Ulrike Bechmann | Wolfram Reiss (Hg.)

Anwendungsorientierte Religionswissenschaft

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Cornelis Hulsman (Ed.)

FROM RULING TO OPPOSITION

Islamist Movements and Non-Islamist Groups in Egypt 2011–2013

Tectum

Anwendungsorientierte Religionswissenschaft

herausgegeben von Ulrike Bechmann und Wolfram Reiss

Cornelis Hulsman (ed.)

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in Egypt 2011-2013

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This book is mainly based on interviews with Islamists in Egypt.
The interviews are accessible at Arab-West Report:
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Contents

Abbreviations

AWR	Arab West Report
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IJMES	International Journal of Middle East Studies
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SCC	Supreme Constitutional Court

Notes on Transliteration

There are a plurality of transliteration systems used for transliterating Arabic texts into English. To ensure consistency, this book uses the IJMES transliteration chart which transliterates the letter 'g' (Egyptian colloquial) with 'j' (Modern Standard Arabic). The names of places reasonably familiar to the English-speaking reader have been written in their familiar form (for example Tahrir Square rather than midān al-taḥrīr). Neither the IJMES wordlist for exceptions nor not adding diacritics to names has been applied for the sake of consistency. The article is al-. After the prepositions li, bi and fī the initial 'a' of the article is replaced by - (for example *bi-l-Waṭan*). Furthermore, no assimilation to sun-letters was applied. No hamza was used for the article. As for Arabic letterblocks containing more than one word, the different words are connected through - (for example *wa-bi-l-Waṭan*). No cases were used for single nouns since these are rarely written in modern Arabic publications. The cases in plural, however, have been used. We used the English plural for transliterated Arabic concepts (for example *muftī – muftīs*). To see a list of alternative spellings of names, please refer to Appendix I and II.

All Arabic words are in italics with the exception of personal names. No italics have been used in titles and sub-titles. Names of religious groups, currents and scriptures have been capitalized.

Glossary *(Cornelis Hulsman[1])*

This includes Islamic terms which had different meanings in traditional Islam and that have been partly altered in the discourse of Islamists.

akh al-ʿamal Working Brother; the fifth rank of membership within the Muslim Brotherhood.

al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ The militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, established in the late 1930s and active until around 1965 following massive arrests. The leadership of the Brotherhood made the political decision in the late 1960s to abandon local armed activism. This wing was known for its secrecy and violence. Many members were arrested in the 1960s and released by President al-Sādāt in the 1970s. Former a*l-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ* member Mahdī ʿĀkif was Supreme General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood between 2004 and 2010 and nominated former a*l-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ* member Khayrat al-Shāṭir as his second deputy.[2]

Bahā'ī(s) Member(s) of the Bahā'ī faith, a monotheistic religion that emphasizes the spiritual unity of all human kind. Its founder was Muslim and most early followers came from Islam. Their claim of having a prophet after the prophet Muḥammad is not accepted by traditional Muslims.

daʿwa Call to Islam, spreading the word of Islam by education and preaching.

fatwā(s) Legal opinion(s) given by a recognized Muslim scholar. Traditional Muslims usually recognize different scholars as Islamist Muslims which may result in contradictory *fatwās*.

fulūl Literally: Remnants. Derogative term used by opponents of the Mubārak regime to describe those with a close association with the Mubārak regime.

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1 With the assistance of Prof. Abdallah Schleifer and Eildert Mulder.

2 Pargeter 2013; Ashour 2014.

Ḥadīth	Sayings and actions attributed to Prophet Muḥammad, that play a canonical role as a basic commentary on the *Qurʾān*. This includes narration, descriptions of his deeds and manners, dress and physical attributes and approval or disapproval of the Prophet.
ḥakimiyya	Belief that all things in life are under God's sovereignty and hence this implies that everything, including law and institutions, has to be Islamic. In recent years this term has, in Islamists discourse, obtained the meaning that Muslim scholars can authoritatively determine – as instruments of God – how to apply this.
ḥarām	Forbidden under Islam.
ḥisba	The Islamic concept of accountability based on the *Qurʾānic* verse "Enjoin what is good and forbid what is wrong," giving the government the duty to coercively command right and forbid wrong in order to keep everything in order according to the *Sharīʿa*. Islamists have made this the right of, giving any Muslim to bring another before the court for violating religious principles.
jāhiliyya	The pre-Islamic period (known as the time of ignorance). This term has been redefined by some Islamists as being applicable to Muslims whose actions and words are not approved by these Islamists.
jihād	Literally: "Striving in the way of God" or "struggle". The spiritual struggle against the ego is called 'greater *jihād*.' The term is also used for armed struggle against whoever is perceived as the enemies of Islam, which for radical Islamists can include other Muslims who are opposed to Islamists. This designation is not limited to one particular current in Islam.
jihādī	Jihadist, person engaged in *Jihād*, contemporary term to describe Islamist fighters (only a few decades ago the term *mujāhid* was used by Islamists as well as non-Islamists fighting the Russians in Afghanistan).
jihādī Salafi(s)	Salafi who believes that *jihād* is an essential component of his beliefs.

ijtihād	Analogical reasoning in Islam to find a solution to a legal problem.
Kifāya	Literally: Enough. Name of a protest movement founded in 2004, primarily against the expected transfer of power from president Mubārak to his son Jamāl.
madhhab	A traditional school of Islamic law.
Maktab al-Irshād	Guidance Council of the Muslim Brotherhood or *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*.
muʾayyid	Supporter; the second rank of membership within the Muslim Brotherhood.
muftī	An Islamic scholar with the authorization to give *fatwās*, who has, in traditional Islam, received an official appointment by the state. Islamist groups have appointed their own *muftīs* since they do not recognize the *muftīs* that have been appointed by a non-Islamist state.
muḥibb	Literally: lover; follower, the first rank of membership within the Muslim Brotherhood.
muntasib	Affiliate; the third rank of membership of the Muslim Brotherhood.
muntaẓim	Organizer; the fourth rank of membership within the Muslim Brotherhood.
murshid	Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. This term is an example of *Ṣūfī* terminology that has been adopted by Ḥasan al-Bannā for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Nahḍa	Literally: "Renaissance." Name chosen by the Muslim Brotherhood for their political, economic and scientific-program in 2012.This name was earlier used for the secular cultural revival in the Arab world at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th Century in which the core actors were Arab Christians. Christians focused on the Arabic heritage, Islamists aimed at connecting the Arabic and Islamic heritage.
Qurʾān	Muslims believe the *Qurʾān* is the compilation of God's revelations.

Quṭbī(s)	Member(s) of the Muslim Brotherhood following the ideas of Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966), called conservatives by Muslim Brothers and revolutionaries by scholars in traditional Islam.
salaf	Devout ancestors from the days of the Prophet Muḥammad.
Salafī(s)	Adherent(s) of ultra-conservative reform movement within *Sunnī* Islam. It aims to apply the traditions of the "devout ancestors" (*salaf*) in modern times.
Sharīʿa	Body of legislation derived from *Qurʾān* and *Sunna*.
shaykh(s)	Islamic teacher or scholar. Plural in Arabic: *shuyūkh*. In this text we used English grammar to make it plural since it has become a word that has more or less been adopted into the English language.
Shīʿī(s)	Adherant(s) of *Shīʿī* Islam.
shūrā	Consultation.
Shūrā Council	Egypt's upper bicameral chamber of Parliament (pre-2014).
Sunna	Collection of recorded words/actions of Prophet Muḥammad.
Ṣūfī	Person adhering to a mystical dimension of Islam that preferences spiritual rather than legal sensibility.
Tablīghī(s)	Adherents of missionary Muslim group advocating a return to the values of Islam in the days of the Prophet Muḥammad.
takfīr	The act of branding a fellow Muslim of apostasy. In traditional Islam only the state, representing the *umma*, is allowed to do so. Yet, Islamists believe they, as the vanguard of the *umma*, can do so as well. Traditional Islam rejects this.
takfīrī	Deregatory designation of a Muslim who accuses another Muslim of apostasy. This designation is not limited to one particular current in Islam.
tarbiyya	Education.

Tilmisānī(s)	Member(s) of the Muslim Brotherhood following the ideas of ʿUmar al-Tilmisānī (1904-1986).
umma	The worldwide Muslim community.
usra	Literally: "family." A term taken from Ṣūfism to denote a basic cell of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Wasaṭiyya	Literally: "middle" or "center", term used by politically engaged Muslims to describe that they are moderate. This is mostly used as a self-description of Islamists who are more open to contacts with people outside their own circle. The term was in particular adopted by *al-Wasaṭ* Party.

Foreword *(Ambassador Mona Omar)*

When I was asked to write a foreword to this valuable book, I thought it would take a long time for me to just read it, but as soon as I started, I could not put the book down until I finished reading it. Firstly, I was so impressed by the number of interviews, and the quality of the information presented: this book is an invaluable reference for researchers and political analysts on one of the most misunderstood subjects.That is to say, the role of Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood in contemporary Egyptian politics.

The text is incredibly comprehensive, including historical background, and a plurality of points of view, ranging from the most radical right-wing to the most liberal. I would like to especially note the academic value of the research conducted by non-Egyptians. The work reveals an objective image about the events that took place in Egypt during the very critical period of 2011-2013. This book is a cornerstone for any researcher or political analyst seeking to understand what went on in the Middle East and Egypt during this pivotal period of history.

It is certainly in line with the objectives of the Center for Arab-West Understanding (CAWU), an NGO that was established by Dutch sociologist Cornelis Hulsman with the aim of creating understanding between Arab countries and the world at large. CAWU hopes to dispel the numerous negative efforts to create divisions between these cultural spheres by using sincere reporting based on nuanced realities, on the ground interviews, and comprehensive explanations. CAWU calls for dialogue, not confrontation, as a mechanism for reaching an understanding between the Arab world and the West. In my view, dialogue is not an option with those who would use violence and acts of terrorism against any human being.

With regard to peaceful Islamists, they have to accept democracy in practice which entails accepting the choice of the majority of the people. In Egypt's case, the elected president who came to power following a people's revolution rejecting the Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, what they call *ḥisba*, which is a Machiavellian style of operating, has to disappear from their philosophy, and violence has to be completely erased from their vocabulary.

In conclusion, this book is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand what happened in Egypt in 2013 through diverse, comprehensive, and first-hand information.

Ambassador Mona Omar

Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs (2008-2013), Chair of International Committee at the National Council for Women, Board Member of Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Honorary Member of the Center for Arab-West Understanding

Comments of Scholars on the Book

"For any serious student of the modern Middle East, From Ruling to Opposition is a very necessary corrective to the conventional coverage of Egypt in the critical and turbulent years of 2011 to 2013. Much of that coverage was lazy, buying into the simple narrative offered to journalists by fluent Muslim Brotherhood spokesmen. The extensive interviews with Egyptians of all political persuasions and the thoughtful reporting in this book dispels such false oversimplifications."

Abdallah Schleifer
Professor of Political Science and Mass Communication, Future University, Egypt

"The merit of this well-researched book lies in the fact that it addresses a critical dimension that is absent from most of the academic and media analyses of what happened in Egypt during the events that led to 30th of June revolution. This objective, outstanding and thoroughly researched historical study provides an in-depth analysis of a great number of interviews with many key involved actors. I can consider this work as an excellent refutation of a monolith inpropaganda studies that weaponized information for activating and achieving agiven political agenda. I do highly recommend this book for those who are interested in the areas of historical analysis, political science, media studies and crisis management."

Dr. Hassan Mohamed Wageih Hassan
PhD Georgetown University, Expert International Negotiation and Crisis Management, Professor of Linguistics and Political Science, al-Azhar University, Chairman of Political Science Department at Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Future University, Egypt

"I highly recommend this excellent documentary work for those who want to learn about the rise and fall of the Muslim Brothers' rule in Egypt."

Prof. Dr. Hoda Awad
Professor of Political Science at the Misr International University, Secretary of the Center for Arab-West Understanding, Egypt

"The authors have an eye for the socio-economic reverberations of the time: the tensions between pragmatism and puritanism, and the various stages of relationship between the state and Islamist movements from containment to open conflict. The editor has a vast experience of Egyptian affairs from his work in the countryfrom 1976 to the present."

Amr Sherif
Bureau Chief of the Middle East News Agency (MENA) Bureau in Ankara, Turkey, 2013-2016

"This book is the product of a dedicated group of researchers. Objectively presenting a multiplicity of viewpoints and perspectives, the book provides an enlightening analysis of the critical period in contemporary Egyptian history from 2011-2013. This is required reading for all scholars of Egyptian history, Islamic Movements, and political Islamism. I recommend this book as a textbook for all future students wishing to understand the post-2011 period of Egyptian history."

Ebtehal Younes
Head of the Department of French language and literature, Faculty of Letters, Cairo University, Professor of French and Comparative Civilization, Founder and president of the Dr. Nasr Hamed Abouzayd Institute for Islamic Studies, Egypt

"This is an important academic work that describes the rise and fall of Islamists in Egypt in 2013. When the Islamists came to power, they could have used their position to work on consensus-building, but instead they tried to push their own views upon the political opposition. This move alienated many non-Islamists who initially supported them. The rejection of the call for early presidential elections led to Mursī's downfall. This book is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the dynamics of this period. It describes a period in our recent history that we hope and pray will never be repeated."

Rev. Dr. Safwat al-Bayadi
Honorary President of the Protestant Community Council, 2015-today, Member of the Constituent Assemblies of 2012 and 2013, Founding member of the Center for Arab-West Understanding.

"This book is a unique contribution to our understanding of Egyptian Islamism after 2011. This research represents the first sustained effort to synthesise the perspectives of a broad range of Islamist actors on important political issues. This book is essential to anyone interested in the development of Islamist movements after the Arab uprisings."

Dr. Jerome Drevon
Research fellow at the University of Manchester (UK) specialised in political violence and insurgencies.

1 Introduction *(Cornelis Hulsman)*

2013 was a crucial year in Egypt's history. It was a year in which the relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies on one hand and their opponents on the other became increasingly tense culminating in repeated massive demonstrations. As a result of these demonstrations Egypt's then Minister of Defence, General ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī, issued a number of clear warnings, not just at the ruling Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party but at all political factions, declaring that political unrest could instigate the "collapse of the state."[3] On June 23, General al-Sīsī cautioned "There is a state of division in society, and the continuation of it is a danger to the Egyptian state, there must be consensus among us all."[4]

Expectations were that president Muḥammad Mursī would make efforts to heal divisions in society or call for new presidential elections but instead he remained defiant. In June 2013, he replaced many regional governors with Muslim Brotherhood members, loyalists or allies. One such appointment included establishing a leader of the *Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, as the governor of Luxor, the very city where members of the *Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* killed 58 tourists and four Egyptians in November 1997. These and other decisions showed that President Mursī was seeking support from more hardline Islamists instead of seeking consensus with his poli-tical opponents.[5] Muslim Brotherhood leaders knew that the president and his government had lost popularity but rejected calls for new presidential elections giving examples of presidents in the West who had experienced low popularity but nevertheless continued to serve the entire period.[6]

The largest demonstrations began nationwide on June 30 which promp-ted General al-Sīsī to warn President Mursī on July 1 "that we still have 48 hours to find a way out of the crisis."[7] Mursī remained defiant. On July 3rd, the Egyptian army led by General ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī removed him from power.

In order to understand the crisis in 2013 we need to go back to January 25, 2011. Youth belonging to leftist movements drew increasingly large num-

3 Saleh 2013.

4 Kingsley 2013 (a).

5 Hulsman (ed.) 2013 (a).

6 Diana Serôdio and Cornelis Hulsman meeting Dr. Usāma Farīd on May 15, 2013, in the Marriot Hotel, Zamalek, Cairo. Interview with Dr. ʿAmr Darrāj, July 22, 2013.

7 Al-Sīsī 2013.

bers of demonstrators who, three days later, were joined in full force by the Muslim Brotherhood. The demonstrations quickly spread to more cities[8] which in turn led to the overthrow of autocratic president Ḥusnī Mubārak on February 11. This was the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood's eventual ascent to power. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) then took over the rule of Egypt. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) then took over the rule of Egypt. The SCAF started negotiating with the Muslim Brothers and other political actors at the time. This resulted in the SCAF appointment of Judge Tāriq al-Bishrī, a top Egyptian legal expert widely believed to be sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, as head of the Egyptian Constitutional Review Committee to begin reviewing the constitution. On March 19, 2011, Egyptians voted on the text of al-Bishrī's committee, limiting presidential terms to a maximum of two four-year terms, and stipulating a roadmap where parliamentary elections would come first, followed by presidential elections and the formation of a Constituent Assembly to write a new permanent constitution for Egypt. The Brotherhood and other Islamist groups campaigned in favour of accepting this roadmap while their opponents believed amending the Constitution should come before holding elections.The debates between Islamists and non-Islamists were heavily focused on the role of religion in the Egyptian Constitution as was earlier discussed in "The Sharia as the Main Source of Legislation?"[9] The Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Translation (CIDT) asked statistician Dr. Fāṭima Al-Zanātī to carry out a study on whether Egyptians wanted to cancel or keep Article II of the Egyptian Constitution. This article specifies that the *Sharī'a* is the main source of legislation. Egyptians overwhelmingly wanted this article to remain. This point is an excellent indicator of Egypt's religiosity, which was used and manipulated by Islamists during the elections.[10]

The parliamentary elections in December 2011-January 2012 resulted in 68.95% of the votes going to a bloc of Islamist parties with non-Islamist parties receiving the remaining 31.05%. Most voters for Islamist parties were not Islamists but religious swing voters who, lured by promises of Islamists, believed they would be the political group best able to bring Egypt stability and economic progress. The Islamists used their victory to form a Constitutional Assembly that would produce a new constitution with heavy Islamist leanings. Non-Islamists resisted these efforts and other ef-

8 Not the countryside.

9 Hulsman (ed.) 2012 (a) This book discusses the history of the debates about the role of the *Sharī'a* in Egypt in which Islamists and non-Islamists have had widely different opinions in the decades prior to the January 25 Revolution.

10 El-Zanaty and al-Ghazali 2012.

forts to push an Islamist agenda which resulted in a decline of support for Islamists.

In the first round of the presidential elections, the Islamist candidates received only 43.77% of the vote, indicating a rapid decline in popularity. The second round of the Presidential elections pitted Muḥammad Mursī and Aḥmad Shafīq against each other. Mursī represented the Muslim Brotherhood and depicted himself as a proponent of revolutionary forces against the old regime. Aḥmad Shafīq, a former air force general and Mubārak's last Prime Minister, presented himself as an independent candidate, but was widely viewed as a representative of the old Mubārak regime. It did not help Shafīq's claim of being an independent candidate that the Supreme Constitutional Court had dissolved the Egyptian Parliament and declared the Political Disenfranchisement Law as unconstitutional on June 14. The Political Disenfranchisement Law had been accepted by the Muslim-Brotherhood dominated parliament in order to bar former officials from Mubārak's government from government participation. This added to the already extremely tense atmosphere with a lot of rhetoric, continuous allegations and bad-mouthing in both directions. The Al-Ahram Weekly described this as "a war between two political blocs" with:

> Shafik openly accusing Mursi, and the Muslim Brotherhood, of wanting to drag Egypt into outmoded norms and with Mursi openly accusing Shafik of working with the support of state security bodies and a corrupt business community to re-instate the Mubarak regime in what would amount to a total elimination of the revolution. [11]

The consequence was that, in the first round of voting, around 7% of the voters who had voted for a non-Islamist candidate now voted for Mursī for no other reason than fear of a return to the old regime. The ballot boxes closed on June 17, 2012. On the same day the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces published an appendix to the interim Constitutional Declaration in the Official Gazette which gave itself "the final say over swathes of domestic and foreign policy."[12] The decree increased fear for military intervention in the electoral process with Shafīq seen, rightly or wrongly, as the candidate more closely associated with the SCAF. The Muslim Brotherhood immediately declared electoral victory which was given credibility by Ahram Online, stating that "initial indications appeared to suggest victory for

11 Ezzat 2012 (a).

12 El-Din 2012.

Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi." [13] But Ahram Online also stated that

> the two presidential campaigns continued to exchange accusations of electoral fraud. Meanwhile, there were several reports of violations, including illegal campaigning in front of polling stations, vote-buying, influencing voters to choose certain candidates, and arranging votes for military and police personnel.[14]

Ahram Online stated on June 18 that counting is still in progress but "indications so far put Morsi in the lead - 51.74% to 48.25%."[15] Monday morning, June 18, Mursī declared victory in what was seen as his "acceptance speech." The Al-Ahram Weekly reports that

> chants of "God is great" and "down with military rule" rang out at the press conference, and hundreds of Mursi supporters marched to Tahrir Square to celebrate.[16]

The Shafīq campaign rapidly responded that their candidate had won the elections. "The Muslim Brotherhood, they claimed, was attempting to impose a fait accompli."[17] One day later they claimed Shafīq was leading Mursī by half a million votes. Lawyers of both parties filed complaints of vote rigging with the Presidential Election Committee which decided to investigate the claims and postpone the election results. This also made the war of words continue and enabled at the same time secret negotiations to take place between different parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the army. Opponents to the army used the terms revolution and revolutionaries liberally for any activity that opposed any form of army interference in politics. On the evening of June 19 Tahrir Square was packed with mainly Brotherhood and *Salafī* demonstrators chanting:

> 'we shall continue the struggle', 'down with SCAF' and 'leave! We won't leave, they leave!', a revival of a slogan popular throughout the 18-day uprising that toppled Mubarak, only this time directed against the military council.[18]

On June 20 the Muslim Brotherhood issued a warning: "There will be a "dangerous faceoff" between the people and the army if Ahmed Shafīq is

13 Shukrallah 2012.

14 Ibid.

15 El-Rashidi 2012 (a).

16 Abdel-Baky 2012.

17 Ibid.

18 El-Nahhas 2012.

declared Egypt's new president." Meanwhile the President of the Presidential Election Committee stated that "the results announced by both campaigns are inaccurate and do not take into account the appeals that have been filed." [19] On June 22 Ahram Online referred to an unknown source in the government who had said that Shafīq will be declared victor with 50.7 per cent of the vote.[20]

The Muslim Brotherhood suspected support of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces for Aḥmad Shafīq[21] and called for a meeting with prominent representatives of the liberal opposition and revolutionary youth who were equally opposed to a former army officer becoming president at the Fairmont Hotel on June 22, 2012.[22] The Brotherhood promised their ideological opponents that they would not nominate a Muslim Brother as Prime Minister and would give the opposition candidate a place in the government. The Fairmont meeting sent a message to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Presidential Elections Committee that not only the Muslim Brotherhood, but also anti-Shafīq liberals and revolutionary youth would resist if the Committee would announce Shafīq as winner.[23]

With this they gave a clear signal that not only they but also other parties that feared a return to military rule would resist a Shafīq presidency. There was fear in those days that there would be civil unrest if Shafīq would become president. Ahram Online reported that:

> a number of newspapers have accused the Muslim Brotherhood of cooking up an aggressive reaction in case their candidate loses. Al-Dostor newspaper went as far as claiming that the group was planning "the massacre of the century. [24]

Finally, after a week long tense stand off, on June 24, the Presidential Election Committee declared Muḥammad Mursī to be the winner with a narrow 51.73% against 48.27% for Shafīq. Shafīq claimed this outcome to be fraudulent and disputed this for years.[25] Later documents of the same Presidential Election Committee popped up showing that they had declared Shafīq

19 Ahram Online 2012 (b).
20 Ezzat 2012.
21 Shukrallah 2013 (a).
22 Ikhwanweb 2012 (d).
23 Interview Cornelis Hulsman with Prof. Abdallah Schleifer, November 22, 2015.
24 Ahram Online 2012 (c).
25 Hulsman 2014 (b).

president with 56.67% of the votes as winner of the elections.[26] Mursī, according to that document collected 40.14% of the votes while the 3.19% of the votes were declared invalid. It is impossible to tell what is true and what is not. However certain is that Mursī's 'victory' was both narrow and contested, yet he tried to push through an Islamist agenda which infuriated his opponents, including the participants in the Fairmont meeting of June 2012 who felt that Mursī had not lived up to this promises for sharing power in June 2012.[27] On November 22, 2012, Mursī issued his infamous Constitutional Declaration, giving him powers over Egypt's judiciary to prevent them from dismantling the Egyptian Constituent Assembly and thus pushing through an Islamist colored Egyptian Constitution in December 2012. This was widely perceived to be as authoritarian as that as his predecessor Ḥusnī Mubārak.[28]

In these days, researchers of the Center for Arab-West Understanding and Arab-West Report interviewed both prominent Islamist actors as well as their opponents. This drew the interest of Prof. Dr. Wolfram Reiss, publisher of Anwendungsorientierte Religionswissenschaft who encouraged the Center for Arab-West Understanding to interview pro-minent actors and use this as the basis for this book. At the time we, of course, did not know that we would witness the end of the Mursī regime and neither did the Muslim Brotherhood.

Dr. ʿAmr Darrāj, prominent Muslim Brotherhood member and Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, wrote to me on June 30 about the anti- Mursī demonstrations, "It will pass. Egyptians will never let violence prevail."[29] When a senior leader did not expect this, it is likely that other senior members of the Brotherhood close to the president did not expect this either, despite the repeated warnings given by Minister of Defense ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī in the preceeding months and days.

Following Mursī's removal the National Alliance Supporting Legitimacy was founded in which the Muslim Brotherhoods and part of the politicized *Salafīs* cooperated in rejecting the overthrow of President Mursī, refusing to negotiate with the interim regime who wanted them to accept this new reality and invited them to participate in the new Constituent Assembly that was being formed in those days. The Brothers, however, rejected this since their president was removed through demonstrations and an army inter-

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26 Colonel Sabry Yassin's Facebook Page accessed July 2015. https://www.facebook.com/sabry.yassin.92

27 Shukrallah 2013 (c).

28 Hulsman (ed.) 2013 (a).

29 Personal email of Dr. ʿAmr Darrāj to Cornelis Hulsman, June 30, 2016.

vention and not through new elections that they had earlier rejected. The same uncompromising attitudes we found at the Islamist *Rābaʿa al-ʿAdawiyya* sit-in that formed the background of the violent dispersal that resulted in at least 800 deaths and countrywide violence in which police stations and church property were attacked and policemen were brutally murdered.[30] Efforts we witnessed in September and October 2013 to negotiate a compromise could not possibly produce results because of the uncompromising positions of different parties that with ongoing violence only became sharper.

The roadmap changed. It became the Constitution first, followed by Presidential elections and Parliamentary elections. In this period, we experienced the formation of a new Constituent Assembly which resulted in a new Constitution that was accepted by referendum in January 2014. The battle over the Constitution was a battle over the identity of Egypt. It is thus not surprising that Islamist influences in the Constitution were greatly reduced.[31]

We have conducted 79 interviews with 65 people, starting on April 1, 2011 but mostly between November 12, 2012 and November 29, 2013, documenting a transition from close by. The interviews were carried out with major political players of widely different currents in this period. We have become witnesses of change to a new political reality in Egypt's history in which the positions of different political currents changed significantly.

The interviews show how deeply divided Egypt had become between Islamists and non-Islamists By Islamists, we are referring to those who promote an "Islamic Project," which seeks to realize the implementation of *Sharīʿa* and create a utopian Islamic state that would ultimately unite Egypt and other Muslim countries. Many times, this concept of an Islamic state is often invoked in reference to the Ottoman Empire, the last Muslim state in which Muslims of numerous national and ethnic backgrounds were united. However, this empire was broken up by the western powers at the end of World War I.[32]

This project to Islamize Egyptian society in no way means that Islamists were united in how to achieve this. Muslim Brothers believed that this could be best achieved through the political power of parliament and president who would need to Islamize the institutions of the state. *Salafīs*, how-

30 Hulsman (ed.) 2013 (b), 2014 (a).

31 Hulsman 2016.

32 This was the theme of International Conference on the Middle East Strategic Landscape 100 Years After the First World War, Future University, September 12-14, 2015. The proceedings are expected to be published in 2016.

ever, to a large extent believed that change had to come through preaching, making Egyptians more religious and adhering to the law God has constituted in the *Qurʾān*, *Ḥadīth* and *Sharīʿa*, not man made laws.[33]

Eline Kasanwidjojo discusses the political participation of Muslim Brothers and former Brothers through the Freedom and Justice Party and other political parties which show competing currents and ideas that provide a good overview of the tensions that existed in this period. Her interviews provide a unique insight into how important members and former members of the Muslim Brotherhood saw the political environment in Egypt prior to and after president Mursī was removed. Kasanwidjojo's chapter is naturally the first in this book since the Muslim Brothers were by far the largest and best organized Islamist movement in this period who forced the other political forces in Egypt to take them seriously but they also overstepped their strength by alienating non-Islamist political parties who were equally opposed to a return of the old guard around president Mubārak.

The chapter of Quinta Smit deals with the *Salafī* political participation in the "Islamic Project." Unlike the Muslim Brothers, the *Salafīs* had not been politically active during the Mubārak era and the Revolution took them by surprise. Some remained quietist, believing that they should remain apolitical and accept the rule of any Muslim leader while others believed that they should become politically active. *Al-Nūr* Party was formed around *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya*, a large countrywide preaching group that, due to their spread throughout the country, were remarkably successful in the elections. Other *Salafī* political parties were also formed. Interviews carried out by Quinta Smit highlight a struggle between political pragmatism and religious identity existent inside each of the different *Salafī* parties.

Jayson Casper interviewed *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* leaders and *jihādī Salafīs* about their sense of political participation and the contradictions they faced. These people were often described in different media as terrorists. As persons they were, however, often pleasant to meet with but their inflammatory and inciting speeches made them indeed a threat to the state. The *jihādī Salafīs* also posed a threat to the participatory Islamists' right flank, those who participated in the democratic process but who were also uncertain about 'democracy' since the laws of God should prevail over those of men.

Nicholas Gjorvad discusses the response of non-Islamist movements during a period in which Islamists were dominating the political process. There was definitely a lot of soul-searching this time for non-Islamists as well as

33 Prof. Abdallah Schleifer compared this to socialism, united in the objective to achieve a socialist society but deeply divided in how to achieve this, Wellisch 2016.

many discussions as to how to differentiate themselves from Islamists. Both Islamists and non-Islamists believed to be the true revolutionaries but where Islamists believed in an "Islamic Project," non-Islamists, many of them pious Muslims, believed in the rule of law but also out of fear for what they saw as Islamist reactionaries were ready to ally themselves with the old guard. The belief in relegating religion to a large extent, but not entirely, to the private sphere made many Islamists accuse them to be secular, a term often associated with atheism, a deeply troublesome accusation in a society which is overwhelmingly religious.[34]

The authors have made use of the network of the Center for Arab-West Understanding but also made their own connections. That was a tremendous achievement because of the general skepticism of Islamists towards Western researchers. Yet, these same Islamists also wanted their views to reach a wider Western public through a trusted academic channel. It was at times difficult, as Quinta Smit writes in her chapter "to judge the verity of certain statements made by those interviewed." All authors, however, have been very careful in reviewing and analyzing all interviews and other information obtained.

It was obvious that both Islamists and liberals were most accessible to the researchers. Yet, opposition to Islamist views were also strong in al- Azhar and among Egypt's large *Ṣūfī* network and other mainstream Muslims. They were carrying out their ideological battles with Islamists in a less visible way to non-Egyptian researchers, also since they were not as much involved in anti-Islamist demonstrations as liberals were. They were for example engaged in debates about Brotherhood efforts to introduce new Islamic concepts and give new interpretations to traditional Islamic concepts. Prof. Abdallah Schleifer, distinctive professor of political science at Future University, Egypt, assisted us with the glossary of this book which shows several concepts as they are used in traditional Islam and the new meaning obtained through the efforts of Islamists ideologues.

Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966) introduced, for example, the concept of a vanguard of the *umma*, the Muslim nation, that could engage in *takfīr*, denouncing other Muslims as apostates which justifies killing them. This, Schleifer, observed, is similar to the vocabulary of Communist parties that presented themselves as the vanguard of the work-

34 Email with a Muslim Brother who wished to remain anonymous, October 17, 2014. This Muslim Brother referred to Dr. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Masīrī's book on 'Whole Secularism and Partial Secularism' in which he interprets the difference in understanding secularism between Westerners and Muslims, and also why he thinks secularism was a necessity in Western societies but not in Islamic ones. I have frequently heard Islamists make references to al-Masīrī.

ing classes and, of course, this vanguard was better able to guide the masses then the masses themselves were. *Quṭbīs*, followers of Sayyid Quṭb, are, in the eyes of al-Azhar to be compared with radical revolutionaries rather than conservatives as many Muslim Brothers would present them.[35]

Most interviews were carried out by the authors of the different chapters and myself but we also owe thanks to the interviews of Diana Serôdio, Esther Schoorel, Ahmed Deiab, Arndt Emmerich, Judit Kuschnitzki, Fouad Masoud, Jaco Stoop, Daniela De Maria, Shabana Basheer, Mette Toft Nielsen, Omar Ali and Felix Wellisch. Editor Jenna Ferrecchia completed the first language edit. Proofreading was done by Prof. Reiss and PhD candidates Anna Hager and Sanna Plieschenegger. Later, Catherine Volkmann continued the language editing, which Quinta Smit, Nicholas Gjorvad and Matthew Sparks ultimately completed. Eva Ritt has assisting us in formatting and checking the bibliography. The index of Arabic names of people, organizations and locations was made with help of Alastair White, Catherine Volkmann and Eildert Mulder. The list of organizations and interviewees was made with help of Tugrul von Mende, Eline Kasanwidjodo, Quinta Smit, Jayson Casper, Nicholas Gjorvad and Khaled H. Zakaria. Arabist Eildert Mulder reviewed the transliteration of all Arabic names and texts. Filippus Hulsman created diacritics in Book Antiqua for the transliterated names. We have tried to trace the people we have interviewed. Most, in particular Muslim Brothers and *Salafīs*, were no longer active after 2013. Some were arrested, one died in prison, others left Egypt and again others are simply no longer politically active. In 2013 Egypt went through a major political transformation, which we were witnessing and documenting at the time of its occurrence. This has resulted in a unique documentation about an important period in Egypt's modern history. The work of the authors, interviewers, editors and proofreaders has been invaluable for the composition of this book.

35 Interview Cornelis Hulsman with Prof. Abdallah Schleifer, April 7, 2016.

2 The Political Participation of the Muslim Brotherhood *(Eline Kasanwidjojo)*

2.1 Introduction

The Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011 marked the beginning of open political participation for the Muslim Brotherhood. For the first time since its founding in 1928, they formed a political party and fielded a Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Muḥammad Mursī, for the Presidency. Being granted the right to participate openly was a far cry from the decades of suppression and arrests prior to the revolution.

With its firm organizational structure and experience as an opposition organization, the Muslim Brotherhood was for a long time seen by many observers as the most comprehensive political movement in an undemocratic Egypt.[36] Due to threats to the organization, the Brotherhood for many years shied away from the spotlight of the political scene. They worked `quietly´ underground: recruiting new members, practicing *da ʿwa*, and dedicating their resources to community work.

In the 1970s President Anwar al-Sādāt introduced a multi-party-system in which opposition parties were allowed and the Muslim Brotherhood started to accept party pluralism.[37] Former president, Ḥusnī Mubārak, then allowed the Brotherhood to participate in all parliamentary elections since 1983.[38] They did so through alliances with other political parties or as so-called independent candidates.

In 2010 newly-elected *murshid* (Supreme Guide), Muḥammad Badīʿ, reaffirmed the Muslim Brotherhood's political slogan under the Mubārak regime: "participation, not domination," withdrawing the Brotherhood from the political scene. At that time, they did not want to found a political party, let alone campaign for the Presidency.

Their modus operandi shifted in the wake of the January 2011 Revolution, when political participation was announced and gradually this slogan was attenuated.

Political participation was influenced by internal and external factors. The organizational base, leadership, resignation of members, and the political experience throughout history played an important role within the Bro-

36 Trager 2011.

37 Wickham 2012, 243.

38 Nawara 2013.

therhood. Externally, the Arab Spring and the Egyptian Revolution, the emergence of political factions, such as *Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ* (Center Party), *Ḥizb al-Tayyār al-Miṣrī* (Egyptian Current Party) and *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Qawiyya* (Strong Egypt Party), and public support influenced the political participation of the Brotherhood.

Since the July 3, 2013 ouster of President Mursī, the Brotherhood has defended the case of bringing back the legitimately elected president of Egypt. The mass protests and the intervention of the army on July 3 raised the question of what steps were taken by the Brotherhood leadership, what happened internally, and to what extent the Egyptian public supported them. This chapter will give an overview of their time leading the political spectrum and their downfall, between January 25, 2011 and July 3, 2013. Moreover, it concludes that internal rifts and more conser-vative leadership contributed to an unclear political approach, which influenced the end of the Brotherhood rule.

The first section of this chapter deals with a short historical overview of the Brotherhood, explaining Ḥasan al-Bannā's influences on the foundation of the Brotherhood, the organizational structure, the recruitment process, the idea of political participation and leadership. It will become clear that there has always been a rift within the Brotherhood regarding the nature of their activities. Some members have favored a more subdued role exclusive of politics, while others have championed political involvement on various levels. This section delves into this internal division between politically oriented and more conservative members, which plagued the leadership between 2011 and2013.

The second part offers an analysis of the political participation of the Brotherhood in the post-Revolution environment after January 25, 2011. The Brotherhood's modified legal status meant that there were new opportunities to organize themselves politically. This section clarifies the founding of *Ḥizb al- Ḥurriya wa-'l-ʿAdāla* (the Freedom and Justice Party) and the reasons for a political project of the Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood's political presence was remarkably different after the Revolution and divisions followed.

Alienated members were organized in the Strong Egypt Party and the Egyptian Current Party, leaving the electorate questioning their potential loyalty towards the Brotherhood and the authenticity of their vision.

The final section elaborates on the power and the fall of the Brotherhood in Egyptian politics. There might be a certain agreement over mistakes the Brotherhood and the Presidency made, but there is complete disagreement about what happened on July 3, 2013, when the then Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī, announced the oust-

ing of President Mursī. Was this needed in response to the protests against Muslim Brotherhood rule, or averting the danger of a civil war? Or was a legitimately elected president ousted by the military and can we speak of a coup? Public support, political challenges, public mistakes and the so called 'Brotherhoodization' all influenced and affected the protests of June 30, 2013.

Brotherhood members and supporters see Mursī as the democratically elected president of Egypt and condemn the actions of the military. Others believe the army responded to the will of the people as expressed in the mass demonstrations. This chapter concludes by briefly describing the challenges after July 3, 2013.

2.2 Brief Historical Overview of the Muslim Brotherhood

Islamic scholar and teacher, Ḥassan al-Bannā, founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. His daughters, however, said that he envisaged such an organization as a six-year-old. According to them, he was influenced by his family situation and the post-colonial era in Egypt and therefore he sought to create an organization that would educate Muslims about Islam. This organization would benefit society through philanthropic works and would ultimately create an Islamic society.[39]

Al-Bannā's daughters tell the story that their grandfather, Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, educated his sons in the different schools of Islamic law in order to stimulate discussion inside the house. Each was asked to follow a different *madhhab* (school of law): one of them followed the *mālikī* school (Amīr ʿAbd al-Raḥmān); one of them the *shāfiʿī* school (Muḥammad); another son learned of the *ḥanafī* school (Ḥassan, nicknamed Imām al-Shahīd); and still another followed the *ḥanbalī* school (Jamāl). In addition to his life experiences, the discussions inside the house and his education about Islam directly influenced Ḥassan al-Bannā's personal understanding of Islam and his vision for the Brotherhood.[40]

At the beginning of the 1920s Egypt was still under the control of the British Empire that ruled Egypt between 1882 and 1922.[41] Ḥasan al-Bannā appreciated the need to establish a counterweight to the persisting influence of foreign rulers. Roel Meijer, Senior Researcher on the Middle East at the Clingendael Institute (The Netherlands) depicts the Brotherhood as the

39 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

40 Ibid.

41 Botman 1991, 7.

counterbalance against the colonizing rule of the British Empire.[42] According to Meijer, the Brotherhood can be seen as one of the oldest Islamic organizations that turned Islam into a political activist ideology.[43]

Comparably, in other countries that were in the colonization process starting from the second half of the 19th century, Islam has been at the roots of an ideology of resistance as an answer to western domination and influence. Influential Islamic reformist thinkers like Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī[44] (1838 in Asadabad, Iran-1897 in Istanbul, Ottoman Empire), Muḥammad ʿAbduh[45] (1849 in Nile Delta, Egypt-1905 in Alexandria, Egypt) and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865 near Tripoli, Ottoman Syria-1935 in Cairo, Egypt) formed a range of ideas of how Islam could be reformed in the light of foreign suppression.[46] If the *umma* (the society of Muslims) would live true to the principles of their religion, external forces could be defeated, according to Al-Afghānī.[47] ʿAbduh referred to an era in which the Islam conquered the Great Mediterranean and Muslims practiced their religion in the `right´ and `pure` way, so that domination by external forces was unthinkable.[48] Riḍā founded the Islamic reformist magazine, *al-Manār* (the Lighthouse) in 1898 through which he exported his ideas on Pan-Arabism and Islamic reform. Al-Bannā took over the publication of *al-Manār* after Riḍā died in 1935.[49] The Brotherhood emerged in the light of these reformist thinkers who inspired al-Bannā. The Brothers viewed themselves in line of this Islamic reformist movement.[50]

The ideology of the Brotherhood was formed around the Brotherhood's definition of Islam:

> A total system complete unto itself; the final arbiter of life in all its categories; formulated from and based on its two primary sources,

42 Meijer and Bakker (eds.) 2012, 1.

43 Ibid.

44 Controversy remains about his place of birth. It is reported that he travelled a great part of the Islamic world and Europe and received education in Afghanistan and Iran. Between 1871 and 1879 he was in Egypt and taught at al-Azhar University. Rogan 2010, 191.

45 Al-Bannā's father was a student of ʿAbduh.

46 Pargeter 2013, 9.

47 Hourani 1962, 113.

48 Rogan 2010, 193.

49 Mitchell 1969, 186.

50 Ibid, 321.

> the revelation in the Qurʾān and the wisdom of the Prophet in the Sunna and applicable to all times and all places.[51]

Al-Bannā's vision for the Brotherhood was to focus on important values such as educating Muslims on Islam, *Sharīʿa* (Islamic law), and community work. He explained that the Muslim Brotherhood was a "*Salafiyya* message, a *Sunnī* way, a *Ṣūfī* truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural educational union, an economic company and a social idea."[52]

In order for the Brotherhood to reach an Islamic state, Egypt needed to be independent from British rule and protected from aggression. According to al-Bannā, religious self-respect was only possible in a free nation.[53]

Al-Bannā's ideology resonated in his writing *Daʿwatunā* (Our Message), published as pamphlet in 1937. He emphasized the all-encompassing role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the sense that the Brotherhood should not restrict itself to one identity as a political animal or a means to practice *daʿwa;* instead it should be the whole system.[54] For al-Bannā, this meant that the Muslim Brotherhood would be omnipresent in society and spread its ideology in different steps: first the family would become more Islamic, and then this would extend to society, government, country, the Caliphate, and eventually the world.[55] The Brotherhood's ideology can thus be summarized as the realization of an Islamic state through community work and *daʿwa*, the introduction of *Sharīʿa* as the means to control the affairs of state and society and finally, to achieve unification among the Islamic countries and states, mainly among the Arab states, and liberating them from foreign imperialism.[56] Foremost on the Brotherhood agenda is the 'Islamization' of the country and unifying all Muslim countries.[57] This entails a complete political, economic, and social reformation of the state.[58]

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51 *Al-Muʾtamar al-Khāmis* as cited in Mitchell 1969, 14.

52 Ibid.

53 *Daʿwatuna fi Ṭawr Jadīd, Ila al-Shabāb, Ila ʾayy shayʾ nadʿu al-nās, Jaridat al-Ikwān al-Muslimīn* as cited in Mitchell 1969, 264.

54 Thequranblog 2008.

55 Ibid.

56 Ikhwanweb 2012 (a).

57 The Muslim Brotherhood has an impressive international outreach, not only in North-Africa. Their headquarters in England for example date to the early fifties. Pargeter 2013, 152.

58 Mitchell 1969, 260-261.

2.3 Structure and Organization of the Brotherhood

A strong organization characterizes itself by effective leadership and the loyalty of the members. The head of the Muslim Brotherhood, who represents the Brotherhood worldwide, is the Supreme Guide, or the *murshid*. Because of the importance of Egypt as the birthplace of Ḥasan al-Bannā and the Brotherhood, the Egyptian *murshid* is the leader of all branches of the Brotherhood worldwide. According to ʿAbd al-Jalīl al-Sharnūbī, an Egyptian journalist and former Muslim Brother, the Brotherhood is represented in 88 countries worldwide.[59] The conservative Muḥammad Badīʿ is the 8th General Guide and was elected by the senior Brotherhood members of the Brotherhood's Guidance Council in 2010. In the 1960s Badīʿ was imprisoned at the same time as Sayyid Quṭb and can be considered as one of Quṭb's followers.[60]

The Brotherhood is characterized by a top-down, hierarchical structure. The leadership is essentially a power triangle between the *murshid*; *Maktab al-Irshād* i.e. the Guidance Council (12-15 members); and the Consultative Assembly, known as the *Majlis al-Shūrā* i.e. the *Shūrā* Council (100-150 members).[61] The Guidance Council is elected by the *Shūrā* Council.[62] To be elected in this leadership one needs to be a senior-ranking member, who has completed all steps of the recruitment process and has extensive experience inside the Brotherhood in teaching new recruits, being involved in *daʿwa*, or providing community work, for example. The Brotherhood has representations across Egypt, and local administrations can be directly mobilized or contacted by the Guidance Council.[63]

Eric Trager, an expert on Egyptian politics and the Muslim Brotherhood at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, explains the Brotherhood formed a pyramidal structure in such a way that if leaders are imprisoned, the rest of the organization can remain afloat.[64] The Brotherhood managed to recruit new members, establish an international orga-nization, and work out a political program, despite decades of arrests and imprisonment of leaders and members. According to al-Bannā's daughters, not only did imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood members remain influential – often also be-

59 Ulitzka 2013.

60 Al-Hayat 2010, in Pargeter 2013, 63.

61 Mitchell 1969, 295.

62 Trager, Kiraly, Klose, and Calhoun 2012.

63 Interview with a Muslim Brother (*akh al-ʿamal*) 2013.

64 Sen 2013.

cause their families were still permitted to visit – but they also influenced other prisoners.[65]

2.4 Recruitment Process

The secretive organization with inspiring leaders and a message of self-esteem and hope for a better future did have an impact on the Egyptian society of 85 million people of which more than two-thirds live in poverty. The Muslim Brothers in Egypt were estimated to have between 300,000 and 1,000,000 members in 2013.[66]

During the foundation of the Brotherhood, al-Bannā made sure that the organization was protected against intelligence infiltration by installing an extensive and above all, secretive, recruitment process. This process was, and still can be seen as, one of the biggest protection measures, as it rules out virtually any intrusion by security services. It could take fifteen years to become an *akh al-ʿamal* (working brother) with the rights to any position and to vote internally.

A new recruit is either approached or enters out of free will. From the 1970s onwards, recruiting at universities became the main activity of the Brotherhood. The universities were a bulwark of the different political forces, including the future leaders and other influential individuals.[67]

For Ibrāhīm al-Huḍaybī, a researcher and journalist, and also great-grandson of the second Supreme Guide, Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī, and grandson of Maʾmūn al-Huḍaybī, sixth Supreme Guide, the reason to become a member of the Brotherhood was the fact that the Brotherhood was the only working opposition movement in society. Al-Huḍaybī explained he made this decision in 2003 out of free will, not because of his family history.

> It was a combination of so many different things. This (The Muslim Brotherhood) was the only functioning opposition group in society. I also believe in Islamism, and I did so very much at that time. That was at the time of the war on Iraq, so that played a role too; the need to resist that foreign military occupation.[68]

Al-Huḍaybī did not complete the recruitment process and left the Brotherhood in 2008. He had reached the status of a *muntasib* (affiliated) and was

65 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

66 Kingsley 2013 (b).

67 Pargeter 2013, 37.

68 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (c).

responsible for the content on the English website of the Muslim Brotherhood.[69]

For Dīnā Zakariyya, a Muslim Sister and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the FJP, becoming a member was a free choice, too. At the age of 18 she decided that she wanted to become a member herself though no one else in her family was a member.[70]

The recruitment process of the Brotherhood consists of five levels. The recruit enters as a *muḥibb* (follower/lover) and becomes, after some tests and camps, a *muʾayyid* (supporter). This process can take up to four years. As a *muʾayyid*, he[71] simultaneously enters an *usra* ("family" or cell), which is guided by a senior member. After the studying hours have been tested, if praying is considered enough and liturgical routine followed correctly, the *muʾayyid* becomes a *muntasib* (affiliated). At this stage the recruit becomes more of an insider, and starts to pay up to 8% of his earnings to the organization. If the *muntasib* fulfils his tasks correctly, he will proceed to the level of *muntaẓim* (organizer). This level used to be the one in which recruits had to undergo loyalty tests in order to avoid any infiltration by, for example, the secret service. The final step is to become *akh al-ʿamal* (working brother). At this final stage the Brother is allowed to vote in the Muslim Brotherhood's *Shūrā* Council elections and get elected for the highest positions.[72]

Not only has this process protected the organization, but it has also created a great sense of lifelong loyalty. New Brothers dedicate their time, money and life to the organization.

