

Memories of the War and the War of Memories

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War, as a tectonic fracture of social life, is the source of such deep and all-consuming experiences that they become a key constituent of individual and collective memories. War, as socially organised violence, is also viewed differently. Some authors consider humans to be “the most dangerous animal” in whom natural aggressiveness is combined with intelligence and the ability for social organisation.¹ Paradoxically, (and known to these observers,) the dark side of this capacity for social cooperation is how often it is used to promulgate conflict. This makes humans ready for violence and war. At the same time, from this point of view, war as violence is dehumanisation, evolutionary degeneration, and a regression of humanity. War opponents claim that war is not socially and sociobiologically inevitable and that the forms and methods of resolving armed conflict are determined by culture and the ideas different societies have about what war is². Collective, cultural, individual, and communicative memories of war are determined by both public discourse and an individual reaction to war as an upheaval in social life and an event with widespread physical destruction.³

- 1 David Livingstone Smith, *The Most Dangerous Animal: Human Nature and the Origins of War*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007.
- 2 Brian R. Ferguson, “Ten Points on War”, *Social Analysis* 52/2, 2008, 32–49.
- 3 This is both an integrative memory and a confrontational memory, a memory of one's own traumatic experiences and a memory that glorifies and idealises armed confrontation, a memory that condemns war, a memory of fear, and a memory traumatised and stigmatised by history. The collective and cultural memory of the war, as well as the individual memory of the participants in the war, can be described as a pathophysiological phenomenon. This is a damaged, injured, deformed, and lacunar memory, from which the most traumatic moments have been erased or torn. However, the individual memory of the war can also be filled with traumatic experiences that lead to psychopathology, which must be pushed out to the subconscious after the war. War provokes real/physical and virtual injuries, and individual or social amnesia or the deformation of consciousness and thinking. For more, see: William A. White, *Thoughts of a Psychiatrist on the War and After*, New York: Paul B. Hoeber, 1919. For an individual, the impressions of war are often chaotic, and it is the collective cultural memory of the war that organises and directs this individual memory, in the process selecting it. This is how the ‘immediate’ and ‘short-term’ vis-à-vis the distanced, long-term, and remote memory of the war appears. Radically different versions of the war give rise to either a war of memo-

Modern and Postmodern War Memories: Ukrainian and Russian Contexts

Modern Ukrainian and Russian personal/direct and collective/mediated/constructed memories of war have a long tradition.⁴ The modern Russian tradition of heroising war dates back to at least Leo Tolstoy's novel *War and Peace* (*Voina i mir*, 1865–1869) or Mikhail Lermontov's poem "Borodino" (1837). In the formation of this tradition, texts that depict key events and images from the First World War,⁵ the Revolution of 1917, and the postrevolutionary Civil War in Russia played an important role.⁶ These and other texts and films⁷ laid the foundation for the Russian as well as the Soviet perception of war in the 20th century. In Ukrainian historical memory, the First World War and the Civil War were seen with the established division of 'own'/'ours' ('svoihk') and 'foreign'/'theirs' ('chuzhykh') in Russian and Ukrainian memories of the wars of the 20th century.⁸

ries of different communities, or a shared memory of one community. Both can become tools of information warfare, and both (ideally) need reconciliation, coordination, and correlation.

- 4 Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila, Tatiana Zhurzhenko (eds.), *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- 5 In a rare instance, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg compared Russia's war in Ukraine from 2022 to 2023 (and in particular Bakhmut in 2023) with the events of World War I: "Russia is throwing waves of soldiers against the Ukrainian defense lines in a way we haven't seen since the First World War". Justina Ilkevičiūtė, "Russia is constantly planning for new offensives" – interview with NATO chief Stoltenberg", *Lithuanian Radio and Television (LRT)*, 28 February 2023, <https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1923076/russia-is-constantly-planning-for-new-offensives-interview-with-nato-chief-stoltenberg/> [accessed: 28.02.2023].
- 6 Sheila Fitzpatrick, "The Civil War as a Formative Experience", in: Abbot Gleason, Peter Kenez, and Richard Stites (eds.), *Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, 57–76.
- 7 For literary texts, see, for example, Dmitry Furmanov's *Chapaev* (1923) and Mikhail Bulgakov's *Belaya gvardiya* (*The White Guard*, 1925). For films, see, for example, *Chapayev* (1934) by Georgi Sergi Vasilev and *Neulovimye mstiteli* (*The Elusive Avengers*, 1967) by Edmond Keosayan.
- 8 This imagination formed through non-Soviet visions of war refugees in the works of Katria Hrynnyevycheva or the representations of extreme experience of prisoners of war (POWs) in the works of Osyp Turyansky (e.g., *Poza mezhamy bolii*, *Beyond the Pain*, 1989), as well as through the image of the anti-Soviet 'national revolution' of 1917–1921 in interwar Western Ukrainian artistic texts. In Ukrainian Soviet literature and culture, the idea of the 'Great October Socialist Revolution' and the Civil War took various forms: from the romantic *Vershynyky* (*The Riders*, 1935) by Iurii Ianovskii to *Arsenal* (1929) and *Shchors* (1939) by Oleksandr Dovzhenko. Here, as in Russian socialist literature, the image of one's own (Ukrainian Soviet and Russian Soviet) soldier was formed. This soldier defeats the enemies of the Soviet government and working people, such as the 'Denikinians', 'Vrangelovians', 'Petlyurians', and 'Makhnovians'. In Ukrainian non-Soviet literature, on the contrary, Ukrainian Sich Riflemen became heroes, fighting first against the Russian Imperial Army, and then, together with the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (and in particular under the leadership of Simon Petliura) against the Communists/Bolsheviks.

