

purportedly turned on him, commissioning the French Commander of the Togolese Gendarmerie, Georges Maïtrier, to initiate the plot. After the meeting that prepared the coup, Maïtrier is said to have taken Eyadéma aside and asked him to shoot Olympio for 300,000 CFA francs (6,000 French francs).²⁹⁷ After learning from Ambassador Henri Mazoyer on the night of the 12–13 January 1963 that Olympio was hiding in the courtyard of the US Embassy, Maïtrier reportedly informed the coup plotters and encouraged them “to complete the work that has already begun.”²⁹⁸

2.3 Togoland

In contrast to many other decolonisation processes, the independence of Togoland was granted under UN trusteeship. Although not as violent as the case of the trust territory of Cameroon, for example, the case of Togoland attracted enormous international attention. There are many detailed scholarly perspectives on the colonial history of French or British Togoland. The main strands of literature that have been included concern the rise and fall of (colonial) statehood and nationalism, particularly around the demand of Ewe and Togoland unification as well as contributions on colonial policing and security.

2.3.1 State- & Nationhood

German Togoland

Compared to other territories formerly under German colonial rule, literature on the German colonisation of Togoland is not very extensive and although Germany's colonisation of Togoland preceded the French and British mandate era, the literature on this period is less extensive than on the mandate period.

A handful of monographs are devoted to the study of the colonial state and administration in German Togoland, yet, in which Togolese themselves hardly make an appearance.²⁹⁹ Literature that examines, with varying degrees of historical emphasis, the web of colonial relations between the German administration, its colonial crimes, indigenous resistance, and its aftermath is of rather recent nature.³⁰⁰

297 Verschave, *La Françafrique*, 117–119.

298 Verschave, *La Françafrique*, p. 114.

299 Arthur J. Knoll, *Togo under Imperial Germany 1884–1914: a case study in colonial rule*, Hoover colonial studies 190 (Stanford: Hoover Inst. Press, 1978); Ralph Erbar, *Ein "Platz an der Sonne"? Die Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der deutschen Kolonie Togo 1884–1914*, Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Überseegeschichte 51 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1991); Trutz von Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft: Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des "Schutzgebietes Togo"* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994); Dennis Laumann, "A Historiography of German Togoland, or the Rise and Fall of a "Model Colony", *History in Africa* 30 (2003); Bettina Zurstrassen, *"Ein Stück deutscher Erde schaffen": Koloniale Beamte in Togo 1884–1914*, Campus Forschung 931 (Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus, 2008).

300 Peter Sebald, *Die deutsche Kolonie Togo 1884–1914: Auswirkungen einer Fremdherrschaft*, Schlaglichter der Kolonialgeschichte 14 (Berlin: Links, 2013); Rebekka Habermas, *Skandal in Togo: Ein Kapitel deutscher Kolonialherrschaft* (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 2016); Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft*.

Although Sebald's chronicle is rather descriptive, it ranks with some authority in the literature on German Togoland. Sebald highlights that in the mere three decades of German rule over the narrow territory, the German colonisers made use of all the typical means of European colonial rule.³⁰¹ By restoring large parts of the archival holdings left behind by the German colonial administration in Togo, Sebald thus compiled source material as a basis for subsequent historical works, debunking the myth of a self-sustaining "model colony" that never applied to the perspective of the colony's inhabitants anyway.³⁰² Among German historians, he was one of the first to turn to anti-colonial resistance in Togoland, identifying petitioning as a central form of resistance.³⁰³

Departing from rather historical-descriptive contribution, Trotha draws on Heinrich Popitz' sociological aspects of rule to develop a general sociological theory of state-formation in Africa based on the German colonisation of Togoland. According to him state-formation took place in three steps: in a first step, the (German) colonizers concealed their numerical inferiority through a policy of selective terror to achieve maximum intimidation with minimum use of resources.³⁰⁴ Although still in possession of the despotic instrument of violent oppression, in a second step, colonial rule was transformed into bureaucratic rule. In addition to the already existing monopoly of violence, in a third step the colonial state gained a monopoly on knowledge: educational institutions, literacy and statistics were introduced, and the capabilities of the colonial headquarters were strengthened by technical inventions such as the telegraph. Eckert assesses that Trotha accounted well for the ambiguity of the bureaucratic colonial state, yet, due to the lack of a comparative perspective Trotha erroneously assumes that state formation in Africa was only initiated by European colonisation. In doing so, he hastily adopts the *failed states* motif of the 1990s, which invokes the "incompleteness" of colonial state-building as the reason for the preponderance of military regimes in the post-colonial period.³⁰⁵

