism and power struggle.²⁸²

This constellation is exacerbated by the ability of the independent administrative apparatus or bureaucracy (touched upon in the above quote from Weber) to classify essential knowledge as “specialist service knowledge” and, if necessary, to place it under secrecy, i.e. under the concept of “official secrets.” In their standard work on bureaucracy theory, Hans-Ulrich Derlien, Doris Böhme and Markus Heindl pinpoint this diagnosis, describing this specialist service knowledge as another possibility for the bureaucracy to withdraw from political control and thereby increase its autonomy.²⁸³ Independent of this protecting of knowledge through secrecy, another method exists to monopolize bureaucratic expertise and secure it as a power resource: the establishment of an *arcane language*. In our section on Power and Symbolism (see Chapter 2.1), we traced the potential power inherent in controlling symbolic forms and modes of communication – through the monopolization of writing by the Catholic church in the Middle Ages or the prohibition of certain written languages to oppress ethnic minorities. Bureaucratic terminology is a variant of this power technique in that it links access to decision-relevant information to the mastery of a highly technical vocabulary and, as in the case of jurisprudence, an idiosyncratic syntax. A mere glance at a memorandum from the tax office or a ministerial bill reveals the exclusionary effect of such nomenclature. Titles of bills like “Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act” are understandable for experts on the topic but laypeople – in this case, not only ordinary citizens but also those in positions of leadership – face difficulties in grasping the content.

Of course, Weber dealt with the question of what measures can be taken to combat the autonomy of the bureaucracy and the destructive antagonism between leadership and administration, naming five concrete approaches.²⁸⁴ The *first* measure is the introduction of the collegial principle, i.e. decision-making is undertaken by a collegial group and not by monocratic administrative authorities. By distributing power to an entire body of equal members, a system of mutual control is

282 Cf. Derlien, Böhme & Heindl (2011): pp. 86-89.

283 Ibid.: p. 92.

284 Cf. Derlien, Böhme & Heindl (2011): pp. 93f.; and Stachura, Mateusz (2010): Politische Führung: Max Weber heute, *Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 2-3, pp. 22-27.

established in which the actors ideally keep each other in check. The *second* option is administration by non-specialists, who, by definition, have no knowledge advantage over the management elite and thus no corresponding means of power. As a *third* means of control, Weber provides for restrictions on the designation of administrative staff – specifically short terms of office, the possibility of permanent dismissal or appointment by lot.²⁸⁵ However, these three measures pose a conflict of objectives insofar as they limit power but at the same time increase the risk of a considerable reduction in efficiency – e.g. by blocking the administration or by spreading incompetence. The *fourth* obvious means of control is to establish a strict separation of powers with an independent judiciary, in particular an administrative court that can review and overturn decisions made by the civil service.

Nevertheless, for Weber the fifth and decisive factor is sovereign and responsible political leadership itself. For him, success here consists not only of charisma and the gift of inspiration, but equally of the idea of personal responsibility and the sincere representation of potentially unpopular positions that are perceived as being right. A leadership figure who unites Weber's famous triad of personality traits – "Passion - Responsibility - Judgement" – not only arouses loyalty within the bureaucratic power apparatus, but also wins the respect of potential adversaries and popular support. This, of course, is no longer a question of power knowledge, but of the power competence.²⁸⁶ At this point, therefore, the mutual dependence of our power vectors is shown once more.

Summing up, it can be stated that expert knowledge is both a decisive power resource and an important form of power knowledge. On the one hand, it is an indispensable basis for stable power in a highly specialized structure of power-reinforced social positions; on the other hand, it plays a role in the competitive struggle between the political leadership and the administration, which must be contained and channeled through control mechanisms and leadership qualities.

2.5.3 Instruments of Power and Organization

Turning now to the *third and final* vector, we address the instruments of power. As we mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 2.5, instruments of power constitute the objective, external side of political power, while power competence and power

285 Interestingly enough, in the current debate of political theory lotteries are enjoying renewed interest, cf. Alexander Guerrero's (2014) influential post, Alexander (2014): *The Lottocracy*, [online] <https://aeon.co/essays/forget-voting-it-s-time-to-start-choosing-our-leaders-by-lottery>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

286 Cited according to Stachura (2010): p. 26.

knowledge constitute the subjective, internal side. Accordingly, instruments of power are tools for the exercising, expansion and consolidation of power which actors may have at their disposal but which are not intrinsically linked to those actors. However, the quality and scope of these instruments are decisive for how successfully actors can use their expertise and knowledge at all. Based on this definition, two categories of instruments can be distinguished: *artifacts*, i.e. man-made objects, and *social organizations*.²⁸⁷

The most basic form of artifacts used to enforce power since the beginning of history are weapons. From Bronze Age spears and chariots, to modern assault rifles, nuclear warheads and malware, weapons have always combined the power of action and instrumental power (see Chapter 2.1). By exponentially increasing the human ability to damage or destroy living beings – be they other humans or livestock – and infrastructure, they also represent a threat to internal and external enemies. The sovereignty of a state exercising a monopoly on violence cannot be enforced without weapons.²⁸⁸ The notion of a pacifist utopia is rendered unrealistic by, on the one hand, the recognition that not all members of a community are intrinsically motivated to comply with legal norms and, on the other hand, by the insight summarized by Hans Morgenthau that “[i]nternational politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”²⁸⁹ As long as not all citizens become saints

287 For an overview of the instrumental foundations of political power that overlaps with our approach, see Warren, T. Camber (2014): Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty, *International Organization*, 68 (1), pp. 111-141.; pp. 113-117. An alternative but quite readable overview can be found in Worley, D. Robert (2015): *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.; pp. 227-241.

288 This insight is clearly expressed in the well-known Mao (1938) quote: “Every Communist must grasp this truth: Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”, Mao Tse-tung (1983): *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. II*, [online] <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/>, retrieved from Marxist Internet Archive on 16th April 2018.