In the Soviet Union, there was an attempt to form an official Ukrainian and Russian war memory according to the same model to potentially form a common Soviet historical memory. At the same time, the Russian Soviet image of the Second World War⁹ was constructed along the lines of the mythology of the 'Great Patriotic War', which became even more ideological and controversial when compared to Ukrainian Soviet literature that depicted the war in a similar, but slightly different way.¹⁰ Already in this memory model, the dichotomy of the 'Ukrainian and Russian Soviet soldier' and their antipodes of the 'German fascist occupier', 'Nazi', and 'fascist' was established. The image of a Soviet intelligence officer – as seen in Vladimir Basov's film *The Shield and the Sword* (*Shchit i mech*, 1968) and Yulian Semyonov's *Seventeen Moments of Spring* (*Semnadsat mgnovenii vesny*, 1973) – also became significant for Soviet historical memory.¹¹ Subsequently, the figures of postwar counterintelligence agents from the USSR and Eastern Bloc countries were added to it. These later figures fought with 'capitalist intelligence' agents (from Western Europe and the USA) or hunted Nazis (as in Semyonov's *TASS is Authorised to Declare...*, *TASS upolnomochen zayavit...*, 1984, and *Confrontation, Protivostoyanie*, 1985). Negative depictions of anti-Soviet partisans who fought against the Red Army in Western Ukraine also featured, unsur-

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- 9 See texts such as *Vasili Tyorkin (1941–1945)* by Aleksandr Tvardovsky, *Semnadsat mgnovenii vesny* (*Seventeen Moments of Spring*, 1973) by Yulian Semyonov, and *Zhizn i sudba* (*Life and Fate*, 1959) by Vasilii Grossman.
 - 10 See, for example, the romanticised *Praporonostsi* (*The Standard Bearers*, 1946–1948) by Oles Honchar or *Bytva za nashu Sovetskuiu Ukrainu* (*Ukraine in Flames*, 1943) by Oleksandr Dovzhenko.
 - 11 The memory of the Second World War is central when describing the war in Ukraine in 2022. Russian propaganda created the image of the 'Ukrainian neo-Nazis' who could attack Russia, like the German Nazis who once attacked the USSR. In the Ukrainian imagination, on the contrary, Putin's Russian Federation is identified with Hitler's Germany, and simultaneously with the repressive Stalinist USSR. For example, the Russians fighting at Bakhmut and Soledar are associated with the strategically meaningless losses of Soviet soldiers in the Battles of Rzhev in World War II. See: Artur Levchenko, "Ia zahynuv pid Bakhmutom. Rosiiany bilsh ne mozhut povtoryty" ("I Died Near Bakhmut: The Russians Can No Longer Repeat"), *Zaxid.Net*, 2023, https://zaxid.net/ya_zagynuv_pid_bahmutom_n1556155 [accessed: 31.07.2024]. Less often, the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 is contextualised in the memory of other wars of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. It has been compared with the wars in Syria and Afghanistan (by the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orban), as well as with the Yugoslav Wars. See: Rob Myers, "The War in Ukraine Through Some Memories of the Yugoslav Wars", *Insurgent Notes: Journal of Communist Theory and Practice*, 29 December 2022, <http://insurgentnotes.com/2022/12/the-war-in-ukraine-through-some-memories-of-the-yugoslav-wars/> [accessed: 31.07.2024]; and Rod Dreher, "Viktor Orban: West Is 'In A War With Russia'", *The American Conservative*, 26 January 2023, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/viktor-orban-we-are-in-a-war-with-russia/> [accessed: 31.07.2024].

prisingly, in Soviet discourse.¹² These stereotypes were reactualised in post-Soviet Russian, and partly also in Ukrainian, cultural memories. Meanwhile, based on the cultural memories of émigrés, positive representations of Ukrainian anti-Communist partisans/rebels who fought against the Soviets/Russians for the independence of Ukraine were incorporated into post-Soviet Ukrainian cultural discourse.¹³ But Soviet images of the Second World War, as the Great Patriotic War, and its heroes also remained on Ukrainian television screens and in Ukrainian culture and places of memory.¹⁴ Lastly, the general scheme of the reception of the interaction between Soviet Ukraine and Russia as parts of the USSR in peacetime and wartime that was fixed in Soviet memory was also visibly present.¹⁵

Ukrainian post-Soviet memory of the war developed in different directions during different periods. Ukrainian memory politics oscillated between 'war' and 'peace' vis-à-vis their main contender, Russian collective memory.¹⁶ Post-Soviet Ukrainian memory of the war was more heterogeneous, containing both anti-Soviet (which opponents called nationalist and anti-Russian) and pro-Soviet (which

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- 12 In the Soviet discourse, they were described as 'Banderites'/'Nazi allies' or 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists', and both were associated with the surname of the leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Stepan Bandera, and with the idea of the 'bandit' and the 'criminal'. See, for example, the propagandistic texts of Yaroslav Galan or Volodymyr Belyaev as well as Yuriy Ilyenko's *Bilyi ptakh z chornoïu oznakoiu* (*The White Bird Marked with Black*, 1971) or Timofyi Levchuk's *Duma o Kovpake* (*The Poem of Kovpak*, 1973, 1975, 1977) film series.
 - 13 See the novels *Braty hromu* (*Brothers of Thunder*, 2009) by Mykhailo Andrusiak and *Vohnenni stovpy* (*Pillars of Fire*, 2006) by Roman Ivanychuk as well as the films *Zalizna sotnya* (*The Iron Hundred*, 2004) and *Neskorenyy* (*The Undeclared*, 2000) by Oles Yanchuk.
 - 14 Tatiana Zurchenko, "Shared Memory Culture? Nationalizing the 'Great Patriotic War' in the Ukrainian–Russian Borderlands", in: Małgorzata Pakier and Joanna Wawrzyniak (eds.), *Memory and Change in Europe: Eastern Perspectives*, Oxford: Berghahn, 2016, 169–192.
 - 15 Serhy Yekelchuk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian–Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.
 - 16 Oleksandr Hrytsenko, *Prezydenty i pamiat. Polityka pamiaty prezidentiv Ukrainy (1994–2014): pidgruntia, poslannia, realizatsiia, rezultaty*. (*Presidents and Memory: The Policy of Memory of the Presidents of Ukraine (1994–2014): Background, Message, Implementation, Results*), Kyiv: K.I.S., 2017; Oksana Shevel, "The Politics of Memory in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine", *Slavic Review*, 1, 2011, 137–164; Andriy Portnov, "Memory Wars in Post-Soviet Ukraine (1991–2010)", in: Uilleam Blacker, Alexander Etkind, and Julie Fedor (eds.), *Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 233–254; Anna Wylegała and Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper (eds.), *The Burden of the Past: History, Memory, and Identity in Contemporary Ukraine*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020; and Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "Legislating Historical Memory in Post-Soviet Ukraine", in: Eleazar Barkan and Ariella Lang (eds.), *Memory Laws and Historical Justice*, London: Palgrave Macmillan Cham, 2022, 97–130.

opponents called retrograde and pro-Russian) divisions. This also led to the regionalisation of memory in Ukraine.¹⁷ At the same time, the Soviet/Russian paradigm of memory remained very influential, especially on the level of mass culture. This was facilitated by both a shared Russo-Ukrainian mass media communicative space – which existed substantially until at least 2014 and continued in diminished form until 2022 – and by Russo-Ukrainian bilingualism – which was a channel for the formation of hybrid Russo-Ukrainian memories.¹⁸ The struggle between different types of memory provoked sharp discussions around topics like, for example, the Holodomor (1932–1933)¹⁹ and figures and movements from Ukrainian history from the 1920s onward (e.g., Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army).²⁰ Eventually, the events of the Orange Revolution (2004–2005) and the Revolution of Dignity/Euromaidan (2013–2014) became sites for the wars of memory as well. In the latter case, pro-Ukrainian Maidan positions (centred around nodes like the Warriors of Light/the Order of the Heavenly Hundred – i.e., activists who died on the Maidan in 2014)²¹ confronted the pro-Russian anti-Maidan stance in Kyiv.