Prominent former Muslim Brotherhood member and founder of the international wing of the Brotherhood, Kamāl al-Hilbāwī, who was a member for more than 60 years, explains that the organization was his life: "more than my family, it is my future, my history. It is my blood."[73]

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69 Ibid.

70 Interview with Dīnā Zakariyya 2012.

71 From al-Bannā's daughter I understood that the inauguration process for women is the same, while another Muslim Brother explained that the process for women is different. Therefore I use "his and he" in this connotation of the inauguration process as I am sure this process works for the inauguration of men.

72 Interview with a Muslim Brother (*ākh al-ʿamal*) 2013; Trager, September-October 2011.

73 Kasanwidjojo and Smit 2013.

2.5 The Idea of Political Participation

Involvement in politics has always been a trade-off between political circumstances - i.e. the freedoms the regime gave the Brotherhood - and internal considerations. Within the Muslim Brotherhood, there has been a wide range of opinions regarding political participation. There are members who maintain that the movement should not participate in politics, whereas other Brothers believe politics is a part of Islam.

As Al-Bannā stated in Our Message, the Brotherhood encompasses a complete system and should therefore be considered a political organization as part of that system.

Participation in politics was thus justified in the sense that politics was not in conflict with religion, but a part of Islam.[74]

Muslim Brothers and young Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) leaders in the Giza governorate, ʿAlī Khafājī and Muḥammad ʿAbd Allah, explained their political participation as stemming from the idea of al-Bannā and the Brotherhood.[75]

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Associate Professor at Emory University and political science researcher, argues that al-Bannā, while he justified political participation, he was simultaneously against the idea of having more political parties in the country because they would harm the country's unity and thereby facilitate foreign occupation. According to Wickham, Ḥassan al-Bannā's contradictory statements were partly responsible for the internal debate in 2011-2012 over whether to cooperate with other political parties or not.[76]

Wickham writes that the internal Brotherhood reasoning changed in the seventies when the Brotherhood agreed on party pluralism. At that time, President Anwar al-Sādāt changed the political system from a one-party-system to a multi-party-system. Consequently, legal opposition parties were accepted and the Brotherhood leaders convinced their members of the benefits of participating in a multi-party system. The message to the members was that political participation would benefit the bigger plan i.e. `Islamization´ of the country. Brothers were told that al-Bannā ran for Parlia-

74 Mitchell 1969, 264.

75 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (e), Kasanwidjojo 2013 (b).

76 Wickham 2012, 241-248.

ment himself in 1942 and 1945.[77] Al-Bannā's initial rejection of the multi-party system was explained as "a product of historical circumstances."[78]

By the 1950s, the Brotherhood had developed as a strong opposition movement and had adopted a more political approach.[79] During this time the Brotherhood had close links to the "Free Officers", the instigators of the military coup in 1952 that ended both the monarchy and the parliament. Prominent Free Officers were Muḥammad Najīb (Muhammad Naguib), Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir (Gamal Abdel Nasser) and Anwar al-Sādāt, amongst others. Views differ on the relation between the Brotherhood and the Free Officers.[80] King Fārūq mentioned in his memoirs that the Muslim Brotherhood, with the help of the Sovjet Union, was behind the revolution of 1952:

> Who are the men behind Naguib? I will tell you, they are a secret politburo of the Muslim Brotherhood, using money supplied by the Russian Embassy in Cairo. And that efficient coup d'état which cost me my throne was not planned by Naguib in the candlelight of his simple army tent, but was worked out for him by a group of foreign military advisers.[81]

The alleged cooperation deal is unclear. Former Brotherhood spokesman and son of the Ḥassan al- Huḍaybī, who was *murshid* in 1952, Maʾmūn al-Huḍaybī explains that the relationship was one of betrayal:

> Abdel Nasser deceived everyone who worked with him. He deceived all the allies with whom he collaborated prior to and after July 1952.

Maʾmūn al-Huḍaybī also mentioned that al-Nāṣir denied anything had been agreed upon for the Brothers. He added that the attempt on al-Nāṣir's life, allegedly by a member of the Brotherhood, was used as a tool to disband the Brotherhood in 1955.[82] Al-Nāṣir's successor Anwar al-Sādāt reduced restrictions on the Brotherhood in exchange for support against his opponents, i.e. Al-Nāṣir's loyalists.[83]

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77 Ibid, 243.

78 Ibid.

79 Pargeter 2013, 9.

80 Counselor Aḥmad Talāt showed photos of al-Nāṣir with Muslim Brothers at the tomb of Ḥassan al-Bannā. C. Hulsman and and C. Ramizova, 'Interview with Counselor Aḥmad Talāt, former deputy head of the liberal ʿAhrār Party,' Heliopolis, June 22, 2015.

81 Crompton 2014.

82 Abdel-Latif 2012.

83 Laub 2013.

After Egypt's independence, successive regimes became more authoritarian, leaving the Brotherhood as one of the few opposition movements.[84] The 1970s marked the start of Brotherhood participation in various civil society organizations. Individual members participated in the 1980s in elections in the lower chamber of Parliament.[85] In 1984 the Brotherhood won 58 seats in the parliamentary elections in an alliance with *Al-Wafd* Party. The greatest parliamentary victory prior to the January 25 Revolution of 2011 came in 2005 when the Brotherhood put forward 161 independent candidates and won 88 out of 444 seats.[86]

Under the Mubārak regime, the Brotherhood started using the slogan "Participation not domination."[87] According to Nathan J. Brown, Professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, this motto was needed to reassure the distrustful leader, Mubārak, that the Brotherhood only wanted to participate and did not aim to replace the leader.[88] The Brotherhood was always careful not to completely overrule the political scheme because of the feared repressive consequences.

Alongside the great parliamentary victory of 2005 came the public "concerns" of a political move by the Muslim Brotherhood. Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood in 2005, Muḥammad Mahdī ʿĀkif assured the public that the Brotherhood was not ready for politics yet and sought reform by education.[89]

Prior to the elections in 2005, approximately 800 members were, according to Human Rights Watch, arrested without a fair trial. Arrested members were charged with "belonging to an illegal organization", "possession of publications", "spreading propaganda of a nature to disturb public security," and "promoting the use of force to breach the constitution."[90]

In the wake of the 2010 parliamentary elections ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Barr, Guidance Council member and Brotherhood *muftī*, issued a *fatwā*,[91] which stated that participating in these elections was "a religious duty." The *fatwā* was based on *ḥisba* (the Islamic concept of accountability) and issued to

84 Hamzawy and Brown 2010, 6.

85 Ibid, 16.

86 Ibid, 7.

87 Hamid 2012.

88 Brown, N. 2011.

89 Elad-Altman 2006.

90 Human Rights Watch 2005.

91 Legal judgment issued by a qualified *muftī*. In this case, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Barr, a member of the Guidance Council, and nick-named `the Brotherhood *muftī*´, issued this *fatwā* for the Muslim Brothers.

prevent a boycott by members, which was to be expected because of the high number of arrests, after the successes of 2005.[92]

According to Khalil al-Anani, political analyst at *al-Siyāsa al-Dawliyya* (Foreign Policy journal) this was the first time the Muslim Brotherhood used *ḥisba* in the context of elections. To strengthen the *fatwā*, ʿAbd al-Barr added that participation, both voting and the candidacy, in these elections was a form of the greater *jihād*.[93] A day after the Brotherhood announced its participation in the 2010 elections 22 Muslim Brothers were arrested.[94]

Internally, there has been an ongoing discussion on whether the Brotherhood should remain a *daʿwa* and religious movement working on community projects, or be politically active and in the ruling position even though they had always been comfortable to oppose. Two groups within the Brotherhood, referred to as the *Tilmisānīs* and "*Quṭbīs*," differed in opinion at the beginning of the 1980s. The *Tilmisānīs* were represented by ʿUmar al-Tilmisānī who was the *murshid* of the Brotherhood between 1972 and 1986.

Umar al-Tilmisānī wanted to participate in politics under the rule of Mubārak and tried to keep political oriented members inside the Brotherhood while trying to achieve change inside the Brotherhood.

When al-Tilmisānī passed away in May 1986, a number of members who formed the more rigid current and belonged to *al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ* (the militant wing of the Brotherhood), such as Khayrat al-Shāṭir and Maḥmūd ʿIzzat, returned to Egypt.[95]

The third group, the rather more conservative *Quṭbīs*, wanted to continue concentrating on the Brotherhood's *daʿwa* efforts. This group was named after Sayyid Quṭb, a radical Brotherhood ideologue who was critical of Western imperialism and Arab autocratic regimes.[96] This discussion eventually led to the defection of some politically oriented brothers in the mid-1990s. Abū al-ʿIla Māḍī and ʿIṣṣām Sulṭān were core followers of al-Tilmisānī, and later founded *al-Wasaṭ* Party.[97] ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abū al-Futūḥ, former Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guidance Council member and Strong Egypt Party leader, acknowledged the division between *Quṭbis* and *Tilmisānīs*.[98]

92 Pargeter 2013, 43; Al-Anani 2010.

93 Al-Anani 2010.

94 Human Rights Watch 2010.

95 Pargeter 2013, 37-48.

96 Rogan 2010, 541- 542.

97 Pargeter 2013, 47.

98 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (b).

Politically, *Tilmisānīs* wanted to strive for a more balanced approach, also referred to as *Wasaṭiyya*. The *Wasaṭiyya* thought seeks to reconcile Islamic legal principles with a modern liberal democracy.[99] According to Quṭb, the answer was the belief in the principle of holy unity, which demands that all things in life are under God's sovereignty and hence implies that everything, including law and institutions, has to be Islamic. This is also referred to as *ḥakimiyya*.[100] He believed that the world is currently in a state of *jāhiliyya*- the time of ignorance i.e. ignorance of the One God. In Islam, *jāhiliyya* refers to the pre-Islamic times. For Quṭb, an Islamic vanguard was needed to bring Islam back as leader of humanity through the means of *daʿwa* and physical force.[101] By transforming the concept of *jāhiliyya*, which referred to a very specific period of time and initially to a specific region (the Hijaz), into an ahistorical concept, his ideas became applicable anytime and to any Muslim society that was in his view no longer living according to the Islamic principles as understood by Quṭb himself.

According to Aḥmad Najīb, founding member of the Council of Trustees of the Revolution and a member of the Egyptian Current Party, senior Muslim Brotherhood members Khayrat al-Shāṭir, Muḥammad Mursī and Maḥmūd ʿIzzat are all considered *Quṭbīs*, while Muḥammad Ḥabīb, Abū al-Futūḥ, and Kamāl al-Hilbāwī are *Tilmisānīs*.[102] It is remarkable that the men Najīb labeled as followers of ʿUmar al-Tilmisānī all withdrew from the Brotherhood.

The internal Brotherhood discussion on the participation in politics is still relevant. The late Jamāl al-Bannā, the youngest brother of Ḥasan al-Bannā and a liberal Islamic scholar, said in November 2012 that the Brotherhood should not work in politics: "I know this is already too late to mention, but this is also something that my brother Ḥasan al-Bannā said. They should go back to teaching people."[103]

A Muslim Brother, *Akh al-ʿAmal*, interviewed for this research confided that he prefers to abstain from politics and would rather focus on the teaching function of the Brotherhood. This Brother recalled the progression of the spread of Islam in society. He said in April 2013, that at the time of the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 the stage of `Islamizing´ the society was not

99 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2010.

100 Hoebink 1997, 209.

101 Rogan 2010, 541-542.

102 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

103 Kasanwidjojo 2012.

yet completed. He laments that filing a presidential candidate was an imprudent decision, given the hastened process.[104]

According to Kamāl al-Hilbāwī, the Brotherhood exists primarily for *da'wa* activities. He left the Brotherhood immediately after Khayrat al-Shāṭir had announced his participation in presidential elections in 2011.[105]

Experiencing internal disagreement in combination with a rather new, challenging political environment after the Revolution, the Brotherhood promised to work with the slogan "participation, not domination."

2.6 Leadership

Leaders of the Brotherhood enjoy full authority over the complete organization. To keep members loyal to the *murshid*, members have to take an oath and swear complete confidence in and absolute obedience to the *murshid*.[106]

Political scientist and founder of the Freedom Egypt Party, ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī and Nathan J. Brown expected *murshid* Badīʿ would focus less on politics and more on the internal organization of the Brotherhood. Therefore, they predicted in 2010 that the Brotherhood would engage more in community work and internal regulations.[107] Badīʿ asserted in a speech addressing a crowd in the city of Damanhūr in April, 2011 that the Muslim Brotherhood sought "participation, not domination" through elections.[108]

Ibrāhīm al-Huḍaybī agreed with Aḥmad Najīb that those inside the leadership are considered *Quṭbīs*, including Badīʿ. Their policy was, according to al-Huḍaybī, focused on organizational and procedural questions and in 2013 did not focus on the intellectual matters or the strategy.[109] The exception was ʿIṣṣām al-ʿIriyān, who could be considered a *Tilmisānī* and was in the leadership of the Brotherhood.

A leadership that had become predominantly *Quṭbī* suggests that the hardline view to establish an Islamic state, in which Western views were to be combated, dominated the movement.

The influence of Khayrat al-Shāṭir is debated. He is considered a conservative *Qūṭbī* and was a member of the militant wing of the Brotherhood, *al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ*.

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104 Interview with a Muslim Brother (*ākh al-ʿamal*) 2013.

105 Kasanwidjojo and Smit 2013.

106 Mitchell 1969, 300.

107 Hamzawy and Brown 2010, 1-2.

108 Ikhwanweb 2011 (b).

109 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (c).

Al-Futūḥ belongs to the group of the politically oriented (former) Brothers and is a follower of al-Tilmisānī. Al-Futūḥ said that his position resulted from his moderate and tolerant vision — a vision he has held since the 70s: "I have never had a hostile viewpoint that excludes the other."[110] He explained that his work as a student in the Islamic Movement of Students could be called part conservative, but in a peaceful context. Subsequently, develop-ment took place through parliament, syndicates and other professional organi-zations. He stated the conservative part disappeared from his agenda, first in the 1970s, then in the 1980s, 1990s until today.[111]

Both al-Shāṭir and al-Futūḥ had and continue to have their followers inside the Brotherhood. According to Aḥmad Najīb, al-Shāṭir flooded the Brotherhood with new young recruits from the Delta, thereby creating more supporters for al-Shāṭir.[112]

Abd al-Raḥīm ʿAlī, a senior researcher on Islamist current, explained that having a following within the Brotherhood does not count for a democratic voting process inside the organization. He argued that ha-ving more support in the highest circles of the Brotherhood would carry more weight in elections to the highest ranks.[113]

The message of Badīʿ's statement of "participation, not domination" was lost in the wake of the parliamentary elections when the Brotherhood filed a presidential candidate. While most of the influential, political oriented reformists, such as al-Futūḥ and al-Hilbāwī, left the Brotherhood and not all of the Brothers were sure whether political participation was the best option, it were the *Quṭbīs* who lead the Brotherhood in the first steps of political participation.

ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī explained that factions within the Brotherhood can be distinguished as `participation-friendly´ and `non-participation-friendly´. Those within the Brotherhood who are participation-friendly are considered to be more open to opposition movements, to cooperate with liberal parties, and are more open to national consensus. Those who are less participation friendly are those who would like to dominate. Ḥamzāwī remarked that the latter one had the upper hand in the leadership and pushed the Brotherhood to be more dominant. As Ḥamzāwī explained:

> ...differences always lead to factions, more participation-friendly and less participation-friendly factions. And that continues to exist.

110 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (b).

111 Ibid.

112 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

113 Interview with ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ʿAlī 2013.

> The more participation-friendly are more accessible to ideas of reaching out to opposition movements to cooperate with liberal parties to search for national consensus, and the less participation-friendly are not against running in the elections, no, they would like to dominate…Saying we will not run candidate in the presidential elections and then end up having at the end of the day a candidate whom they then manage to get elected.[114]

2.7 Brotherhood Political Participation After 2011

2.7.1 The Freedom and Justice Party

In February 2011, shortly after the Egyptian Revolution, *murshid* Muḥammad Badīʿ announced that the Muslim Brotherhood would establish a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). According to Badiʿ, this party would respond to "the wishes, hopes and aspirations of Egyptians for a brighter future and the restoration of the country's prestige and leadership role."[115]

As mentioned before, this announcement came as a surprise. Badīʿ was expected to pursue a policy based on strengthening the Brotherhood internally, and, taking into account al-Bannā's stance on party politics, a party establishment was rather unexpected. However, the political circumstances provided by the Revolution created an unprecedented opportunity to found a party.

The FJP was founded by about 10,000 members of the Brotherhood, of which at least 1,000 members were women.[116] On June 6, 2011, the party received official legal status and was headed by senior Brotherhood member Muḥammad Mursī. They listed 46 women as candidates for the Parlamentary elections. There were initially no Coptic members, even though the FJP had also invited Christians to join the party.[117]

Yūsuf Sīdhum, a prominent Copt and Editor-in-Chief of the weekly *Waṭanī* (my country) since 1986, met with FJP leaders in the fall of 2011. According to Sīdhum, the FJP wanted to show Egypt that they were able to create a democracy and protect minorities. "The meetings were good but we need to keep this dialogue going without compromising our objectives," Sīdhum said about these meetings.[118] Some Copts eventually became active within

114 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad 2013 (a).

115 Ikhwanweb 2011 (a).

116 Interview with Dīnā Zakariyya 2012.

117 Shehata 2011.

118 Hulsman 2012 (a).

the FJP. Examples were Nāhīd Lamʿī Jirjis, who was a member of the FJP General Assembly and FJP's Public Relations Committee in Giza,[119] and Dr. Rafīq Ḥabīb, a Christian researcher who became Vice President of the FJP[120] but withdrew after the Constitutional crisis of November-December 2012.[121]

During the 80 years of grassroots work, the Brotherhood had invested in direct communication with the people and community projects. With the support from the Brotherhood, the FJP had funding, members, a plan, and support. A campaign thus appeared relatively easy, especially in comparison to other Islamist actors, in particular the smaller *Salafī* parties, such as *al-Aṣāla* (the Authenticity Party) and *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's Ḥizb al-Bināʾ wa-l-Tanmiyya* (Building and Development Party). This contributed to their victory over these parties taking 235 seats in their first participation as a party in the parliamentary elections in January 2012.[122]

The FJP allowed women and youth to participate in politics.

> You can be politically active once you are 18 years old. The average percentage of youth within the FJP is 40%, 20% are women in the Giza district and overall in Egypt. We also have Christians in the party but I do not know how many exactly.

ʿAlī Khafājī explained in April 2013.[123]

Women have been part of the Muslim Brotherhood for decades, but it was too risky to admit their membership under the tight intelligence grip of Mubārak and other former Egyptian presidents. Allegedly, men put themselves in danger, but women needed to be protected as they were the primary caretakers of the family.[124] The Revolution diminished the threat of arrests for Muslim Brotherhood members, and thus also for women. In July 2013, during the Muslim Brotherhood sit-in at *Rābaʿa al-ʿAdawiyya* Square, al-Bannā's granddaughter Wafāʾ Ḥafnī declared: "now you find all the women in Rābaʿa because they all know us. If they take people, they are going to take men and women, they took women from the Presidential Palace, part of the people that have been imprisoned are women."[125]

According to ʿAlī Khafajī the FJP had become the biggest party in Egypt and even the biggest political group in the world. He claimed that this was

119 Ikhwanweb 2012 (e).

120 Casper 2011 (a).

121 Phone-call Cornelis Hulsman with Ḥabīb in January 2013.

122 Agence France Presse 2012.

123 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (e).

124 Interview with a Muslim Brother (*akh al-ʿamal*) 2013.

125 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

the result of the application of a moderate, less conservative approach to Islam:

> We are a civil party with Islamic background, we do not represent Islam, we want to apply it. As for the other parties, they actually share the same beliefs, we do not have a problem with that. But how we see the process is quite different.

ʿAlī Khafājī explained in April 2013. Khafājī noted that the FJP had two offices: a political office and a Supreme Council. Prominent Muslim Brotherhood member Saʿd al-Katātnī was the leader of the political office. Political decisions were made by both offices together.[126]

For the public, however, the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood are considered one and the same. Members who acted on behalf of the FJP were not permitted to continue to be active in the Muslim Brotherhood organization.[127] According to al-Bannā's granddaughter Wafāʾ Ḥafnī, and Walīd al-Ḥaddād, foreign affairs spokesperson of the FJP, the Muslim Brotherhood is the FJP in the sense that every Muslim Brother automatically became part of the FJP, but not every member of the FJP was a member of the Brotherhood.[128]

The FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood were administratively separated, but FJP leaders were formerly prominent leaders within the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, they shared an identical ideology. According to Ḥamzāwī, this was the biggest challenge of the Brotherhood and the FJP, "But they have been able to develop an internal democratic structure for their party, in fact much much better than most liberal parties.They have elections, they have regular elections and they have a degree of accountability and transparency, which does not exist elsewhere,"[129] he said in 2013. Prof. Abdallah Schleifer agrees with Ḥamzāwī that "accountability and transparency were not particularly apparent among the political parties opposed to the Muslim-Brotherhood/FJP. But the authoritarian pyramid-like structure of the Muslim Brotherhood also does not match liberal democratic political practice. The pyramid's tip, so-to-speak, is the Supreme Guide to whom members must submit on policy. This 'democratic structure' within the Muslim Brotherhood far more resembles 'Democratic Centralism' of Marxist-Leninists parties at the time of Stalin. The differenceis

126 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (e).

127 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

128 Smit and Kasanwidjojo2013 (d), (f).

129 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad 2013 (a).

that in a Leninist party the Supreme Guide is called the Secretary-General."[130]

2.7.2 The Political Project of the Brotherhood

The most important part of the political ideology of the Brotherhood remained the importance of Islam as `the solution´. According to Richard P. Mitchell, al-Bannā's call for constitutional reform lay in the slogan "*Al-Qurʾān* is our constitution," which was linked to his slogan "reform of the law," with which he pointed at the *Sharīʿa*.[131] But the political plan had to be adapted to the situation.

ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī and Nathan J. Brown note that until the 1990s the political focus points of the Muslim Brotherhood were narrowed to the application of *Sharīʿa* as well as religious and moral values.

Since its political reform in 2000, human rights and socio-economic policies have been added to their political agenda; however, the vague stance on women's rights and sectarian relations between Muslims and Copts remained.[132]

With the founding of the FJP, the political values and ideas of the Brotherhood had to shift away from opposition statements to government rule, while still being based on the core principles of the organization.

In April 2012, the FJP presented the *Nahḍa*[133] (Renaissance) plan, or "political project," a detailed plan the Brotherhood had been developing for the previous 15 years.[134] The *Nahḍa* plan "aims to re-build the Egyptian person, the Egyptian society and the Egyptian nation, build its strength, and entrench the values of moderation, balance and tolerance in its thought, with an Islamic reference and a modern cultural identity for the enlightened, noble people of Egypt."[135]

According to Aḥmad Kamāl, *akh al-ʿamal* and FJP Youth Leader of Southern Cairo, there had always been a political plan to rule, but this plan had never

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130 Interview Cornelis Hulsman with Prof. Abdallah Schleifer, November 22, 2015.

131 Mitchell 1969, 260.

132 Hamzawy and Brown 2010, 16.

133 The name "*Nahḍa*" refers to the earlier *nahḍa*, the secular cultural revival in the Arab world at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th Century in which the core actors were Arab Christians and secular Muslims. Where Christians and secular Muslims focused on the Arab heritage Islamists aimed at connecting the Arab and Islamic heritage.

134 Ikwanweb 2012 (b).

135 Ibid.

been clearly formulated.[136] This detailed plan, presented by the FJP and later in the presidential program of Mursī, claimed to cover all aspects of society.[137] Key points of *Nahḍa* were the "building of a political system, transformation to a developmental economy, societal empowerment, comprehensive human resource development, building of a safety and security system, regional and international leadership, and files under focus, i.e. women's empowerment, the status of al-Azhar and Copts."[138]

In a speech al-Shāṭir gave in Alexandria entitled, "Features of *Nahḍa*: Gains of the Revolution and the horizons for developing" on April 21, 2011 he did not discuss the plan in depth, although it was considered an important roadmap for rebuilding Egypt.[139] In that same speech al-Shāṭir mentioned that "the project does not exist on the level of planning or formulation."[140] This showed that there was no specific pragmatic political approach on how to reach the points listed in the *Nahḍa* plan.

2.7.3 Muslim Brotherhood Political Presence and the Ballot Box After January 25, 2011

The Revolution unseated President Ḥusnī Mubārak, and left Egypt with the interim rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), which in February 2011 dissolved the Parliament and suspended the Constitution. 2011 marked a year of public struggle against the SCAF and preparation for rebuilding of political institutions.

The Brotherhood initially did not file a presidential candidate, but focused instead on the formation of the FJP and advocated for democracy in general. At the beginning of February 2011 Mursī said: "we will not have a presidential candidate, we want to participate and help, we are not seeking power."[141]

The first post-Revolutionary parliamentary elections in December 2011-January 2012 were dominated by Islamists. The FJP won 235 seats (47.2%), alongside the *Salafī Ḥizb al-Nūr* (the Light Party), which won 121 seats (24.3%).[142]

136 Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad 2013 (a).

137 The Freedom and Justice Party 2011.

138 Ikhwanweb 2012 (c).

139 Ibid.

140 Tadros 2013.

141 CNN 2011.

142 Agence France Presse 2012.

A month later in the elections for the Upper House, or the *Shūrā* Council, the same parties won. The FJP won a total of 107 seats (58.8%) and the *Nūr* Party won 46 seats (25.5%).[143]The FJP claimed in 2012 that this result illustrated the continued confidence of the Egyptian people in the FJP.[144]

Meanwhile, the Parliament had provided 50 out of the 70 Islamists who became part of the 100-member Constituent Assembly drafting the Constitution. In April 2012, the administrative court ruled that the composition of the assembly was violating the constitutional declaration by ha-ving doubled the permitted number of members in the Parliament and the Constituent Assembly. The assembly was led by Saʿd al-Katātnī, the same lawmaker who was at the time the speaker of the Parliament and a member of the Brotherhood. Adding to that, just weeks before, people demonstrated against the poor representation of women and Christians. People walked out of the assembly. The administrative court suspended the first Constituent Assembly.[145]

During this time of debates about the Constituent Assembly, the FJP announced, almost at the same time, the participation of Khayrat al-Shāṭir in the presidential elections.[146] The decision to nominate al-Shāṭir as a presidential candidate was, according to Kamāl al-Hilbāwī, supported by 56 for and 52 against this decision in the Muslim Brotherhood's *Shūrā* Council, thus showing the division within the *Shūrā* Council.[147]

First of all, this coincided with the end of ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abū al-Futūḥ's Brotherhood membership after he had announced that he considered participation in the presidential elections just a year earlier.[148]

Secondly, the decision also coincided with numerous claims that the Brotherhood would not strive for domination, nor would participate in the presidential elections.

At the end of May 2012, the first round of presidential elections started. Just days before the second round of the presidential elections, the Parliament was dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court.[149] The newly-elected president would thus go unchecked by an elected house and a charter of rules.

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143 Egypt Independent 2012 (b).

144 Ikhwanweb 2012 (b).

145 Kirkpatrick 2012 (a). Following this a second Constituent Assembly was formed.

146 Russia Today 2012.

147 Fouda 2012.

148 Pargeter 2013, 231.

149 Hearst and Hussein 2012.

On June 24, 2012, the Brotherhood experienced their greatest triumph when the Egyptian Presidential Election committee announced that presidential candidate Muḥammad Mursī had won the presidential elections with 51.7% in the second round.[150]

The results, however, were announced after a week of uncertainty and negotiations and were heavily disputed by his opponent Aḥmad Shafīq.[151]

Meanwhile, the FJP obtained the most seats out of any party in the second Constitutional Assembly.[152] In February 2013, former assembly member and former member of *al-Wafd* Party, George Masīḥa listed the affiliations of all members of this assembly, showing 55 Islamists, 26 non-Islamists and 19 independents before the walk-out of opponents to the Islamists dominated procedures. Since a minimum of 85 members were needed for the vote, members were replaced resulting in 64 Islamists, 12 non-Islamists and 9 independents showing this assembly was dominated by Islamists.[153]

The overwhelming presence of the Brotherhood in the political arena increased the doubts about the claims of "participation, not domination" among non-Islamists.

2.7.4 Divisions Following the Revolution

Before the Revolution of 2011, the first politically organized Brotherhood offshoot was *al-Wasaṭ* Party in 1996. According to Ibrāhīm al-Huḍaybī, the Revolution not only brought a political party (the FJP) that was formally separated from the Brotherhood, but it also caused internal discord and conflict within the Brotherhood.[154]

After the Revolution, two other political parties that included former Muslim Brotherhood members were founded: the Strong Egypt Party, headed by influential former Muslim Brother and former presidential candidate, ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abū al-Futūḥ, and the Egyptian Current Party, founded by former Muslim Brothers, Muḥammad al-Qazzāz and Islām Luṭfī.

2.7.4.1 Strong Egypt Party

According to the party's founder, ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abū al-Futūḥ, the Strong Egypt Party had 10,500 members in June, 2013.[155] Al-Futūḥ holds an inter-

150 Kirkpatrick 2012 (c).

151 Hulsman 2014 (a).

152 Ahram Online 2012 (a).

153 Casper 2013 (b).

154 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (c).

155 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (b).

esting position. Not only is he a former member of the Brotherhood, but he was also said to be a candidate for the Supreme Guide position in 2010 and was an independent presidential candidate in 2012. Al-Futūḥ had to leave the Brotherhood because of his disagreement with the leadership of the party about his participation in the presidential elections of 2012. This could be seen as a conflict between al-Shāṭir and al-Futūḥ as both wanted to participate in the newly shaped political landscape but both hold different ideas; as previously mentioned al-Futūḥ is considered a *Tilmisānī*, whereas al-Shāṭir is considered a *Quṭbī*.

Al-Futūḥ shares a long history with the Brotherhood and many believe he still has ties but his membership cannot be proven. Aḥmad Najīb says al-Futūḥ said that he did not leave the Brotherhood 'administratively' but was kicked out.[156] ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Mashshāṭ, Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at the Future University in Egypt, believed al-Futūḥ remained strongly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.[157]

Al-Futūḥ acknowledged personal relations in June 2013 but denied formal ties and involvement with the Brotherhood:

> I announced that I was an independent candidate and was consequently no longer affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood. There is no relation and there is no participation in any activities with them, just like I do not participate in the activities of the Constitution Party or *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. But there are still the human relationships since we are all Egyptians, and these relationships are good.[158]

The links with the Brotherhood appeared to be ambiguous and raised the question whether al-Futūḥ could still serve the interests of the Brotherhood and influence internal matters.

2.7.4.2 Egyptian Current Party

The Egyptian Current Party had an interesting composition. With their registration still under construction in 2013, the party had 1,500 members of which 20% are former Muslim Brotherhood members. 30% of the party was apolitical and 50% was predominantly left-leaning, of which 20% was "a bit radical," according to Aḥmad Najīb, Egypt Current Party's coordinator for external affairs and member of the trade committee.[159]

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156 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

157 Interview with ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Mashshāṭ 2013.

158 Hulsman, Smith and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (b).

159 Ibid.

The party wanted to be non-ideological. That is, according to Aḥmad Najīb, the reason why all of the different groups were able to stay together.[160] The youth in this party were responsible for the presidential campaign of al-Futūḥ in 2012. Aḥmad Najīb said that al-Futūḥ originally planned the Strong Egypt Party to be the development section and the Egyptian Current Party the political section of his political ambitions, but he never pursued this plan.

In June 2013, the relationship between the two parties had, according to Aḥmad Najīb, become one of both love and hate:

> We both believe that we are ultimately meant for each other. At the same time we hate the politics of getting together. There are camps within each group, that are definitely for consolidation of efforts, endeavours and authorities and there are groups who are completely against. At our end, those who are against [unifying] believe that Egyptian Current is a non-ideological, non-oligarchic party, not based on a person, like al-Futūḥ, but on the youth. This is our competitive edge, that we are a revolutionary youth based party.[161]

Due to the number of former Muslim Brothers and the role of members of the Egyptian Current Party in campaigning for the presidential race of al-Futūḥ, they are often placed in the Islamists' corner. However, the biggest difference between the two parties was that the Egyptian Current Party lacked a clear unified stance on the role of the *Sharīʿa*.

The challenges that the various groups originating from the Muslim Brotherhood, revolutionaries, and leftists faced was the core issue that created a sense of loyalty towards these parties.

2.8 The Brotherhood in Power and Their Fall from Power

The actual rule of the Mursī Administration began when the support for the FJP was already in decline. In March 2012, months before the presidential elections, the strong presence of the FJP within the first Constituent Assembly was heavily criticized.

Political groups, such as *Ḥizb al-Miṣriyyīn al-Aḥrār* (Free Egyptians Party, *Taḥāluf al-Thawra Mustamirra* (Revolution Continues Alliance), and *al-Ḥizb al-Miṣrī al-Dimūqrāṭī al-Ijtimāʿī* (Egyptian Social Democratic Party) criticized the FJP and the *Salafī al-Nūr* Party for dominating the assembly, therefore diminishing the principles of consensus and participation.[162] The first Con-

160 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

161 Ibid.

162 Egypt Independent 2012 (c).

stituent Assembly was dissolved and a second, more balanced assembly was formed with fewer FJP members but the influence of the FJP remained nevertheless very large.[163] Days before Muḥammad Mursī's election as president in June 2012, the FJP-dominated Parliament was dissolved by the Supreme Court, yet the work of the second Constituent Assembly, still containing an Islamist majority, was about to begin.

2.8.1 Public Support for the Brotherhood

Initial public support for the Muslim Brotherhood rested on the Brotherhood's actions during the Revolution, their initial, humble approach in politics and their status as the main opposition to the former regime.

People can voice their desire for legitimacy in various ways. The ballot box is a democratic indicator of public support, but millions of people demonstrating in the streets are also a clear indicator of public support.

Brotherhood leader, ʿIṣṣām al-ʿIriyān, gave an official statement during the January 25 Revolution in which he claimed that the Brotherhood was not officially participating in it, while at the same time stressed that the youth should be able to express their anger. Members were giving instructions in the mosques to demonstrate at specific locations in town. According to a Muslim Brother, this speech was understood by Brothers to go out and demonstrate.[164]

Aḥmad Najīb, co-founder of the Council of Trustees of the Revolution, co-organized the first sit-ins at Tahrir Square and took the responsibility to protect the square against violence by the security forces. The actual physical presence of the Muslim Brotherhood came, according to Najīb, on January 30, 2011, after demonstrators were fired upon the day before. Najīb was there together with Brotherhood sympathizer, Ṣafwat Ḥijāzī, and Muslim Brotherhood leader, Muḥammad al-Biltajī.[165]They told Najīb that young people of the Brotherhood were mobilized and ready to be sent off to parts of the square. Najīb explained that Muslim Brotherhood members made great sacrifices at Tahrir Square: "This is why we thought of giving them [the Brotherhood] a chance. And little did we know back then."[166]

Firstly, public support derived from the fact that the Brotherhood worked on the ground for over 80 years and had done grassroots community work. ʿAlī Khafājī said that the most important department of the FJP was the one

163 Hulsman (ed.) 2013 (a).

164 Shukrallah 2011.

165 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

166 Ibid.

working on community projects. This initiative had been founded by the Brotherhood. The key to reaching the people had been in the communication and language of the FJP. The "Let's Build Egypt Project," in which the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood worked together in establishing social projects, benefitted more than 500,000 people, according to Khafājī.[167]

Secondly, the Brotherhood initially took a humble approach of participating in politics by founding a political party and not filing a presidential candidate, indicating that they were not aspiring to control all of the state institutions.[168]

A third area for public support was the Brotherhood's suppression for decades under Mubārak and its opposition to the former regime. For those who fought to bring down the Mubārak regime, Mursī was considered the lesser of two evils in the second round of the presidential elections. Youth members of the April 6 Movement were positive about Mursī's electoral victory. They did not support Mursī, but they hated the former regime, believed to be represented by presidential candidate Aḥmad Shafīq.[169]

2.8.2 Challenges During Mursī's Presidency

The Brotherhood began their political participation with experience in politics as an opposition movement. They were seen, mostly by Islamists, as a viable alternative to replace the former leading *al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Dīmūqrāṭī* (National Democratic Party) of Mubārak. However, the belief that they were able to replace the old guard, rapidly evaporated.

Both Ibrāhīm al-Huḍaybī and ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī stated in April and May 2013 that the Brotherhood as a movement did not perform well. Al-Huḍaybī explained that "My problem with the Muslim Brotherhood is with the meritocracy. They are not working."[170]

Ḥamzāwī said, "The Muslim Brotherhood is losing that image of being a meritocratic movement… It is not performing that well." He remarked that they had lost trust and were seen as a distant and remote ruling party.[171]

To state that the Brotherhood, the FJP, and the Presidency were the only ones responsible for their political fate is debatable. In this section, an account will be given from those directly involved in governance and those in opposition during Mursī's tenure as president. On the one hand some argue

167 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (e).

168 Saleh 2011.

169 Kirkpatrick 2012 (c).

170 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (c).

171 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (b).

that any person, not just the Brotherhood, would have struggled in those circumstances in post-revolution Egypt. Conversely, there are those who blame the Muslim Brotherhood for their own downfall. Public mistakes were made, but it is unclear to what extent President Mursī, the FJP, and the Brotherhood had succumbed to difficult circumstances.

Inside the Brotherhood there were members who disagreed with the political direction of the Brotherhood. Former Brotherhood members and members of the opposition argued that the Brotherhood, the Presidency, and the FJP needed to retreat from politics. This was best summed up by the late Jamāl al-Bannā in November 2012, "the Muslim Brotherhood is strong, but too weak to lead Egypt." Jamāl Al-Bannā briefly highlighted the main problems:

> It starts with the decree now, but besides that, they do not listen to anyone. They do not have any expertise in leading and have been underground for a long time. The Revolution came as a surprise and they were eager to catch the authority. True democracy is not in their belief. To conclude, they have no idea about *Sharī'a*. Their opinion about *Sharī'a* differs from the *Salafīs*, it cannot be implemented in both ways.[172]

Externally, the Brotherhood was losing popularity. The attacks on headquarters and party buildings of the FJP increased dramatically after the widely opposed presidential decree at the end November 2012 that made it possible for the president to overrule court decisions. But the Muslim Brothers saw this differently. As Walīd al-Ḥaddād said,

> Actually we have faced 38 or 39 attacks on our headquarters and we are considering this not an expression of rights of other political forces, but using the extra violations in order to make the president changing his decisions and maybe leaving the power or the presidential palace to other political forces, this is not democracy.[173]

2.8.3 Political Decisions and Mistakes

Political decisions triggered unrest and demonstrations. Decisive triggers included the Presidential Decree in November 2012, economic decisions, internal security, dwindling Christian support and the Ethiopian plan for building a dam in the Blue Nile, a major source of water for Egypt. Most agreed that the Presidency made mistakes, but there remained an extreme difference of opinion about the justification for the removal of Mursī.

172 Kasanwidjojo 2012.

173 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (f).

Ishtishhād al-Bannā said in July 2013 that the Muslim Brotherhood took power prematurely.[174]

Kamāl al-Hilbāwī left the Brotherhood immediately after they announced they would participate in presidential elections. He thinks the Brotherhood should promote *daʿwa* and not get involved in politics. "I saw lesser concentration on *daʿwa* and *tarbiyya* (education), and more concentration on politics."[175]

The departure of prominent figures, like Muḥammad Ḥabīb, Abū al-Futūḥ, and Kamāl al-Hilbāwī, also reduced internal support within the organization. These men left to realize their political ambitions in other parties that also supported their revolutionary wishes, while still having a strong Islamist base.

Samuel Tadros (Ṣāmūīl Tādrus), Research Fellow at Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom, argues that the Brotherhood was "incompetent and failed miserably in actual governance." He said the Brotherhood lacked any substantial experience in the actual ruling of a state.[176]

Tadros and Jamāl al-Bannā both argue that the experience of being an opposition movement made the Brotherhood unsuitable for the actual ruling of Egypt's bureaucracy. As Ḥamzāwī stated in April 2013, they were heading towards domination more than participation.[177]

2.8.3.1 Pluralism and Inclusivity

With new opportunities for the establishment of new parties after the Revolution and therefore more choice for the electorate, pluralism and inclusivity were important premises to participate in democratic politics. The Brotherhood's stance towards pluralism has been ambiguous. Their recent acceptance of other political parties created a lack of trust from conservative members, who were blinded by the Brotherhood's argument to make the country more Islamic.

In 2011 the FJP led the formation of the Democratic Alliance for Egypt which consisted of the FJP, Nasserists and Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī's *Ḥizb al-Karāma* (the Dignity Party). Ḥamzāwī noted that, directly after the election of Mursī, the FJP was more willing to build a consensus, participation, and a coalition with non-religious and non-right-wing parties than they were in April 2013.

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174 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

175 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (e).

176 Tadros 2013.

177 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad 2013 (a).

In August 2012, Mursī appointed four assistants, representing different groups of Egyptian society which showed a direction towards consensus building: Samīr Marqus, a liberal and Coptic Orthodox Christian; Bākīnām al-Sharqāwī, a female Muslim scholar; ʿIṣṣām al-Ḥaddād, who was a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood; and ʿImād ʿAbd al-Ghaffūr of the *Salafī al-Nūr* Party.[178]

In April 2013 this had radically changed. "They [the FJP] are becoming more closed," Ḥamzāwī said. It became clear that they only selectively cooperated with parties outside of their own spectrum.[179]

Tadros talked about "zero-sum politics," indicating the way the FJP put the non-Islamist parties offside, leaving them with nothing more than the wish of the fall of the Mursī regime.[180]

Senior Brotherhood member and FJP minister, ʿAmr Darrāj, however, said others refused to cooperate.[181] On May 7, 2013, positions in the cabinet were reshuffled. Mursī did consult non-Islamist leaders, but they refused to cooperate. He founded a cabinet with five Muslim Brotherhood ministers and several technocrat ministers.[182]

2.8.3.2 Presidential Decree

The Presidential Decree of November 22, 2012, that immunised the Constituent Assembly and *Shūrā* Council from a pending dissolution through an order of the Supreme Constitutional Court was widely seen as the most important event that marked the policy change of the FJP and it relations towards the opposition.[183]

Samuel Tadros recounts the observations of various researchers who noticed dictatorial moves, the alienation of allies, the failure to reach the electorate after being elected and the ignorance of criticisms. In his view their policy amounted to a power grab.[184]

178 Hulsman 2012 (e).

179 Ibid.

180 Tadros 2013.

181 Hulsman and Schoorel 2013.

182 Hulsman (ed.) 2013 (b).

183 Ahram Online 2012 (d).

184 Tadros 2013.

Muslim Brotherhood members who did not support the plan inside the Brotherhood had to go. Researcher Roel Meijer called their political plan the "majority strategy," i.e. the desire to seize power and rule the majority.[185]

Mursī granted himself all the necessary authority to "protect" what was called "the goals of the Revolution." In the view of the Brothers at the time the remnants of the old regime, *fulūl*, needed to be eradicated from the state institutions.[186]

Mursī extended the work of the Constituent Assembly by another two months.[187] The integrity of the assembly had been diminished weeks earlier, as twenty out of the one hundred members who were responsible for writing a new constitution had walked out.[188]

Mursī tried to placate the revolutionaries by increasing the pensions and widening the net of recipients calling for revolutionary trials and removing the sitting Prosecutor General.[189]

Mass demonstrations resulted leading to clashes at the Presidential Pa-lace on December 5, 2012, which left four protesters dead and hundreds wounded.[190]

Mursī's supporters believe he had no other choice. Former presidential advisor, Wāʿil Ḥaḍāra, not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, believed that the only way for Mursī to preserve the Constituent Assembly and to continue the project of writing the Constitution was to place himself above the law. Ḥaḍāra said: "the president was legitimately concerned that the Supreme Constitutional Court would annul both, leaving Egypt without an elected house and without a mechanism for writing the constitution. (...) For a variety of reasons, some legitimate, others political, the constitutional declaration was met with extreme disapproval, including street demonstrations and attacks on the Presidential palace. The President extended an invitation to public figures, legal experts and opposition parties. Most opposition parties refused to participate."[191]

Hudā al-ʿAwad (Hoda Awad), Professor of Political Science, believes the decree and the aftermath were the starting point for military plans to re-

185 Meijer 2013, 1.

186 Ahram Online 2012 (d).

187 Sabry 2012.

188 Ahram Online 2012 (f).

189 Sabry 2012.

190 Egypt Independent 2012 (h).

191 Ḥaḍāra 2013; Hulsman (ed.), Serôdio, and Casper 2013 (a).

move Mursī.[192] Darrāj, however, believes the military had planned Mursī's removal earlier on.[193]

Sāmiḥ Sayf al-Yazal, former Egyptian army general and advisor to the government of ʿAdlī Manṣūr, agreed in December 2013 that the decree was Mursī's biggest blunder.[194] Mursī relinquished his acquired rights on December 8, but he continued with the constitutional referendum, which resulted in new mass demonstrations.[195]

The Presidency did everything to uphold the possibility of issuing a constitution under the leadership of Mursī. The referendum continued and was approved by 63.8% after two voting rounds in December, 2012, however, with a low turnout of just over 32.9%.[196]

2.8.3.3 Christian Support

Mursī stated in June, 2012 that he would be the president for all Egyptians, believing in equal citizenship for all:

> I turn to you all on this historic day, in which I have become president of all Egyptians, equally. Everyone will be afforded due respect, without any privilege, except that rendered by their service to our nation and their respect for the constitution and the law.[197]

His statement aimed at reassuring Christians whose support for Brotherhood rule had been minimal from the start. Yūsuf Sīdhum estimated that 60% of the Copts voted for Shafīq in the first round of the presidential elections. According to Sīdhum, this was a choice between political Islam and a civil state, of which Copts preferred the latter.[198]

In the second round of the presidential elections, a great majority of the Copts voted for Shafīq. Copts were then accused of supporting the old regime, therefore being anti-revolutionary.[199]

Mariz Tadros, a fellow at the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Sussex in Great Britain, notes that there was an increase in sectarian violence against Christians during the power vacuum after the Revolu-

192 Interview with Dr. Hudā al-ʿAwad, July 20, 2013, in Hulsman (ed.) 2013 (a), 45.

193 Hulsman and Schoorel 2013.

194 Interview with Sāmiḥ Sayf al-Yazal 2013.

195 Hulsman (ed.) 2013 (b).

196 Al-Ali 2012.

197 Morsi 2012.

198 Casper 2012.

199 Meleka 2012.

tion.[200] She adds that in June 2013 a strong perception amongst interviewed Copts who saw the Islamists acting as if they enjoyed absolute power in government and society, and were accountable to no one.[201]

2.8.3.4 Economy

Economically, the regime under Mursī had a hard time accomplishing their main program points. The *Nahḍa* plan described 100 national projects each exceeding one billion dollars, which was supposed to guarantee a growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with 6.5-7% in five years. There was also a promise that the employment rate would decrease by 5% each year.[202] The jobless rate in Egypt had risen from 9% to 13% in two years.[203]

Jihād al-Ḥaddād, the Brotherhood official responsible for economic recovery, blamed the government bureaucracy for obstructing reforms. Al-Ḥaddād claimed in May 2013 that the priorities remain vibrant, but that there was a lack of financial and human resources.[204]

A loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could have helped Egypt with the needed resources at that moment but after more than 20 months[205] of arguing, the $4.8 billion loan had not been signed.[206] Ibrāhīm al-Huḍaybī explains the reluctance from the side of the Brotherhood to come to an agreement to their initial stance on independence. By signing an agreement with the IMF, the Presidency would have compelled Egypt to pay back the loan to a `Western´ institution.[207]

2.8.3.5 Security

The Presidency kept the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979, played a role in negotiating the Israel-Gaza ceasefire in 2012, and tried to keep jihadists under control in the Sinai. Aside of that, the Presidency attempted to reform the intelligence apparatus.[208]

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200 Tadros M. 2013.