289 Morgenthau, Hans ([1948] 1978): *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Knopf.; p. 29.

and the multipolar world of rival states does not develop into a world republic, weapons will remain a cornerstone of power.²⁹⁰

The practical consequence of this principle is that rulers – whether in the form of democratically elected governments, monarchs, or oligarchical governing bodies – must have *de facto* control over the use of the (police and military) weapons of the community.²⁹¹ Otherwise, both their internal monopoly of force and their external authority are void. This principle is impressively clear in the recent history of Turkey: a total of four times – in the years 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 – the military, sworn to support the founder of the state Kemal Atatürk, has disempowered the democratically elected governments of the Turkish Republic. Each time, the generals declared they were protecting Atatürk’s secular ideology, and each time the political Islam-oriented governments were powerless in the face of the armed intervention. That changed in July 2016, when high-ranking officers attempted to overthrow the government again – this time under the AKP-President Erdoğan. In this case, the political leaders succeeded in repelling the coup d’état, and in the following months they decisively weakened the military. The events of 2016 are historically far from over, but there are two lessons to be learned from more than 50 years of Turkish coup history. First, it would be a misjudgment to assume that any democratic government ever held power in Turkey before Erdoğan. Power, in the sense of control over the weapons of the country, had been exercised by the military. Second, the AKP has undertaken the historical achievement of wresting from the military the power instrument of actual control of weap-

290 In her essay “Moral Saints”, the philosophies of Susan Wolf also propose the provocative but thoroughly readable thesis that a society of moral saints is not only unrealistic, but also undesirable, because it clashes with our central notions of successful life; see: Wolf, Susan (1982): Moral Saints, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 79 (8), pp. 419-439. On the idea of the World Republic see Kant, Immanuel ([1795] 2003): *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, translated by Ted Humphrey, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

291 We are restricting discussion to the control of police and military weapons because many states – such as the USA, Switzerland, Canada and Germany – are apparently in a position to authorize the possession of private weapons and nonetheless to maintain a monopoly of force. The key is to restrict particularly powerful weapons (fully automatic weapons, rockets and grenade launchers, etc.) and weapon systems (tanks, fighter pilots and helicopters, etc.). In Germany, for example, this is i.a. governed by the War Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz KrWaffKontrG). The US pendant is the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 22 U.S.C. Chapter 39 § 2751.

ons and thereby established a necessary – though obviously insufficient – condition for representative popular rule.²⁹² In short, the AKP government not only recognized the indispensable significance of this instrument of power, but it has also successfully seized the opportunity to exploit it.

Now, of course, the question arises whether, beyond the rule of thumb, “If you want to rule, then control the weapons” there is another practical principle for this class of power artifacts. The school of the so-called political realists around Morgenthau (cited above) opts for the simple principle: the more the better. The suggestion is that rulers are always well-advised to arm their services and to continuously advance the innovation of all types of weapon in order to be optimally poised in the global power struggle and – we hasten to add – in the struggle against the internal enemies of their own states as well. This maxim, which had its heyday from the beginning to the middle of the twentieth century, was often criticized in following years, and not without justification.²⁹³ The arming of the state internally and externally does not necessarily create an improved position of power and more security, and it arouses, above all, mutual distrust and thus the risk of violent escalations. In the light of this criticism, the idea of a universal maxim of armament (the more the better!) fails to convince. Instead, the question must always be context-dependent – i.e. with regard to the external and internal level of threat and the other power capacities of the actor concerned (for example, authoritative power and technical power, see Chapter 2.1).

The second power artifact is *means of communication*. The significance of this instrument of power has already been discussed in detail in our section on Power and Symbolism (Chapter 2.2). Therefore, we will be brief and restrict ourselves principally to a recapitulation of what has already been said. Basically, complex political action in cooperation with other people over a considerable period and greater distances requires remote communication and appropriate vehicles for the transmission of commands and information. Otherwise, the exercise of power remains limited in time and space. In addition, the specialized structure of power

292 We speak of a necessary, but not sufficient condition of representative popular rule, because additional criteria such as fair political competition and press freedom must supplement civil and political control of weapons. Both requirements are currently not sufficiently fulfilled in Turkey; see Freedom House (2016): Turkey, [online] <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/turkey>, retr. on 21.12.2017.; and Göl, Ayla (2017): The paradoxes of ‘new’ Turkey: Islam, Illiberal Democracy and Republicanism, *International Affairs*, 93 (4), pp. 957-966.

293 See also March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1989): *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, London/New York: The Free Press.

with its complex hierarchy of responsibilities divided between political specialists and generalists requires a continuous flow of communication in order to function at all. Accordingly, since the age of the Sumerians, means of long-distance communication comprise one of the necessary foundations of political power.

These means of communication must meet three central, partially conflicting quality standards: speed, differentiation of content, and security. The requirement of speed is quickly explained. For the coherent and flexible exercising of power within large territories, means of communication between geographically distant broadcasters and recipients must ensure an exchange that is as smooth as possible. Between the legendary run of Pheidippides, who sped by foot from Marathon to Athens to bring the message of the Attic victory over the Persians, and nanosecond messaging via email or instant messaging are two and a half thousand years of technological innovation – and an exponential growth in the importance of communication tools as instruments of power. The second criterion of contentual differentiation means nothing more than that the means of communication can transport the informational content of the intended message as adequately as possible. For instance, smoke and fire signals may have had immense merits in terms of speed and bridging distance prior to the invention of the telegraph – their early perfection was already evident in the construction of the Great Wall in the fifth century BC,²⁹⁴ but obviously they drastically limited the possible content of the messages. Although the conflict between speed and differentiation of content has been largely defused in the age of digital communication, this innovative thrust has made the third criterion of security dramatically more important and, above all, more challenging. As we have shown in our section on data power (see Chapter 2.3), opportunities to transmit extremely large amounts of data extremely quickly exist as never before in the age of the Internet. However, the technical opportunities and capacities for data extraction by enemy powers are also greater than ever. The resulting security pressure on means of communication creates a practical paradox: the effective protection of vital information, e.g. through blockchains, hermetic intranets or tap-proof ‘crypto-phones,’ often comes at great expense in terms of speed.²⁹⁵ The increase in communicative speed provided by digital innovation is directly challenged by these risks. Again, there is no universal maxim in

294 Cf. Turnbull, Stephen (2007): *The Great Wall of China. 221 BC–AD 1644*, London: Osprey Publishing.; p. 14.

295 The term ‘blockchain’ refers to the storage and backup of data over a decentralized peer-to-peer network with countless users. The purpose of this decentralized backup mechanism is to ensure that the data is ideally protected against hacks, tampering and unauthorized copies; see. Kiyaias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos (2016): Speed-

terms of balancing speed and security. The concrete decision remains a question of political judgment and thus falls into the domain of power competence and power knowledge.

Not surprisingly, in light of the preceding discussion, the third power artifact is surveillance technology, understood by us as outwardly and inwardly directed methods and instruments for collecting, systematizing and evaluating power-relevant information about individuals and organizations.²⁹⁶ In relation to external powers, such as competing states, confederations of states, global companies or international terror groups, these instruments are used to gain insights into strategic goals, power capacities and technologically sensitive information (keyword industry espionage) and serve, among other things, the preparation of risk forecasts and international conflict scenarios. As we discussed in Chapter 2.3, foreign intelligence services increasingly fall back on the possibilities of big data. The foundation of this so-called ‘dataveillance’ is the storage and algorithm-based analysis of digitized data available worldwide (IP addresses, e-mails, search queries, credit card debits, tweets, etc.). Due to the detailed discussion of the topic elsewhere, we will not go into the technological perspectives of external surveillance here.