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- 17 Viktoriya Sereda, "Regional Historical Identities and Memory", in: Yaroslav Hrytsak, Andrii Portnov, and Victor Susak (eds.), *Lviv-Donetsk: sotsialni identychnosti v suchasni Ukraini. Ukraina Moderna. Spetsialnyi vypusk* (Lviv-Donetsk: Social Identities in Modern Ukraine. Modern Ukraine, Special issue), Lviv-Kyiv: Krytyka, 2007, 160–209; and Roman Holyk, "'Tsentr ukrainskoho Skhodu' y 'Natsionalnyi Piemont': 'donbaski' siuzhety halytskoi kulturnoi pamiaty" ("The 'Centre of the Ukrainian East' and 'National Piedmont': The 'Donbas' Plots of Galician Cultural Memory"), in: Mykola Lytvyn (ed.), *Mizh viinoiu i sobornistiu. Sotsiokulturna intehtatsiia ta adaptatsiia pereselentsiv z Donbasu ta Krymu. Zakhidnoukpaivskyi vektor* (Between War and Unity: The Sociocultural Integration and Adaptation of Immigrants from the Donbas and Crimea, the Western Ukrainian Vector), Lviv: I. Krypyakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2017, 89–144.
 - 18 Marco Puleri, *Ukrainian, Russophone, (Other) Russian: Hybrid Identities and Narratives*, Berlin: Peter Lang, 2020.
 - 19 Georhii Kasianov, *Danse macabre: holod 1932–1933 rokiv u politytsi, masovii svidomosti ta istoriografii (1980-ti–pochatok 2000-kh)* (Danse macabre: The Famine of 1932–1933 in Politics, Mass Consciousness, and Historiography (1980s–early 2000s)), Kyiv: In-t istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy and Nash chas, 2010. The Holodomor, which in historical memory appears as a kind of undeclared war of the Soviet authorities against the Ukrainian peasantry, is also a demonstrative example of historical trauma in the Ukrainian collective memory before the Second World War. Iryna Starovoyt, "Traumatic memories: from Holodomor to Maidan", in: Rob van der Laarse et al. (eds.), *Religion, state, society, and identity in transition: Ukraine*, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2015, 219–240.
 - 20 For the discussions surrounding the name of Stepan Bandera in relation to traumatic memories of the events of 1939–1944 and the first postwar years in Western Ukraine, see: Yhor Balynskyi, Yaroslav Hrytsak, and Taryk Syryl Amar (eds.), *Strasti za Banderou: staty ta eseji (Passions for Bandera: Articles and Essays)*, Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2010.
 - 21 In certain contexts, the Heavenly Hundred were contrasted with the Russian Immortal Regiment, originally intended to record the memory of the myth of the Great Patriotic War.

The Memory of the Russo-Ukrainian War from 2014 to 2023

In 2014, Russia's hybrid war in Ukraine highlighted the conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian versions of historical and cultural memory.²² In the occupied territories of Ukraine (Crimea and the Donbas), Russians and pro-Russian organisations began to fashion new local variants of Russian memory to describe the formation of the so-called 'Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics'.²³ On the Ukrainian side, the collective consciousness and memories of events from 2014 onwards developed in the opposite direction.²⁴ During this period, each party tried to encode the other in cultural memory as the aggressor and perpetrator of war crimes. Accordingly, both sides published books on war crimes in the Donbas, which became tools in the wars of memories and perceptions. Russian propagandists, in particular, manipulatively used the name of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to construct a picture of the 'atrocities of the Ukrainian army'.²⁵ But this confrontation of memories eventually became 'frozen', with neither side able to claim new ground – just like in the physical war in Eastern Ukraine.

Subsequently, some Ukrainian politicians and businesspeople began to promote the idea of a relatively quick forgetting of the war (and a displacement of its trau-

22 Ultimately, the ideologies of Russian Orthodoxy, nationalism, and totalitarianism became the foundations of this war. See: Taras Kuzio, *Putin's War Against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime*, Toronto: Chair of Ukrainian Studies, 2017; and Taras Kuzio, *Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War: Autocracy—Orthodoxy—Nationality*, London and New York: Routledge, 2022.

23 This included St. George ribbons as signs of the Great Victory over fascism and the cults of the 'heroes' of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) (e.g., Mikhail Tolstykh "Givi" and Arsen Pavlov "Motorola") and of Crimea (the 'little green men' or 'polite people', i.e., disguised Russian military personnel). These symbols have been placed in opposition to those of the 'antiheroes' (e.g., 'Ukrainian occupiers' or 'dills', 'fascists', 'the Kyiv junta', and 'the Kyiv regime').

24 The hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine was associated with the figures of 'cyborgs' (i.e., the defenders of the Donetsk Airport), with the tragic events near Ilovaisk and Debaltsevo (i.e., the encirclement and destruction of the Ukrainian military there), with the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 and the Russian Buk missile system, and with the figures of Russian antiheroes (e.g., 'separatists' or 'separ's' and 'colorados' or 'Colorado beetles').