201 Ibid.

202 Ikhwanweb 2012 (c).

203 Halime 2013.

204 Ibid.

205 The SCAF, ruling after the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, opposed the IMF loan already, as it did not want more debt. Fahmy, N. 2013.

206 Ibid.

207 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (c).

208 Laub 2013.

Mariz Tadros concluded that despite these attempts the Mursī Presidency was unable to ensuring security in public.[209] The crime rate in Egypt tripled, according to data of the Ministry of Interior, after the Revolution in 2011.[210] Analysist believed state institutions like the intelligence apparatus were in need of reform.[211]

Political scientist Dr. Nādiya Muṣṭafā voiced in May 2013 a much heard belief among Islamists that the security forces and the army have always been against Islamists in power, leaving Mursī the impossible task of reforming institutions with decades of experience of fighting against the Brotherhood. Nādiya Muṣṭafā distinguished, however, between the police and army. The army "is a nationalist institution," she said. "The main body of the security forces are with the people though, not with those who are governing."[212]

2.8.3.6 Ethiopian Dam

Ethiopia announced at the end of May 2013 plans to build the Grand Renaissance Dam along the Blue Nile, which could have dire consequences for Egypt's water resources.[213] In response, Islamist politicians and secular allies of the Brotherhood met to discuss this, unaware that this meeting was aired live. Some politicians believed this dam to be a secret plot by the Americans and the Israelis.[214]

FJP leader, Saʿd al-Katātnī said that Egyptians had a historically based right to Nile water. It is Egypt's "right to defend it by any means necessary."[215] What this meant became clear on June 10 when President Mursī assured an Islamist public that he would defend Egypt's Nile water with "blood if necessary." At the same time, he pointed out that dialogue was the best option.[216]

Mursī's statement sounded severe, but Sāmiḥ Sayf al-Yazal also asserted that Egypt would do whatever it would take to defend the water from the Nile since this is Egypt's main source of water.[217]

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209 Tadros M. 2013.

210 Daragahi 2013.

211 Ibid.

212 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

213 Ahram Online 2013 (f).

214 Stack 2013.

215 Ahram Online 2013 (f).

216 El Sharnoubi 2013.

217 Interview with Sāmiḥ Sayf al-Yazal 2013

Many believed Mursī's statement came much too late since the precidency had been aware of the Ethiopean plans since 2011. That he, nevertheless, made a strong sounding public statement in June was believed to be aimed at taking attention away from the boiling unrest in the streets of those days. His statement was made just days before big protests were announced. [218]

2.8.3.7 'Brotherhoodization'

The liberal opposition to Mursī argued that he fostered a 'Brotherhoodization' of the state. Mursī's government was accused of rampant nepotism in the appointment of large numbers of Muslim Brotherhood members in governmental positions, such as ministers, governors, and senior administrators in various ministries. Islamists disputed this.

Dr. Nādiya Muṣṭafā responded that the accusation of 'Brotherhoodization' presumes that Islam is dictatorship. She pointed to the behavior of certain groups who were convinced from the beginning that any Islamist who will come to power would create a dictatorship. Nādiya Muṣṭafā said Islamists were not able to rule the country since Egypt did not have all the needed political institutions, such as a Parliament. She did not find it surprising that in such circumstances the president picked assistants and councilors from his own party.[219]

Aḥmad Kamāl agreed with Nādiya Muṣṭafā and underlined that Mursī only could secure his plan with people in place who understood this plan.[220]

Walīd al-Ḥaddād stressed that the FJP and its allies had the majority in the Parliament that was dissolved in June 2012.[221] Al-Ḥaddād said, after earlier technocrat cabinets had failed, that the FJP had to become a real ruling party, the cabinet, including the Prime Minister, needed to be formed completely by the FJP. At the time Walīd al-Ḥaddād stated this there was no FJP prime minister and there were 9 FJP ministers out of a total of 35.[222]

Mursī appointed in May 2013 seventeen governors who were all Brotherhood members or affiliated with the organization. The most controversial of these appointments was ʿĀdil Asʿad al-Khayyāṭ, a member of the Building and Development Party of the *Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, in Luxor. This stuck a nerve with many as the *Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* had committed a large-scale ter-

218 Kantor 2014.

219 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

220 Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad (a).

221 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (f).

222 Ibid.

rorist attack in Luxor in 1997 leaving 62 people, mostly tourists, dead.[223] The Minister of Tourism, Hishām Zaʿzūʿ, even threatened to resign.[224] The widespread critique to this appointment made al-Khayyāṭ hand in his resignation at the end of June.

Mursī's rule was challenged. The opposition called the approach of the Presidency and the FJP "authoritarian." Public support for the president declined and demonstrations increased. The Presidency and the FJP claimed in response that the presence of remnants of the Mubārak regime posed a serious challenge to the reform of the security apparatus and the implementation of their political plan. They argued that people needed to be instated in political places who understood the political plan.

2.8.4 After June 30, 2013

In the wake of the June 30 protests calling for Mursī to step down, supporters of Mursī took to the street to show their support for the president. Media reported numbers varying between 14 to 33 million demonstrating against Mursī. The day reminded most of the Egyptians of the early days of the 2011 Revolution.

June 30 passed with high rates of sexual harassment, 16 people killed, over 700 people wounded, as well as attacks on the Brotherhood headquarters.[225] The day after, the army issued a 48-hour ultimatum for a political "roadmap." Mursī addressed the nation in a speech on Tuesday night, July 2, 2013. It was remarkable that this speech offered a solution for the political crisis without responding to the demonstrations in the streets.

Mursī announced a new government, parliamentary elections within six months, and a committee to review proposals for constitutional amendments. He also offered a possibility for the youth to be more active in the Parliament and the status of the prosecutor general would be revised. Most of all, Mursī continued to advocate himself as the legitimate, elected president of Egypt and called on the army to withdraw their warning.[226]

Members of the Muslim Brothers and FJP wanted Mursī to complete four years in office in line with Article 133 of the 2012 Egyptian Constitution.[227]

Three days after countrywide demonstrations on June 30, 2013, Minister of Defense, General ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī, in the presence of Muḥammad al-

223 Laub 2013.

224 El-Dabh 2013.

225 Anadolu Agency 2013.

226 El Sharnoubi 2013.

227 Youssef 2012.

Barādaʿī, Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros, and the Grand Muftī of al-Azhar Aḥmad al-Ṭayyib, suspended the Constitution on national television at 9 pm on July 3, 2013. Al-Sīsī appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court, ʿAdlī Manṣūr, as interim president of Egypt.

This measure led directly to the ouster of President Mursī. He was detained in an unknown location.[228]

On November 4, 2013, Mursī stood trial against the charges of inciting violence and murder at the clashes that erupted at the presidential palace in December 2012. During his trial he firmly stated that he "is the legitimate president of the country," refusing to acknowledge the validity of his trial.[229] Mursī held on to this, also when he was sentenced to death.[230]

With the Brotherhood leadership back to prison, it became hard for them to rule over their members and other supporters.[231]

Sāmiḥ Sayf al-Yazal, said in December 2013 that the transition government had invited everybody, including the Muslim Brothers and the FJP, to participate in a political dialogue. The Muslim Brothers and FJP refused. *Salafīs*, however, were part of the dialogue and the Constituent Assembly.[232]

ʿAmr Darrāj argued that such a dialogue was not possible in the circumstances of those days: "the chairman of my party is in jail; other leaders are in jail; my people are killed in the streets. How would I go and engage with them? It is like pointing a gun at my head and tells me 'why don't we discuss?'"[233]

Most of the top leaders, including the *murshid* have been arrested. Hundreds of Muslim Brothers and Brotherhood supporters were killed during a raid by the Egyptian police on pro-Mursī sit-ins in Cairo on August 14, 2013.[234]

In November 2013, the Brotherhood announced their openness to dialogue on the condition that the crackdown on the organization would stop.[235]

Brotherhood members continued to defend Mursī as the legitimate president of Egypt and do not accept the governments that followed.[236] They re-

228 Ashraf, Spiegel and Peel 2013.

229 Eldeen, El-Tawy and Fathi 2013.

230 Hulsman 2015 (b).

231 Tarek 2013.

232 Interview with Sāmiḥ Sayf al-Yazal 2013.

233 Hulsman and Schoorel 2013.

234 Ahram Online 2013 (h).

235 Ahram Online 2013 (j).

jected for that reason participation in the 50-member committee that drafted a new Constitution.[237] Supporters of the ousted president hold on to their case: Mursī was in their view democratically elected and therefore they did not accept his removal from office and keep calling this an illegitimate coup d'état. The Brotherhood did not concede.

2.9 Conclusion

The Brotherhood is one of the oldest Islamic organizations that holds on to an Islamic based politically-active ideology. Founder Ḥasan al-Bannā wanted the Brotherhood to become an all-encompassing organization that would ultimately `Islamize´ the whole of society.

The Brotherhood developed as a strong hierarchical organization with a secretive recruitment system and a leading ideology. The organization has survived arrests, suppression and a ban since it was founded.

Participation in politics has always been a trade-off for the Brotherhood between political circumstances - i.e. the space the regime gave the Brotherhood, and internal considerations. Decades of fighting foreign oppression, opposing Egyptian regimes and arrests contributed to the initial restraint of the Brotherhood from becoming actively involved in politics.

Internally, there have been deep differences over whether to remain focused on *da ʿwa* and social work or whether the organization should participate politically even though they had always been comfortable as a religious opposition movement.

The *Tilmisānīs* (politically oriented, more reformative) and *Quṭbīs* (more conservative) differed in opinion at the beginning of the 1980s. This resulted in the formation of separate political factions.

When *murshid* Badiʿ was appointed in 2010, he was expected to take a more conservative approach. With a predominantly *Quṭbī* leadership and a hard-lined approach to Western ideologies at the start of the Revolution in 2011, the Brotherhood leadership believed it had opportunities to work towards implementing the Islamic state.

The Revolution created an environment in which the Brotherhood was no longer suppressed by the regime. For the first time, the organization was able to establish a political party and field a presidential candidate. Years of grassroots philanthropy benefitted the political campaign. Their *Nahḍa* plan, however, lacked a clear approach and solid implementation system,

236 Petricic 2013.

237 Ashraf 2013.

and neglected the changing political landscape and pluralism. Their focus was on the creation of an Islamic state without considering fellow political competitors. They insisted that their "revolutionary demands" be satisfied.

With the FJP victories in Parliament, the *Shūrā* Council and the Constituent Assembly their official slogan, "participation not domination," seemed to be forgotten. Political decisions were made quickly, leaving behind members whose support was lagging or those who did not want to be part of an organization for which *da'wa* was no longer one of the main priorities.

Each success for the FJP further encouraged further aspirations to achieve an Islamic state. The Presidential Decree of November 2012, however, cost them dearly, as the decree granted the president unrestricted powers to defend the Revolution's goals, causing fear and anger amongst Egyptians who sensed a return to authoritarian rule. Public support declined and opposition to Mursī's rule grew. Meanwhile the country was suffering high crime rates, a failing economy, sectarian tensions, and on top of it all, Mursī was accused of the 'Brotherhoodization' of the state. The Presidency and FJP blamed remnants of the Mubārak regime for challenging their rule which made them determined to appoint members of the Muslim Brotherhood in key positions since only they would understand their political plan but this just made arguments that they were attempting to Brotherhoodize the state stronger.

In this political environment the Brotherhood, the FJP, and the president came under increasing public pressure. Many Egyptians could not see the difference between the three institutions and were wondering whether it was in fact the *murshid* who was ruling Egypt. These tensions fed the plan for mass demonstrations to end Mursī's rule. The army ultimately took the side of the demonstrators and ousted President Mursī.

An interim government was installed. The Brotherhood rejected to accept the ousting of their president and invitations for dialogue.

The Brotherhood had been careful for decades and worked under the "participation, not domination" slogan under Mubārak, because of the consequences this could have for repression.

After the Egyptian Revolution, however, the Brotherhood experienced a safer political environment to participate in and obtained support from the electorate. The process to constructively `Islamize´ the society seemed to be secured.

Internally, rifts between the politically oriented *Tilmisānīs* and the more conservative and radicalized, *Quṭbīs*, together with a *Quṭbī* leadership contributed to policies that contributed to the end of the Brotherhood rule.

On top of that, Egypt faced a challenging environment in which reforms were needed while making the first steps toward democracy.

The Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization by the interim government in December 2013.[238] Members argue that throughout history the Brotherhood has proven its ability to overcome pressure by regimes and successfully reorganize.

With its deep-rooted history, strong organization, but most of all, its strong ideology, they will certainly not concede so readily.

238 Associated Press 2013.

3 Salafī Political Participation and the "Islamic Project" *(Quinta Smit)*

3.1 Introduction

The January 25 Revolution demonstrated a unity of Egyptians that remains largely unprecedented in contemporary Egyptian history. In addition, the revolution witnessed the remarkable rise of political *Salafism*. Before January 2011, Egypt's *Salafis* were a politically marginalized group, primarily concerned with teaching and spreading the word of God. After the January 25 Revolution, a previously unsurpassable political barrier dissolved and created an opportunity for *Salafis* to become politically active. Since then, Egypt has witnessed the emergence of various parties and movements that identify themselves as *Salafī*. This chapter provides a framework for the different *Salafī* parties and movements that are currently active in Egypt's political scene. It analyzes their role in the political arena and suggests that the future stability of *Salafī* political parties is not at all certain. Moreover, it concludes that *Salafī* parties are likely to continuously face challenges that may impede the successful materialization of the *Salafī* goal, namely the creation of an Islamic state governed by *Sharīʿa*, also referred to as the "Islamic Project."

The analysis provided in this chapter is based on discussions with -and opinions of - *Salafī* political participants, as well as few non-participative *Salafis* and scholars of political Islam. The chapter begins by discussing the working definitions of *Salafism* and Islamism. The intention here is to provide an analysis of the current political situation in Egypt based on how those *Salafis* active in the political scene view themselves, their position, and their future role in the political arena of Egypt. It is important to distinguish between the broader understanding of *Salafism* and the political *Salafism* that came out of the Revolution. To clarify this difference, a brief historical overview of *Salafism* in Egypt will be provided in order to describe the background from which certain *Salafis* entered the political arena. This is necessary to contextualize and to facilitate comprehension of their aims and ambitions for participating in politics.

The bulk of this chapter is devoted to two main arguments used to support the claim that the future stability of *Salafī* political parties is uncertain, thereby challenging the successful implementation of the "Islamic Project." The first argument sets out the struggle between what can be called religious *Salafism* and political *Salafism*. The difficulty of balancing the need to preserve a religiously-conservative identity while simultaneously finding ways to be politically pragmatic presents a struggle that cannot be easily

overcome and hence challenges the future stability of *Salafī* political parties. This section is broken up into four subsections in order to demonstrate when and how this struggle has taken shape. The first subsection explains how, in having become politically active, political *Salafīs* are dividing the *Salafī* masses more than uniting them. The second subsection presents the dilemma faced by *Salafī* parties in deciding on the political role of the *shaykhs*; they are important for mobilizing support, but they generally know very little about economics and politics. The third subsection discusses the implications of the *Tamarrud* (rebellion) campaign of June 30, 2013 - the massive popular uprising against former president Muḥammad Mursī, and the different ways in which parties have responded to this event. Finally, the last subsection scrutinizes the "Islamic Project" and the challenge *Salafī* parties face in trying to create an Islamic state ruled by *Sharīʿa* while simultaneously taking on a more political role, a process that requires them to make concessions and negotiations.

The second main argument suggests that the success of long-term *Salafī* political participation faces many challenges because the parties are a product of the January 25 Revolution. This section discusses the possible implications of having a support base that consists largely of revolutionaries. Moreover, it suggests that the majority of *Salafī* political parties appear to have a revolutionary mindset, in addition to a religious one, instead of a political mindset. Unless this mentality is partially amended, *Salafī* parties are likely to face difficulties in sustaining a stable position in the political arena.

In conclusion, based on the research conducted it appears as though the parties most likely to survive in the future are those with a mother organization – the religious movement from which the political party hails and that teaches and spreads the word of God. Of these, *al-Nūr* Party, the political arm of *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* (the *Salafī* Call) and currently the biggest *Salafī* party in the political arena, appears to be the most resilient to the many struggles and challenges facing *Salafī* parties. Nevertheless, even parties with a mother organization will constantly need to address and redefine the balance between political *Salafism* and religious *Salafism*. This will prove challenging because the very concept of politics stands in stark contrast with the religious purity *Salafīs* believe they should uphold.

Before diving into the rest of the chapter, some of the challenges and limitations of this study should be addressed. The still somewhat reserved nature of *Salafism* and general skepticism towards Western researchers has sometimes made it difficult to get in touch with key figures, in particular influential *shaykhs* such as Yāsir Burhāmi, Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismāʿīl, Muḥammad ʿAbd al- Maqṣūd, and Muḥammad Ismaʿīl al-Muqaddim. Muqaddim is a

unique case and explained that he did not want to be involved in politics and was therefore unwilling to be interviewed for this chapter because its focus lays solely on *Salafī* political participation.[239] The general skepticism towards Western researchers and the difficulty of getting in touch with key figures, have occasionally made it difficult to judge the verity of certain statements made by those interviewed. Nevertheless, this analysis is a result of careful consideration and numerous interviews with figures of diverging hierarchical statuses, positions, and backgrounds. It thereby hopes to overcome some of the challenges met on the way and provide a comprehensive analysis. Important to bear in mind is that the *Salafī* opinion expressed in this chapter is that of the political *Salafis* and does not necessarily represent the *Salafī* opinion in general. As this chapter is a study of political *Salafis*, the author mainly targeted those *Salafis* active on the political scene.

3.2 Defining Concepts

The term *Salafism* has a somewhat negative connotation in Western media and the intention here is to break away from the negative stereotyping to which the terms *Salafī* and Islamist often give rise. Among a signi-ficant portion of the Western public, the word *Salafī* raises images of a bearded man who is convinced that *Sharīʿa* must be implemented. In this context, *Sharīʿa* is often understood as (capital) punishment and submission of women, instead of the all-encompassing way of life, which it actually entails. These definitions are thereby not only inaccurate, but also insufficient. Understanding a *Salafī* as someone who wants to apply *Sharīʿa* does not sufficiently distinguish between *Salafis* and the Muslim Brothers or even *jihādī Salafis* in Sinai, all of whom may be equally keen to see the implementation of *Sharīʿa*.

3.2.1 Salafism

The aim here is to offer an understanding of *Salafism* in general, before expanding further on the concept of political *Salafism*. The term *Salafī* is extremely broad, which is precisely the reason it is easily misinterpreted. There are many sub-streams within *Salafism*, some of which have manifested themselves as more extreme and radical movements willing to use violent measures in order to reach their goals. Jayson Casper discusses these groups in chapter five. During an interview held on April 18, 2013 with Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ, a politically non -active *shaykh* and well-known

239 This was explained by *shaykh* Muḥammad Ismaʿīl al-Muqaddim in phone call with Cornelis Hulsman, Cairo, Egypt, December 3, 2012. This sets al-Muqaddim apart from the other *shaykhs*.

presenter on the Islamic channel, Huda TV, Ṣalāḥ explains that *Salafī* also refers to individuals of a more quietist nature, meaning those *Salafīs* who concern themselves with peaceful preaching, spreading the word of God and encouraging people to always refer to the Islamic sources: the *Qurʾān* and the correct *Ḥadīths*[240]– a collection of sayings that are attributed to Prophet Muḥammad and witnessed by his companions and the Caliphs who followed him.[241]

Salafī literally means "follower of devout ancestors," so in the broadest meaning of the word any Muslim can be called a *Salafī*. In a more limited scope however, *Salafī* refers to an individual who believes he or she should narrowly follow the example set out by Prophet Muḥammad. According to Bassām al-Zarqā, leading member of *al-Nūr* Party, "the meaning of *Salafism* is one of transparency. [...] *Salafism* is the fundamental principles that Prophet Muḥammad said and gave to his close friends, which they passed on until it reached us."[242] It is believed that the first few generations immediately following Prophet Muḥammad were most informed of how the Prophet lived and it is their example that *Salafīs* aim to follow. A *Salafī* thus believes in the need to return to the Islamic faith, as it existed at the time of the Prophet and the first generations of followers.[243] Nādiya Muṣṭafā, an expert on political Islam and International Relations, says *Salafīs* are called fundamentalists because they believe the doctrine should be solidified in a strict way.[244] In turn, Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ understands *Salafism* as a movement that was initiated "to put people back on the track of monotheism."[245]

All *Salafīs* believe in the unity of all Muslims, sometimes referred to as the *umma*. Additionally, *Salafīs* believe in the creation of an Islamic empire governed by *Sharīʿa* in order to unite all Muslims. Although quietist *Salafīs* believe in the implementation of *Sharīʿa*, they maintain that society must be prepared first.[246] This means that *Salafīs* are concerned with reforming the individual in order to create a society that accepts *Sharīʿa*. In other words, they believe a bottom-up approach will lead to the gradual implementation of *Sharīʿa* and thereby ultimately to the creation of an Islamic empire. This is what sets the quietest *Salafīs* apart from the *jihādī-Salafīs*, who maintain

240 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

241 Akyol 2011, 100.

242 Smit 2013 (a).

243 Brown 2011, 3.

244 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

245 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (f).

246 Brown 2011, 4.

that the gradual implementation of *Sharīʿa* is a betrayal of Islam,[247] and even from the Muslim Brothers, who want to change society from the top.[248]

The strict adherence to Islamic sources lies at the core of *Salafī* teaching. Important to mention however, is that there are *Salafīs* who do not always rigidly apply these teachings in practice. Additionally, there is a tendency to select specific sources to adhere to in order to justify a specific action or claim. The *Ḥadīths* for example, are oral traditions documented in later years that are susceptible to fabrication and certain *Ḥadīths* have, for that reason, led to endless debate about their authenticity.[249] Although the *Ḥadīths* help understand the *Qurʾān* and are considered important historical references, there are *Ḥadīths* that have become a religiously authoritative ruling but that actually have no mention in the *Qurʾān*. Examples are the stoning of adulterers and certain social limitations on women.[250] Since *Salafīs* place *Ḥadīths* above human reasoning, quietist *Salafī shaykhs* can issue a *fatwā* whose religious credibility rests on a *Ḥadīth* that may, or may not be, authentic,[251] but which may nevertheless be implemented.[252] The general lack of control over who implements what *fatwās* and for what reason has at times blurred the boundaries between quietist *Salafism* and *jihādī Salafism* and should therefore be noted as an important critique of *Salafism*.[253]

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247 See chapter 5 'Non-political Islamists: the *Salafī* Jīhādis and the situation in Sinai'.

248 Casper 2013 (a).

249 Akyol 2011, 101.

250 Ibid, 103.

251 In June 2013, prominent *Salafī shaykh* ʿAbd al-Maqṣūd called on people to support the revolution in Syria and to attack anyone who denigrates the followers of Prophet Muhammad. According to many, al-Maqṣūd's speech was directed at Shiʿite Muslims and days later, four Shiʿites, including a prominent *shaykh*, were murdered. The way in which this particular *fatwā* was interpreted or implemented suggests the ease with which the boundaries between quietist *Salafīs* and *jihādī salafīs* can be blurred. For more information see Hulsman (ed.) 2013 (a).

252 Jerome Drevon, in 2013 a Ph.D. candidate studying the evolution of Islamist armed groups, also mentions the blurring of this line in reference to the conflict in Syria. Quietist *Salafīs* can issue *fatwās* that they must support their Muslim brothers in Syria, but they do not control how this is interpreted, who goes to Syria and what tactics are used to support their Muslim brothers. The war in Syria has seen a surge of *jihādī salafīs* from all over the world who follow the *fatwās* of *shaykhs* who claim that it is a religious duty to fight against the Syrian regime. Drevon 2013.

253 Brown 2011, 5.

3.2.2 Islamism

Salafis are often called Islamists, another term that has triggered endless debate and often brings together diverse groups under one banner. Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ, for example, explains how "the main stream [of Islam] encompasses the Muslim Brotherhood, the *Salafis*, the *Tablīghīs*, [who] are all considered Islamists."[254] This section briefly details how different *Salafi* political actors define Islamism and whether they identify as Islamist. Such a discussion will deepen the understanding of the term Islamism and perhaps do away with some of the misconceptions surrounding it.

The majority of political *Salafis* interviewed define Islamists as those Muslims who are religiously committed and who consider it their responsibility to work towards the unification of all Muslims believing that this unity will result in an Islamic empire.[255] Political Islam scholar Nādiya Muṣṭafā clarifies this statement a little more by explaining that political *Salafis* view this responsibility as all encompassing, referring to social, religious, spiritual or political duty.[256] A former member of the *Ḥizb al-Waṭan* (The Homeland Party), who later left politics all together, maintains that the label 'Islamist' is purely a Western construction and a label used by the media. He explains that these so-called 'Islamists' are individuals who identify themselves simply as Muslim or as someone who supports the idea that Islam is part of daily life - including politics - and whose culture comes from Islam.[257] Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ supports this line of reasoning by explaining how "Islamic thought and Islamic teachings evolve around one thing, good manners, [and] if somebody observes them, then he is a religiously committed person, something [the West] likes to call an Islamist."[258] He continues by stating that there is in fact "no Muslim who is an Islamist and no Muslim who is not an Islamist; there is a Muslim who is a practicing Muslim and a Muslim who is negligent of his religious duties."[259]

Those labeled as Islamists in the current political arena in Egypt believe in the "Islamic Project," a term that also needs further clarification. The "Islamic Project" is aimed at realizing the implementation of *Sharīʿa* and the creation of an Islamic state. Although the *umma* lies at the core of *Salafism*, and subsequently the "Islamist Project," it appears to be a conceptual idea rather than a realistic goal that can be achieved in the near future. Discuss-

254 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

255 Smit 2013 (a); Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

256 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

257 Smit 2013 (d).

258 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

259 Ibid.

ing the extent to which Muslims worldwide are being united is thus beyond the scope of this chapter. When it is argued that successful implementation of the "Islamic Project" faces many challenges, the implementation of *Sharīʿa* and the creation of an Islamic state are considered within the confines of Egypt only.

3.3 History and the January 25 Revolution: Becoming Politically Active

3.3.1 Before the January 25 Revolution

As mentioned above, most *Salafīs* believe in religiously reforming the individual according to the teachings of Prophet Muḥammad through strict adherence to Islamic sources. Most quietist *Salafīs* believe in individual transformation rather than societal transformation by political means.[260] For this reason, they have historically refrained from political participation and *Salafism* has manifested itself in movements such as the *Jamāʿat Anṣār al-Sunna* (Assembly of the Helpers of *Sunna*) or *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya*, both of which were concerned with teaching religion and later also with assisting the poor by acting as large non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Since 1952, former regimes under Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, Anwar al-Sādāt, and Ḥusnī Mubārak, respectively, accepted this for two main reasons: first, in allowing *Salafī* movements to teach people about the pure form of Islam and to support the poor through charity work, the risk of an uprising from the poor was somewhat subdued; second, former President Mubārak in particular, used the quietest *Salafīs* to counter the more extremist Islamist movements, such as the Islamic *Jihād* or the then outlawed, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, two violent movements that aimed to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state.[261] Moreover, because quietist *Salafīs* believe they should not rise up against a Muslim leader, these former regimes were inclined to allow them to practice their religion more freely.[262]

Nevertheless, many of the political *Salafīs* interviewed explain how despite these freedoms, *Salafīs* were treated as second-class citizens; they were limited in their mobility and they were not admitted to the army, the police, the judicial system, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other high-ranking, politically sensitive governmental positions.[263] In the words of Khālid

260 Jung 2012.

261 Smit 2013 (d).

262 Brown 2011, 5.

263 Smit 2013 (d); Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Casper 2013; Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

Manṣūr, founding member and spokesperson of *Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ* (Egyptian Reform Party), "[*Salafīs*] faced the tyranny of the old regimes, from 30 years ago."[264]Many *Salafīs* were subjected to arbitrary arrests and imprisonment and according to a former member of the *Salafī al-Waṭan* Party, Mubārak's regime did not sufficiently differentiate between devout Muslims who were peaceful and successful in their work and *jihādī Salafīs* with possible relations to terrorism.[265] The easily blurred boundaries between quietist *Salafīs* and *jihādī Salafīs* could easily be manipulated by former regimes and was used to limit the movement of *Salafīs* in general.

The first *Salafī* association, *Anṣār al-Sunna*, was founded in 1926 and never tried to create a mass movement. It was only under Anwar al-Sādāt in the late 1970s, when *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya* was founded in Alexandria, that there was a *Salafī* movement that presented itself not only as a religious organization, but also as a larger social phenomenon.[266] A growing number of students who had received the *shaykhs'* teachings in Alexandria returned to their hometowns and spread the message of *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya,* which soon grew to be the most organized *Salafī* movement and provided religious teachings and social services in different neighborhoods around the country.[267]

Khālid Manṣūr explains that although *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya* may currently have a significant number of *Salafī* followers, it still only represents a portion of Egypt's *Salafīs*.[268] This is because *Salafīs* follow the teachings and sermons of a particular *shaykh*, or scholar. The more acclaimed or charismatic the *shaykh*, the more followers he is likely to have. For *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya* this means that individual *shaykhs* are affiliated to the movement and are in turn followed by their students or other individuals who trust and respect that particular *shaykh*. *Salafīs* do not believe in hierarchy or an organized movement that they must obey[269] and they therefore do not rigidly follow *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya* as an organization. As a result, *Salafism* has never manifested itself as a centralized, hierarchical, and united movement and has for that reason never resembled anything close to the organized movement of the Muslim Brotherhood.

264 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

265 Smit 2013 (d).

266 Lacroix 2012, 2.

267 Ibid.

268 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

269 Brown 2011, 4.

3.3.2 The Salafī Shaykhs and the January 25 Revolution

Before moving on to this next section, a brief description of the concept of *shaykhs* is required. *Shaykhs*, or Islamic scholars, are an important concept in Islam in general, but are particularly relevant in *Salafism* since the movement exists around the teachings of individual scholars and preachers who are referred to as *shaykhs*. Some *shaykhs* were educated at al-Azhar University, most notably Yāsir Burhāmi, whereas others are more influenced by Saudi scholars.[270] *Shaykhs* have studied the Islamic sources and are considered an authority when it comes to determining what Islam does and does not permit. As a result, *shaykhs* stand central to *Salafism*.

As mentioned above, before the January 25 Revolution, *Salafis* were absent from the political scene in Egypt. The choice to refrain from political participation appeared to be a unanimous *Salafi* decision. Nevertheless, there was a division among *shaykhs*. Some believed it was religiously impermissible, and thus *ḥarām*, to be politically active. Most notable were *Shaykh* Yāsir Burhāmi - who was very vocal in condemning elections and democratic institutions for being anti-Islamic[271] - and *shaykh* Muḥammad Ismaʿīl al-Muqaddim, who rejected democracy because he claimed it turned people into gods.[272]

At the same time however, there were *shaykhs* who simply said political participation would require working with an oppressive regime and ultimately would not change anything and should thus be avoided. An example is *shaykh* Abū Ishāq al-Ḥiwīnī, who stated that politics was a government scheme to draw power away from Islamic movements.[273] Moreover, according to *shaykh* Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ, "[*Salafi* political] participation was zero because they (…) did not believe in the Machiavellian slogan, which is that goals justify the means." He explains that the pre-Revolution ideology adhered to the belief that "Islam says: if you cannot change the evil, then at least you have to dismiss it."

During a June 18, 2013 interview, Bassām al-Zarqā of *al-Nūr* Party explains:

> When we used to work in pre-revolutionary Egypt we refused to join the electoral process for three reasons: One, we had to let go of a lot of principles; two, in the end we were not getting anything in return; three, we can find no improvement. The only improvement was decorating Mubārak's dictatorship, and being part of the im-

270 Ibid, 4-6.

271 Wright 2012, 46.

272 Ibid, 46.

273 Ibid, 46.

aginative décor of how the system works, so we refused to join the electoral process before the revolution.[274]

Clearly, *shaykhs* in this camp believed that political participation was not necessarily *ḥarām*, but that *Salafīs* should not be part of an oppressive regime that they were incapable of changing.[275]

After the January 25 Revolution, there is a shift in opinion. Many of the *shaykhs*, who had considered political participation futile, but not *ḥarām*, quickly embraced the protests and once it became clear that Mubārak's regime would fall, they called for *Salafī* political participation.[276] *Shaykh* ʿAbd al-Maqṣūd for example, was one of the first prominent *shaykhs* to support the Revolution.[277] A former member of *al-Waṭan* Party and Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ explain some of the shifts that occurred: some of the *shaykhs* in the first camp, in particular Yāsir Burhāmi, who previously considered political participation *ḥarām*, now states that *Salafī* political participation is required in order to reach their goals.[278] Bassām al-Zarqā, who had always been interested in politics already,[279] was one of those who followed the new vision of *shaykh* Burhāmi:

> There was a group that had a political interests within *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* and they were excited for founding a party. Some of them were not enthusiastic about this, but in every change there is always a group that leads the way.[280]

Other *shaykhs* however, such as al-Muqaddim and Muḥammad Ḥasan adhere to their old beliefs and want nothing to do with politics. Some *shaykhs* maintain that it is religiously impermissible to rebel against a Muslim ruler and that the January 25 Revolution makes demands that are unrelated to religion.[281]

The fluctuating positions on democracy and political participation resulted in a conflict among the more senior *Salafī* figures in Egypt. This conflict created a division among the *Salafī* masses and some *Salafīs* joined the Revo-

274 Smit 2013 (a).

275 Smit 2013 (a); Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

276 Brown 2011, 6.

277 Lacroix 2012, 2.

278 Smit 2013 (a).

279 Smit 2013 (a).

280 Ibid.

281 Smit 2013 (d).

lution and supported the formation of *Salafī* political parties, whereas others upheld their belief that they should not be politically active.[282]

Despite this division, we have seen the appearance of numerous *Salafī* political groups and movementssince the January 25 Revolution. The rest of the chapter will limit its discussion to those parties that are officially registered, have a significant outreach, or are abundantly present in the Egyptian media. These parties are *al-Nūr* Party, the political branch of *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* of which *shaykh* Yāsser Burhāmi is one of the most senior figures; *al-Waṭan* Party, which split from *al-Nūr* Party; *al-Aṣāla* Party, which is led by a group of well-known *shaykhs* of which ʿAbd ʿAbd al-Maqṣūd is the most well-known; *Ḥizb al-Faḍīla* (Virtue Party), a small independent party with no mother organization; *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party, the political branch of *al-Tayyār al-Salafī* (the *Salafī* Current); *Ḥizb al-Rāya* (the Flag Party), founded by the popular *shaykh* Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismāʿīl; and *Ḥizb al-Shaʿb* (the People's Party), the political arm of *al-Jabha al-Salafiyya* (the *Salafī* Front), a young *Salafī* movement founded during the January 25 Revolution.[283]

3.3.3 The Ideological Agenda of Salafī Parties

Ideologically, there is little difference between the various *Salafī* parties. *Salafīs* believe in an Islamic state in which the rules of *Sharīʿa* govern all aspects of life. This has led to heated arguments with the more liberal and secular segments of Egyptian society, particularly where it concerns the rights of minorities and women.

Sharīʿa only recognizes the three Abrahamic religions - Islam, Christianity, and Judaism - and under *Sharīʿa* law, Christians and Jews can follow their own personal status law. Although all *Salafī* parties unanimously agree that Christians have the same rights as Muslims, they maintain that the president of Egypt can only ever be a Muslim.[284] According to Maḥmūd Fatḥī, party leader of *al-Faḍīla* Party, and Nādir Bakkār, spokesperson of *al-Nūr* Party, the situation for Christians is safer under an Islamic state than it is within the current situation.[285] When asking about Christian members however, it quickly became apparent that most *Salafī* parties do not actually have any active Christian members who support their call for an Islamic

282 Casper 2013 (a).

283 For an overview of the political agendas of each of these parties please see http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/category/political-parties.

284 Smit, 2013 (c); Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

285 Smit, 2013 (c); Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013; Shalaby 2013.

state.[286] Bassām al-Zarqā from *al-Nūr* Party, states that ten percent of Christians in Southern Egypt would be likely to give their vote to *al-Nūr* Party, but this is difficult to verify.[287] Nevertheless, to simply ignore such statements or consider them refutable would be wrong, too. In some places around Egypt, for example in Qufādah, al-Minyā, in Upper Egypt, it is common to see Muslims and Christians living closely alongside each other. In this particular village, a Christian priest actively campaigned for a *Salafī shaykh* and member of *al-Nūr* Party running for Parliament during the 2012 parliamentary elections. This decision however, was based on personal relations between the priest and the *shaykh* and not on the priest's support for *al-Nūr* ideology.[288] As a result, statements made by *Salafī* politicians regarding active Christian support for the creation of an Islamic state are almost impossible to sub-stantiate.

Egypt has other minorities as well, including Bahā'īs and Shīʿīs, both of whom are not permitted to practice their religion under the Islamic law as understood by the *Salafīs*. *Salafīs* believe that Shiʿite Islam is not the correct form of Islam and its practice should therefore not be permitted. Both Fatḥī and Bakkār emphasize that any minority group practicing a religion other than *Sunnī* Islam, Christianity, or Judaism will be protected equally as Egyptians, but will not have the same rights because their religion is not recognized under the *Salafī* understanding of Islamic law.[289]

Salafī parties are known for their conservative stance on women as well. According to Fatḥī, the protection and well-being of the woman is of utmost importance and hence there are certain limitations to what she is and is not permitted to do.[290] For example, a woman is not allowed to travel abroad unless a male member of the family accompanies her. "The goal here is the protection and the well being of the woman more than anything, not her restrictions."[291] However, this inevitably limits her opportunities in comparison to that of men. Fatḥī explains how *al-Faḍīla* Party has female members listed for parliamentary elections since qualifications are more important than gender. In fact, they can run for any seat, but not for the presidential seat. Fatḥī explains that during the days of the Prophet, he had

286 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013; Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Casper 2013; Shalaby 2013.

287 Smit 2013 (a).

288 Hulsman 2012 (d).

289 Smit 2013 (c); Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

290 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

291 Ibid.

said, "no society will succeed being ruled by a woman."[292] He continues by explaining the existence of a scholarly opinion, which stipulates "that the woman has a level of emotions that guides and governs the female, which is also present in the sentimental or emotional man, who is similarly not allowed to run for president."[293] So, although most *Salafī* parties have female members, there are no *Salafī* parties with high-ranking female members. *Al-Nūr* Party leader, Yūnis Makhiyyūn, for example, explains that female candidates are not allowed in the top third of the list because it would increase their chance of election.[294]

Salafīs believe that sovereignty lies with God and not with the people. And, as Fatḥī rationalizes, since *Sharīʿa* is derived from the word of God, "the *Sharīʿa* should not be a part of the constitution; it should stand above the constitution."[295] Fatḥī hereby explains that the stance of *Salafī* parties on women's rights for example, is not a political opinion, but a religious rule that all of society must obey if Egypt is to be an Islamic state.[296] The implications of this strict adherence to *Sharīʿa* and the position *Salafī* parties believe *Sharīʿa* should hold in terms of the Constitution will be further discussed in section 3.4.6.1.

The rest of this chapter will focus on and scrutinize the actions and positions of the *Salafī* parties in the political playing field of Egypt in order to assert that the future stability of *Salafī* political parties is fragile and that they face challenges that may impede the successful implementation of the "Islamic Project."

3.4 Tension Between Political and Religious Salafīsm

Politics is a dirty business and we are not dirty people.[297]

There is a tension between religious *Salafism* and political *Salafism* that needs to be resolved in the future if parties want to maintain a stable position in the political playing field. The struggle has appeared on numerous occasions and is a result of parties searching for ways to be politically pragmatic while simultaneously maintaining a religiously conservative identity. This section makes four sub-arguments in order to demonstrate the apparent struggle between religious *Salafism* and political *Sala-fism*. The

292 Ibid.

293 Ibid.

294 Shalaby 2013.

295 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

296 Ibid.

297 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

first argument centers on the notion that political participation is unlikely to generate a united *Salafī* movement.

3.4.1 No United Salafī Movement

Since the January 25 Revolution, the political arena of Egypt has witnessed the rise of several *Salafī* parties, all of which must compete with each other in order to guarantee their future position in the political playing field. By nature, politics is a divisive and competitive game. One of the reasons that *Salafīs* were not politically active and did not accept democratic structures before the January 25 Revolution was their belief that a multi-party system would go against the idea of unity preached by Islam. Because of the competitive nature of the political system into which the *Salafīs* have been absorbed, disputes have arisen both between and within *Salafī* parties. On certain occasions these disputes had led to the fragmentation of parties. This occurred early for *al-Aṣāla* Party which split from *al-Faḍīla* Party in July 2011 as a result of managerial and administrative differences.[298] Similarly, in January 2013, *al-Waṭan* Party separated from *al-Nūr* Party because, as explained by a former member of *al-Waṭan* Party, they disagreed over the way *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya* continued to hold over the day-to-day functioning of the party.[299] In turn, within *al-Waṭan* Party there had allegedly been massive resignations as a result of further internal differences and divisions causing additional fragmentation.[300]

The fragmentation and division of politically active *Salafīs* is apparent elsewhere, too. Although there is still a significant amount of cooperation between the different *Salafī* parties, there appeared to be a deepening rift between *al-Nūr* Party on the one side, and the remaining *Salafī* political parties on the other side. This further discouraged the formation of a united *Salafī* front. The clear division in cooperation can be seen as a result of certain political decisions taken by *al-Nūr* Party. According to most of the *Salafī* political parties, and as expressed in particular by Ihāb Shīḥa, *al-Aṣāla* Party leader, Khālid Manṣūr of *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party and Maḥmūd Fatḥī of *al-Faḍīla* Party, *al-Nūr* Party's early decision (which was later revised) to cooperate with the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, despite a belief among the *Salafī* parties that the Muslim Brotherhood was sacrificing part of their Islamic identity for the sake of ruling, is among the main causes for the rift in cooperation between them and *al-Nūr* Par-

298 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

299 Smit 2013 (d).

300 Ahram Online 2013 (f).

ty.[301] Fatḥī, for example, described the FJP as "pragmatic"[302] and opposed it for four main reasons:

> one, their way of dealing with the previous regime on a transformational basis [...], rather than a revolutionary basis; two, their way of maintaining the previous corrupt system in place as it was under the Mubārak regime; three, their way of maintaining the international political domain in the same way that it used to be dealt with [...]; four, [how] they are consumed by the day to day issues of running the country rather than focusing on the objectives that the country should be built on.[303]

In initially allying with the ruling FJP, *al-Nūr* Party had chosen a path of political pragmatism. The party was looking for ways to set itself apart from other parties in order to gain that competitive advantage that it thinks would win the party a larger support base. As such, the decision to ally with the ruling Islamist party suggests *al-Nūr* Party was looking for ways to strengthen its political position. Shīhā describes *al-Nūr* Party and the FJP as "operating on that dictatorial type of leadership role,"[304] enabled because of the large support base provided by *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* and the Muslim Brotherhood, respectively. He explains how despite the effectiveness of being able "to get their people to just obey the instructions they were given, [...] at this stage [it] is not really appropriate for [...] the country to be built on the direction of a group that has closed in upon itself."[305]

Al-Nūr Party is not the only *Salafī* party capable of demonstrating political pragmatism. After its split with *al-Nūr* Party, *al-Waṭan* Party adopted a more moderate discourse and distanced itself more from persuasive *shaykhs* influencing party policies in order to set itself apart from *al-Nūr* Party and other *Salafī* parties. *Al-Waṭan* Party allows Christian members and female members to run for Parliament and promotes the party's open approach to anyone who is qualified and supports the "Islamic Project."[306] The party's insistence on a centrist approach based on inclusion rather than exclusion demonstrates the pragmatic approach adopted by *al-Waṭan* Party. Additionally, the party leader, ʿImād ʿAbd al-Ghafūr, had obtained his position as presidential advisor to Muḥammad Mursī as a result of the party's cooperation with the FJP. Being a new party on the political scene, *al-Waṭan* Par-

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301 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Casper 2013; Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h, i).

302 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h).

303 Ibid.

304 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Casper 2013.

305 Ibid.

306 Smit 2013 (d); Azab and Senegri 2013.

ty did not want to lose the support of the FJP and chose a path of cooperation. Although *al-Waṭan* Party was vocal in stating its disagreement with the FJP, politically it was willing to negotiate with the ruling party at that time.[307] The separation between *al-Waṭan* Party and *al-Nūr* Party is apparent, but unlike the other *Salafī* parties, it is not because *al-Waṭan* Party rejects the political pragmatism. In fact, the pragmatism practiced and embraced by both *al-Nūr* and *al-Waṭan* is what sets these two parties apart from the other *Salafī* parties.

This rift between *al-Nūr* Party and the other *Salafī* parties is significant. *Al-Nūr* Party is the biggest *Salafī* party in Egypt, primarily because it benefits from *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya*'s long history and organized structure: "they have the people on the streets [...], which is why they can win seats in parliament," explains Khālid Manṣūr from *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party.[308] Nevertheless, Manṣūr also claims that *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* only represents about 30 percent of Egypt's *Salafīs* and believes that *Salafīs* are increasingly reaching out to parties other than *al-Nūr*.[309] This suggests that the existence of so many different parties encourages a division among Egypt's *Salafīs*. *Salafī* followers must decide what party they will follow and are forced to decide whether they will support a more pragmatic *Salafī* party, such as *al-Nūr* or *al-Waṭan*, or a more radical one, such as *al-Shaʿb* Party or *al-Rāya*, two parties that are particularly unwilling to compromise with any actor that does not share its vision and which have for this reason taken many young and radical *Salafī* followers with them.[310]

Many of the *Salafī* politicians interviewed agree that there might not be a united *Salafī* movement at that time, but that this is sure to come in the future.[311] Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ explained the lack of *Salafī* political experience by comparing *Salafīs* to members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who "have been in politics since before they were born: (...) they were breastfed politics."[312] The *Salafīs* however, have only recently emerged on the political scene and their general lack of political experience means that there has been little to no chance for them to manifest themselves politically and for political parties to comfortably maneuver their way around the political playing field. It

307 Shukrallah 2013 (a).

308 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

309 Ibid.

310 Rubin 2013.

311 Smit 2013 (d); Smit and Casper 2013.

312 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

is generally assumed that it will take some time for a single, well-grounded political party to be established behind which all *Salafis* can unite.[313]

The majority of *Salafis* who are now politically active have not had any significant kind of political exposure before. They have only recently started communicating on a political level and it is likely that some parties will dissolve while others will unite.

Nevertheless, there appears to be little strength gained from having x number of *Salafi* parties that all have the same official objective, but who all criticize each other for either not having the correct administrative procedures, or for not having a clear vision, even when they all have an almost identical vision.[314]

Ideologically, there is not much difference between the various parties, which would imply that the parties could certainly merge or grow towards each other in the future. Structurally, managerially, and administratively however, differences are paramount and in the first two years of *Salafi* political participation, the trend has been one of division rather than unity. This suggests that the pragmatic decision to participate in an inherently fractured political landscape actually contradicts with the religious conviction of *Salafis*. A tension thus exists between religious *Salafism* and political *Salafism*, which may challenge the successful implementation of the "Islamic Project."

3.4.2 Dilemma with the Shaykhs

The struggle between religious *Salafism* and political *Salafism* also appears in deciding on whether *shaykhs* should play a role in *Salafi* political parties. The question of whether to break from the *shaykhs* is extremely complex precisely because *shaykhs* play such an important role in Egyptian society and are highly respected and closely followed by pious *Salafis* throughout the country. The dilemma that *Salafi* political parties are likely to face is as follows: *shaykhs* are needed for religious credibility, raising funds, and community projects. In short, *shaykhs* are needed to mobilize support among a Muslim constituency. Simultaneously how-ever, *shaykhs* know very little about the day-to-day management of a country and are generally concerned with spreading and teaching the word of God only. This means that religious movements or influential independent *shaykhs* may prevent the party from truly embracing politics when and if this contradicts with their religious convictions.

313 Ibid.

314 Drevon 2013.

There appears to be a divide between those parties that have attempted to break political ties with *shaykhs* and those parties that are closely affiliated with either a mother organization or influential independent *shaykhs*. According to *al-Faḍīla* Party leader Maḥmūd Fatḥī, *al-Nūr* Party, *al-Aṣāla*, and *al-Sha'b* Party are parties whose agendas are largely influenced, if not determined, by prominent *shaykhs*. *Al-Aṣāla* Party leader Shīhā, however, claims that his party "tried to get away from the domi-nance of the *shaykhs* so [they] have a greater amount of flexibility in the way [they] operate because [they] can take [their] own decisions."[315] However, despite this being the leadership vision, the party is, practically speaking, still very much dependent on influential *shaykhs*, a point that will be further developed below.

