

## 7. Conclusion

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“It is easy to lose one’s way in the ‘Togoland question.’ There are so many actors in the drama, like a Dostoyevsky novel.”<sup>1</sup>

### 7.1 General Summary

The introductory part of this study was devoted to the resurgent conflict over ‘Western Togoland’ and one of its most pronounced spokesmen, the late Charles Kwame Kudzordzi. Since September 2020, the conflict has turned violent, including kidnappings and exchanges of gunfire. The subsequent crackdown by and overhaul of the Ghanaian security and intelligence sector exemplifies how serious the Ghanaian government considered the precariousness of national security. Representatives of the Ghanaian state and the secessionists point out that the roots of the conflict lie in the region’s history of decolonisation: the contested integration of the United Nations trusteeship territory of British Togoland into the Gold Coast.

Driven by the purposes of peace and conflict research, the aim of the analysis was to find out why during the period of decolonisation, despite the resources made available under the special conditions of the United Nations Trusteeship System, the then immensely active Ewe and Togoland unification movement was unable to realise its *Dream of Unity*, resulting in British Togoland’s integration into the Gold Coast, thus, allowing the seeds of conflict to grow.

The literature review revealed, on the one hand, that the debate on international state-building and peace-building missions recently underscored an increased desideratum of historical work with a special interest in its historical precedents during the era of trusteeship and decolonisation. On the other hand, while previous work by historians and Africanists on the trusteeship territory of Togoland has tended to address the origins and persistence of ethnic and territorial identities, there have been few theory-based explanations of the strategies and ultimate failure of the Ewe and Togoland unification

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1 Thomas Hodgkin [1956] as cited in Nugent, *Smugglers, secessionists & loyal citizens on the Ghana-Togo frontier*, p. 197.

movement. Thus, trusteeship-related literature that can inform the desideratum of intervention, state-building, and security scholarship, remained limited.

A theoretical framework was designed that adapted theories of International Relations, foremost the Copenhagen School's securitisation framework with a conceptual addendum of postcolonial theory, to grasp securitisation efforts as well as their silencing during the historical context of decolonisation. The Ewe and Togoland unification movement's campaign before the United Nations was thus examined with this postcolonial reading of securitisation, which allowed to analyse under what conditions and with what effects and consequences seeming 'subaltern actors' may or may not (de)securitise.

It has been argued that long before the establishment of the Trusteeship System, not only the unification movement itself, but also the petition and securitisation campaign it ran, drew on antecedents from the period when Togoland was administered under German rule and the Mandates System. Through the opportunities that were opened by the Trusteeship System after World War II, the first Ewe petitioners made their plea known to the Trusteeship Council. However, the two main trusteeship powers, France and Britain, sought to integrate French and British Togoland into the French Union and the Commonwealth of Nations, respectively. They did everything in their power to silence the petition campaign of the Ewe unification movement at the United Nations level and have its leadership closely surveilled by the ever-expanding security and intelligence apparatus in the trusteeship territories. The investigation aimed to understand how the insecurity by security agencies influenced discussions at the international level. It delved into the formation of the respective intelligence and security apparatuses, that is, the Special Branch in British Togoland and the Service de Sûreté in French Togoland. Particularly in French Togoland, significant repression by the Administering Authority targeted unificationists

From 1951 onwards, Ewe unificationists formed a tactical alliance with Togoland unificationists and increasingly used a securitising language to present their case not to the Trusteeship Council but to a new audience, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. While the Fourth Committee was dismayed by allegations of repressive measures and favourably disposed to the securitised unification argument, the Administering Authorities employed various techniques to silence the petitions of the unificationists, such as by obstructing their consideration (*locutionary silencing*), disrupting oral hearings by mobilising counter-petitioners or presenting counter-securitising arguments (*illocutionary frustration*), or by discrediting the unificationists and by expanding their often civilizational reasoning towards undecided delegations (*illocutionary disablement*).

Albeit the movement's relentless petitioning campaign, the United Nations eventually resolved the integration of the trusteeship territory of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. Exactly ten years after the commencement of the British Trusteeship Agreement for Togoland, Ghana's independence on 6 March 1957 sealed the partition of Ewe- as well as French and British Togoland once and for all, effectively frustrating the securitisation efforts, which the movements had undertaken during this decade. The northern integration-favouring part of British Togoland eventually became the Northern Region of Ghana, while the southern separation-favouring and predominantly Ewe-inhabited Trans-Volta-Togoland became the Volta Region.

After Togo's and Ghana's independence, the region's territorial allocation led to a conflict between the two successor states, which used the security and intelligence services developed by the trusteeship powers to eliminate political opponents. Following growing discontent that led to coups by the security services in both countries, the region entered a period of instability, during which sub-nationalist tendencies seemed extinguished once and for all.

## 7.2 Key Findings and Conclusion

The methodological and theoretical approaches form the basis to answer the main research question “How did constructions of threat and (in)security influence the decolonisation of Togoland?” including the sub-questions, broken down along the focus on the main actors within the trilateral constellation of the Trusteeship System, that is, the United Nations, the Administering Authorities, and the unificationist petitioners.

### 7.2.1 Sub-Question 1: (In)Securitisation by the Administering Authorities

The first sub-question focused on the French and British trusteeship powers, their (de)securitising and silencing moves before the United Nations, and the organisation of the colonial security apparatus in French and British Togoland. The theoretical framework was based equally on postcolonial readings of the Copenhagen and Paris Schools. For the conclusion, the analysis of the negotiations at the UN is based primarily on a Copenhagen-School-focused reading, while the analysis of the security and intelligence agencies in Togoland is based primarily on a Paris-School-focused reading.

#### Insecuritisation by the Administrations of French & British Togoland

The Lomé riots of 1933 initiated the emergence of the *Service de Police et de Sûreté* in French Togoland and the Accra riots of 1948 the *Special Branch* in British Togoland. Both agencies were established in response to anti-colonial discontent. Equally, both agencies equated a broadening and continuous reform of the police, the security command structure, and intelligence gathering, amounting to the demilitarisation, bureaucratisation and increased routinisation of security practises. Via surveillance, the violence of early colonialism was supplemented by more subtle methods of population control, turning the territories into a Foucauldian panopticon.

By infiltrating secret informants at the meetings of the unificationists, the French and British trusteeship administrations were well informed about their strategies, declarations, power struggles, travel plans, etc. Both the Special Branch and the Service de Sûreté were in this respect a type of repository of knowledge from which colonial administrators drew to construct their threat assessments. Thus, as ‘knowledge institutions,’ both these security and intelligence agencies played a key role in discursively constructing the ‘unease,’ which the Administering Authorities harboured vis-à-vis the unificationists. Among themselves, the Administering Authorities were not only aware of these structures and developments, but in order to thwart the unificationists, the French and British Administering Authorities even cooperated on security and intelligence matters,