

5 The Proclamation of the ‘New World’

And I said – so I said, ‘There’s a new world here.’ After September the 11th, we must take threats seriously.

GEORGE W. BUSH (2004)

We live in a world [...] different from the one in which we think.

STEPHEN E. BRONNER (1995: 68)

In the previous chapter, I advocated labelling the ‘object’ that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse ‘new world’. This move was grounded in the observation that the idea that there was a ‘new world’ is constitutive of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. of the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. I supported my argument by demonstrating that the idea/s ‘globalisation’ came to be ‘in the true’, and the neologism *globalisation* was able to enter the language, in the face of a post-1989 reality that was perceived as ‘new’, in the sense of no longer graspable with the help of established theoretical and conceptual tools.

In this present chapter, I take another step away from the adjective *global* and follow a path that arises from the main insight in Chapter 4. I reflect on the issue of the ‘new world’. I carve out what is distinct and interesting about it. To do this, I discuss implicit and explicit *proclamations* of the ‘new world’.

I make two analytical moves in this present chapter. First, I reflect on what it means when social and political actors ‘proclaim’ (implicitly or explicitly) that there is something ‘new’ about the world or about social and political phenomena. In order to carve out the specificity of this kind of proclamation of the ‘new’, I contrast it with another kind of proclamation of the ‘new’. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ is a familiar component of modern politics. It is the proclamation of a ‘new world’ *to come* as a result of progressive, active, confident and targeted action. It is a kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ that is grounded in the modern fondness (for the

striving) for the ‘new’, which is perceived as a central, in fact, foundational aspect of societal progress and development. In contrast with this (modern) proclamation of the ‘new’ *to come*, I carve out the main characteristics of the kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ that is manifest in the above sketched reaction to the post-1989 reality. I call this second kind of proclamation a proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came*. I point out that this second kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ implies a passive speaking position of an observer, who is confronted with a ‘new’ reality and whose task it is to *grasp* this reality, rather than to actively *shape* it and its future development. In contrast with the proclamation of a ‘new world’ *to come* as a product of an agent’s action, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came* appears to be an objective observation of the world as it is. Yet, despite its supposed ‘naturalness’, it is, of course, also enmeshed in existing discourses. It is as much a political act to proclaim the (supposed) ‘newness’ of the world that *came*, i.e. that ‘is’, as it is to proclaim the ‘new’ *to come*. In this sense, in this first analytical move, I frame the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world as an aspect of political actors’ struggle to legitimise past and future decisions and actions.

While the proclamation of the ‘new’ *to come* is a manifestation of the modern and optimistic fondness for innovation, progress and development, I argue that the proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came* is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, which is constituted by the “internal cosmopolitanisation” (Beck 2006: 2) of national societies, the existence of “global risk” (Beck 1992, 1999, also 2009a), and the “return of uncertainty” (Beck 1994: 8; Bonß 1996). I substantiate this proposition in the second analytical move that I take in this chapter.

My conceptualisation of the proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came* as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation is grounded in an understanding of social reality that follows sociologist Ulrich Beck (especially 1994, 2004, 2006). According to this understanding, contemporary social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay. First, it is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. As just mentioned, this ‘backfiring’ is constituted by the ‘internal cosmopolitanisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. Second, social reality is shaped by the prevalence of what Beck (2006) calls “the national perspective” and “methodological nationalism”. This is a political perspective and a scholarly take on the world that is grounded in “nationalstaatlich normierte [...] Kategorien des Wirklichkeitsverständnisses” (Beck 2004: 114), that is, “categories in terms of which we understand reality that take the nation-state as the norm” (Beck 2006: 73).¹ The ‘national perspective’² is a perspective that obscures the

1 I provide the original German quote here in addition to the official English translation of this quote because the English version does not capture fully the sense of the original.

view at social reality; more precisely, it obscures the view at the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation, especially the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies, which is, according to Beck, a social reality.

Given the relevance that is accorded to the interplay of the above two aspects in this conception of social reality, I use the term 'reflexive modern' to label the nature of contemporary social reality, in general, and national societies, in particular.

To be clear, my understanding of the proclamation of the 'new world' that *came* as a manifestation of an 'awareness' of the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation is a *conceptual* move. It is not an *observation* of how social and political actors actually grasp the perceived 'newness' of the world, in the sense of how they label and conceptualise it. As we saw in the previous chapter, through the word *globalisation* the world is grasped in diverse ways and not necessarily consciously and explicitly as being shaped by the 'internal cosmopolitisation of national societies', 'global risk' and the 'return of uncertainty', let alone through the use of this precise vocabulary. Hence, to understand the proclamation of the 'new world' that *came* as a manifestation of an 'awareness' of the 'internal cosmopolitisation of national societies', 'global risk' and the 'return of uncertainty' is an interpretation that *presupposes* the above mentioned Beck-inspired conception of social reality – this presupposition is quasi a "pre-theoretical commitment" (Moore 2004: 75).

Consequently, it is a central task of the second part of this present chapter to outline this distinct conception of the 'reflexive modern' social reality, i.e. to elaborate on what I mean when I speak of the reflexive 'backfiring' of the process of modernisation, the 'internal cosmopolitisation' of national societies, the existence of 'global risk' and the 'return of uncertainty', as well as the prevalence of the 'national perspective'. In doing this, I conceptualise events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, as events that make the complexity of the 'reflexive modern' world – or, more precisely, the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation – come to the surface and become visible to social and political observers.

Building on these theoretical elaborations, I conclude the second move presented in this chapter by pointing to the analytical frame that arises from such a Beck-inspired conception of social reality. Notably, through this frame the various conceptions of the 'newness' of the world, which are manifest in the re-production of the 'globalisation'-discourse, are to be seen as ways, in which the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation, that is, the 'internal cosmopolitisation of national societies', the existence of 'global risk' and the 'return of uncertainty', are dealt with and negotiated. As such,

2 To make the text more readable from now on, I use the term 'national perspective' to include also scholarly takes on the world that follow 'methodological nationalism'.

in the vein of my pre-supposed conception of ‘reflexive modern’ social reality, their study facilitates nothing less but insights into the nature of the ‘national perspective’ in distinct historical moments.

PROCLAMATIONS OF THE ‘NEW WORLD’

As outlined in the previous chapter, the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were widely taken to mark the advent of a ‘new’ era. They were regarded as heralding the advent of a ‘new world’ that *came*. This is manifest in the fact that new concepts were perceived to be necessary and new theories were thought to be required to grasp the world. As outlined in Chapter 4, it was this conviction that a ‘new world’ had come, which opened the path for the idea/s ‘globalisation’ to come to be ‘in the true’ and for the neologism *globalisation* to enter the language as a socially ratified word.

In the previous chapter, I pointed to manifestations of perceptions of the post-1989 world as a ‘new world’ in the *scholarly* discourse. I referred to various instances, in which scholars expressed the conviction that established theories and concepts were not equipped any longer to grasp the post-1989 social reality. But perceptions that there was a ‘new world’ after 1989 were not exclusive to scholarly commentators. We find expressions of the ‘new world’ also beyond academic circles; here, such expressions are even more explicit. Take, for instance, US President George Bush’s public communication in the aftermath of 9 November 1989. Bush (1990a; emphasis added) saw after 1989 an “amazing *new world* of freedom” arising, explained that “to remain competitive, government must also reflect the *new world* emerging around us” (Bush 1990b; emphasis added), and cautioned US voters in 1992:

“So when you vote, you’ve got to understand the *new world*, the world after the cold war.” (Bush 1992; emphasis added)

But the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent breakdown of the bipolar bloc system is not the only relatively recent event that triggered perceptions and public proclamations of the advent of a ‘new world’. The most prominent other event, which had the same effect, was the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City on 11 September 2001 (9/11). 9/11, too, moved commentators to speak explicitly of a ‘new world’.

“In an instant and without warning on a fine fall morning, the known world had been jerked aside like a mere slide in a projector, and a *new world* had been rammed into its place”,

writes Jonathan Schell (2001; emphasis added) on 12 September 2001 in *The Nation*. The 'new world' is also a prominent feature of US President George W. Bush's Public Papers (for the following see also Selchow 2011 and 2013):

"On the morning of September the 11th, 2001, our Nation awoke to a nightmare attack. Nineteen men armed with box cutters took control of airplanes and turned them into missiles. They used them to kill nearly 3,000 innocent people. We watched the Twin Towers collapse before our eyes, and it became instantly clear that we'd entered a *new world* and a dangerous new war." (Bush 2006; emphasis added)

"The last choice of any President ought to be to commit troops into combat. We ought to try everything possible before we commit one soul into combat, and that's why I went to the United Nations. I said, 'We see a threat. How about you?' You've passed resolutions before – resolution after resolution after resolution. And I said – so I said, 'There's a *new world* here.' After September the 11th, we must take threats seriously." (Bush 2004; emphasis added)

"The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, [...] revealed the outlines of a *new world*." (Bush 2005; emphasis added)

"In the *new world* we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action." (Bush 2002; emphasis added)

More generally, after 9/11 the adjective *new* came to be used to modify all sorts of nouns, from *struggle*, *terrorism* and *threats* to *war*, *dangers* and *enemies*, indicating that there was something different *in kind* about these phenomena. For instance, a 2002 fact sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on border security concludes, "[t]he *new* threats and opportunities of the 21st century demand a new approach to border management" (US Department of Homeland Security 2002; emphasis added). George W. Bush (2001c) suggests to NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, "[w]e stand shoulder to shoulder in a *new kind* of struggle", fighting a "*new kind* of war" (Bush 2001d; emphasis added). In other contexts, he reminds addressees that this war was fought against a "*new kind* of enemy" (Bush 2001e; emphasis added) and, as he explains to High School students in Wisconsin, in the face of a "*new kind* of threat":

"You're graduating in a time of war, right here in America, but a war that your textbooks really haven't been able to describe before. It's a *new kind* of threat to our country." (Bush 2002b; emphasis added)

In the following section, I reflect on what is implied in this kind of 'proclamation' of the 'new world'. However, in order to carve out its characteristics, I first look at another kind of proclamation of the 'new' and draw a

contrast with it. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ is about a ‘new world’ *to come*, rather than about a ‘new’ nature and constitution of the world that *came*. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new world’, namely of the ‘new world’ *to come*, is a familiar feature of past and contemporary political discourses. It is intimately interwoven with modern premises and with a distinct idea of the temporal category ‘future’.