In the area of domestic policy, surveillance technology, in the words of the sociologist James B. Rule, acts as a “means of knowing when rules are obeyed, when they are broken and most importantly who is responsible for which [...] A second element of surveillance, also indispensable, is the ability to locate and identify those responsible for misdeeds of some kind.”²⁹⁷ Surveillance technology, however, is not simply a means of verifying and sanctioning violations of the rules, e.g. through speed cameras on highways or security cameras in subways, in order to stabilize the structure of power and its norms. It is also, as Michel Foucault has pointed out in his classic work *Discipline and Punish*, a most effective

Security Tradeoffs in Blockchain Protocols, Working Paper, [online] <https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1019.pdf>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

296 It is important to keep an eye on methods – i.e. certain social techniques and patterns of organization – and technological tools. Both together constitute the corresponding instrument of power. See the volume by Mohanan, Torin (ed.) (2006): *Surveillance and Security. Technological Politics and Power in Everyday Life*, New York: Routledge.; Dandeker, Christopher (1990): *Surveillance, Power and Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.; and Rule, James B. (1973): *Private Lives and Public Surveillance*, London: Allen Lane.

297 Rule, James (1973): p. 21f.

means of discipline.²⁹⁸ Discipline in Foucault's sometimes abstract diction is "the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise."²⁹⁹ This means, in concrete terms, that discipline both teaches the members of a community to voluntarily accept a socio-political order and also motivates them to exercise control over one another. However, "The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that *coerces by means of observation*; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion make those on whom they are applied clearly visible. [...] Side by side with the major technology of the telescope, the lens and the light beam, which were an integral part of the new physics and cosmology, there were the minor techniques of multiple and intersecting observations, of eyes that must see without being seen, using techniques of subjection and methods of exploitation."³⁰⁰ The nexus between discipline and surveillance technology becomes obvious in this way: through the continuous anticipation of surveillance – be it by machines or fellow human beings – on the one hand there arises an individual need to demonstrate that one has nothing to hide and, on the other hand, there is an impulse to report rule-breakers in order to actively demonstrate one's own compliance. Foucault studied these mechanisms using the example of modern prison camps. However, he emphasizes the reflection of this principle "in urban development and in the construction of working-class housing estates, hospitals, asylums, prisons, schools."³⁰¹ in short, everywhere in modern society. However, in 1975 – the original year of publication of the French version of *Discipline and Punish* – not even this great theorist of power could have imagined the extent to which "techniques of multiple and intersecting surveillance" would spread. More than 40 years later, mass surveillance is one of the standard repertoires of instruments of power, even in liberal democracies. Britain is at the forefront, with up to 5.9 million surveillance cameras estimated by the British Security Industry Authority in 2013; this would correspond to a ratio of one camera per eleven people.³⁰² Since the introduction of the Investigatory Power Bill at the end of 2016, this arsenal has been flanked by comprehensive digital

298 Cf. Foucault (1995).

299 Ibid.: p. 170.

300 Ibid.: p. 171, our accentuation.

301 Ibid.

302 Cf., Vincent, James (2016): The UK now wields unprecedented surveillance powers – here's what it means, in: The Verge from 29th November 2016, [online] <https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/23/13718768/uk-surveillance-laws-explained-in-vestigatory-powers-bill>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

surveillance, which includes the storing of any website visited by a British citizen in a central archive.³⁰³ Despite serious interference with privacy rights, this law has so far encountered little resistance; instead, experts see it as a harbinger of similar developments in other liberal democracies.³⁰⁴

The fourth and final artifact we want to talk about is *mass media*.³⁰⁵ In the coupling of the terms political power and mass media, some readers may make immediate associations with totalitarian regimes and their propaganda machines; the notorious KpdSU, Pravda and the National Socialist Volksempfänger come to mind. But mass media – regardless whether newspapers, radio stations, TV channels or social media – is as central an instrument of power in a liberal constitutional state as in a dictatorship. The reason for this lies in the amalgamation of mass media with an essential form of power, as discussed by Popitz, to which we already referred in Chapter 2.1: authoritative power. A reminder: unlike the power of action or instrumental power, for example, authoritative power is not exercised through violence or by setting positive and negative incentives in the context of the existing preferences of the addressee. It rather works by influencing people’s inner attitudes and convictions. Thus from a “deliberate and acquiescent willingness to follow”, the authority-bound bow to the desires of the other and ‘fixate’ on the other as a role model. Authoritative power thus does not arise from coercion or material superiority, but from the strategic potencies of mediated capability and fame (see Chapter 2.5.2). This is precisely where political communication via mass media plays a key role, as T. Camber Warren writes in his essay *Not By the Sword Alone*: “the legitimacy of appeals to state loyalty must be spoken into existence, on the basis of images, narratives, and other symbols that at least some portion of the population are willing to accept as valid interpretations of their lived realities. It is through this ‘alchemy’ that political communication produces, maintains, and transforms prevailing visions of the political regime and the political community.”³⁰⁶ Warren’s conclusion can be formulated as a syllogism: because

303 Ibid.

304 Cf. Bernal, Paul (2016): Data Gathering, Surveillance and Human Rights: Recasting the Debate, *Journal of Cyber Policy*, 1 (2), pp. 243-264.

305 Cf. i.a. Warren (2014); Street, John (2011): *Mass Media, Politics and Democracy*, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.; Sarcinelli, Ulrich (2010): *Politische Kommunikation in Deutschland: Medien und Politikvermittlung im demokratischen System*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.; and Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam (2002): *Manufacturing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon Books.

306 Warren (2014): p. 116f.

authoritative power is central to the maintenance of domination, and because it can only be generated by communication to the largest possible audience in the community, mass media is an indispensable instrument of power.

The political significance of mass media since the invention of the printing press becomes immediately clear through a negative contrast: “[T]he most basic political impact concerns the sheer reproducibility of political messages and symbols. In the absence of mass media infrastructure, political leaders and would-be leaders must physically travel to numerous small-scale venues to disseminate their political messages. In contrast, with thousands of flickering screens dotting the hinterland, or thousands of newspapers dotting city corners, each instance of state authority-making can be instantly and effortlessly reproduced for thousands of citizens.”³⁰⁷ While without media multipliers the ritual and symbolic staging of political power in the form of elections, parades or speeches remains local, it reaches a potentially global audience in the age of the mass media. The symbolic power resource we have already emphasized is exponentially reinforced by media catalysts.

