

After Togo's and Ghana's independence, the region's territorial allocation led to a conflict between the two successor states, which used the security and intelligence services developed by the trusteeship powers to eliminate political opponents. Following growing discontent that led to coups by the security services in both countries, the region entered a period of instability, during which sub-nationalist tendencies seemed extinguished once and for all.

## 7.2 Key Findings and Conclusion

The methodological and theoretical approaches form the basis to answer the main research question "How did constructions of threat and (in)security influence the de-colonisation of Togoland?" including the sub-questions, broken down along the focus on the main actors within the trilateral constellation of the Trusteeship System, that is, the United Nations, the Administering Authorities, and the unificationist petitioners.

### 7.2.1 Sub-Question 1: (In)Securitisation by the Administering Authorities

The first sub-question focused on the French and British trusteeship powers, their (de)securitising and silencing moves before the United Nations, and the organisation of the colonial security apparatus in French and British Togoland. The theoretical framework was based equally on postcolonial readings of the Copenhagen and Paris Schools. For the conclusion, the analysis of the negotiations at the UN is based primarily on a Copenhagen-School-focused reading, while the analysis of the security and intelligence agencies in Togoland is based primarily on a Paris-School-focused reading.

#### Insecuritisation by the Administrations of French & British Togoland

The Lomé riots of 1933 initiated the emergence of the *Service de Police et de Sûreté* in French Togoland and the Accra riots of 1948 the *Special Branch* in British Togoland. Both agencies were established in response to anti-colonial discontent. Equally, both agencies equated a broadening and continuous reform of the police, the security command structure, and intelligence gathering, amounting to the demilitarisation, bureaucratisation and increased routinisation of security practises. Via surveillance, the violence of early colonialism was supplemented by more subtle methods of population control, turning the territories into a Foucauldian panopticon.

By infiltrating secret informants at the meetings of the unificationists, the French and British trusteeship administrations were well informed about their strategies, declarations, power struggles, travel plans, etc. Both the Special Branch and the Service de Sûreté were in this respect a type of repository of knowledge from which colonial administrators drew to construct their threat assessments. Thus, as 'knowledge institutions,' both these security and intelligence agencies played a key role in discursively constructing the 'unease,' which the Administering Authorities harboured vis-à-vis the unificationists. Among themselves, the Administering Authorities were not only aware of these structures and developments, but in order to thwart the unificationists, the French and British Administering Authorities even cooperated on security and intelligence matters,

albeit to a limited extent. It is noteworthy that while the Special Branch's contributions were relatively modest, the Service de Sûreté played a more significant role in this regard.

Besides the Anglo-French rivalry in colonial matters, the hesitance of the French and British to cooperate on security and intelligence issues can be attributed to the different threat perceptions of the French and British colonial orders. The different national colonial approaches, that is, French *assimilation* versus British *indirect rule*, led to different views of what exactly constituted a threat and how this threat had to be dealt with. While the British *indirect rule* allowed for a colonial state that was not only able to integrate a certain degree of self-government, but indeed even depended on it, the pronounced French colonial policy of *assimilation* could not avoid but to consider demands of self-government by any nationalist movement as a threat. Therefore, nationalist movements, such as the Ewe and Togoland unifications, were much more likely to be perceived as a threat to the assimilationist French Union than, for example, nationalist movements such as the CPP in the British Gold Coast, where the latter was soon introduced and integrated into the security and intelligence architecture. This aspect is further evidenced by the fact that in the oral hearings before the Fourth Commission, France was more often on the defensive than Britain and in the years following decolonisation, intervention in the former British colonies remained limited while intervention in the former French colonies was extensive. In short, since France defined the constraints of its *assimilation* policy and the French Union much more narrowly, the more drastic the measure of its 'management of unease,' that is, the *insecuritisation*, means and measures of its security apparatus, had to be.

British unease, on the other hand, stemmed primarily from a different source. In London, that is, the metropolis of liberalism, much more attention was drawn to the 'red menace.' Yet, regarding colonial possessions, London and the Governor of British Togoland diverged widely on the communist threat. The latter was convinced that London was seeing threats where there were none. It seemed that in its intelligence-driven search to clearly predict upcoming threats, the British Special Branch was blinded by London's own *insecuritisation*. The same applies to French Togoland: The Service de Sûreté that *insecuritised* and repressed the unification movement was, in a way, a victim of its own success, that is, it was structurally self-blinded as evidenced by the fact that Governor Spénale had no explanation for the 1958 elections that brought Sylvanus Olympio to electoral power.