The modern proclamation of the ‘new’ *to come*

In modernity the ‘new’ is valued for its own sake. It is something that is to be actively, systematically and consciously promoted and reproduced (Leggewie 1996: 4). Both, the striving for the ‘new’ and innovation are seen as the engine of societal development and progress.³ The ‘new’ and innovation serve as symbols for national power, associated with economic growth and rising living standards.⁴ At the same time, however, as Claus Leggewie (*ibid.*) stresses, it is not transcendently fixed what the ‘new’ and innovation are. The ‘new’ is and always has been subject to questioning and innovation. It is a historical product.

In his discussion of political creativity, renewal and the ‘new’ Leggewie (1994) refers to Hannah Arendt (1986[1963]) and presents politics as *the* domain of innovation. He distinguishes between four political agencies of innovation: bureaucracy, movements, leaders (charisma) and intellectuals (Leggewie 1994: 8). Analysing each of these four agencies in their contemporary form and regarding their contemporary potential to (politically) innovate, Leggewie argues that each of them suffers from an epochal exhaustion of their innovating potential (*ibid.* 11). This does not mean, however, that the ‘new’ in politics has disappeared (*ibid.* 14). Rather, Leggewie (*ibid.*) argues, the ‘new’ arises these days less as the result of planned intellectual endeavours and collective action, and more as the product of external, unexpected and incisive events – like the fall of the Berlin Wall or, as I would add, 9/11.

Yet, despite the importance of incisive mega-events relative to the actual innovative power of political agencies today, the *striving* for the ‘new’ remains to be a central feature of political practices and discourses. It remains highly valued. Doing politics remains to be about (the proclamation of) the explicit striving for the ‘new’ and the commitment to innovate.

One of the most prominent and remarkable historical examples of the striving for the ‘new’ is captured in the narrative of the US as the ‘New World’, which is nothing less than one of the founding “myths that made

3 For a comprehensive overview and discussion of the ‘new’ in philosophy, see Norbert Rath (1984).

4 With reference to the first World Exhibition, the ‘Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations’ in 1851 in London, Kendra Briken (2006: 22) points to the important role that the ‘new’ and innovation play in national narratives.

“America” (Paul 2014). This ‘New World’-narrative is inscribed in US culture in fundamental ways. Most obviously it is captured in the narrative of Christopher Columbus’ landing on an island in the Caribbean in 1492. Columbus’ landing was officially commemorated for the first time in 1792, when the USA was established. It was glorified in this context as “the greatest event in the history of mankind since the death of our Savior” (de Lancry quoted in Schuman, Schwartz and d’Arcy 2005: 6). It was further glorified and ‘translated’ into the metaphor ‘Columbia’. “[R]epresenting the new land, the exotic wilderness of North America”, Columbia did not only serve as the feminine “symbolic counterpart to George Washington, who was seen as imposing order and reason upon the land through republican government”, as Cynthia Koch (1996: 32) observes,⁵ it also helped to symbolically demarcate the ‘New World’ against the ‘Old World’. The renaming of *King’s College* in New York City after the American Revolution in 1784 into *Columbia College* and eventually (in 1912) into *Columbia University* is just one example of the explicit break with the ‘old’.

The narrative of America as the ‘New World’ is an example of the striving for the ‘new’ *to come* because it is only *symbolically* linked to Columbus’ actual travel in 1492. The vision of a ‘new world’ was already in the European mind before Columbus even started his journey and accidentally landed on an island off the coast of what is now Venezuela.⁶ The *ex post*

5 Just think of the name that was chosen for the new nation’s capital: Washington, District of Columbia. In this name the ‘exotic’ and ‘wild’ feminine and the ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ masculine are juxtaposed and at the same time symbolically united. A problematic feminization of the ‘New World’ is also apparent in Samuel E. Morison’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Columbus biography from 1942, in which he glorifies Columbus’ landing as a capturing of ‘the pure’ and ‘the untouched’ when he writes, “never again may mortal men hope to recapture the amazement, the wonder, the delight of those October days in 1492 when the New World gracefully yielded her virginity to the conquering Castilians” (quoted in O’Gorman 1961: 44).

6 In various respects it is obvious that Columbus did not actually ‘discover’ the ‘New World’. There is clearly something problematic about the idea that a man is said to have ‘discovered’ a land as ‘new’, which was already inhabited by people with century-old civilisations. As Russell Thornton (1987: xv) stresses in his account of what he calls the “American Indian Holocaust”: “Columbus did not [...] discover the ‘New World’. It was already old when he came to it.” The common perception that Columbus ‘discovered’ America as the ‘New World’ makes us aware of the particular, namely European perspective implied in this notion; obviously the ‘discovered’ continent was ‘new’ only from the perspective of the Old World, which, in turn, was ‘old’ only in the face of the ‘new’. But even if we accept the European exploration of the Western hemisphere including Columbus’ landfall on one of the islands in the Caribbean Sea in 1492 and the eventual landing of his men on the coast of what is now called Venezuela in

understanding of his actual landing as the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ was just “the actualization of a fiction, the founding of a world that had its origins in books before it became a concrete and tangible *terra firma*”, as Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria points out (quoted in Dash 1998: 22). In this sense, it was in retrospect that Columbus’ journey came to be utilised as the opening chapter in a narrative of the ‘new’, that is, of a break with ‘old Europe’ that had already long been imagined as a story of an inexorable “‘progress of civilization’ leading directly from Columbus to Washington” (Koch 1996: 32). As we can see in Michael Berliner’s (1999) (suspect) defence of “Western civilization” as the “objectively superior culture”, the ‘new world’ was already there before it was literally ‘discovered’; it existed independently of Columbus and the ‘discovery’ of America:

“Did Columbus ‘discover’ America? Yes – in every important respect. This does not mean that no human eye had been cast on America before Columbus arrived. It does mean that Columbus brought America to the attention of the civilized world, i.e., to the growing, scientific civilizations of Western Europe. The result, ultimately, was the United States of America.”

In a similar vein, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1941) explains in 1941:

“America has been the New World in all tongues, and to all peoples, not because this continent was a new-found land, but because all those who came here believed they could create upon this continent a new life – a life that should be new in freedom.”

The case of the narrative of America as the ‘New World’ is one of the most prominent and obvious examples for the striving for the ‘new’ to come.⁷

1498 as a ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’, it is still not natural that Columbus was accredited with its ‘discovery’. Apart from the fact that forebears of the Native Americans came from the Asian continent and that there are suggestions of an African ‘discovery’ of America some 3,000 years ago (see Cohen URL), Columbus was not even the first *European*, who explored the Western hemisphere; there were Scandinavian-lead explorations some 500 years before Columbus reached the shore of South America. These Scandinavian explorations led famously to Leif Ericson’s settlement ‘Vinland’ on what is now called Newfoundland (see further Quinn 1977). And, of course, Columbus actually never conceived his ‘discovery’ as the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ to begin with; he thought he arrived in India. Arguably, it was Amerigo Vespucci who ‘discovered’ the ‘discovered’ land as a ‘New World’, in that he realised that this was a continent that was unknown to the ‘Old World’.

7 In the context of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 it was played out by then-US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2003), who called Germany and France (both countries were opposing a war in Iraq) a “problem” and labelled

However, we do not need to search far to also find contemporary manifestations of the fondness for the 'new' and the striving for it. They are manifest in everyday political rhetoric. The proclamation of the 'new' *to come* as the result of the doing of an entrepreneurial agent is a popular and, in fact, essential move in political rhetoric. No matter if 'conservative' or 'progressive', no one can afford not to allude to the 'new' in their fight for political support and the legitimization of their power.

Take, for instance, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008; emphasis added), who declares that "[w]e have got to have the *new* thinking that is necessary for the future". In their 2010 government programmes, Brown's successors David Cameron and Nick Clegg, too, assure the public that they "are both committed to turning old thinking on its head and developing *new* approaches to government" (Cameron and Clegg 2010: 7; emphasis added). French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007) took office as a self-proclaimed inventor of "un nouveau modèle français". In a 1990 address to the United Nations General Assembly, US President George Bush (1990; emphasis added) stresses that

"[i]t is in our hands [...] to press forward to cap a historic movement towards a new world order and a long era of peace. We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War."

In her 2009 government declaration (*Regierungserklärung*), German Chancellor Angela Merkel (2009) promises that her government would lead Germany on the right path to develop a 'new strength'.⁸ And in their respec-

and dismissed them as "old Europe", that is, as a Europe which is backwards looking and has no sense of the spirit of the time. The 'old Europe'-expression was taken up in political discourses since then in various ways. Given the strong public opinion opposing a war in Iraq, in Germany Rumsfeld's 'old Europe'-dismissal was immediately taken as a compliment and filled with positive notions; the *Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache* (URL) elected the German translation ('altes Europa') as the 'word of the year' in 2003. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin (2003), in his speech to the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003, also referred to it and re-wrote the 'old Europe'-phrase by using it to remind of the wealth of Europe's (old) experience: "This message comes to you today from an old country, France, from a continent like mine, Europe, that has known wars, occupation and barbarity". And UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2009b) took up the phrase in a speech to the US Congress, stressing: "There is no old Europe, no new Europe, there is only your friend Europe."

