

Philippines, confronted France with the petitions by Olympio and de Souza accusing the French authorities of organizing the elections in such a way as to favour the part of the population that was against the unification of the Ewes.

At the same time, several other anti-colonial members of the Fourth Committee complained particularly about the hostility, which the Administering Authorities have adopted toward anonymous petitions.²⁷¹ The Yugoslav representative, Sudjan Prica, criticized the Trusteeship Council for having “too often replied in the vaguest terms to interesting and useful petitions.”²⁷² The representative from the Philippines, Diosdado Macapagal, noted that the Council “tended to discourage appeals to the United Nations against any act or policy of the Administering Authorities and thus to render illusory the right of petition.”²⁷³ Furthermore, Macapagal noted that it was also difficult to reconcile the fact that arrests were taking place on the eve of elections with the pledge given by the Administering Authority during the Council's previous session.²⁷⁴ The delegates of India, Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia submitted a joint draft resolution urging the General Assembly to persuade the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authorities that it was not only important to find an appropriate solution as soon as possible, but also to conduct the elections to the ECC in a democratic manner.²⁷⁵ In particular, the joint resolution called on France, to investigate the practices objected to in the petitions and to report on them at the next meeting of the Trusteeship Council. In addition, the General Assembly requested the Trusteeship Council to report separately to the General Assembly on all steps taken in connection with the Ewe issue.²⁷⁶

Furthermore, the Fourth Committee called on the Council to transform the *ad hoc* Committees on petitions into a *Standing* Committee on petitions, which would be empowered to examine petitions between Council sessions, requiring colonial powers without delay to provide comments and information on measures taken.²⁷⁷ The reaction by General Assembly towards the new procedure was prelude to the decade-long exchange of blows between the Assembly's Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council.

6.4.3 From Ewe to Togoland Unification (1951)

The boycott of the ECC was an expression of frustration with the Trusteeship Council's passivity toward the demands of the unification movement. Thus, on 7 January 1951, the AEC, the CUT, and the Togoland Union held a joint meeting in Agomé, near Kpalimé, and adopted a resolution that was course-changing in several respects.

271 GAOR, “5th Session: 4th Committee” (1950), pp. 15–20.

272 GAOR, “5th Session: 4th Committee” (1950), p. 15.

273 GAOR, “5th Session: 4th Committee” (1950), p. 20.

274 GAOR, “5th Session: 4th Committee” (1950), p. 21.

275 A/C.4/L.82/Rev.1, available at GAOR 5th Session, Annexes, (T/5/Annexes Vol. I), *Agenda Item* 13, pp. 21–22.

276 GAOR, “5th Session: 4th Committee” (1950), p. 126.

277 GAOR, “5th Session: 4th Committee” (1950), p. 176. General Assembly Resolution 435, *Examination of petitions*, A/RES/435(V) (December 2, 1950), available from [undocs.org/en/A/RES/435\(V\)](https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/435(V)).

First, the joint resolution included the clear demand for independence. Previously, the AEC had called only for the reunification of all Ewe under a single colonial power – not for straightforward independence.

Second, the AEC had accepted the fact that the UN did not have the authority to decide on the Ewe populated areas of the Gold Coast – a matter, which the AEC had previously consistently denied in petitions and oral hearings as a technicality. However, confronted with the Administering Authorities' apparent unwillingness to bring about Ewe unification, Olympio now argued that unification of the Ewe majority could only be achieved through Togoland reunification and independence. Thus, overall Olympio championed a new program that aligned the AEC's and CUT's position more closely with that of the Togoland Union by calling for the independence of a reunified Togoland within five years under UN auspices. The drive to prioritise the unification of Togoland over the unification of the Ewes divided many Ewe unificationists and led to many notable members such as Francis Asare, Komla Gbedemah and Daniel Chapman (after all the founder of the AEC), turning their backs on the AEC and joining Kwame Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party, which would win the General Elections in the Gold Coast in the following month.

Third, it did not escape the movement's attention that in recent months it had been supported by non-Western members on the Trusteeship Council and that the majorities in the General Assembly had already resulted in several resolutions in its favour. Thus, the movement sought to by-pass the Trusteeship Council, dominated by the colonial powers, to appear before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, where most of the delegates was favourably disposed to the anti-colonial cause of the unification argument. The securitizing actors were looking for an audience that was easier to attract.