25 For the Russian side, see: The Foundation for the Study of Democracy, *War Crimes of the Armed Forces and Security Forces of Ukraine: torture and inhumane treatment*, report, April 2016, <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/7/233896.pdf> [accessed: 24.02.2023]. For the European and Ukrainian side, see: Małgorzata Gosiewska et al., *Report: Russian War Crimes in Eastern Ukraine in 2014*, report, Ji-Magazine, 2015, https://ji-magazine.lviv.ua/engl-vers/2015/Russian_War_Crimes_in_Eastern_Ukraine_in_2014.pdf [accessed: 31.07.2024].

matic memories).²⁶ However, the war of memories continued. The continuation of hostilities was evident in Russian school textbooks, which reinterpreted the history of Ukraine in a neocolonial style, preparing readers not for peace but for war.²⁷

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 opened a new stage in this battle of memories. In Ukrainian discourse, the definitions of this event were unambiguous: it was called 'Russian aggression' and 'war'. By contrast, the Russian media declared the invasion a 'special military operation for the denazification and demilitarisation of Ukraine'. The ideological preparation for the Russo–Ukrainian War was an eight-year-long propagation of false and misleading images about the Ukrainian people and government by the Russian government for the Russian public. These images included the tropes of 'Ukrainian neo-Nazis and nationalists',²⁸ who precipitated 'the illegal coup in Kyiv in 2014' and 'the Kyiv regime'; the topics of 'the genocide of Russians in the Donbas' and the 'militarisation of Ukraine by NATO countries'; and talking points about the 'aggressive West' (i.e., Europe and the USA), the 'threat of creating a nuclear bomb in Ukraine', and, lastly, the 'artificiality' of Ukrainian statehood and Ukrainians as a people in general. On an unofficial level, the negative stereotypes of a Ukrainian as a '*Khokhol*' (a derogatory name for a Ukrainian, from the early modern Russian "*khohol*" – a tuft of hair on a shaved head) with little intrinsic worth and of Ukraine as the '*Khokhlands*' (a country of *Khokhls*) was promulgated. To this negative image of Ukrainians the ideas of 'good Little Russians' and 'good Little Russia' were added, which reside next to 'Novorossiya'. In general, the period starting in 2014 became a time of a war of words and concepts, which Ukrainian intellectuals tried to win and explain to Western readers.²⁹

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- 26 Anton Troianovski, "A Ukrainian Billionaire Fought Russia. Now He's Ready to Embrace It", *The New York Times*, 13 November 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/world/europe/ukraine-ihor-kolomoisky-russia.html> [accessed: 31.07.2024].
- 27 Vitalii Yaremchuk and Andrii Smirnov, *Analitichnyi ohliad "Istoriia Ukrainy v rosiiskykh shkilyakh pidruchnykh z istorii"* (*An Analytical Review of "the History of Ukraine in Russian School History Textbooks"*), Kyiv: Almenda, 2023.
- 28 This attitude appeals to the memory of the Great Victory over German fascism in the Great Patriotic War and, in particular, to the campaign against Germany. The slogan of Russian propagandists is: "We can repeat it!" This idea is also visible in the inscriptions on Russian equipment and ammunition, such as, for example, "To Berlin!". Such slogans are in opposition to the interpretation of wars adopted in Ukraine and Europe: "Never again". Oleksii Polegkyi, "'Never again' vs. 'We can repeat it': Russians will pay any price to restore the glory of Soviet victory in WWII", *Forum for Ukrainian Studies*, 11 June 2022, <https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2022/06/11/never-again-vs-we-can-repeat-it-russians-will-pay-any-price-to-restore-the-glory-of-soviet-victory-in-wwii%ef%bf%bc/> [accessed: 31.07.2024].
- 29 Andriy Kulakov et al. (eds.), *Words and Wars: Ukraine facing Kremlin propaganda*, Kyiv: KIC, 2017.

On the other side, Ukrainians called the aggression 'Putin's attack', and coined terms such as 'Ruscism'/'Rucsianism' and 'Ruscist'/'Ruscianist' (combining 'Russian' with 'fascism'), 'Putinists', and 'Pushkinists'.³⁰ As a result, in Ukrainian discourse, Russian troops began to be depicted in dehumanised (e.g., 'pig-dogs') or ethnographised (e.g., 'lapti legs'³¹) ways, as monstrous, hybrid creatures. This could also take the form of literary monsters (e.g., orcs or goblins), while Russia could be shown as Mordor and its leaders as 'Saurons'. These images stemmed from J.R.R. Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings*. Additionally, Russia's leaders could also be presented as 'Voldemort's', based on the villain from J.K. Rowling's *Harry Potter* series.³²

The Russo–Ukrainian War of 2022 also became a war of visual symbols. These symbols included Russian identification signs in the form of special letters: Z, O, V, X, and A.³³ The Ukrainian side saw in Russian visual symbols the distinguishing marks of the troops of Nazi Germany.³⁴ To counter the Russian imagery, the Ukrainian army began using the sign of the cross, among other symbols, relying on its obvious religious significance. The linguistic context for the war of visual sym-

30 In this discourse, 'Putinists' are supporters of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Fans of the Russian poet Alexander Pushkin and supporters of the Russian language, and Russian literature and culture in general, are called 'Pushkinists' in the Ukrainian military lexicon.

31 *Lapti* are archaic footwear made of tree bark, which in Ukrainian discourse, in contrast to the Ukrainian analogues of *lychaks*, are considered a marker of Russian peasant culture and Russian national identity.

32 Serhy Yekelchuk, "Naming the War: Russian aggression in Ukrainian Official Discourse and Mass Culture", *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 64/2–3, 2022, 232–246.

33 Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager and Evgeniya Pyatovskaya, "The Banality of Putin's Propaganda: A Dangerous Déjà vu", *Forum for Ukrainian Studies*, 26 September 2022, <https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2022/09/26/the-banality-of-putins-propaganda-a-dangerous-deja-vu/> [accessed: 31.07.2024].

34 For example, the Ukrainian media discourse associates 'V' with the slogan "*Deutschland siegt an allen Fronten*" ("Germany is Victorious on All Fronts"), which appeared on famous landmarks including the Eiffel Tower and the Palais Bourbon in occupied Paris. 'Z', meanwhile, is associated with the emblems of the 4th SS Polizei Panzergrenadier Division, among other Nazi groups. Oleksandr Bekker, "Z — natsystskyi symvol samoznyshchennia Rosii" ("Z is the Nazi Symbol of Russia's Self-Destruction"), *ArmiiaInform (ArmyInformation)*, 17 March 2022, <https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/03/17/z-naczystskyj-symvol-samoznyshchennya-rosiyi/> [accessed: 31.07.2024].

bols became the spelling/orthographic war with Russia and its supporters on mass media and social networks.³⁵

The Ukrainian memories of the war from 2022 to early 2023 are fixed in significant events, concepts, words, material objects, and figures.³⁶ These include air raid alarms, shelters, mobilisation, roadblocks, the ban on the departure of men abroad, the mass appearance of refugees, Russian 'tags' on military objects, the tracking of Russian agents/collaborators, rocket attacks (at first on military targets, and then on civil infrastructure), and, as a result of the rockets, blackouts, the destruction of thousands of civilian houses, and the devastation of important Ukrainian cultural sites. Russian war crimes, such as the genocide in Bucha, Hostomel, and Irpin,³⁷ as well as the mass burials in Mariupol, became important elements of the war memories. Russia used the simulacrum of the 'genocide of Russians and Russian speakers in the Donbas' as a pretext for the war. To counteract this damage, Ukraine is trying to establish in world memory the historical and geographical chain of Russian