8 At the same time, however, Angela Merkel's 2009 election campaign ran under the motto '*Keine Experimente*' ('No experiments'), which is a slogan that is preserving and conservative, rather than shaped by the promise of innovation and radical renewal. As Ketterer (2007) explains, the '*Keine Experimente*'-slogan is a motto that her conservative party, CDU, already used in the 1957 election cam-

tive Inaugural Addresses US Presidents Barack Obama (2009; emphasis added) announces “a *new* way forward”, and Ronald Reagan (1985; emphasis added) states that

“[w]e must think *anew* and move with a *new* boldness. [...] The time has come for a *new* American emancipation. [...] From *new* freedom will spring *new* opportunities.”

George Bush (1989; emphasis added) commences his term on the basis that “[t]here is *new* ground to be broken and *new* action to be taken”; Jimmy Carter (1977; emphasis added) makes clear: “This inauguration ceremony marks a *new* beginning, a *new* dedication within our Government, and a *new* spirit among us all”; and Bill Clinton (1997; emphasis added) stresses:

“We need a *new* Government for a *new* century. [...] With a *new* vision of Government, a *new* sense of responsibility, a *new* spirit of community, we will sustain America’s journey. [...] The promise we sought in a *new* land, we will find again in a land of *new* promise. In this *new* land, education will be every citizen’s most prized possession. [...] Yes, let us build our bridge, a bridge wide enough and strong enough for every American to cross over to a blessed land of *new* promise.”

These examples – especially the repeated proclamations of the ‘new’ in the Inaugural Addresses of the US Presidents – show us that no matter what kind of a political vision is implied, reassurance about a striving for the ‘new’ and the proclamation of the ‘new’ *to come* are key components of political rhetoric. In fact, the ‘new’ is not only invoked in instances, in which actors promise ‘new deals’, ‘new agendas’, ‘new beginnings’ and ‘new visions’, but also in the context of regressions to the ‘old’. It is not infrequent that references to and conservations of the past are framed as acts of renewal: “Let us *renew* our determination, our courage, and our strength. And let us *renew* our faith and our hope”, demands Ronald Reagan in 1981 – and what Jimmy Carter (1977; emphasis added) actually means when he refers to “the *new* national spirit of unity and trust” is, as he makes clear, “a fresh faith in the old dream.”

paign to promote Konrad Adenauer. The CDU won the 1957 elections with an absolute majority. In fact, 1957 was the only time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that a party won the absolute majority of votes. With the slogan ‘Keine Experimente’, the CDU campaigned for its re-election by targeting plans of the Social Democrats (SPD), such as the idea for the FRG to leave NATO. The CDU argued in 1957 that a victory of the SPD would lead to a state of uncertainty, which the Federal Republic of Germany could not afford in times of the Cold War; as Adenauer dramatically and famously warned: “Ein Sieg der SPD bedeutet den Untergang Deutschlands” (‘A victory of the SPD would mean the downfall of Germany’); for the above see Ketterer (2007).

If we take the above quoted Brown's and his successors Cameron and Clegg's promises of a "new thinking" and acknowledge that, arguably, they had different ideas in mind as to what this 'new thinking' would and should look like, we become aware that in these kinds of invocations of the 'new' the 'new' is valuable in itself, and above and beyond the way, in which it is actually filled with meaning. To promise the 'new' is a discursively required and widely shared practice that political actors seem to feel motivated to participate in because, referring back to the above referenced Briken and Leggewie, the 'new' is valued for its own sake. It is a modern paradigm, which generates meanings that are then spread through discourse, as Briken (2006: 24) explains. As a central component in and product of the discourse of modernity, the 'new' implies and evokes the key modern premises of development and progress. As famously inscribed in and promoted by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1912), innovation and entrepreneurship are considered to play a central part in economic development. With that, the 'new' is accredited with the role of *the* driver of progress. This means, simultaneously, that the 'new' is never simply the 'new' but always also an '*improvement*' on the past, that is, on what has been or will be 'renewed' (see Briken 2006: 27).

Following from the above, the 'new' – as well as the innovator, as the one, who promises and pushes for the 'new', who sets out to explore 'new directions', is dedicated to 'new thinking' and is, like David Cameron and Nick Clegg (2010), "committed to turning old thinking on its head" – is attributed with intrinsic positive value. In their study "Innovation and the Post-Original: On Moral Stances and Reproduction", Alf Rehn and Sheena Vachhani (2006: 310) find that, given the central role of the idea of innovation and entrepreneurship and the positive value that is attributed to these phenomena within the modern(-economic) discourse, the innovator takes the position of "a heroic figure, one who opposes old regimes and creates a rift in the weave of economic time, ushering in the new". This positive value and the positive, if not at times, even ecstatic language of the 'new' and the entrepreneur is, for instance, apparent in the following extract from a policy paper of the UK Institute for Public Policy Research on "The Entrepreneurial Society" (Gavron, Cowling, Holtham and Westall 1998: i):

"If we can make Britain 'a country of enterprises' we will as a consequence advance and progress in new technology and we will reduce unemployment as well as increasing self-employment. A society in which entrepreneurship is valued and encouraged is a dynamic society. Entrepreneurs bring new ideas and new life to old industries, they create new industries, they look at established practices with new eyes, they question everything, they shake up old comfortable habits and customs, they eschew complacency, they make fortunes for themselves and others and they spend them, thus recirculating the money for the good of the economy."

In political discourses, this intrinsic positive value of the 'new' and the innovator means that alternative perspectives and suggestions are rendered

unacceptable *a priori*. As a consequence, the position of the innovator is discursively legitimised, and critique of and political alternatives to their ‘new’ approaches are discredited. For instance, once Nicolas Sarkozy managed to symbolically capture the role as innovator, he was in a discursive position to demonize “opposition to change” as having never “been so dangerous for France” (Sarkozy 2007).

Yet, as we learn from Leggewie (1964: 4), what the ‘new’ is and should be, does not stand beyond debate, and is itself subject to steady innovation. It is historical and, with that, it is political, subject to power and subject to change.

Proclaiming the ‘new world’ that *came*

The above sketched striving for the ‘new’ and the proclamation of the ‘new’ *to come* are a familiar component of modern life. They are a valued expression of progress and are perceived as necessary for modern civilisation and development. This lifts the proclaimer of the ‘new’ into a powerful position, loaded with positive value.

The perception that the world *is* a ‘new world’, i.e. the proclamation of a ‘new world’ that *came*, differs significantly from the striving for the ‘new’ *to come* that I sketched above. The acknowledgment that there is a “new world emerging around us” (Bush 1990b), that “[t]here’s a new world here” (Bush 2004), as, for instance, both Presidents Bush proclaim in their respective historical socio-political contexts, is not about a vision for a ‘new world’ *to come*. It constitutes a statement about the world as it *is*. It is a statement about the constitution of the world in and of itself. As a consequence, this kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ implies a particular speaking position, one which is different from the ‘modern’ proclamation of the ‘new’ that I sketched above.

This speaking position has a number of features. Most significantly, it is a less active position. The one, who proclaims the ‘new’ that *came*, takes the position of an ‘observer’, rather than a shaper and innovator in and of this world. The proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came* renders the proclaimer, the decision maker, as a passive person, merely reacting to a world that is ‘out there’, one with which they are suddenly confronted and that has changed all of the sudden, triggered by incisive events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or 9/11, without the person doing anything. The task and challenge that this (supposed) ‘new world’ poses to the observer (due to its ‘newness’) is not so much to shape it but to understand it correctly and to adapt to it. This requires a distinct expertise of analytic skill and, crucially, and in a somewhat self-reinforcing way, the ability and ‘willingness’ to see that the world *is* ‘new’ to begin with.

Drawing on the above, first of all, there is a sense of ‘objectivity’ insinuated in this proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world. While the announcement of a ‘new thinking’, a ‘new agenda’ or a ‘new vision’ to be brought forward by an agent is unmistakably a political claim, the proclama-

tion that it is the world 'out there' that *is* (suddenly) 'new', appears more 'innocent', neutral, and descriptive, that is, it appears to be less politically loaded or, indeed, not politically loaded at all. Consequently, political decisions, which are taken in the face (of a supposedly neutral observation) of a 'new world', appear as if they 'naturally' flow from, and are 'naturally' justified by reference to the very existence of the 'new' state of affairs. These political decisions readily take the form of inevitable and natural *re*-actions, rather than particular political moves and pro-actions.

But, of course, the proclamation of the 'new' that *came* is no more a neutral observation of a world 'out there' than the announcement and promise of a 'new world' *to come*. To begin with, and referring to my discussion in Chapter 4, it requires a distinct discursive opening for something to be 'allowed' to be seen as 'new', i.e. for the claim that something is 'new', to be 'in the true'. In this sense, acknowledging the 'new' that *came* is always already a product of the discursive environment, from within which it is 'observed'. It is not a context-free observation. Furthermore, as we saw in the brief overview of the various ideas that have come to be associated with the word *globalisation*, the 'new world' is inevitably filled with conceptions that are grounded in both, distinct lived realities and existing webs of meanings.