Fourth, because the unificationist had been particularly successful in the past with their securitising language, especially regarding delegates from the Global South, the language of written and oral petitions became more drastic. This change in language is also evident in the adopted resolution, which resolved that...

"[...] in carrying out the unification the wishes of that part of the section of the Ewe peoples which inhabit the South Eastern part of the Gold Coast Colony which the Trusteeship Council accepts is outside the competence of the Trusteeship Council be seriously considered by United Nations in the interest of the *peaceful development of the Trust Territory and the maintenance of world peace and security for which the United Nations stands*."²⁷⁸

Thus, the unificationists adapted their language by addressing the UN in the spirit for which it was created after World War II in the first place: as *the* international organization to prevent armed conflict. Thus, the Togoland Union, which was taken over by Antor, addressed a cablegram not to the UN Trusteeship Council but the UN Security Council, requesting the withdrawal and replacement of the current Trusteeship Agreement.²⁷⁹

278 Emphasis added, PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/676, *Standing Consultative Commission for Togoland*, Resolution adopted on 7th January 1951, p. 1.

279 PRAAD (Ho), D/DA/376, *Togo Union*, Cablegram [59]. Togoland did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Security Council and was, therefore, dismissed.

Several other written petitions and short cablegrams heavily securitised Togoland unification: "Farmers indignant [regarding] delay Togo Unification. Approval vitally necessary to safeguard peace in territory."²⁸⁰

After Antor's successful takeover of Togoland Union, its new General-Secretary, Michael Batse, wrote:

"The patience of the people in the Trust Territory is now exhausted and it is feared these peace-loving people of the territories may soon lose their hitherto [sic] levelheadedness and the matter may get out of control unless the two territories are unified in the very near future. It is hoped that for the maintenance of the principles of the Charter, the United Nations will be more prepared to appoint peaceful commissions now to *implement immediate unification than to send Military Missions at a later date*. The people of the territories are wide aware of the activities of the Administering Authorities to frustrate their demand for unification. In the interest of peace and good order therefore, it is respectfully requested that the General Assembly set up a suitable machinery for the immediate unification of the two territories."²⁸¹

Nevertheless, during the Trusteeship Council's 8th Session (1951), the Administering Authorities continued their course to frustrate the unificationist petitions. Although the report of the French *Procureur Général*, Paulin Baptiste, expectedly attested that the electoral system implemented in French Togoland was the only one which, "in view of the tribal state of development of the people of Togoland, enabled the population to express its views,"²⁸² the Council noted that the EEC had failed due to the boycott of the unificationist parties. The Council took note of the petitioners' grievances but followed the French account of the situation, urging the unificationists to co-operate with the Administering Authorities to find a solution to the problem.²⁸³

Moreover, since the Council resolved at its 7th Session (1950) to defer consideration of the 1949 Annual Reports on Togoland and the 1949 Visiting Mission report, it had decided at its 3rd Special Session (November 1950) not to consider the reports at the next possible session, that is, the Council's 8th Session (1951), but only six months later at the 9th Session (1951).²⁸⁴ It was only at the beginning of the 8th Session that the Non-Administering Authorities took note of the ulterior motive behind this move, that is, in this way the Administering Authorities intended to postpone also the discussion of all petitions, which, as they put it, were raising questions of general character. Again, France, Britain, and Belgium argued that those petitions be best considered during the debate of the Annual Reports and the Visiting Mission.²⁸⁵ And thus, with only a narrow majority the Council

280 PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/94, *Administration of Southern Togoland*, Cablegram, 21 June 1951, Thomas Egbadzo to UNations.

281 Emphasis added, PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/94, *Administration of Southern Togoland*, handwritten letter "Togoland Affairs", Michael Batse to Secretary-General, 11 May 1951, p. 3 [110].

282 TCOR 8th Session, Annex (T/8S/Annex), *Agenda Item 17*, p. 19.

283 TCOR, "8th Session" (1951), p. 197. Trusteeship Council Resolution 306, *The Ewe problem*, T/RES/306(VIII) (9 March 1951), available from digitallibrary.un.org/record/216359.