35 This is expressed through writing the country's name and the names of its political leaders with lowercase letters. There is also a virtual struggle over the name 'Russia' and the ethnonym 'Russians'. Some of the Ukrainian narratives represent Russians retrospectively as 'Muscovites' and the country itself as 'Moscovia' (the Western name of present-day Russia and its inhabitants until the 18th century). The names 'Russia' and 'Russians' are described as 'stolen' ethnonyms or the former self-names of current Ukrainians. In response to the aggression, Ukrainians want to push names associated with Russia out of their memory, language use, and everyday life: the former 'Moscow' sausage became the 'Stolychna' or 'Chernihivska' sausage, 'Russian' cheese became 'Smetankovyji' cheese, and 'Borodino' bread became 'Trypilia' bread. Yuliia Semenets, "'Kovbasa "Moskovska" pishla vslid za korablem', – kazhut pokuptsiam chernihivski prodavtsi" ("'"Moskovska" Sausage Followed the Ship', Chernihiv Sellers Tell Customers"), *Texty.org.ua*, 18 July 2022, <https://texty.org.ua/fragments/107271/kovbasa-moskovska-pishla-vslid-za-korablem-kazhut-pokuptsiam-chernihivski-prodavtsi/> [accessed: 31.07.2024].

36 Kateryna Topolyuk, "Rik nezlamnosti. Yak tse bulo dlia Lvova" ("The Year of Indomitability: How It Was for Lviv"), *032 Sayt mista Lvova (032 Website of the City of Lviv)*, 24 February 2023, <https://www.032.ua/news/3553072/rik-nezlamnosti-ak-ce-bulo-dla-lvova> [accessed: 31.07.2024]; and Antonina Kostyk, "Yak mynuv rik povnomasshtabnoi viiny dlia Lvova: spohady, foto, tsyfry" ("How the Year of the Full-Scale War Passed for Lviv: Memories, Photos, Numbers"), *Tvoie misto (Your City)*, 2023, https://tvoemisto.tv/exclusive/yak-mynuv-pershyy-den-povnomasshtabnogo-vtorgnennya-u-lvovi-ta-kudy-letily-rakety_144240.html [accessed: 31.07.2024].

37 These are cities and towns in the Kyiv Oblast. In very recent Ukrainian discourse and memory, they are considered 'hero cities' and 'cities of the mass murder of Ukrainians by the Russian Army'.

war crimes: Chechnya (1999–2009), Ukraine (2014), Syria (2015), and, again, Ukraine (2022).³⁸

Weapons became another object of collective memory. On the one hand, this includes Russian missiles (in particular the Kalibr and Kinzhal/Dagger missiles) and Iranian drones (the Shahed), and on the other hand, Turkish Bayraktar drones, American portable antitank missile complex Javelins, and portable anti-aircraft missile complex Stingers (and, subsequently, the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), the American High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and German Leopard tanks). Another area of memory is the narratives of heroism and courage during the siege of Mariupol, and particularly of Azovstal.³⁹ Additionally there are ‘memories of triumph’, the liberation of part of the occupied territories (particularly Kherson⁴⁰), and the concept of ‘cotton’⁴¹ – that is, strikes on Russian military facilities – all of which were established in mass culture. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and, for some time, even former Advisor of the Office of the President Oleksiy Arestovych became iconic figures inhabiting this memory. Next to them appeared an animal hero, the literal and figurative ‘bravest military dog Patron’.⁴² The war also caused the appearance of new linguistic formulas and slogans, such as “Ukrainians will resist [the Russian aggression]”, “say

38 Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, *Russia's War Crimes All Over the World: From Chechnya to Syria*, report, https://mkip.gov.ua/files/pdf/%D0%B7%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8_eng.pdf [accessed: 31.07.2024].

39 Azovstal (literally meaning ‘Azov steel’) is the name of the metallurgical plant in Mariupol (a Ukrainian city in the south of the Donetsk Oblast), which in 2022 became a battleground between Ukrainian defenders and the Russian military that surrounded it.

40 Kherson is an oblast in Southern Ukraine that in Ukrainian collective memory is often associated with watermelons, although the name itself refers to the ancient Greek/Byzantine name ‘Kherones’.

41 This is due to the homography of the Russian words *khlopók* (meaning a short sound of impact, clapping, or a flash of gas less powerful than an explosion) and *khlópok* (meaning cotton). The Ukrainian military lexicon began to ironically call the Russian military discourse’s references to explosions in the occupied territories of Ukraine and at Russian military facilities ‘cotton’. This was present in internet memes.

42 Patron is the nickname of a dog that sniffed out explosives. This dog is presented as the mascot of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and a symbol of the indomitability of the Ukrainian people in the fight against the Russian military. Patron the dog also became the hero of a recent Ukrainian song.

'*paliannytsia*!'”⁴³, “to go with the Russian (war) ship”,⁴⁴ “good evening, we are from Ukraine”,⁴⁵ and “everything will be Ukraine”.⁴⁶ In European and American memory, these expressions corresponded to conceptions of fearless Ukrainians: “Be brave, like Ukrainians”.⁴⁷

In stories about the full-scale Russo–Ukrainian War of 2022, even ordinary concepts and common things (e.g., ‘earth’, ‘bus’, ‘thunder’, ‘lightning’, ‘lamp’, ‘letter’, ‘bear’) acquired new connotations dependent, in some cases, on individual, in others, on collective perception.⁴⁸ Some of these connotations already had a certain semantic or semantic-symbolic tradition: for example, the bear as an archetype of Russia. However, even well-established references have been transformed under the influence of direct, day-to-day military conflict.

New Ukrainian heroes represent difficult terrain for collective memory. Here, ‘heroic memory’ and ‘tragic memory’ collide. On the one hand, there are soldiers who performed heroic feats (such as the pilot, the Ghost of Kyiv); on the other hand, there are those who perished in the war. New places of memory are associated with the latter, including the numerous new military cemeteries (e.g., the reactivated Mars Field near the Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv⁴⁹), which testify to the scale of the losses.

43 In Ukrainian, *paliannytsia* is a type of bread. It is believed that this lexeme is difficult to articulate for those who use only the Russian language. Such words play the role of a ‘shibboleth’ – that is, a differential linguistic feature of a certain ethnonational community that are difficult to pronounce by the representatives of another community.