Habermas' study is a microhistory of a colonial scandal that was caused by the abuse of an African minor through which she traces the broad lines of the colonial imagination, such as colonial gender relations, the violent economic exploitation on the cotton plantations, the relationship between the German colonial administration, German missionary schools and metropolitan Germany. Though Togolese under German rule regularly petitioned the governor or the Reichstag to draw attention to abuses of power, Habermas characterizes their reception as "eloquent silence," because the treatment these petitions received mobilized stereotypical rather than realistic images of Africa and Europe and thereby concealed more than it brought to the fore.³⁰⁶

301 Sebald, *Die deutsche Kolonie Togo 1884–1914*.

302 Laumann, "A historiography of German Togoland, or the rise and fall of a "model colony"".

303 Sebald, *Die deutsche Kolonie Togo 1884–1914*, p. 170.

304 Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, p. 37.

305 Andreas Eckert, "Theories of Colonial Rule," *The Journal of African History* 38, no. 2 (1997): 17, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853797377019>.

306 Habermas, *Skandal in Togo*, 17, 130–138.

Early Post-Independence Works

The political developments in the trusteeship territories and protracted discussion on the Ewe and Togoland unification at the United Nations inspired a whole series of writings on various aspects of the issue in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The earliest comprehensive works on the history of Togoland are by François Luchaire,³⁰⁷ Robert Cornevin,³⁰⁸ and Jean-Claude Pauvert.³⁰⁹ Yet, since they speak only rudimentarily about the Ewe and Togoland reunification movement and foreground France's accomplishment, the works by Cornevin and Luchaire can be regarded as justifying French policy in Togo.³¹⁰ Similarly, Alan Burns, former governor of the Gold Coast and British Togoland who was later the British permanent representative on the Trusteeship Council, justified British policy in Togoland.³¹¹ In fact, Charles Arden-Clarke, late governor of the Gold Coast and British Togoland argued:

"It seemed to all of us out there that the natural destiny of Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship was to become an integral part of the Gold Coast [...] in the case of Togoland there seemed to be quite a lot of Gold Coast imperialism and imperialism was not necessarily a bad thing! I am glad to say that Gold Coast imperialism has won the day and that British Togoland is now an integral part of independent Ghana."³¹²

The first widely cited scholarly contribution was James Coleman's *Togoland*, who chiefly accused the Ewe and Togoland unification movement essentially of running a smear campaign against the Administering Authorities and accused the UN General Assembly of tending toward irrationality on the unification question.³¹³ In fact, Coleman argued that by providing the unificationists with a platform, the United Nations effectively created the unification problem in the first place. While Dennis Austin holds that trusteeship powers had a more stabilizing effect on the dynamics on the Togo-Ghana border than postcolonial Togo and Ghana,³¹⁴ Franz Ansprenger's study of Togolese po-

307 As professor of French Public Law, François Luchaire was co-author of the *loi-cadre* and as such a co-architect for the plans to integrate postcolonial French Africa into the French Union. François Luchaire, *Du Togo français sous tutelle à la République autonome du Togo* (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1957).

308 Robert Cornevin, who was stationed as colonial administrator in French Togoland from 1948 to 1956, can certainly be considered an expert on the country and its history. Although he did not call Togo a "model colony," he also took up the rhetoric once invented by the Germans and praised France's achievement by celebrating Togo as a "nation-pilot" after its independence: Robert Cornevin, *Histoire du Togo* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1959); Robert Cornevin, *Le Togo: Nation-Pilote*, Collection Survol du monde (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions latines, 1963).