284 TCOR, "3rd Special Session" (1951), p. 7.

285 TCOR, "8th Session" (1951), p. 225.

decided to postpone all “those petitions from trust territories in Africa which are regularly before the Council.”²⁸⁶ Since 7 of the 11 UN Trusteeship Territories were in Africa, this affected virtually all petitions. However, petitions from Togoland were particularly affected, because of the total of 317 petitions brought before the Council at this session, 123 petitions, that is, more than one third originated from Togoland alone.²⁸⁷ Many of them were anticipated to remain unexamined for two years following their dispatch.

Yet, two days after the postponement, on 15 March 1951, Antor appeared before the Council as a representative of the yet-to-be-officially-constituted Togoland Congress and presented the main lines that the unification movement had adopted at the Kpalimé Conference in January 1951. Antor laid down the demand that no part of Togoland should be integrated into a neighbouring territory as long as Togoland was not unified, and its people could thus decide for themselves on a possible union or federation with the Gold Coast. He repeated the call, which Olympio had made as early as 1947, for a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the people and wished the UN to set the transition period to independence at a maximum of five years.²⁸⁸

After Antor’s hearing, the Soviet representative, Aleksander Soldatov, wished to reverse the earlier decision to postpone consideration of the petitions until the next session in order to take a decision immediately after the hearing. Yet, the Administering Authorities rebuffed the motion considering it “grossly unfair”²⁸⁹ to other opinions held in the territory if the Council reaches a decision immediately after hearing from only one side.²⁹⁰ Conversely, the Council resolved to postpone also consideration of the Assembly resolution that demanded to turn the *Ad Hoc* Committee procedure for examining petitions into a Standing Committee for examining petitions.²⁹¹

Following the Council’s 8th Session (1951), the French and British Colonial Ministers Pierre Pflimlin and Oliver Lyttelton, agreed during an interministerial meeting at the end of March 1951 to maintain the status quo in the territories.²⁹²

Founding of the Togoland Congress (1951)

The unification parties decided to ignore the Council’s resolution urging them to attend the second meeting of the ECC, which was scheduled for 15 May 1951. As a result, the ECC proved to be a failure. The continued boycott of the ECC prompted Awuma, who had been expelled by the Togoland Union, to write a hateful letter to Antor in June 1951, expressing that although they were pursuing the same goals, they differed in their means: „we condemn without reserve and shall ever resist ruthlessly any Fascist attempt to achieve this

286 Trusteeship Council Resolution 341, *Deferment of the consideration of certain petitions*, T/RES/341(VIII) (March 13, 1951), available from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/216428>.

287 Calculation based on United Nations, “Art. 87,” in *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs*, 1945–1954, Vol. VI, 425–399, available from legal.un.org/repertory/art87-english/rep_orig_vol4_art87.pdf, p. 390.

288 TCOR, “8th Session” (1951), pp. 241–49.

289 TCOR, “8th Session” (1951), p. 249.

290 TCOR, “8th Session” (1951), p. 264.

291 TCOR, “8th Session” (1951), pp. 264–65.

292 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/3341/2, *Entretiens franco-britanniques sur le Togo-Cameroun*, without title [compte-rendue], 7 February 1953, p. 1.

end through gangster methods by your Boycott Party.²⁹³ Awuma's fascism-insinuations were not far-fetched, since, when under the leadership of Antor, the Togoland Congress was officially constituted on 7–8 July 1951, the Special Branch reported that the Togoland Congress' Working Committee had adopted the swastika as its flag and emblem a month later.²⁹⁴ Although Awuma was an ex-member of the *Bund der deutschen Togoländer*, he was likewise an objector of Naziism. As early as 1 August 1951, Awuma wrote to the Gold Coast Ministry of Defence and External Affairs and to the Senior District Commissioner in Ho, asking that members of the Togoland Congress be warned not to let the Swastika fly anywhere in Togoland.²⁹⁵ The adoption of the Swastika by the Congress sparked controversy,²⁹⁶ but it passed soon as even the Commissioner in Ho acknowledged that the Togoland Congress has shown merely a lack of foresight and disregarded the Swastika-flag-incident as irrelevant.²⁹⁷ The incident nevertheless shows that Antor and his followers were prone to naive Germanophilia – no wonder, since they wanted Togoland to be reinstated within its former 'German borders.'

However, it was not the former founders of the Togoland Union who were to lead to the most challenging antagonism of the Togoland Congress, but the political developments in the Gold Coast that led to the formation of a new anti-colonial party: the *Convention Peoples Party* (CPP), led by Kwame Nkrumah.