Pushing this point further, the proclamation of the 'new' that *came* can be seen as a promising strategic move in the constant struggle over the legitimisation of past and future decisions and the presentation of one (understanding of the) world as more 'real' than another. The following quote by US President George W. Bush, already extracted above, is an excellent illustration of the potential power and use of the proclamation of the 'newness' of the world as a means to legitimise decisions and actions. The quote shows how the supposed 'newness' of the world is used to legitimise and 'naturalise', in this case *ex post*, a particular decision, namely the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003:

"The last choice of any President ought to be to commit troops into combat. We ought to try everything possible before we commit one soul into combat, and that's why I went to the United Nations. I said, 'We see a threat. How about you?' You've passed resolutions before – resolution after resolution after resolution. And I said – so I said, 'There's a new world here.' After September the 11th, we must take threats seriously." (Bush 2004)

As these words suggest, it is because 'there is a new world here' that the decision to intervene militarily in Iraq is presented as justified. Another apt example on the same lines is the following claim, made in the Introduction to the 2002 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS 2002):

“In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”

Again, it is the (proclaimed) existence of the ‘new world’ that ‘naturalises’ the decision to adopt an ‘active’ approach to ‘peace and security’. This quote illustrates that the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world is a particularly promising move in efforts to legitimise past and future decisions precisely because it camouflages a political move under a cloak of obviousness, innocence and objectivity. In the particular case of the NSS 2002, it ‘naturalises’ a pro-active and, in fact, pre-emptive approach to security.⁹

In addition, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came* evokes a historical caesura. The ‘observation’ that we are confronted with a ‘new world’, ‘new enemies’, ‘new threats’ and ‘new challenges’, in the sense of new *kinds of* threats, new *kinds of* enemies and new *kinds of* challenges insinuates an ontological uncertainty. This ontological uncertainty implies a state of epistemological uncertainty. It symbolically produces a state, in which – given the supposed ‘newness’ of the world – we have lost the ability to readily understand the very nature of the present. To proclaim that the world, in which we live, has come to be ‘new’, as a result of an event like the fall of the Berlin Wall or 9/11, establishes a historical divide into a ‘before’ and ‘after’, carves historical time neatly and decisively, and defines the relationship between the temporal categories ‘past’ and ‘present’ in a particular way. It implies that experiences of the past no longer hold in the ‘new’ reality, which has supplanted the familiar, the known world. As such, it fuels a notion of and legitimises a state of exception, in which constant adaption to an ‘unknown’ world is necessary. In this ‘new world’, it is no longer just the future that must be predicted but the present itself. This prediction, however, must do without (experiences of) the past because the past is no longer a trustworthy basis for such an endeavour (see further Selchow 2013). This is precisely what is implied in President George W. Bush’s earlier quoted post-9/11 address to US High School students, in which he explains:

“You’re graduating in a time of war, right here in America, but a war that your textbooks really haven’t been able to describe before. It’s a new kind of threat to our country.” (Bush 2002b)

These words insinuate that, in the ‘new (post-9/11) world’, existing textbooks and, by extension, existing analyses have lost their value. The past does not provide the ground for decisions to be taken in the present. It does not provide guidance for action in the ‘new world’. This means, while the proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came* implies a speaking position that is less active than the one implied in the proclamation of the ‘new’ *to come*, it

9 For a discussion of the pre-emptive turn in security practices, see for instance de Goede (2008) and Stockdale (2013).

opens a distinct space for actors to move on in this 'new world'. It paves the path for potential moves, which are made independent of historical knowledge and past experiences.¹⁰

I will pick up these points and refine them in Chapter 6, in which I conceptualise the 'new world' as a distinct mode of the temporal category 'present' and position it in line with the categories 'past' and 'future'. For now, we take from the above the distinction between the proclamation of the 'new world' *to come*, as an expression of the modern fondness for the striving for the 'new world', and the proclamation of the 'new' that *came*. The latter is the kind of 'new world' that is implied in the reaction to the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system, which, as I discussed in Chapter 3, allowed 'globalisation' to come to be 'in the true.'

THE PROCLAMATION OF THE 'NEW WORLD' AS A MANIFESTATION OF AN 'AWARENESS' OF THE REFLEXIVE 'BACKFIRING' OF MODERNISATION

In the previous section, I reflected on what it means when social actors 'proclaim' that there is something 'new' about the world. In this section, I make a move in a different direction. While I stay with the issue of the 'new world', I take up a different scholarly position and suggest that we understand the proclamation of the 'new' that *came* as a manifestation of an 'awareness' of the complexity of the 'reflexive modern' social world, in general, and, in particular, as a manifestation of the 'reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation'; the latter being constituted by three aspects: the "internal cosmopolitisation" (Beck 2006: 2) of national societies, the existence of

10 Taking the above together, it can be argued that the proclamation of a 'new' post-9/11 world played a significant role in the construction of 9/11 and the narrative of the 'global war on terror'. It helped to open the path for the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein. This interpretation is supported by the observation that plans to remove Saddam Hussein from power were not just developed in the aftermath of and in direct reaction to 9/11. A public letter to President Bill Clinton in 1998 illustrates that the idea has been there before. In this letter, prominent US public commentators, among them Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, demanded "a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power" (Project for the New America 1998). It was not only a change in administration that this plan was followed through. The distinct construction of 9/11 and, as I argue, the construction of the world as 'new', that is, as different in kind and demanding radically new moves, opened the possibility for such a move and helped to put the 1998-plan into action.

“global risk” (Beck 1992, 1999, also 2009a), and the “return of uncertainty” (Beck 1994: 8; also Bonß 1996).

To put forward such a suggestion presupposes a particular conception of the world, one which is grounded in an interpretation of sociologist Ulrich Beck’s work. According to this conception, social reality is shaped by (the interplay of) the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation, constituted by the just mentioned ‘internal cosmopolitanisation’¹¹ of national societies, ‘global risk’ and ‘return of uncertainty’, on the one side, and the prevalence of the “national perspective” and “methodological nationalism” (Beck 2006), on the other side.

In what follows, I provide an account of this conception of social reality. I start by elaborating on each of the two aspects that shape social reality. I do this by building on Beck (especially 1994, 2004, 2006), as well as, my own interpretation of his theory, as outlined elsewhere (see Selchow 2015a, 2016a). Having sketched this conception, I then move to elaborate on my claim that the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that *came* is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ for this kind of social reality.

Beck’s ‘provisional’ project of rethinking how we think about social reality

In his rich and extensive scholarship, sociologist Ulrich Beck paints a complex picture of the state and nature of contemporary national societies.¹² Beyond the bounds of his home discipline sociology, it is especially his ‘risk society’-thesis (see Beck 1986, 1992, 1999a, 2009a) that has attracted attention and that has inspired not only scholarly but also public imaginations. Yet, ‘risk society’ is only one component of Beck’s social theory. It is just one of three theorems that constitute his theory of social reality, the other two being “cosmopolitanisation” (especially Beck 2004, 2006) and “individualisation” (e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1994). In this sense, it is unproductive to take Beck as a ‘risk’-scholar, as it has been done by many in the political studies and IR discourse. Such a conception of Beck distracts from what is at the heart of his scholarship and from the key drivers of his intellectual endeavour. Beck is not a ‘risk’-scholar, narrowly understood, and his ‘risk society’-thesis is not a theory of ‘risk’ as such. Rather, it is an attempt to *question* and deconstruct the usefulness of the modern idea ‘risk’ in its political function and applications. In this sense, the invented German word *Risikogesellschaft* (‘risk society’) is not a term that refers to a society with

11 The German word *Kosmopolitisierung* in Beck’s work is sometimes translated into English as ‘cosmopolitanisation’ (e.g. Beck 2006; Beck and Sznajder 2006) and sometimes as ‘cosmopolitanisation’ (e.g. Beck 2011, 2014). In his most recent work, it is consistently the latter. Both terms mean the same. I use the word *cosmopolitanisation*.

12 The following elaborations and interpretation of Beck build on Selchow (2016a).

more 'risks', as it is sometimes understood (e.g. Krahmann 2011). On the contrary, the word serves to signal that 'risk' and 'society' no longer work as concepts to grasp social reality (see Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014).

Beck's overarching aim and main scholarly passion was to trigger an epistemological shift in sociology, in particular, and in the social sciences, more generally. Most recently, he uses the word *metamorphosis* to capture the kind of change that, he holds, modern societies are subject to, a change that warrants a new approach, in fact, a new epistemology (Beck 2016; also Beck 2015). As Bronner (1995: 68) puts it, Beck's main conviction is that "[w]e live in a world [...] different from the one in which we think." This striving for a radically different way of approaching and understanding social reality is grounded in Beck's particular conception of this reality as a 'new' reality.

As I put it elsewhere (Selchow 2016a), the ambitious goal to completely rethink how we see and think about society – namely, by moving beyond the (modern) language of 'development', 'change' and '(social) transformation', and away from the (naturalised) focus on the nation-state as *the* guiding social and political category – accounts for the kind of 'provisionality' that shapes Beck's work. This provisionality is manifest in his writings in two ways. First, it is manifest in the sometimes loose and what appears to be inconsistent use of words and, arguably, even concepts throughout Beck's texts: is it "cosmopolitanisation" (e.g. Beck 2006) or "cosmopolitanisation" (e.g. Beck 2011)? Is there a difference between "imagined cosmopolitan risk communities" (Beck and Grande 2010), "imagined communities of global risk" (Beck 2011) and "cosmopolitan communities of climate risk" (Beck, Blok, Tyfield and Zhang 2013)? And where exactly is the dividing line between his idea of 'risk', 'danger' and 'catastrophe'? Beck sometimes uses these words and concepts interchangeably. Second, the provisionality is manifest in his theory itself, which does not always unfold in a strictly consistent way across his various publications. Most obviously, as he himself acknowledges, there are two interpretations of 'reflexive modernisation' in his writings, where only one fully captures the essence of his main thesis (see Beck 2013).¹³

And yet, this 'provisionality' is not a shortcoming in Beck's writing. It is something that lies in the nature of the exercise in which he was involved and to which he was committed. The provisionality mirrors "the ambivalent character of the world [Beck] describes", argues Bronner (1995: 67). "In the state of total change we try to think this change. This is difficult", Beck explains, self-reflectively adding, "hence, we cannot appear with full confidence", implying the imperative of constant adjustment and rewriting along the path of discovery and theorisation (Beck 2013; my own translation). In this sense, as I also suggest elsewhere (see Selchow 2016a), Beck's language use and theory development was, and had to be, about the invention,

13 I return to this point in due course.

testing and rewriting of concepts and frameworks – ‘provisional’, playful, sweeping and somewhat provocative, but at the same time, inviting and open to critique, by virtue of the nature of the task he set himself.