309 Jean-Claude Pauvert, "L'évolution Politique Des Ewés," *Cahiers d'études africaines*, no. 2 (1960)

310 See preface in Amenumey, *The Ewe Unification Movement*.

311 Alan Burns, *In defence of colonies: British colonial territories in international affairs* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957).

312 Charles Arden-Clarke, "Gold Coast into Ghana," *International Affairs* 34, no. 1 (1958): 54

313 James S. Coleman, *Togoland*, International Conciliation 509 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956), p. 60.

314 Dennis Austin, "The Uncertain Frontier," 1, no. 2 (1963), accessed 13 December 2019, available from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/159025>.

litical parties was the first of the European contributions to take a more critical stance, especially towards the French trusteeship administration.³¹⁵

The Ewe and Togoland unification question also formed the empirical case in the studies by Iwuoha Aligwekwe on the *Paradoxes and Problems of Political Transition in West Africa*,³¹⁶ and by George Thullen on *The Problems of the Trusteeship System*.³¹⁷ Yet, as Amenumey pointed out, both dissertations relied heavily on Coleman's tendentious sympathetic stance toward the colonial powers, and his inadequate knowledge of Ewe history. Thus, one of Aligwekwe's hypotheses, along with Coleman's Eurocentrism, is strikingly reminiscent of the recent securitisation of secessionists in Western Togoland:

"The present [1960] political and demographic or ethnographic picture of Togoland and West Africa embody the danger of tribal or ethnic unification and irredentist movements which can pose threats to the peace and security of the whole region or at best leave it a mere potential area of crisis; and this has been made more so by the development of a trans-territorial nationalism in the region."³¹⁸

Thullen, on the other hand, who apart from Chowdhuri can be considered the only notable comprehensive study of the Trusteeship System. The inability to conduct fieldwork in the study area or access unofficial records led to Thullen's uncritical acceptance of Coleman's leniency toward the colonial powers. This is evidenced by assessments such as that anti-colonial state representatives at the UN "were prepared to sacrifice the further search of objectivity"³¹⁹ or that "[m]ost petitioners [were] *not understanding* the constitutional limitations on what the United Nations could do for them."³²⁰

The dissertation by Ghanaian Ewe historian D.E.K. Amenumey is probably the most comprehensive work on the political run-up to Togoland's independence. Amenumey's dissertation draws on Thullen's work,³²¹ especially regarding the discussions at the UN, but distances itself from the administration-lenient perspective which Thullen adopted from Coleman. Amenumey brings the anti-colonial actors back to the centre of historiography by situating the historical developments based on the activities of the unification movement in the territory itself, thereby filling in the previous gaps in the historiography. Amenumey, however concedes that the very core period of his study falls into the "closed" period for which records were inaccessible at the time.³²²

315 Franz Ansprenger, *Politik im Schwarzen Afrika: Die modernen politischen Bewegungen im Afrika französischer Prägung* (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1961). <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-98464-7>

316 Iwuoha E. Aligwekwe, "The Ewe and Togoland problem: a case study in the paradoxes and problems of political transition in West Africa" (Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1960), accessed 07 June 2021, available from http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1486478713870084.

317 Thullen, *Problems of the Trusteeship System*.

318 Aligwekwe, "The Ewe and Togoland problem," p. 33.

319 Thullen, *Problems of the Trusteeship System*, p. 180.

320 Emphasis added, Thullen, *Problems of the Trusteeship System*, p. 77.

321 Compare Amenumey, *The Ewe Unification Movement*, p. 210; Thullen, *Problems of the Trusteeship System*, p. 145.

322 Amenumey, *The Ewe Unification Movement*, preface.

Constructed Nationalisms: Togoland & Ewe Nationalism

Claude Welch's dissertation on Pan-Africanism and political unification in West Africa, later published as *Dream of Unity*,³²³ included a study of the unsuccessful Ewe unification movement. Welch's study is a central reference point to a series of studies on Ewe and Togoland nationalism that would appear from the 1980s onwards. Drawing on Welch, Hodder tried to pin "Eweness", estimating the population size of the Ewe and pointed out the tendency to exaggerate the homogeneity of so-called ethnic and tribal groups. In any case, Hodder argued, "the desire for unification among the Ewe – an idea of Eweland as a distinct and homogeneous unit – is in reality of European origin."³²⁴