Harnessing Nkrumah for Togoland Annexation (1951)

The 1948 Accra riots forced the British government to make gradual constitutional concessions. When the all-African Commission under the chair of Justice H. Coussey completed its work, a new constitution was adopted on 29 December 1950, which fundamentally changed the entire structure of local government. The new constitution provided that the Gold Coast government's cabinet would be composed of a large majority of eight African ministers and created an 84-member legislative assembly, of which just under half (38) were to be popularly elected and 37 would represent the territorial councils.

Yet, six members (all white) were appointed by the governor to represent commercial interests and three were the *ex-officio* ministers: the Financial Secretary, the Attorney General and the Chief Secretary, who was in charge of Defence and External Affairs. Thus, despite the majority of African ministers, core executive power remained in the hands of the British colonial administration, and the legislature was tailored to be subject to control by traditionalist interests. The merging of Defence and External Affairs is noteworthy since any official diplomatic interaction, whether with France, French Togoland or

293 PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/676, *Standing Consultative Commission for Togoland*, Otto Awuma to Senyo Antor, 5 June 1951, p. 3.

294 TNA (London), FCO 141/4997, *Gold Coast: Special Branch Summaries*, Special Branch Summary No. 30, July 1951, p. 15.

295 PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/94, *Administration of Southern Togoland*, Letter BA.93/191, September 1951; Without Title, Senior District Commissioner, 6 September 1951.

296 PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/94, *Administration of Southern Togoland*, Ianthe Lee, "The Significance of the Swastika to the Joint Togoland Congress," 12 September 1951.

297 PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/94, *Administration of Southern Togoland*, Chief Commissioner: "Flying of the Swastika Flag", 4 October 1951.

regarding the Trusteeship Council, was thereby always underpinned by security considerations. The ex-officio Minister of Defence, Reginald Saloway, would become as much a scapegoat for the Togoland Congress as Governor Arden-Clarke.²⁹⁸

Although the new constitution represented enormous progress, it fell far short of the CPP's demand for complete self-government. When elections to the Legislative Assembly created by the new constitution were held on 8 February 1951, the CPP's leader, Kwame Nkrumah, was still imprisoned. However, this only strengthened his reputation as a leader and hero of the anti-colonial cause, lending him the status of a martyr. The CPP won an impressive victory with a two-thirds majority of the seats, including one for the still-imprisoned Nkrumah. The governor, Charles Arden-Clarke, released Nkrumah and allowed him to form a government as head of affairs, a position similar to that of prime minister.

Shortly after his electoral victory, Nkrumah travelled to London in June 1951. A British cabinet paper records that during Nkrumah's visit, he had a private meeting with Thomas Cooke, the parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, who involved Nkrumah in the British plans to integrate British Togoland into the Gold Coast.²⁹⁹ The British needed Nkrumah for the plan because they could afford to be seen as the main actors.³⁰⁰

The priority that the Togoland question had for the British was further expressed in the fact that in the same month the British carted Nkrumah to New York. There, he discussed the Ewe question with Ralph Bunche, Director of the UN Trusteeship Division and Daniel Chapman, UN Senior Area Specialist on African Affairs. Chapman, who was after all, the founder of the Ewe Newsletter and the AEC, as well as other prominent members of the AEC, such as Komla Gbedemah, henceforth advocated for Nkrumah's and the CPP's push for the "integration" of British Togoland into the Gold Coast as a first step toward Ewe liberation.

A Special Branch report recounts how just one month later, on 4 August 1951, at a CPP party convention held in Ho (that is, the capital of British Togoland) Nkrumah "sought to bring great weight to his promises of the benefits that would accrue to the Togoland peoples when their territory was "annexed'."³⁰¹ Approximately half a year later, on 5 February 1952, Nkrumah declared his intention to "liberate" French Togoland once the Gold Coast was independent along with British Togoland.³⁰²

Thus, slowly a line of conflict formed between the CPP, which demanded the *integration* of British Togoland into the Gold Coast, and the Togoland Congress, which wanted *unification* of British and French Togoland in their former borders under German rule.³⁰³

298 See comment by J.K.A. Quashi (Togoland Congress) in TNA (London), FCO 141/4997, *Gold Coast: Special Branch Summaries*, Special Branch Summary No. 30, July 1951, p. 10.