So, how has the routinised *insecuritisation* (Paris School) at the level of the territorial administrations informed the *securitization* dynamics in New York (Copenhagen School)? The British archival materials provide more comprehensive insights into the activities and threat constructions of the Special Branch compared to the scarcity of information in the French archival materials on the Service de Sûreté. Consequently, a direct comparison is hindered by the limited availability of French archival materials. Nonetheless, the repressive behaviour of the French administration suggests a significantly stronger *insecuritisation* within the Service de Sûreté. Whether this heightened *insecuritisation* substantially influenced the negotiations in New York, however, can be deemed limited in its impact. Therefore, it can be assumed that the administration-internal *insecuritisations* of the unificationists had little direct influence on the negotiations in New York. In conclusion, a definitive answer to the question remains elusive though.

Of course, unlike in French Togoland, security policy for British Togoland was mainly determined by the more pressing developments in the Gold Coast. Although in British Togoland the colonial administration was aware of the political activities of the unificationists, their statements at meetings, travel plans, et cetera, the archives indicate that only after the lessons of the Mau-Mau rebellion the colonial administrators realised its dissatisfaction with the intelligence and security arrangements in British Togoland and never really resolved them until independence. After decades of routinized colonial administration, reforms of the security and intelligence apparatus had to be carried out in great haste.

Furthermore, the analysis revealed a profoundly divided security and intelligence service in the Gold Coast and British Togoland. The insistence of London regarding intelligence acquisition often led to conflicts of authority between various levels of the colonial administration. The involved were profoundly divided on matters of the organisation of colonial security. The internal struggles among the various levels of administration remain a neglected topic in studies of decolonisation and clearly show that there was no agreed colonial order. This is also evident in the transfer of power and the resulting conflicts of loyalty over serving two masters: the colonial administration or Nkrumah. Various times the fear was expressed that after independence the latter would gain latent power over his opponents (a fear that was ultimately confirmed).

This problem of loyalty, that is, the dichotomy of serving two masters, also existed in the transition process in French Togoland: according to the Togo Statute, the gendarmerie, responsible for maintaining internal security, was subject to the orders of the Autonomous Government. However, according to the Togo Statute, when the gendarmes acted as auxiliaries to the French forces of law and order, they were subject to the orders of the French High Commissioner. Thus, in French Togoland, too, there seemed to be a reluctance to relinquish control over security functions. Even after Togo's independence, the Togolese Gendarmerie was led by a French Commander – a circumstance without which the theories about the involvement of the French in Olympio's murder would probably not have arisen. Certainly, the conclusion cannot be generalized, but the comparison suggests that this loyalty problem seems to be a fundamental one in processes of power transfers.

The archival record is too scarce for French Togoland, but the post-independence developments of Ghana and Togo suggest that in French Togoland there was a similar problem as in British Togoland. In the final phase of the transition, the question arose as to how internal security and intelligence could be ensured most effectively without being misused as a political weapon. Eventually, the French and British left the successor governments the colonial structures of their security and intelligence agencies without legislative control. In the following, Nkrumah's and Olympio's government became increasingly repressive until they were eventually overthrown by their own security forces.

### **(De)Securitisation at the United Nations**

However, developments in surveillance and security structures remained (and as is usual with intelligence agencies, were supposed to remain) invisible to international monitoring bodies. When it came to answering to others than themselves, that is, to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Administering Authorities portrayed the territory's

path to self-government as a completely normal and orderly process. Instead, the intelligence-driven reform of the security sector was rendered invisible. The annual reports of the Administering Authorities did not indicate the establishment of these agencies. Statistical data on the configuration and size of the police force, especially in French Togoland, were displayed dazzlingly opaque. Considering these secrecy-attempts as a turnout or repertoire of (de)securitisation, the conclusion can be drawn that the struggle of the national movements was desecuritised vis-à-vis the international audience, but *de facto* insecuritised at the places of the colonial power, foremost within metropolitan ministries, the colonial administration, and police stations.

Between 1947 and 1950, that is, since Sylvanus Olympio's first appearance before the Trusteeship Council, France and Britain resolved to frustrate the unification movement. Using the simple expedient of *locutionary silencing*, they proposed ever stricter procedural rules for anonymous petitions, postponed the examination of petitions, agreed on vague resolution, and deliberately refrained from undoing the overburdening of the petition system through which residents of the territories could submit complaints to the United Nations. During tours of Visiting Missions, Administering Authorities exploited the relentless opposition of political parties to securitise potential clashes and, thus, dissuade Visiting Missions from meeting the unificationists.

