Discussing Wæver's conceptualisation of *societal security*,[69] which actually preceded the development of securitisation, Jutila also raises awareness to the distinct role, which history plays in the securitisation of national identities, and respectively, in the securitisation of history to consolidate national identities. Usually, history and myths, which are not infrequently collective traumas, are mobilised by securitising actors to construct or reinforce identity or to point to historic narratives to identify threats to this identity.[70] In times of uncertainty, family history can serve as a coping mechanism and politicians often invoke a nation's history to reinforce a country's national identity. But Jutila cautions that a security-centred history of identity is only a short way from othering and producing divisions into friends and enemies, which might transform "pluralist communities into two opposing camps: 'If you're not for us, you're against us!'."[71] As a possible form of resistance to such a securitisation of national identities, Jutila bets on 'responsible studies of history' that lead to a complex and nuanced picture of the past that is ill-suited for nationalist purposes. In other words, it is the responsibility of the historian not to render history itself a repertoire against a securitised Other. Because of this inherent relationship between othering and securitisation of history, postcolonial critique is not far away.

3.1.5 Securitisation in a Postcolonial Reading

Silence Dilemma

In principle, post- and decolonial historiographies drew attention to two types of silence: on the one hand, attention is drawn to those narratives of the past that did not correspond to the scope of action imaginable at the time and which now must be laboriously excavated or else be lost forever. On the other hand, attention is drawn to the silencing of contemporary, yet marginalized interpretations of history.

Lene Hansen referenced first to the silence problem within the securitisation framework, by dealing with the dilemma of Pakistani women who are prevented from publicly speaking about the threats they face (e.g., rape, honour killings, etc.) because if they did, they would provoke the very threats they try to address in the first place. Thus, the women are forced to remain silent. Ken Booth critiqued this blind spot of securitisation concisely: "If security is always a speech act, insecurity is frequently a zipped lip."[72]

Sarah Bertrand extends Hansen's notion of the silence dilemma by shifting attention to the audience. Bertrand shows that silence, and hence insecurity, is not exclusively due to the muteness of the subaltern but also due to the audience. In the Copenhagen School, or more specifically, within the dramaturgy of the *grammar of security*, the success or failure of a securitising move ultimately depends on the audience. However, the

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Proof Identity' in the European Union," Malmö University Electronic Publishing, available from http://muep.mau.se/handle/2043/14368.

69   Ole Wæver, "Identity, Integration and Security," *Journal of International Affairs* 48, no. 2 (1995), available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357597.

70   Ketzmerick, *Staat, Sicherheit und Gewalt in Kamerun*, p. 199; Jutila, "Securitization, history, and identity," p. 927.

71   Jutila, "Securitization, history, and identity," p. 938.

72   Booth, *Theory of world security*, p. 168.

conceptual involvement of the audience is passive, that is, the audience's participation is limited to either granting or not granting extraordinary measures. The audience is not conceptualized as an actor with its own agenda. Adam Côté speaks in this regard of "agents without agency."[73] Drawing on Spivak,[74] Bertrand reorients the analytical focus from the speaker's muteness to the audience's power to silence and exclude. Bertrand emphasizes that any securitising actor, who occupies a subaltern subject position, can similarly also not be listened to (*illocutionary frustration*) or not be heard or understood (*illocutionary disablement*), regardless of the persuasiveness of the securitising argument.

Illocutionary frustration involves the unwillingness of an audience to agree to the securitising move. It describes the situations in which actors can certainly speak, but do not have the power to make an audience listen and are thus also excluded from the production of security, or the audience very much acknowledges the existential threat to the referent object but is not willing to confront the threat. This occurs when an audience does not see itself as the competent body or when it has an agenda of its own (be it due to personal benefits or ideology). Ken Booth commented on this aspect, noting that...