299 Kudzordzi (private) (Ho), *Kudzordzi Archives*, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies [C.(54) 169], Cabinet Meeting 19th May 1954, p. 2

300 Kent, "The Ewe Question 1945–56," p. 197.

301 TNA (London), FCO 141/4997, *Gold Coast: Special Branch Summaries*, Special Branch Summary No. 30, July 1952.

302 Luchaire, *Du Togo français sous tutelle à la République autonome du Togo*, p. 79.

303 Nugent, *Smugglers, secessionists & loyal citizens on the Ghana-Togo frontier*, pp. 183–97; Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland*, pp. 149–54.

Local Intelligence Committee (1951)

In British Togoland, a new era dawned in 1951 in terms of the attitudes of the security services, albeit not equally repressive. Yet, security and intelligence operations intensified: After Arthur Young ended his two-month tour in 1950, his 1951-report followed the recommendation of his predecessor, William Johnson, to unify and overhaul the Gold Coast's police force. Young concluded that, with merely ten European Special Branch officers, the British administration had only extremely limited sources of intelligence and recommended the broadening and Africanization of the Special Branch in the territory.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, in September 1951, Security Liaison Officer, Philip Kirby Green, requested a general authority from the Minister of Defence, Reginald Saloway, to exchange information with French officers equivalent to the British Security Liaison Officers.

With the broadening of security intelligence measures, especially those of the Special Branch, CenSeC decided in October 1951 on the creation of a *Local Intelligence Committee* (LIC), tasked with the "purpose of collating and assessing all intelligence which had a bearing on the security of the country."³⁰⁵ While CenSeC was staffed exclusively with administration members responsible for *external* security, with the exception of the Police Commissioner, LIC comprised mainly members concerned with *internal security*, namely the Governor, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, the Head of Special Branch, the Security Liaison Officer, and military intelligence officers of Gold Coast Forces. LIC and CenSeC autonomously generated their intelligence and security reports, each focusing on their respective areas of concern.

It should be noted that after Nkrumah's election victory that the British intelligence apparatus lost one of its most important surveillance targets and sources of insecurity. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the formation of the LIC corresponded to a reorganization of the intelligence apparatus that followed only after Nkrumah's inclusion into British annexation plans.

Maintaining 'Public Order' in French Togoland

In French Togoland the unification parties were increasingly losing ground by 1951, since the French administration made it cumbersome for unificationist parties to hold regular rallies. The CUT continuously complained about collusion between the PTP and the police. For example, after the CUT applied to the relevant authority for a permit to hold a meeting and indicated the time and place of the meeting, the PTP scheduled a meeting at or near the same place and time. Both meetings were therefore prohibited to avoid a clash between the rival parties and a threat to public order. Amenumey provides an overview of the range of tactics used by the French administration to use trifles, such as missing bicycle licenses or incomplete first aid boxes to hinder attendance to rallies.³⁰⁶ The

304 TNA (London), FCO 141/4999, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Central Security Committee, 7.

305 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*

306 D. E. K. Amenumey, "The General Elections in the 'Autonomous Republic of Togo', April 1958," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 16, no. 1 (1975): 50–51, available from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41406580>.

obstructions were significant because public rallies were often the only means of communicating with the masses, many of whom were still illiterate, including some of the traditional representatives of the people: the chiefs. Thus, after the PTP failed to oust the CUT, the French administration turned to the northern chiefs, who according to government propaganda would lose out in the event of an Ewe Union, and thus in 1951 helped founding the *Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord* (UCPN).

The fact that the police were recruited almost exclusively from the north, which according to French propaganda would lose out on unification of the Ewe, increased the enthusiasm with which they conducted the orders of their officers. Many younger people, especially Kabré from the North, who had little to no education were attracted by the career opportunities offered by the police but also the military during the colonial period. Yet, though France was allowed to maintain military bases in its trusteeship territory, it was prohibited to actively recruit within Togo. With the knowledge of the French, many North-Togolandese simply crossed the border into Dahomey and (usually) posed as Dahomeans at the recruitment centre in Djougou, where Olympio was imprisoned during World War II.³⁰⁷ Trained as riflemen, some were later recruited as the so-called *gardes-cercles*, a civilian local police force under the authority of the local chiefs and de facto of the *commandant de cercle*.

