

functioning state and accountable institutions.⁶⁴ At the same time, SSR suggested that security is after all a political interdependent process that goes beyond the traditional spheres of security such as the military and the police. Thus, what had begun as a series of UN peace-keeping operations turned into a debate on peace-building, only to become a discussion on market- and state-building missions,⁶⁵ in the belief that a strong civil society and a developed economy was the path to stability.⁶⁶ Though state-building interventions (both as a principle and as a means to achieve their goals) remained highly controversial, in practice, they were considered a necessity without an alternative.⁶⁷

2.1.4 The 3rd Generation: Colonial Reminiscence

The hope that state-building missions would lead to a permanent transition to market democracy and, consequently, establish enduring peace ultimately proved to be a disappointment. Barnett Rubin noted that even long-term commitments such as in Afghanistan never managed to put an end to insurgency to establish sustainable market democracies or hamper the influence of the Taliban.⁶⁸ Similarly, the intervention in Iraq led to insurgency, increased crime and insecurity, and political instability – not only in the domestic sphere but for the entire region.⁶⁹ Similarly, David Lake holds that interventions neither led to an increase in state capacity,⁷⁰ nor in the durability of those states in the future.⁷¹ In the mid-2000s, this insight was the focus of a third generation of scholars and policymakers, whose criticism was directed at the Western-centric normativity of interventions.

Post-Liberal Critique

The United Nations' guiding principles, which served as a blueprint for a wave of peace- and state-building missions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, received much criticism

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- 64 See Paris' review of the literature at Roland Paris, "Human Security," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001): 91.
- 65 Oliver P. Richmond, "Rescuing Peacebuilding? Anthropology and Peace Formation," *Global Society* 32, no. 2 (2018): 224, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2018.1451828>.
- 66 Crawford, "Decolonization through Trusteeship," pp. 106–7.
- 67 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*, Security and governance series (London: Routledge, 2010).
- 68 Barnett Rubin, "Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006).
- 69 Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States in a World of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2002), <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033245>; Jennifer Milliken, ed., *State failure, collapse and reconstruction*, Development and change book series (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003); Bain, "Saving failed states."
- 70 David A. Lake and Christopher J. Fariss, "Why International Trusteeship Fails," *Governance* 27, no. 4 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12066>.
- 71 David A. Lake, "Coercion and Trusteeship," in *The Oxford handbook of governance and limited statehood*, ed. Thomas Risse, Tanja A. Börzel and Anke Draude, 1st ed., Oxford handbooks (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 304; Lisa Hultman, Kathman Jacob D., and Megan Shan-non, "United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Civil Conflict Peace," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33, no. 3 (2016).

from the early-2000s onwards.⁷² Coining the second-generation approach as the “liberal peace,”⁷³ Mark Duffield argued that the emerging strategic complex of humanitarian, military, and development actors engaged the Global South through the *security-development-nexus*, whilst the relations of liberal governance and global economic processes increasingly excluded the Global South from production and investment prospects. Several authors increasingly stressed the liberal peace’s *neo-liberal* character, which entailed a mimicry of Western institutions, the downsizing of the public sector, and integration into the global market economy.⁷⁴ They criticised that the states that have emerged in such internationalised processes lack sovereignty, legitimacy,⁷⁵ social penetration, and thus societal validity.⁷⁶ The critique pointed to the inherent contradiction of Western values such as self-determination, sovereignty and democratic decision-making, as the societies where intervention took place could not achieve them as long as they were dictated by the interveners.

By the late 2000s, a wide arrange of scholars problematised overall limitations of externally induced reforms,⁷⁷ and the notion of ‘recipe-like’ state-building approaches,⁷⁸ which had been advocated mostly by Western actors.⁷⁹ Critique was directed against the top-down and one-size-fits-all approach that considered the state as an independent variable and a sphere separate from politics and economics. In their view, the state- and peace-building operations’ quasi-governmental policies (including electoral assistance, human rights, rule of law assistance, institutional or Security Sector Reform)⁸⁰ tended to

72 Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997), <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539367>; Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, *Global governance, liberal peace, and complex emergency*, Contemporary welfare and society (2000).