> "we all know that in politics as in life in general, there are none so deaf as those who do not want to hear. Audiences with agenda-making power can choose not to be an 'audience,' as happened with the UN Security Council (UNSC) during the Rwandan genocide in 1994."[75]

Illocutionary disablement describes an audience's inability to understand the intended meaning of a message due to 'disabling frames.' Banal examples would be when an audience does not speak the same language or interference distorts a radio distress signal beyond recognition. Bertrand points out that also certain forms of repetition can also act as 'disabling frames.' Shouting 'help' just for fun is commonly discouraged, since actual calls for help might therefore probably be understood differently over time and will not trigger a reaction even in the case of real danger.[76]

Yet, drawing on Spivak's concept of discursive or *epistemic violence*, Bertrand specifically refers to *epistemic* disabling frames, which have a cognitive or epistemic impact on the audience. Bertrand provides the illustrative example of a theatre actor trying to warn an audience about a fire, but who tragically fails to do so because the audience takes the warnings to be part of the play. Thierry Balzacq already thought about this as the "relevant aspects of the *Zeitgeist* that influence the listener,"[77] whereas other works circumscribe this aspect as a form of "security heuristics."[78] Yet, in certain power constellations, especially colonial ones, *illocutionary disablement* may distort securitising speech acts to the point of incomprehensibility. Similar to what Walter Mignolo analogously termed

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73   Côté, "Agents without agency"
74   Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?"
75   Booth, *Theory of world security*, pp. 167–68.
76   Bertrand, "Can the subaltern securitize?," p. 285.
77   Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization," p. 192.
78   Bonacker, "Situierte Sicherheit"

the "colonial matrix of power,"[79] *illocutionary disablement*, thus, describes epistemic operations of power, such as racism or patriarchy, that filter and shape an audience's view of reality, whereby the "subaltern are silenced by the epistemic violence of essentialisation."[80] While Bertrand argues that the category of *perlocutionary frustration* is inapplicable to securitisation, her creation of the category *illocutionary frustration* also captures the active part played by the audience in producing silence that the category *perlocutionary frustration* highlights.

Bertrand's 'typology of silencing' can be illustrated allegorically with the three-monkey motif of the Japanese proverb 'see not, hear not, say not.' While the three wise monkeys in Japan have the meaning 'to wisely overlook bad things,' in its modified meaning in the West they stand for 'not wanting to acknowledge anything bad' and thus stand for a lack of civil courage or unquestioning loyalty.

Table 1: Silence Dilemma & Three Wise Monkeys

Type of silencing	Translation	Monkey...
Locutionary silencing	"Say not"	...covering its mouth.
Illocutionary frustration	"See not"	...covering its eyes.
Illocutionary disablement	"Hear not"	...covering its ears.

Source: Own creation.

Bertrand concludes that the inability of the subaltern to securitise gives way to a 'double' or 'colonial' move of silencing the subaltern by attempting to securitise on its behalf, which "easily end up silencing the very people one tries to give a voice to."[81] According to Bertrang, 'securitising for' can occur "by political action designed to remediate or take advantage of the 'silence-problem', by normative claims intending to critique the 'silence-problem', as well as by mere analysis aimed at locating and uncovering the 'silence-problem'."[82]

Bertrand criticizes the Copenhagen School that securitisation can only come into being through the successful completion of a speech act. Yet, she argues, even a well-meaning critique of the marginalizing effects of securitisation must invoke (in)security before a subaltern actor successfully completes the speech act, thereby erasing or marginalizing the subaltern's agency or voice. Bertrand argues that this aspect is structurally baked into securitisation's reliance on the speech act and does not emerge from historical contingency.[83] Bertrand's critique implies that securitisation falls short as an

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79   Walter D. Mignolo and Catherine E. Walsh, eds., *On decoloniality*: *Concepts, analytics, and praxis*, On decoloniality (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2018), p. 114.
80   Bertrand, "Can the subaltern securitize?," p. 289.
81   Bertrand, "Can the subaltern securitize?," p. 289.
82   Bertrand, "Can the subaltern securitize?," p. 288.
83   Bertrand, "Can the subaltern securitize?," pp. 291–92.

empowering transformative approach for subaltern actors. The suggestion that securitisation is thereby disqualified as a critical theory oversimplifies the issue.[84]

Table 2: Securitisation's Silence Dilemma resulting from….

Exclusion *(failure to complete securitising speech acts)*	*Remedy against Superimposition* *(speaking security 'for' others)*
Locutionary silencing	Active remediation of the silence problem
Illocutionary frustration	Normative critique of the silence problem
Illocutionary disablement	Analysis uncovering the silence problem

Source: Bertrand, "Can the subaltern securitize?," p.290.