Finally, in the elections of the Togolese deputy to the French National Assembly on 17 June 1951, Martin Aku (CUT) lost to Nicolas Grunitzky (PTP), reversing the November 1949 election, in which Aku defeated Grunitzky. The frustration over the obstruction of rallies and the electoral defeat led to a brawl between members of the CUT and the PTP during a public meeting organized by the CUT on 3 July 1951. French law of 30 June 1881 and the Trusteeship Agreement provided that freedom of assembly was subject to the condition that the police had the right to prohibit demonstrations or meetings that might disturb the peace or public order.³⁰⁸

In the name of public order, the French Governor, Yves Digo, systematically exploited this provision to prohibit public gatherings planned by the CUT as he issued two days later, on 5 July, a decree banning all public meetings in the southern districts of Kpalimé and Lomé (strongholds of the CUT) for the month of July. On the very same day, the French administration's police forces stormed a private CUT meeting at Augustino de Souza's estate, claiming that the crowd in front of the estate was blocking the road. As a result, several people were injured on the part of both the participants and the forces of order. Governor Digo was forced to justify the heavy-handed intervention before the French Overseas Ministry, which feared that Governor Digo's course could lead to reprimands from the Trusteeship Council:

"As far as the police force was concerned, I had no other way to maintain order and calm in the Lomé region without brutality. By acting otherwise, I would have found

307 Decalo, *Historical dictionary of Togo*, p. 48.

308 TCOR, p. 303.

myself one day constrained to extreme means in front of people who would have been given widely at the same time the council of violence.”³⁰⁹

The ban on meetings in July naturally had a particular aftertaste ahead of the August elections to the newly created *Conseils de Circonscription*, which advised the French administration on certain matters, much as the *Conseils de Notables* had done before World War II. These were largely inactive until Governor Digo re-established the *Conseils de Circonscription* in July 1951 with slightly wider powers as way to counterbalance the southern elites and pro-unificationists. Of the six *Conseils de Circonscription* in the south, the CUT took control of two in the south (including Lomé) and provided half of the twelve members in the *Conseil de Circonscription* in Kpalimé. The UCPN, on the other hand, took control of all six *Conseils de Circonscription* in the north. In French Togoland as a whole, the CUT won only 22 seats, compared with 48 for the PTP and 82 for the UCPN.³¹⁰

Joint Council for Togoland Affairs (1951)

At the Trusteeship Council's 9th Session (1951),³¹¹ the French and British delegations presented yet another joint memorandum in which they announced to dissolve the EEC to establish a *Joint Council for Togoland Affairs*.³¹² It was now the third joint Anglo-French memorandum proposing this kind of joint consultative body. The memorandum dismissed the solutions proposed so far by the unificationists as unworkable, claiming that neither Ewe nor Togoland unification met the wishes of more than a minority of the population. Despite the boycott of the unificationists, the Administering Authorities claimed that the ECC had shown that none of the border changes proposed so far would meet the general approval of the population. Yet, the proposal by the unificationists to conduct a plebiscite to elicit this assertion was rejected by the Administering Authorities on the ground that the matter of Togoland unification would be too complex for the conduct of a plebiscite, which would overwhelm the electorate. Furthermore, they argued that in the event of a plebiscite it would then be unjustifiable to deprive the non-Ewe sections of the population the right to express its views.³¹³ In other words: in colonial fashion, it was argued that, on the one hand, the Ewe could not be granted a democratic voice because the danger of democratic participation by other ethnic groups endangered the continuation of the colonial order, and that, on the other hand, the population was overwhelmed in articulating its own interests. The racist assertion unveiled *illocutionary disablement*, specifically, the silencing of the unification movement, as the colonial mindset proved resistant to engaging with the unificationists' ability to express their views.

The Soviet representative, Aleksander Soldatov, was overly critical of the memorandum, charging that French Togoland's membership in the French Union violated the

309 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/3283/4, *Affaire Ewe*, Secret Letter N° 428, Governor Digo, 13 July 1951.