73 Duffield, *Global governance and the new wars*, p. 9.

74 David Chandler and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *Routledge handbook of international statebuilding*, Routledge handbooks (London: Routledge, 2013).

75 Bernhard Knoll, “Legitimacy and UN-Administration of Territory,” *German Law Journal* 8, no. 1 (2007), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S207183220000540X>.

76 Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention,” p. 57.

77 Risse, *Governance Without a State*; Paris and Sisk, *The dilemmas of statebuilding*; Bryn W. Hughes, Charles T. Hunt and Boris Kondoch, eds., *Making sense of peace and capacity-building operations: Rethinking policing and beyond* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010)..

78 Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, *Statebuilding and state-formation: The political sociology of intervention*, Routledge studies in intervention and statebuilding (Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2012); Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Florian P. Kühn, *Illusion Statebuilding: Warum sich der westliche Staat so schwer exportieren lässt* (Hamburg: Ed. Körber-Stiftung, 2010); Meera Sabaratnam, “History Repeating?,” in Chandler; Sisk, *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding*, Vol.; Kai Koddenbrock, “Recipes for Intervention,” *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 5 (2012), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2012.721987>; Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner, *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*, New Security Challenges (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230228740>; Oliver P. Richmond, *Failed statebuilding: Intervention, the state, and the dynamics of peace formation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=861313>.

79 James Dobbins et al., *The beginner's guide to nation-building* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2007).

80 Chesterman, *You, the people*, p. 5.

take on a technical management character,⁸¹ that evaded their actual political nature.⁸² Andersen and Zaum independently pointed out that international staff members meanwhile often endeavoured to define themselves as neutral, apolitical actors.⁸³ Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn criticised the so-called Weberian approaches of the second generation as an “illusion of statebuilding,”⁸⁴ because these missions aimed to meet solely the technical expectations of statehood, but not the underlying social relations, which seemed to follow other structures, patterns, and logics. Because of this, the to-be-built states lack recognition and legitimacy in the recipient societies. Since these states did not penetrate society, they were unable to implement political goals, even if institutions appeared to be functional from an external perspective.⁸⁵

Accountability Deficit

Beyond the question to what extent the prospects of success of international administrations were limited, since the mid-2000s critics such as Michael Pugh,⁸⁶ Outi Korhonen,⁸⁷ David Chandler,⁸⁸ and Anne Orford,⁸⁹ have highlighted what might be called the ‘dark sides’ of state-building missions. Beyond the fixation with neoliberal economic reforms, these authors emphasised the tendentious authoritarian character of the top-down approaches. In fact, numerous scholars have assessed and critiqued the human rights record of different international administrations.⁹⁰ Most notably, Kempel, Friesendorf, and Jackson identified an increasing tendency towards militarisation

81 Richmond, *Failed statebuilding*.

82 Mats Berdal and Richard Caplan, “The Politics of International Administration,” *Global Governance* 10, no. 1 (2004).

83 Louise Andersen, “Outsiders Inside the State,” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 4, no. 2 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970903533660>; Zaum, *The sovereignty paradox*; Christof P. Kurz, “What You See Is What You Get: Analytical Lenses and the Limitations of Post-Conflict Statebuilding in Sierra Leone,” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 4, no. 2 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970903533702>.

84 Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, *Illusion Statebuilding*.

85 Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, *Illusion Statebuilding*, p. 10.

86 Michael Pugh, “The Political Economy of Peacebuilding,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10, no. 2 (2005), accessed 08 February 2022, available from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41852928>.

87 Outi Korhonen, “‘Post’ as Justification: International Law and Democracy-Building After Iraq,” *German Law Journal* 4, no. 7 (2003), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S2071832200016357>.

88 David Chandler, “The Uncritical Critique of ‘Liberal Peace,’” *Review of International Studies* 36, S1 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000823>.