Taking into account these general comments on Beck’s *oeuvre*, what follows is not a comprehensive account of Beck’s theory but a conception of contemporary social reality that is grounded in a purposeful and selective reading and interpretation of his writings. In this conception, social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay. As mentioned above, these two aspects are, on the one side, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation and, on the other side, the prevalence of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. In the following, I elaborate on each of these two aspects in turn.

The reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, comprising the ‘internal cosmopolitanisation’ of national societies, ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’

With the term ‘reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation’ I capture three aspects that together shape contemporary social reality: the ‘internal cosmopolitanisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. These aspects are intimately interwoven in, both, empirical reality and Beck’s writings. They determine each other but are not of the same order. Yet, in order to reduce complexity, I present each of them side by side, separately from each other, and as if they belonged to the same class of phenomena.

First, in the conception of contemporary social reality that constitutes the ‘pre-theoretical commitment’, which shapes my take on the omnipresence of *global*, national societies and their institutions are shaped by a process called “cosmopolitanisation” (especially Beck 2004, 2006).¹⁴ The term *cosmopolitanisation* refers to the unfolding enmeshment of lived realities, that is, of cultures and horizons of experience (*Erfahrungshorizonte*) and horizons of expectation (*Erwartungshorizonte*). Cosmopolitanisation is, as Beck (2006: 19) stresses, a “really existing” process that shapes modern national societies. He invents the German word *Wirklichkeitskosmopolitismus*¹⁵ to stress this important point (Beck 2004: 31). This term is used to make sure that ‘cosmopolitanisation’ is not misunderstood as a normative project that social agents *choose* to advance (or not). Cosmopolitanisation is not to be confused with what is usually referred to with the word *cosmopolitanism*.¹⁶ The process cosmopolitanisation, this enmeshment of lived realities, of cultures, horizons of experience and horizons of expectation, is not a conscious and

14 The following builds on Selchow (2016a).

15 The word *Wirklichkeit* is to be translated as *reality*.

16 For a short elaboration of the distinction between cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanisation in Beck’s own words, see Beck (2009: 13).

intended process that is triggered and guided by the normative ideals of the (elite) project of cosmopolitanism. Rather, in Beck's conception, the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and national societies unfolds and shapes lived realities, societies and institutions, regardless of whether there is an awareness and appreciation of it, and regardless of whether this is wanted and/or intended. The internal cosmopolitisation of national societies unfolds as a *side effect* of actions.

It is crucial to appreciate the significance of the idea of cosmopolitisation being a *side effect* because it captures the important point that the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality unfolds in the process of actions and decisions that are actually targeted at other ends – not at a cosmopolitisation of lived reality, in general, and national societies, in particular. What is meant by the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and national societies is not a process that is voluntarily, let alone, strategically set into gear under the label 'cosmopolitisation'; rather, it is a process that inevitably, unintentionally and 'accidentally' happens to be set into gear by actions of social actors, which go under different labels and which are motivated by different intentions. As Beck puts it, the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies is an

"unwanted [in the sense of unintended] and unobserved [in the sense of unseen] side effect of actions that are not intended as 'cosmopolitan' in the normative sense." (Beck 2006: 18)

It is

"an unforeseen social effect of actions directed to other ends performed by human beings operating within a network of global interdependence risks." (ibid. 48)

It is worth taking up Beck's example of the hiring practice of the German football club *1. FC Bayern München* to illustrate this point (ibid. 11). The practice of hiring football players from around the world as a strategic practice undertaken by the managers of the club in order to create a world class football team has the unintended side effect of setting into gear a process of internal cosmopolitisation of Bavaria, because, as Beck (ibid.) puts it, it produces

"a profane cosmopolitan 'We' in which the boundaries between internal and external, between the national and the international, have long since been transcended. Bayern Munich symbolizes a cosmopolitan Bavaria that officially cannot and must not exist in Bavaria, but [...] exists. Indeed, without this taken-for-granted cosmopolitanism Bayern Munich [...] would not exist."¹⁷

17 In the original this reads: "Ich lebe in München. Wenn es richtig ist, daß der kosmopolitische Blick die kosmopolitischen Potenzen der Provinz aufdeckt,

But the idea that the cosmopolitisation of social reality is a *side effect* also means that even explicitly *exclusive* actions entail a cosmopolitisation. This makes it an “irreversible” (Beck 2006: 74) and long-term process. As a consequence, as Beck argues,

“consciousness and politics are for that very reason fundamentally ambivalent. But the converse also holds: because consciousness and politics are fundamentally ambivalent, the cosmopolitanization of reality is advancing. For example, all ‘opponents of globalization’ share with their ‘opponents’ the global communications media (thereby enhancing their utility for promoting and organizing transnational protest movements).” (ibid. 74)

This means that even actions, which can be seen to have been actively and consciously taken *against* a reality of enmeshed lives, inevitably fuel the process of the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and of national societies. Anti-European parties, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), constitute another helpful example to illustrate this point (Beck 2014a). They follow an exclusionary and anti-Europe(an integration) doctrine but, in order to be ‘successful’ as anti-EU parties, their representatives sit in the European parliament. In fact, they *have* to sit in the European parliament in order to succeed. In doing so, they ‘accidentally’ but inevitably fuel the process of the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and of national societies, as a(n unintended) side effect of their *active* striving for exclusion. In this sense, the cosmopolitisation of national societies does not necessarily lead to a normatively ‘cosmopolitan’ reality:

dann muß sich das auch am Beispiel Münchens zeigen lassen: Was meint kosmopolitisches München? Zunächst – im Sinne des banalen Kosmopolitismus – *Bayern München*. Thomas Mann schreibt: ‘München leuchtet.’ Vielleicht darf man Thomas Mann trivialisieren: *Bayern München* leuchtet – jedenfalls dann, wenn die Fußball-Profis dieses weltberühmten Clubs schöne Tore schießen. Steht *Bayern München*, stehen DIE Bayern für Bayern? Ohne jeden Zweifel. Stehen DIE Bayern für ‘wir sind wir’ oder – wie es auf Bayerisch heißt – ‘mir san mir’? Niemals! Ausgeschlossen! Wer schießt die Tore? Oft genug ein Brasilianer, dessen Ballzauber dem Münchner Fussball-Club Weltklasse verleiht. Bayern-Spieler sind selbstverständlich ursprünglich weder Bayern noch Münchner, sondern vielfältigen nationalen Ursprungs, sprechen mit vielen Zungen, haben viele Pässe. Worauf manche in Bayern so großen Wert legen: Mir san mir und die Anderen die Anderen, gilt dort nicht, wo das Bayerische Herz schlägt. *Bayern München* steht für ein profan-kosmopolitisches Wir, in dem die Grenzen von innen und außen, von national und international längst ueberwunden sind. *Bayern München* symbolisiert ein kosmopolitisches Bayern, das es in Bayern offiziell weder geben darf noch geben kann, nur gibt. Mehr noch: Ohne diesen selbstverständlichen Kosmopolitismus gäbe es DIE Bayern, also Bayern, nicht” (Beck 2004: 20-21).

"There is no necessary relation between the internal cosmopolitanization of national societies and the emergence of a cosmopolitan consciousness, subject or agent",

writes Beck (2006: 74).

A third and final example not only further illustrates the above point but also builds a bridge between this first and the second aspect that constitutes the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation and shapes contemporary national societies, namely the existence of 'global risk'. Following the above conception of the internal cosmopolitanisation of social reality and of national societies as a side effect of actions that are targeted at other ends, the exclusive, in the sense of explicitly national decisions and actions to increase the German GDP by, for instance, promoting the production of automobiles through German companies, have to be seen as 'accidentally' setting into gear the process of the internal cosmopolitanisation of Germany. This is because these exclusive, national decisions inevitably link Germany and, say, Tuvalu. They enmesh German (national) lived reality with Tuvaluan (national) lived reality through the (potential) consequences of Germany's exclusive, national decisions, i.e. consequences such as rising sea levels and the warming of the climate beyond 2°C due to a (possible) increase in carbon emissions. In this sense, as Beck and Grande (2010: 417) put it, cosmopolitanisation is a process that 'accidentally' brings the "global other" into the midst of other "global others" – the internal cosmopolitanisation of social reality unfolds accidentally and, in this case, as the product of exclusive national actions and decisions.

But there is more to this example than that it further illustrates what has been said above. The issue of 'unintended consequences' brings us to the second aspect that shapes contemporary social reality and national societies. This is the existence of what Beck calls "global risk" (Beck 1992, 1999, also 2009a). To understand what is meant by 'global risk', it is necessary to start with a brief look at the idea 'risk'.

'Risk' is a child of modernity.¹⁸ It is a modern way of dealing with the uncertainty of the future. Generally speaking, notions of uncertainty and the unknown are central components in socio-political life. The way a society perceives and deals with uncertainty and the unknown, more broadly, how it understands and deals with the future, affects its political action in the present.¹⁹ Perceptions of uncertainty and the unknown impact on the way political decisions are made in that they shape what decisions are perceived socially acceptable, that is, legitimate. As Brian Wynne and Kerstin Dressel (2001) show in their comparative study of German and UK perceptions of and reactions to the (potential) danger of bovine spongiform encephalopathy

18 For the following paragraphs, see Selchow (2014: 69-70); also Loughnan and Selchow (2013: 274-282).

19 In Chapter 6, I elaborate in more detail on the relationship between the temporal categories 'past', 'present' and 'future'.

(BSE), which became an issue in Europe in the late 1990s, there are cultural differences in perceptions of uncertainty and the unknown, leading to fundamentally different political decisions.²⁰ These different political decisions are, however, each perceived as ‘reasonable’ and legitimate in their respective cultural contexts. Over and above this, the criteria for legitimate decisions are not only culturally specific but of course also historical – they are valid at a specific moment but might change over time.