Al-Waṭan Party has distanced itself a little from the influence of the *shaykhs*, this also being one of the reasons they have separated from *al-Nūr* Party. *Al-Iṣlāḥ* has also distanced itself somewhat from *shaykhs*, however, as explained by Manṣūr himself, and as emphasised by Fatḥī, in being the political arm of *al-Tayyār al-Salafī* it is unlikely that *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party can be completely separated from their *shaykhs*.[316] As a result, Fatḥī maintains that *al-Faḍīla* is the only party that is completely separated from *shaykhs*.[317]

3.4.3 Mobilizing Support

Let us first look at one side of the dilemma, namely why *shaykhs* are important for mobilizing support. The mobility of *Salafīs* had been restricted for decades; they were largely absent from the higher echelons of society and until the January 25 Revolution they had never participated in Egypt's political arena. According to Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ, an inevitable consequence of this is that ordinary *Salafīs* rely more on the people they trust, in other words the *shaykh* they have followed for years, rather than on people with (political) qualifications.[318]

This belief is supported by testimonies from 'Iṣṣām al-Sharīf- responsible for representing *al-Aṣāla* Party in Warrāq, Cairo - and Hānī Fawzī, a leading *al-Aṣāla* Party member responsible for public relations. They both assert that people listen to *shaykhs* and follow their advice about what party to support. Al-Sharīf explains how

> Administratively [the *shaykh*] has no relation with the party, but realistically he is the party. And the party was made because of him and for him. [...] [Administratively they], don't have to agree with

315 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Casper 2013.

316 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h); Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

317 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Casper 2013.

318 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

> what he says, but this won't happen because of the spiritual commitment.[319]

In support of this view, Fawzī offers the following explanation:

> [A person] will listen to the shaykh's words. If the shaykh says that Aṣālah is a good party and he should help support the party and help them grow, that person will obey. The shaykh always says the right thing, so it offers comfort. That's the point. But if the shaykh says that he must go to the Freedom and Justice Party, then he will go to the FJP because he is convinced by everything the shaykh says.[320]

As an inevitable result, the preaching of prominent *shaykhs* with known ties to *al-Aṣāla*, including for example Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Maqṣūd, had also increased the party's membership.[321] A small party such as *al-Aṣāla* has not been in existence for a significant amount of time. Moreover, it does not have a mother organization and has not had time to develop its own religious references and leaders. It is a small party that has no real outreach on its own. Moreover, Shīhā explains that they will not change the law or bring forward a new law until they feel that the Egyptian citizen is ready to accept it. "Hence [they] ask the *shaykhs* to help the people love *Sharīʿa*."[322] Although on a political level, *al-Aṣāla* may be trying to move away from *shaykhs*. ʿAbd al-Maqṣūd, for example, the party will remain dependent on him for helping prepare society in accepting the party and thereby expanding its support base.

Khālid Manṣūr, leading member of *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party, also explains the importance of *shaykhs* for spreading the party's message, directing people to the party, and for collecting money.[323] A membership fee has to be paid by anyone who joins the party and thus by encouraging people to join *al-Iṣlāḥ*, for example, *shaykhs* automatically help the party raise money. Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ believes that *Salafī* political participation has changed the role of the *shaykh* because "in the past [he] was 100% preoccupied with the reform of the person, the soul, the mind, the society, the individual or the family, but nowadays, willingly or unwillingly, even in [his] speeches [he] finds [himself] swerving towards politics right and left."[324]

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319 Smit and Casper 2013.

320 Smit 2013 (b).

321 Smit 2013 (b); Smit and Casper 2013.

322 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Casper 2013.

323 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

324 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

Al-Faḍīla Party is not the political offshoot of any *Salafī* movement or a larger mother organization. Moreover, it does not closely associate itself to any particularly influential *shaykh*. Although this a deliberate decision, perhaps to differentiate itself from the other *Salafī* parties, the inevitable consequence is that *al-Faḍīla* is one of the smallest *Salafī* parties active on the political scene. According to Nādir Bakkār, *al-Faḍīla* is "a one-person party" that cannot even be considered.[325]

In contrast, *al-Nūr* Party's immediate electoral success in the 2012 parliamentary elections gives an indication as to how important *shaykhs* are for mobilizing support. *Salafīs* across Egypt have known *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* for decades. By using the name of *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya*, *al-Nūr* Party has tried to tell people that every step they take is judged according to Islamic principles and *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* thereby provides *al-Nūr* Party with the religious credibility it needs to garner support among conservative Egyptians. During the 2012 parliamentary elections, *al-Nūr* Party was in an alliance with *al-Aṣāla* and the Building and Development Party, the political branch of *Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. 85 percent of the joint candidates came from *al-Nūr* Party [326] and it can thus be assumed that the majority of votes collected were for *al-Nūr* Party, rather than for *al-Aṣāla* and the Building and Development Party. At the time of elections, it was still too early to predict how such a new party would manifest itself on the political scene, but the party still won 24 percent of the seats in Parliament and 25 percent of the seats in the *Shūrā* Council, unprecedented for a recently established political party.[327] This suggests that *al-Nūr* Party already had a large *Salafī* constituency, regardless of what the party's political role would become. It can thus be argued that people voted for the *shaykhs* affiliated to *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya*, who they were likely to have known for years, rather than for what they thought to be a qualified political party.

3.4.4 Shaykhs' Limited Knowledge of Economics and Politics

On the other side of the dilemma is the realization that *shaykhs* are likely to have very limited knowledge of economics and politics. Although Islam broadly outlines how one should live their life morally and ethically, it says very little about how society functions on an economic and political level. Despite this limitation, *shaykhs* play a significant role in the decision-

325 Smit 2013 (c).

326 Jung 2012, 2.

327 Carnegie Endowments for International Peace 2012.

making process of the majority of *Salafī* political parties thereby framing politics through an Islamic legal and theoretical lens.[328]

Shaykhs have always consulted Islamic sources when they are asked about the religious legality of any decision. In being politically active, economic and political decisions often need to be made for which there may not be a religious reference stipulating its permissibility. When this arises, *ijtihād*, or independent reasoning, is applied, which allows comparisons to be made to other precedents and rationality to be used to determine whether something is religiously permissible or not.[329] *Shaykhs* can have different opinions on this since there is room for personal interpretation and for judgment according to their own reasoning, a process influenced by culture, history, or education. An example where this gave rise to conflict was in February 2012, during the debate about whether Egypt should accept an IMF loan in order to help lift the country out of immediate economic crisis.[330] Some *shaykhs* maintained that it was religiously impermissible because of the interest that had to be paid over the loan, something that is forbidden under Islamic law. Other *shaykhs* however, maintained that Egypt's detrimental economic circumstances and the lack of alternative options made it an exceptional situation and therefore considered the loan religiously permissible.[331]

This suggests that *shaykhs* are prone to saying different things when it comes to matters that have no or little religious reference. In having become politically active, the likelihood of this occurring on a regular basis has increased significantly precisely because politics is performed in the context of a modern nation-state, which did not yet exist at the time in which the religious references were written. This suggests that *ijtihād* will have to be applied on a regular basis, increasing the chances for tension that may arise in deciding whether to base a decision on its political or economic necessity or on the basis of its religious permissibility. So on the one hand, a close relationship with *shaykhs* is indispensable for mobilization, while on the other hand their general lack of political and economic know-how and their tendency to base decisions on what is stipulated in the religious sources may ultimately damage the party's position in the political arena.

328 Smit 2013 (d); Smit 2013 (a); Smit 2013 (c).

329 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

330 Perry 2013.

331 Smit 2013 (d); Perry 2013; Rubin 2013.

3.4.5 June 30 and the Struggle Between Political Pragmatism and Religious Purity

The struggle in finding a balance between being politically pragmatic while simultaneously upholding an identity based on religious purity is clearly visible when analyzing the massive popular uprising of June 30, 2013 and its immediate aftermath. The event demonstrates how parties felt forced to choose between politics and religion. *Al-Nūr* Party opted for tipping the balance in favor of political pragmatism and remaining neutral at first, while later clearly taking the side of the interim regime. The other *Salafī* parties however, chose to protect their religiously- conservative identity by emphasizing their commitment to their ideological goal - implementation of the "Islamic Project" – and supporting the Islamist president and the Muslim Brotherhood. The consequences of both decisions are discussed below and once again suggest that *Salafī* parties face a significant challenge in overcoming the tension created by this struggle.

3.4.5.1 Al-Nūr Party and Political Pragmatism

Al-Nūr Party was the only *Salafī* party that chose to remain neutral in the lead up to June 30. In an interview with *al-Nūr* Party spokesperson Nādir Bakkār, conducted just days before June 30, he explains how the party refused to classify the event as a struggle between Islam and non-Islam, and instead chose to frame it as criticism of the regime headed by Muḥammad Mursī.[332] After Mursī's deposal on July 3, 2013, *al-Nūr* Party adopted a discourse in which they called for political reconciliation and dialogue between all parties instead of a discourse that depicted June 30 and the subsequent ousting of Mursī as an attack against Islamism. Khālid Manṣūr explains that *al-Nūr* Party can do this because unlike the majority of *Salafī* parties, "their political ideology allows them to sit with [the opposition] at this point in time, and negotiate with them."[333] *Al-Nūr* Party thereby appeared to have adopted a tactic based on politics, rather than religion.

In choosing to play politics, *al-Nūr* Party has, for the time being, secured a position in the political arena. Nevertheless, *al-Nūr* Party has sacrificed part of its popularity in order to secure this position. The party's decision to remain neutral towards June 30 was strongly criticized by the other *Salafī* parties, as well as by the party's own members and followers.[334] Bakkār explains that they are "facing a very strong criticism that is pushing [them] to go out on the streets in support of Mursī saying that [they] are separating

332 Smit 2013 (c).

333 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

334 Al-Anani 2013.

[themselves] from the Islamic stream."[335] Moreover, he admitted that a number of his party's supporters have in fact rejected the party's stance and have chosen instead to join the protests in support of Mursī. Bakkār claims that they can stop about 80% of their supporters from going out in the streets and joining the protests.[336]Even after Mursī was deposed on July 3, *al-Nūr* Party has maintained that political pragmatism is the only way they can ensure their position in the political arena. This decision cost the party a lot of support from people who believe that *al-Nūr* Party is abandoning the "Islamic Project" by negotiating with the army and the liberal and secular players who are considered to be behind the deposal of the Islamist president.[337]

Despite this loss in support however, *al-Nūr* Party was the only *Salafī* party that was part of the new political roadmap launched by the interim regime and was part of the committee drafting the new Egyptian Constitution. It was thereby the only active *Salafī* player in the interim government struggling to safeguard the progress that may have already been made towards implementation of the "Islamic Project" and struggling to ensure that steps can continue to be made in the future. Progress towards the "Islamic Project" can be understood in terms of the 2012 Egyptian Constitution, which had an extra article - Article 219 - that strengthened the weight of *Sharīʿa* and its conservative *Sunnī* interpretation. In addition, the 2012 Constitution ensured the Islamic identity of the Egyptian state and limited the freedom of religion to Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. These were significant steps in the direction of the "Islamic Project" as envisioned by the *Salafī* political parties.

3.4.5.2 Preservation of a Religiously Conservative Identity

In contrast to *al-Nūr* Party, in the weeks leading up to June 30 and continuing well after Mursī was overthrown, the other *Salafī* political parties opted to safeguard their religious credibility among the masses rather than choosing for the politically pragmatic approach adopted by *al-Nūr* Party. The narrative adopted by these parties however, was at first glance not necessarily religious. In fact, they claimed to be fighting for the preservation of democratic values and the reinstatement of a legitimately elected president, thereby adopting the discourse used by the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, these *Salafī* parties were tipping the balance more towards ensuring religious credibility rather than acting according to political

335 Smit 2013 (c).

336 Ibid.

337 Al-Anani 2013.

pragmatism for two main reasons: one, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, many *Salafīs* believe they cannot reject a Muslim ruler, implying that the parties could not have supported *Tamarrud's* call for Mursī's resignation; two, the *Salafī* parties rejecting Mursī's deposal were using religion to justify their cause.

Before June 30, the majority of *Salafī* parties, in particular the *al-Faḍīla* Party, *al-Iṣlāḥ*, and *al-Aṣāla*, were very vocal in their critique of Muḥammad Mursī, the FJP, and the Muslim Brotherhood. They referred to themselves as opposition parties and rejected many actions taken by Mursī and the Qandīl cabinet. For example, *al-Faḍīla* party leader Maḥmūd Fatḥī rejected the way the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood worked with and essentially sustained the previous corrupt system of Mubārak. Moreover, he criticized the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood for being so consumed with day-to-day politics that they were forgetting the larger objectives, presumably the "Islamic Project."[338] In turn, Khālid Manṣūr of *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party claimed to be in an opposition party for many reasons, including the Muslim Brotherhood's struggle to control high-ranking positions.[339] In the lead up to June 30, however, these parties radically changed their positions and sided with the FJP, even though many of the reasons for launching the June 30 *Tamarrud* campaign in the first place ran parallel to *Salafī* objections towards the FJP and its mother organization. Manṣūr explains how "there is still a lot of common ground and that is very clear when it comes to *Rābaʿa al-ʿAdawiyya* Square and *al-Nahḍa* Square. Many people will have different political views, but now there is a common ground."[340]

In contrast to the smaller *Salafī* parties discussed here, *al-Waṭan* Party can be considered slightly more pragmatic. Although the party openly sided with the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood, it decided to not participate in the protests leading up to June 30 in order to avoid bloodshed.[341] *Al-Waṭan* Party also led a national reconciliation initiative, which sought consensus between the different sides.[342] Nevertheless, after July 3, *al-Waṭan* Party was among the founding members of the National Alliance Supporting Legitimacy to reject the overthrow of President Mursī. Since Mursī was deposed on July 3, these *Salafī* parties, including *al-Waṭan* Party, have stood by the Muslim Brotherhood and have demanded the return of Mursī as the only legitimate president, refusing to negotiate with the interim regime.

338 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h).

339 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

340 Ibid.

341 Ahram Online 2013 (g).

342 Ibid.

Although this can be understood in terms of fighting for democratic principles, it must be placed in a wider context. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, *Salafis* believed in political quietism; historically speaking, they were not politically active, nor did they rebel against their Muslim leader. Moreover, until the January 25 Revolution, *Salafis* essentially rejected democracy because it gave too much sovereignty to the people instead of to God. It has already been established that the January 25 Revolution changed the context and environment in such a way that many *Salafis* shifted their position and became politically active. Demo-cracy and political participation has since become a means to an end, a way to ensure the implementation of the "Islamic Project" through legitimate means. Even the political *Salafis* however, still maintain that the religious texts forbid them from rebelling against a Muslim leader, unless he ceases to be Muslim.[343] They may have become politically active and accepted to work within a democratic framework, but many still believe that they cannot rise up against a Muslim leader, even if they are largely against his actions. For these *Salafis*, religion, more than politics, influenced their decision to stand behind Mursī during and after the popular uprising against him.

June 30 and its aftermath have become defined as a struggle between Islamists and non-Islamists. Manṣūr believes that the divide between Islamists and non-Islamists is more severe after June 30. He explains how "people who choose now to struggle in the streets against what happened are mostly the Islamists and the people who show sympathy [to] Islamists."[344] Mursī's deposal was even used as evidence for suggesting that the army and the interim regime were intent on oppressing Islamists.[345] Moreover, various speakers at the pro-Mursī sit-ins at *Rāba'a al-'Adawiyya* and *al-Nahḍa* Square claimed it was a religious duty to reject the deposal of the Islamist president. Frequent references have been made to martyrdom and dying in the name of Islam.[346] Yāsir Burhāmi, senior *shaykh* and founder of *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya*, even spoke out about the "catastrophic discourse being done in the name of Islam."[347] It thus appears as though the majority of *Salafi* political parties are looking for ways to preserve their religious identity by using religion to justify their current position in the political arena.

Moreover, although many *Salafi* parties identified themselves as opposition parties to the FJP, their criticism of the party was administrative and politi-

343 Brown 2011, 3.

344 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

345 See *Salafi* newspaper www.elshaab.org

346 Ezzat 2013.

347 Al-Burhāmi 2012.

cal more than ideological. Ultimately, the FJP wishes to see the implementation of *Sharī'a* and the unification of Muslim countries in a wi-der Islamic Caliphate. Despite certain objections to the FJP's political decisions, having a president who hails from an Islamist movement, and whose ultimate goal is broadly speaking in line with that of the *Salafis*, means that the deposal of this president for possibly a liberal or secular president significantly hampers materialization of the "Islamic Project." Since the "Islamic Project" strongly influences *Salafī* political activism, calling for the reinstatement of the Islamist president should be considered in relation to this goal. Remaining faithful to the "Islamic Project" is important for upholding and protecting the conservative religious identity of the *Salafī* parties, something that is threatened if they opt for a more political approach by negotiating with the interim government, largely seen as responsible for the overthrow of the Islamist president. This is reflected in the conflicting position of *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party: Manṣūr claims that "[they] can sit with people of different ideologies and come to a decision," yet he simultaneously states that he cannot sit with the army and the opposition responsible for toppling Mursī's government.[348] Although he claims to be assuming a political role rather than a religious role by sitting with people of different ideologies, one must keep in mind that after the toppling of Mursī, these people of different ideologies only represent other *Salafī* parties and the Muslim Brotherhood. The post-June 30 position taken by the majority of *Salafī* parties once again suggests that their commitment to the "Islamist Project" leaves very little room for political maneuvering with groups and parties of a truly different ideological view.

Unlike *al-Nūr* Party, the smaller *Salafī* political parties refused to recognize the interim regime and are refusing to participate in the political roadmap. Since they did not participate they can continue to frame the struggle in terms of Islamists versus non-Islamists, using their identification with Islam and the "Islamic Project" to guarantee a wide support base among the more religiously conservative Egyptian population. It thus appeared as though the majority of *Salafī* parties have ignored poli-tical pragmatism and has opted instead for preserving their religious credibility among the masses. The conflicting reactions of *al-Nūr* Party and the remaining *Salafī* parties towards June 30 and Mursī's subsequent deposal clearly demonstrate the struggle that exists between the simultaneous need for political pragmatism and protection of their religiously conservative Islamic identity. In order to safeguard their future stability however, it is important that *Salafī* parties find a way to balance political pragmatism and religious conservatism.

348 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

3.4.6 The "Islamic Project"

This section is divided into three parts in an effort to further explain the struggles surrounding the attempted implementation of the "Islamic Project." The first part analyzes the 2012 constitutional debate in order to illustrate the tension that may arise in trying to convert an ideological vision into a political agenda. Then the 2012 presidential elections are described after which the types of alliances made in the name of the "Islamic Project" are addressed in order to further demonstrate the tension that exists between religious *Salafism* and political *Salafism*.

3.4.6.1 The Constitutional Debate

In the second half of 2012 a Constituent Assembly began drafting the new Egyptian Constitution. *Al-Nūr* Party was the only *Salafī* party represented in the Constituent Assembly.[349] Drafting of the Constitution gave rise to much debate, in particular concerning Article 2, which stipulates that the principles of Islamic law are the main source of legislation. *Salafīs* opposed this article because it failed to have the principles defined and determined by *shaykhs*.[350] They were pushing for a stricter rule that guaranteed a dominant presence of *Sharīʿa*, whereas the liberal and secular members were reluctant to amend Article 2 at all.[351] The only solution was a compromise, which gave birth to Article 219. Article 219 defined the principles mentioned in Article 2 and attributed the role of defining these principles to al-Azhar, known for its moderate view of Islam, and not to the *shaykhs* suggested by the *Salafīs*.[352]

This compromise did not receive a warm welcome among the majority of *Salafī* parties. In fact, most *Salafīs* rejected the 2012 Constitution because they felt that it did not sufficiently protect *Sharīʿa*.[353] *Al-Nūr* Party, as the largest and hence only *Salafī* party represented in the Constituent Assembly, reluctantly accepted Article 219, even though it did not sufficiently satisfy the *Salafī* ideological goal. In negotiating with other political actors, *al-Nūr* Party had been forced to make a political concession. In fact, according to ʿImād ʿAbd al-Ghafūr, leader of *al-Waṭan* Party, but presidential advisor and leader of *al-Nūr* Party at the time of the constitutional debate, stated it was a good constitution that was written by a diverse group of Egyptians.[354]

349 Lombardi and Brown 2012.

350 Ibid.

351 Ibid.

352 Serôdio 2012.

353 Lombardi and Brown, 2012; Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

354 Serôdio 2012.

Al-Aṣāla, al-Faḍīla, al-Sha'b Party, *shaykh* Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismā'īl, and his supporters all opposed the Constitution and they may well have considered the concessions made by *al-Nūr* Party as a sacrifice of the "Islamic Project."

Nevertheless, despite the apparent *Salafī* disapproval of the draft constitution, the referendum passed with 63.8% approval rate,[355] a figure that was used to illustrate Egypt's overall support of *Sharī'a*. Voter turnout, however, was only 32.9%,[356] which indicates that the grand majority of Egyptians boycotted the referendum. While the other smaller *Salafī* parties openly rejected the Constitution, it is difficult to determine whether they actually voted against it, as well. Although *Salafīs* would rather have seen an article that more clearly defined the principles of *Sharī'a* and that assigned interpretation of these principles to the *shaykhs* they trusted, the inclusion of Article 219 is in fact a step in the right direction of implementing the "Islamic Project." With Article 219, *Salafīs* had succeeded in defining what the principles of *Sharī'a* would be, albeit in broad and technical terms, and the article thereby strengthened the role of *Sharī'a* in the 2012 Egyptian Constitution in comparison to the previous constitution. The smaller *Salafī* parties may thus have been vocal in their rejection of the Constitution in order to gain more support among conservative Muslims who wished to see a more definitive article, but whether they actually voted against it as well, is difficult to determine.

The 2012 constitutional debate illustrates how *Salafī* presence in a diverse multiparty system forced them to make political concessions, which impeded the desired progress toward implementation of the "Islamic Project." This suggests the difficulty of translating the strict *Salafī* ideology into a political agenda.

3.4.6.2 2012 Presidential Elections

A decisive moment for *al-Nūr* Party was during the 2012 presidential elections when they chose to support 'Abd al-Mun'im Abū al-Futūh, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood and moderate Islamist, instead of *shaykh* Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismā'īl. According to Nādir Bakkār, *al-Nūr* Party backed al-Futūh because he met the minimum requirements for a president even though *shaykh* Ḥāzim appeared to be the more likely choice because he identifies as a Salafī.[357] For the grand majority of *Salafī* parties and *Salafī* followers, *shaykh* Ḥāzim represented the "Islamic Project." His sole vision was the implementation of *Sharī'a* and creating an Islamic state in Egypt.

355 Egypt Independent 2012 (g).

356 Ibid.

357 Smit 2013 (c).

The lack of experience versus the correct *Salafī* identification is perfectly depicted in a statement made by *shaykh* Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ, who is not affiliated to any party in particular. He states that "[one] may be a physician and very religious, but being a physician or being able to manage [one's] own private clinic does not qualify [him] to be the minister of health."[358]

The fact that *al-Nūr* Party considered *shaykh* Ḥāzim's qualifications, or lack thereof, as a politician and as a president for all Egyptians to be more important than his commitment to the "Islamic Project" gave rise to controversy.[359] *Al-Nūr* Party understood the rules of the political system and made the required political concessions, but this was something that their followers did not understand, and it cost them a significant amount of support.[360]

In a letter written by Yāsir Burhāmi, he referred to a conversation he had with high-ranking *Salafī shaykh*, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAbd al-Khāliq, who explained that "the situation is not suitable for an Islamist president. What we need is a devout president who will not fight Islam."[361] This implies that *al-Nūr* Party has adopted an approach that recognizes the need for patience and political pragmatism in stabilizing the Egyptian social and political arena first. The "Islamic Project" is a long-term goal, whose implementation cannot be guaranteed by simply supporting a presidential candidate who identifies as *Salafī*. The tension that surfaced during the 2012 presidential elections thereby suggest that *Salafī* political parties face challenges in committing to the "Islamic Project" while simultaneously taking the necessary political decisions in order to guarantee a stronger and more stable Egypt in the future.

3.4.6.3 The Making and Breaking of Alliances

Since the main goal of *Salafī* political parties is the implementation of the "Islamic Project" it often determines the alliances that are made and the projects on which a party chooses to focus. This once again suggests that a politically pragmatic approach in order to safeguard a future position in the political arena may be sacrificed for activities that can be carried out in the name of the "Islamic Project."

ʿIṣṣām al-Sharīf of *al-Aṣāla* Party explains how it is of little relevance what party people support as long as it is an Islamist party.[362] He adds that al-

358 Smit and Casper 2013.

359 Smit 2013 (c).

360 Drevon 2013.

361 Al-Burhāmi 2012.

362 Smit and Casper 2013.

liances are not very important, as long as they are made for the greater goal of the "Islamic Project." He says: "As long as that flag is being raised, we'll stand behind it and work for it. [...] We want the application of *Sharīʿa*; who is going to do it, doesn't matter."[363] Similarly, leading *al-Aṣāla* figure, Hānī Fawzī, states that because the party agenda is Islamic, "[they] must be connected to Islamic parties. [...]. If an un-Islamic party is doing something good for our right, then that is good, but we do not make a connection with them."[364] Regardless of their political position, *Salafī* parties work together on charity projects in order to strengthen the support for the "Islamic Project."[365] This explains why *Al-Aṣāla* worked together with the FJP in Warrāq despite *al-Aṣāla* identifying itself as in opposition to the then ruling FJP. Instead of strengthening its own position and working towards expanding a support base for *Al-Aṣāla* specifically, the party appears to be more concerned with the "Islamic Project" in general.

It must be emphasized that *Salafīs* have access to the masses. Already well before their political participation, *Salafīs* had established charity hospitals around the country and devoted significant resources to social welfare projects, particularly in rural areas. As a result, *Salafīs* have always had a large support base and continue to benefit from their effective methods of mobilizing this support. As long as *Salafī* parties are capable of mobilizing people, regardless of what party has the greatest number of members or supporters, there is likely to be some kind of *Salafī* representation in politics, which can subsequently safeguard any progress made towards implementation of the "Islamic Project."

Nevertheless, this approach may still limit the alliances that are and can potentially be made with non-Islamist parties. *Salafī* parties are not the only actors on the political scene, hence concessions and negotiations must be made with other actors who may not believe in the same principles or whose policies are likely to be determined by a different end goal. Many smaller *Salafī* parties are dictated by religious convictions, and thus refuse cooperation with actors who do not strive for the creation of an Islamic state. However, negotiating and working together with these actors to maintain a legitimate and credible political position is of utmost importance, especially given the diversity of Egypt's political system.

In short, political pragmatism is important for parties to guarantee their position in the political arena and adoption of a more inclusive approach would be sensible, but as long as the "Islamic Project" remains a priority,

363 Ibid.

364 Smit 2013 (a).

365 Ibid.

this is unlikely to happen. This suggests once again that the constant struggle between being politically pragmatic and thereby securing a position in the political arena, while at the same time maintaining a conservative religious identity challenges the future stability of any *Salafī* party.

3.5 Product of the Revolution

The previous section has attempted to outline the struggle that exists between political *Salafism* and religious *Salafism* and the inevitable tension that this is likely to continuously generate. The second argument for assessing that the future shape and position of *Salafī* political parties is fragile at best is based on the notion that these parties are a product of the Revolution. Rather than having had the time to gradually become politically-integrated, *Salafī* parties were thrown headfirst into an environment considered revolutionary, with a support base of which the majority had not had a voice for decades but suddenly considered themselves a crucial component of the Revolution. This section illustrates the challenges faced by *Salafī* political parties because of their participation in a revolutionary environment as well as their adoption of a revolutionary frame of mind.

3.5.1 A Revolutionary Environment and Support Base

Since the January 25 Revolution, there has been a strong tendency to take Egyptian politics to the streets. As a result, a *Salafī* support base has manifested itself which is increasingly rebellious in nature and which is likely to influence the decisions taken by any *Salafī* party that surfaced during or immediately after the January 25 Revolution. This is illustrated by examining the positions of *al-Nūr* Party and *al-Waṭan* Party in the political scene. *Al-Nūr* Party's official stance in a lot of instances appears to be more moderate than the positions taken by smaller *Salafī* parties such as *al-Sha'b* Party, *al-Faḍīla* Party, and *al-Aṣāla* Party because the party is, as already argued, more politically pragmatic. For example, *al-Nūr* has refused to participate in numerous protests called for by other *Salafī* parties, such as the protests rejecting the 2012 draft constitution, the protests demanding the purging of the judiciary, and the protests to counter June 30, *Tamarrud*. After *al-Waṭan* Party was launched on January 1, 2013, it also distanced itself from certain protests, including the early protests organized to counter *Tamarrud*. This was a pragmatic decision taken by both parties in which they may have considered the future importance of maintaining a moderate political position.

After July 3 however, *al-Waṭan* Party reconsidered their decision and adopted a more prominent stance in support of the FJP and the deposed former president, Mursī. Although *al-Nūr* Party distances itself politically

from many protests, supporters and members of the party and *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* have frequently been seen at those protests they officially claimed not to support.[366] Khālid Manṣūr, frequently present at the protests, explains this is because "the people on the ground, the grassroots of *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya*, whose structure is not solid like the Muslim Brotherhood, [...] do not have control over all their supporters. It's as simple as their supporters taking a taxi and joining the protests in Nasr City."[367] This is supported by *al-Nūr* Party spokesperson Nādir Bakkār, who maintains that the party and *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* cannot stop all their members from joining protests despite their open rejection of certain protests.[368] Another possible explanation is that the party depends on that part of the population that became vocal only after the Revolution and who continue to make revolutionary demands in the streets. In order to appease this support base, *al-Nūr* may thus opt to still have a representation at some of the protests it has officially rejected. Either way, the on-going revolutionary environment of Egypt is bound to influence political parties.

The reason to continuously take politics to the street can also be considered as a reflection of the lack of political experience of both the *Salafī* political parties as well as their support base. As mentioned above, political participation was completely new to this part of Egyptian society. In order not to loose the momentum created by the January 25 Revolution, the now politically active *Salafīs* threw themselves head first into the political arena of which they had no previous experience whatsoever. As explained by Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ,

> political participation could be simply by voting or preparing ourselves for the next five, ten, or twenty years because we are not in a hurry. That way we can present qualified and experienced people, instead of presenting people who are handicapped.[369]

Instead, parties were created, a *Salafī* presidential candidate was presented and a support base was formed, all in a revolutionary environment in which the main actors were acutely unaware of what politics actually meant. Ṣalāḥ again explains how "*Salafīs* had zero [political] experience. [...] They can [...] supervise from a distance, but they should not be in the front row."[370]

366 Sabry 2013.

367 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

368 Smit 2013 (c).

369 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

370 Ibid.

Since *Salafī* parties are trapped in this revolutionary environment, they may be required to give in to some of the demands made by a support base that continues to take politics to the streets. *Al-Nūr* Party has lost support because it has not always represented itself as revolutionary as some of the other *Salafī* parties by showing their support in protests.[371] It thus appears as though *Salafī* parties are forced to balance a political identity with a religious identity, in addition to a revolutionary identity. The tricky position in which the *Salafī* parties now find themselves is an inevitable result of them never having had the chance to grow naturally and create a support base that is more loyal to the party and its political ideas rather than to the Revolution.

3.5.2 The Revolutionary Character of Salafī Political Parties

> *In the environment of revolution, where there are no standards, rules and regulations, you lose respect.*[372]

Many of the political parties in Egypt consider themselves revolutionary. Many parties were formed after the January 25 Revolution and claim to be striving for the goals of the Revolution – bread, freedom, and social justice. Arguably, the *Salafī* political parties have an even stronger revolutionary identity and can be considered a ground-breaking product of the Revolution. Their very presence on the political playing field is revolutionary because it is unprecedented and it shows the extent to which now political *Salafīs* have radically revised their ideas and adapted to the new situation. This gives every *Salafī* political party a particularly distinct revolutionary identity.

Nevertheless, some *Salafī* parties are more revolutionary and radical[373] than others and have taken on an uncompromising, and sometimes extreme, position in the political arena. These parties are *al-Rāya, al-Sha'b, al-Aṣāla, al-Faḍīla,* and *al-Iṣlāḥ*. As already illustrated, *al-Nūr* Party is politically too pragmatic and compromising to be added to this list. *Al-Waṭan* Party is somewhere in between - before June 30 the party was pragmatic in allying with the FJP despite criticism that the ruling party was keeping the corrupt system in place. In the post-Mursī era however, *al-Waṭan* Party has sacrificed this pragmatism and taken on an uncompromising position towards

371 Drevon 2013; Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h).

372 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

373 Note that radical here does not necessarily refer to religious beliefs or a religious agenda. It refers instead to the extremity with which they wish to see the goals of January 25 Revolution materialised and the former regime punished.

the interim regime thereby siding completely with the smaller *Salafī* parties mentioned above.

These smaller and particularly revolutionary *Salafī* parties believe in the need to deal with the previous Mubārak regime in a radical way, which includes the purging of the entire system and banning any member of the previous regime from participating in politics.[374] These parties opposed the FJP before June 30 because they considered it to work within the old system without attempting to drastically reform it. Manṣūr states that *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party wanted "the restructuring of the ministry, getting people of the old regime out of everything and putting them in prison. [They] wanted serious cases against them [...] and [they] also wanted to achieve all the goals of the revolution."[375] Fatḥī of *al-Faḍīla* Party describes the performance of President Mursī and his government as "weak" and "less than [their] expectations" because they do not deal with the previous regime on a revolutionary basis.[376] In his opinion, "the successful revolutions are those that deal with the previous regime on a very clear, what they deserve basis, as for example, the French Revolution and the slaughter of the opposition and the Iranian Revolution and the jailing of the previous regime."[377]

The revolutionary mindset of the *Salafī* parties also clearly came to the forefront in April 2013, during the debate regarding the purging of the judiciary. The parties that were participating in these rallies were *al-Aṣāla*, *al-Rāya*, *al-Waṭan*, *al-Sha'b*, and *al-Iṣlāḥ*. These parties were particularly vocal in stating that all the judges suspected of supporting Mubārak needed to be removed.[378] They demanded that the retirement age was lowered in order to force out the older generation of judges with alleged ties to the former Mubārak regime. A more realistic, but less revolutionary, demand would have been to lower the retirement age across the entire political and economic spectrum instead of targeting just the judiciary - a suggestion made by an anonymous former member of *al-Waṭan* Party, who later left politics because he could not agree with some of the decisions that were being made in his party.[379]

Jerome Drevon, a PhD researcher studying Islamist groups in Egypt, suggested that perhaps the most revolutionary and radical *Salafī* party is *al-*

374 Smit 2013 (b); Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h, i).

375 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

376 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h).

377 Ibid.

378 Smit 2013 (b); Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h).

379 Smit 2013 (d).

Rāya, founded by *shaykh* Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismāʿīl.[380] *Shaykh* Ḥāzim was very vocal in the early days of the January 25 Revolution and was considered one of the biggest supporters of the Revolution.[381] Drevon explained that this has made him extremely popular, particularly among the *Salafī* youth who took to the streets en masse in the early days of the Revolution.[382] Fatḥī, who supported *shaykh* Ḥāzim during the presidential elections, further emphasized this idea, stating, "*shaykh* Ḥāzim was clearly the most revolutionary candidate among all. [...] [He] has always stood firm on the clear position of the Revolution hence he has garnered a huge population in the country."[383] His followers are referred to as Ḥāzimūn and are often the youth who are not part of any other movement.[384] Ḥāzim has frequently called for protests to counter what he considers the opposition's attempts to boycott Islamist efforts to rule the country. For example, in March 2013, Ḥāzim called for a siege of the liberal parties' headquarters and the Egyptian Media Production City in response to the liberals' opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and the media's bias against Islamists.[385] In the words of a member of the Ḥāzimūn support group, "burning hypocrisy city [Egyptian Media Production City] is a revolutionary action. Glory to peacefulness."[386]

A significant number of the *Salafī* and Islamist youth consider themselves revolutionaries and therefore find a perfect role model in Ḥāzim.[387] In fact, before the events of June 30, Jerome Drevon predicted Ḥāzim could easily win around 15-20 percent of the votes during the next parliamentary elections.[388] As a result of this popularity, smaller parties such as *al-Shaʿb* and *al-Faḍīla* wanted to merge with Ḥāzim's party in order to benefit from the party's large support base.[389] Additionally, *al-Waṭan* Party tried to ally with *shaykh* Ḥāzim and there were also rumors that 150 members of *al-Nūr* Party resigned to join *al-Rāya* immediately after the party was founded.[390] These

380 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

381 Lacroix 2012, 7.

382 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

383 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h).

384 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

385 Enein 2013.

386 Ibid.

387 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a); Lacroix 2012, 8.

388 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

389 Fady 2013; Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h).

390 Fady 2013.

developments suggest that Ḥāzim's popularity among the Islamist revolutionary youth made him a crucial ally for a number of *Salafī* parties.

Although Ḥāzim is considered extremely charismatic - apart from his call for the continuation of the Revolution and for the implementation of Islamic law - he has no vision for the future of the party or a well-formulated political policy.[391] He appears to have no real economic or political agenda. Drevon predicted that despite a large backing, Ḥāzim and his *al-Rāya* Party would lose all popular and political support in five years' time, a period lasting from 2011-2016, because of the complete absence of a real party program.[392] Nādir Bakkār of *al-Nūr* Party agreed with Drevon's opinion and expected that "[Ḥāzim's] party will fail with the people. [...] He is the one-man show style, without any real team around him."[393] In the aftermath of Mursī's deposal, Ḥāzim has been arrested and accused of inciting violence. With Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismāʿīl currently in jail, *al-Rāya* Party is missing its main component and unless Ḥāzim returns, the party is likely to gradually lose momentum and eventually disappear from the scene altogether.

3.5.3 Implications of Being a Product of the Revolution

Being a product of the Revolution essentially implies that *Salafī* parties were born out of a struggle; *Salafīs* came out to fight for freedom and equality during the Revolution. Since the January 25 Revolution and after the decision to participate politically, *Salafīs* have gained a more legitimate place in Egyptian society.[394]

Although this was a positive development for *Salafīs*, their mentality appears to be one in which they continue to build on the notion of a revolutionary struggle. This is indicated by Khālid Manṣūr from *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party when he explains that "when [they] joined the January 25 Revolution, [they] knew most of [them] would die on the streets, but [they] had a clear objective for which [they] were going to struggle."[395] Manṣūr explains how in the post-June 30 setting *Salafīs* are again forced to struggle for their rights. He adds that they will continue "struggling" in order to protect their position and make their demands heard.[396] This epitomizes the revolutionary mindset that dominates a grand majority of *Salafī* political participants. As long as they maintain that the Revolution is incomplete, their

391 Smit 2013 (d); Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

392 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

393 Smit 2013 (c).

394 Smit 2013 (d).

395 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

396 Ibid.

struggle is justified. And as long as there is a struggle in which they identify themselves as the victim, they have a way of justifying their unwillingness to negotiate with other players. Manṣūr believes that the deposal of Mursī is a coup, and therefore they do not "have the space to sit with them [the opposition] or start any negotiations unless there are clear objectives that [they] can meet."[397] As long as they can argue that the liberal opposition, the police force, the army and the judiciary are against Islamists, their struggle becomes one in which they must continue to fight for the rights of Islamists. *Salafī* parties are thereby able to benefit from a political environment where much of the discourse creates a sense of division between Islamists and non-Islamists because it enables them to carry forward their struggle with the new voice their political participation has created.

Nevertheless, *Salafī* parties need to partially amend this struggle mentality and find a way to negotiate with the other political players in order to ensure that they will have a legitimate position in the future political arena. Egyptians are generally starting to get weary of the instability of the last years and the volatile economic and political landscape. There is a dire need for reconciliation, but instead the majority of *Salafī* political parties are prolonging their struggle and thereby playing an important role in perpetuating the polarization that grips Egypt. In the long run, this struggle cannot withstand the presumably stronger demand for stability and it is possible that support will gradually wane for those *Salafī* parties that continue to refuse negotiations and concessions.

Noteworthy is that the *Salafī* parties are not the only ones playing a role in prolonging the conflict. *Salafī* political parties are participating in an environment that is dominated by a strong anti-Islamist sentiment emanating largely from the "deep state," which refers to the state bureaucracy and institutions that have been in place since the time of Mubārak (arguably dating back to the time of al-Nāṣir already) including for example the security forces, military intelligence and the judiciary. The "deep state" is apprehensive of any kind of change, and *Salafīs* have subsequently faced opposition since the day they became politically active.[398] Although political *Salafīs* in particular may be lacking an inclusive approach, this appears to be the case for Egypt's political scene in general, whether the actors are liberal or secular, the Muslim Brothers, the judiciary or the former regime. One side's policy of exclusion thus perpetuates the other's and it is too simple to say that the *Salafī* political parties must end their struggle and embrace a more inclusive approach in which they recognize the need to negotiate with all ac-

397 Ibid.

398 Hubbard and Kirkpatrick 2013; Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (h).

tors. This is made nearly impossible given the nature of Egypt's political system.

Nevertheless, by calling for the purging of the former regime and the judiciary, and by denying any remnant of the former regime to be politically active, the smaller *Salafī* parties are creating the impression that they refuse to seek a path towards stability. In addition, this type of rhetoric empowers the trend of suppression and tyranny. It is a radical and revolutionary way of punishing everything and everyone related to the former regime. On a political level, this means there is little room for negotiations or peace building, and this mentality is thus unlikely to be capable of sustaining a large support base in the long run. In a country that is already so politically divided, it is only likely to prolong the struggle and deepen the rifts in society.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to illustrate that the *Salafī* political parties are likely to face many challenges in the future, particularly as a result of an inherent struggle between religious *Salafism* and political *Salafism*. The challenges are further complicated by the parties' need to find a politically pragmatic approach that does not undermine their revolutionary identity.

A significant proportion of Egypt's population identifies with one or more of the *Salafī* parties and feels like his or her rights may now finally be acknowledged. As a result, *Salafī* political participation has become an important factor in Egypt's post-January 25 setting. Nevertheless, a struggle is born when the politically inexperienced *Salafī* parties place such great importance on their ideological goal before first ascertaining a stable political position. This struggle will prove difficult to overcome. *Salafī* political parties, especially the smaller parties such as *al-Faḍīla*, *al-Aṣāla* and *al-Waṭan* that have no significant constituency nor mother organization, are ultimately dependent on *shaykhs* for mobilizing support. At the same time however, creating an influential role for *shaykhs* is likely to prevent these parties from truly embracing their political role. Being politically pragmatic and accepting to play according to the, at times, dirty rules of the political arena is the only way these parties can guarantee their future position in the political scene. Playing this game how-ever, stands in stark contrast with what they must do to remain faithful to their *Salafī* identity and guarantee a large support base from among the religiously conservative Egyptian masses. A stable political future for the *Salafī* parties requires that a balance be found between being politically pragmatic, while simultaneously maintaining a conservative religious identity. It appears as though this will continue to pose challenges given the seeming unwillingness to sacrifice part of their

ideological goal or make concessions to the "Islamic Project" for the sake of appeasing other political actors.

An extra challenge is added to this when considering the revolutionary environment in which the *Salafī* parties find themselves. The majority of politically-active *Salafīs* are revolutionaries, which implicates their role as politicians; they cannot negotiate about the demands of the Revolution as politicians would without sacrificing part of their identity as revolutionaries. Additionally, their support base consists mainly of *Salafī* individuals who equally consider themselves revolutionaries, and playing the politician card would thus likely cost them supporters.

Their revolutionary mindset is largely influenced by a struggle mentality, which limits the extent to which these parties are capable of embra-cing a politically pragmatic approach in order to negotiate and cooperate with other political actors. Although the Egyptian political landscape largely blocks any such approach, regardless of whether there is desire to adopt it, it appears as though *Salafī* political parties need to somewhat readjust their revolutionary rhetoric in order to make room for a more moderate political approach that is both realistic and more representative of all Egyptians. At the same time, such a shift in rhetoric is risky because it may create a more detached support base that sees this shift as an abandonment of the Revolution. *Salafī* parties are again faced with a dilemma and because they are a product of the Revolution, and essentially owe their entire existence to the Revolution, this dilemma will prove difficult to overcome.

Despite the many challenges outlined in this chapter, a positive development must be mentioned, as well. By having become politically active, *Salafīs* have shown to be capable of flexibility and mobility, two traits that are not normally associated with the image of the conservative Salafī. Since the January 25 Revolution, *Salafīs* have, time and again, demonstrated their ability to redefine certain values and beliefs in order to move along with the political process. The very fact that they have become politically active and accepted to work within and towards a more inclusive and democratic system is indicative of this. This suggests that *Salafīs* are very much able to adapt to their environment and are still searching for ways to navigate through the political arena in order to secure their political position while simultaneously staying on the most direct path towards their ideological goal - the "Islamic Project."

Concluding from this research, *al-Nūr* Party is the most pragmatic *Salafī* party in the field with the most secured political position. *Al-Nūr* Party plays the political game and has made concessions and alliances that have cost it support, but that have at least protected their legitimate position in the political arena. Moreover, *al-Nūr* has the backing of *al-Da ʿwa al-Salafiyya*,

which provides it with the religious credibility it needs in order to benefit from a still significant number of followers. Other *Salafi* parties may have won more followers after June 30, but in refusing to recognize the interim government and rejecting calls for reconciliation, they risked their legitimate position in the political arena and were thereby unable to support *al-Nūr* in their attempt to further the steps that can be made toward the "Islamic Project."

Given the volatility of the political arena however, one can do little more than hypothesize. However, it is sufficient to assert that *Salafi* political parties are facing significant challenges in finding a clear balance between political pragmatism and religious conservatism and in turn combining this with the appropriate amount of revolutionary spirit. *Salafi* parties thereby find themselves in a precarious position whose future shape is not at all certain. Not only is the political position of *Salafi* parties fragile, it appears as though these challenges will also obstruct the steps that can be made in the direction of the "Islamic Project"- their very justification for existence.

4 Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya: The Burden of History on Internal Transition *(Jayson Casper)*

4.1 Introduction

Among the post-revolutionary Islamist actors in Egypt, the significance of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* (Islamic Group) rests mostly in its history. The success of the Muslim Brotherhood, older as an organization, is attributed to their extended experience in oppositional protest politics. The *Salafīs*, playing politics for the first time after a long non-political and quitestist experience, have reaped the rewards of decades of social work. But both, compared to *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, are odd recipients of revolutionary reward.

Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya is Egypt's original revolutionary movement. The history of this movement is contested due to its association with violence, as will be explored. Nevertheless, they were one of the few to call for and actively work towards the downfall of President Mubārak during the 1980s and 90s.

A two decade-long war of attrition resulted in the deaths of many partisans and the imprisonment of most leaders. As an organization they were all but completely incapacitated, earning a degree of freedom of operation only after the publication of an equally contested revision of their practical theology concerning violence. But when the youth-led Revolution of January 25 erupted, they had no youth to join. The moment passed them by.

But it did not pass by completely. As the Revolution morphed into a political transition they participated wholeheartedly. Their Islamist rivals cum allies were better equipped to succeed, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* lent support, especially from their base of strength in Upper Egypt, particularly in Asyūṭ. They gained few seats in the new parliament, but their reward was a return to prominence. Leaders, long imprisoned, now spoke forcefully in the public square.

The situation can be seen as ironic. Egypt's Islamic revolutionaries i.e. *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* missed the Revolution. In the aftermath of the Revolution, they preached democracy. But the greatest legitimacy of their voice was due to their use of violence in the past, now forsworn, amid great societal doubt. Their ongoing calls for greater 'Islamization' of the political order brought back their revolutionary overtones. But their relative political weakness was contrasted with a feared resurrection of their social burden to enforce Islamic morality. This, they constantly denied, though such defensive posture hardly seemed worthy of their revolutionary heritage.

Neither popular nor organized enough to be fully relevant, they appeared as a relic of a former age struggling to adapt to a new reality they long have called for. They appeared comfortable letting others have the stage, placing importance in the success of Islam rather than the success of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* specifically. Though genuine in appearance, it also begs the question of a necessary contentment with their lot.

This chapter reflects perspective on *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* gained from several sources. These include the chapter of Roel Meijer in the book Global *Salafism*, focusing on their history and practice in promoting virtue and preventing vice. It also relies upon the field-work, reports, and an interview with Jerome Drevon, a French researcher who has spent considerable time in *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* networks, and the testimony of Mamdūḥ Sarūr, an Upper Egyptian journalist critical of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. Finally, it consists of personal interviews conducted with ʿAlaʾ Abū Nāṣir, General Secretary of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*'s Building and Development Party (*Ḥizb al-Bināʾ wa-l-Tanmiyya*), ʿIzzat al-Salamūnī, member of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*'s guidance council in Cairo, Muḥammad ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥman, son of the organization's former Muftī ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥman, often called "the blind *shaykh*," now imprisoned in the United States for his role in the World Trade Center bombing of 1993, and draws also from other conversations with less influential group members over the past few years.