Although the logic of power behind the amalgamation of authoritative power and mass media is universal, liberal constitutional states – which form the focus of our discussion below – are dramatically different from authoritarian regimes and dictatorships in terms of control and the concrete use of these communicative catalysts. With respect to the latter, mass media serve first and foremost as a centrally-directed mouthpiece for the propaganda of their leadership elite,³⁰⁸ regarding the former, however, they serve as arenas of the competition for public opinion.³⁰⁹ In his essay *Re-shaping Public Affairs*, which deals with the mediation of interests in the so-called ‘mood democracy’, Peter Köppl concludes: “In the tough

307 Ibid.: p. 119.

308 It is noteworthy that the grand master of totalitarian propaganda and mass influence, Joseph Goebbels, was not a supporter of constant streams of propaganda. In the course of media cooptation in 1933, he complained to the Nazi directors of the “all-too-energetic politicization” of broadcasting and called for “a loosening up of the programs” based on the principle of not being boring or dull and not presenting basic convictions all too obviously (cited from Frei, Norbert and Schmitz, Johannes (1988): *Journalismus im Dritten Reich*, Munich: C.H. Beck.; p. 86). Behind this approach was the insight that totalitarian rule must always combine the elements of indoctrination with those of entertainment.

309 Cf. Peters, Hans P. (1994): Mass Media as an Information Channel and Public Arena, *RISK: Health, Safety & Environment*, 5(3), pp. 241-250.; p. 245.

daily competition for media attention more and more actors are battling one another with ever more elaborate methods.”³¹⁰ The metaphor of the battle stands for a continuous struggle for the scarce commodities of attention and interest (see also Chapter 2.5.2), which in representative democracies are central resources for the (temporary) attainment of power. In the wake of the digital revolution and with the emergence of new, continually updated forms of media (online news portals, tweets, social networks, etc.), this struggle has not only accelerated, but has also grown more complex. Obtaining attention and effectively placing messages thus becomes more and more demanding, but at the same time more prestigious. Against this background, Frank Marcinkowski’s argument is quite convincing: “As public attention becomes a leading social value and a generally applicable resource, the media visibility and journalistic resonance of demands and positions are treated as a valid indicator of their legitimacy.”³¹¹ Nevertheless, the equation of media presence with political legitimacy is a fallacy: legitimized influence and political fame, as we noted in our section on power knowledge, do not consist of attaining *sui generis* attention, but rather attention that is coupled with recognition of power competence and power knowledge. Media attention can have a disastrous outcome. In this regard, in Germany, one thinks of the notorious, swimming pool photographs of Rudolf Scharping, the Federal Minister of Defense, that appeared in the tabloid *Bunte* just before Germany’s military deployment in Macedonia in 2001. U.S. examples include the poorly ranked tributes to Rosa Parks and Kwanaa in 2016 during Hilary Clinton’s campaign, as pursued on Twitter, or Mitt Romney in the 2012 press conference for the election campaign, as reporters who attempted to interview the Republican presidential candidate were thwarted. Moreover, the Trump Era is providing no shortage of examples in this respect.

Indeed, attention, like the instrument of power of the mass media, is a double-edged sword, and its handling requires symbolic dexterity, power instinct and – of course – media competence.

The classification of mass media as a competitive arena for media attention harbors the risk of a misunderstanding which we want to decisively preclude. The expression could give the impression of a neutral venue for interpretive struggle, but of course that would be far from reality. Newspaper publishers, social media

310 Köppl, Peter (2017): *Advanced Power Lobbying. Erfolgreiche Public Affairs in Zeiten der Digitalisierung*, Wien: Linde Verlag.; p. 247.

311 Marcinkowski, Frank (2015): ‘Die Medialisierung’ der Politik. Veränderte Bedingungen politischer Interessenvermittlung, in: Rudolf Speth and Anette Zimmer (eds.), *Lobby Work. Interessenvertretung als Politikgestaltung*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 71-95.; p. 89.

portals and TV stations have their own political and economic goals. Accordingly, they affect the political field both through reporting and investigation, and by giving a prominent forum to certain messages, persons and institutions, while denying others access. Ulrich Sarcinelli, the doyen of German communication science, aptly described this reciprocal relationship, noting that politics and the media need each other. Mass media are not a constitutional power (such as executive, legislature and judiciary) in their own right. Rather, they stand in a symbiotic relation towards the political apparatus. Politics needs publicity – it largely lacks its own means of communication and uses the mass media as a platform. For their part, the various media seek proximity to politics because they are interested in exclusive and continuously flowing information.³¹² Shaping this symbiotic relationship to serve one's own interests is still one of the most demanding strategic leadership tasks of all. With this interim conclusion we want to conclude the discussion of the power artifacts and turn to the field of social organizations.

It is immediately obvious that, like artifacts, social organizations are central instruments of power and domination. Organizations pool knowledge, skills and resources, create synergies and, above all, facilitate the coordinated actions of thousands – in the case of large armed forces or authorities, hundreds of thousands – of people to pursue political goals. In the hands of skilled power actors, analogous to power artifacts, they can be used as highly effective tools of interest enforcement. Much of what can be said about social organizations as instruments of power is already mirrored in our discussion of the power artifacts. In the following, we focus on a few highlights.³¹³ An important categorization is, however, required: a differentiation between *formal* and *informal* forms of organization. The former are characterized by an official, codified structure of rules and clear hierarchies of responsibilities with a corresponding distribution of roles and tasks, whereas the latter are constituted by unofficial agreements between the persons involved and implicit norms.³¹⁴ Both are equally relevant as instruments of power; we want to start with discussion of formal organizational forms.

Corresponding to the power artifact of weapons discussed above, the focus is first on the two polar types of organization that use force, the *military* and the

312 Sarcinelli (2010): p. 302.

313 Sarcinelli (2010): p. 302.

314 We will therefore focus on those social instruments of power that are fundamental to all forms of rule rather than those that are linked to specific political systems.

police.³¹⁵ Although both are characterized by the use of armed action power as an essential feature, their functional distinction is based on the difference between internal and external security. Police authorities, historically far younger than military organizations,³¹⁶ are responsible for law enforcement, internal security and crime prevention in the broadest sense. The military is responsible for deterring enemy aggression and warfare. According to this division of tasks, both organizations differ in terms of potential action and armament: the use of lethal action power is the *ultima ratio* for the police if all other forms of power of action are inadequate; for the military, on the other hand, it is the *sola ratio*, the only means. Of course, power actors have blurred or set aside this clear distinction between police and military, between internal and external, throughout history. The reasons given for this are usually the (supposed) intermingling of internal and external security interests and an overlapping of areas of responsibility. The corresponding hybrid form of police and military is the *paramilitary*, understood as a highly armed organization, which is trained and used both for warfare and for the fight against crime. Historical examples include the *Cheka*, founded in 1917 by Vladimir Lenin (short for: Extraordinary All-Russian Commission to Combat Counterrevolution, Speculation and Sabotage), and the *Schutzstaffel* (SS) founded by Adolf Hitler in 1925, which acted as an agency of repression and terror within Germany and German-occupied Europe and fought as combat units at the front.