Yet, despite their cultural specificities, what modern societies, like the UK and Germany, share is an approach to uncertainty and the unknown that is ‘active’ and ‘optimistic’; in this respect they stand in contrast to traditional societies. The modern approach to uncertainty and the unknown is ‘active’ in that it is grounded in the idea that humans have their future in their hands. This is one of the significant characteristics of modernity. Modernity is about the active “colonization of the future” (Giddens 1994: 7).

Besides being ‘active’, the modern approach to uncertainty and the unknown is ‘optimistic’ in the sense that it understands the unknown as something that *could* be known, either by overcoming (lay) ignorance or through further scientific exploration and advanced/advancing knowledge production (Wehling 2010: 265). This is an ‘optimistic’ approach to the unknown and to uncertainty, in the sense that it takes it as something that is not *yet* known. In this context, ‘risk’ is a prominent modern way of dealing with the unknown and the uncertainty of the future. More precisely, it is a way of dealing with the uncertainty that human actions (or inactions) entail. ‘Risk’ is about assessing the probability of the future occurrence of an unintended

20 Wynne and Dressel (2001) compare perceptions of what they call “actionable uncertainty” in Britain and Germany as expressed by the respective governments’ chief veterinary officers. They identify in the attitude of the British official “the taken-for-granted UK policy view of effective scientific certainty about the lack of species transferability of the BSE agent, and hence the lack of risk to humans” (*ibid.* 148). In contrast, the Germans held a very different understanding of the nature of non-knowledge and its role in policy-making. Whereas the UK officials’ “German counterparts saw that the abstract possibility of such species crossing represented a serious, that is, ‘policy-actionable’, scientific uncertainty. The UK policy-scientists frequently talked of the ‘lack of evidence’ for this possibility, hence, the ‘unscientific’ nature of the German position” (*ibid.*). Wynne and Dressel’s comparative investigation of perceptions of uncertainty and non-knowledge does not only explain the widespread public fury in Britain, claiming that the EU in general and Germany in particular acted ‘irrationally’ when they banned British beef, it also reveals the fundamentally different understandings of the phenomena of non-knowledge and uncertainty and their different role in and impact on policy-decisions: in contrast to the British, the German notion of non-knowledge and its perceived relevance lead to a more pro-active policy formation (*ibid.* 122).

consequence of an action in the present. An assessment of such kind is undertaken on the basis of past experiences.

Taking these brief points on 'risk' together, we see why it makes sense to call the tool 'risk' a 'child of modernity'. 'Risk' only makes sense within a modern cultural context, in which we have human agency and in which the future is imagined as able to be shaped by agents, rather than pre-determined by a higher force (such as deity). Again, with Anthony Giddens (2002: 24) we can understand 'risk' as

"the mobilising dynamic of a society bent on change, that wants to determine its own future rather than leaving it to religion, tradition, or the vagaries of nature."

This does not mean that the future can ever actually be determined through the logic of 'risk' or that uncertainty can actually be overcome. As Gerda Reith (2004: 396) explains, 'risk'

"cannot make the future predictable or the world certain, [but] it can create the means for acting as though it were."

Ultimately, 'risk' is a fiction; it is an imagination of potential unintended, future consequences of decisions in the present. In Beck's words, it is "something non-existent, constructed or fictitious" (Beck 1999: 100). In this sense, 'risk' "exist[s...] as a feature of knowing, not as an aspect of being" (Reith 2004: 387). Pushing this further, Niklas Luhmann (quoted in *ibid.* 385-6) explains,

"[t]he outside world itself knows no risks, for it knows neither distinctions, nor expectations, nor evaluations, nor probabilities."

Having outlined what 'risk' is makes it now possible to demonstrate that Beck's concept 'global risk' captures something entirely different from the modern notion 'risk'. In fact, Beck uses the term 'global risk' to *question* the modern notion 'risk'.²¹ The adjective *global* in the term 'global risk' does not refer to the (geographical) reach of unintended consequences of decisions, but serves as a 'question mark' that casts a shadow of doubt over the idea of 'risk' as a (modern) technology to be applied 'naturally' in dealing with the uncertainty of the world and the unintended, potential consequences of decisions made in the present. It points to "the arrogant assumption of controllability" that underpins the modern notion 'risk' (Beck 2009a: 5). Let me unravel this.

To begin with, the term 'global risk' refers to a distinct kind of uncertainty, namely to the potential consequences of "industrial, that is, technoeconomic decisions and considerations of utility" (Beck 2009a: 98). These

21 For the following paragraphs, see Selchow (2014: 77-81, 2016a).

decisions must be understood as being grounded in modern institutions and basic modern principles. They have, as Beck (2009a: 98) puts it, their “peaceful origin in the centres of rationality and prosperity with the blessings of the guarantors of law and order.” The concept ‘global risk’ highlights the fact that the potential unintended consequences of these decisions cannot be imagined or dealt with through the modern tool ‘risk’. The technological advancements brought about by industrialisation, the progress of modernisation and the modern sciences require a different handling of the potential unintended consequences of these decisions and, consequently, of how these decisions are made.

This different handling of potential unintended consequences of decisions made in the present is necessary because of three dimensions of such decisions. First, ‘industrial, that is, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility’ need to be imagined as potentially having consequences that might stand and remain beyond knowledge. Second, these decisions must be imagined as potentially producing *Nichtwissen* (non-knowledge) (Beck 2009a; see also Wehling 2006, 2010, 2012). Third, and finally, they need to be imagined as potentially producing unintended consequences that are “socially delimited in space and time” (Beck and Grande 2010: 418) – all of which we see supported in empirical cases, such as the accident in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant on 26 April 1986, or climate change as an unintended consequence of past industrialisation and past decisions that lead to CO₂ emissions.

Taken together, all this means that ‘techno-economic decisions’ can no longer be grounded in an assessment of their potential unintended consequences that is shaped by a national container-thinking and based on the modern belief in progress through scientific knowledge production. On the contrary, as Beck stresses, potential consequences of ‘techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility’, i.e. ‘global risks’, need to be understood as “a *result* of more knowledge” (Beck 2009, 5; emphasis added), as opposed to something that could be ‘tamed’ and dealt with through more (modern scientific) knowledge production. In this sense, they are to be understood as the ‘fruits’, that is, the very *success* of the process of modernisation, and not as the dark side effects of it, something that could be dealt with based on the same premises that informed and legitimised the actions and decisions that produced them in the first place. For instance, as I put it elsewhere (Selchow 2014: 79), ‘global risks’ are the outcome of our very *understanding* of the low toxicity, low reactivity and low flammability of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that made these gases attractive for use in refrigerators, or of our *ability* to genetically modify organisms, or of the scientific *sophistication* that enables us to enrich uranium, or of our *achievements* that make it possible to be mobile and travel the globe by plane. In this vein, “[c]limate change, for example, is a product of *successful* industrialization which systematically disregards its consequences for nature and humanity”, as Beck (2009: 8; emphasis added) puts it.

The above is just a small but significant shift in the understanding of the *potential* consequences of 'industrial, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility', i.e. 'global risks'. It implies that these 'risks' cannot be conceptualised as the (as yet 'untamed') *shortcomings* of the process of modernisation and industrialisation. Rather, they have to be acknowledged as the very *realisation*, indeed, the triumph and *success* of modernisation and industrialisation. In this sense, what is imagined as 'global risk' is different *in kind* from the modern imagination 'risk'. Ultimately, it is exactly this distinct different in kind-nature of what is imagined under the label 'global risk' that justifies conceptualising 'global risks' as having a fundamental impact on modern national societies. 'Global risks' produce a social reality that is subject to a 'borderless' necessity to cooperate (*Kooperationszwang*), as well as an interrelation of responsibility (*Verantwortungszusammenhang*) (Beck and Grande 2010: 417), whether or not this is acknowledged by actors.²²

This brings us back to the above sketched reality of cosmopolitisation, in which the 'global other' is implicated in the decisions and actions of other 'global others'. My elaboration on 'global risk' now advances our understanding of cosmopolitisation, as it makes us aware that the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies is actually best understood as a product of 'global risk'. This also helps us now to better understand the above provided quote, in which Beck describes cosmopolitisation as an

"unforeseen social effect of actions directed to other ends performed by human beings operating within a network of *global interdependence risks*." (Beck 2006: 48; emphasis added)

What he calls 'global interdependence risks' here are, in essence, what I described above as 'global risks'.²³ Furthermore, my brief reflection on 'global risk' makes us aware that, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, the three aspects that constitute the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation – the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies, the existence of global risks, and the return of uncertainty – are not only difficult to separate from each other, as they are intimately enmeshed, but that they are also not necessarily of the same order. However, as suggested above, for my purposes here, a 'compartmentalised' view at them is sufficient and 'acceptable' in order to provide a picture of the presupposed conception of social reality that informs my move of taking the proclamation of the 'newness' of the

22 Again, it is worth reminding us that 'risk' is not about *actual* unintended consequences but the *imagination* of possible future consequences, which serves as the ground for decisions.

23 This is an example of the earlier mentioned challenge that Beck does not always use language coherently across his writings.

world as a manifestation of the ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation.

To finalise this picture, I now turn to the third aspect that constitutes the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, which is the ‘return of uncertainty’. Generally speaking, the term ‘return of uncertainty’ refers to the dubiousness of the above sketched ‘optimistic’ modern approach to uncertainty and the unknown. In the vein of my elaborations above, it implies that non-knowledge can no longer simply be understood as something that could be unlocked through (further) scientific knowledge production (see in detail Wehling 2010: 260-262). It can no longer simply be taken as

“the given ‘primitive or native state’ [...] from which the scientific endeavor departs to replace it, sooner or later, with complete and reliable knowledge.” (Böschen, Kastenhofer, Rust, Soentgen and Wehling 2010: 785)

In this sense, the expression ‘return of uncertainty’ refers to the fact that scientific knowledge *produces* non-knowledge (which was also already indicated in my reflection on ‘global risk’ above).