In the absence of a politically unifying Ewe or Togolese identity in precolonial times, subsequent studies by and large adopted the constructivist thesis of *imagined communities*,³²⁵ arguing that both Ewe ethnic-nationalism and Togoland territorial-nationalism are products of colonial inventions. David Brown wrote about the post-independence struggle of the Ewe and the *National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland* (better known as the "Togoland Liberation Movement" or TOLIMO) against the central government after Ghana's independence in 1957. Yet, Brown attested the demise of TOLIMO in the late 1970s,³²⁶ particularly due to "the propagation by incumbent elites of an 'ethnic rivalry' view of politics and an 'ethnic plot' threat to stability" that operates along an "Ewe *versus* Akan" factionalism.³²⁷

Providing perhaps the most comprehensive account of the emergence and growth of the Ewe unification movement, D.E.K. Amenumey extended Thullen's analysis of the UN debates by additionally examining what was happening on the ground within the Ewe unification movement. Amenumey credited the development of the Ewe Presbyterian Church prompted by German Christian missionaries and the standardisation of the Ewe language as the birth point of Ewe nationalism.³²⁸ Similarly, Sandra Greene argues that 'Eweness' stems from religious and mythical identifications.³²⁹ While Amenumey mainly focuses his analyses on the political struggle of the Ewe unification movement and its suppression by the British and French authorities, John Kent concludes that it was not African nationalism but Anglo-French intergovernmental as well as international considerations that determined British and French policy towards the movement.³³⁰ Although his archival work should not be discounted, Kent thus echoed a number of his contemporaries that decolonisation was bequeathed by the merciful hand of the benevolent West and not won by the nationalist movements against the resistance of the colonial powers.

323 Welch, *Dream of Unity*.

324 Bramwell W. Hodder, "The Ewe Problem," in *Essays in Political Geography*, ed. Charles A. Fisher (London: Methuen, 1968), p. 281.

325 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

326 David Brown, "Borderline Politics in Ghana," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 18, no. 4 (1980)

327 David Brown, "Sieges and Scapegoats," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 21, no. 3 (1983): 458

328 Amenumey, *The Ewe Unification Movement*, p. 28.

329 Sandra E. Greene, "Notsie Narratives," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, no. 4 (2002), <https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-101-4-1015>.

330 John Kent, "The Ewe Question 1945–56," in *Imperialism, the State, and the Third World*, ed. Michael Twaddle (London: British Academic Press, 1992), p. 202.

At the same time, increasingly more French-language works were being written again, both in France and in Togo, to critically examine the period of Togoland under French trusteeship. Wen'saa Ogma Yagla emphasised the ethnic divisions of the short period of the post-independence Olympio government, and the perception of bias towards the Ewe-speakers of the south, thereby offering an implicit justification for the *coup d'état* that brought Gnassingbé Eyadéma to power in 1967 and ushered in Africa's longest single-party regime.³³¹ Marc Michel concluded that France certainly did not establish a "*nation pilote*," as the ex-colonial officer Robert Cornevin tried to establish in the 1960s.³³² Addressing the question why Togoland remained peaceful while other French territories such as Côte d'Ivoire or the trusteeship territory of Cameroon experienced violence, Michel dismisses that this was due to less repression by the French authorities, mass mobilisation, or class conflict. Rather, it was the unification movement's early and sustained intervention at international venues that gave peaceful measures a chance.³³³ Since the 1990s Togolese historians under the leadership of Nicoué Lodjoudie Gayibor have continuously published on the period in question in the series titled *Histoire des Togolais : des origines aux années 1960*, that comprises four volumes to this date. With the explicit aim of promoting the democratisation of Togo and overcoming the often politically manipulated regional differences between the ethnic groups of the north and the south.³³⁴

The debate on the origin of Ewe and Togoland nationalism was continued Paul Nugent, who recasts Amenumey's thesis of German missionaries as the cradle for Ewe and Togoland nationalism as it does not explain why individuals, that were educated in the same institutions and ethos, ended up mobilising behind opposing political projects (that is, on the one side, the integration of British Togoland into Ghana and the accommodation of French Togoland within the French Union versus the complete independence of a reunified Togoland, on the other side).³³⁵ Somewhat novel within in African Studies, Nugent rather advances spatial theoretical approaches to explain the identarian dynamics in the border region of nowadays Togo and Ghana.³³⁶ Nugent concurs that an overarching Ewe identity did not exist before colonial partition and

331 Wen'saa Ogma Yagla, *L'édification de la Nation Togolaise: Naissance d'une conscience nationale dans un pays africain* (Paris: Harmattan, 1978).