For obvious reasons, the police and military (and paramilitary) are essential instruments of power: they consolidate political power both internally and externally by embodying and realizing the state's monopoly on the use of force. As already mentioned above, organized power of action offers huge potential for abuse, ranging from arbitrary policing to militarily organized genocide. However, due to our descriptive focus on analysis (see introduction), we will not pursue this

315 Cf. Geser, Hans (1996): Internationale Polizeiaktionen: Ein neues evolutionäres Entwicklungsstadium militärischer Organisationen, in: Georg-Maria Meyer (ed.), *Friedensengel im Kampfanzug? Zur Theorie und Praktik militärischer UN-Einsätze*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 45-74.; p. 45.

316 As we explained in our discussion of power competence (see Chapter 2.5.1), there was no dedicated police force in the Imperium Romanum, nor in the political order of the Middle Ages. Police authorities, as we know them, only emerge in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; see e.g. Spencer, Elaine G. (1985): Police-Military Relations in Prussia, 1848-1914, *Journal of Social History*, 19 (2), pp. 305-317.

genuinely ethical issue; the work of peace and conflict research as well as applied military and police ethics offer comprehensive orientation.³¹⁷

From a practical point of view, the organized power of action of the police and military poses a potential dilemma for power actors: on the one hand, it is indispensable for the consolidation of power, and it should therefore be in their interest to strengthen these organizations as comprehensively as possible. On the other hand, history teaches us that strengthening the human and material capacities of armed organizations often encourages their political independence and development into a “state within a state”.³¹⁸ For the political leadership, therefore, it appears rational not only to strictly and consistently restrict organized action power, but also to keep highly ambitious individuals away from leadership positions – just think of the repeatedly mentioned Napoleon. No matter which horn of the dilemma is chosen, there are negative effects: either the heightened danger of military and police coups or the diminished clout of the respective organizations.³¹⁹ Of course, this conflict of objectives does not have to be manifested to the extent described. Pronounced power competence and power knowledge undoubtedly favor the development of lasting loyalty among a country’s armed forces, and the same applies to moral codes. Nonetheless, the dilemma described remains a structural political risk and thus a permanent strategic challenge.

Corresponding to the power artifacts of surveillance technologies and communication channels, the second form of organization we discuss is that of foreign and domestic intelligence. The historical roots of these instruments of power are almost as old as those of the military. The early empires of the Near and Middle East – Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria and above all Persia – based their political power

317 Cf. The excellent monograph McMahan, Jeff (2011): *Killing in War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

318 Cf. Singh, Naunihal (2014): *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

319 For example, from 1937 on, Stalin’s concern over the undisputed power of the Red Army in the USSR led him to subject the ruling elite of the army to a brutal cleansing wave. One of his first victims was the gifted strategist Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, known as the ‘red Napoleon.’ Stalin’s purges proved to be a double-edged sword: on the one hand he was able to contain the military, on the other hand the blood toll significantly reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army in the war against Germany. Cf. Bullock, Alan (1992): *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives*, 1st American edition, New York: Knopf.; and Reese, Roger R. (2000): *The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army 1917-1991*, Warfare and History, London/New York : Routledge.

on intelligence services; specifically on field spies, secret couriers and centrally directed spy networks in conquered provinces.³²⁰ In his monograph on the history of the secret services, the historian Wolfgang Krieger demonstrates that their tasks have remained largely constant since ancient times:³²¹ obtaining information about opponents (but also about partners and allies); covertly influencing foreign powers and their own population (keyword: fake news, see Chapter 2.3); shielding one's own apparatus of power against secret service attacks; and penetration of opposing intelligence services (i.e. counterintelligence).

As the political scientist Harry H. Ransom notes, the power-strategic relevance of this range of tasks and functions is evident: "control of secret information provides the leverage for political power."³²² Anyone who controls a powerful intelligence apparatus has exclusive access to potent (political, economic, military, but also personal) information about foreign and domestic opponents and thus a strategic advantage over those who are not equally informed. At the same time, they possess a means of power that is "less visible than police and military" due to the covert operations of the secret services.³²³ Nevertheless, the use of intelligence services creates a similar dilemma as that found in the context of organized action power: "Intelligence agencies are simultaneously a *resource* and *liability* to nation-states. They provide essential services for the protection of the society and its citizens, but invariably become large, entrenched and secretive state bureaucracies."³²⁴ Because 'secrecy', a lack of transparency and defense against external

320 Michael Andregg speaks, with a suggestive wink, of the second oldest profession. Cf. Andregg, Michael (2007): *Intelligence Ethics: Laying a Foundation for the Second Oldest Profession*, in: Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, New York: Routledge, pp. 52-66.

321 Cf. Krieger, Wolfgang (2009): *Geschichte der Geheimdienste: von den Pharaonen zur CIA*, Munich: C.H. Beck.; pp. 13f. Similarly also: Johnson, Loch K. (1998): *Secret Agencies: US Intelligence in a Hostile World*, New Haven: Yale University Press.; pp. 3f.; Ransom, Harry H. (1980): Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence, *American Political Science Review*, 74 (1), pp. 141-148.; and Crowdy, Terry (2011): *The Enemy Within – A History of Spies, Spymasters and Espionage*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

322 Ransom (1980): p. 147.

323 Krieger (2009): p. 9.

324 Joffe, Alexander H. (1999): Dismantling intelligence agencies, *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 32, pp. 325–346.; p. 325; our emphasis.

influences are part of the day-to-day business of the secret services, controlling and monitoring them becomes a particular problem.³²⁵

Most democratic constitutional states have established specific supervisory and sanctioning mechanisms for this purpose. These include intelligence inspectorates, which act as an interface between the civilian legislative and judicial organs and the services and monitor whether government decisions are adequately implemented, and also parliamentary institutions with special powers, such as the Parliamentary Control Panel (PKGr) of the German Bundestag or the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) of the US House of Representatives.

Totalitarian and authoritarian systems often choose a different path, which can best be described as a system of intelligence checks and balances. It involves the establishment of competing and controlling parallel structures. Under Saddam Hussein, for example, Iraq had a dozen secret services and secret police, who sought the potentate's favor and tried to discredit each other; the situation is similar to this day in Syria or in the Palestinian autonomous regions.

Of course, control has its price – in both cases. The creation of parallel structures and the climate of mutual spying and mistrust that results from them are inefficient; the procedure paralyzes the apparatus. The establishment of civilian political enforcement bodies and the enforcement of (at least selective) transparency create potential security gaps and increase the risk of 'leaks.' In the context of the instruments of power, the primary concern is to be aware of the continuous challenge posed by these conflicting objectives. A universal solution seems implausible given the many strategic variables that may be relevant to the trade-off process.