310 Gouvernement Français, "Rapport Annuel: Togo placé sous la Tutelle de la France" T/994 (Année 1951, 1952), p. 197.

311 TCOR, "9th Session" (1951), pp. 264–65.

312 T/931 available at TCOR 9th Session, Annex (T/9S/Annexes), *Agenda item 12: The Ewe problem*.

313 T/931, pp. 6–7.

Trusteeship Agreement.³¹⁴ The proposed *Joint Council for Togoland Affairs* would be virtually as ineffectual as the ECC. The French representative, Pignon, dismissed this as the “usual criticisms” of the representative of the USSR and did not even try to refute them.³¹⁵ The French and British representatives tried to convince the Council that the problem had a different character than the unificationists intended to portray. The problem had arisen from rigid boundaries during World War II, but since then the improved conditions, including the constitutional development in the Gold Coast, and the political awakening of the population had shaken the widespread belief that improvements could be achieved only through unification.³¹⁶

In the meeting that followed, Antor was granted an oral hearing, in which he accused the Administering Authorities of engaging “in a conspiracy to discredit the unification movement.”³¹⁷ Furthermore, he maintained that their annual reports gave no accurate picture of the situation in the territory. He did not restrain himself in his securitising choice of words, expounding that while “the British used persuasion, intrigue and occasionally intimidation to achieve their plan of annexation, the French had established a *reign of terror*.”³¹⁸ With these drastic words, Antor referred to the obstruction of the campaign of the unificationists for the June 1951 election of the Togolese deputy to the French National Assembly and the subsequent storming of the de Souza estate, as well as the meeting ban for July, ahead of the elections of the *Conseils de Circonscription*. For instance, Antor referred to several petitions explaining how the French administration blocked transportation facilities for pro-unificationist rallies and maintained that “the unification of Togoland was of minor importance in comparison to the international solidarity and security between France and Britain [... which] must be achieved at the expense of the demand of the peoples of Togoland.”³¹⁹ Following this exposition, Pedro Olympio (PTP) strongly opposed unification unless it were to take place under French aegis. He accused the unificationists of using false reports and intimidation to reach their goal.³²⁰

Despite the apparent schism in the Trusteeship Council, all Council members agreed that regarding the accounts they had just heard, a continuation of the ECC did not make sense. The USSR and Iraq, however, opposed the Franco-British proposal to create yet another institution that would not differ significantly from the existing ECC. The Iraqi Council member pointed out that “after several years of discussion and study, the Ewe question was still as far as ever from an effective solution and was threatening to lead to violence.”³²¹ The French representative, Pignon, rejected the allegations as mere exaggerations, yet admitted that the French authorities had forbidden meetings under the law of

314 TCOR, “9th Session” (1951), pp. 289–90.

315 TCOR, “9th Session” (1951), p. 291.

316 TCOR, “9th Session” (1951), p. 296.

317 TCOR, “9th Session” (1951), p. 297.

318 TCOR, “9th Session” (1951), p. 299.

319 T/PV.380 as quoted in George Arthur Padmore, *The Gold Coast revolution: The struggle of an African people from slavery to freedom* (London: Dennis Dobson Ltd, 1953), p. 154; corresponds to; TCOR, “9th Session” (1951), p. 299.

320 TCOR, “9th Session” (1951), p. 300.

321 TCOR, “9th Session” (1951), p. 303.

30 June 1881 that allowed the administration to prohibit meetings likely to disturb public order.

Without being able to get to the bottom of the repression allegations for the time being, the Council contented itself with the submission of draft amendments by the representatives of the United States, Thailand, and the Dominican Republic, aimed at broadening the scope of the proposed *Joint Council for Togoland Affairs*, authorizing it to deal specifically with matters relating to the Ewe problem. This proposed amendment was adopted as it satisfied the members who had opposed the Franco-British proposal.³²²

The *Joint Council* was, of course, only a temporary device for the two Administering Authorities to keep the United Nations and the unification movement quiet for the time being. The French and British could not afford for the *Joint Council* to become a truly effective body, because it would rival the existing representative bodies and could be seen as the nucleus of a unified Togolese parliament. In the words of the Colonial Office's Deputy Under-Secretary of State, William Lethbridge Gorell Barnes, the French and British found themselves on a tightrope walk to "breathe sufficient life into the Joint Council to make it live for the Fourth Committee, while ensuring that it does not become a Frankenstein."³²³ Gorell Barnes found: "We must preserve to ourselves the ability to frustrate the unificationists both locally and in New York if they show signs of seeking to sabotage the Joint Council."³²⁴

Later during the session, the Trusteeship Council eventually considered the Assembly resolution that urged the Trusteeship Council to expedite its petition examination procedure. Since Thailand sided with the Administering Authorities, the Council merely resolved with seven votes to five abstentions to slightly change the wording of its rules of procedure: instead of "asking," the rules of procedure now "required" colonial powers "when possible" to transmit observations on petitions in a timely manner. Information on measures had to be provided merely "where the Council had indicated it to be necessary."³²⁵ Since the colonial powers ignored the Assembly's call to establish a Standing Committee, the anti-colonial Council members did not consider the changes in line with the General Assembly resolution.³²⁶

322 TCOR, "9th Session" (1951), p. 304. Trusteeship Council Resolution 345, *The Ewe Problem*, T/RES/345(IX) (24 July 1951), available from digitallibrary.un.org/record/216583.