44 The phrase comes from the (obscene) expression of a soldier – a defender of the Ukrainian island Zmiinyi in the Black Sea and Odesa Oblast – who answered the representatives of the Russian cruiser Moskva, who offered the Ukrainians to surrender, “Russian warship, go fuck yourself”.

45 The phrase, taken from a single of the musical group DakhaBrakha, which was distributed as early as 2021, became an unofficial military salute after the Russian aggression in 2022.

46 According to one version, this phrase was coined in 2014 or 2015 by representatives of the pro-Ukrainian forces of the Luhansk Oblast as a counterweight to the pro-Russian/separatist slogan “Everything will be Donbas!”. The Ukrainian phrase was supposed to simultaneously signify the Ukrainian ownership of the territories occupied by the Russian Federation and be a substitute for the phrase “everything will be fine!”.

47 This concept is reflected in the French book of the Ukrainian philosopher Konstantin Sigov. Konstantin Sigov, *Le courage de l'Ukraine (The Courage of Ukraine)*, Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2023.

48 For example, a bus as a place of rescue from Russian shells and as a transport to the Ukrainian checkpoint as a symbol of security. Ostap Slyvynskyi (ed.), *Slovnyk vinyi (Dictionary of the War)*, Kyiv: Vivat, 2023, p.14.

49 ‘Mars Field’ or the ‘Field of Mars’ is an example of the changes in memory policy and memory places in 20th-century Eastern Europe. This military cemetery was established in Lviv/Lemberg during WWI for the burial of soldiers of the Austro–Hungarian Empire. After WWII, it was sovietised, the remains of Austrian soldiers were exhumed, and representatives of the Soviet Army and NKVD/MGB troops were buried in their place. After February

Part of the Russo–Ukrainian War is also a war of monuments and toponyms. On the territory occupied by the Russians, monuments and memorial signs related to Ukrainian history and culture are being removed from public places, and Ukrainian place names are changed to Russian ones. In a certain way, this mirrors the Ukrainian de-Sovietisation of cities and villages.⁵⁰ Meanwhile in Ukraine, monuments to Russian figures are also dismantled, and streets and squares named after famous Russians are renamed. Increasingly, this war becomes a war of languages, literatures, and cultures.⁵¹

The Russo–Ukrainian War contributes to the de-Russification of Ukrainian cultural and historical memory. Based on this new memory, novel Ukrainian identities are being formed, although it is still difficult to say which of them will become dominant. On the one hand, these identities are based on an almost total opposition of Russian identity in terms of language and culture (e.g., a Ukrainophone identity, or one based on the Ukrainian as opposed to the Russian language), religious denomination (e.g., the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church versus the Russian Orthodox Church or the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate), and ideology (e.g., the ‘Ukrainian identity’ against the ‘*russkiy mir*’ (the ‘Russian World’)). On the other hand, a Russophone identity is also forming in Ukraine. This is ideologically, or even confessionally, opposed to a Russian identity, but relates to it through the Russian language and the inclusion of at least some Russian culture. This ‘Ukrainian Russian culture’ is still in the process of differentiating itself from ‘Russian Russian culture’. At the same time, there are also other hybrid identities that combine Ukrainian and Russian linguistic and cultural identification in different configurations and to varying degrees. Each of these identities appeals to one or the other’s cultural memory.

As long as the war has not ended, the memory of it is incomplete as well. Rather, the changing fortunes of war on the front and at home ensure that cultural and collective memory of the war is and will remain fragmented and internally differentiated. This manifests through internal migration and refugees. Particularly from 2014 to 2023, this occurred with the image of the migrant from Eastern Ukraine in the public discourses in the west of the country.⁵² This was a reflection of the general

2022, instead of representatives of the Soviet armed forces, current Ukrainian soldiers who died in battles against the Russian Army began to be buried in the Field of Mars.

50 There are even discussions about renaming the occupied cities to their former Soviet names (e.g., Luhansk to Voroshilovograd).

51 Some people demanded the complete removal of the Russian language and Russian classics from school curricula. This would include the works of Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky, whom Ukrainian critics satirically call ‘Tolstoyevsky’.

52 A significant portion of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are perceived as ‘us’ and ‘patriotic’ figures who survived the occupation and whose memory recorded the horror of all-out urban battles. Some of them also internalised the new local identity despite their difficult

trends in the development of Ukrainian cultural and historical memory. On the one hand, this demonstrated the desire for reconciliation and the formation of an integrated and whole 'national memory'; on the other hand, it showed regionalisation and the opposition of different types of memory.

Because the Russo–Ukrainian War is ongoing, the memory of it is still an unfinished, dynamic, and unstable collection of different structures. Theoretically, the memories of the war in Ukraine can be imagined as a system divided into several zones. First are the memories of those who survived full-scale combat operations in the centre, east, and south of Ukraine. This may also be divided into several possible segments: the memories of soldiers engaged in direct combat; the memories of civilians who witnessed battles and war crimes; the memories of refugees/migrants or of those who remained; and the memories of those who survived the Russian occupation or captivity (among the military) as compared to those who were continuously in the territories controlled by Ukraine. War memories are also stratified according to gender and age. This can be broken up into the memories of women, men, and children.⁵³ Memories may also be differentiated based on professions, be it of politicians, writers, scientists, clergy members, military personnel, or energy workers (who restored the infrastructure destroyed by Russian strikes), or on types of dwellings, such as the memories of the residents of cities, towns, or villages, among other configurations.

living conditions in the cities of Western Ukraine. Ivan Stanislavskiy, "Novyi dim v staromu hurtozhytku. Yak pereselentsi zi Skhodu namahaiutsia vlashtuvaty svoie zhyttia u Lvovi Ivan Stanislavskiy" ("A New Home in an Old Dormitory: How IDPs from the East Are Trying to Organise Their Lives in Lviv"), *LB.ua*, 22 June 2022 https://lb.ua/society/2022/06/22/520803_noviy_dim_staromu_gurtozhitku_yak.html [accessed: 31.07.2024]. However, there are also cases where IDPs are seen as the Other, as people with a Soviet or post-Soviet memory and belonging to the 'Russian world'. In 2022, the situation changed, as the bearers of the different representations of Ukrainian memory were now seen as victims of the same war. Kateryna Sadlovska, and Anastasiia Yarmolovska, "Pereselenka z Mariupolia pratsiuie pediatrom u Lvovi" ("A Migrant from Mariupol Works as a Paediatrician in Lviv"), *Suspilne novyny* (Public News), 04 February 2023, <https://suspilne.media/370849-pereselenka-z-mariupola-pracue-pediatrom-u-lvovi/> [accessed: 31.07.2024]; Olena Danylo and Kateryna Sadlovska, "Brat znyk bezvisty. Rozpovid mariupolky, yaka evakuivualasia z mista u veresni" ("Brother is Missing: The Story of a Mariupol Woman who Evacuated from the City in September"), *Suspilne novyny* (Public News), 15 January 2023, <https://suspilne.media/358548-brat-znik-bez-visti-rozpovid-mariupolki-aka-evakuivualasia-z-mista-u-veresni/> [accessed: 31.07.2024]; and Kateryna Rodak, "Bilshist pereselentsiv na Lvivshchyni namahaiutsia hovoryty ukrainskoiu, – opytuvannia" ("Most of the Immigrants in the Lviv Try to Speak Ukrainian, According to a Survey"), *Zaxid.net*, 31 May 2022, [https://zaxid.net/bilshist-pereselentsiv_na_lvivshhini_n_amagayutsya_govoriti_ukrayinskoyu_opituvannya_n1543703](https://zaxid.net/bilshist-pereselentsiv-na_lvivshhini_n_amagayutsya_govoriti_ukrayinskoyu_opituvannya_n1543703) [accessed: 31.07.2024].