89 Anne Orford, *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511973574>.

90 Annemarie Devereux, “Searching for Clarity,” in *The UN, human rights and post-conflict situations*, ed. Nigel D. White and Dirk Klaassen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Remzije Istrefi, “Should the United Nations Create an Independent Human Rights Body in a Transitional Administration?,” in *Accountability for human rights violations by international organisations*, ed. Jan Wouters et al. (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2010); Ralph Wilde, “Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor,” *ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law* 7, no. 2 (2001).

of the police structure as part of the state-building efforts.⁹¹ Using the examples of the international administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, Frédéric Mégret and Florian Hoffman have argued that it is necessary to start considering the United Nations as a potential violator of human rights.⁹² Joel Beauvais showed that the administration in East Timor tended towards a paternalistic, authoritarian style of government with little regard for local political actors.⁹³ Similarly, Jarat Chopra referred to UNTAET as “the UN’s Kingdom of East Timor.”⁹⁴ Therefore, Oliver Richmond pointed out that ‘liberal’ top-down peace- and state-building approaches paradoxically undermined their own promises associated with the broader understanding of human security and R2P.⁹⁵

Scholars addressed the lack of accountability on the part of security actors, the strengthening of autocratic rule, or an overemphasis on security at the expense of socio-economic development.⁹⁶ Although the scope of accountability mechanisms has expanded through the stricter imposition in human rights treaties, such as the petition procedure of the United Nations Human Rights Council, this progress has paradoxically not applied to UN peace- and state-building missions. In fact, in 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Anan’s Director of Communications, Edward Mortimer, who proposed the reactivation of the Trusteeship Council, based his proposal on the argument that without proper accountability, international territorial administrations have a potential for abuse,⁹⁷ since, unlike in the case of mandate and trusteeship territories, the UN Charter does not provide a specific framework of accountability mechanisms for contemporary peace- and state-building missions.

Securitisation of Failed States

Several scholars argued that the securitising rhetoric about ‘rogue’ or ‘failed states,’ which allegedly jeopardise global order, international peace, and security, has overturned the universal principle of sovereign equality in the postcolonial context. This postulate of inequality allegedly legitimised military interventions and enabled the introduction of

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- 91 Cornelius Friesendorf and Jörg Krempel, *Militarized versus civilian policing: Problems of reforming the Afghan National Police*, PRIF reports in English 102 (Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), 2011); Paul Jackson, *Reconstructing security after conflict: Security sector reform in Sierra Leone*, New security challenges series (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10445769>.
 - 92 Frédéric Mégret and Florian Hoffmann, “The UN as a Human Rights Violator?,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (2003).
 - 93 Joel C. Beauvais, “Benevolent Despotism,” *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, no. 33 (2001).
 - 94 Jarat Chopra, “The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor,” *Survival* 42, no. 3 (2000), <https://doi.org/10.1093/survival/42.3.27>.
 - 95 Oliver P. Richmond, “A Post-Liberal Peace,” *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 3 (2009), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210509008651>.
 - 96 Christopher Daase and Cornelius Friesendorf, eds., *Rethinking security governance: The problem of unintended consequences*, Contemporary security studies (London: Routledge, 2012); Jackson, *Reconstructing security after conflict*; Rubin, “Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan”; Aleksandar Momirov, *Accountability of International Territorial Administrations: A Public Law Approach* (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing).
 - 97 Mortimer, “The Politics of International Administration,” p. 13.

Weberian-style trusteeship administrations for state-building.⁹⁸ Oliver Richmond attributes this to the unwillingness of the West to let go of “a paternalistic discourse of trusteeship, or a focus on counterfactual securitisation, that is, the security threats that might arise if intervention does not occur.”⁹⁹ David Lake holds that military interventions in ‘failed states’ represent “the most aggressive mode of trusteeship and state-building” and argued that interveners will almost certainly have interests of their own in the client-states.¹⁰⁰ Jaap de Wilde illustrated that while the Global South is primarily the target of international interventions, similarly precarious security conditions in parts of the Global North are largely neglected.¹⁰¹ De Wilde argues that from a human security perspective, “the homicide rate in California needs to be treated with the same concern and urgency as the killings in Liberia. But when will the UN send troops to California?”¹⁰² Wilde contends that the idea of the ‘white man’s burden’ is thus simply continued, now under the banner of the struggle against human *in*-security.¹⁰³ Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit argue in a similar direction that in “‘failed states’ securitization runs amok” as “Discourses of state failure [...] operate within a lineage of racial discourse that emerged to justify colonialism and continuing trusteeship.”¹⁰⁴ An illustrative example of this discursive shift is Bridget Coggins’ analysis of the *Failed States Index*, established in 2005 by the American *Fund for Peace*. Coggins identified major flaws with the index’ measurement criteria, as well as the lack of transparency surrounding its data base, accusing the index of being instrumental in the discursive construction of failed states by establishing a false binary between salvageable and non-salvageable states.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Coggins’ analysis hints towards the dilution of terminology: What has been described as “quasi” states in the 1980,¹⁰⁶ became “failed” states in the 1990, then “weak” states in the 2000s,¹⁰⁷ to result in “fragile” states in the 2010s.¹⁰⁸