323 TNA (London), CO 554/668, *Togoland under UN Trusteeship: future policy*, Secret Letter No. 31614/23, from Gorell Barnes to Arden-Clarke, 13 March 1952, p. 4–5.

324 TNA (London), CO 554/668, *Togoland under UN Trusteeship: future policy*, Secret Letter No. 31614/23, from Gorell Barnes to Arden-Clarke, 13 March 1952, p. 7.

325 Trusteeship Council Resolution 347, *Examination of petitions*, T/RES/347(IX) (30 July 1951), available from digitallibrary.un.org/record/216433.

326 TCOR, "9th Session" (1951), p. 323.

6.5 Securitising Petitions II: The General Assembly (1951–1955)

According to Ginette Kponton the months following the Council's 9th Session (1951) heralded a new era of repression in French Togoland,³²⁷ evidenced by a series of incidents:

- 10 August 1951, Agbétiko: one dead
- 23 August 1951, Vogan: eight dead and several injured
- 27 October 1951, Mango: 63 arrested

Paraphrasing Pierre Alexandre, an agent of the French administration, Amenumey concurs that under the direction of the French Governor, Yves Digo, the French administration went “into an open war against the CUT, with the result that the latter lost its most fervent supporters.”³²⁸ Furthermore, in 1950 the French Overseas Ministry had already pressured the United Africa Company to transfer Sylvanus Olympio, the company's general manager, from Togoland to Paris to keep his activities on a short leash. But when Olympio showed defiantly continuing effort to unify the Ewe, Louis Jacquinot, Minister of Overseas Affairs, demanded his transfer to London in 1951, hoping to “put on him the label of Anglophile and damn him.”³²⁹ The effort backfired: Olympio resigned from the Paris office of the United Africa Company in December 1951 to devote himself entirely to the unification movement.

The electoral defeats preceding the Council's 9th Session (1951) and the upcoming elections for the *Conseil de Circonscription* heated up the tempers: On 10 August 1951, in Agbétiko, a large village in the southeast, a scuffle between members of the CUT and PTP over the enthronement of a pro-French chief resulted in a death among the affiliates of the new chief.³³⁰ Yet, the most serious incident, would occur two weeks later, when on 23 August 1951, a conflict between members and opponents of the CUT over the leadership of the Vogan chieftdom degenerated into an attack on the local administrative post, whereupon the guard returned fire, killing eight people.³³¹ Governor Digo took advantage of the incident to crack down on the unificationists, indicting fifty-one people (five of them in absentia). The trial against them took place in January 1954 and ended with harsh punishments in the form of forced labour and imprisonment. The guard who fired the lethal shots on the other hand was acquitted.

The incident was the dominant theme at a joint conference of the AEC and the Togoland Congress in Accra on 2 September 1951, at which about 150 people were present.

327 Ginette A. Kponton, “Réactions Populaires Au Pouvoir Colonial: Agbetiko, Vogan Et Mango (1951),” in Gayibor, *Les Togolais Face À La Colonisation*, Vol:

328 Amenumey, “The General Elections in the ‘Autonomous Republic of Togo’, April 1958,” p. 50; Pierre Alexandre, pseud. Praetor Africanus, “Vers Une Federation Franco-Africaine,” *LAfrique et l'asie* 11, no. 36 (1956): 18–19

329 As quoted in David Fieldhouse, “British Merchants and French Decolonization,” in *L'Afrique noire française: l'heures des Indépendances*, ed. Charles R. Ageron and Marc Michel (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1992), pp. 491–92.

330 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/3283/4, *Affaire Ewe*, Secret Letter, Observations relatives aux pétition, 1.

331 Kponton, “Réactions populaires au pouvoir colonial: Agbetiko, Vogan et Mango (1951),” pp. 180–90.