We will see in more detail in my elaboration on the ‘national perspective’, below, that the word *return* does not suggest that there was ever a time when ‘uncertainty’ had vanished. Rather, the word indicates that, as suggested above, the modern optimistic narrative of scientific progress and the belief in advanced and advancing knowledge production, which is encapsulated in the notion ‘risk’, enabled and enables an approach to the world and the potential unintended consequences of actions and decisions in the present, *as if* uncertainty could be ‘tamed’, and *as if* it had ‘vanished’ (at least for the purposes of making (national) ‘techno-economic decisions’). As cited above, Beck (2009a: 5) calls this an “arrogant assumption of controllability.”

Moving further, the fact that scientific knowledge *produces* non-knowledge does not simply refer to the common adage that the more we know the more we realise we do not know, that is, the more we are aware of known unknowns. Rather, it captures the idea that increasing scientific knowledge production leads to an increase in ‘unknown unknowns’, that is, things that we do not know we do not know – and, furthermore, that it (potentially) leads to things that we are actually not able to know. In other words, scientific knowledge produces non-knowledge and uncertainty that would not exist without scientific knowledge production and, on top of things, that might remain beyond human grasp (Wehling 2010: 266-7; also especially Beck 1992).²⁴

To this point, I have captured one aspect of the ‘return of uncertainty’. But there is more to it. As I also explain elsewhere (see Selchow 2016a), the

24 The word *might* is important here. The claim is not that it remains beyond human grasp but that it *might*.

term 'return of uncertainty' also points to and captures an inherent uncertainty, which is due to the 'ambivalence', as Beck (2006: 74; also Beck 2013) calls it, that arises between contemporary horizons of experience (*Erfahrungshorizonte*) and horizons of expectation (*Erwartungshorizonte*), on the one side, and modern principles and institutions, on the other. Again, this is closely enmeshed with the two aspects discussed above, namely the 'internal cosmopolitisation' and 'global risk'. It can best be explained with reference to what is meant by "reflexive modernisation" (e.g. Beck 1994; also Beck, Bonß and Lau 2003).

As mentioned in the first part of this section, there are two interpretations of the theory 'reflexive modernisation' in Beck's work. The dominant interpretation, which was developed by Beck and his colleagues in the 10-year-collaborative research programme "Reflexive Moderne" at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (1999-2009), is less radical than the more marginal one, as Beck (2013) himself suggests. At the heart of both interpretations is the distinction between the basic principles of modernity, on the one side, and basic modern institutions, such as the nation-state, family etc, on the other side. Basic principles of modernity are, for instance, freedom, market dependence, rationality, progress, statehood, the obligation to give reasons, as well as principles of equality. In a nutshell, the first, less radical interpretation of reflexive modernisation holds that the radicalisation of these basic modern principles, which has taken place in the course of industrial modernisation, produces side effects, which lead to a crisis of modern institutions. These side effects are, for instance, *actually* (in contrast to potentially) occurring unintended consequences of 'industrial' or 'techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility', which have not been accounted for in the 'risk' assessments that guided past decisions. A good example of this sort of side effect is climate change as an actually occurring, unintended consequence of past 'techno-economic decisions'. New kinds of family constellations that arise from advances in reproductive health or in the context of new communication technologies also fall into this category (e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2013); this latter example shows that these side effects are, of course, not necessarily negative, or, better, that they are not necessarily 'catastrophic'.

Overall, these side effects can be grasped as a 'backfiring' of modernisation. They confront modern institutions with the progress of modernisation itself. Consequently, these institutions no longer measure up to social reality, where the central point is that this social reality is the very *product* of modernity's own radicalised principles. This is where the adjective *reflexive* comes in.

In this first interpretation of 'reflexive modernisation', institutions are variable. They take different forms at different times, in response to various aspects of modernisation that 'backfires'. In the scholarship, this has been translated into ideas about new governance constellations and new governance experiments (see Grande 2013).

The second interpretation of ‘reflexive modernisation’ builds on the first one but goes further. In this interpretation, it is not only the institutions that are set as variable but also the basic modern principles. This interpretation holds that, through rapid contemporary developments, a process of change is set into gear, which takes on a life of its own and generates a social reality that is qualitatively ‘new’, precisely because it is not only modern institutions that are challenged by modernity’s ‘backfiring’ but also basic modern principles. “Modernity in this sense is a sub-political ‘revolutionary system’ without a revolutionary program or goal”, explains Beck (1995: 41). In this process of reflexive modernisation, both, modern institutions and modern principles are confronted with the consequences of the progress of modernisation itself, which ‘reflexively’ overturns its own foundations, its institutions *and* principles. This means that lived reality – the horizons of experience and horizons of expectation – no longer correlates with the institutions of modern national societies or with their principles. As a consequence, contemporary individuals enter a “*Nicht-Koordinatensystem ihrer Erfahrungen*”, as Beck (2013) puts it, ‘a non-coordinate system of their experiences’, which lies outside existing categories. This implies an ‘inherent uncertainty’ that shapes social reality. One of the consequences of this is what Beck and Lau (2004; see also Beck and Grande 2010) capture with the word ‘politicisation’. ‘Reflexive modernisation’ implies a ‘politicisation’ in the sense that even things that used to be perceived as anthropological constants, such as aspects of reproductive health, are now in the realm of choice and decisions, i.e. are ‘political’.

The prevalence of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’

The previous section sketched one side of the Beck-grounded conception of social reality that serves as the presupposition for my suggestion that the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world constitutes a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. I outlined what I mean by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, which includes the ‘internal cosmopolitanisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’.

In this present section, I turn to the second aspect. This is the prevalence of “the national perspective” and “methodological nationalism” (especially Beck 2006). More precisely, it is the prevalence of the *tradition* of ‘the national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’.²⁵

The prevalence of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’ is more straightforwardly explained than the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. The ‘national perspective’²⁶ is a way of

25 For the following paragraphs, see Selchow (2016a, 2015a).

26 Refer back to fn 2 in this chapter.

looking at the world that is grounded in “the equation of the nation-state with national society”, as Beck (2006: 48) puts it – “one of the most powerful convictions concerning society and politics” (ibid. 24). In a nutshell, the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ is the tradition that brings out a view on the world that is blind to the reality of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, including the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies. Simultaneously, it re-produces “the categories in terms of which we understand reality that take the nation-state as the norm” (ibid. 73). The ‘national perspective’ is grounded in modern conceptions of the world that do not acknowledge the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. It does not acknowledge the above sketched nature of contemporary reality, which is shaped by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risks’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’.

Consequently, the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’ produce an ideational and conceptual layer that makes possible the establishment of institutions, which are not only ‘inadequate’ in the face of the nature of the social reality that is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation but which actually *produce* ‘ambivalence’.

“The national outlook [perspective], together with its associated grammar, is becoming false. It fails to grasp that political, economic and cultural actions and their (intended and unintended) consequences know no borders, indeed, it is completely blind to the fact that, even when nationalism is reignited by the collision with globality, this can only be conceptualized” (ibid. 18)

as an ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of societies, and as the result of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. In short, referring back to the above quoted Stephen Bronner, in the conceptualisation of the world, which I present here, the social reality in which modernisation reflexively ‘backfires’ is the world, in which we live, and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’ shapes the world, in which we, i.e. social and political actors and scholars, think.

The ‘reflexive modern’ social reality of ‘both/and’

To this point in this subsection of the present chapter, I have sketched the two aspects that shape social reality in the conception that underlies my argument that the proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came* is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. These are, on the one hand, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, constituted by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’, and the ‘return of uncertainty’, and, on the other hand, the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. To be precise, it is actually the interplay of these two aspects that shapes social reality. Even more precisely, their interplay brings out *historical actualisations* of each of these two aspects, which shape social reality.

In order to indicate the significance of the interplay of the above two aspects for the nature of social reality, it is worth giving it a distinct name: ‘reflexive modern’. Hence, according to the above sketched conceptualisation, social reality and national societies are best labelled ‘reflexive modern’.

Moving forward from here, and following Beck further, the interplay of the two aspects – reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ – and, consequently, the path of societies are not to be imagined as leading into a particular direction. Putting it the other way around, it would be misguided and, in fact, an analytical strategy shaped by ‘methodological nationalism’ to presuppose that the ‘development’ of ‘reflexive modern’ societies follows a distinct trajectory, against which it could be assessed (especially Beck 2016). In general, the ‘development’ of ‘reflexive modern’ societies should not be seen as linear. In particular, as mentioned, it should not be seen as a process that leads to a (normative) cosmopolitan consciousness, or cosmopolitan subjects or actors (e.g. Beck 2004: 115). Reality might or might not ‘develop’, or as Beck recently put it, “metamorphose” (Beck 2016) into a normative cosmopolitan reality; or, societies might or might not ‘metamorphose’ into an explicitly exclusive and ‘national’ state, leaving perspectives deeply shaped by an expressly exclusive actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. In any case, none of these developments can be seen as either/or-developments (*entweder-oder*). Social reality, as it is conceptualised above, needs to be treated as a both/and-place (*sowohl-als-auch*), where the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies does not constitute the opposite of the ‘national’ reality, and ‘the cosmopolitised’ is not to be understood as the opposite of ‘the national’ (e.g. Beck 2016; also Beck and Lau 2004). Rather, one is an integral part of the other – as we saw in the above mentioned example of UKIP. In this respect, the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies is to be understood as an integral part of the redefinition of ‘the national’ (Beck 2004: 15), and of distinct actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. As such, similar to imaginations of the world as, for instance, advanced by IR scholars, such as James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (1989) and David Campbell (1998[1992]), the conceptualised ‘reflexive modern’ social reality is one that can no longer be grasped through comfortable (modern) dichotomies of inside/outside, national/international, political/non-political, etc. Yet, the either/or is not simply obsolete and deconstructed in Beck’s conception of the ‘reflexive modern’ world but replaced with a both/and. This both/and is the historical product of the interplay of the two above sketched aspects, namely of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’.