98 Wilde, *International territorial administration*; Marta Silva, “Securitization as a Nation-Building Instrument,” *Politikon: IAPSS Journal of Political Science* 29 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.29.12>; Sabaratnam, *Decolonising intervention*; K. P. O’Reilly, “Perceiving Rogue States,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3, no. 4 (2007), <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2007.00052.x>.

99 Richmond, *Failed statebuilding*.

100 David A. Lake, *The Statebuilder’s Dilemma* (Cornell University Press, 2016). <https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501703836>.

101 Jaap de Wilde, “Speaking or Doing Human Security?,” in *The viability of human security*, ed. Monica den Boer and Jaap d. Wilde (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008).

102 de Wilde, “Speaking or Doing Human Security?,” p. 237.

103 Wilde, *International territorial administration*.

104 Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, “Is Securitization Theory Racist?,” *Security Dialogue* 26, no. 22 (2019): 8.

105 Bridget L. Coggins, “Fragile Is the New Failure,” *Political Violence at a Glance*, 27 June 2014.

106 Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial encounters: The politics of representation in North-South relations*, Borderlines 5 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 150.

107 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” *International Security* 28, no. 4 (2004).

108 Coggins, “Fragile is the New Failure.”

Colonial Reminiscence

The third generation of intervention scholars emphasized that state-building was predominantly influenced by policymakers, who drew on conceptions of security and the state based on discourses and experiences of the Global North. They criticized that through the securitisation of failed states, which allegedly threatened global security, those states were constructed by Western 'experts' as inferior Others and they produced knowledge that was adopted without alternative into the state-building canon. For Duffield this is particularly evident in the maintenance of colonial patterns of interpretation, such as the distinction between developed and underdeveloped countries, or between a civilised North and a dangerous South.¹⁰⁹ Reading state-building practices as a of form liberal power, Duffield noted the growing influence of Western biopolitical governance, identifying it as a "new imperialism."¹¹⁰ Neta Crawford argued that transitional administrations were increasingly comprehensive and come to function like colonial trusteeships.¹¹¹ Michael Ignatieff attributed the technocratic turn in state-building mission to the "desire to imprint our values, civilisation and achievements on the souls, bodies and institutions of other people,"¹¹² without invoking the spectre of neo-colonial appearance.¹¹³ Similarly, Robert Rubinstein has argued that an essential characteristic of contemporary peacekeeping is the risk "to incorporate a troubled region into an economic and moral order imposed from outside."¹¹⁴

Thus, the observation became common ground that mainly industrialised countries intervene in the Global South. As the historical context of colonialism and decolonisation makes any intervention suspect,¹¹⁵ the similarities between the "new interventionism"¹¹⁶ and decolonisation administrations were judged as a continuity of colonial logics.¹¹⁷ Thus, the 'new interventionism' after the Cold War was frequently referred to as neo-trusteeship or postmodern imperialism, meant highlight the continuation of colonial logics. A common critique of the third generation was to term the period after the

109 Duffield and Waddell, "Securing Humans in a Dangerous World."

110 Duffield, *Global governance and the new wars*, pp. 31–34.

111 Crawford, "Decolonization through Trusteeship," p. 108.

112 Michael Ignatieff, "Empire Lite," *Prospect*, 2003, p. 42.

113 Wesley, "The state of the art on the art of state building," p. 373.

114 Robert A. Rubinstein, "Peacekeeping and the Return of Imperial Policing," *International Peacekeeping* 17, no. 4 (2010): 468, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2010.516652>.