53 Aleksandra Boroń and Agnieszka Gromkowska-Melosik, *Ukraińskie uchodźczynie wojenne. Tożsamość, trauma, nadzieja* (Ukrainian Female War Refugees: Identity, Trauma, Hope), Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, 2022.

All these memories differ territorially. The war memories of the civilian population of Western Ukraine are, to a certain extent, 'cold' and somewhat distant from the war.⁵⁴ In the 'hot' memories of Ukrainian soldiers on the frontline, the war is an image of real battles, weapons, enemies, and the lives and deaths of other soldiers or civilians. The 'memories of the front' largely differ from 'rear memories'. The memories of those who survived the occupation are ones that incorporate stories about Russian soldiers and their power, collaborators, the disoriented population, destruction, looting, murders, death threats, evacuations, and difficult material conditions (e.g., a lack of light, gas, water, food, etc.). All these memories are currently in the (unstable) deep structures of collective memory, and not on the surfaces of culture or literature.⁵⁵ On the Russian side, meanwhile, the perception of the war that started in 2022 is not very clear for various reasons (including totalitarian control over public opinion).⁵⁶

54 This memory contains images of missile attacks, the victims and heroes from among the military (and their burial ceremonies), as well as book and television depictions of the war. It also holds images from heroic songs of the First World War, which gained popularity after February 2022, such as "Oi u luzi chervona kalyna" ("Oh, the Red Viburnum in the Meadow"), first published in 1875 and given a modern treatment in 1914 by Stepan Charnecksky to honour the Sich Riflemen of WWI.

55 They are partially reflected in academic tests, in the diaries and memories of the historian Vladyslav Verstyuk (*Dumky z pidvalu, Thoughts from the Cellar*, 2022) from Hostomel and Vorzel, in Valeriy Smoliy's reflections *Istoriik i viina (The Historian and the War*, 2022), and in the studies of the first year of the confrontation (e.g., *Nad pririvoiu. 200 dnyv rosiiskoi viiny, Over the Abyss: 200 Days of the Russian War*, 2022, by Volodymyr Horbulin and Valentyn Badrak). Other memoirs, diaries, interviews (as well as the documentary film *Hod, The Year*, 2023, by Dmytro Komarov) that form the overall picture of the aggression on 24 February 2022 and the following days and months record the images of 'indomitable' Ukrainian men and women, the monthly public speeches of the President of Ukraine during the war, and the chronicle of events (Olexandr Krasovytskyi series *Dvanadtsiat misiatsiv viiny. Khronika podii. Promovy ta zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelenskoho (Twelve Months of War. Chronicle of events. Speeches and addresses of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi*, 2023). Attempts to fictionalise the memory of the war remain a problem. In the first steps, such intentions were perceived as conjunctures, and they were abandoned. However, later, even adventure books about the war appeared, such as the work of Andrii Kokotyukha *Taimer viiny. Dovha komendantska hodyna (War Timer. Long Curfew*, 2023). Some of the visual productions – including the film *Zvychaynyi rashyzm (Ordinary Rashism*, 2023) by Ihor Piddubny, as a response to Mikhail Romm's film *Obyknovennyy fashizm (Ordinary Fascism*, 1965) – began to shape the image of the Russian enemy-aggressor in the cultural memory of Ukrainians. Currently, the (often pessimistic) memory from the fronts of war (the 'memory of losses') is rare in publications, because it is inconsistent with the optimistic memory of the rear (the 'memory of victories'). Despite everything, all memories are still a mosaic and partially 'closed', although in this, as in other war memories, 'post-memory' zones are already forming.

56 State propaganda portrays the heroism of Russian troops in the fight against neo-Nazis in works such as the book *Krasnye linii (Red Lines*, 2023) by Ivan Solovyov (its cover is decorated

The modern war of memories in the context of the Russo–Ukrainian War has at least three possible analogies in or can be based on three possible models stemming from European events in the 20th century, as well as their aftermath. The first is the case of the First World War and the interwar period. In 1918, a conflict arose in European collective memories between the memories of the victors (the Entente countries) and the memories of the vanquished (especially Germany and Austria). Initially, the memories of the victors dominated and shaped European historical and political discourse, but in the 1930s, resulting from the growing influence of Germany and its allies, these memories weakened and found a powerful opponent