332 Cornevin, *Le Togo*.

333 Marc Michel, "The Independence of Togo," in *Decolonization and African Independence: The transfer of power, 1960–1980*, ed. Prosser Gifford (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988)

334 Nicoué L. Gayibor, ed., *de l'histoire des origines à l'histoire des peuplements*, 4 vols., *Histoire des Togolais. Des origines aux années 1960* 1 (Paris, Lomé: Karthala; Presses de l'Université de Lomé, 2011); Nicoué L. Gayibor, ed., *du XVI^e siècle à l'occupation coloniale*, 4 vols., *Histoire des Togolais. Des origines aux années 1960* 2 (Paris, Lomé: Karthala; Presses de l'Université de Lomé, 2011); Nicoué L. Gayibor, ed., *Le Togo sous administration coloniale*, 4 vols., *Histoire des Togolais. Des origines aux années 1960* 3 (Paris, Lomé: Karthala; Presses de l'Université de Lomé, 2011); Nicoué L. Gayibor, ed., *Le refus de l'ordre colonial*, 4 vols., *Histoire des Togolais. Des origines aux années 1960* 4 (Paris, Lomé: Karthala; Presses de l'Université de Lomé, 2011).

335 Paul Nugent and Carola Lentz, eds., *Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

336 Paul Nugent, *Smugglers, secessionists & loyal citizens on the Ghana-Togo frontier: The lie of the borderlands since 1914*, *Western African studies* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002); Paul Nugent,

developed only in response to European domination. However, different from Amenu-mey, Nugent does not assume the borders of colonial states were simply invented at the Berlin Conference of 1884/5, but that the Ewe, not the Europeans, gave meaning to the border. The boundaries of colonial entities were shaped by deeper spatial logics as colonial states were superimposed on pre-existing political formations. For Nugent, these borders were central to processes of state-formation. Although Nugent's theory of the emergence of (colonial) states is rooted in European political theory, he tries to avoid "conceptual Eurocentrism" by emphasising that during the colonial period, local problems, and the persistence of cross-border trade (especially smuggling) provided for, on the one hand, the impetus for the emergence of the Ewe question and, on the other, its inevitable end. Yet, because of these considerations, Nugent prematurely echoes Brown in that desires of Ewe unification and TOLIMO's Western Togoland secessionism are all but extinguished as a Volta Region identity amongst Ghanaian citizenship has emerged trump. Understandably, as before 2006 the Western Togoland separatists hardly managed to gain media attention.

Subsequently adopting a similar spatial perspective, Lawrance argues that the Ewe ethno-nationalist struggle was doomed from the outset because the Ewe never constituted a coherent, self-conscious ethnic group capable of pushing a political agenda.³³⁷ Analysing the emergence of a "proto-nationalism" in the interwar period, Lawrance is particularly critical of the fact that the role of urban elites was overstated and the strategic place of the rural electorate (so-called *dokuwo*) was underestimated. Lawrance argues that historians are far too infatuated with the elites of the unificationist movement such as Sylvanus Olympio. It is just as important, if not more so, to look at the "local" population (those who make up the nation beyond the elites). Lawrance tries to capture the local population through the various Ewe Newspapers such as the *Ewe Newsletter*, the *Guide du Togo*, and the *Gold Coast Leader*. Uniting the urban and rural experiences of colonialism after World War I, Lawrance documents the contributions of rural people to anti-colonial struggles against what he calls 'periurban colonialism.'