115 Neta Crawford, *Argument and change in world politics: Ethics, decolonization, and humanitarian intervention*, Cambridge studies in international relations 81 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491306>, p. 427.

116 Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, p. 6.

117 Werner Distler, "Breaking with the Past?," in *United Nations Trusteeship System: Legacies, continuities, and change*, ed. Jan Lüdert, Maria Ketzmerick and Julius Heise, Global Institutions (London: Routledge, 2022).

Cold War, for example, *new interventionism*,¹¹⁸ *Empire-lite*,¹¹⁹ *Neo-Trusteeship*,¹²⁰ *postmodern imperialism*,¹²¹ *new protectorate*,¹²² or simply *tacit trusteeship*.¹²³

Historical Scholarship

Bain, Chesterman, Wesely, Fearon and Laitin, pointed out that after the end of the Cold War the academic debates and policies on peace- and state-building in post-conflict societies did not engage with the historical cases of decolonisation or trusteeship,¹²⁴ probably out of fear to strike “neo-colonial overtones.”¹²⁵ Given this context, there were hardly any empirical-comparative studies between the historic UN Trusteeship System and what some scholars call the “neo-trusteeships” after 1990.¹²⁶ It is one of the reasons why international administrations were initially branded as ‘novel’ or ‘unique.’ This levelled criticism above all regarding the ahistorical nature of the second-generation state-building approaches.¹²⁷

A series of postcolonial scholars accused the *liberal peace* of Eurocentrism because it overlooked the Global North’s responsibility in the historical conditions of postcolonial statehood in the Global South.¹²⁸ Kai Koddenbrock criticizes the neglect of the specific historical context in which African states emerged, as well as the application of universal standards to Africa and the self-evidence of intervention logic.¹²⁹ Also Laura Appeltshauser demands to historicise African insecurity and points out that Critical Security Studies has neglected this complexity.¹³⁰ According to Rubinstein “peacekeeping has been sliding toward recreating earlier practices of imperial policing by placing the concerns of international actors ahead of those of the local communities in which peace operations take place.”¹³¹ Heonik Kwon holds that “it appears that cold war history has a

118 Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, p. 6.

119 Ignatieff, “Empire lite”

120 Richard Caplan, “From Collapsing States to Neo-Trusteeship,” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007), <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590601153622>.

121 Fearon and Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states.”

122 Michael Pugh, “Protectorates and Spoils of Peace,” in *Shadow globalization, ethnic conflicts and new wars: A political economy of intra-state war*, ed. Dietrich Jung, The new international relations series (London: Routledge, 2003); James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *The new protectorates: International tutelage and the making of liberal states* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

123 Andersen, “Outsiders Inside the State.”

124 William Bain, *Between anarchy and society: Trusteeship and the obligations of power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Fearon and Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states”; Chesterman, *You, the people*; Wesley, “The state of the art on the art of state building,” p. 375.

125 Caplan, “From collapsing states to neo-trusteeship,” p. 242.

126 Wilde, *International territorial administration*; Chesterman, *You, the people*.

127 Chesterman, *You, the people*, p. 11; Bain, *Between anarchy and society*, pp. 145–46.

128 Phillip Darby, “Rolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the Postcolonial,” *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 5 (2009), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303347>.