According to Bertrand, it becomes impossible for a securitisation scholar to assume that a subaltern actor genuinely faces a security problem. This is particularly because, even if the subaltern actors should, in principle, be able to securitise their concerns, Bertrand argues that this assumption is unattainable within the specified epistemological framework. The consequence of this argument is that it sidesteps the potential scenario where the subaltern actor, despite not swaying the relevant audience, may have successfully persuaded the scholar. Furthermore, in her critique, Bertrand keeps speech act theory out of the proverbial line of fire: "the main reason behind securitization theory's 'silence-problem' lies in its specific epistemological choice to locate security within speech act theory."[85] Yet, Claudia Aradau righteously contents that it is not clear how this distinction is drawn between speech act and its particular deployment in securitisation theory.[86] Therefore, Aradau champions to prioritize the *perlocutionary act*, that is, context- and consequences-focused analysis of securitisation for it may "open up the possibility of taking into consideration the sedimentation of 'elaborate institutional structures of racism as well as sexism'."[87] The present study takes up this impulse, whilst Bertrand's taxonomy of 'securitising for' still captures the formalised guardian-ward-relationship of colonial and trusteeship regimes that is the focus of this work.

Securitisation & the Trusteeship Constellation

As indicated above, on the one hand, the subaltern subject position might be a hindering condition for a securitising actor in an uneven playing field simply because securitisation moves are discursive devices, which take place in a world that has been shaped for

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84   Bertrand, "Can the subaltern securitize?," p. 291.
85   Bertrand, "Can the subaltern securitize?," p. 297.
86   Aradau, "From securitization theory to critical approaches to (in)security," p. 302.
87   Aradau, "From securitization theory to critical approaches to (in)security," p. 302.

centuries by colonial discourse. On the other hand, many of the issues in the theoretical debate on securitisation also revolve around who the audience is, what its function is and whether it is relevant.

Regarding these aspects, a securitisation analysis of the debates in the United Nations Trusteeship System promises to be relatively straightforward: The Trusteeship Council represented a specific and closed audience whose powers and terms of reference were clearly stipulated in the Charter and its *rules of procedure*. In the Trusteeship System, the people of the trusteeship territories had the *right to petition*, which was supposed to protect them against the abuses of the Administering Authorities. As such, petitions in their written and oral form represented complaints to a competent body for the redress of their grievances. In other words, for the most part, they represented securitising moves by their very premise. The roles of the relevant audience (state representatives) and the securitising agents (petitioners) were clearly distributed, and their debates meticulously recorded.

Yet, the Copenhagen School's *grammar of security* assumes in a sense a 'neutral audience.' Yet, the UN Trusteeship System represented a colonial constellation that contorted not only the context in which security speech acts are uttered but also the internal logic or structural constraints of the *grammar of security*. In the Copenhagen School, the default approach of a securitising actor is to address a relevant audience to draw its attention to an existential threat to a referent object. However, in the context of trusteeship, anti-colonial actors had to address the very members of the audience, which embodied the threat to their freedom, independence, etc. This corresponds to Vuori's observation that the audience may very well represent the very security predicament of the securitising actor.[88] Unlike Ketzmerick, who interprets the Trusteeship Council as an "uninvolved and supposedly rational third party,"[89] the current analysis holds that the UN Trusteeship System was a special colonial constellation in which the audience had a decisive influence on the securitisation process.

Moreover, as Adam Côté noted "securitization is less of a one-way, linear process in which the actor articulates a security reality to the audience, and more of a deliberation between actor and audience, consisting of multiple iterative, contextually contingent interactions between actor(s) and audience(s) regarding a single issue over time."[90] This holds especially true for the specific make-up of the United Nations Trusteeship System, where the two principal venues or 'audiences', that is the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly's Fourth Committee, were also characterized by internal dependencies. For example, against their better judgment, some members of the Fourth Committee chose not to follow the securitising arguments of petitioners because they feared to be sanctioned by the Administering Authorities in the later run. Audiences, so argues Côté, must therefore be theorized as heterogeneous entities. Thus, it is not the securitising move by the securitising actor that drives the decision of the audience to (dis)agree to a securitising message, but rather the (de)securitising moves by members within the au-

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88   Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization," p. 81.
89   Ketzmerick, *Staat, Sicherheit und Gewalt in Kamerun*, p. 80.
90   Côté, "Agents without agency," p. 552.