4.2 History

Mentioning "the blind *shaykh*" is a useful starting point to describe *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. He was invited by youthful Islamist students from universities in Asyūṭ, al-Minyā, and Sūhāj in the 1970s and served officially as their spiritual leader when *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* became a formal organization. Islamism at this time was reemerging from a time of suppression as President Anwar al-Sādāt encouraged student religiosity in order to weaken the leftist networks nurtured by his predecessor, Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir. By 1977 these disparate groups established control on campus by winning student union elections.[399]

Students were motivated by a basic *Salafī* ideology which meant to return society to the practices of the first generations of Islam. *Salafism* as an ideology is multifaceted, applied differently according to the interpretations of individual *shaykhs* or movements as explained in chapter 3. The Muslim Brotherhood was influenced by *Salafī* ideas but chose the path of political participation as an organizational vanguard. *Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* rebelled

399 Meijer 2009, 195.

against this idea and combined *Salafī* scholarship with a revolutionary social agenda.

4.2.1 Ḥisba

Specifically this included the concept of *ḥisba*, which was the duty of the community to promote virtue and prohibit vice (*al-ʾamr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar*). Despite the opening given to *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* by Anwar al-Sādāt, the organization increasingly came to see him as negligent in his duties as a Muslim leader, especially concerning *ḥisba*. Zealous students therefore took this upon themselves.

Group members would forcefully break up social gatherings where men and women comingled. Attacks would be made on alcohol shops. But above all, leaders, such as Muḥammad ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥman, would preach vehemently against the president. Naturally, these activities attracted the attention of the security services.[400]

4.2.2 State Response

This is where the narrative gets murky. *Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* leaders admitted 'excesses' on the part of their members. Muḥammad ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥman maintained the oppressive al-Sādāt government provoked and escalated violence. Police would storm a mosque hosting an anti-al-Sādāt preacher; those inside would resist, resulting in deaths on both sides. Furthermore, successive ministers of the interior pursued a policy of assassinating *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* leaders; over 100 were killed, he said. This drove retaliatory strikes against police, and culminated in *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* most damning blow. In an effort to assassinate the minister of the interior in 1990, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* killed the head of parliament instead.[401]

Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya leadership was rounded up in prison, and their youthful devotees, devoid of guidance, engaged in ever more 'excesses'. The group's goal was to lead a popular – not violent – revolution to establish a true Islamic state. The police state made this impossible, while others who tried to reform the system, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, only validated the secular legitimacy of parliamentary democracy.[402]

400 Ibid.

401 Casper 2013 (c).

402 Meijer 2009, 207.

4.2.3 Adoption of Violence

In 1979, therefore, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* pursued a different strategy. They merged with the *Jihād* Organization toward a dual purpose. *Jihād* would be a small, secretive wing dedicated to assassinating Anwar al-Sādāt. Simultaneously, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* would lead an insurrection in Upper Egypt and gain administrative control of the region. The first plot succeeded in 1981; the second was crushed. The response of the state was swift and harsh and decimated the organization. Some leadership fled and began operating abroad; local leaders were all imprisoned.

Of note is the fact that in 1982, sentencing the main assassins to death, an Egyptian court found ʿAbd al-Raḥmān not guilty of involvement. Nonetheless, he left Egypt and eventually settled in the United States, where he continued his preaching against the government led by President Ḥusnī Mubārak. His son claimed his incarceration in 1993 was a conspi-racy in which the US agreed to Mubārak's request to pervert justice and lock him up in exchange for acceding to American foreign policy goals in the region.[403] Academic literature, however, notes "the blind *shaykh*'s" incendiary rhetoric and incitement toward violence.[404]

Sitting in solitary confinement, however, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān still served as spiritual guide. Mubārak meanwhile arrested over 20,000 group members, prompting the jailed domestic leadership to reevaluate its strategy. In 1997 they issued a unilateral and unconditional ceasefire. This was jeopardized by the terrorist attack killing dozens of foreign tourists visiting Luxor in 1997. "The blind *shaykh*'s" son claimed that radicalized youth, perhaps in association with external *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* leadership, preferred the path of violent overthrow. The best way to weaken the government, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān stated of group policy in the 1990s, was to ruin tourism.[405]

4.2.4 'The Revisions'

This strategy was indeed formulated by "the blind *shaykh*," but he never wanted anyone dead, said ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. His father signaled his initial agreement in 1998, though he wavered when he did not see a full response from the government. Still, by 1999 negotiations led their leadership to agree publicly to the nonviolent initiative, and a limited number were released from prison. In 2001 these cooperated with the government in highly

403 Interview with Muḥammad ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012.

404 Meijer 2009, 197.

405 Interview with Muḥammad ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012.

publicized visits to convince still imprisoned members of the new, nonviolent, doctrine. Their results are contested, as will be seen.

The culmination of the nonviolent initiative was the publication of four volumes of theological reflection, called 'The Revisions', on the use of force, on the concept of *ḥisba*, and on legitimate means of change. This included an acceptance of the parliamentary system.[406]

However, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* only benefitted in a limited way from their allowance of this less than desirable but permitted democratic process, since many members remained imprisoned, and released leaders were closely monitored. Preaching opportunities remained extremely limited. The organization remained in shambles up until the January 25 Revolution.[407] Though they played almost no part, they were beneficiaries. Shortly after the fall of Mubārak most leaders were released from prison.[408]

4.3 Reconstitution

At the outbreak of the Revolution differences began to appear among traditional leaders. Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm and Karam Zuhdī, widely considered champions of 'The Revisions' stayed silent. They had been released from prison earlier and, at least in retrospect, were considered to have gone too far in placating the state, viewing Mubārak as a legitimate Muslim president whose rule should be respected. Many still in prison however, notably the brothers Ṭāriq and 'Abbūd al-Zumar, openly called for revolution from their cells after January 25, 2011.[409]

All viewed themselves as legitimate revolutionaries in their youth. According to ʿAbd al-Raḥman, 'Abbūd al-Zumar supplied the weapons involved in the assassination of Anwar al-Sādāt; Zuhdī was a leading figure in the effort to declare an independent state in Upper Egypt at the time of al-Sādāt's assassination.[410] But as *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* began to reconstitute itself in the new political situation, a shift began to appear, partially involving interpretation of 'The Revisions.'

In a first step, however, al-Salamūnī stated that the basic organization structure had to be restored. From before the Revolution and continuing, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* cells were created at the village level and usually centered around a particular mosque. Members chose a Guidance Council

406 Meijer 2009, 214.

407 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

408 Baghat 2014.

409 Drevon 2014.

410 Interview with Muḥammad ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012.

(*Maktab al-Irshād*) of 5-7 leaders, geographically linked villages, then created a council at the district level, and these chose between 7-9 members for a guidance council in each governorate.[411]

Governorates then elected a total of 300 members to a nationwide general assembly, to which 50 additional influential leaders were appointed by the historical leadership. By May of 2011 these were able to meet and democratically elect *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* Guidance Council comprising of nine members. These included ʿIṣṣām Darbāla as the president, Usāma Ḥāfiẓ as the vice-president, ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid, ʿAlī Dinarī, Ṣafwat ʿAbd al-Ghanī, Ṭāriq al-Zumar, ʿAbbūd al-Zumar, Ṣalāḥ Hāshim, and Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-ʿĀl. Even though these persons exercised leadership and publically represent the organization, all official decisions are taken by the larger general assembly.[412]

Missing from this list are Ibrāhīm and Zuhdī, long considered the ideologues of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. In fact, Ibrāhīm was elected to the Guidance Council, but in the ninth and final position. Previously, he was considered the number two man in the organization with Zuhdī serving as president. Perhaps recognizing the changing attitude among members, Ibrāhīm declined his position and chose to leave administration to others.[413]

Exploring this changing attitude and what it implies for *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* and its Revisions will be considered below. As the main challenge within *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* was perceived to be the question of how to deal with the new opening granted by the Revolution in which they had not played a key role, a shift from ideology to pragmatism took place.

4.4 Politicization

One of the first decisions taken by the general council was to create a political party, called the Building and Development Party, to serve as the political arm of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. There was only limited debate about this issue, which signaled the organization's recognition of the Revolution and the legitimacy of its turn toward politics.

4.4.1 Internal Democracy

Nāṣir ʿAbd al-Salām was selected as party president, ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr as its general secretary, and Ṭāriq al-Zumar as head of the political office. Each

411 Casper 2013 (c).

412 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

413 Ibid.

was appointed into his position by *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* leadership, with whom there was great overlap.

According to ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr, this overlap was viewed as natural by *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, which considers the political party to be its birth child.[414] In this they resemble the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood and *al-Nūr* Party *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* (the *Salafi* Call), each of which is viewed less as an independent political party than as an extension of the group in question. This perhaps semantic question is important, for each of these parties have been able to register legally with the government, while the mother institutions remain in official limbo. For their part, al-Salamūnī asserted that they were studying the issue of official registration, waiting to see how the institutions of state would be reshaped in the transitional period.[415]

But if this overlap seems natural, he said it is not official party policy to have it continue, though independence is not to be considered. Internal elections were due to be held after one year, but were canceled for unclear reasons. Moreover, the party claims it has a majority of members drawn from outside *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, including Christians.[416] Identifying them, however, is difficult even for the party. Neither al-Salamūnī nor his staff were able to offer estimates of total party membership or name the Christians among them.

4.4.2 Financing

Another uncertain issue facing both (the original group and the political party) party and group concerns financing. Unlike members of the Muslim Brotherhood which were given space in society to operate and conduct business though officially banned, most members of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* spent considerable time in prison. They are not a wealthy organization, and in fact, according to Jerome Drevon, a considerable number of members appear not to have work at all apart from their group activity.[417]

Some members themselves expressed uncertainty about where the money comes from, having heard it is funded by wealthy Egyptians, perhaps some who have made their fortune in the Gulf.[418] Others, such as al-Salamūnī, speak of a more general interplay of financial transfer – they receive from

414 Ibid.

415 Casper 2013 (c).

416 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

417 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

418 Ibid.

the rich to give to the poor, having won a trusted social role in Upper Egypt.[419]

But some observers, such as Mamdūḥ Sarūr, wondered if they are financed by the Muslim Brotherhood,[420] while the accusation of funding from either citizens or states in the Gulf hung over all Islamist movements. The Building and Development Party was required to file officially with the state, but *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* escaped scrutiny due to its unregistered nature.

4.4.3 Political Influence

Lacking such capital may help explain their relatively poor performance in national politics. The Building and Development Party joined with the smaller, Cairo-based *Salafī al-Aṣāla* Party and the more influential *Salafī al-Nūr* Party, whose base of operations is in Alexandria. Overall, this alliance did very well, winning a full quarter of the popular vote. How much of their success in Upper Egypt can be attributed to the influence of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* is debated, but their reward was meager. Of a total of 123 seats won by the coalition, the Building and Development Party received only 13. Ṣafwat ʿAbd al-Ghanī was elected head of their parliamentary bloc.[421]

Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya again played second fiddle in the presidential elections, but their maneuvering suggests a maturity in their political reasoning. The general assembly gathered and for fifteen hours listened to various invited Islamist candidates, afterwards debating who they should support.[422]

Early on, they somewhat surprisingly rejected the populist campaign of the independent Islamist Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismāʿīl. Though conservative Muslims throughout Egypt rallied behind his calls for an Islamic state, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* deemed him too divisive in his rhetoric as it unnerved liberals and non-Islamist revolutionaries alike.[423] Eventually he was disqualified for having a parent of non-Egyptian citizenship, which was forbidden by the electoral law.

They also chose not to support the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, first Khayrat al-Shāṭir, then Muḥammad Mursī. They were aware that many liberals did not trust the Brotherhood, and instead favored a decision of

419 Casper 2013 (c).

420 Interview with Mamdūḥ Sarūr 2013.

421 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

422 Ibid.

423 Ibid.

maximum consensus to secure the gains of the revolution.[424] ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abū al-Futūḥ, on the other hand, occupied a middle ground between the Islamist and liberal camps, was a revolutionary figure, and had the added benefit of once being among their number.[425] *Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* support, however, along with the endorsement of *al-Nūr* Party, may have cost him in the end as liberals and revolutionaries grew wary of ʿAbū al-Futūḥ's true objectives. He fell to fourth position with a disappointing 17 percent of the vote, having early on been considered a front runner.

In the second round, however, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* rallied behind the candidacy of Muḥammad Mursī in opposition to Aḥmad Shafīq, whom they viewed as the representative of the former Mubārak regime. When Mursī prevailed in a tight contest, Ṭāriq al-Zumar called on Christians and other average Egyptians to apologize for their losing vote.[426] Despite their developing democratic acceptance, the organization still viewed the struggle for power as a revolutionary contest.

But *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* also continued to reflect a new consciousness for unity in the subsequent struggle over the constitution. Amid fierce haggling, the elected parliament selected individuals for a 100-member committee to craft Egypt's new charter. Liberals complained vehemently that the fact of an Islamist majority did not grant them the right to dominate the committee. Seeking a modicum of consensus, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* decided to withdraw its two candidates from consideration, offering they be replaced by non-Islamists. As such they did not participate in writing the constitution.[427]

4.5 Mobilization

The back and forth nature of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, simultaneously supporting unity while advocating for revolutionary Islamic change, reflects a dichotomy within the organization concerning 'The Revisions' and their role in an organization moderating between its past and future. In many ways, they held to the past, if not to their association with violence.

4.5.1 Revolutionary Fervor

One useful example of this dichotomy is *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* leader ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid, a member of the Guidance Council. During the presidency

424 Ibid.

425 Ibid.

426 *Al-Miṣrī al-Yawm* 2012.

427 Interview with Abū al-Nāṣr 2013.

of Muḥammad Mursī, many Islamists saw the 'deep state' or 'remnants of the old regime' working to undermine his authority. Two main culprits were the media and the judiciary, and many Islamist followed the call to conduct sit-in protests at the Egyptian Media Production City and Supreme Constitutional Court in December of 2012. Mursī took no actions against their disruptive presence, but such 'revolutionary' activity made little sense to his opponents who criticized Islamists for behaving as an oppositional force while officially in charge of the nation.

Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya, meanwhile, very conscious of the public skepticism about their new commitment to nonviolence, sought to portray itself as a unifying force, albeit unapologetically Islamic. ʿAbd al-Mājid, however, wished to continue revolutionary activity, recalls Abū al-Naṣr, showing their commitment lied primarily with the energetic youth – of all spectrums – who feared the Mubārak regime was not yet dismantled despite the Mursī presidency. He sought to resign his position in April of 2013 in order not to politically embarrass his organization. As per bylaws, the matter was put to *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* general assembly, which rejected his resignation.[428]

Politics aside, the example of ʿAbd al-Mājid illustrates the difficulty *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* has in mobilization. Leaders like ʿIzzat al-Salamūnī admit they suffer a generation gap,[429] (and therefore recruiting among the politicized youth would have been useful) so who better to recruit than politicized Muslim youth? But at the same time, they wished to demonstrate their capacity as a mature political entity, and youthful 'excesses' have cost them in the past. Negotiating this balance was not easy, especially coupled with issues tied to their own self-identity.

This has two components. As an organization, the leaders of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* view the organization as a middle way between the literalism of *Salafīs* and the pragmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood. The former gets bogged down in religious texts, seeking for justification before they can take any step at all. The latter, meanwhile, readily sets aside religious principle if it suits the needs of their organization. Both are allies, they all support the end goal of an Islamic Project. But they choose to walk a path fully consistent with *Salafī* principles, while being fully engaged in striving to change the political and societal order.[430]

428 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

429 Casper 2013 (c).

430 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

4.5.2 Nonviolent Advocacy

As a political organization, meanwhile, they sought also to be a middle way. A regional leader in Fayyūm, Sharaf al-Dīn al-Jibālī states they have called themselves 'The Third Current' (*al-Tayyār al-Thālith*), seeking to praise the president for what he does right, but also say when he does wrong.[431] Few examples of the latter, however, were evident in either the press or in conversation.

Their greatest effort to mobilize with such balance played into one of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* greatest strengths – the break from their past. As President Mursī retreated more into the safety net of his Islamist advisors, primarily after his November 2012 decree elevating his decisions above judicial review, demonstrations against him turned increasingly violent. Some attacked Muslim Brotherhood regional headquarters, and a mysterious group called Black Bloc appeared on the scene in January of 2013, to oppose the Muslim Brotherhood and Mursī-led state.[432] In the middle of this controversy, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* called for a protest on February 15.

Labeled '*lā li l-ʿunf al-siyāsī*' or, 'no to political violence', they issued an invitation to all political forces to condemn and distance themselves from this violent phenomena of the Black Bloc. Attended largely by Islamists, they attracted a substantial number of non-Islamist revolutionary activists as well. In defense of democratic legitimacy, they put their own legitimacy on the line. "We have experience down this path," al-Jibālī said to those flirting with violence. "It will only end in bloodshed – avoid it."[433]

But despite seeking a middle way, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, perhaps characteristically, failed. Group leaders appeared on the stage and honored Khālid al-Islāmbulī, the assassin of al-Sādāt. Ṭāriq al-Zumar even called him a martyr in his subsequent death. Their revolutionary nature – and with it a justification of violence – continued to seep out. Perhaps in terms of mobilization this was for the best?

It may not be so. Officially, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* has foresworn violence, though the absolute nature of this commitment will be examined below. But leaders have complained that today's youth listen to, what they call, '*shaykh* Google' more than any traditional leaders, including themselves.

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431 Interview with Sharaf al-Dīn al-Jibālī 2013.

432 Egyptians were calling this group "Black Bloc." I have not heard Egyptians, even in demonstrations, using an Arabic name.

433 Interview with Sharaf al-Dīn al-Jibālī 2013.

Those with a bent towards violence or who experience radicalization can now gravitate easily toward extremists online.[434]

4.5.3 Joining a Social Islamism

Meanwhile, in defining their Islamism simply as an Islamic frame of reference, they did nothing distinctive compared with their political rivals. Islam, said Abū al-Naṣr, demands the integration of the religion with all aspects of life, including state, politics, economy, and law. Moreover, this is not deserving of being called 'Islamism', which is a label secularists have forced upon them. It is simply Islam, he said.[435]

In conversations with the author, leaders were careful to say their opponents are also Muslims, keen to avoid the *takfīr* (calling a Muslim an infidel) label associated with extremist groups. But it is a fine line difficult to tread; even if they allow others the name of 'Muslim', in calling their Islam deficient they are sure to make enemies. But in all this, they differ little from the Muslim Brotherhood or *Salafīs*. So why would someone join *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*?

Back in the 1970s and 80s it was or it seemed to be simpler. They were one of the few to turn Islam into an activist social movement.[436] A young man frustrated with the lack of Islamic piety in his life, family, and or society would hear an *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* preacher in a mosque. Inquiring more, local leadership would take him aside, get to know him, and encourage him to attend additional lectures and seminars. Eventually he would be invited to be an active member in the local setting, drafted into *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* commitment for *ḥisba*.[437]

This *ḥisba* is understood as described above, but also included assuming the role of reconciliation agents in a community. In the case of a conflict, all too often the state and the law are negligent in setting things straight, or else the judicial process would take years to decide an issue. Instead, villagers would agree to sit before a trusted elder who would pronounce his judgment immediately, in binding fashion. Often, he would receive financial compensation for his service.

Abū al-Naṣr states they perform this service as volunteers, for the sake of God, and are trusted because of their higher commitment to religion, not

434 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

435 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

436 Meijer 2009, 190-1.

437 Casper 2013 (c).

just to tradition.[438] Other observers testify they often do take a share, and in fact, in the case of local Copts, work in coordination with area thugs to create a dispute and then profit off the settlement.[439] True or not, this social role has earned them authority among Muslims especially in Upper Egypt, and adds to their recruitment efforts.

4.5.4 Controversies in Mobilizing Practice

This status as protectors of community was controversially engaged as Mursī's presidency found itself at odds with the police force. Frustrated with being put on the front lines of protest activity without adequate equipment to protect themselves, police went on strike in a number of locations, including *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* areas in Upper Egypt.

4.5.4.1 Militias

Their response was to organize community policing, but this sent shockwaves through the nationwide media. Rumors were rampant at the time about Islamist militias, and this effort played right into their hands. Furthermore, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* had sought to lead an insurrection three decades earlier to gain administrative control of the area. This raised the question if instability would now simply hand the region to them? Would *ḥisba* become area policy?

Leaders consistently denied any intention to form militias, revolutionary guards, or morality-enforcing religious police. At the same time, however, Abū al-Naṣr confirmed they rode through the streets on motorcycles, proclaiming that if the police left, "we are here."[440] He denied the detail reported about brandishing swords held aloft in the air.[441]

But such a perception lasts, and may well be related to their mobilization effort. No matter how 'mature' they sought to present themselves in the political arena, they reached out to the masses through their customary aggressive rhetoric. Perhaps this was due to their background less as statesmen or politicians, as opposed to preachers.

4.5.4.2 Rhetoric for the People

A descriptive example of aggressive rhetoric concerns a conference *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* held in October 2012 in the Cairo suburb of ʿAīn Shams,

438 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

439 Interview with Mamdūḥ Sarūr 2013.

440 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

441 Interview with Mamdūḥ Sarūr 2013.

a lower class urban district. During the height of the controversy over the Islamic nature of the constitution, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* described the efforts of liberals to remove Article Two of the Constitution, which called Islam the religion of the state and the principles of the *Sharīʿa* the main source of legislation. It was a false claim; there was no organized, consensus effort among non-Islamists to do so, as described in chapter 6. But ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid led the panel discussion, in which one member threatened to defend *Sharīʿa*, even if blood is shed.[442]

Abū al-Naṣr described this simply as a means to communicate with the people at their level. There is a difference between political discourse and popular rhetoric, he said, though both are important and are non-contradictory.[443] But to the observer, the difference is clear, leading to wonder which discourse is primary and which is their true face. It certainly called into question their stated commitment to non-violence, an issue which continually haunts them.

4.6 Philosophy

One reason for this ongoing issue is the doubt over the sincerity of their commitment to non-violence. While *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* may have given up violence themselves, the Muslim Brotherhood, the *Salafis*, violent militias in Sinai, and even *al-Qāʿida* are all accused of being part of one grand scheme to turn Egypt into an Islamic state. They have simply divided up the different roles between them.[444]

Such a grand conspiracy can be set aside for more concrete analysis, but it is worth noting this idea is common among anti-Islamists and the security sector.[445] The following section will explore *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* attitude toward violence.

4.6.1 The Conception of Violence

As noted above, 'The Revisions' were both a watershed and controversial moment in the history of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. Some observers believed certain leadership figures were compelled to agree publicly with the document,[446] while others may have done so simply to secure their freedom. ʿAbd al-Ākhir Ḥammād, reportedly *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* current spiritual

442 Al-Miṣrī Al-Yawm 2012 (a).

443 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

444 Interview with Mamdūḥ Sarūr 2013.

445 Interview with a former security advisor for the government in North Sinai 2013.

446 Interview with Mamdūḥ Sarūr 2013.

leader, admits his own reservations, while making clear these do not endorse violence. He also describes how Ibrāhīm and Zuhdī went too far in interpreting 'The Revisions' to admit Mubārak's status as a Muslim worthy to be obeyed as head of state.[447] Abū al-Naṣr said these two were not fit for leadership.[448]

Abū al-Naṣr refutes the notion, however, that 'The Revisions' themselves were the cause for the recent shift in leadership. ʿIṣṣām Darbāla, their president, was one of the key historical leaders involved in their production.[449] He also disputes those who believe the entire younger generation, left in prison while many leaders were freed, reject 'The Revisions' entirely.[450]

The first notion to set aside is that 'The Revisions' were a complete rejection of violence. On the contrary, it recognized the Islamic legitimacy of *Jihād* in its violent dimension, but subjected it to consideration of the overall general good and the importance of avoiding civil strife. Furthermore, as a concept, it was restricted to repel a foreign invasion.[451]

This is similar to one of Hammād's objections. He stated that the use of violence against a Muslim leader who refuses to apply Islamic law is legitimate in theory.[452] However, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* practical experience led it to commit to nonviolence, as the group's violent struggle increased civil strife and harmed the general good.

This helps explain why *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* leaders like Abū al-Naṣr continued to honor al-Sādāt's assassin, Islāmbulī. He must be judged, he insisted, with an appreciation for the context of the time. After the Revolution, society opened and it became feasible to change the system without having to resort to violence. In contrast, al-Sādāt's regime made this impossible. Islāmbulī and *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* did not calculate properly the cost of their rebellion, said Abū al-Naṣr, but their intentions were noble.[453]

Worthy to remember also is *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* insistence that the security forces took the fight to them. Their initial goals were to be a revolutionary social movement, not an armed insurrection. Many times their violence was mixed up with the retaliatory culture of Upper Egypt, as members were drawn into family, tribal, and community disputes. Leaders told

447 Ibid.

448 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

449 Ibid.

450 Interview with Mamdūḥ Sarūr 2013.

451 Meijer 2009, 215.

452 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

453 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

stories of traveling extensively to stop younger members from engaging in violence, whereas it flared in areas unable to be reached in time. Often leaders watched from prison in disbelief.[454]

Taken together with the above, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* wishes to maintain an ideological acceptance of violence as a means of change, while severely restricting its application. Perhaps this is also from necessity, the group no longer had much capacity to act violently. But a close observer with thorough familiarity of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* was convinced the leadership has moved on from their violent past and embraces instead the new possibilities of the Egyptian Revolution.[455]

4.6.2 The Conception of Democracy and Shūrā

Despite their past ambivalence, even rejection, these new possibilities included a practical democracy.

Democracy, however, has to be introduced along with an arguably similar Islamic concept, i.e. *shūrā*. *Shūrā* means 'consultation', and has long been suggested by modernizing Muslims as an equivalent of democracy and religiously legitimate bridge by which to import an otherwise Western model of governance. Its traditional usage, comprising consultation only, however, worried many Egyptians hopeful the January 25 Revolution would turn the state into a true and open democracy.

In Article Six of the 2012 constitution, Egypt's political system was said to be based on the principles of democracy and *shūrā*, as if they are different, though no difference is elaborated upon. Some believed the word was added only to placate the *Salafīs*, who were distraught over other articles such as those giving sovereignty to the people, and not to God.

But something else may have been intended. *Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* shared this concern over the issue of sovereignty with the *Salafīs*, and rejects democracy as un-Islamic, even if they accept(ed) it in practice.[456] Abū al-Naṣr explained that the traditional caliphate is the ideal Muslim system of government, even if it is not yet achievable in reality.[457]

Moreover, he added that this ideal includes the theological belief that God has given the ruler all authority. It is within the ruler's remit, however, to delegate his authority to others, such as judges. Islamic history, he explained, is full of examples where a judge decided against the ruler, but he

454 Hulsman. Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a)

455 Ibid.

456 Ibid.

457 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

did so only within the authority designated by him. The separation of powers is not an Islamic idea, but it does not violate *Sharīʿa*.[458]

A similar delegation could be seen with the legislative branch, though troubles may begin to emerge here. *Shūrā* intends for the ruler to listen to all perspectives on a given issue, Abū al-Naṣr explained, but the ruler alone is constituted to take the final decision. If he does not listen he opens up grounds for his removal by the people, but it is assumed he will judge wisely among the options presented him.

A legislature, however, does not present the ruler with options – it codifies the law. So while Abū al-Naṣr believes such a democracy may be the closest of all systems to *shūrā*, it does not equal it. Much is shared between the two, such as the principle of rotation of power. But democracy may be acceptable as a means to eventually get to *shūrā*.

Until it does, he said, it must be limited by God's law. The parliament in a democracy is also deficient because it allows for the collection of representatives to allow the transgression of *Sharīʿa*. *Shūrā* as an Islamic system will never permit this; it serves as a ceiling to the authority of the people to legislate as they wish. It also includes the ḥudūd punishments such as cutting off the hand of a thief. God is the merciful one, Abū al-Naṣr explained, and his system is always more merciful than man's, even if we cannot comprehend it.[459]

Drevon noted that however much *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* still holds to the idea that democracy is at least sub-Islamic, they do accept it in practice.[460] The example given is of their own internal elections, which resulted in a transfer of leadership.[461] Closer examination, however, moderates this understanding.

Abū al-Naṣr explained that *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* does not have a culture of nominating oneself for a position. Instead, each member puts forward 5-10 names he has confidence in, and these are debated together, with the most agreeable chosen.[462]

By appearances, these are chosen by election, and indeed Ibrāhīm technically qualified for the Guidance Council in the ninth position. But Abū al-Naṣr

458 Ibid.

459 Ibid.

460 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

461 Ibid.

462 Interview with ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr 2013.

chose to distinguish this process from democracy, which has a culture of competition.[463]

What does this mean for their political vision for Egypt? Did the mention of *shūrā* in the constitution suggest some sort of communal selection of an all-powerful leader? These details are not spelled out so conclusively, but they do reflect the ultimate vision of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*.

Additionally, however much *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* does intend to help establish a modern, Islamic democracy, this message is not getting down to their people. At the 'No to Political Violence' protest, one of their partisans declared their entrance into the political system was simply the jurisprudence of reality. "If the people want ballot boxes," he said, "we will use them."[464]

He then smiled, recognizing the weight of his words to a foreigner, and said, "No, the ballot box will stay. But I know our people and they are religious. They will choose us."[465]

4.7 Conclusion

The protestor's confidence has proved unfounded. Massive protests in June and early July of 2013 demanded early elections to replace the Islamist president Muḥammad Mursī, and though such a demonstration does not serve to predict the outcome of future electoral contests, it is clear the religious nature of Egyptians is not sufficient to ensure the success of political Islam.

So far, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* has held to their commitment of non-violence,[466] at least in denial. When security forces forcibly removed pro-Mursī sit-in protests, a wave of retaliatory violence struck the Coptic community, especially in Upper Egypt, burning their churches and assaulting their homes and shops.[467] It was reminiscent of the worst 'excesses' *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* (in the 1970s and 1980s), at least one of their more conciliatory leaders, has since apologized for.[468]

Immediately, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* distanced itself from the attacks, condemning them completely.[469] Such denials were widely suspected in the

463 Ibid.

464 Interview with Muḥammad Aḥmad 2013.

465 Ibid.

466 Ahram Online 2013 (i).

467 Hulsman 2013 (c).

468 ʿAmr al-Misrī 2012.

469 Mada Masr 2013.

press, however, as a public cover to escape responsibility, either of the spontaneous action of their supporters or worse, a pre-planned expression of revenge. Media reports placed ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid in Daljah, al-Minyā, 300 kilometers south of Cairo, where Islamists had displaced local police and taken over the village, abusing Copts in the process.[470]

Whether or not this accusation is true, rumors abound, and they are likely to remain with *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* in the foreseeable future. If many doubted their true intentions during a period of openness, these are likely to increase during a time of public crackdown on Islamists.

What is more to be feared is if this crackdown results in pushing *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* once again to violence. Early indications suggest in both capacity and in commitment to 'The Revisions', the leadership does not welcome such a return. Instead, they will publically reject this 'coup' through non-violent protests only. Their answer could be imagined such: Even if the actions of the military to remove Mursī subject them to overthrow according to Islamic law, the resulting social price of a return to violence makes this option untenable.

At least, this is their imagined answer, one which would be spoken to a foreigner or to the press. Whether or not they can control their recently affiliated youth, or whether or not they wish to, is another matter.

Given their history, it is only fitting such suspicions remain. Should they prove themselves truly, even in the midst of adversity, it will be a great development for Egypt.

470 Kirkpatrick 2013 (a).

5 Non-Political Islamists: The Jihādī Salafīs and the Situation in Sinai *(Jayson Casper)*

5.1 Introduction

The Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011 sought 'bread, freedom and social justice'[471] for all. It resulted in a political system opened to all, by which these revolutionary goals were to be achieved. Benefiting most from the opening were Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and previously quietist *Salafīs*, who had been largely excluded from the political process. They went on to win majorities in parliament, the presidency, and a constitutional referendum giving primacy of place to *Sharī'a*. However, some Islamists were not satisfied with this process, as will be described in this chapter.

A first challenge was that for years many Islamists, outside the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, were reared on the idea that democracy itself runs counter to *Sharī'a* and the Islamic system. Egypt's *Salafī* parties were able to navigate this challenge and unexpectedly won a quarter of the seats in parliament, as mentioned in chapter 4. In what was hailed as 'the battle of the ballot box', *Salafīs* mobilized the religiously conservative population by promising that democracy was the means by which God's law would be established. All that was necessary was to outvote the others.

However, some Islamists viewed voting as opportunism and a betrayal of Islam. A small number rallied around the dogmatic positions of the *jihādī Salafīs* in rejecting democracy and with it the so-labeled hypocritical Islamists who agreed to play within this system. Most, however, paid them little attention as the Islamist tide was rising by peaceful means.

A second challenge was geographic. Contrasting with this peacefulness was the status of Sinai, which tied in well to fears associated with the self-appellation of 'jihadist' in this rejectionist faction. The buffer region between the Suez Canal and Israel was considered a wild terrain of Bedouins, armed groups, and criminals, tied into the illicit tunnel economy to Gaza ruled by Ḥamās. In this regional context, a democratic opening meant little.

These two challenges, ideological and geographical, can arguably be connected, since both could have had the potential to destabilize the nascent democracy. The *jihādī Salafīs* posed a threat to the participatory Islamists' right flank, who were already uncertain about 'democracy'. President Mursī's own democratic credentials and commitments can be debated, but

471 In Arabic, '*'Aysh, ḥurriya, 'adāla ijtimā'iyya.*'

unless he assured *Salafīs* that democratic gains would indeed lead to the triumph of *Sharīʿa*, he would risk splitting his strongest supporting constituency. Nevertheless, the more he leaned on them as allies, especially following his presidential decree in November 2012 to set his decisions above judicial review, the more he alienated the rest of the electorate, who accused him constantly of being sectarian and of having a religious, not democratic, agenda.

Meanwhile, armed entities in the Sinai posed a different threat. Criminal groups engaged in drug or human trafficking were one thing, while other militant groups were dedicated only to the cause of Palestine. But the presence of jihadists who might potentially target the state became a security issue. As weapons proliferated following the fall of Muʿammar al-Qaddāfī in Libya, Mursī, with many Islamists, tried to reason with the inhabitants of Sinai, seeking to inculcate them against a violent ideology. But opponents accused him of being soft on terrorism, giving cover to militant Islamists he might secretly be aligned with. And if jihadists carried out an attack in Sinai, he appeared unable to govern the nation he presided over.

For indeed, there were attacks, both before and after he was deposed as president. During the period of military transitional governance, the pipeline supplying gas to Israel was bombed at least fifteen times before Mursī's election. However, the first attack of note thereafter actually resulted in the cementing of his power. On August 5, 2012, sixteen soldiers were killed as militants commandeered their vehicles and crossed the border into Israel, where they also were subsequently killed. On August 12 President Mursī responded by sacking leading military brass and thereby attempted to establish civilian control over the army.

Nevertheless by May 2013, another attack called Mursī's leadership into question. A number of soldiers were kidnapped by militants, though negotiations eventually led to their release. In both cases, mystery continued to surround the perpetrators, who were never brought to formal justice. Instead, Egyptian military operations continued in the area, as conspiracies circled from both sides. Some Egyptians suspected Islamists in the Sinai precipitated the crisis to give Mursī the space to remove aging military leadership. Islamists, meanwhile, wondered if intelligence links to militant groups were working to make trouble for the president.[472]

The threat from Sinai to the new democratic system was never direct, but along with a deteriorating security situation many felt nostalgia for the stability offered before the Revolution. Following the deposing of Mursī, a new wave of violence sprang from the Sinai, as will be described below.

472 From frequent conversations with ordinary Egyptians during this period.

Noteworthy here is the comment of a leading Muslim Brother, Muḥammad al-Biltājī, that this insurrection would stop the moment Mursī returned to power.[473]

Biltājī's statement a minute earlier on YouTube insisted the Muslim Brotherhood did not control the situation in Sinai, but his comment fueled all the speculation otherwise. Even if they had no direct control, due to the shared end goal of an Islamic state, the Muslim Brotherhood was suspected of coordination with *jihādī Salafīs* and jihadists proper. But if not, as was consistently denied, this jihadism threatened the democratic aspirations of Islamism in general, providing justification for critics who wished to see Mursī removed from power.

This chapter will explore both of these challenges, of the political but non-participatory *jihādī Salafīs* and the apoliticism of groups in the Sinai. It is based on interviews with Aḥmad ʿAshūsh, a leader in the *jihādī-Salafīs*, Jerome Drevon, a researcher who has spent considerable time with jihadists, Ismail Alexanderni, a socio-political researcher with years of experience conducting field work in the Sinai, and a former security advisor for the government, a general with extensive experience in North Sinai.

5.2 Jihādī Salafīs and Ideological Non-Participation

The "*jihādī* Salafī" sobriquet is both descriptive and misleading. The misleading aspect comes in their use of *Jihād*, which conjures among many images of terrorism at worst and violent insurrection at best.[474] As will be seen, the use of violent rhetoric was not absent from their discourse, but since *jihādī Salafīs* appeared on the public scene post- Revolution and continued through the presidency of Mursī, they claimed to have focused exclusively on preaching and arguing the rightness of their cause.[475] As will be seen below, this claim is contested.

5.2.1 Restoring Jihād and Sharīʿa

The movement's cause, however, includes a full restoration of the concept of *Jihād* as an essential feature of Islam, which they describe in militant terms.[476] In this their name is usefully descriptive. Unlike the participatory

473 AlKaheraWalNasTV 2013.

474 For many Muslims, of course, *jihād* refers primarily to the struggle against the self in submission to God. The concept of *jihād* can be used in many different ways. See Anwar 2007.

475 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

476 Anwar 2007.

Salafīs who have adopted at least the tools of democracy and thus implicitly the world system that accompanies it, these *jihādī Salafīs* have demanded nothing less than the triumph of Islam and the resurrection of its birthright as the leading influence in the world, as it was in the first three generations (*salaf*) following the Prophet Muḥammad. As one of their followers noted, "Is there any *Salafīsm* without *Jihād*?"[477]

The *Salafīs* and Muslim Brotherhood may have believed they were aiding Islam in their ascent to power, but according to *jihādī-Salafīs*, they were playing the wrong game.[478] They believed, actually, that the Brotherhood was working in cooperation with America, cares nothing about *Sharīʿa*, and was concerned only for their own power.[479] ʿAshūsh argued in 2013 that:

> The Muslim Brotherhood do not strive to implement or enforce the Shari`a; the Muslim Brotherhood organization is solely committed to hold on to and evolve around power. In fact, to hold onto power is the main objective of the Muslim Brotherhood, and eventually they neglect values and religious doctrines for the sake of pragmatic considerations.[480]

With regard to the participatory *Salafīs*, the *jihādī Salafīs* were slightly more generous, but it was the connection to America and the West that compromised them all. Democracy, *jihādī Salafīs* understand, means placing sovereignty in the hands of the people, while they say that for a Muslim, sovereignty must be for God alone. Any movement away from this is hypocrisy and error.[481]

The cause of *jihād*, therefore, is not one of wanton violence. It is the firm commitment to not give way to a world system imposed on Muslim peoples around the world. It is a rejection of what they believed to be imperialism proper, but also of cultural and intellectual imperialism which is far more insidious. A foreign army can be repelled, but foreign ideology can seep into the consciousness of unwary individuals and families.[482] "The Egyptian people have been brain-washed," contends."[483] A chief example of these effects caused by imperialism was witnessed in the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood and *Salafīs*, explain *jihādī-Salafīs*. As these Islamists campaigned for office, they often spoke to assuage the people – and the

477 Interview with Ashraf 2013.

478 Hulsman and Casper 2016

479 Ibid.

480 Ibid.

481 Ibid.

482 Ibid.

483 Ibid.

West – that they were interested only in the 'gradual application' of *Sharīʿa*. This rhetoric asserted that political freedom had to be achieved, the economy set right, and only then would *Sharīʿa* make sense in its entirety. When all is done well in the name of Islam, people will welcome *Sharīʿa* with open arms, and its oft-maligned *ḥudūd* punishments of cutting off hands would never need to be applied.[484] During this period, ʿAshūsh explained that

> Our major concern now is to achieve a change in thought and mentality. Our struggle as Salafi-*Jihādis* is to first change the Egyptian mentality that has been strongly afflicted by the corrupt media structure, the treacherous liberal politics that had succeeded to systematically distort the people's thought. Our goal is to bring back the authenticity of [Islamic] thought to the people, to disclose the truth, to revive in them the power of their belief.[485]

For *jihādī-Salafis*, God has made *Sharīʿa – ḥudūd* and all – as part of his mercy, aspects of which can be set aside in times of poverty. But to be set aside means that as a system it has already been established. Thus, to say *Sharīʿa* will be applied 'gradually' is to accept the terms of debate set by the West, as it tries to define what proper Islam looks like, for its own interests.

Jihādī Salafis saw this foreign ideology deforming the concept of *jihād* itself. Muslims have allowed the West to limit its meaning to a defensive war against an invading power. *Jihād*, however, is, in their view, far more powerful a concept. Islam is God's system of justice; it is a code of ethics, economics, and politics that will put the world right. *Jihād*, as God intends it, is a way to right the wrongs of the world and end the idolatry of man enthroning man's law. As ʿAshūsh claimed,

> *Jihād* is an ongoing religious duty to maintain our religion, Islam. There are different kinds of *jihād*; one kind is the struggle against oneself (nafs), the strife to inform people on the truth of Islam, or an outer struggle, the *jihād* of the sword. It depends on what efforts would fit best according to situation and location as well.[486]

Of course this necessitates violence, but it is more appropriately labeled as power.[487]

This intellectual warfare from the West has also convinced Muslims that democracy is consistent with Islam, that they can recapture some of their lost glory in adopting these forms. But according to *jihādī-Salafis*, there are

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484 Ibid.

485 Ibid.

486 Ibid.

487 Ibid.

three legitimate means to achieve power. The first is simply to seize it, which becomes justified if the *Sharīʿa* is applied.

Once a *Sharīʿa*-based state is established, the other two means follow. First, the leader may bequeath his authority to someone else. Or, and this is preferred, the consensus of approved scholars give their indication of approval. These scholars would assert themselves, and be recognized as such by the population, but the source of their formal or informal authority was not otherwise explained.[488]

Jihādī Salafis find that the participatory *Salafis* fell into a trap. By running for parliament they believed they could ensure the priority of *Sharīʿa* in the constitution. In the end, in their interpretation, a constitution was produced which was influenced equally, if not more, by non-Islamists opposed to the rule of Islam. This flawed document then became the basis for the authority of a supposedly Islamist president. Mursī bound himself to guard both this constitution and the law, but the 'true' Muslim leader, they believe, must bind himself only to the *Qurʾān* and the *Sunna*. From ʿAshūsh's perspective, their hypocrisy and error were apparent. "Mursī declared himself a secularist ruler who rules according to positive law and the constitution," he said, "contrary to the Muslim ruler who declares *Sharīʿa* in accordance with the *Qurʾān* and *Sunna*. Mursī is a constitutional ruler, but not a legitimate one."[489]

5.2.2 How to Restore Jihād and Sharīʿa

When focusing on *jihādī-Salafis*' vision, the question of the means to achieve it arises. Here they exhibit less clarity. As one of their primary spokesmen, ʿAshūsh, presented two somewhat odd comparisons to Hitler and to the American neo-conservative foreign policy establishment. As leaders of the movement, he said, *jihādī Salafis* intend to speak clearly and never compromise, positing that "earthly matters are negotiable, beliefs are not to be bargained."[490] On the one hand this would win the respect of the people, causing them to rise to power like Hitler during a moment of national crisis. On the other hand, their rhetoric would set the tone for both national and pan-Islamic policy, like the American neo-conservatives ruling without actually being 'elected'.[491] But how will it happen?

488 Interview with Ashraf 2013.

489 Hulsman and Casper 2016.

490 Ibid.

491 Ibid.

They have been deliberately vague. *Jihādī Salafīs* have asserted a wide following but give no evidence of it. They claimed no organizational structure and insisted they carry no weapons. Their *jihād*, spoken of during the period of Mursī's presidency, was described as only intellectual and psychological. Perhaps it is the latter that made them appear wild-eyed.

For example, they approve of *al-Qāʿida*, supported the attacks of September 11, in 2001[492] and in 2012, when the American ambassador to Libya was killed in Benghazi. These are demonstrations of power, ʿAshūsh explained, showing the West they will resist their world dominance.[493] He stated that they "will never cede to any form of domination, whether intellectual or military."[494] But at the same time, one of their leading figures, Muḥammad al-Ẓawāhirī, the brother of *al-Qāʿida* leader Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī, publicly offered a truce to 'the West', in which all attacks would stop in exchange for the withdrawal of all armies from Muslim territory and non-interference in their affairs.[495] Until then, however, resistance movements, incorrectly labeled 'terrorism', will continue and receive the moral and material support of the *jihādī-Salafīs*.[496]

However, analysts believe that they had very little support in Egypt or even among Islamic militants elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq. They could neither enforce a truce[497] nor guide operations.[498] On the whole their rhetoric was a show, offered to the media as a platform to showcase their views. Political Islamists who were asked about the *jihādī Salafīs* disavowed them and claim ignorance of their movement.[499] Yet others find *jihādī Salafī* leaders to be heroes, and furthermore, closely linked with public figures of political Islam.[500] The security sector asserted the same.[501]

Muḥammad Jamāl al-Kāshif, a leading *jihādī Salafī* figure, is in prison in Egypt due to his connection with the Benghazi attack on the American consulate in September 2012. ʿAshūsh denied he was involved, additionally absolving another *jihādī Salafī* figure, ʿĀdil Shaḥāta, of being linked to the

492 Interview with Ashraf 2013.

493 Hulsman and Casper 2016.

494 Ibid.

495 Egypt Independent 2012 (f).

496 Hulsman and Casper 2016.

497 E-mail exchange with Khalil al-Anani 2013.

498 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

499 Interview with Sharaf al-Dīn al-Jibālī 2013.

500 Interview with ʿAbd al-Bāsit al-Fashnī 2013.

501 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

militants in Sinai.[502] But he did not deny their status as *jihādī-Salafīs*, nor did he condemn the attacks. Was their '*jihād*', therefore, in fact violent, actual, and underway? Analyzing this question demands a closer look at the realities of Sinai.

5.3 Bedouins, Jihādis, and Geographical Non-Participation

Though military opinion runs contrary,[503] many observers note the Sinai is a region of economic neglect among the Bedouin.[504] The population of North Sinai, where most militant activity is located, is estimated between 350,000 and 400,000, of which 130,000 to 200,000 are Bedouin.[505] The rest are predominantly transplanted residents of the Nile Valley, who come to work as doctors, teachers, and government employees, and live exclusively in the region's cities.[506] There is also a small but influential number of descendants of the former ruling Mamluk class deposed and massacred by Muḥammad ʿAlī in the 19th Century. These are of Turkish and Eastern European origin and live primarily along the Sinai-Israel border.[507]

The economic neglect has been due to the state's policy of treating the region – especially its Bedouin elements – as a security matter.[508] This policy is explained by factors such as being on the border with Israel, being home to a traditional tribal community that resists modern notions of citizenship, and being a vast, underpopulated area of difficult terrain easing the flight and hideout of criminals and militants alike. However, the sometimes harsh and arbitrary behavior of the state has increased the local population's resentments, as they resist governmental coercion.

5.3.1 The Security Sector and Bedouin Tribes

State policy adopted the strategy of working closely with the tribes. But this strategy has also contributed to dividing the Bedouin and engendered social instability among them, as the tribal code has weakened. The Committee of Tribal Affairs, based in the Sinai, is staffed entirely by security fig-

502 Hulsman and Casper 2016.

503 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

504 Eleiba 2013.

505 Higher estimates are from Balanga 2012, lower estimates are from an interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

506 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

507 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

508 Ibid.

ures, with no Bedouin participation.[509] Furthermore, the police bypassed the traditional route of leadership selection by appointing the head of each tribe, resulting in some rejecting him while others profit from his privileged access to resources and influence.[510]

A further source of social disruption came from the state's unofficial policy of promoting a tunnel economy with Gaza. Allowing these tunnels had several advantages. It facilitated Egypt's image as a supporter of the Palestinian cause, gave a political pressure point with which to influence both Israel and Ḥamās,[511] and greased the wheel of corruption while providing both economic opportunity for and leverage with the Bedouin community. At its height during the Israeli operation in Gaza in 2009, a rented tunnel would gain $30,000 per day,[512] and provide exorbitant profits for traded goods and smuggling alike.[513]

The rapid development of this industry naturally contributed to competition between Sinai actors. Informal spheres of influence were divided so that the ten families of Mamluk descendants who reside on the border 'own' the tunnels, the Bedouins control the routes of access, and the Nile Valley residents participate in shipping and handling. However, among the Bedouins some profited more than others, while others have pushed the boundaries with drugs, weapons, and human trafficking.[514] As a result, while a tribal code still exists, tribal leaders find it difficult to take and enforce consensus measures.