129 Koddenbrock, “Recipes for intervention.”

130 Laura Appeltshauser, “African In/Security and Colonial Rule: Security Studies’ Neglect of Complexity,” in *Globalizing International Relations*, ed. Ingo Peters and Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

131 Rubinstein, “Peacekeeping and the Return of Imperial Policing,” pp. 457–58.

concentric conceptual organization, consisting of a 'formal' history of relative peace in the center and 'informal' violence in the periphery.¹³²

In the mid-2000s, a series of relevant historical analyses on international territorial administration appeared, focussing on the similarities between historical examples of imperialism and current practices of statebuilding. Edward Newman points out that historically, the formation of states has usually been violent and conflictual, and that this dynamic is unlikely to change in the context of contemporary peacebuilding efforts.¹³³ Charles Tilly serves as a key reference for such studies on violence, contending that the state is a historical byproduct of warfare, wherein monopolizing violence and extracting resources arise to enhance the state's war capabilities.¹³⁴ Tilly examines the violent nature of European state-building,¹³⁵ distinguishing between state-building and state-formation—highlighting the latter as an unconscious historical process and the former as a conscious effort.¹³⁶ However, Julian Go criticizes Tilly for bifurcating European states from their colonial empires, suggesting a need for more nuanced approaches to interconnected histories.¹³⁷ Indeed, there are now other approaches to entangled multiple histories and modernities.¹³⁸ Likewise, Philipp Lottholz and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert contend that Tilly's work on the emergence of European statehood still represents a pivotal point of criticism for neo-Weberian approaches of statebuilding.¹³⁹

Due to the structural similarities between decolonisation administrations and international administrations, Marauhn and Bothe pointed to a continuity of intervention logics, comparing the UN interventions in Kosovo and East Timor to "Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administrations."¹⁴⁰ Anne Orford argued that the R2P grew

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- 132 Heonik Kwon, *The other Cold War*, Columbia studies in international and global history (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=982234>, pp. 154–55.
 - 133 Edward Newman, "The Violence of Statebuilding in Historical Perspective," *Peacebuilding* 1, no. 1 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.756281>.
 - 134 Charles Tilly, ed., *The formation of national states in Western Europe*, Studies in political development 8 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).
 - 135 Tilly, *The formation of national states in Western Europe*; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990–1990*, Studies in social discontinuity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).
 - 136 Thorsten Bonacker, Maria Ketzmerick, and Werner Distler, "Introduction: Securitization in Statebuilding and Intervention," in Bonacker; Distler; Ketzmerick, *Securitization in Statebuilding and Intervention*, Vol. p. 13.
 - 137 Julian Go, ed., *Postcolonial sociology*, 1st ed., Political power and social theory (Bingley: Emerald, 2013).
 - 138 Richard Rathbone, "West Africa," in *African modernities entangled meanings in current debate*, ed. Heike Schmidt and Jan-Georg Deutsch (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002); Robert A. Schneider, ed., "AHR Forum," special issue, *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007), available from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/i40000361>.
 - 139 Philipp Lottholz and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, "Re-Reading Weber, Re-Conceptualizing State-Building: From Neo-Weberian to Post-Weberian Approaches to State, Legitimacy and State-Building," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2016.1230588>.
 - 140 Thilo Marauhn and Michael Bothe, "UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality and Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration," in *Kosovo and*

out of the UN's practices of executive rule, which once arose in response to decolonisation.¹⁴¹ Focussing on South Africa, Buur, Jensen and Stepputat show that the much-debated nexus of security and development is by no means a recent invention.¹⁴² Rather, the security-development linkage has been a principal element of the state policies of colonial as well as post-colonial regimes during the Cold War, and it seems to be prospering in new configurations under the present wave of democratic transitions. Alex Veit compares the intervention with one of the core ideas of Frederick Lugard, the architect of 19th and 20th century British imperialism, namely *indirect rule*, and points out that the history of colonial, external rule determines the understanding and development of statehood in societies today.¹⁴³ Bain examined similarities and differences between trusteeships and neo-trusteeships by comparing imperial possessions of the British Empire to international engagement in East Timor and Kosovo.¹⁴⁴ Ralph Wilde argues that the existence of international administrations raises the possibility that colonial ideas live on today in practices that operate in the same manner as colonial trusteeship, the only difference being in the identity of the administering actor.¹⁴⁵ Chesterman's historic analysis of past UN state-building missions focuses on the tensions between the idealistic goals of international territorial administrations and the less ideal means of achieving them.¹⁴⁶ Though peace and security are the core drivers of transitional administrations, with the UN playing the role of the administering government attempting to build justice and economic structures, Chesterman points to the lasting significance and legacy of the era of decolonisation. To this day, decolonisation legacy left an organisational imprint in the UN's peacebuilding operations since the Decolonisation Unit is part of the *Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs*. Ivarsson and Rud note that many of the states that are considered failed also have a colonial past. It should therefore come as no surprise that the colonial states from which they emerged would be no less considered failures by today's standards.¹⁴⁷ A first criterion for comparison would be the similar tendency towards the use of coercive state power. Secondly, colonial states and today's neo-trusteeships were similarly dependent on metropolitan states. Finally, the colonial state and failed states are at times not recognised as stakeholders with voting rights on the international stage. Although the establishment of the League of Nations Mandates System enshrined the specific colonial state in international law, neither the local population nor the colonial state itself enjoyed its own representation in the governing bodies of international organisations; only metropolitan states 'spoke' for the territories under their