Digre intended to refocus the debate on the unification movement towards the role of the UN-monitored referenda. On the one hand, he compares the 1956 UN-supervised referendum on the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast with the 1956 referendum in French Togoland on the admission of French Togoland into the French Union.³³⁸ In doing so, he points out that (as is too often forgotten today) a consideration of the referendum in British Togoland without reference to the referendum in French Togoland would be incoherent, as their interactions were part of a concerted Anglo-French strategy. Furthermore, Digre elaborates the different imperial strategies of France and Britain on the issue of ethnic mobilisation in a comparison of the UN-supervision in the 1956

Boundaries, communities, and state-making in West Africa: The centrality of the margins, African Studies 144 (Cambridge, United Kingdom, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

337 Benjamin Nicholas Lawrance, *Locality, Mobility, and "Nation": Periurban colonialism in Togo's Eweland, 1900–1960*, Rochester studies in African history and the diaspora (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2007).

338 Brian K. Digre, "The United Nations, France, and African Independence," *French Colonial History* 5, no. 1 (2004), <https://doi.org/10.1353/fch.2004.0003>.

Togoland referendum with the 1961 referendum in Cameroon.³³⁹ Digre again brings into focus the special role of UN observation, which he advocates despite its pitfalls because generally UN-led trusteeship led to peaceful outcomes.

Similarly, Ashley Bulgarelli juxtaposes the 1956 British-Togoland referendum with the 2018 New Regions Referendum, identifying the revival of three competing nationalisms in the Volta Region: ethnicity-based Ewe nationalism, territory-based Western Togoland nationalism and a forming Voltarian identity, the latter of which he advocates as the only inclusive identity.³⁴⁰

Like Nugent, Kate Skinner is wary of mission-centric narratives of Ewe nationalism yet relocates the history of its emergence within educationist institutions and literacy frameworks.³⁴¹ Moreover, while concurring with the insufficient nationalist mobilization in the late colonial period, Skinner overall challenges the supposed end of the Ewe and Western Togoland movements with reference to the position of Kosi Kedem, a former parliamentarian of the Volta Region. As of 2022, Kedem advocates integrating 'Western Togoland' more closely into Ghana while preserving its distinct national identity.³⁴²

Alexander Keese interrogates the mobilisation of Ewe ethnic identity as an anti-colonial weapon between the late 19th century and the 1960s.³⁴³ Unwittingly adapting the ideas of Leibnitz, Humboldt, and Tilly on the interplay of state formation and external as well as internal security,³⁴⁴ Keese argues that in those pre-colonial societies that possessed functioning state structures, that is, where the population enjoyed some protection from external and internal attacks, ethnic mobilisation was normally *not* regarded as a necessary strategy. Ethnicity was mainly used as a basis for group solidarity and political claims where, as in the case of the pre-colonial Ewe territories, pre-colonial state structures were either weak or non-existent. According to Keese, in the colonial period the differences in the mobilisation of Ewe ethnicity, among others, are not so much the result of often inflated differences between British 'indirect' and French 'direct' traditions in colonial administration, but rather the result of local experiences of statehood: "if the structures of states and administrations provide a reasonably reliable set of rules, 'ethnicity' is not usually needed as a factor in group mobilisation."³⁴⁵

339 Brian K. Digre, "Ethnic Loyalties, National Choices, and International Oversight," in *The Histories, Languages, and Cultures of West Africa: Interdisciplinary Essays*, ed. Akua Sarr (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006)

340 Ashley Bulgarelli, "Togoland's Lingering Legacy," *Australasian Review of African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.22160/22035184/ARAS-2018-39-2/222-238>.

341 Skinner, "Local Historians and Strangers with Big Eyes"; Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland*.

342 GhanaWeb, "Ghana doesn't legally exist – Kosi Kedem"; Kosi Kedem, "Why There Is Urgent Need to Talk About the British Togoland Question," *Ghanaian Times*, 15 June 2022

343 Alexander Keese, *Ethnicity and the Colonial State*, Studies in global social history 22 (Boston: Brill, 2016). <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004307353>

344 For a discussion on security in a historical perspective see Conze, *Geschichte der Sicherheit*, pp. 24–30.

345 Keese, *Ethnicity and the Colonial State*, 308, 311.