The al-Minā'ī family of the *Sawārka* tribe provided an example. Ibrāhīm al-Minā'ī was the tribal leader of a divided clan. He and his son, Khalaf, were killed by unknown militants upon returning from a tribal conference to take a decision on how to deal with increasing militancy.[515] Khalaf suggested each tribe arm itself through popular committees to pacify its area, and turn over any of its members involved in militancy. Meanwhile, Ibrāhīm described his own brother as a member in a *jihādī* group. While security labeled this brother the operational leader of local *jihādīs*,[516] an analyst described him as a cousin, and not a *jihādī* at all but rather a human trafficker newly associated with a rejectionist strand of Islam, and in fact, likely an

509 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

510 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

511 Ibid.

512 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

513 El-Rashidi 2012 (b).

514 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

515 Reuters 2013.

516 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

informant for the intelligence apparatus.[517] Such confusion did not aid proper understanding of the Sinai.

From the security perspective, this confused situation is tied directly not only to *jihādī* groups culminating in *al-Qāʿida*, but also to the larger Islamist movement. Muslim Brotherhood deputy leader Khayrat al-Shāṭir was, according to a security source, stated to be one of the chief beneficiaries of the tunnel economy, with his group coordinating between all in common pursuit of an Islamic state.[518] After the Revolution in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood are said to have divided up roles, in which *jihādīs* play the 'useful' part, according to a security source. Their role is to scare the liberals and assure the West that Islamists alone are able to keep militants in line. The many visits paid by Muslim Brothers[519] and *Salafī shaykhs*[520] to the Sinai gave evidence to an effort – officially to combat violent ideologies – to synchronize operations.[521] Either way, it appeared that there was a level of success in pacifying the area was achieved, at least up until the deposing of Mursī.[522]

However, Mursī's policy may not have been a success at all. The security source says that, although President Mursī made it seem like he was authorizing military operations against militants, he was actually preventing them behind the scenes.[523] Mursī much preferred the delegations of dialogue, some of which were presidential,[524] and promised a new era of development in Sinai. But all the while, the aforementioned *jihādī Salafīs* are said to have carried instructions to the up to 10,000 jihādīs,[525] who were organized by Ramzī Muwāfī, the former medical doctor of Usāma bin Lādin.[526]This is not analysis, the security source said, but intelligence.

Analysis may give a more balanced view. This requires a deeper delineation of militancy in the Sinai.

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517 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

518 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

519 Al-Monitor 2012.

520 Egypt Independent 2012 (e).

521 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

522 Pelham 2012.

523 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

524 Associated Press 2012.

525 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

526 Ahram Online 2011 (a); Fahmy, M. 2013.

5.3.2 Militancy in the Sinai

Before describing the militancy during this period, however, its forerunners are necessary to understand. *Takfīrī* groups were formed in the 1970s as a breakaway from the Muslim Brotherhood. Their name designates 'excommunication', i.e. the process of calling someone an infidel. Seeing Egyptian society as un-Islamic, these groups decided to withdraw from it and live a 'pure' Islamic existence in community in the desert.[527] Some groups turned violent, such as *al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād*, which bombed Sinai resorts each year from 2005 to 2007.[528]

Most so-called *takfīrī* groups, however, were not violent, according to researcher Alexanderni. Quite the opposite, as they live apart from others and believe they must await a new caliph before being able to establish a full Islamic society. Those who engage in violence are generally associated either with criminal activity or regional intelligence networks promoting chaos and instability.[529]

Even ideologically, violent militant groups have not traditionally focused on Egypt. Their presence and activity in the Sinai is instead directed at Israel. Bedouins in general do not recognize the borders between Egypt and Israel which were drawn ignoring their living quarters, and most view Israelis as occupiers of Muslim land. Bedouin residents of Sinai are thus more than happy to provide refuge to those who work against Israel, and consider them heroes.[530]

Of the four major militant groups, the two strongest, *Anṣār Bayt al-Maqdis* and *Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn fī Aknāf Bayt al-Maqdis*, fit the description of being anti-Israeli. The former, however, was thereafter radicalized.

Outraged at the dispersal of the pro-Mursī sit-in in Nasr City, Cairo, but especially at the killing of their members at the hands of Israeli and Egyptian 'aggression', they took on the activity of terrorists, Alexanderni said. He further asserted that their attempted assassination of the minister of the interior on September 5, 2013 could have painted them as rebels, but in announcing the targeting also of journalists and television presenters, they exceed all limits of sympathy.[531]

527 Fahmy,M. 2011.

528 Ashour 2013.

529 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

530 Ibid.

531 Ibid.

The other two groups are the confusingly named *jihādī Salafīs* and the remnants of *al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād*. These groups did not display the operational capacity nor the communication sophistication of those above. But despite any sharing of nomenclature, none of these militants had connections with *jihādī-Salafīs*[532] or political Islamists outside the Sinai or elsewhere, Alexanderni stated.[533] And while Alexanderni believed there is ideological connection with *al-Qāʿida*, he also contended there are no established relationships between them. Even among themselves, militant groups have been fiercely independent – as well as clandestine. Jihādīs, as they have been targeted by the state do not tend to associate with others, he said, and are unknown even by their own families. A major figure in the formerly violent, turned participatory Islamist group, *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, who Alexanderni said preferred not to be named, demonstrated almost no knowledge of the realities of the Sinai.[534]

If anything, the accusations of Mursī's accommodation of jihādīs should be seen in reverse. The high profile visit of *Salafī* leader Yāsir Burhāmi – accompanied by an intelligence officer – resulted in jihādī threats, and neither coordination nor placation. They warned the state that the authorities may know about us here in Sinai, but they do not know what we have in Cairo or Alexandria, conveyed Alexanderni. To signal their strength, they gave a tip which resulted in a raiding of a terrorist cell in Nasr City, as it was not of their own organization.[535] Information in this raid led to the linking of the alleged, having been arrested for coordinating the attack on Benghazi.[536]

While security signaled up to about 10,000 militants in Sinai, they estimate only about 350 of these are Bedouin – and they are known to the intelligence apparatus.[537]Alexanderni numbered the total as no more than a few thousand, and perhaps only hundreds.[538]Analyst Omar Ashour, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, however, said the number is no more than in the tens.[539]

532 Drevon 2014.

533 Al-Monitor 2012.

534 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

535 Ibid.

536 Fahmy, M. 2013.

537 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

538 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

539 Ashour 2013.

5.3.3 Local Political Islamism

More influential than militant groups, however, were the *Salafī* associations that had begun to replace traditional tribal allegiances. Abū Fayṣal for instance had been a *Salafī Sharīʿa* court judge in al-ʿArīsh, heading one of fourteen established but unofficial courts for dispute resolution in the Sinai. Bedouins have always had their internal methods of tribal justice, but as the state weakened, their traditional code alongside an increasingly absent public justice sector since the Revolution, more and more have been turning to religious solutions.[540]

Abū Fayṣal is a veteran of *al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād*, but as security cracked down upon his group following their bombing campaign, he joined the wing which revised its ideology in prison and adopted *Salafī* ways in *Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamāʿa* (roughly translated as 'Those of the Prophet's way and group'). In September 2013 he conducted a symbolic trial of General al-Sīsī of the Egyptian army, pronouncing a sentence of execution. He also rejoiced in the fact that since the Revolution *Sharīʿa* has been the effective law of the Sinai, and longed for the day it will be the law of the state.[541] Security estimated the number of religious but not armed *Salafīs* such as Abū Fayṣal are between 5,000 and 7,000,[542] but their influence may be much wider.

By contrast, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sinai has been rather limited. They have almost no presence in eastern Sinai and find support only among urbanites hailing originally from the Nile Valley.[543] A diversity of political allegiance can be found among this community, but as a whole, the region is geographically distant and politically marginalised. Such is the nature of a desert and a social system dominated by tribal realities.

5.4 Conclusion

As has been noted, the information presented on both the *jihādī Salafīs* and realities in Sinai is deeply sensitive and contested. The former appeared on the margin of the political scene, which they pulled to the Islamist right. On the one hand, they portended ill for safety and stability as they are linked to an armed form of the *Jihād* they insisted was nonviolent, but very confrontational.

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540 Revkin 2013.

541 Ashour 2013.

542 Interview with a security advisor to the Egyptian government 2013.

543 Interview with Ismail Alexanderni 2013.

On the other hand, however, this could have been the tarnishing of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* by state security and the intelligence apparatus, a sector prominently involved among the latter described groups in the Sinai as well. Amid discontent Bedouins resided a limited number of armed so-called jihādīs, whose aims are not always clear. The recent turn against the Egyptian police and armed forces, mostly in Sinai but creeping elsewhere, bodes negatively for Egypt's future. Even before this, the situation in Sinai was hardly conducive to the establishment of a participatory democracy.

These issues may be on the periphery of the major changes going on in Egypt. After all, both radical ideology and militant Islamism have been present in Egypt for decades. In the Sinai it was mostly left to fester, while the state cracked down upon its spectre in Upper Egypt. But unless they are dealt with in transparency by the state, media, liberals, and Islamists alike, the positive transformation of socio-political dynamics is bound to stall.

The full integration of Sinai's residents is one of Egypt's many ongoing challenges, among its most entrenched and difficult.

6 Non-Islamist Political Actors in Egypt
(Nicholas Gjorvad)

6.1 Introduction

While previous chapters in this book have primarily concentrated on political parties and movements classified as Islamist, this chapter will focus on their non-Islamist counterparts. Specifically, this chapter will identify the core beliefs and strategies of non-Islamist parties and movements during the rule of Muḥammad Mursī. The observations in this chapter come both before and directly after the massive protests of June 30, 2013, which eventually led to the ouster of Mursī, causing a rapid succession of political turmoil. With this in mind, this chapter will focus on the overall trend of the non-Islamist current since the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 until August 2013.

6.2 Defining non-Islamist Groups in Egypt

In discussing non-Islamists, the distinction between non-Islamist political parties and non-Islamist movements will be made. During the rule of Mursī in 2012-2013, non-Islamist political parties largely coalesced under the umbrella group, National Salvation Front, which was formed after former President Muḥammad Mursī's controversial Constitutional decree made in November of 2012. Political parties and movements in this group include the *Ḥizb al-Dustūr* (Constitution Party), *Ḥizb al-Taḥāluf al-Shaʿbī Al-Ishtirākī* (Socialist Popular Alliance Party), *Ḥizb al-Miṣrī al-Dimūqrāṭī al-Ijtimāʿī* (Social Democratic Party), *Al-Tayyār al-Shaʿbi al-Miṣri* (Egyptian Popular Current), *Ḥizb al-Miṣriyyīn al-Aḥrār* (Free Egyptians Party), *Ḥizb al-Wafd al-Jadīd* (the New *al-Wafd* Party[544]), *Ḥizb al-Karāma* (Dignity Party), *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Ḥurriyya* (Freedom Egypt Party), *Ḥizb al-Tajjamuʿ* (National Progressive Unionist Party), and *Ḥizb al-Muʾtamar* (Congress Party) as well as many others.[545] Muḥammad al-Barādaʿī (Constitution Party), Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī (Egyptian Popular Current), and ʿAmr Mūsā (Congress Party) have served as the most visible leaders of the National Salvation Front (NSF).

Non-Islamist political movements will refer to three main groups. Two of the older movements are the April 6 and *Kifāya* movements, the former

544 The 'New *al-Wafd* Party' will be referred to as '*al-Wafd* Party' in this chapter. The label 'New *al-Wafd* Party' is used to differentiate the party from the pre-1952 *al-Wafd* Party.

545 Ahram Online 2012 (e).

which has a significant following and is well-known among Egyptians. Another major movement which is widely supported by non-Islamists is the *Tamarrud* movement, which came to the forefront during the run-up to the June 30th protests. This movement, which means "Rebellion" in English, was supported by many non-Islamist political parties and finds strong support from groups involved in the NSF.[546] As we will see, while there has been significant cooperation between non-Islamist parties and movements, there is an underlying tension between these groups.

While the debate surrounding the term Islamist was mentioned in previous chapters, it is helpful to briefly define how the terms Islamist and non-Islamist will be used in this chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, the term Islamist will refer to political groups which seek to enact a comprehensive version of Islam and *Sharīʿa* to all aspects of governance and actively use religion to promote their political ambitions. The term non-Islamist describes groups that believe there is a degree of separation between religion and the functions of government and are mostly against any use of religion in electoral politics. Generally, parties labeled as leftist, secularist, and liberal are considered to be non-Islamists in Egypt. Non-Islamists may be deeply religious, but by and large believe that the role of government should primarily revolve around responsibilities concerning the betterment of the economy and ensuring the security of the state. However, several non-Islamist groups believe that *Sharīʿa* law should be used as a frame of reference for laws in Egypt. Moreover, it is important to point out that for non-Islamist parties and movements the inclusion of *Sharīʿa* in the Constitution means different things to different groups.

The first half of this chapter will provide a short summary of the relationship between various political parties under Ḥusnī Mubārak and the common causes such as the demand for free elections, which united Islamists and non-Islamists alike. It will also briefly detail the events following the resignation of Mubārak, the election of Muḥammad Mursī, the Islamist victories in the parliamentary elections, and the ouster of Mursī from power.The second half of the chapter will describe the basic political worldview of the non-Islamists in Egypt during the rule of Mursī. In doing so, a description of beliefs and common political strategies of non-Islamist parties and movements during this time period with be included. Overall, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the political mindset of non-Islamists during the timeframe between January 2011 and August 2013. Personal inter-

546 Ahram Online 2013 (d).

views with political actors of non-Islamist groups will provide the basis for these observations.[547]

6.3 Non-Islamists Before the Egyptian Revolution: Cooperation with Islamist Groups

There have been several instances of electoral cooperation between Islamist and non-Islamist groups since the beginning of the rule of Ḥusnī Mubārak and during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. Mubārak's authoritarian rule inspired opposition groups from various political persuasions to interact and cooperate in an attempt to create a freer and fairer electoral system. While cooperation between Islamist and non-Islamist political parties appears to be almost permanently frayed, this has not always been the case in Egypt. Under the rule of Mubārak, there were instances when Islamist and non-Islamist political actors in Egypt formed a bloc of parties disillusioned with the authoritative political system.

A well-known example was the 1984 parliamentary elections. In this election two of the major opposition parties, the non-Islamist *al-Wafd* Party and the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood joined electoral forces to run under a common list of candidates.[548] The result of this strategy was beneficial to both sides since *al-Wafd* Party benefited from the Brotherhood's organization, while the Brotherhood found a way into parliament via *al-Wafd* Party. However, the goodwill between these two parties was short-lived as *al-Wafd* Party ultimately was relatively uninterested in lobbying for any type of *Sharīʿa* law.[549]As political scholar Nuha al-Mikāwi (Noha El Mikawy) contends, the cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood and *al-Wafd* was merely pragmatic, and "*al-Wafd* [and Muslim Brotherhood] failed to make their respective secular and religious ideologies compatible."[550] In other words, the realities of cooperation in proposing legislation were much more difficult than merely combining forces for elections. During the 1987 parliamentary elections, parties running against the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) also formed alliances in order to break through an unfair electoral system.[551] Additionally, the 1990 parliamentary election witnessed

547 I am grateful for the assistance of Abanob Rizk in conducting and translating interviews done in Arabic.

548 Hatina 2007, 34.

549 Ibid, 34.

550 El Mikawy 1999, 83.

551 Hatina 2007, 37.

a coordinated boycott by both opposition Islamist and non-Islamist parties alike.[552]

Another instance of cooperation involving several political currents was the *Kifāya* movement of 2005. *Kifāya*, which in Arabic means "enough," was primarily concerned with the expected transfer of power from Ḥusnī Mubārak to his son Jamāl.[553] The *Kifāya* movement was an apolitical movement, meaning that it did not have a set ideology or political frame of reference. This feature allowed it to attract and incorporate several opposition movements, both Islamist and non-Islamist, under a single banner revolving around the issue of political freedom in Egypt. As political scientist Rabāb al-Mahdī writes, "The founders and members of these groups came from all shades of political backgrounds (leftists, nationalists, liberals, and Islamists), different generations, and varying political experiences."[554] Moreover, this movement was made to transcend ideology in order to avoid disagreements over particular issues regarding the governance of Egypt.[555]

In the years preceding the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, Islamists and non-Islamists would occasionally come together in opposition to an oppressive political structure. While their vision for Egypt was different, they could at least agree that they must all work against the rule of Mubārak and implement a free and fair electoral system. However, it was not until after the resignation of Mubārak that these camps came into direct conflict in a markedly different political environment.

6.4 Non-Islamists after the Egyptian Revolution

The Egyptian Revolution, which began on January 25, 2011, opened the political environment of Egypt to an extent never before seen in its history. Members of a wide variety of political groups and movements have expressed admiration for the diverse set of beliefs that converged in Tahrir Square in January 2011. After Mubārak stepped down and the prospect of free and fair elections became a reality, the goodwill found in Tahrir Square during the Revolution began to slip away as various political groups organized and surveyed post-Revolution Egypt.

The transition of power from Mubārak to the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF), headed by Field Marshall Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-

552 El Mikawy 1999, 93-94.

553 Lynch 2011, 47.

554 Al-Mahdi 2009, 1018.

555 Shorbagy 2007, 195.

Ṭanṭāwī, was marred by several deadly incidents, many of which were blamed on military leaders.[556] Moreover, even before elections, less than a year after the Revolution, non-Islamist parties feared that Islamists would have a significant advantage.[557] Many of these predictions, which foretold of Islamist dominance in elections, were realized in the following months. After the fall of Mubārak, several crucial votes demonstrated the strength of Islamist parties at the polls.

The parliamentary elections, which were concluded in December 2011 – January 2012, were a major victory for Islamist streams and disheartening for non-Islamist groups.[558] This amounted to 223 seats for the Freedom and Justice Party and 111 seats for the *Salafī al-Nūr* Party out of the 498 seats available.[559] By comparison, non-Islamist parties garnered few seats with parties such as *al-Wafd* taking 38 seats, the Free Egyptians Party taking 17 seats, the Social Democrats with 17 seats, the Dignity Party with 6 seats, and the Freedom Egypt Party with 1 seat.[560] When the final votes were counted, Islamist members comprised approximately two-thirds of this body. While the Egyptian Supreme Court eventually dissolved this legislative body in June 2012, the electoral results by Islamist parties were impressive.[561] Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood celebrated a large victory during the *Shūrā* Council election in February 2012, taking 45% of the vote.[562] However, it is important to point out that the voter turnout for this election was approximately 10%.[563]

The Presidential elections following the parliamentary contest witnessed a runoff between the Brotherhood's Muḥammad Mursī and the final Prime Minister of Mubārak's regime, Aḥmad Shafīq. The choice for revolutionaries was a difficult one and, in order to secure non-Islamist votes, Mursī promised a consensus government and made guarantees about the future actions of the government.[564] In the end, Mursī narrowly bested Shafīq in a hotly disputed run-off election. However, after the election there were several events, ranging from disputes between Islamists and non-Islamists, sectarian violence, and the oppositions' belief that the Mursī's 100 Day Plan

556 Stacher 2011.

557 Hamid 2011.

558 Egypt Independent 2012 (c).

559 Al-Jazeera 2012.

560 Ibid.

561 Egypt Independent 2012 (a).

562 Wade 2013.

563 Ibid.

564 Shukrallah 2013 (a).

and the Brotherhood's Renaissance Project had failed, resulting in a high-level of distrust between the different groups.

President Mursī's Constitutional Decree of November 2012 served as the impetus for the formation of the National Salvation Front and drew the ire of many non-Islamist political groups and movements. The most far-reaching of the decree's articles was placing the legality of the Constituent Assembly, dominated by Islamists, beyond judicial review.[565] Furthermore, this decree allowed for Mursī's to take "necessary actions" to "protect" the Revolution.[566] What made this Constitution so controversial was that it was mostly Islamists voting on the precise wording and formulation of the Constitution after walk-outs by liberals and other currents.[567] The Constitution was then put to a nation-wide referendum vote and was passed in a two-part vote with 63.8% of the voters approving the Constitution.[568] Not only did this victory demonstrate the continued ability of Islamists to mobilize votes, but also revealed disunity among opposition politicians, who debated whether to oppose the Constitution through participating in the referendum or boycotting the vote.[569] It is important to point out that the voter turnout for this vote was approximately 32%, demonstrating that large segments of the Egyptian electorate did not participate in the vote.[570]

The apparent betrayal of the democratic process by the Brotherhood's Mursī and his Islamist allies constituted a fundamental rift between Islamists and non-Islamists.[571] After Muḥammad Mursī's constitutional decree, the political tension in Egypt worsened. The *Tamarrud* movement, formed in the beginning of May 2013, quickly morphed into the movement to which all groups in opposition to the rule of Mursī would throw their weight.[572] This movement ultimately led to massive protests beginning on June 30. On July 3 the Egyptian military, led by General ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī, removed Muḥammad Mursī from power and initiated a new political roadmap for Egypt. Islamists then engaged two major sit-ins around Cairo, located in Giza and Nasr City, which were dispersed by Egyptian government forces on August 14, 2013 leading to scores of deaths.[573] In the coming

565 Ahram Online 2012 (c).

566 Ibid.

567 Chick 2012.

568 Egypt Independent 2012 (g).

569 Samek 2012.

570 Aboul Enein 2012.

571 Spencer 2012.

572 Kirkpatrick, Baker and Gordan 2013.

573 Kirkpatrick 2013 (a).

months the Muslim Brotherhood would be labelled a terrorist organization with many of its assets and affiliated organizations seized by the state.[574] In June 2014, ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī, the former Defense Minister who led the ouster of Mursī, won a landslide victory which many international observers claimed to not reach international standards.[575]

While the Egyptian political scene had remained relatively static for the thirty year rule of Ḥusnī Mubārak, the last three years have experienced explosive changes.[576] The open political environment after Mubārak ushered in a new era of political participation among groups that rushed to improve their electoral position in Egypt.

6.5 The NDP and the Fulūl

One group that merits special attention is the now defunct National Democratic Party (NDP), which was the political party of former President Ḥusnī Mubārak. It was initially created in 1978 during the presidency of Anwar al-Sādāt and has been used to cement control of the ruling party for several decades.[577] From its political inception, the NDP had been the dominant party in Egypt, winning huge electoral landslides until the Egyptian Revolution of 2011.[578] Beginning in the 2000's, the NDP largely became a party whose most powerful members were businessmen who benefited from their relationship with government officials.[579] After the Revolution of 2011, the NDP was disbanded while many of its members left the political scene or joined other political parties.[580] Many of the high-profile politicians who were members of the NDP or had a close association with it were nicknamed *fulūl*. The next section will briefly explain this term and the alleged political participation of the *fulūl* after the Egyptian Revolution.

6.6 The Meaning of Fulūl

The term *fulūl*, which in Arabic means "remnants," has been used in a derogative way since the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. While this term is often used to describe those with a close association with the Mubārak regime, there is some ambiguity as to who exactly should be considered *fulūl*. The

574 BBC 2013.

575 Kingsley 2014 (a).

576 Serôdio 2013 (a).

577 East and Joseph 1993, 83.

578 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2014 (c).

579 Roll 2010.

580 Ahram Online 2011(b).

precise characteristics of those who are labeled as such is an open and ongoing question in Egypt.[581] There seems to be consensus that Ḥusnī Mubārak, his sons, and other top government officials who were members of NDP should be classified as *fulūl*. Moreover, there seems to be some debate about other figures that had ties to the Mubārak regime and their classification as *fulūl*.[582] For example, some may consider ʿAmr Mūsā as part of the *fulūl* since he held a number of important foreign posts under Mubārak.[583] These important positions seem to indicate that Mūsā had close connections with the Mubārak regime. However, his supporters may point out that he was a proponent of the protests that eventually led to the resignation of Ḥusnī Mubārak.[584] In this sense, he is seen as supporting fundamental change of a corrupt system under Mubārak. Conversely, others may contend that the mere support of the protests against Mubārak does not erase his past ties with the ousted regime. From this example, one can begin to understand the difficulty of applying this term to those with some type of ties to Mubārak and the NDP.

While some may consider *fulūl* to be only those in positions of power in the NDP, others may consider a large swath of government appointees under Mubārak as part of the *fulūl* as well. As we will see in the next section, several in the administration of Muḥammad Mursī accused judges appointed by Mubārak to be part of the *fulūl* conspiracy against the Mursī government. However, one must ask whether being a political appointee of Mubārak is enough of a reason to be classified as *fulūl*. Others have argued that institutions such as the judiciary have long ac-ted as a counterbalance to the presidency and that there resistance to Mursī was natural in this regard.[585] While there is a substantial debate regarding this topic, it is clear that the term *fulūl* is used to discuss different people and groups.

The Egyptian bureaucracy greatly expanded under Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir's rule and grew to employ a massive number of Egyptians.[586] Since Mursī's ouster, there have been some accusations that members of the so-called "deep state" have used the massive and plodding bureaucracy of Egypt against the initiatives enacted by the Mursī government.[587] However, it is also important to point out that the term *fulūl* has not traditionally been

581 For instance, see Gamal 2013.

582 Ibid.

583 Maher 2012.

584 Ibid.

585 Soliman 2012.

586 Palmer, Leila and Yassin 1988, 1-18.

587 Hubbard and Kirkpatrick 2013.

used to describe those who are employed by the Egyptian government or part of its bureaucracy.

The *fulūl* and former members of the NDP can be considered part of the non-Islamist political stream even though this political entity has had vastly different experiences than the other non-Islamist parties mentioned. This is mostly due to the fact that the NDP was the ruling party in Egypt for several decades and was used primarily to solidify the ruling regime's power. While the NDP was not known as a secularist party, it did show hostility toward Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, in its policies and practices.[588] Moreover, Brotherhood leaders have maintained that the deep state and holdovers from the Mubārak regime have undermined the Mursī's Islamist government.[589] With this in mind, it is helpful to briefly survey the alleged political involvement of those associated with the NDP after the Egyptian Revolution of 2011.

6.6.1 Political Involvement After 2011

There has been rampant speculation about the *fulūl's* role during Mursī's presidency and its future in Egypt.[590] With this is mind, this section will briefly outline the accusations leveled against those associated with the Mubārak regime and also discuss what future role former NDP party members and the *fulūl* may have in Egyptian politics.

After the 2011 Revolution, Islamists contended that remnants of Mubārak's political regime still played an active part in Egyptian politics. A number of accusations were aimed at Mubārak appointments in the judiciary. The judiciary made several rulings that drew the ire of Islamists and particularly the Muslim Brotherhood prompting them to accuse the *fulūl* of attempting to undermine the state. One example concerned the Supreme Constitution Court (SCC), declaring the Egyptian Parliament, elected in 2012, to be invalid due to violations of voting rules.[591] This decision was decried by many as an effort by the remnants of the Mubārak regime to impede the Islamist's rise to power.[592] In another case, Mursī attempted to remove public prosecutor ʿAbd al-Majīd Maḥmūd, who was appointed by Mubārak, a decision which some saw as an attempt to rid the government of all those associated with Mubārak.[593] However, the judiciary resisted this dismissal

588 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2014 (c).

589 Marroushi 2013.

590 Hubbard and Kirkpatrick 2013.

591 Kirkpatrick 2012 (a).

592 Ibid.

593 Al-Tawy 2013.

while demonstrating its ability to resist some of Mursī's decisions through judicial review.[594]

In several instances, Mursī and his supporters have accused those associated with the Mubārak regime of thwarting their efforts at reform. In the latter months of 2013, there have been articles devoted to several problems that occurred in Egypt, especially in the summer of 2013, regarding the workings of the government bureaucracy. For instance, leading up to the massive June 30 protests, there were persistent gas shortages and long lines at the gas pumps around Cairo.[595] While some pointed to problems in the supply chain, others argued that members of the *fulūl* were behind these shortages in an effort to discredit Mursī's presidency.[596] Leading members of Mursī's government have maintained that they underestimated the power of those who wished to see Mursī's pre-sidency fail.[597]

The crux of these arguments is that Mursī and his administration were never given a fair chance to succeed due to the depth of resistance to Islamist rule. Many hypotheses have been presented concerning the extent of resistance toward Mursī's administration from those associated with Mubārak and the deep-state. As previously mentioned, it appears clear that elements of Mubārak's regime actively sought to undermine Mursī's rule. However, there is little concrete evidence about the extent of the resistance against Mursī and which individuals and entities were the most actively involved.

The *fulūl's* future role in Egyptian politics continues to be a popular topic of conservation. Much of the attention now turns to whether former prominent members of the NDP will find their way back into the political fold of party politics in Egypt. The current political environment in Egypt has presented an opportunity for those associated with the Mubārak regime to creep back into the political fold. For instance, Prime Minister Ibrāhīm Maḥlab, who was appointed under interim President ʿAdlī Manṣūr and was retained for a time by President ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī , was a former member of the NDP and was seen as closely associated with Mubārak.[598] Additionally, many contend that the current political environment has allowed former NDP members to re-enter politics along with helping them regain their political footing.[599]

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594 Ibid.

595 Hubbard and Kirkpatrick 2013.

596 Ibid.

597 Marroushi 2013.

598 Kingsley 2014 (a).

599 Fouad 2014.

In the coming years, more research is needed on the precise role the *fulūl* and deep state played in the resistance against Mursī's presidency. While it is clear that members of the NDP have joined other political parties, the extent that they will regain significant positions of power is yet to be seen.

6.7 Non-Islamist Parties

Non-Islamist political parties are characterized by two features. The first feature is that each party adheres to a political ideology with regard to issues such as foreign policy and economic philosophy. For example, parties such as the Dignity Party have a Nasserist ideology, which has socialist leanings, while political parties such as the Constitution Party adhere to a more capitalistic, free-market framework. However, these parties agree on a core set of values, including social justice, democratic elections, and at least some degree of the separation of religion and politics.

The second feature is that political parties tend to work within traditional political channels in order to achieve their goals and vision for Egypt. This means that they believe that elections and political participation are the primary methods by which to enact change. While there are dozens of political parties in Egypt that can be described as non-Islamists, this chapter will concentrate on some of the largest and most influential parties. However, this does prevent them from participating and organizing protests in order to exert pressure for their political demands.

Representatives from *al-Wafd* Party, Egyptian Social Democratic Party, Constitution Party, Conference Party, Dignity Party, and Freedom Egypt Party were interviewed for this chapter.[600]

6.8 Non-Islamist Movements

Non-Islamist movements tend to be non-partisan in that they do not adhere to any static political ideology or party platform concerning economics or foreign policy. Rather, these movements believe in set core values revolving around freedom, Egyptian nationalism, and social justice. Movements such as April 6, *Kifāya*, and the *Tamarrud* take a stance that the Egyptian nationalism is what binds people together rather than a particular religious or political ideology. In general, these non-Islamist movements were mobilized to challenge the "status quo" of Egyptian politics, rallying against the authoritarian and partisan nature of Muḥammad Mursī's rule. Furthermore, non-Islamist movements have, at times, been skeptical of the political process in

600 ʿAbd Allah Al-Mughāzī; Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Laṭīf; Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir; Sayyid Al-Ṭūkhī; Khālid Dāwūd; ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī.

Egypt and saw the "old state" of Mubārak and the subsequent rule of the Muslim Brotherhood as corrupt groups that did not have the best interests of the Egyptian people in mind.

The April 6 Movement was originally founded in April 2008 to support striking workers in al-Maḥalla al-Kubra, Egypt.[601] It also played an instrumental role in the 2011 Revolution and remained active after the ouster of both Mubārak and Mursī. Its most prominent founders were ʾĀsmāʾ Maḥfūẓ and Aḥmad Māhir, amongst others.[602] The group experienced a split in 2011 when founder Aḥmad Māhir sought to make the movement into an NGO, while others claimed that he acted independently without a vote from the group.[603] In April 2014, the activities of April 6 were banned based on charges of undermining the security of Egypt.[604] However, the movement has vowed to continue their activities.[605]

The *Tamarrud* Movement was founded in April 2013.[606] The *Tamarrud* movement began as a campaign to collect millions of signatures withdrawing support from then President Mursī, a symbolic demonstration that *Tamarrud* activists believed discredited Mursī.[607] However, since the ouster of Mursī, the movement has experienced deep splits surrounding the group's future.[608] There had been indications that some members of this movement will create a political party, but an official party has not yet been formed.[609]

It is also important to mention the *Kifāya* movement, founded in 2004, which was one of the first youth movements based on promoting democratic principles in Egypt and has served as inspiration to later movements.[610] As mentioned in section 6.2, *Kifāya* included many groups from across the political spectrum while demanding political freedoms. However, *Kifāya's* influence has greatly diminished since 2006.[611]

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601 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2014 (a).

602 Ibid.

603 Ibid.

604 Ahram Online 2014 (a).

605 Co-founders of the movement, Rāmī al-Suwīsī and Amal Sharaf were interviewed along with Aḥmed ʿAbd Allah, a leader of the movement's political bureau at the time of the interview.

606 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2014 (d).

607 Ibid.

608 Ibid.

609 Co-founders Maḥmūd Badr, Walīd Al-Maṣrī, and Muḥammad ʿAzīz were interviewed along with *Tamarrud* activist Shīmāʿ Al-Tūnī.

610 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2014 (b).

611 Ibid.

6.9 Non-Islamists in Politics

The purpose of this section will be to offer a broad overview of the core beliefs of non-Islamist political parties and movements. To a large extent during Mursī's rule, non-Islamists define themselves by differentiating themselves from Islamists, generally focusing on critiquing Islamist groups. This section will exhibit the non-Islamists' broad political vision for Egypt and their response to the Islamist parties' impressive electoral victories after the fall of Mubārak. While several interviews were conducted in the spring and summer of 2013, a time when Mursī was still in power or had recently been removed from the presidency, these interviews will serve as an important look into the worldview of non-Islamists at a time when their political effectiveness was being questioned.

6.9.1 Religion and Personal Freedoms

It is important to describe the beliefs of non-Islamists pertaining to religion in society. For many Egyptians, religion plays a significant role in daily life. However, many non-Islamists reject and active role for religion in politics. The distinction appears to lie in the conception of religion and its role in individual life and society at large. One of the primary accusations coming from the non-Islamist camp, is that Islamists attempt to enforce a specific interpretation of religion on all people. In reaction, non-Islamists have maintained that religious belief is a personal matter while emphasizing personal freedoms. This became a major issue during the rule of Muḥammad Mursī and became a popular talking point amongst non-Islamists.

For instance, ʿAbd Allah al-Mughāzī, *al-Wafd* Party spokesman at the time of the interview, stated that that he is a Muslim and he prays, but is frustrated with the way that Islamists associate liberals with not being true Muslims.[612] In this sense, Islamists appear to be claiming that their ideology is the only one that coincides with pious religious belief, which should be adopted by society at large. However, al-Mughāzī countered by saying that religious belief is between "a worshiper and God."[613] It is important to point out that the critiques of Islamists do not necessarily demonstrate that non-Islamists believe that religion is unimportant or that it does not play an important role in their lives. Rather, non-Islamists have expressed that the state should not be made responsible for enforcing the religious interpretations of others. The strategy for non-Islamists in this regard is the personalization of religious belief in order to guard against Islamist claims of impiousness amongst non-Islamists.

612 Interview with ʿAbd Allah al-Mughāzī 2013.

613 Ibid.

In many instances, non-Islamists have made it clear that personal freedom is an essential part of their ideology, with the implication being that Islamist parties would restrict these freedoms. ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī, the founder of the Freedom Egypt Party, has stated that his party is "committed to freedom and human rights."[614]

Additionally, Amal Sharaf, a co-founder of the April 6 Movement, highlighted the need to protect freedoms throughout Egypt.[615] In many of the political programs of non-Islamist parties, the protection of freedoms is prominently emphasized. In this sense, non-Islamists made the idea of personal freedom prominent in their political discourse in order to counter to Islamist claims.

Conversely, many non-Islamists tend to believe that Islamists will use government as a way to impose their own beliefs on society.

Non-Islamists have felt inclined to provide justification for their political beliefs and how these beliefs do not interfere with their practice of Islam. For instance, Khālid Dāwūd, spokesman for the Constitution Party, said that he believes there is no contradiction between being a good Muslim and believing in a separation of religion from the state.[616] Dāwūd continues by stating that Egyptians "are seeing that being a bearded guy with a sign of prayer here [on the forehead] does not necessarily mean you are an angel from the sky."[617] Statements such as these make clear that non-Islamist groups felt the need to articulate their beliefs concerning the role of religion in society, and especially the way religion was being used to give Islamists an electoral advantage.

6.9.2 The Issue of Sharīʿa in the Constitution

The issue of *Sharīʿa* law has been discussed extensively after the political success of Islamist movements after the Egyptian Revolution. Many of the non-Islamist parties support the inclusion of *Sharīʿa* law in the Egyptian Constitution, particularly Article 2, which states that "the principles of *Sharīʿa* are the source of legislation," an article that has been enshrined in the constitution since al-Sādāt's presidency. With this in mind, it is important to understand the stance of non-Islamist politicians and acti-vists regarding the issue of *Sharīʿa* in the Egyptian Constitution.

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614 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad 2013

615 Interview with Amal Sharaf 2013.

616 Interview with Khālid Dāwūd 2013.

617 Ibid.

Several members of non-Islamist parties and movements support this provision. ʿAbd Allah al-Mughāzī maintained that his party has no issue with Article 2 of the Constitution which stipulates that *Sharīʿa* is the principle source of legislation, but stresses that religion is a relationship between an individual and God.[618] Other non-Islamist party leaders view the inclusion of Article 2 of the Constitution as an ethical reference but not a set code of laws. For instance, Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, the Deputy Secretary General for the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, said that with Article 2 "You get not the laws but the morality."[619] While both Islamists and most non-Islamists may support a reference to *Sharīʿa* in Article 2 of the Constitution, non-Islamists have voiced that *Sharīʿa* serves more as a type of moral compass and not a codified set of laws. As Dāwūd emphasizes, "We have always believed that Islam is a religion. Islam is not a political ideology" adding that "We have been trying to explain the dangers of monopolizing religion. Of speaking in the name of religion."[620]

Non-Islamists were strongly against the inclusion of Article 219, which provided an interpretation of *Sharīʿa*, in the Constitution passed during Mursī's presidency.[621]This article defines *Sharīʿa* law in a way that many non-Islamists believe is too narrow and serves to restrict freedoms.[622] Along these lines, NSF leader Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī stated, "'Religion is a key component of our culture and our identity and we will not allow anyone to monopolize it or speak under its name.'"[623] While many non-Islamists appear to believe that religion is important for Egyptian society and that the mention of *Sharīʿa* should appear in the Constitution few have described how Article 2 may influence legislation in a tangible manner. However, there are some who speak out against this article in the Constitution. For instance, liberal scholar of international law, Nabīl Ḥilmī, has spoken in depth about Article 2, arguing that any constitution that favors a religion necessarily denotes that it is a religious and not a civil state.[624] He continues by stating that religious states are largely unsuccessful.[625]

At its core, it appears that many non-Islamists believe that Islam is important to uphold the morality of a society, but that specific interpretations of a

618 Interview with ʿAbd Allah al-Al-Mughāzī 2013.

619 Interview with Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 2013.

620 Interview with Khālid Dāwūd 2013.

621 Lombardi and Brown 2012.

622 Interview with Sharaf al-Dīn al-Jibālī 2013.

623 Egypt Independent 2013 (e).

624 Hulsman 2012 (c), 188.

625 Ibid.

religious creed, when promoted by the government, are harmful to society. While individual opinions about the extent of religion's role in the state vary greatly, there seems to be some fundamental agreement that the mention of *Sharīʿa* law in the Constitution should be looked at broadly. It is important to note that many in the non-Islamist camp interpret secularism differently, in that a party may claim to be secularist while seeing no contradiction supporting Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, a position supported by Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party.[626] Along these lines, non-Islamists appear to understand the concept of *Sharīʿa* as closer to an ethical frame of reference, rather than any set group of laws. The issue of religion in public and political life has been, and will continue to be, discussed at some length.

6.9.3 Egypt or an Organization?

Leading to the June 30 protests, a popular mantra was that the Muslim Brotherhood had placed the interests of the organization above those of the state. Accusations of the "Brotherhoodization" of the state ran rampant among groups opposed to the Brotherhood.[627] One example of this was the large number of Islamists on the Constitution-writing committee in 2012.[628]

Another example concerned Mursī's nomination of several governors with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist currents.[629] Moreover, some protesters argued that the Brotherhood had "hijacked" the Revolution in order to obtain their political and organization goals.[630] For non-Islamist activists, these accusations against the Brotherhood were important speaking-points while resisting Mursī's presidency.

These perceptions have led to sentiments by non-Islamists that members of Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have put their organizations above the common good of the state and all its citizens. Sayyid al-Ṭūkhī, the vice-President for the Dignity Party, contended that Brotherhood members "have a relationship with the organization and do not think of the country," while adding that "the faction is not patriotic."[631] These opinions were reiterated during the June 30 protests against Mursī, which, for non-Islamists, serves to emphasize that the Brotherhood was more concerned with its own pursuits of power than effectively running the country.

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626 Interview with Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 2013.

627 Fahmy H. 2012.

628 El-Gundy 2012; Casper 2013 (b).

629 Egypt Independent 2013 (b).

630 Ibid.

631 Interview with Sayyid Al-Ṭūkhī 2013.

For many non-Islamists, the presidential tenure of Muḥammad Mursī, which saw many of his supporters in important governmental positions, only enforced this narrative. They draw this distinction since they believe that their political ideology revolves around governing, rather than just the act of getting themselves elected in order to propagate their beliefs, an accusation that they level against many Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.

6.9.4 Religious Diversity in Egypt

Non-Islamists have argued that they respect the religious diversity of Egyptians and that this respect is found within their political ideology. Consequently, they claim that they embrace religious diversity while Islamists follow a narrow and relatively strict version of Islam, which had led to various sectarian acts of violence, a narrative that received significant attention after Islamist electoral victories. Non-Islamists generally accept that a non-Muslim can become president of Egypt, a position which is in contrast to many Islamist parties, and they pointing to this as evidence that they accept a nationalistic rather than religious conception of Egyptian identity. However, it is important to point out that some well-known Islamists, such as preacher Ṣafwat Ḥijāzī, have argued that a Christian can, in fact, be the head of state in Egypt.[632]

There are often accusations that political Islamist groups discriminate against Christians and smaller groups of *Shīʿīs* and *Bahāʾīs*, which non-Islamists view as problematic in Egypt. Non-Islamist groups stress that their set of beliefs and view of religion are more open to other beliefs than Islamist parties. ʿAbd Allah al-Mughāzī pointed out that "the principle slogan [of the party] is 'the crescent and the cross,'" which demonstrates the inclusiveness of the party.[633] Others, such as Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, mention the large number of Christians in her party who fear the rise of Mursī and Islamist groups.[634] This is in contrast to Islamist parties, which are seen to have only small numbers of non-Muslim membership. From these statements it is clear that non-Islamists, during the rule of Mursī, attempted to highlight the open nature of their political platforms and beliefs, which rely not on religion, but rather on a form of nationalism in which the idea of being Egyptian takes precedent over religious belief.

Khālid Dāwūd believes that sectarianism is a major issue under Mursī, due to the attempted Islamist monopolization of Islam resulting from Islamists,

632 Ferrecchia 2013.

633 Interview with ʿAbd Allah al-Mughāzī 2013.

634 Interview with Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 2013.

especially the Brotherhood, rising to power.[635] For instance, Dāwūd references sectarian rhetoric after clashes around the Presidential Palace in December 2012.

> After those clashes Khayrat al-Shāṭir [Deputy-Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood] made a news conference and he said that 70% of those people around the presidential palace were Christians. And this was supposed to be the President of Egypt.[636]

In this sense, it is perceived by non-Islamists groups that Islamists adhere to a rigid form of *Sunnī* Islam which, in some ways discriminates against non-Muslims. Additionally, Aḥmad ʿAbd Allah, a leader in the April 6 Movement's political bureau, said that he sees no reason to fear *Shīʿīs* and considers them good Muslims, a belief he attributes to a less rigid view concerning Muslim identity.[637] In order to differentiate themselves from Islamists, non-Islamists wish to quell the fears of religious minorities by emphasizing that their ideology is much more tolerant of those with different beliefs.

Religious minorities in Egypt like *Ṣūfī* Muslims, *Shīʿīs* and *Bahā'īs* face serious issues, and also threats, in Egypt.[638] For some *Sunnī* Islamists, *Ṣūfī* beliefs border on apostasy and there have been attacks against *Ṣūfī* places of worship.[639] Another group of Muslims in Egypt include *Shīʿī* Muslims. In the past, *Shīʿī* Muslims have been distrusted and, recently, some Islamists, especially *Salafīs*, have expressed their fear of *Shīʿīs* in Egypt.[640]

Additionally, there is tense animosity toward *Bahā'īs*, a small religious sect in Egypt, who *Salafī* groups view as heretics.[641]

However, *Bahā'īs* were not recognized as a religion under the rule of Ḥusnī Mubārak either and have largely been oppressed in Egyptian society. Finally, the most widely discussed sectarian issue concerns the Christian community, which has become increasingly worried about the power of Islamists. Several Christians have expressed concern that some Islamist groups allegedly supported attacks on their churches.[642] In light of the tension be-

635 Interview with Khālid Dāwūd 2013.

636 Ibid.

637 Interview with Aḥmad ʿAbd Allah 2013.

638 *Ṣūfī* Muslims practice a mystical form of Islam which has been rejected by some Islamist groups.

639 Al-Alawi 2011.

640 Egypt Independent 2013 (a).

641 Halawa 2011.

642 Kirkpatrick 2011.

tween several Islamist groups and minorities in Egypt, non-Islamists wish to express their solidarity with these minorities, which may also result in electoral gain.

In the non-Islamist critique of Islamist parties, other problems such as sectarian violence and hatred have also been used as evidence that Islamists do not embrace diversity of belief. However, it is important to point out that Islamists would refute this generalization, maintaining that their ideologies are open to freedom of belief in Egypt. Moreover, Islamist leaders will point out that they have close associations with non-Muslims such as Christians, and have blamed the security services for church attacks.[643] Similar to other issues, both Islamists and non-Islamists trade accusations concerning whether their political groups truly believe in religious freedoms for all. One example of this comes from the January 2011 Church bombing in the coastal city of Alexandria after which then-President Mubārak issued a statement blaming terrorism, while other government officials claimed that sectarianism does not exist in the country.[644]

However, many Christians blamed the Egyptian government for not protecting their places of worship and failing to combat sectarianism.[645]

6.9.5 Religion in Electoral Politics

Another important position many non-Islamist champion is that religion should be kept out of electoral politics and political parties based on religious beliefs should be prohibited.[646] This serves as another major point of contention between Islamists and non-Islamists. In the spring of 2013 there was controversial legislation that would allow religious slogans in electoral campaigns with many Islamist groups supporting this measure.[647]

Several Islamists supported this legislation, even though Egyptian law presently bars these types of electoral slogans. The combination of religious rhetoric and the electoral process after the Revolution of 2011 elicited strong reactions from non-Islamists. For starters, many non-Islamists voiced a firm opposition to any type of religious involvement in politics. For example, *Tamarrud* activist Shīmāʾ al-Tūnī said, "We are against the entry of religion in politics."[648] Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir made a similar objection stating, "We

643 Egypt Independent 2013 (d).

644 Fahim and Stack 2011.

645 Ibid.

646 Egypt Independent 2013 (e).

647 Ahram Online 2013 (c).

648 Interview with Shīmāʾ al-Tūnī 2013.

don't want to have any religion in politics. We want religion to be taken away from politics."[649]

During elections, many non-Islamists have accused Islamist parties of using religious rhetoric in their campaign slogans. ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī, objects to the use of religious rhetoric in this manner, contending that, "It's bad not only because I am against mixing religion and politics. It is bad simply because it really eats away the equal opportunity regulations which we need to have."[650] He emphasizes that "You cannot use religious phrases to discriminate against your opponents."[651] However, after the protests of June 30, there was significant discussion about banning religious-based parties from politics.[652] Moreover, some non-Islamist politicians believe that Egyptians are beginning to understand the problems associated with religious rhetoric in political slogans. As Ḥamzāwī posits, "At least the credibility of some actors using religion for political and election-based purposes is swinging."[653]

While the 2014 Egyptian Constitution bans parties based on religion, questions still persist as to the role of religion in the state.[654]

The basis for the removal of political slogans and religious-based parties from Egyptian politics illustrates the popularity of claims that Islamists use religion for political gain. Some, such as Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī have stated that nobody should be allowed to speak for religion.[655] From these statements it is clear that non-Islamists believe that there should be a separation between religion and electoral politics. This serves as one of the main tenets of non-Islamist parties moving forward in a post-Mursī electoral scene. Non-Islamists will point out that there are various social, economic, and political problems and that Islamists have been using religion to win elections, while not having the political expertise to adequately solve these pressing problems. However, Islamists could argue that banning religious references serves as a restriction on freedom and that laws banning religious slogans unjustly discriminate against Islamist parties.