Another challenge is quoted by Ransom in his entertaining and literally "intelligent" essay *Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence*, authored in the late phase of the Cold War: "Intelligence systems tend to report what they think the political leadership wants to hear."³²⁶ Other than his decades of experience as a US security expert, the author provides no empirical evidence for this provocative thesis. But

325 This is particularly the case in liberal democracies, as Leigh (2007: p. 67) aptly puts it, "the basic problem is easily stated: how to provide for democratic control of a governmental function and institutions which are essential for the survival and flourishing of the state but which must operate to a certain extent in justifiable secrecy". Cf. Leigh, Ian (2007): *The Accountability of Security and Intelligence Agencies*. in: Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, New York: Routledge, pp. 67-81.; p. 67.

326 Ransom (1980): p. 147.

the blatant inability of Western intelligence agencies to predict the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the 1980s can at least serve as anecdotal evidence. In any case, the risk highlights the importance of a specific form of leadership knowledge which we discussed in Chapter 2.5.2: meta-expertise. The effective leadership of intelligence instruments of power requires the ability to select and direct personnel who are not only loyal and trustworthy, but who also willing to critically question and challenge established political narratives – in the case of the Cold War, for example, the continuity of a struggle between two stable ideological blocs.

The third form of organization relevant to power is the *bureaucracy*, here understood as a collective term for the state administrative apparatus. We have already discussed this topic in detail under the term bureaucratic expert knowledge (see Chapter 2.5.2). In the context of instruments of power, however, it can be emphasized that the connection between power and administration is already implicit in the etymology of the word ‘bureaucracy’, which is an idiosyncratic and (originally pejorative) compound from the French *bureau*, standing figuratively for administrative activity, and the Greek verb *kratein*, which can be understood as ‘rule’ or ‘power.’ Bureaucracy refers to the exercising of power through the means of administration.

This combination is immediately obvious insofar as the public administration has the core task of organizing the structure of rule and its division of labor and implementing, substantiating and applying the guidelines and objectives authorized by the political leadership (laws, ordinances, budgetary decisions, trade agreements, etc.). Logically, the social scientist Renate Mayntz states that “in all types of rule the administrative body serves to safeguard political rule and to guarantee the enforcement of their objectives.”³²⁷ Mayntz, with her reference to the universality of the bureaucracy as an instrument of power, should be taken at her word. The general development of centered territorial rule, referring once again back to Popitz, is inconceivable without financial and tax authorities, trade inspectorates, road construction offices, census records etc. This principle applies at all times, whether in the Roman Republic, in the Ottoman Empire or in a modern nation state.

An impressive example of the significance, but also critical nature, of the administrative apparatus for maintaining and expanding power is provided by the early phase of the Islamic caliphate under the Abbasid dynasty in the eighth and

327 Mayntz, Renate (1985): *Soziologie der öffentlichen Verwaltung*, 3rd revised edition, Heidelberg: C.F. Müller.; p. 42.

ninth centuries.³²⁸ After the explosive, military expansion under the Prophet Mohammed and his successors, the Muslim empire extended from North Africa to today's Afghanistan. The undisputed brilliance of the Arab conquerors on the battlefield, however, stood in blatant contrast to their inability to politically control and administer their newly gained empire. However, the pragmatic caliphs knew how to proceed: they delegated all administrative tasks to the Persian bureaucratic elite, who had previously been militarily subjugated and converted and whose leaders have gone down in history as 'viziers.'³²⁹ These viziers implemented a well thought-out, Persian-style administrative system with individual councils (divans) for the army, for finances and taxes, for the post office and for the provinces; the state revenues were precisely regulated and accounted for.³³⁰ In addition, they established a system of communication in the Abbasid Empire. This was supplemented by carrier pigeon post and a system of watch and signal towers, which, as the Orientalist Bertold Spuler notes, also served as the central government's intelligence and surveillance body.³³¹ The dependence of the Arab political leadership on the Persian administrative specialists went so far that the legendary Caliph Harun ar-Rashid felt it necessary to comment desperately: "The Persians have ruled for a millennium, without needing us [the Arabs] for a day, and we now reign for centuries without being able to do without them for an hour."³³² In fact, the recourse to the Persian bureaucrats proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the Abbasid Empire experienced an unprecedented economic, scientific and cultural heyday that experts classify as the golden age of Islam.³³³ On the other hand, administrators used their political indispensability for the gradual strength-

328 Cf. Spuler, Bertold (1959): *Die Chalifenzeit. Entstehung und Zerfall des islamischen Weltreichs*, Leiden: Brill.

329 Cf. Farazmand, Ali (2001): Learning from Ancient Persia: Administration of the Persian Achaemenid Empire, in: Ali Farazmand (ed.), *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration*, New York/Basel: Marcel Dekker, pp. 33-60.

330 Spuler (1959): p. 55.

331 Ibid.

332 Translated from Spuler (1959: p. 55). This account is, from a contemporary perspective, hardly exaggerated, as Ali Farazmand notes: "The fall of the Persian Empire to the Islamic Arabs in 651 A.D. did not result in the demise of Persian administrative excellence. [...] The Persian bureaucracy continued its long tradition with its own language and culture [...]. This happened particularly during the Abbasid Caliphate which was totally Persianized and under Persian control.", Farazmand (2001): p. 55.

333 Cf. for example Lombard, Maurice (1975): *The Golden Age of Islam*, New York: American Elsevier.

ening of their position at the court of Baghdad – to the point of a factual takeover after which the caliphs finally acted only as the symbolic leaders of the empire.

The fall of the Abbasid Empire is a historical lesson for the sociologist Max Weber's Thesis of Independence, which we have already discussed. He states in a nutshell that administrative specialists can use their expertise and the corresponding organizational structures as a power resource to decouple the administrative apparatus from the control of the political leadership. This separation need not, as in the case of the caliphate, lead to open usurpation. It can also (just) lead to tension within the power structures between the goal-setting, political power formation and the implementing, administrative power formation – and thus to the immobilization of the political system. The institutional mechanisms for protecting against these tendencies, as outlined in Chapter 2.5.2, do not require repetition here. For Weber and other experts of bureaucracy, the decisive factor remains sovereign and responsible political leadership.

The last formally organized, social instrument of power that we wish to address at this point is also the most obvious one: the party. From the very beginning, the history of the political is also a history of organizations that manifest an open aspiration to power – not just the support of power, as in the case of the military, police, intelligence and administration, but claiming legitimacy and expertise and competing with other organizations.