Conceptualised as *locutionary silencing*, a review of the Trusteeship System's petition examination procedure, thus, shows that the way petitions were examined gave the United Nations the least insight into the conditions of the trusteeship territories. Although the rules of procedure allowed a certain degree of politicising petitions, they systematically excluded securitising petitions. Purposefully, written petitions were prevented from leading to extraordinary measures or even a bending of rules. The opposite is rather true: the steady adoption of ever more restrictive rules of procedure, especially concerning anonymous petitions, led to the bureaucratic marginalisation of written petitions. The result: the right to petition, that is, the very instrument that was supposed to provide a means to bring grievances to the attention of the United Nations, was effectively used to contain these efforts.

The attempts at *locutionary silencing* are, of course, only the result of *illocationary frustration*, that is, the records show that the Administering Authorities understood and acknowledged the securitising arguments of the unificationists very well but chose not to address and eventually thwart them. Whether or not this happened because the Administering Authorities did not believe in their substance is a matter of *illocationary disablement*. On many occasions, the Administering Authorities argued (and were quite convinced themselves) that the unificationists were representing a minority demand, which they were only very vocal about. Whether this was the case cannot be answered definitively, because the two referenda of 1956 and the 1958 Legislative Assembly Election only provided limited clarity about the majority situation. A referendum on the unification of Ewe or Togoland, which would have been held simultaneously in British and French Togoland and would have settled the question once and for all, was successfully thwarted by the British and French. In the framework of the present work, however, this is of secondary importance, because if the French and British assertion was true, this would underline the prominence of the securitisation of a vocal minority before the United Nations. If it was false, that is, a majority really championed unification, then the silencing

of the unificationists' securitisation efforts by the Administering Authorities should be regarded as even more significant.

Statements in the archival records do not make it easy to always distinguish clearly between *illocutionary frustration* and *illocutionary disablement*, that is, whether actors within the colonial administrators understood the petitioners' securitisation moves but deliberately frustrated them (*illocutionary frustration*), or whether the disabling frames of their colonial mindsets did not allow them to understand the petitioners' securitised demands at all (*illocutionary disablement*). None of this would have mattered to the unificationists, however, because in practice it made no difference whether the trusteeship powers acted in good faith or bad faith. Yet, on a theoretical side, it would substantiate, on the one hand, the need for a context-focused, that is, *perlocution*-focused approach that considers the consequences and effects of securitisation and, on the other hand, that the subaltern can indeed securitise if colonial power structures such as *disabling frames* are sufficiently eroded.

The Administering Authorities certainly made use of these *illocutionary disabling frames*. Figuratively speaking, the Administering Authorities emitted jamming signals to disrupt the expressed securitising arguments of the unificationists. The Administering Authorities tried to discredit the unificationists by portraying them as troublemakers, who used overly radical language. Complaints were regularly made about the language of the unificationists and about their mobilization methods, which allegedly threatened public order in the territories. Furthermore, the Administering Authorities sought to securitise their policy not only as a warranty of peace and order in the trusteeship territories, but also as responsibility for the post-trusteeship period, arguing that meeting the demands of the unification movement would lead to a possible domino effect in other colonial territories, threatening a balkanization of the African continent, which could not be in the interest of the United Nations. The Administrative Authorities did not succeed in misleading the Fourth Committee in general with these *disabling frames*, but at key moments during the negotiations over resolutions they were certainly able to wrest strategically important concessions by their use.

## 7.2.2 Sub-Question 2: Securitisation by the Petitioners

In 1956, James Coleman noted: "The Togolands have not commanded the international spotlight because of their size or international importance. They are among the smaller of the eleven areas under trusteeship, and they are geographically rather far removed from any direct involvement in the 'cold war.' Nor has the 'colonial crisis' been more acute there than elsewhere."<sup>2</sup> In deciding to achieve its goals by peaceful and largely constitutional means, the unification movement limited its only chance of success by persuading the bodies with the necessary power, namely the British and French governments and the United Nations, through petitions. Notably, Togolese unificationists commanded the international spotlight because they were the first who appeared before the new 'world organisation' and, by imbuing early debates with a securitising language, they were able to ensure for more than a decade that the reunification of Togoland remained the only

<sup>2</sup> Coleman, *Togoland*, p. 3.