As we have seen, non-Islamist parties attempted to differentiate themselves from Islamists during Mursī's rule with regard to how they view the rela-

649 Interview with Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 2013.

650 Hamzawy 2013.

651 Ibid.

652 Al Arabiya 2013.

653 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad 2013

654 Shama and Labib 2014.

655 Egypt Independent 2013 (e).

tionship between religion and political life in Egypt. In doing so, non-Islamists have emphasized their support of personal freedoms and their commitment to the Egyptian state instead of a particular group. Moreover, they have continued to stress that their political ideology is more accepting of non-Muslims because of their more inclusive belief structure.

This section has given voices from the non-Islamist current the opportunity to provide a working description of their groups' core political views on freedom, religion and the state through interviews conducted during Mursī's rule. It is important to point out that, while issues such as religious pluralism have been raised as ways in which non-Islamists are different than Islamists, only time will tell if improvement in these areas is realized.

6.10 Countering the Islamist Rule: Reflections of Non-Islamists

After Islamists electoral victories in 2012, non-Islamists were on the defensive. For non-Islamist parties and movements one of the most important questions moving forward after Islamist victories was how to counteract this success. The political situation since Mursī's rule has undeniably changed with the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the way in which non-Islamists sought to counter Islamist electoral gains will provide a glimpse of the worldview of non-Islamist groups during Mursī's presidency.

6.10.1 Uniting Non-Islamists

6.10.1.1 The National Salvation Front

As evidenced by poor electoral showings in the 2011-2013 parliamentary and presidential elections, non-Islamist parties have emphasized a need to work together in the face of the better organized Islamist groups. As previously mentioned in the introduction, the NSF was created to unite opposition movements, most prominently non-Islamist groups, against the increasingly authoritative nature of Muḥammad Mursī. Some non-Islamists recognized this development as a prelude to increased political cooperation amongst similar-minded groups.

After a number of electoral victories by Islamists, non-Islamists groups began to recognize the value of uniting in some matter in order to strengthen their political position. During this timeframe, many non-Islamists pushed for greater electoral cooperation. For instance, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, the Deputy President of the Congress Party, maintained that non-Islamists need to create political compatible parties to bring about a situation in

which two or three major parties compete in the Egyptian electoral system.[656] ʿAbd al-Laṭīf contended that large parties that combine like-minded individuals are the correct path to challenge Islamists.[657] He surmised this would better allow these non-Islamist parties to target and sway the undecided swing votes in Egypt, which he estimates to be five to six million.[658] Sentiments such as these permeated non-Islamist parties after Islamist political victories and have only increased after the ouster of Mursī.

There is a deep running sentiment amongst non-Islamist parties that they need to grow their support bases. In this sense, non-Islamists need to develop greater electoral sophistication to challenge Islamist parties. As Sayyid al-Ṭūkhī stated before the summer of 2013, "The new strategy for us is the idea of expansion with a bigger audience."[659] Specifically, this involves reaching citizens who may be unfamiliar or unconvinced by non-Islamist parties.

Others, such as Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, emphasized the importance of electoral alliances during the summer of 2013, but admitted that there were not any concrete alliances at that time saying that her party would be, "Going for alliances with similar parties but I cannot say (which parties) exactly now."[660] In the summer of 2013, there were reports in the media about the merging of political parties.[661] Both before and after the ouster of Muḥammad Mursī, many questions surfaced as to how well non-Islamists will continue to cooperate with each other and these questions have yet to be answered.

It is important to point out that the NSF's primary goal was to oppose the Constitutional Decree of President Mursī and then to stop the enactment of the Constitution. The underlying sentiment was that the NSF should not be viewed as a long-term solution for organization among parties, but was made to oppose the Islamist bloc's support of President Mursī's Constitutional Decree. ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī, whose party was part of the coalition, made it clear that the NSF should not be viewed as a political party.[662] He said, "In any front, in any umbrella organization, you have a variety of … stances and positions and the National Salvation Front is to my mind a Front which

656 Interview with Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Laṭīf 2013.

657 Ibid.

658 Ibid.

659 Interview with Sayyid al-Ṭūkhī 2013.

660 Interview with Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 2013.

661 Kortam 2013.

662 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad 2013.

cannot lead to the formation of one single party. It is too diverse."[663] While these concerns were relayed in the spring of 2013, they foretell of some difficultly regarding large-scale electoral cooperation amongst non-Islamists in the coming years.

While several other political leaders believe that unity is the best defense against the Islamist majority, this is easier said than done. As was the case with alliances in the 1980s, specifically the alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and *al-Wafd* Party, electoral cooperation is made easier when there is a common opponent. However, once the realities of governing set in, it becomes much more difficult to function as a united group. With this in mind, future cooperation between non-Islamist parties will be a significant factor in their electoral fortunes.

6.10.1.2 Tamarrud

The coalescing of several political parties and activists around the *Tamarrud* movement was a monumental development in the summer of 2013. The idea of *Tamarrud* was to create a signature campaign in order to voice "no confidence" in the rule of then-President Mursī, thus using the street to make a conspicuous statement against the administration.[664] The NSF strongly supported the aims of the movement while emphasizing that this movement would correct the path of the previous Revolution.[665]

According to Maḥmūd Badr, a co-founder of the movement, the aim of *Tamarrud* was "to collect 15 million signatures withdrawing confidence from President Mursī."[666] The idea of *Tamarrud* is predicated upon the belief that the people hold the power in Egypt and will challenge any leader who suppresses freedom or the path to social justice. Walīd al-Miṣrī, a co-founder of the movement, described *Tamarrud* as a "movement of conscious" that seeks to return the country back to the path of the January 25 Revolution.[667] This rhetoric allowed *Tamarrud* to transcend several ideological differences while spurring various political groups to work together based on a clear goal.

After Mursī's ouster, several questions revolve around the future of the *Tamarrud* movement.[668]After the common enemy had been removed from

663 Ibid.

664 Ahram Online 2013 (d).

665 Wahba 2013.

666 Interview with Maḥmūd Badr 2013.

667 Interview with Walīd Al-Maṣrī 2013.

668 Gjorvad 2013 (a).

power, much of the momentum of the *Tamarrud* had slowed. Moreover, the splits within the *Tamarrud* movement have displayed some of the issues surrounding various attempts at maintaining large alliances.[669] These divisions pertained to who the group would support in the Presidential election.[670]

The issues complicating the cooperation between non-Islamists further demonstrate the difficulty non-Islamist parties and movements continue to have when enacting a strategy built around joining forces. In these instances, cooperation was easy when non-Islamist groups united against Muḥammad Mursī, but has proven to be difficult going forward. The NSF and *Tamarrud* were successful since they mobilized support against Mursī, but cooperation has stalled since.

6.10.2 "Principles" Versus "Politics"

While there is significant agreement and cooperation between non-Islamist parties and movements, after the fall of Mubārak there was some degree of animosity between them concerning the state of affairs in Egypt. This animosity stems from the debate over how to best bring about political change in Egypt during the rule of Muḥammad Mursī. As previously mentioned, after the Mursī's election there were significant issues regarding the heavy-handed nature of his rule. For many non-Islamists, the process of achieving the Revolution's goals seemed to stall. Well before the June 30 protests, there was significant debate concerning how to best regain the momentum of the Revolution of 2011.

Some in the non-Islamist party camp have viewed non-Islamist movements as youthful discontents, whose zeal for revolutionary change is praiseworthy, but are incapable of changing things in Egypt. On the other hand, some in the non-Islamist movements had thought that they are the real revolutionary forces capable of provoking change in Egypt. This is a debate that centers on the voiced principles of non-Islamist movements or the reality of politics of non-Islamist parties.

Non-Islamist party members have, at times, criticized the approach of non-Islamist movements as unrealistic and impractical towards the poli-tical reality in Egypt. For instance, ʿAbd Allah al-Mughāzī argues that some activists "continue to dream and do not want to apply, but only imagine."[671] Moreover, Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir agrees that working through political chan-

669 Mokbel 2014.

670 Ibid.

671 Interview with ʿAbd Allah al-Mughāzī 2013.

nels is necessary while adding "Politics is the art of the possible."[672] ʿAbd al-Nāṣir believes that some just see the need for revolution and no need to start building saying "If we could have tore everything down and start from scratch we should have done that after the first wave of the Revolution," adding that "It's very easy to knock any building down. It's about how you build it again. "[673] In this sense, the continued refusal to compromise and work through the traditional poli-tical process is, in the eyes of some non-Islamists, detrimental to improving Egypt.

In many instances, the goals of non-Islamist parties and movements overlap and there are clear signs of support. However, some in non-Islamist parties appear to look at younger members of non-Islamist movements as out of touch with how to bring about change due to the latter's uncompromising nature. This uncompromising nature may lead to unrealistic goals and visions that will never be realized in Egypt. In other words, non-Islamist parties believe that they are the ones capable of changing Egypt through more practical means in the political process.

With this being said, non-Islamists movements may be tempted to form political parties. The April 6 Movement has already had a breakaway group attempting to form a political party called the April 6 Party.[674] Moreover, soon after Mursī's ouster, reports surfaced that *Tamarrud* members have been deliberating over whether they would form a political party.[675] Therefore, there has been, and continues to be, significant internal debate within these movements concerning how to precisely engage the political sphere.

On the other hand, members of non-Islamist movements are confident that they are the true revolutionaries in Egypt. Aḥmad ʿAbd Allah believes there is a difference between the reformists and revolutionaries. He believes that it is the revolutionaries who are the ones who are able to change the political state in Egypt.[676] Rāmī al-Suwīsī and Amal Sharaf, co-founders of the April 6 Movement, agree, and said that without dreamers there would be no revolution or opportunity for non-Islamist parties to enter the political system.[677] As Amal Sharaf states, "These dreamers are the ones with the Revolution," while holding steadfast in the belief that "Without dreams you will never achieve your goals."[678] However, it should be pointed out that

672 Interview with Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 2013.

673 Ibid.

674 Rashwan 2013.

675 Taha 2013 (b).

676 Interview with Aḥmad ʿAbd Allah 2013.

677 Interview with Ramī al-Suwīsī and Amal Sharaf 2013.

678 Interview with Amal Sharaf 2013.

several political currents in Egypt, including Islamists, believe that they are protecting the revolutionary gains of the Egyptian people.

Since the Revolution, there has been an active back and forth between political currents over who truly represents revolutionary Egypt. With this being said, the prevailing idea voiced by some non-Islamist movements is that they are the engines of Revolution and will uphold the core principles of the Revolution. Non-Islamist parties counter that they are the political actors who are actually able to realize the demands of the Revolution. This battle of "principles" and "politics" will continue in light of the political difficulties in Egypt.

6.10.3 Reaching a Broader Audience

A number of representatives from non-Islamist groups have expressed their desire to broaden their message since they believe their political messages are not reaching sufficient number of citizens due to a lack of outreach to outside the Egypt's metropolitan areas. This was abundantly clear after non-Islamist parties experienced electoral setbacks after the Revolution. Several members from various political parties have stressed that in the past election they did a poor job of articulating their message to the voters and did not reach out to the general electorate. As Khālid Dāwūd states, "We are also facing, liberal and leftist parties, the fact that we need to work on the ground."[679] In light of these poor electoral showings in 2011-2013, non-Islamist parties are attempting to better reach the constituents that they hope will connect to the message.

These parties' underlying strategy is to broadly circulate their message and political values to those who are unfamiliar with their platforms. Dāwūd maintains that non-Islamist political parties were at a disadvantage after the Revolution for two primary reasons. The first is that Islamists, in the past, were able to use the mosque to congregate, while non-Islamists had difficulty organizing in the public sphere under the Mubārak's rule.[680] Second, the social services system of the Islamists bought them goodwill.[681] Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir agrees and contends that the organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood had 40 years to organize and form a social network, while non-Islamist parties had only a few years since the Egyptian Revolution.[682] However, it is important to point out that this is not entirely true. For instance, *al-Wafd* Party had existed for many years in Egypt. Moreover, other

679 Interview with Khālid Dāwūd 2013.

680 Ibid.

681 Ibid.

682 Interview with Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 2013.

political parties such as *al-Tajammuʿ* and smaller leftist parties were in existence for several decades before the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. Both Islamist and non-Islamist parties were suppressed under Mubārak.

Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Laṭīf contended that Islamist victories were expected because Egyptians thought they needed to give Islamist parties a chance after the severe oppression they experienced during the Mubārak era.[683] Non-Islamists present this as another possible explanation as to why Islamist parties fared so well in 2012. However, this hypothesis appears to lack concrete evidence. In reality, a myriad of factors, such as better organization and a more widespread political apparatus, may be primarily responsible for the Islamist electoral victories after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. According to non-Islamists, the aforementioned explanations are the primary reasons that Islamists have held an early advantage in electoral politics since 2011.

In order to counteract the success of Islamist political parties and their outreach, non-Islamist parties have claimed that they need to more clearly and thoroughly explain their beliefs and policies. Several of these groups have previously relied on new means of technology, such as Facebook, Twitter, and various television channels, rather than face-to-face interactions with the public. However, ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī criticized the lack of outreach, saying that, "You cannot simply sit down and do politics via televised cameras or Twitter."[684] Political parties have emphasized that new methods should be employed in light of the difficulty of relaying their message to a wider constituency.

After the electoral victories of Islamists, there is a widely held sentiment that non-Islamists need to better connect with people who may not be well informed about the various political parties in Egypt. In this way, non-Islamist parties had begun to recognize their shortcomings in the previous elections when they failed to connect with certain constituencies in non-urban areas. However, it is important to point out that concrete and specific examples of how to implement these strategies have not been prominently circulated.

6.10.4 The Political Issue of Social Services

After the electoral victories by Islamist parties, the question over the politicization of social services became an increasing important topic. Se-veral Islamist groups, especially the Brotherhood had significant social service networks where they supplied items such as bread, rice, and cooking oil to

683 Interview with Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Laṭīf 2013.

684 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad 2013.

poor Egyptians. Many non-Islamists pointed to the politicization of social services as a key to the Brotherhood and other Islamists' success in elections. However, non-Islamists remain steadfast in their refusal to copy this electoral tactic.

ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī said that it is important for groups to provide aid to the poor, but these groups should be non-politicized.[685] Other leaders of the political groups and movements have indicated that social services should be in the domain of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and not political parties. Khālid Dāwūd emphasized that political parties deal with issues such as providing education to children, promoting social justice, and ensuring law and order.[686] Dāwūd continued by stating that political parties should not be responsible for getting staples such as rice and cooking oil to poor Egyptians.[687]

This is not to say that non-Islamist political parties do not see social services as essential to Egypt, but these activities should not be politicized. For instance, Aḥmad ʿAbd Allah, the head of the April 6 political bureau, supports the formation of social service networks to connect with the people.[688] He claims that by aiding Egyptian communities, the April 6 Movement can better relate to the needs of Egyptians.[689] Rāmī al-Suwīsī agrees and points out that the April 6 Movement has already been involved in community works such as placing railroad signs by tracks in an attempt to cut down the number of train/car accidents in Egypt.[690]

Non-Islamists point out that the aim of providing social services is not to sway people to their way of thinking. Rather, they contend that one of the aims of volunteering and helping communities is to show how the Egyptian government has been failing to provide for its people, explains Rāmī al-Suwīsī.[691] Although, Islamists can and do claim the same thing. However, other non-Islamists believe parties should stay out of NGO work. As Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir states "We are not an NGO, we are a political party," contending that political parties should help people achieve their aspirations

685 Ibid.

686 Interview with Khālid Dāwūd 2013.

687 Ibid.

688 Interview with Aḥmad ʿAbd Allah 2013.

689 Ibid.

690 Interview with Rāmī Al-Suwīsī 2013.

691 Ibid.

and not supply these type of social services.[692] In her mind, this is the only way in which democracy will thrive in Egypt.[693]

Through providing social services to people around Egypt, some non-Islamist movements are demonstrating that the state needs to be more involved in bettering the lives of its citizens. In light of these comments from non-Islamists, questions arise concerning how to prevent the politicization of social services and other forms of aid. It is clear that non-Islamists must continue to face the challenge concerning how their political and social messages resonate with a public that has faced immense economic and political hardships in the past decades, both under Mubārak and Mursī. Non-Islamist political solutions are needed to realize goals such as freedom and social justice, and non-Islamist movements are unclear about precisely how to accomplish this. It is still unclear how well these messages have resonated with people in dire economic conditions.

6.10.5 Mobilizing the Street

Street protests and observable demonstrations were a prominent strategy for non-Islamists during the rule of Mursī. For instance, there was a highly publicized protest by April 6 members outside the home of the Interior Minister where protesters waved women's underwear, implying that the Ministry of Interior was "selling" itself to a new ruler, in this case Mursī.[694] For many non-Islamist movements, especially the April 6 Movement, the Ministry of Interior represents an institution that remains unaffected despite significant political changes over the past few years.

Moreover, Amal Sharaf maintains that the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 has demonstrated that pressure from the street can force an Egyptian ruler to step down.[695] It is through the continued pressure emanating from the street that the April 6 Movement seeks to continue to challenge the status quo and bring about real change in Egypt. After all, *Tamarrud* had effectively used protests as their main form of activism against the Muslim Brotherhood. The events of June 30 serve as prime examples of massive protests leading to the ouster of a government in Egypt. However, the extent of this change and whether or not it will lead to a genuine democracy in Egypt has yet to be seen.

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692 Interview with Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 2013.

693 Ibid.

694 Ahram Online 2013 (b).

695 Interview with Amal Sharaf 2013.

Street protests were an important tool for non-Islamists during Mursī's presidency and have continued to be utilized since his ouster. The effectiveness of the method has come into doubt since the interim Egyptian government passed an "anti-protest" law severely limiting the viability of demonstrations, making them illegal without government approval.[696] As a result of this law, several prominent activists who were important figures and allies to non-Islamist movements have been arrested and detained.[697]

6.10.6 Time as an Ally?

The primary assumption of the strategies articulated by non-Islamist parties is that, with more time, they will more effectively transmit their message. Several of the political leaders of these groups have voiced that they are reaching out to more Egyptians than ever before. After all, as Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir has argued, Islamists had been propagating their message for years through grassroots activities while non-Islamists have had a little more than two years to get organized.[698] However, as pointed out earlier, some of these non-Islamist parties had existed during the rule of Mubārak. Non-Islamists also assume that their message will resonate with the majority of the population as they believe that public opinion has fully turned against Islamists in Egypt. In all, the effectiveness of articulating their political values to the populace, along with the ability to reach more segments of the Egyptian population will be central to non-Islamists' success.

Non-Islamists must also find a way to unite under a common banner in the post-Mursī Egyptian political landscape. While it was easy to unite in opposition of the Brotherhood, there have been signs of disagreement in the NSF after the ouster of Mursī, with many viewing Muḥammad al-Barādaʿī's resignation as vice president as an act of treason.[699] Al-Barādaʿī's resignation caused a great deal of tension in the NSF and in other groups that supported the June 30 protests.[700] Moreover, al-Barādaʿī has warned that political divisions are widening on a number of fronts.[701] Tensions have been bubbling beneath the surface between young and old generations, who may have different visions for their political parties.[702] Currently, for non-Islamist parties, the future appears much brighter than in 2012. Members of

696 Kingsley 2013 (b).

697 Daily News Egypt 2014.

698 Interview with Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 2013.

699 Fleishman 2013.

700 Taha 2013 (a).

701 Ibid.

702 For instance, see Taha 2013 (c).

non-Islamist political parties understand that much work is needed in order to realize their political goals. However, it appears as though they think with more time their vision for electoral success will come to fruition.

Similar to non-Islamist parties, non-Islamist movements have high hopes for Egypt's future. Soon after Mursī's ouster, Muḥammad ʿAzīz, one of *Tamarrud's* founders, stated that this is the time to develop Egypt and that *Tamarrud* has "evolved from a movement of protest to a movement of building."[703] Encouraged by past successes, members of the April 6 Movement also expressed confidence that, with continued pressure generated from the street, real change can come to Egypt.[704] Consequently, there is a natural aura of optimism around these movements with regard to the future.

In the coming years, it will be interesting to see what the future holds for non-Islamist movements in Egypt. The *Tamarrud* and April 6 Movements both have indicated that they will continue to play major roles in shaping Egypt's political transition. Moreover, as we have seen, each movement has been active in various ways since the ouster of Mursī. Divisions within movements, however, have cast uncertainty on the direction they might take with regard to their involvement in politics. How non-Islamists approach compromise and consensus with other political currents will also go a long way in determining the political future of Egypt.

6.11 Conclusion

Non-Islamist parties and movements are currently faced with a rapidly changing political environment. Many Islamist groups, with the exception of the *Salafī al-Nūr* Party, continue to protest against what they believe is a military coup and have refused to participate in the transitional process until certain conditions are met; the most prominent condition being Muḥammad Mursī's return to the presidency.[705] This has further complicated a difficult political situation and has caused deep political and social divisions. Additionally, non-Islamist parties and movements are now forced to work together in an increasingly tense political environment where consensus-building is needed. With this in mind, this chapter has provided an overview of the non-Islamist worldview before and after Mursī's ouster in order to help illustrate how non-Islamist groups reacted to past Islamist electoral victories.

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703 Interview with Muḥammad ʿAzīz 2013.

704 Interview with Rāmī al-Suwīsī and Amal Sharaf 2013.

705 Egypt Independent 2013 (c).

Non-Islamist groups have generally differentiated themselves from the Islamist current on the basis of the use of religion in politics. As discussed in section 6.7, religion may play an important role for non-Islamists, many believe that its use in politics is not only damaging to the political process, but can also corrupt the sanctity of religion. As previously mentioned, non-Islamists are largely in support of Article 2 of the Constitution, affirming that the principles of *Sharīʿa* are the source for legislation. They justify the inclusion of Article 2 by pointing to the Islamic identity of Egypt. However, non-Islamists have been insistent that freedom of all people is fundamental to their belief and that their ideologies are inclusive of non-Muslims and those following *Shīʿī* Islam.

In many ways, non-Islamist parties and movements believe that time is on their side. First, non-Islamists have emphasized that their messages are reaching more Egyptians than before and are resonating with the populace, as evidenced by Mursī's overthrow. Second, many have expressed that the failure of Islamists in governing, particularly that of the Muslim Brotherhood, will only help their message in the future. Non-Islamist parties and movements believe that the answer to their political success does not lie in copying tactics of the Islamists, but rather in demonstrating the faults and shortcomings of the Islamist ideology and reaching segments of Egyptian society with which they have not had previous contact. This may continue to spark conflict between Islamist and non-Islamist currents.

Non-Islamist parties and movements have generally worked together, but there appears to be some underlying tension between these groups. Some members of non-Islamist parties perceived those in non-Islamist movements to be impractical and unrealistic in their demands for political reform. Conversely, some members of non-Islamist movements see that some non-Islamist parties have not been able to bring about real change and are not genuine revolutionaries in the true sense of the word. It will be interesting to see whether this tension grows in the coming years in the midst of a deeply divided political environment.

This chapter has presented several voices from the non-Islamist current to provide their views on a number of issues. While 2012 was a year that witnessed electoral successes by Islamists in Egypt, 2013 had seen a dramatic changing of fortunes for non-Islamists. Non-Islamists now have a greater opportunity to play a defining role in shaping the Egyptian state. After the ouster of Muḥammad Mursī, non-Islamists now believe that time is on their side. Only time will tell if they are correct.

7 Conclusion *(Cornelis Hulsman)*

When we started interviewing political actors at the end of 2012 the Islamist electoral successes were still fresh. Their fortunes, however, dramatically changed in 2013.

We have included the first months after the removal of Egypt's first Islamist president and thus all chapters dealt with the transition from Islamist rule to a non-Islamist rule of Egypt. Islamists were deeply disappointed and angry that they were not able to achieve their "Islamic Project," realizing the implementation of *Sharī'a* and creating a utopian Islamic state that would ultimately unite Egypt and other Muslim countries.

Eline Kasanwidjojo described the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization with a history of grassroots preaching and social work, political activism and at times involvement in violent actions. The Brotherhood has been internally divided on whether to remain focused on *da'wa* and social work or whether to become more politically involved. The January 25 Revolution had deeply weakened the Egyptian state and created for them a better climate for political involvement.

The Muslim Brotherhood entered the Revolution with a strong hierarchical organization with a largely secretive membership in which the organization took care of the families of members who were arrested or killed. With this hierarchical system they were almost able to act as an army, with directives given from top to down. The successes in the Parliamentary elections of December 2011-January 2012 made them bolder resulting in many secret members becoming known." The process to constructively `Islamize´ the society seemed (in that period) to be secured," Kasanwidjojo writes.

Muslim Brotherhood leadership was focused on achieving their ideals of building an Islamic state and in the process of doing so turned non-Islamist political actors against them. Leaders did not show much of an effort toward consensus building during their rule and neither did they show much readiness to compromise after they lost power.

This Muslim Brotherhood's secretive system was never fully dismantled and thus when Mursī was deposed and the higher level leaders were arrested or escaped second echelon or third echelon leaders were able to direct the people who were operating under their directives. Brotherhood members believe that their organization is able to overcome the pressures that continued to increase. Kasanwidjojo concludes that "with its deep-rooted history, strong organization, but most of all, its strong ideology, they will certainly not concede so readily."

Just as the Muslim Brothers the *Salafis* struggled between preaching and political involvement. But unlike the Muslim Brothers *Salafis* had been mostly quietist and focused on preaching until the January 25 Revolution. Their political parties were only formed after the Revolution and were thus to a larger or smaller extent perceived as revolutionary. Quinta Smit described the subsequent struggle that resulted between preaching or religious *Salafism*, often with a revolutionary angle, and political *Salafism* that needed to be more pragmatic. Political pragmatism was often seen as contrasting with the traditional *Salafi* identity which would guarantee large scale support from the religiously conservative Egyptian masses.

Of all *Salafi* political parties *al-Nūr* Party turned out to be the largest and most pragmatic. They have made concessions and alliances that have cost it support, but that also protected their legitimate position in the political arena. Prior to the June 30 protests they sided with the parties asking for Mursī's downfall. As a consequence they were not banned and played a role in the 2013 Constituent Assembly that formed Egypt's new Constitution.

Jayson Casper described the process from violence to nonviolence and participation in politics of the *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. The forced removal of the pro-Mursī sit-ins in August 2013 led to a wave of burning Coptic property including tens of churches. *Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, just as several Muslim Brotherhood leaders, distanced itself from the attacks, condem-ning them completely. Their denials were, however, suspected by many. "If many doubted their true intentions during a period of openness, these are likely to increase during a time of public crackdown on Islamists," Casper concluded.

Casper also wrote about the *jihādī Salafis* who were and are primarily active in Sinai. The *jihādī Salafis* had no faith in participatory democracy. In the days of Mursī they were largely involved in preaching but after Mursī's removal militant resistance moved to the foreground. They were able to draw other *Salafis* who had little faith in democracy into their camp.

Non-Islamist parties and actors were divided and weak before President Muḥammad Mursī was elected. Resistance against Mursī forced them to cooperate but it was not them but Egypt's judiciary that proved to be Mursī's greatest stumble block. Calls of Minister of Defense ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī to political opponents to unite in the last months of Mursī's rule had no effect. Al- Sīsī warned several times that the Egyptian state could not endure such deep divisions but neither the Brothers and their allies and their opponents showed much readiness to come to consensus.

Nicholas Gjorvad showed that many non-Islamists are in fact religious but they believe the use of religion "in politics is not only damaging to the po-

litical process, but can also corrupt the sanctity of religion." Non-Islamists were to a large extent affirming the need to keep the reference to the *Sharīʿa* as the source for legislation in the Constitution. They, however, also "have been insistent that freedom of all people is fundamental to their belief and that their ideologies are inclusive of non-Muslims and those following *Shīʿī* Islam."

Non-Islamist parties and movements believed in 2013 that time was on their side, banking on a widespread resistance in the Egyptian population against the Islamist policies during Mursī.

Will this anti-Islamist antipathy remain? For this to happen non-Islamists will need to show that they can bring economic progress to the country in which large numbers of Egyptians will be able to participate. Despite major efforts this has thus far not yet materialized. Islamists are well aware that Egypt's weak economy is the Achilles heel of the al- Sīsī government and thus efforts have been made to undermine recovery.[706]

The removal of president Mursī by force has undermined the legitimacy of the transfer of power, in particularly in the eyes of Islamists. Muslim Brothers have contributed to this through their lack of consensus building and refusal to call for new elections prior to Mursī's removal. Instead they were organizing counter demonstrations and sit-ins, digging themselves in for a removal that, due to deepening tensions, was bound to happen. Following the removal of Mursī, they continued the large sit-ins with fiery preachers whose inflammatory speeches, which called for rejection of the interim government, were broadcasted. Neither the sit-ins, nor the violent removal of the sit-ins have contributed to efforts to seek consensus. The consequence of Mursī's forced removal and lack of consensus was that large numbers of Islamists have lost faith in democracy. Others became involved in militant attacks, in particular on what they see as their greatest enemies: police, military and the judiciary. Egypt has, since the removal of president Mursī, seen continuous violence that resulted in harsh government responses.

706 A Muslim Brotherhood leader who wished to remain anonymous told me on August 7 2014, that there was no contact between the Brotherhood and the Government of Egypt. He predicted that Egypt's economy would not recover which in turn would undermine this government.

Appendix 1: Organizations and Interviewees Mentioned in This Book *(Cornelis Hulsman)*

In this appendix we provide a brief overview of all interviewees with their positions at the time of the interview. We have attempted to find out what happened with these interviewees after 2013. Sometimes this was easy, but often calls to old telephone numbers and email addresses were not answered. We also briefly describe the political parties to which people we interviewed in 2013 belonged, as well as what happened to them after 2013. Also oither political parties and movements that are mentioned in the book are listed here. This list was compiled with the help of Tugrul von Mende, Eline Kasanwidjodo, Quinta Smit, Jayson Casper, Nicholas Gjorvad and Khaled H. Zakaria.

The people we interviewed in 2013 are listed under the names of the organizations they represented. Information is presented in the following order:

Name and position in 2013

Date of interview(s)

Information obtained as to what happened to them after the interviews.

Authors of different chapters tried to contact the people whom they had interviewed, but rarely succeeded. The anonymous former member of *al-Waṭan* Party responded and explained he and other former members of *al-Waṭan* Party are no longer active in politics. Dr. Jerome Drevon wrote that most of his contacts dating back to 2013 are now unavailable, or under surveillance. "Many had to leave the country and many others were incarcerated by the authorities. I am sporadically in touch with them, but they are not willing at the moment to meet anybody considering the risks (which is very understandable)."[707] We also searched the internet and found a few people in the media or facebook or twitter.

It is clear that the Muslim Brothers who had been interviewed were either imprisoned, in exile or no longer publicly active in politics. Some of the members of the *Salafī al-Nūr* Party are still active in politics. *Al-Nūr* Party members whom we had interviewed and who had left for *al-Waṭan* Party ceased to be active in politics after 2013. Leading members of *al-Aṣāla*, *al-Faḍīla* and *al-Iṣlāḥ* Parties (all *Salafī*) were either abroad, arrested or their whereabouts are unknown to us. Preacher Ṣafwāt Ḥijāzī is in prison. ʿIzzat al-Salamūnī of the *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* died in prison. Another member is in prison and of others we do not know where they are. Of the *jihādī Salafīs*

707 Email November 18, 2015.

we interviewed, one is in prison and of the others we do not know their whereabouts. The Islamist scholars we interviewed in 2013 are still active. Of the non-Islamists, Jamāl al-Bannā (1920-2013) passed away, others are still active. Dr. George Masīḥa of the New *al-Wafd* Party left politics. Of others, their whereabouts are unknown, which is likely to be an indication that they are no longer active in politics.

1 Muslim Brotherhood & Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded 1928 in opposition to Western political dominance in Egypt and the Muslim World. In Chapter 2 several wings are mentioned:

Al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ - the militant wing.

Quṭbīs – members belonging to the more conservative political wing.

Tilmisānīs – members belonging to the reformist political wing.

The Muslim Brotherhood provides grass roots services, and throughout the decades tried to increase its influence in society through Parliament, trade unions, NGOs and other organizations. In 2011, prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood created the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which in turn became the dominant party in a coalition of political parties called *al-Taḥāluf al-Dimuqrāṭī min ajli Miṣr*, Democratic Alliance for Egypt. In the first post-Revolutionary parliamentary elections in December 2011 - January 2012, the *Ḥizb al-Ḥurriya wa-l-ʿAdāla*, Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won 213 seats. With its allies in the Democratic Alliance it won 235 seats (47.2 percent).

Their support declined in the first round of the presidential elections, when the combined Islamist candidates received only 43.77 percent of the vote. However, in the run-off between Muslim Brother candidate Muḥammad Mursī and former airforce general Aḥmad Shafīq they won with a disputed 51.7 percent.[708] President Mursī was ousted after repeated warnings from the Minister of Defense, ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī, not to let tensions in society grow, and following massive demonstrations on July 3, 2013.

Mursī's ouster led to the formation of the Anti-Coup Alliance, also known as the National Alliance Supporting Legitimacy, which is a Muslim Brotherhood led alliance of approximately 40 Islamist parties and groups who demand that Mursī be reinstalled as president. The composition of the al-

708 Hulsman 2014 (b).

liance has changed and it seems their discourse changed to rejecting al-Sīsī's regime, more than reinstalling Mursī.

On December 25, 2013, after the bomb attack on the security directorate in Manṣūra, the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization, which caused ʿAmr Darrāj, one of our interviewees, to immediately leave the country. On August 9, 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court ordered the dissolution and liquidation of assets of the Freedom and Justice Party. The Anti-Coup Alliance was dissolved by Prime Ministerial decree on 30 October 2014. On June 16, 2015, a court upheld the death penalty of former president Muḥammad Mursī, which was followed by a bomb attack killing Hishām Barakāt, Egypt's Prosecutor General.[709]

1.1 Dr. ʿIṣṣām al-Ḥaddād (Essam el-Haddad)

Position in 2013: Leading Muslim Brotherhood member, national security adviser to President Mursī.

Interview: February 25, 2013 by Cornelis Hulsman, Eline Kasanwidjojo, Prof. Abdallah Schleifer.[710]

Position after 2013: In prison since President Mursī was ousted on July 3, 2013.

1.2 Dr. ʿAmr Darrāj (Amr Darrag)

Position in 2013: Professor of Civil Engineering at Cairo University since 1988. Muslim Brotherhood member, head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the FJP since 2012, Secretary-General of the Constituent Assembly of 2012, Member of a multi-party delegation to the Netherlands in October 2012,[711] Minister of Planning and International Cooperation in the last cabinet of President Mursī.

Interviews: March 25, 2013, by Cornelis Hulsman and Diana Serôdio, April 8 by D. Serôdio[712], July 22[713] and October 22, 2013 by Cornelis Hulsman and Esther Schoorel. Ahmed Deiab joined October 22. [714]

Position after 2013: Dr. ʿAmr Darrāj played a role in seeking a settlement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the interim government in the

709 Hulsman 2015 (a).

710 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a)

711 Hulsman 2012 (f).

712 Serôdio 2013 (d).

713 Hulsman and Schoorel 2013.

714 Hulsman, Deiab and Schoorel 2013.

second half of 2013 which failed. He also regularly met senior European officials and is since December 2013, with a large number of other Muslim Brotherhood and FJP leaders, in exile in Turkey.

1.3 Dr. Walīd al-Ḥaddād (Walid el-Haddad)

Position in 2013: Member Muslim Brotherhood, Foreign Relations Spokesperson of the FJP, not family of Dr. ʿIṣṣām al-Ḥaddād.

Interviews: December 11, 2012, by Diana Serôdio[715] and June 13, 2013, by Eline Kasanwidjojo.[716]

Position after 2013: He was arrested for "inciting violence" in October 2013[717] and has been in prison since his arrest.

1.4 Dīnā Zakariyya Ḥusayn

Position in 2013: Muslim Brotherhood sister, mother of two children, presenter of social and religious programs on different satellite channels, 2001-2008, co-founder of the FJP, member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the FJP. Member of a multi-party delegation to the Netherlands in October 2012.[718]

Interview: November 19, 2012, by Eline Kasanwidjojo.[719]

Position after 2013: She is not responding to calls or e-mails.

1.5 Ishtishhād al-Bannā, Sanāʾ al-Bannā

Position in 2013: Muslim Brotherhood sisters, daughters of Ḥasan al-Bannā.

Interview: July 11, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo and Quinta Smit.[720]

Position after 2013: The interviewers do not know where they are now.

1.6 Dr. Wafāʾ Ḥafnī

Position in 2013: Muslim Brotherhood sister, daughter of Sanāʾ al-Bannā and professor at al-Azhar University.

Interview: July 11, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo and Quinta Smit.[721]

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715 Serôdio 2013 (a).

716 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (f)

717 El Badil 2013.

718 Hulsman 2012 (f).

719 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (c)

720 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

Position after 2013: Dr. Wafāʾ Ḥafnī did not respond to efforts of the interviewers to contact her.

1.7 ʿAlī Khafājī (Aly Khafagy)

Position in 2013: Muslim Brotherhood member and Youth leader of the FJP in the Giza Governorate in 2013.

Interview: April 15, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo and Quinta Smit.[722]

Position after 2013: According to his twitter account, he is now living in Qatar.[723]

1.8 Muḥammad ʿAbd Allah

Position in 2013: Muslim Brotherhood member and FJP Youth leader in Giza Governorate.

Interview: May 28, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo.[724]

Position after 2013: The interviewer does not know where they are now.

1.9 Aḥmad Kamāl

Position in 2013: Muslim Brotherhood member and FJP youth leader of Southern Cairo.

Interview: June 10, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad and Eline Kasanwidjojo.

Position after 2013: According to his Facebook account, he remained in Cairo.[725]

1.10 Anonymous

Position in 2013: working member of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Interview: April 16, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo.

Position after 2013: According to his facebook he seems to be in Cairo.

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721 Ibid.

722 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (e).

723 https://twitter.com/alykhafagy

724 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (b).

725 https://www.facebook.com/ahmad.elbab

1.11 Usāma Farīd

Position in 2013: Businessman and head of international relations of the Muslim Brotherhood initiated Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA). He stated that he does not represent Muslim Brotherhood thinking, though media associate him with the Muslim Brotherhood. [726]

Interview: June 14, 2011 by Cornelis Hulsman. Farīd introduced Hulsman on April 30, 2012, to Dr. ʿIṣṣām al-Ḥaddād.

Position after 2013: Member of a multi-party visit to the Netherlands in October 2012.[727] Several meetings in 2012 and 2013. Left in 2013 for Istanbul where he now resides.

1.12 Wāʿil Ḥaḍāra (Wael Haddara)

Position in 2013: Advisor to President Mursī, not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood but with sympathies for the Muslim Brotherhood. He came from Canada to Egypt to support the president and returned to Canada after Mursī had been removed. He described his views on the removal of President Mursī.[728]

Interview: Telephone interview with Cornelis Hulsman on September 15, 2013.

Position after 2013: He is living and working in Canada.

2 Former Members of the Muslim Brotherhood

Because membership of the Brotherhood is not public but secret, it is widely believed that former members of the Muslim Brotherhood are still members of the Brotherhood, or still have connections to the organization. Whether those beliefs are true or not is very difficult to ascertain. Former members of the Muslim Brotherhood can be found in: *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Qawiyya* (the Strong Egypt Party), formed in 2012, *Ḥizb al-Tayyār al-Miṣrī* (the Egyptian Current Party), formed in 2011 by youth leaders who had been expelled from the Muslim Brotherhood (now dissolved, after a merger with the Strong Egypt Party) and *Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ* (the Center Party), formed in 1996, legalized in 2011.

726 Casper 2011 (b).

727 Hulsman 2012 (f).

728 Hulsman 2013 (d).

2.1 Dr. ʿAbd al-Munʾim Abū al-Futūḥ

Position in 2013: Member of the Muslim Brotherhood in increasingly important positions between the the 1970s and 2011. Reformist member of the Guidance Office of the Muslim Brotherhood until 2011, presidential candidate in 2012 and founder and leader of the Strong Egypt Party, secretary general of the Arab Medical Union.

Interview: June 19, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo, Quinta Smit and Cornelis Hulsman.[729]

Position after 2013: Dr. Abū al-Futūḥ is sporadically writing for al-Shurūq. Lawyer Ṭāriq Maḥmūd filed complaints against him for "insulting the president" and "inciting people to undermine state institutions." The complaint led to the Alexandria Prosecution opening an investigation in the complaints on November 22, 2015.[730]

2.2 Dr. Kamāl al-Hilbāwī

Position in 2013: Former member of the Muslim Brotherhood and the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Interviews: June 20, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo[731] and July 10, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo and Quinta Smit.[732]

Position after 2013: Dr. al-Hilbāwī became a member of the Constituent Assembly in 2013. In 2013 he stated that he planned "to form a parallel apolitical body devoted exclusively to education and preaching."[733] He is still talking to the media, and sometimes calls for reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. He stated on November 11, 2015, that the Muslim Brotherhood has not fielded any candidates in the Parliamentary elections and that those who claim otherwise are spreading rumors.[734] On November 21, 2015, he commented on the low turnout in Egypt's Parliamentary elections, and said that the reasons that people are not parti-cipating are the reasons that may result in another revolution.[735]

729 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (b).

730 Mada Masr 2015 (a).

731 Kasanwidjojo, 2013 (d),

732 Kasanwidjojo and Smit 2013 (e).

733 Ahram Online 2013 (b).

734 Zakariyyya 2015.

735 Hasan 2015.

2.3 Dr. Ibrāhīm al-Huḍaybī

Position in 2013: Writer, political researcher and former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, great-grandson of Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī, second General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, 1951-1973 and grandson of Maʾmūn al-Huḍaybī, sixth General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, 2002-2004.

Interviews: April 1, 2011 by Cornelis Hulsman, Arndt Emmerich and Judit Kuschnitzki[736] and May 17, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo and Quinta Smit.[737]

Position after 2013: Dr. al-Huḍaybī is freelance writer for *al-Shurūq* and Ahram Online and is affiliated with DGAP (Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik e.v.). His main areas of study are: *Sharīʿa*, Islamic movements and political economy of the Middle East.

3 Council of Trustees of the Revolution

Organization promoting dialogue between different actors of the Revolution but mostly between Muslim Brothers and *Salafīs*. Dissolved after July 3, 2013.

3.1 Aḥmad Najīb

Position in 2013: Founding member of the Council of Trustees of the Revolution and a member of the Egyptian Current Party.

Interview: June 18, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo.[738]

Position after 2013: During the 2011 Revolution he was working with the Coordination Committee of the Masses. Since August 2011 he has been Corporate Social Responsibility Director at FinBi. In 2014 he was a board member of the National Committee for Defence of Civil Liberties and Rights on Egypt's constitution.

3.2 Dr. Ṣafwāt Ḥijāzī (Safwat Hegazy)

Position in 2013: Graduated from the Faculty of Agriculture, Cairo University. Not a member of a specific political party, but an active Islamic preacher trying to bridge *Salafīs* and the Muslim Brothers.[739] Secretary-General of the Revolution's Board of Trustees, Member of the National Council for Human Rights during Mursī. Fiery preacher during the *Rābaʿa al-ʿAdawiyya* sit-in in July and August 2013.

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736 Hulsman, Emmerich and Kutschnitzki 2011.

737 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (c).

738 Kasanwidjojo 2013 (d).

739 Interview with Usāma Farīd June 14, 2011.

Interview: July 25, 2013 by Cornelis Hulsman, Ahmed Deiab and Daniela De Maria,[740] and August 1, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad. [741]

Position after 2013: Ḥijāzī fled after the violent dispersal of the *Rāba'a al-'Adawiyya* sit-in to Siwa Oasis, where he was arrested on August 21, 2013. A trial against him started in September 2013. He is in prison until now.

4 Salafī Associations and Political Parties

The first *Salafī* association, *Anṣār al-Sunna*, was founded in 1926. In the late 1970's, *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya* was founded, which focused on preaching. Until the Revolution of January 25, 2011, *Salafīs* were not organized in political parties, but there was already a distinction between quietist and *jihādī-Salafīs*. Most *Salafīs* followed the quietist line. Prof. Abdallah Schleifer summarizes this, saying "all *jihādīs* are *Salafīs*, but most *Salafīs* are not *jihādī*."[742] Following the Revolution, *al-Nūr*, *al-Aṣāla*, *al-Faḍīla* and *al-Iṣlāḥ* parties were founded between May and September 2011. *Al-Nūr* Party is the political arm of *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya*. *Al-Iṣlāḥ* Party is the political arm of *al-Tayyār al-Salafī* (the *Salafī* Current).

The Islamist Bloc, consisting of *al-Nūr*, the Building and Development Party and *al-Aṣāla*, won 27.8% of the vote in the Parliamentary elections of December 2011-January 2012, resulting in their attaining 107, 13 and 3 seats respectively.

Al-Nūr Party members, led by then Assistant President 'Imād 'Abd al-Ghafūr, launched *al-Waṭan* Party on January 1, 2013, because they disagreed with the influence of *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya shaykhs* on *al-Nūr* Party. In June 2013, 130 leading members of the party resigned – including a member we interviewed- in response to conflicts over party leadership. *Al-Waṭan* Party sided with the Freedom and Justice Party after President Mursī was deposed on July 3, 2013 and became part of the Anti-Coup Alliance, but withdrew from this on 17 September 2014. In November 2014, opponents to religious parties tried to dissolve *al-Waṭan* Party, but the Alexandria Urgent Matters Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. *Al-Nūr* Party had one representative in the 2013 Constituent Assembly and participated in the 2015 Parliamentary elections.

Salafīs are very divided politically. After the 2011-2012 Parliamentary elections *Salafīs* founded *al-Sha'b* Party (the People's Party) in 2012, the political arm of *al-Jabha al-Salafiyya* (the *Salafī* Front). *Al-Rāya* Party (the Flag Party)

740 Hulsman, Deiab and De Maria 2013; De Maria 2013.

741 Gjorvad 2013 (b)

742 Interview Cornelis Hulsman with Prof. Abdallah Schleifer on November 22, 2015.

was created in 2013. *Al-Tayyār al-Thālith* (the Third Current) is a *Salafī* political organization that was also active in 2013.

5 *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya*

5.1 Muḥammad Ismāʿīl al-Muqaddim

Position in 2013: Leading *Salafī shaykh* of *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* (*Salafī* Call). He rejects democracy and subsequent involvement in politics, declined to appear in public or speak about politics.

Interview (telephone): December 3, 2012 by Cornelis Hulsman.

Position after 2013: He is still based in Alexandria and active in *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya*

6 *Ḥizb al-Nūr (al-Nūr/Light Party)*

6.1 Bassām al-Zarqā

Position in 2013: Leading member of *al-Nūr* Party, advisor to President Mursī.

Interview: June 18, 2013 by Quinta Smit.[743]

Position after 2013: He was a member of the 2013 Constituent Assembly, left the Assembly in disagreement over articles dealing with religion and was replaced by another member of *al-Nūr* Party. He is currently the Deputy President of *al-Nūr* Party.[744]

6.2 Nādir Bakkār

Position in 2013: Spokesperson and co-founder of *al-Nūr* Party, married to the daughter of Bassām al-Zarqā.

Interview: June 20, 2013 by Quinta Smit[745].

Position after 2013: He is a columnist for *al-Shurūq* (according to his Twitter account). His first article appeared in January 2013.[746] He is no longer involved in politics, obtained a MPA Student Scholarship for a study at Harvard since summer 2015.

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743 Smit 2013 (a).

744 Al-Miṣriyyūn 2015.

745 Smit 2013 (c).

746 Bakkār 2013.

7 *Ḥizb al-Waṭan (the Homeland Party)*

7.1 Dr. ʿImād ʿAbd al-Ghafūr

Position in 2013: President Mursī's advisor and President of *al-Nūr* Party. He left *al-Nūr* Party and founded *al-Waṭan* Party with a group of followers in December 2012 and launched the party on January 1, 2013.