An early manifestation of this type of organization, which we discussed in Chapter 2.5.1, can be seen in the patrician families of the Roman Republic. Through their organizational structure, which is hierarchically tailored to the *pater familias*, their rigorous training system geared towards the acquisition of power, their political ethos, and their commitment to the *bonum commune*, these dynasties already embody the decisive characteristics of this instrument of power. Their genesis and their success are due to a basic logic of the political field: the open aspiration to legitimized rule can only be achieved in a network of like-minded, loyal, specialized experts – today one speaks of professional politicians. Lone fighters, as well as unorganized masses, will inevitably fail to achieve their goal. We have also discussed later manifestations of this type: for example, the noble families of the European Middle Ages or the Japanese warrior caste of the *bushi*. They all share the character of a structured and highly professional elite class whose sole purpose is to directly determine the activities of the government in line with their political goals.

The political party according to our understanding, is therefore ultimately only the modern (democratic) incarnation of a historically far older type of organization. Still, it is the focus of our further analysis, because as a tool of power it shapes the political structure and culture of contemporary communities. Historically, the

concept of the party emerged only in eighteenth-century England, which was something of a special case among European nations with a constitutional monarchy and an independent parliament.³³⁴ Accordingly, the earliest definitions come from the pen of the English philosopher Edmund Burke: “Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the *national interest* upon some *particular principle* in which they are all agreed.”³³⁵ The sociologist Jasmin Siri precisely identifies the internal tension inherent in this still-valid concept, suggesting that the party is an “instrument for enforcing particular interests on the one hand and [...] responsible for the common good on the other”.³³⁶ This pinpoints the central challenge for this form of organization. As it fights for temporary rule in a representative democracy – parliamentary majorities – it has to campaign for votes, taking into account both the particular concerns of its own interest formation and the general public. Taking up the etymological root of the word ‘party’, it must function as *pars pro toto*. In order to meet this challenge, the political parties have gradually developed into highly professional power apparatuses over the past 300 years. Their organization fulfills a number of core functions that are indispensable to the goal of power acquisition: recruiting, indoctrinating, specializing, selecting – ruling. Specifically, this means that parties are constantly recruiting (for example through youth organizations), ideologically consolidating their recruits through training and providing them with knowledge in order to select those whose competence, knowledge, will and willingness to undergo sacrifice renders them suitable as political leaders. Parties must endure a constant tension between loyalty and competition. On the one hand, they can only be powerful candidates for democratically legitimized rule if they can, with one accord, embody a specific set of values, interests and interpretive horizons of the common good and practice coherent, conflict-free politics for the realization of their objectives. On the other hand, they can only survive in the competition over political ideas if they have the best possible leadership personnel; and this can only be achieved through internal competitive pressure and consideration of the principle of merit.

Of course, the political party as an instrument of power is not a unique feature of democratic systems, nor necessarily linked to the decision-making mechanism

334 Cf. Siri, Jasmin (2012): *Parteien. Zur Soziologie einer politischen Form*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS.; p. 33.

335 Burke, Edmund ([1770] 2002): Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, in: Susan E. Scarrow (ed.), *Perspectives on Political Parties*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 37-43.; p. 39; our emphasis added.

336 Siri (2012): p. 33.

of free elections or parliamentarism. For instance, party organizations also played and play a central role in fascist and socialist dictatorships, such as the CPSU in the Soviet Union or the Nazi Party in the Third Reich. Remarkably, even in non-democratic systems, the functional logic of this power instrument is quite analogous to that of democratic parties. This is impressively demonstrated by Lenin's theory of communist parties, which is summarized in his work *What is to be done?*: "I assert: (1) that no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organisation of leaders maintaining continuity; (2) that the broader the popular mass drawn spontaneously into the struggle, which forms the basis of the movement and participates in it, the more urgent the need for such an organisation, and the more solid this organisation must be (for it is much easier for all sorts of demagogues to side-track the more backward sections of the masses); (3) that such an organisation must consist chiefly of people professionally engaged in revolutionary activity; (4) that in an autocratic state, the more we confine the membership of such an organisation to people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to unearth the organisation; and (5) the greater will be the number of people from the working class and from the other social classes who will be able to join the movement and perform active work in it."³³⁷ It is remarkable with what compactness here the aspects of political professionalization and elitism are combined with the functions of recruitment, training and selection. Behind this is Lenin's insight, which can be transferred to democratic states, that the acquisition and exercise of power in modern territorial states with millions of inhabitants can only be successful if it is carried out by a specialized party apparatus run by professional politicians which reproduces itself through the continuous recruitment of new elites.

In addition to formal organizations such as parties, the police, the military or the administration, *informal networks* constitute the second major pillar of social instruments of power. The notion of informal social networks covers an extremely broad range of personal connections.³³⁸ It ranges from mere acquaintanceships, which are occasionally refreshed, to firm and intimate friendships; and it covers both the smallest groups of people as well as large, unofficial associations. In spite of this heterogeneity, these groups share two qualities that make them relevant as

337 Lenin, Vladimir I.: ([1902] 1989): *What is to be Done?*, transcription by Tim Delaney, printable edition produced by Chris Russell for the Marxists Internet Archive, pp. 7-87.; p. 87.

338 Cf. Blum (2015): pp. 76f.

instruments of power, owing to which they are classified by Bourdieu (see Chapter 2.3) as *social capital*.

First, they generate and reproduce so-called *norms of generalized reciprocity*.³³⁹ This means that group members provide services to one another without anticipating that they will immediately receive something in return, but with the legitimate assumption that they can expect equivalent benefits from other members of the network in the future. These flexible conditions of co-operation, which are not exhausted in a simple *quid pro quo* relationship, are indispensable for the exercise, consolidation and expansion of political power, be it in gathering information, implementing unbureaucratic political strategies, creating political majorities before decisive votes, or forming alliances or *ad hoc* affiliations and so on. In other words, the significance of norms of generalized reciprocity arises from the fact that exercising political power would be hopelessly inefficient if all actors were to interact according to a strict ‘work-to-rule’ principle or if their willingness to cooperate was dependent solely on immediate benefits.

The second relevant feature of informal networks is that they create *social trust*, depending on the intensity of personal connections.³⁴⁰ Members accordingly make no (or little) effort to monitor or verify the veracity or willingness to cooperate of other members. In this way, concerted actions are greatly simplified and, in the language of economic theory, less costly. Of course, social trust does not have to mean that the members of a network can rely on each other blindly. It suffices if there is a certain degree of assurance about the interests and motives of the others and the certainty that cooperation partners will be true to their word.

Informal networks are thus the ‘cement’ that holds together the positional fabric of power. Even an efficiently constructed power apparatus equipped with a high degree of leadership knowledge, expertise and justification can falter when there is no social trust among its members and no norms of generalized reciprocity in force. Their cultivation is less a question of *épisteme* and rational strategic planning, but rather one of *téchne*, intuitive authority and political gut feeling. Anyone who wants to expand and use social networks as instruments of power must have developed, as we stated above, a natural inclination for the political, it must flow through their veins as an integral part of their personal habitus.