the international community: A legal assessment, ed. Christian Tomuschat (The Hague: Den Haag; Kluwer Law International, 2002).

141 Orford, *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect*, pp. 3–6.

142 Buur, Jensen and Stepputat, *The security-development nexus*.

143 Alex Veit, *Intervention as indirect rule: Civil war and statebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Mikropolitik der Gewalt 3 (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2010).

144 Bain, *Between anarchy and society*.

145 Wilde, *International territorial administration*, p. 297.

146 Chesterman, *You, the people*.

147 Søren Ivarsson and Søren Rud, "Rethinking the Colonial State," in *Rethinking the colonial state*, ed. Søren Rud and Søren Ivarsson, Political power and social theory 33 (Bingley: Emerald Publishing, 2017), p. 3.

jurisdiction. Aleksander Momirov has shown that some of the safeguards associated with the Mandates System are absent in transitional administrations, that is, accountability is less institutionalized within contemporary international administrations than in historical trusteeship.¹⁴⁸ He insinuates the fact that today's peacebuilding missions have an accountability deficit is also due to the mandate period: Colonial powers were actively involved in truncating petition mechanisms. In consequence, comparable accountability mechanisms are no longer to be found in contemporary peace- and state-building mission agreements.

These historic works suggest that by all contemporary standards of sovereignty and democratic principles, contemporary transitional administrations are a step backward. These authors certainly agree that colonial trusteeship and neo-trusteeships differ since the historical constellations in the era of decolonisation are different from international constellations of the last decades. Yet, they note that the latter encompass colonial continuities. Comparing the UN administrations of the post-Cold War era with the trusteeship administrations after World War II, it becomes apparent that both were subject to similar challenges: The former had to deliver a quick peace dividend and the latter was under pressure to accelerate decolonisation. Inherent in both were attempts of internationally mandated and monitored actors to establish state and security administrations, keep violence/riots at bay, and create" sovereign states in enormously complex and hierarchical settings of practices and discourses of statehood.¹⁴⁹ The self-evident distinction between trusteeship administrations for decolonisation and UN administrations is, therefore, too narrow. They are connected by a history of foreign rule, which ranges from colonial subjugation to the recent intervention.

2.1.5 The 4th Generation: The Local Turn

Since the early 2010s, criticism of the top-down approach and the legitimacy deficit of international statebuilding administrations led to the emergence of academic scholarship, which Oliver Richmond identified as peacebuilding's "fourth generation."¹⁵⁰ This generation is characterized by a "local turn,"¹⁵¹ which refocuses attention on grassroots

148 Aleksandar Momirov, "The Individual Right to Petition in Internationalized Territories," *Journal of the History of International Law* 9, no. 2 (2007): 227, <https://doi.org/10.1163/138819907X237174>; Momirov, *Accountability of International Territorial Administrations*.

149 Wilde, *International territorial administration*; Thorsten Bonacker, Werner Distler, and Maria Ketzmerick, "Securitisation and Desecuritisation of Violence in Trusteeship Statebuilding," *Civil Wars* 20, no. 4 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2018.1525675>.

150 Oliver P. Richmond, *A post-liberal peace*, Routledge studies in peace and conflict resolution (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 15.

151 Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, "The Local Turn in Peace Building," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 5 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.800750>.