Discussing the difference between this conceptualisation of the world and postmodern conceptions, Beck, Bonß and Lau (2003) stress that there are many aspects, in which both overlap, but that, at their core, “[p]ostmodernists are interested in deconstruction without reconstruction, second modernity [the word they use for the above sketched conception of

social reality] is about deconstruction and reconstruction." This makes this Beck-inspired conception of social reality so productive. It is not 'just' a deconstruction of the modern (imagination of the) world, but replaces it with a fundamentally different conception, in which the deconstruction of modern dichotomies is 'built in'. The problem with grasping this newly conceptualised world, however, is that there is no established language yet that we could use to do so.

The proclamation of the 'new world' that came as a manifestation of an 'awareness' of the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation

In the first section of this chapter, I suggested that the proclamation of the 'new world' *to come* is a manifestation of the modern fondness for innovation, progress and development. I proposed that, by contrast, the proclamation of the 'new world' that *came* is a manifestation of an 'awareness' of the complexity of the 'reflexive modern' world and, in particular, the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation. My elaborations above give meaning to this proposition. I suggest, events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the terrorist attack of 9/11, are moments, in which this complexity and the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation surface, that is, in which they become visible, almost unmissable for social and political observers. As I stressed above, the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation shapes contemporary social reality with or without these events. What is interesting about these events, however, is that, in them this unfolding "really existing" (Beck 2006: 19) reality 'bubbles up', in the sense that the fundamental shortcomings of existing (modern) institutions and principles and of existing 'national perspective'-narratives becomes readily apparent to observers. It is this, I argue, that is evident in the fact that there is the proclamation of the 'newness' of the world, which, as we saw above in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, encapsulates the perception that existing concepts are no longer adequate to grasp the supposedly 'new' world. Putting it the other way around, given my presupposed conception of social reality as being a 'reflexive modern' world, this explicit 'awareness' of the shortcomings in existing conceptions of the world, which is evident in the proclamation that there is something 'new' about the world, can be conceptualised as an 'awareness' of the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation.

To be clear, I use the word *awareness* in inverted commas to signal that I do not mean to suggest that there is/was a *conscious* recognition of this reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation, in particular, or the 'reflexive modern' social reality, in general. As I suggested above, it is a *conceptual* move that I take the proclamation of the 'new world' that *came* as an 'awareness' of the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation; it is grounded in the above sketched distinct conception of social reality that presupposes this move.

Following this presupposed idea of social reality, there is something exciting about the recognition of the proclamation that there was something

‘new’ about the world as an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. What makes it exciting is that this insight provides the ground to explore empirically distinct historical actualisations of one of the two aspects that brings out social reality, namely the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. In other words, grounded in my theorisation above, the study of the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that *came*, i.e. the study of how the (supposed) ‘new world’ that *came* is imagined, how it is symbolically dealt with and negotiated, to what extent it is shaking up existing (modern) conceptions of un-certainty, ‘risk’, inside/outside, agency, as well as institutions and guiding principles etc, enables nothing less than insights into the historical actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. Given that the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ is a central aspect which, in its interplay with the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, brings out the ‘reflexive modern’ social reality, its analysis can only be a valuable endeavour toward an understanding of nothing less than a crucial aspect of contemporary social reality.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I picked up the argument from Chapter 4 that the ‘object’, which is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse, can be called ‘new world’. The aim of this present chapter was to elaborate on the issue ‘new world’ by shedding light on *proclamations* of the ‘new world’. In doing this, I firstly reflected on what it means to (implicitly or explicitly) ‘proclaim’ the ‘new world’, i.e. to suggest that there was something ‘new’ about the world. I distinguished between two kinds of ‘proclamations’ of the ‘new’. First, the proclamation of the ‘new’ *to come* and, second, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came*. The latter proclamation is the one that is implied in the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

In comparing these two proclamations, I conceptualised the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that *came* as a distinct dimension of political actors’ struggle to legitimise past and future decisions and actions. I also highlighted the distinct speaking position that such a proclamation implies. In this kind of proclamation, the speaking position is a more ‘passive’ position than the one implied in the proclamation of the ‘new world’ *to come*. While it insinuates a kind of ‘objectivity’, it is, however, not less politically loaded than the proclamation of the world *to come*. Furthermore, I suggested that, while the proclamation of the ‘new’ *to come* is a manifestation of the modern and optimistic fondness for the striving for innovation, progress and development, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came* is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation.

In a second move, I elaborated on the conception of social reality that underpins my claim that the proclamation of the ‘new’ that *came* is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. This conception is grounded in Ulrich Beck’s work. According to this con-

ception, contemporary social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay.

First, it is shaped by the reflexive 'backfiring' of the process of modernisation. This 'backfiring' is constituted by the 'internal cosmopolitisation' of national societies, the existence of 'global risk' and the 'return of uncertainty'. I explored it by looking at each of these three aspects in turn and at their inextricable enmeshment. Of particular importance was that the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation (including the 'internal cosmopolitisation' of national societies) is an 'irreversible' process, a reality that, generally speaking, is the *success* of the process of modernisation. At the same time, it is its 'accidental' *side effect*, in that it is the product of decisions and actions targeted at other ends. Furthermore, I highlighted that the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation is a phenomenon, a process that brings with it a fundamental 'uncertainty'. This uncertainty is grounded in the fact that it is not only modern institutions that are confronted with a 'radicalisation' of modernity, but also modern principles, which are overturned.

Second, social reality is shaped by the prevalence of the tradition of the 'national perspective' and 'methodological nationalism'. This is a political perspective and a particular scholarly take on the world that obscures the view at the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation, especially at the social reality of the 'internal cosmopolitisation' of national societies.

I stressed that it is the interplay of these two aspects, i.e. the historical actualisation of the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation and the tradition of the 'national perspective', that shapes contemporary social reality. I labelled this reality 'reflexive modern', which is a reality that cannot be grasped through the (modern) dichotomies of inside/outside, national/international, national/cosmopolitan. In fact, it is a reality that cannot be captured with familiar concepts such as 'development', 'progress' or 'transformation'. I stressed that the interplay of the two aspects – reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation and the tradition of the 'national perspective' – and, consequently, the path of societies are not to be imagined as leading into a particular direction, on a distinct trajectory or, importantly, proceeding in a linear way. The familiar either/or-logic ('*entweder-oder*') does not grasp the 'reflexive modern' world. This world is a both/and-place ('*sowohl-als-auch*'), in which, for instance, the 'internal cosmopolitisation' of national societies does not constitute the opposite of the 'national' reality, and 'the cosmopolitised' is not to be understood as the opposite of 'the national'. Rather, one is an integral part of the other, and of distinct actualisations of the tradition of the 'national perspective'.

Grounded in this conception of social reality, I grasped the proclamation of the 'new world' that *came* as a manifestation of an 'awareness' of the reflexive 'backfiring' of modernisation. I stressed that this was not an *observation* of how social and political actors actually grasp the perceived 'newness' of the world, in the sense of how they label and conceptualise it. Rather, it is a *conceptual* move, which I took, that presupposes the above

sketched conception of social reality as ‘reflexive modern’. In this context, I explained that events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are moments, in which the complexity of the ‘reflexive modern’ world surfaces and becomes visible to social and political observers. This visibility is manifest in the talk about the ‘new world’ that *came*. In these events, the fundamental shortcomings of existing (modern) institutions and principles and existing ‘national perspective’-narratives becomes readily apparent to observers. In this sense, the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that *came* is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, where I use the word ‘awareness’ not to refer to a *conscious* recognition of this reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. It is an, in fact, it is *the* empirical question, precisely how the reflexive modern reality is symbolically dealt with and filled with meaning in these proclamations of the ‘new’ that *came*, and, in particular, how the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ looks, e.g. how much or how little the distinct ‘awareness’ of the ‘reflexive modern’ reality is actually shaking up the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, that is, existing (modern) conceptions of un-certainty, ‘risk’, inside/outside, agency, as well as institutions and guiding principles.

Bringing the above together, this present chapter framed the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that *came* as an interesting phenomenon in two respects. First, it is an interesting phenomenon in that it is a distinct way, in which political actors legitimise past and present decisions and actions. For instance, George W. Bush’s quote from the very beginning of this chapter²⁷ shows how the proclamation of, i.e. the reference to the supposedly ‘new world’ is used to legitimise nothing less than a preemptive national security-approach, in this specific case, translated into the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003. Second, the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that *came* is an interesting phenomenon in that its analysis enables insights into nothing less than the distinct historical actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’, i.e. one of the two aspects that brings out social reality. It enables the generation of insights into how the ‘reflexive modern’ world is imagined, how it is symbolically dealt with and negotiated, to what extent it is shaking up the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, and what possibilities are implied in these imaginations.

Yet, to conclude this present chapter and, at the same time, pave the way to the next chapter, it is to point out that as much as such as an analysis of the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ is valuable, as much it is challenging and, in fact, ‘uncomfortable’. It is uncomfortable because it takes place in a both/and-world. Consequently, it is not only uncomfortable because, as Nina Degele (2010: 177; my own translation) puts it, “serious social scientists do not like the idea of ‘both/and’”, but because

²⁷ “And I said – so I said, ‘There’s a new world here.’ After September the 11th, we must take threats seriously.” (Bush 2004)

there is no clear, pre-established language that could be used to capture the both/and-world (see also Selchow 2016a). This brings us back to the point about the inherent 'provisionality' of Beck's scholarly endeavour that I highlighted earlier in this chapter. Inevitably, a scholarly project that builds on a conception of the world, as it is sketched above, must embrace and accept a form of 'provisionality' and, not least, demands a good degree of tolerance for (linguistic) experimentation.