with the Z symbol iconic for Russian propaganda). For the majority of Russians, the 'special operation in Ukraine' is a 'close distant war' or a 'distant close war'. For more, see: Svetlana Erpyleva, Natalia Savelyeva (eds.) *The War Near and Far. How Russians Perceive the Invasion of Ukraine February 2022 through June 2022*, Amsterdam: Lmverlag 2023. It is symptomatic that the Russian authorities tried to suppress these materials of the Laboratory of Public Sociology|Public Sociology Laboratory (*Laboratoriya publichnoy sotsiologii*) from the Russian collective memory: after the representatives of this organisation were called "foreign agents" (*inostrannye agenty*), the website of the Laboratory stopped working, and reports related to the Russian-Ukrainian war became unavailable. Ukrainian media also offer their visions of the collective memory of Russians. On the one hand, they describe it sarcastically as a memory of 'Chmobikes' ('partially mobilised' Russians), whom the family sends to their deaths in order to receive material compensation and buy a new Russian car. Ihor Berezhanskyi, "Na novii 'Ladi' — do syna na kladovyshche: rosiianam pokazaly 'plyusy' vid zahybeli ditei na viini z Ukrainoiu" ("In the New 'Lada' to Their Son's Gravesite: The Russians Were Shown the 'Benefits' of the Death of Children in the War with Ukraine"), *Televiziinoi sluzhby novyn* (TSN) (*Television news service*), 19 July 2022, <https://tsn.ua/ato/na-noviy-ladi-do-sina-na-kladovi-sche-rosiyanam-pokazali-plyusi-vid-zagibeli-ditey-na-viyni-z-ukrayinoyu-2113738.html> [accessed: 31.07.2024]. In other cases, the focus is on released bandits who do not have sufficient motivation, engage in looting, and commit war crimes. At the same time, in the interviews of captured Russians for Ukrainian media, their memory appears as that of victims of 'Z-propaganda', who do not orient themselves in the situation and mechanically follow orders. *Lviv Media*, "Stoiaty v oboroni i vse: eksklyuzyvne interviu osliploho u boiu polonenoho rosiianyna" ("Standing in Defence and That's It: An Exclusive Interview with a Russian Prisoner of War Who Went Blind in Battle"), 07 October 2022, <https://lviv.media/viyna/57011-stoyati-v-oboroni-i-vse-ekslyuzivne-intervyu-osliplogo-o-u-boyu-polonenogo-rosiyanina/> [accessed: 31.07.2024]; and Alina Haievskva, "Pryvezly na miasokombinat': poloneniyi na Kharkivshchyni — pro prymusovu mobilizatsiiu v samonazvanii 'DNR'" ("They Brought Me to a Meat-Packing Plant': A Prisoner in the Kharkiv Oblast Talks about Forced Mobilisation in the Self-Proclaimed 'DNR'"), *Suspilne novyny* (*Public News*), 04 June 2022, <https://susplne.media/246704-privezli-na-masokombinat-poloneniy-na-harkivsin-pro-prymusovu-mobilizatsiu-v-samonazvanii-dnr/> [accessed: 31.07.2024]. Such interviews are not always a manifestation of a real memory of the war. The same POW, returning to Russia, may publish the opposite version of events and their assessments. The 'truthfulness' of either version may be relative.

in the form of the memories of the defeated. The collective memories of the defeated constitute the second possible memory model. Ultimately, the signing of the Franco–German Armistice of 22 June 1940 (the surrender of France at the beginning of the Second World War) in the Compiègne Wagon became a symbolic destruction of the memories of the Armistice signed in the same carriage on 11 November 1918 (the surrender of Germany at the end of the First World War). It is no coincidence that in contemporary historical discourse, there is a desire to compare and look for analogies between the Russian Federation (whose leaders cultivate the memory of the ‘greatness of the USSR’ and the trauma of its collapse) and Nazi Germany (whose representatives also instrumentalised past humiliations and the need for revenge).

At the same time, both sides of the Russo–Ukrainian War also appeal to the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War. This represents the third possible memory model and trajectory for the developments of memory culture. The Ukrainian and Russian sides both appeal to the memory of the victory over fascism in ways that mirror each other. Russian propaganda portrays contemporary Ukraine as analogous to Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, implying that ‘Ukrainian Nazism/fascism’ is exported from the West, and particularly from Germany. Crucially, the Russian Federation emphasises the German–Soviet War and Nazi Germany’s attack on the USSR on 22 June 1941. On the other side, Ukrainians, using terms like ‘Ruscism’ and ‘Ruscianism’, denote contemporary Russian ideology and the country itself as heirs of Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. One ideology of contemporary Western Europe – that is, the European Union – is considered to be based on the model of reexamining, overcoming, and reconciling German and French memories of the Second World War. There are currently, however, no such prospects for reconciliation in the memory war between Ukraine and Russia. This would require democratic systems and peaceful attitudes in both states and societies. In Ukraine and Russia, elements of all three models can be combined, and the prospects for the current war of memories depend on how the Russo–Ukrainian War ends.

Conclusions

Each war memory, and the war of different types of memory within these war memories, exemplifies contradictions. On the one hand, war is perceived as a heroic act that mobilises society. On the other hand, it is a tragedy that destroys, deforms, injures, or completely devastates collective and individual memories. Wars can take different forms, can be fought under different slogans, use different strategies and tactics, and be fair or unfair, but at their core lies the destruction of one society by another. Each memory of a war is different, because, significantly, it represents a radically opposite view depending on which side of the front it is based and in which cul-

tural tradition it is grounded. However, in their depths (or 'denotative' levels), these memories directly or indirectly record the same thing: the destruction, death, and suffering of some people, caused, as a rule, by the simple and, at the same time, terrible actions of other people. One of the thematic centres of such memory is, naturally, violence.⁵⁷

Simultaneously, such memories, like the war itself, collect and transform large numbers of events, actions, reactions, and emotions of entire societies involved in the armed conflict. In this sense, such memories are 'pandemonium'. This makes the memories of the war into a kind of drama,⁵⁸ which encapsulates the situation of a person during a war. Nonetheless, the memory of the current Russo-Ukrainian War also contains everydayness and the 'banality of evil' (as coined by Hannah Arendt).⁵⁹ However, the case of Ukrainian collective memories during the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict since 2014 shows that even militarised, non-pacifist memory can become both a weapon and a factor of social integration and peace, or at least in the sense of the resistance of the aggressor. Everything depends on the society, historical situation, cultural context, emotion, and ultimate intentions of those who form and use such memories.

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- 57 This has already been shown in the cases of Syria and Ukraine. See: Ismail Salwa, *The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory and Government in Syria*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- 58 Oksana Kuzmenko, *Dramatyczne buttiia liudyny v ukrainskomu folklori: kontseptualni formy vyrazhennia (period Pershoi ta Druhoi svitovykh voien) (Dramatic Human Existence in Ukrainian Folklore: Conceptual Forms of Expression (during the Time of the First and Second World Wars))*, Lviv: Institute of Ethnology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2018.
- 59 Ali Omar Forozish, "The Banality of Evil, the Ukraine War and Russia's Strategic Goals", *Fair Observer*, 19 June 2022, <https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/the-banality-of-evil-the-ukraine-war-and-russias-strategic-goals/> [accessed: 31.07.2024]. One can also speak about the 'banality of the banality of evil'. It is interesting that this thesis is illustrated by the painting of the anonymous Banksy (*The Banality of the Banality of Evil*, 2013), who in 2022 visited Ukraine incognito and left seven murals on the destroyed walls of Ukrainian cities. One of these murals is the symbolic image of a boy tackling a large adult judoka who looks like Vladimir Putin. This image, like others, also became part of the memory of the war in Ukraine.

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