339 Cf. Putnam (1993).

340 Cf. Levi, Margaret (1996): *Social and Unsocial Capital: a Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work*, *Politics & Society*, 24 (1), pp. 45-55.

2.5.4 Mastering the Power Vectors: *Homo Consultandus* and *Homo Consultans*

Now, since the last building block of the force vectors is set, they stand complete before us. The bird's-eye view provides two key insights. *Firstly*, the three resources – power competence, power knowledge and instruments of power – are in fact complementary and only together are sufficient foundations for political power. Political *epistémé* and political *techné* complement one another in innumerable areas, from abstract strategy development to the concrete control of the instruments of power, such as the intelligence services or administrations. Only when an intuitive mastery of politics is united with leadership knowledge, expert knowledge and justification knowledge in an architecture of power reified by artifacts and organizations, can interests be purposively realized even against the resistance of others. The much-discussed multiple interdependencies of the three great resources confirm our initial hypothesis that classified them vectors of power.

Secondly, it should have become clear that mastering the power vectors, that is, the targeted development and deployment of the essential resources of power politics and political power, is an *extremely demanding and complex challenge*. Habitualized political competence must be acquired through a time-consuming, hands-on learning process – ideally from early on and under the guidance of savvy all-rounders of power. The *tirocinium fori*, which is described in detail in Chapter 2.5.1 as the policy practice of the young Roman senate elite, may have remained unrivalled since ancient times, but it still represents the premium standard for the acquisition of power competence. In turn, power knowledge, even if we focus only on strategic leadership knowledge for the moment, requires not only an immense amount of information on goal-relevant political constants and variables, but also the ability to creatively synthesize them into a pattern of action. The successful use of social instruments of power, such as the military and police and the corresponding technologies, ultimately requires a strong sense of the balance between organizational clout and political control. Combining the vectors thus seems to be a downright Herculean task.

Of course, the recognition of this threefold challenge is not entirely new. It was already implicitly noted in antiquity, as the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk points out.³⁴¹ In the small but extremely competitive Athenian political cosmos of the

341 Cf. Sloterdijk, Peter (2017): Konsultanten sind die Künstler der Enthemmung, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung from 18th February 2017, [online] <https://www.nzz.ch/feuille>

Periclean age, a clear understanding emerged of the enormous “performance pressure” experienced by power actors – and thus also recognition of their “need for supplementation.”³⁴² Sloterdijk states that this ancient city culture recognized that no urban top performers could operate in their field alone and without advice. “As soon as someone in a differentiated culture steps out of the crowd and engages in a key performance function, they inevitably require someone next to them who supports their activities in an advisory, moderating and motivating manner.”³⁴³ In plain English: mastering the power vectors is complex and time-consuming and is recognized in the polis as being dependent upon consultation by specialized service providers. And this step is immediately evident in political structures increasingly characterized by a division of labor. Instead of shouldering the challenges of political power alone, the Attic politicians sought advice and knowledge from actors who had no power (*prima facie*) ambitions of their own – the consultants.

This marks the birth of two historical archetypes, whose reciprocal relationship can henceforth be noted throughout history: the homo consultandus (the person being advised) and the homo consultans (the person doing the advising).³⁴⁴ In recognizing that the exercising of political power is a challenge, and in accordingly aiming to fill the gaps in knowledge or reduce skill deficits – that is, in recognizing the need for advice – a political actor becomes homo consultandus. This creates, as it were, a niche in the political cosmos, which is occupied by an actor who provides the corresponding know-how as a service, the homo consultans. This function was first assumed in the ancient polis by a professional group which acquired a particularly bad reputation thanks to Plato’s dialogues: the *Sophists* (in English: the wise).³⁴⁵ The Sophists’ rivals, the philosophers (in English: the wisdom lovers) pursued the exploration of logos and practice as an academic under-

ton/sloterdijk-konsultanten-sind-die-kuenstler-der-enthemmung-ld.146325, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

342 Ibid.

343 Ibid.

344 Sloterdijk (2017) calls this interchange a “bipolarism of performance roles”, highlighting the interdependence of both archetypes: homo consultandus needs the consultant’s expertise in the vectors of power; the homo consultans requires the power actor as an employer.

345 In order to comprehend how badly the Sophists were vilified in the Occident, one must only think of the words with which Heinrich Faust attacks Mephisto: “You were always a Sophist and a liar.” Of course, the quick-witted devil responds, “Indeed, indeed. If we look ahead a little further, to tomorrow, what do we see.” Goethe, Johann

taking while, according to Sloterdijk, the Sophists knowingly applied effective and pragmatic reason. In concrete terms, this means that they placed their rhetorical, didactic and logical abilities in the “service of a belligerent urban clientele” struggling for power and influence in the polis. Following the Sophists, there were other historical incarnations of homo consultants, e.g. the great medieval royal advisers, such as Alcuin at the court of Charlemagne, or the Privy Councilors of the modern era. For Sloterdijk, however, the perfect embodiment of the homo consultants is the well-known Machiavelli, whose considerations on the foundations of political power were discussed at the beginning of Chapter 2.5 and are a cornerstone of our own system of power vectors. Noteworthy of Machiavelli’s writings is, from Sloterdijk’s point of view, the amalgamation of theoretical reflection and applied political advice. Accordingly, he states that the writings of the great Florentine provide an exemplary study of the professionalization of counseling reason.”³⁴⁶

Since the days of Machiavelli, the professionalization of power consulting has been constantly evolving. Our modern communities are characterized by a consulting cosmos of various service providers who advise actors in the political field – governments, companies, associations, NGOs, political parties, churches, unions, etc. – on how to play the zero-sum game for political power. Nevertheless, the basic principles of consultation, so our thesis, are universal and have remained the same since antiquity. This is so because they start with the great power vectors, which are, as it were, universal and globally uniform. Accordingly, these principles include, *firstly*, the enablement of power competence through training and hands-on apprenticeship; *secondly*, the extraction, systematization and consolidation of relevant information for the development of power knowledge; and *thirdly*, instructions for shaping the political field by means of the various instruments of power. The concretization of this categorical logic must, however, take into account the socio-cultural contexts and laws of the respective communities. Targeted consultation always both draws orientation from the universal guiding principles of political power and is context-sensitive to the specific conditions within which power is being exercised. We will concretely develop these guiding principles in the third and final chapter and thus translate our practical theory of power into an application-oriented guideline.

W. ([1808] 1992): *Faust, A Tragedy, Part I.*, translated by Martin Greenberg, New Haven: Yale University Press.; p. 97.

346 Sloterdijk (2017).