Interview: December 10, 2012 Diana Serôdio.[747] Hulsman met with ʿImād ʿAbd al-Ghafūr on July 25, 2013, during the *Rabaʿa al-ʿAdawiyya* sit-in.

Position after 2013: ʿAbd al-Ghafūr left politics after the summer of 2013 and was not visible in the media until November 2015 with an article about a meeting with Judge Ṭāriq al-Bishrī, widely believed to be linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and architect of the referendum in March 2011.[748]

7.2 Dr. Aḥmad al-Qadrī ʿAbd al-Salām (Ahmed Kadry Abdelsalam)

Position in 2013: Al-Qadrī obtained his PhD in engineering at Strathclyde University in the UK and became a member of *al-Nūr* Party upon its foundation. He was nominated by *al-Nūr* Party to be a member of a multi-party delegation to the Netherlands in October 2012.[749] In December 2012 he became one of the founders of *al-Waṭan* Party and became its English language spokesman.

Interview: February 6, 2013 by Jayson Casper.[750]

Position after 2013: Since he left *al-Waṭan* Party in August 2013 he is no longer active in politics. He is assistant professor in the Faculty of Engineering at the Arab Academy of Science and Technology and Maritime Transport, Electrical Engineering Department, Alexandria. He does not respond to email or phone calls.

7.3 Anonymous Former Member of al-Nūr and al-Waṭan Parties

Position in 2013: This person joined *al-Nūr* Party when it was founded in 2011. In December 2013 he became one of the founders of *al-Waṭan* Party. In May 2013 he left politics. He was never involved in politics before 2012.

Interview: May 15, 2013 (just after he had left politics) by Quinta Smit.[751]

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747 Serôdio 2013 (a).

748 Muftāh 2015.

749 Hulsman 2012 (f).

750 Casper 2013 (a).

751 Smit 2013 (d).

Position after 2013: He is teaching at an Egyptian university and is no longer involved in politics. He is disappointed with politics in general, which is why he asked to keep this interview anonymous

8 *Ḥizb al-Aṣāla (The Authenticity Party)*

Founded in 2011. The party is still active on Facebook. On November 21, 2015 they wrote in commemoration of the Muḥammad Maḥmūd street riots in November 2011 that they had been abandoned.[752]

8.1 Īhāb Shīḥa

Position in 2013: *al-Aṣāla* Party leader.

Interview: April 12, 2013 by Quinta Smit, Eline Kasanwidjojo and Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: The interviewers were unable to get in contact with Īhāb Shīḥa in December 2015.

8.2 ʿIṣṣām al-Sharīf

Position in 2013: *al-Aṣāla* Party representative in Warrāq, Cairo.

Interview: April 17, 2013 by Quinta Smit and Jayson Casper.[753]

Position after 2013: The official Facebook page of the party posted on August 14, 2013 states that he had been arrested.

8.3 Hānī Fawzī

Position in 2013: Member of *al-Aṣāla* Party leadership and responsible for media.

Interview: April 25, 2013 by Quinta Smit.[754]

Position after 2013: Smit was unable to get in contact with him in December 2015.

752 https://ar-ar.facebook.com/alasala.party

753 Smit and Casper 2013.

754 Smit 2013 (b).

9 *Ḥizb al-Faḍīla (Virtue Party)*

The party was founded in March 2011 and is still active on Facebook.

9.1 Maḥmūd Fatḥī

Position in 2013: *al-Faḍīla* Party head.

Interview: May 30 by Quinta Smit and Aidan Mascarenhas-Keyes and June 15, 2013 by Quinta Smit and Eline Kasanwidjojo.[755]

Position after 2013: Maḥmūd Fatḥī fled to Turkey after June 30, 2013.[756] He is still in Istanbul, and wanted in Egypt for a number of trials. Maḥmūd Fatḥī signed a statement in solidarity with Turkey in shooting down a Russian fighter jet in November 2015.[757] Turkey is widely perceived an ally of Islamists while Russia is seen as an opponent to Islamists.

10 *Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ (Egyptian Reform Party)*

Founded September 11, 2011. Still active on Facebook. The chairman of the party, Dr. ʿAtiyya Adlān, issued a statement on May 6, 2015 that the future of President Mursī should not be decided by the court, but by the people, after the success of the Revolution. This is an expression of the Islamist hope that the current government of Egypt will fall through a new revolution. Dr. ʿAdlān is a leader in the National Alliance Supporting Legitimacy. Based on what he says, he is likely to be residing outside Egypt.

10.1 Khālid Manṣūr

Position in 2013: Founding member, member of the leadership and spokesperson of *al-Iṣlāḥ* Party.

Interview: July 9, 2013 by Quinta Smit and Eline Kasanwidjojo.[758]

Position after 2013: Interviewers were unable to contact him in December 2015.

755 Smit and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

756 Ṭāriq 2015.

757 ʿAwīs 2015.

758 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (i).

11 *Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya (Islamic Group)and Ḥizb al-bināʾ wa l-tanmiyya (Building and Development Party)*

Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya was involved in violence mostly between 1992 and 1998, until the government crackdown on the organization after the November 17, 1997, attack on Luxor which left 62 people dead, mostly tourists. The crackdown resulted in massive arrests, and a process of denouncing violence as tool to achieve objectives. The organization was dormant until 2011 and was re-activated after the January 25 Revolution and founded the Building and Development Party.

11.1 Muḥammad Aḥmad

Position in 2013: Supporter of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, present at their 'No to Political Violence' rally on February 15, 2013.

Interview: During the rally by Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: It is not known where he is today.

11.2 Sharaf al-Dīn al-Jibālī

Position in 2013: Member of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*'s Guidance office in Fayyūm present at their 'No to Political Violence' rally on February 15, 2013.

Interview: During the rally by Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: It is not known where he is.

11.3 ʿIzzat al- Salamūnī (Ezzat al-Salamony)

Position in 2013: Member of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*'s Cairo Guidance Council.

Interview: August 5, 2012 by Jayson Casper.[759]

Position after 2013: Al- Salamūnī died in Ṭura prison, August 2015.[760] Jayson Casper wrote an in-memoriam in which he described al-Salamūnī as "friendly, engaging, and eager to give a correct impression about Islam and *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*," but Casper found it difficult to reconcile that experience with al-Salamūnī "angrily shouting before a crowd."[761]

759 Casper 2013 (c).

760 Al-Sharqāwī 2015.

761 Casper 2015.

11.4 ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr

Position in 2013: Elected as Vice-President and Secretary General of the Building and Development Party of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*'s Building and Development Party.

Interview: May 11, 2013 by Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: Abū al-Naṣr was arrested and released in October 2015.[762]

11.5 Muḥammad ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān

Position in 2013: Member of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. Son of the "Blind Sheikh" ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, imprisoned in the USA.

Interview: March 1, 2012 by Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: It is not known where he is.

12 Jihādī Salafīs

Several *jihādī Salafī* organizations are active, including:

Tanẓīm al-Jihād (*Jihād* Organization) – established in the 1970s.

Al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād – active between 1999 and 2004.

Anṣār Bayt al-Maqdis – one of the strongest militant groups in Sinai.

Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn fi-Aknāf Bayt al-Maqdis – an early post-revolutionary militant group in Sinai.
Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamāʿa.

Interviewed members:

12.1 °Aḥmad ʿAshūsh

Position in 2013: He described himself as "a leader in the *jihādī-Salafīs*."

Interview: February 27, 2013 by Jayson Casper and Cornelis Hulsman.[763]

Position after 2013: ʿAshūsh was arrested in October 2013, for the terrorist attack that targeted the satellite telecom facility in Maʿadi, Cairo. According to al-Nahār he confessed that he had carried out this attack on instructions

762 Ismāʿīl 2015.

763 Casper 2013 (d); Hulsman and Casper 2016.

of Khayrat al-Shāṭir of the Muslim Brotherhood and *Salafī shaykh* Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismāʿīl.[764]

12.2 ʿAbd al-Bāsiṭ al-Fashnī

Position in 2013: A supporter of the *jihādī-Salafis*.

Interview: February 17, 2013 by Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: His whereabouts are unknown.

12.3 Ashraf

Position in 2013: An organizer at the *jihādī Salafī* protest at the French Embassy in Cairo on January 18, 2013. He then declined to give his full name.

Interview: January 18, 2013 by Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: His whereabouts are unknown.

13 Islamist scholars

13.1 Dr. Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ

Position in 2013: al-Azhar educated Muslim scholar and well-known presenter on the Islamic channel, Huda TV. Presenting himself as independent Muslim scholar, but widely seen as a *Salafi shaykh* opposed to *jihādī-Salafism*.

Interviews: November 28, 2012 by Shabana Basheer [765] and April 18, 2013, by Quinta Smit and Eline Kasanwidjojo.[766]

Position after 2013: Presenter at Huda TV.

13.2 Dr. Nādiya Muṣṭafā (Nadia Mustafa)

Position in 2013: Professor of Political Science at Cairo University. Founding Director of Center for Civilizational Studies and Dialogue of Cultures at Cairo University.[767] Later founded the Civilization Center for Political Studies as an independent organization with Dr. Sayf ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ.

764 Al-Nahār 2013.

765 Basheer 2012.

766 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (g).

767 https://www.facebook.com/Prof.Nadia.Mustafa

Interviews: March 3, 2013, by Diana Serôdio[768], May 28, 2013, by Quinta Smit, Eline Kasanwidjojo, and Aidan Mascarenhas-Keyes[769], and December 9, 2013, by Jayson Casper.[770]

Position after 2013: In January 2014 Dr. Muṣṭafā criticized the referendum for the revised Constitution.[771] In September 2014 executive director Midḥat Māhir (Medhat Maher) was detained for six months for alleged links with the Muslim Brotherhood. Dr. Muṣṭafā stated on October 5, 2015, that the co-founder of the Civilization Center for Political Studies, Dr. Sayf ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ, was suspended from his position at Cairo University for political reasons.[772] On February 29, 2016 Midḥat Māhir was detained again for the same reasons. [773]

14 Non-Islamist Organizations, Researchers, Authors and Journalists

14.1 Jamāl al-Bannā (Gamal el-Banna, 1920-2013)

Position in 2013: Liberal Islamic thinker, author and brother of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was critical of the Brotherhood.

Interview: November 25, 2012 by Eline Kasanwidjojo, Mette Toft Nielsen and Shabana Basheer. [774],

Position after 2013: He passed away on January 30, 2013.

14.2 Dr. ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Mashshāṭ (Abdul-Monem al-Mashat)

Position in 2013: Liberal scholar and Dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Future University in Cairo.

Interview: June 11, 2013 by Cornelis Hulsman.

Position after 2013: He remains in the same position.

14.3 ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ʿAlī

Position in 2013: Senior researcher on Islamist streams running his own think-tank.

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768 Serôdio 2013 (c).

769 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Mascarenhas-Keyes 2013.

770 Casper 2014.

771 Middle East Monitor 2014.

772 Rassd 2015.

773 Mada Masr 2016.

774 Kasanwidjojo 2012.

Interview: June 22, 2013 by Cornelis Hulsman.

Position after 2013: He remains in the same position and was elected as Member of Parliament in the 2015 Parliamentary elections.[775]

14.4 ʿImād Shāhīn

Position in 2013: Professor of political science, at the American University in Cairo.

Interview: April 9, 2013 by Quinta Smit and Eline Kasanwidjojo.[776]

Position today: Prof. Shāhīn still teaches at AUC.

14.5 Jerome Drevon

Position in 2013: A French PhD researcher studying Islamist armed groups in Egypt.

Interview: April 19, 2013 by Quinta Smit, Cornelis Hulsman and Eline Kasanwidjojo.[777]

Position after 2013: Drevon completed his PhD in June 2015. Following his PhD he became a research fellow at the University of Manchester who specializes in political violence and insurgencies. He publishes about *jihādī-Salafīs*.

14. 6 Mamdūḥ Sarūr

Position in 2013: An Upper Egyptian freelance journalist with *al-Miṣrī al-Yawm* and other media. He spoke of his good connections to all the local Islamist groups in Asyūṭ though he personally opposed them.

Interview: May 2, 2013 by Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: He is still working as a freelance journalist.

14. 7 Ismāʿīl Alexanderni

Position in 2013: A socio-political researcher and investigative journalist with three years of experience conducting field work in the Sinai.

Interview: September 29, 2013 by Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: He was taken into custody on November 29, 2015 by National Security Forces.[778]

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775 http://www.abdelrehimaly.com/

776 Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a)

777 Hulsman, Smit and Kasanwidjojo 2013 (a).

14.8 Professor Abdallah Schleifer

Position in 2013: Professor Emeritus, Mass Communication, American University Cairo, Chief Editor of the Muslim 500 and Senior Fellow Arab West Foundation.

Interviews: November 22, 2015 and April 7, 2016 by Cornelis Hulsman.

Position after 2013: Professor of Political Science at Future University.

15 Non-religious political parties and coalitions

Taḥaluf al-Thawra Mustamirra (Revolution Continues Alliance), a left-leaning, mostly secular alliance established on 23th October 2011.

Al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Dīmūqrāṭī (National Democratic Party) – Political party founded by President Anwar al-Sādāt in 1978 which was dissolved in 2011 after the Revolution.

Jabhat al-Inqādh al-Waṭanī (National Salvation Front) – an alliance of political parties opposing Muḥammad Mursī, created in 2012 including the political parties listed below.

Ḥizb al-Wafd (*Wafd* Party or Delegation Party) – Nationalist liberal party founded in 1919. Egypt's most influential party in the 1920s and 1930s. Dissolved in 1952.

Ḥizb al-Wafd al-Jadīd (New *al-Wafd* Party or New Delegation Party), a nationalist liberal political party in Egypt, established in 1978 but building on the roots of *al-Wafd* Party before the 1952 Revolution.

16 New al-Wafd Party

16.1 Dr. George Naji Masīḥa Ibrāhīm (George Messiha)

Position in 2013: Received an award in 2005 from the Egyptian Ministry of Industry for the best Egyptian industrial project at the World Economic Forum in Davos 2008, where he first met with Dr. Muḥammad al-Barāda'ī. He founded Jetac Inks, and became a businessman with an interest in politics. In 2006 he joined *Kıfāya*. In 2007 he formed Egyptians Against Discrimination. In 2011 he joined the National Society of Tahrir founded by Dr. al-Barāda'ī. Jetac Inks floundered after the Revolution in September 2011, due to Egyptian customers delaying payments, making it impossible for him to import raw materials. MP for the *New al-Wafd Party* in 2012, Member of a multi-party delegation to the Netherlands in October 2012.[779] Member of

778 Mada Masr 2015 (b).

779 Hulsman 2012 (f).

the Constituent Assembly in 2012 but walked out in November 2012. On August 19, 2013, days after the burning of tens of churches in Egypt he wrote

> "I also hope that common sense leads the different parts to start a real dialogue. I feel like a very tiny element in this equation. Gen. El Sisi is determined to end the short history of the MB, and on the other hand the MB is fighting to break the army and police, and then take full control over Egypt through a strict theocratic rule. We true liberals are fighting a lot for common sense and dialogue."[780]

Interview: November 14, 2012, by Cornelis Hulsman and Diana Serôdio,[781] November 28, 2012, by Jaco Stoop[782], February 20[783] and March 24, 2013 by Cornelis Hulsman, Diana Serôdio and Jayson Casper.

Position after 2013: He quit politics and runs a pharmacy in al-Qanāṭir. He resurfaced in 2014 as a member of the Munich Young Leaders in 2014, International Affairs Committee, Security & Defense Committee.

16.2 ʿAbd Allah al-Mughāzī

Position in 2013: Spokesman of the New *al-Wafd* Party, assistant to the Prime Minister.

Interview: May 1, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: He was the spokesperson of the Al-Sīsī Presidential campaign in 2014.[784]

17 *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Ḥurriyya (Freedom Egypt Party)*

A political party "committed to freedom and human rights,"[785] founded May 18, 2011.

17.1 Dr. ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī (Amr Hamzawy)

Position in 2013: Founder of the Free Egyptians Party, professor of political science, Department of Public Policy and Administration at the American University in Cairo (since 2011), author and human rights activist. He had a travel ban in 2014 but it was lifted shortly after.

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780 Email to Cornelis Hulsman, August 19, 2013.

781 Serôdio 2012.

782 Stoop 2012.

783 Casper 2013 (b).

784 Ḥāmid 2014.

785 Smit, Kasanwidjojo and Gjorvad 2013.

Interview: April 16, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad, Eline Kasanwidjojo, Quinta Smit.[786]

Position after 2013: Prof. Ḥamzāwī still teaches at AUC and writes for *al-Shurūq* News.

18 *Ḥizb al-Miṣriyyīn al-ʿAḥrār (Free Egyptians Party)*

Supports a liberal, democratic and secular order, founded by Nājīb Sāwīris on April 3, 2011.[787]

18.1 ʿĀṣim Mīmūn (Assem Memon)

Position in 2013: Deputy Managing Director of the party office of the Free Egyptians Party.

Interview: June 5, 2014 by Omar Ali[788]

Position after 2013: Deputy Managing Director of the party office of the Free Egyptians Party.

19 *Ḥizb al-Dustūr (Constitution Party)*

Political party founded in 2012 by Muḥammad al-Barādaʿī.

19.1 Khālid Dāwūd (Khaled Daoud)

Position in 2013: Spokesman for the Constitution Party, journalist, Assistant Editor-in-Chief of al-Ahram Weekly.[789]

Interview: April 29, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: He resigned as spokesman for the Constitution Party in August 2015[790] but is still Assistant Editor-in-Chief of al-Ahram Weekly.

20 *Ḥizb al-Muʾtamar (Congress Party)*

20.1 Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Laṭīf

Position in 2013: Deputy President of the Congress Party.

Interview: May 30, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

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786 Ibid.

787 Ali 2014.

788 Ibid.

789 http://www.mei.edu/profile/khaled-dawoud

790 Daily News 2015.

Position after 2013: He resigned in May 2014.791 It is not known if he is still politically active.

21 *Al-Ḥizb al-Miṣrī al-Dimūqrāṭī al-Ijtimāʿī (Egyptian Social Democratic Party)*

Social, Liberal Democratic Party founded in 2011 by Dr. Muḥammad Abū al-Ghār.[792]

21.1 Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir

Position in 2013: Deputy Secretary General of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party

Interview: May 28, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: According to the party's website, accessed November 26, 2015 she is still the Deputy Secretary General of the party.[793]

22 *Ḥizb al-Karāma (Dignity Party)*

Founded in 1996 by Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī, presidential candidate in the elections of 2012 and 2014, and Amin Iskander. Left-wing Nasserist. Allied in the Parliamentary elections of 2011-2012 to the *FJP* in the Democratic Alliance for Egypt. During the reign of President Mursī of the *FJP* the party joined the National Salvation Front in opposition to the *FJP* and President Mursī.

Al-Tayyār al-Shaʿbi al-Miṣri (Egyptian Popular Current) – created in 2012, advocates social justice. Closely allied with *al-Karāma* Party. The Egyptian Popular Current supports Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī, but it is not a political party as such. It rather concentrates on social issues with its activism.

22.1 Sayyid al-Ṭūkhī

Position in 2013: Vice-President of the Dignity Party

Interview: May 1, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: He remained with the party, but according to the Facebook page of the party he is no longer the Vice-President. [794]

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791 ʿAbdu 2014.

792 Al-Ḥizb al-miṣrī al-dimūqrāṭī al-ijtimāʿī 2015.

793 Ibid.

794 ṣafḥa rasmiyya li-Ḥizb al-Karāma 2015.

23 *Ḥizb al-ʿAḥrār (Liberal Party)*

23.1 Aḥmad Talāt (Ahmed Talaat)

Position in 2013: Lawyer, former deputy head of the party.

Interviews: March 5, 2013 by Diana Serôdio and Fouad Masoud[795] and June 22, 2015 by Cornelis Hulsman and Cholpon Ramizova.

Position after 2013: same as in 2013

24 Other Parties Mentioned in the Book but No Members Interviewed

Ḥizb al-Taḥaluf al-Shaʿbī al-Ishtirākī (Socialist Popular Alliance Party) – a leftist party, created in 2011.

Ḥizb al-Taǧammuʿ (National Progressive Unionist Party) – a socialist political party, founded in 1977.

Al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Dimūqrāṭī (National Democratic Party, NDP) – The party of President Ḥusnī Mubārak, defunct since his ouster.

25 April 6 Youth Movement

A democratization activist group created in 2008 following a major strike of industry workers in al-Maḥalla al-Kubra, an industrial town in the Delta. They were active in the January 25 Revolution and against the rule of President Mursī. The movement was banned by an Egyptian court order on 28 April 2014.[796]

25.1 Aḥmad ʿAbd Allah

Position in 2013: Lawyer and a leader of the April 6 movement's political bureau

Interview: April 29, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: He did not respond to efforts to contact him in December 2015.

25.2 Rāmī al-Suwīsī

Position in 2013: Co-founder of the April 6 movement.

Interview: May 2, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

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795 Serôdio 2013 (e).

796 Ahram Online 2014 (b).

Position after 2013: He did not respond to efforts to contact him in December 2015.

25.3 ʾAmal Sharaf

Position in 2013: Co-founder of the April 6 movement, Foreign Media spokesman.

Interview: May 2, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: He did not respond to efforts to contact him in December 2015.

26 Tamarrud (Rebellion)

A grass roots organization appealing to President Mursī for early presidential elections, supporting his removal on July 3, 2013. Several founders and major organizers remained politically active after President Mursī had been deposed.

26.1 Walīd al- Maṣrī

Position in 2013: Co-founder *Tamarrud*.

Interview: May 30, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: He did not respond to efforts to contact him in December 2015.

26.2 Maḥmūd Badr

Position in 2013: Co-founder *Tamarrud*, official spokesman, journalist at Al-Sabah

Interview: May 30, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: He was elected in 2015 as a Member of Parliament on the 'For The Love of Egypt' list.[797]

26.3 Muḥammad ʿAzīz

Position in 2013: Co-founder *Tamarrud*.

Interview: July 20, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: In 2015 he was in charge of political communication for *Tamarrud* and member of the Executive Office of the Egyptian Popular Current Party.[798]

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797 ʿAfīfī 2015; Abaza 2016.

26.4 Shīmāʾ al-Tūnī

Position in 2013: *Tamarrud* activist.

Interview: July 31, 2013 by Nicholas Gjorvad.

Position after 2013: She was volunteering for the Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī presidential campaign in 2014 after which she left politics.[799]

27 Military/Security

The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) – a statutory body, a council convening at times of war and crisis.

27.1 Anonymous Former Security Advisor for the Government in North Sinai

Position in 2013: former security advisor for the governorate of Northern Sinai

Interview: May 16, 2013 by Jayson Casper.[800]

Position after 2013: His position remained unchanged

27.2 Sāmiḥ Sayf al-Yazal

Position in 2013: Former Army General who turned political analyst.

Interview: November 29, 2013 by Eline Kasanwidjojo.

Position after 2013: Leader of the 'For the Love of Egypt' List in the Parliamentary elections of 2015. He was elected in the Parliamentary elections of 2015 [801] but passed away on April 4, 2016, after a battle with cancer.[802]

27.3 Other Opposition to Islamists

This includes the *Kifāya* movement, a grassroot democratization movement founded in 2004, primarily opposed to the expected transfer of power from Ḥusnī Mubārak to his son Jamāl, *Ṣūfī* Muslims in various top positions in al-Azhar and others. We have interviewed people from many different political parties and movements but do not claim our list to be exhaustive.

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798 https://twitter.com/mohamedaziz25

799 Personal meeting Nick Gjorvad on July 15, 2014.

800 Casper 2013 (e).

801 ʿAbdel Zāhir 2015.

802 Eleiba 2016; Daily News Egypt 2016.

Appendix 2: Index of Names of People

(Cornelis Hulsman[803])

References are made to Appendix 1 if people have been interviewed. Names of Arabic names are given in alphabetical order of their first name since names in the Arab world are mostly name strings; first name is given, the second name is the first name of father, the third name is the first name of grandfather and the fourth name, if used, is the first name of the great grandfather. Western names, however, in this list have been sorted by family names followed by their first name.

IJMES Transliteration	Common spelling (if used)	Description
Presidents and last king of Egypt (names not repeated in index of chapters 2-6)		
ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī	Abdel Fattah el-Sisi	2014-
ʿAdlī Manṣūr	Adly Mansour	2013-2014
Muḥammad Mursī	Mohamed Morsi	2012-2013
Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭanṭāwī	Mohamed Hussein Tantawi	Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces between Mubārak's ouster and Mursī's presidency the de-facto ruler of Egypt.
Ḥusnī Mubārak	Hosni Mubarak	1981-2011
Anwar al-Sādāt	Anwar Sadat	1970-1981
Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir	Gamal Abdel Nasser	1956-1970
Muḥammad Najīb	Muhammad Naguib	1952-1956
King Fārūq I	Farouk I	1936-1952, died in exile in 1965

Chapter 2: The Political Participation of the Muslim Brotherhood		
ʿAbd al-Jalīl al-Sharnūbī	Abd al-Gelil al-Sharnuby	Egyptian journalist and former Muslim Brother.
ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abū al-Futūḥ	Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh	See Appendix 1
ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Mashshāṭ	Abdel-Monem al-Mashat	See Appendix 1
ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ʿAlī		See Appendix 1

803 With the assistance of Alastair White, Catherine Volkmann and Eildert Mulder.

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Barr		Guidance Council member and Brotherhood Muftī.
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Masīrī	Abdel Wahhab Al-Massiri	Islamist political thinker and author.
ʿAbū al-ʿIla Māḍī		Co-founder *al-Wasaṭ* Party in 1996.
ʿĀdil Asʿad al-Khayyāṭ	Adel Asaad al-Khayyat	Member of the *Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*, the group responsible for the 1997 massacre in Luxor, nominated by president Mursī as governor of Luxor in June 2013 resulting in mass protests and his resignation one week later.
Aḥmad Kamāl		See Appendix 1
Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān		Father Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949).
Aḥmad al-Ṭayyib	Ahmed el-Tayeb	*Shaykh* al-Azhar since 2010.
Aḥmad Najīb		See Appendix 1
Aḥmad Shafīq	Ahmed Shafik	Prime Minister in 2011, Presidential candidate in 2012.
ʿAlī Khafājī		See Appendix 1
Amir ʿAbd al- Raḥmān		Brother Ḥasan al-Bannā.
ʿAmr Darrāj	Amr Darrag	See Appendix 1
Anonymousworking member of the Muslim Brotherhood		See Appendix 1
Bākināām al-Sharqāwī	Pakinam Sharqawi	Cairo University professor of Political Science who became assistant to President Mursī.
Brown, Nathan J.		Professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University (USA).
Dīnā Zakariyya Ḥusayn		See Appendix 1
Fāṭima Al-Zanātī	Fatma El-Zanaty	Professor of Statistics at Cairo University.
George Naji Masīḥa Ibrāhīm	George Messiha	See Appendix 1

Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī	Hamdeen Sabahi	Nasserist Presidential candidate in 2012 and 2014.
Ḥasan al-Bannā	Hassan al-Banna	1906-1949, founder Muslim Brotherhood.
Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī	Hassan al-Hudaybi	Second Supreme Guide Muslim Brotherhood, 1951-1973.
Hishām Zaʿzūʿ	Hisham Zazou	Minister of Tourism with a brief interval since 2012.
Hudā al-ʿAwad	Hoda Awad	Professor Political Science Misr International University, Secretary of the Center for Arab-West Understanding, Egypt.
Ibrāhīm al-Huḍaybī		See Appendix 1
Imām al-Shahīd ʿAbd al-Raḥmān		Brother Ḥasan al-Bannā.
Ishtishhād al-Bannā		See Appendix 1
Islām Luṭfī	Islām Luṭfī	Former Muslim Brother, co-founder Egyptian Current Party in June 2011.
ʿIṣṣām al-Ḥaddād	Essam el-Haddad	See Appendix 1
ʿIṣṣām al-ʿIriyān	Essam el-Erian	Muslim Brotherhood leader, Vice-Chairman Freedom and Justice Party. In prison since 2013.
ʿIṣṣām Sulṭān		Co-founder *al-Wasaṭ* Party in 1996.
Jamāl ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Better known as Jamāl al-Bannā	Gamal al-Banna	See Appendix 1
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī		Islamic reformist thinker (1838-1897) opposed to colonialism.
Jihād al- Ḥaddād		Son of ʿIṣṣām al- Ḥaddād and the Brotherhood official responsible for economic recovery, in prison since 2013.
Kamāl al-Hilbāwī		See Appendix 1

Khayrat al-Shāṭir	Khayrat al-Shater	Member of *al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ* (the militant wing of the Brotherhood) before his return to Egypt after the death of Supreme Guide Umar al-Tilmisānī in 1986. Since 2004 Deputy Supreme Guide Muslim Brotherhood. He was rejected participation in the 2012 presidential elections. In prison since 2013.
Khalīl al-ʿAnānī		Political analyst at *al-siyāsa al-dawliyya* (Foreign Policy)
Maḥmūd ʿIzzat	Mahmoud Ezzat	Member of *al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ* (the militant wing of the Brotherhood) before his return to Egypt after the death of Supreme Guide Umar al-Tilmisānī in 1986. Left in 2013 for Turkey.
Maʾmūn al- Huḍaybī		Sixth Supreme Guide Muslim Brotherhood, 2002-2004.
Meijer, Roel		Senior researcher on the Middle East at the Clingendael Institute, The Netherlands.
Mitchell, Richard P.		Professor of Near Eastern History at the University of Michigan, USA (1925-1983).
Muḥammad ʿAbd Allah		See Appendix 1
Muḥammad ʿAbduh		Islamic liberal reformer (1849-1905).
Muḥammad al-Barādaʿī	Mohammed el-Baradei	Egyptian opposition leader, vice-president July-August 2013.
Muḥammad al-Biltajī	Mohamed Beltagy	Muslim Brotherhood leader who played a prominent role in the *Rabaʿa al-ʿAdawiyya* sit-in. In prison since 2013.
Muḥammad al-Qazzāz		Former Muslim Brother, co-founder Egyptian Current Party in June 2011.

Muḥammad Badīʿ	Mohamed Badie	Eighth Supreme Guide Muslim Brotherhood since 2010. In prison since 2013.
Muḥammad Ḥabīb		Deputy General Guide Muslim Brotherhood during Muḥammad Mahdī ʿĀkif, resigned in 2009, left the Brotherhood and became a critic of president Mursī.
Muḥammad Mahdī ʿĀkif		Seventh Supreme Guide Muslim Brotherhood, 2004-2010.
Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā		Islamic reformist thinker (1865-1935) opposed to colonialism.
Mārīz Tādrus	Mariz Tadros	Research fellow Institute of Development Studies (UK).
Nāhīd Lamʿī Jirjis	Nahid Lamei Georgios	Coptic member of the FJP General Assembly and FJP's Public Relations Committee in Giza.
Nādiya Muṣṭafā		See Appendix 1
Rafīq Ḥabīb		Egyptian-Christian researcher, Vice President of the FJP, 2011-2012.
Ṣafwāt Ḥijāzī	Safwat Hegazy	See Appendix 1
Saʿd al-Katātnī		Senior FJP leader who became speaker of the Parliament in 2012.
Sanāʿ al-Bannā		See Appendix 1
Sāmiḥ Sayf al-Yazal		See Appendix 1
Samīr Marqus	Samir Marcos	Coptic Liberal assistant to President Mursī, August-November 2012.
Ṣāmūīl Tādrus	Samuel Tadros	Research Fellow at Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom (USA).
Sayyid Quṭb		Muslim Brotherhood ideologue (1906-1966) hanged by Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir.
Tawāḍrūs II (Pope)	Tawadros II (Pope)	Coptic Orthodox Pope since 2012.

Trager, Eric		Expert on Egyptian politics and the Muslim Brotherhood at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
ʿUmar al-Tilmisānī		Third Supreme Guide Muslim Brotherhood, 1972-1986.
Usāma Farīd		See Appendix 1
Wafāʾ Ḥafnī		See Appendix 1
Wāʿil Ḥaḍāra	Wael Haddara	See Appendix 1
Walīd al-Ḥaddād	Walid el-Haddad	See Appendix 1
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky		Associate Professor of Political Science at the Emory University (USA).
Yusuf Sīdhum	Yousef Sidhom	Editor-in-chief of the Coptic owned weekly *Watanī* since 1986.

Chapter 3: Salafī political participation and the "Islamic Project"		
ʿAbd al-Munʾim Abū al-Futūḥ		See Appendix 1
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAbd al-Khāliq		Leading *Salafi shaykh* who believed in 2012 that the political climate is not ready for an Islamist president but Egypt needs a pious president.
Abū Ishāq al-Ḥiwīnī	Abu Ishaq al Heweny	Leading *Salafi shaykh* who believes that politics is a government scheme to draw power away from Islamic movements.
Aḥmad al-Qadrī ʿAbd al-Salām	Ahmed Kadry Abdelsalam	See Appendix 1
Anonymous former member of *al-Nūr* and *al-Waṭan* Parties		See Appendix 1
Bassām al-Zarqā		See Appendix 1
Drevon, Jerome		See Appendix 1
Hānī Fawzī		See Appendix 1

Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismāʿīl	Hazem Salah Abu Ismail	Leading *Salafi shaykh* who became involved in politics. Rejected as presidential candidate in 2012.
Hishām Qandīl		Prime Minister during Mursī, 2012-2013.
Īhāb Shīḥa		See Appendix 1
ʿImād ʿAbd al-Ghafūr		See Appendix 1
ʿIṣṣām al-Sharīf		See Appendix 1
Khālid Manṣūr		See Appendix 1
Maḥmūd Fatḥī		See Appendix 1
Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Maqṣūd		Leading *Salafi shaykh* of *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* who became involved in politics.
Muḥammad Aḥmad		See Appendix 1
Muḥammad Ḥasan		Leading *Salafi shaykh* of *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* rejected democracy and subsequent involvement in politics.
Muḥammad Ismāʿīl al-Muqaddim		See Appendix 1
Muḥammad Ṣalāḥ		See Appendix 1
Nādiya Muṣṭafā		See Appendix 1
Nādir Bakkār		See Appendix 1
Sharaf al-Dīn al-Jibālī		See Appendix 1
Yāsir Burhāmi	Yasser Borhamy	Leading *Salafi shaykh* of *al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya* who became involved in politics through *al-Nūr* Party.
Yūnis Makhiyyūn		Leading member of *al-Nūr* Party who said that women should not be in electable positions.

Chapter 4: Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya: The Burden of History on Internal Transition		
ʿAbbūd al-Zumar		Supplied the weapons involved in the assassination of Anwar al-Sādāt. Elected in May 2011 as member Guidance Council of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya.*
ʿAbd al-Ākhir Ḥammād		Reportedly *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya's* spiritual leader.
ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abū al-Futūḥ	Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh	See namelist Chapters 2 and 3
Aḥmad Shafīq	Ahmed Shafik	See namelist Chapter 2
ʿAlaʾ Abū al-Naṣr		See Appendix 1
ʿAlī Dinarī		Elected in May 2011 as member of the Guidance Council of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya.*
ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid		Leader of the *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya.* Elected in May 2011 as member of the Guidance Council.
Drevon, Jerome		See Appendix 1
Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abū Ismāʿīl	Hazem Salah Abu Ismail	See namelist Chapter 3
Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-ʿĀl		Elected in May 2011 as member of the Guidance Council of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya.*
Ismāʿīl Alexanderni	Ismā'īl Alexanderni	See Appendix 1
ʿIṣṣām Darbāla		Elected in May 2011 as president of the Guidance Council of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya.*
ʿIzzat al-Salamūnī	Ezzat al-Salamony	See Appendix 1
Meijer, Roel		See namelist Chapter 2
Muḥammad ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān		See Appendix 1
Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm	Nagih Ibrahim	Ideologue *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* and its vice-president in the 1980s. Elected in the ninth and last place in the Guidance Council after the January 25 Revolution and decided to withdraw.

Karam Zuhdī		Ideologue *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* and its president in the 1980s. Not re-elected in the Guidance Council after the January 25 Revolution.
Khālid al-Islāmbūlī	Khalid Islambouli	The assassin of al-Sādāt.
Khayrat al-Shāṭir		See namelist Chapter 2
Mamdūḥ Sarūr		See Appendix 1
Nāṣir ʿAbd al-Salām		Elected in 2011 as President of he Building and Development Party by the Guidance Council of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*.
Ṣalāḥ Hāshim		Elected in May 2011 as member of the Guidance Council of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*.
Ṣafwat ʿAbd al-Ghanī		Elected in May 2011 as member of the Guidance Council of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. Elected has the head of the Parliamentary bloc of the Building and Development Party in 2012.
Sharaf al-Dīn al-Jibālī		See Appendix 1
Ṭāriq al-Zumar	Tarek al-Zumar	Elected in May 2011 as member of the Guidance Council of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. Elected in June 2011 by the Council as head of the Political Office of the Building and Development Party.
ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān	Omar Abdel Rahman	"The blind *shaykh*," convicted in the USA of seditious conspiracy.
Usāma Ḥāfiẓ		Elected in May 2011 as vice-president of the Guidance Council of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*.

Chapter 5: Non-Political Islamists: The Jihādī Salafīs and the Situation in Sinai		
ʿAbd al-Bāsiṭ al-Fashnī		See Appendix 1
Abū Fayṣal		A veteran of *al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād* and *Salafī Sharīʿa* court judge in al-ʿArīsh.
ʿĀdil Shaḥāta		*Jihādī Salafī* possibly linked to militants in Sinai.
Aḥmad ʿAshūsh		See Appendix 1
Aḥmad Talāt	Ahmed Talaat	See Appendix 1
Ashraf (protester)		See Appendix 1
Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī		Leader of *al-Qāʿida.*
Hitler, Adolf		Führer of Germany (1934-1945).
Ibrāhīm al-Mināʿī		Leader of the *Sawārka* tribe in Sinai who was killed in August 2013 by unknown militants. The tribe is divided.
Khalaf al-Mināʿī	Khalaf al-Minā'ī	Son of Ibrāhīm al-Minā'ī, killed with his father by unknown militants in August 2013.
Khayrat al-Shāṭir		See namelist Chapter 2
Muḥammad Jamāl al-Kāshif (also known as Abū Aḥmad)		Imprisoned leading *jihādī Salafī* due to his connection with the Benghazi attack on the American consulate in September 2012.
Muḥammad ʿAlī	Muhammad Ali	Ruler of Egypt from 1805 to 1848.
Muḥammad al-Ẓawāhirī		*Jihādī Salafī*, brother of Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī, leader of *al-Qāʿida.*
Muʿammar al-Qaddāfī	Muammar al-Gaddafi	President of Libya, 1969-2011.
Muḥammad al-Biltajī	Mohamed Beltagy	See namelist Chapter 2
Ramzī Muwāfī		*Jihādī Salafī*, former medical doctor of Usāma bin Lādin.
ʿUmar ʿĀshūr	Omar Ashour	Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Doha Center.
Usāma bin Lādin		Founder and leader of *al-Qāʿida* until his death in 2011.
Yāsir Burhāmi	Yasser Al Borhamy	See Chapter 3

Chapter 6: Non-Islamist Political Actors in Egypt		
ʿAbd Allah al-Mughāzī		See Appendix 1
ʿAbd al-Majīd Maḥmūd	Abdel Maguid Mahmoud	Public prosecutor appointed by Mubārak. President Mursī tried to sack him in October 2012 but failed but ultimately did so with his infamous Constitutional Declaration on November 22, 2015.
Aḥmad ʿAbd Allah		A leader in the April 6 Movement's political bureau.
Aḥmad Māhir		One of the founders of the April 6 Movement.
Aḥmad Shafīq	Ahmed Shafik	See namelist Chapter 2
Amal Sharaf		See Appendix 1
ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī	Amr Hamzawy	See Appendix 1
ʿAmr Mūsā	Amr Moussa	Chairman Constituent Assembly of 2013, Presidential candidate in 2012, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, 2001-2011, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1991-2001.
ʿĀṣim Mīmūn	Assem Memon	See Appendix 1
ʾĀsmāʾ Maḥfūẓ		One of the founders of the April 6 Movement.
Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī	Hamdeen Sabahi	See namelist Chapter 2
	Ibrahim Mahlab	Prime Minister 2014-2015.
Jamāl Mubārak	Gamal Mubarak	Son of President Mubārak. Until the 2011 Revolution the deputy secretary-general of the National Democratic Party and head of its influential Policies Committee.
Khālid Dāwūd		See Appendix 1
Khayrat al-Shāṭir		See namelist Chapter 2
Mahā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir		See Appendix 1
Maḥmūd Badr	Mahmoud Badr	See Appendix 1
Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Laṭīf		See Appendix 1

Muḥammad al-Barādaʿī	Mohamed El-Baradei	Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1997-2009. Major opposition figure in 2011-2013, briefly vice-president of Egypt. Resigned with the bloody dispersal of the pro- Mursī sit-ins.
Muḥammad ʿAzīz		See Appendix 1
Nabīl Ḥilmī		Liberal, professor of International Law at Zagazig University.
Nuhā al-Mikāwī	Noha El Mikawy	Political scholar.
Rabāb al-Mahdī	Rabab al Mahdi	Political scholar.
Rāmī al-Suwīsī		See Appendix 1
Ṣafwat Ḥijāzī	Safwat Hegazi	See Appendix 1
Sayyid al-Ṭūkhī		See Appendix 1
Walīd al-Maṣrī		See Appendix 1

Publications in transliteration and the own spellings as provided by these publications		
Al-Shurūq	Al Shorouk	
Al-Miṣrī al-Yawm	Almasry Alyoum	
Al-Waṭan	Elwatan	
Al-Yawm al-Sābiʿ	El-Youm El-Sabaa	

Appendix 3: Chronology of Events *(Cornelis Hulsman)*

2011	January 25	Mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square.
	January 28	Muslim Brothers join the Revolution, prisons where Muslim Brothers and other Islamists had been imprisoned are opened.
	February 11	President Mubārak steps down. SCAF assume executive powers.
	Second half of February	The Muslim Brotherhood announces the establishment of the *Ḥizb al- Ḥurriya wa-l-ʿAdāla* (Freedom and Justice Party).
	March	Foundation *Ḥizb al- Faḍīla* (Virtue Party).
	March 29	Foundation *al-Ḥizb al-Miṣrī al-Dimūqrāṭī al-Ijtimāʿī* (Egyptian Social Democratic Party).
	April 3	Foundation *Ḥizb al-Miṣriyyīn al-Aḥrār* (Free Egyptians Party).
	May 12	Foundation *Ḥizb al-Nūr* (Light Party).
	May 18	Foundation *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Ḥurriyya* (Freedom Egypt Party).
	June	Foundation *Ḥizb al-Tayyār al-Miṣrī* (Egyptian Current Party).
	June 6	The FJP receives official legal status.
	June 20	Foundation *Ḥizb al-Bināʾ wa-l-Tanmiyya* (Building and Development Party).
	July	*Al-Aṣāla* Party splits from *al-Faḍīla* Party.
	September 11	Foundation *Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ* (Egyptian Reform Party).
	November 28- January 11	Elections for People's Assembly: 68.95 percent for Islamist parties with non-Islamist parties receiving 31.05 percent.
2012	January 23	The first session of the People's Assembly is held.
	January 29 – February 22	Elections for *Shūrā* Council: 73.67 percent for Islamist parties with non-Islamist parties receiving 16.68 percent.
	March 17	The People's Assembly nominates first the Islamist dominated Constituent Assembly. In the following 11 days non-Islamists walk out.
	April 10	First Constituent Assembly dissolved by the Supreme Administrative Court.
	April 21	FJP leader al-Shāṭir presents the political (*Nahḍa* or Renaissance) plans of his party.
	April 28	Foundation of *Ḥizb al-Dustūr* (Constitution Party).

	May 23-24	First round of presidential elections including Mursī, Abū al-Futūḥ, Shafīq, Ṣabāḥī, Mūsā. Islamist candidates received 43.77 per cent of the vote, non-Islamist candidates received 56.23 percent.
	June 12	Islamist dominated People's Assembly elects second Constituent Assembly.
	June 15	The Supreme Constitutional Court dissolves People's Assembly.
	June 16-17	Second round of Presidential election held; Mursī vs. Shafīq.
	June 24	The Presidential Election Committee announced Mursī to be the winner with 51.73 per cent against 48.27 percent for Shafīq. Shafīq disputes the results.
	June 30	Mursī inaugurated as president.
	July 5	Foundation *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Qawiyya* (Strong Egypt Party).
	September	Foundation *Al-Tayyār al-Sha'bi al-Miṣri* (Egyptian Popular Current).
	September 18	Foundation *Ḥizb al-Mu'tamar* (Congress Party).
	October 14	Draft of the 2012 Constitution published.
	October 20	Foundationof the *Ḥizb al-Sha'b* (the People's Party).
	November 12-20	Non-Islamists and civil society figures walk out of Constituent Assembly.
	November 22	Mursī issues Presidential Decree giving him immunity to judicial oversight and with this avoid the Supreme Constitutional Court from dissolving the Constituent Assembly.
	November 24	Foundation National Salvation Front, an alliance of political parties rejecting Mursī's Presidential Decree and policies to establish political control for Islamists.
	November 30	Second Constituent Assembly votes on draft constitution.
	December 8	Mursī revokes declaration of November 22.
	December	Violence in front of the Presidential Palace prior to the referendum.
	December 15	Referendum approves Constitution with 63.8 per cent majority by a 31 per cent voter turnout.
2013	January 1	*Al-Waṭan* Party announces its split from *al-Nūr* Party.
	February 21	President Mursī issues Presidential Decree announcing elections for People's Assembly; *Shūrā* Council, taking the role of the Peolple's Assembly, prepares new elections law.
	February 27	Foundation of the *Ḥizb al-Rāya* (the Flag Party).

	March	High Constitutional Court dismisses February 21 Presidential Decree on grounds of constitutionality.
	April	Foundation *Tamarrud* Movement.
	January 28 – July 3	Repeated warnings Minister of Defence ʿAbd al-Fattāh al-Sīsī that consensus is needed if Egypt is not to fall apart.
	June 30	Mass protests organised by *Tamarrud* movement occupy public spaces across Egypt.
	July 3	Minister of Defence ʿAbd al-Fattāh al-Sīsī deposes Mursī and announces new transitional roadmap.
	July 4	Head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, ʿAdly Mansūr, sworn in as Interim President.
	July 5	Mansūr issues Presidential Decree dissolving the *Shūrā* Council.
	July 8	Mansūr outlines a new roadmap and suspends the 2012 Constitution. 51 pro-Mursī supporters killed outside of Republican Guard.
	July 27	Security forces open fire on pro-Mursī supporters near *Rābaʿa al-ʿAdawiyya* square, killing 82 and wounding more than 280.
	August 14-16	Interim government clears the *Nahḍa* and *Rābaʿa al-ʿAdawiyya* squares of pro-Mursī sit-ins, resulting in the killing of at least 817 people, mostly demonstrators. Revenge attacks on police, security and Christians occur across Egypt. Government announces State of Emergency.
	September 1	Mansūr announces Committee of Fifty to amend the 2012 Constitution.
	September-ongoing until today	Frequent attacks on police and army personnel, massive arrests of Muslim Brothers and other Islamist leaders followed by verdicts including imprisonments and death penaties.
	November 4	Mursī stands trial for inciting violence and murder.
	November 12	State of Emergency lifted.
	December 14	Mansūr announces national referendum for 2014 Constitution.
	December 25	Muslim Brotherhood declared a terrorist organization after an attack on police headquarters in Manṣūra.
2014	January 14-15	2014 Constitution approved by 98.1 per cent by 38.6 per cent of voters.
	January 18	2014 Constitution takes effect.

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About the Center for Arab-West Understanding

The Center for Arab-West Understanding (CAWU), an Egyptian NGO founded in 2007, was established to contribute to Arab-West understanding and reducing sectarianism in the Arab World through research with student interns. CAWU researchers contribute to the Egyptian electronic magazine Arab-West Report (AWR) which was established in 1997 with the purpose of correcting misinformation that could result in aggravating Muslim-Christian and Arab-West relations. In twenty years of work AWR documented many instances where biased reporting actively contributed to an escalation of tensions.

CAWU has hosted since 2007 over 200 interns from 20 different countries for periods between two and 12 months which has made CAWU Egypt's largest internship provider.CAWU works with the principle that researchers should observe developments and be descriptive in their work without becoming politically involved. CAWU is focused on fact-finding. Researchers provide critique on media reporting, interest groups and activists or statements made by politicians if needed. CAWU's purpose is to be as accurate as possible in reporting and based on this tries to understand why events have occurred as they did. Only then other parties will be able to use this information for the sake of making improvements. Good critique of current reporting requires much investigative work and this in turn is possible with support for CAWU.