CHAPTER 17. Moscow, East Berlin and the "Hawks of Hadramawt":[1]

Nation-Building or Neo-Colonialism in Southern Yemen?

> "The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from the outside. [...] The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world."[2]
> Kwame Nkrumah, 1965

1. How to explore the "Limits of Foreign Policy"

Based on Kwame Nkrumah's monograph "Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism," the notion of "neo-colonialism"[3] has been used to describe the perpetuation of relations of dependence between post-colonial states and their former colonizers, as well as external powers that replaced the former colonizer.[4] And while according to Nkrumah, "neo-colonialism" is considered to be an immediate consequence of colonialism and imperialism, recent research based on discourse analysis[5] expanded the meaning of the term. Here, the concept has also been applied in studies concerned with newly emerging relations of dominance between external powers and formerly colonized states, as well as newly forming or reforming states in the sense of state- and nation-building, such as Iraq or

1 | Title changed for spelling consistency. Alfree, The Hawks of Hadramaut, 1967.

2 | Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, 1965, ixff.

3 | Definition "Neo-Colonialism," in: Stanton/Ramsamy/Seybolt/Elliott, 2012, 332-334 and Young, 2001, Chapter 4.

4 | Nkrumah, 1965, x.

5 | Holzscheiter, 2014; Torfing, 2005.

Afghanistan,[6] often under the umbrella of "humanitarian intervention"[7] and the "responsibility to protect" (RtP).[8] What all of these interpretations of "neo-colonialism" have in common is an outright critical stance towards external engagement in domestic politics of another state, while some would recognize the external actors' intention as a qualifying factor and others wouldn't.

Nkrumah's approach, however, has not only been selected for the reflection on the limits of foreign policy due to its reception and eventual transformation, but because of its direct connection to Marxist-Leninist ideology that is discussed later on in this chapter. All of the approaches inspired by Nkrumah in the end question the basis of international action in the current world system of nation states: A state's national "sovereignty" and how to interpret it. As introduced in Part A of this analysis, this study approaches "sovereignty" in nominalist terms to be able to differentiate between internal and external state sovereignty.[9] Internal sovereignty is defined by Francis Harry Hinsley's interpretation of sovereignty, that is, the "final and absolute authority in the political community" where "no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere"[10] in the respective territory.[11] External sovereignty, on the other hand, is regularly defined in legal terms and based on the sovereign equality of states in the international state system and the non-intervention clause in Chapter 1, Article II(7) of the UN Charter.[12] According to this principle of "non-intervention," every sovereign state has the right "to conduct its affairs without outside interference."[13] This ties in with the major criterion used to distinguish between coercive intervention and "humanitarian intervention" before the introduction of RtP: Any intervention had to be justified by consent of the host state.[14]

---

6 | See e.g. Welch, 2008. For a critique on "Humanitarian Intervention" see, e.g. Nardin, Humanitarian Imperialism, 2006 answering Tesón, 2006.

7 | For a wider discussion on the topic of "humanitarian intervention" as a justification for military and other interference in domestic affairs, see: Welsh, 2004; Wheeler, 2000.

8 | On the origins of the RtP see: Walzer, 1977. Major document that introduced the RtP to be discussed as a new norm in international law: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001.

9 | The argument follows Georg Jellinek, 1900.

10 | Hinsley, 1986 (1966), 26.

11 | Hinsley's definition rests on the essentialist understanding of sovereignty as it had been introduced by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. For a discussion of Bodin's and Hobbes' understanding of "sovereignty" see: Schmitt, 1922, 33. Furthermore, Hinsley includes Max Weber's definition of the state as the agent claiming and owning the "monopoly of the legitimate use of [physical] violence within a certain territory," Weber, 2004 (1919), 310f.

12 | UN Charter of October 24th 1945.

13 | "Case Concerning the Military and Paramilit. Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)," Sep. Opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh President, 1986.

14 | On the question of consent in military intervention see e.g. Lieblich, 2011.

Now, one may transfer this divide used for "rightful military intervention" to non-military intervention in domestic affairs: "Consent of the host state" may serve as a criterion to judge whether the GDR's foreign policy in South Yemen, and actually any other foreign policy as well, transgressed the "limits of foreign policy," in the sense of "imposition" or "neo-colonialism." In more concrete terms, this distinction is occupied with the question of whether it is only the external actors' interests that determine their engagement or if the "neo-colonized" or "host" state actually demanded or needed this intervention. East German engagement in South Yemen is reconsidered with a focus on the motives for this engagement, that is, its foreign policy intent. In so doing, this analysis explicitly differentiated between *intensity* and *intention* of action, as opposed to Prados' approach,[15] and includes an assessment of possible South Yemeni agency, the "receiving side" of this foreign policy.

As shown above, the notion of "neo-colonialism" as it is applied in current debates also encompasses the more problematic side of external support for state- and nation-building, and thus is considered extremely useful to interpreting the GDR's foreign policy of socialist state- and nation-building in the PDRY in normative terms. In addition to that, the notion of neo-colonialism developed by Nkrumah is based on Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"[16] and thus on the socialist ideal of international relations, socialism's own standard of comparison, so to speak. As a consequence, "neo-colonialism" might turn out to be an intriguing basis for normative judgment.

2. The GDR's Policy of Socialist State- and Nation-Building: Motives and Strategies

> "We, [the MfAA working group on the 1986 crisis] already concluded at that time that our support [for Aden] with the constitution and everything else had merely been superimposed on South Yemen. But this was not only because we wanted it. [The South Yemenis] wanted it themselves, the party wanted it."[17]
>
> (Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GDR Heinz-Dieter Winter in 2012)

The first question to be answered is about the possible motives of the GDR, that is, its foreign policy intent, separating these motives from any considerations about the intensity of the GDR's engagement. While the first phase in South Yemen was clearly focused on the full diplomatic recognition by the Aden regime, the following engagement was part of East Germany's attempt to further strengthen its international status. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1969,

15 | Prados, 2005.

16 | Lenin, 1963 (1917).

17 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.

South Yemen became one of the few countries of intense East German involvement following its "strategy of focus." One of the highest levels of East German foreign policy engagement outside the Eastern Bloc was accomplished in Aden.

2.1 The Determinism of Socialist State-Building

From that time onward, East Berlin emphasized assistance with the establishment of a functional state apparatus in the sense of *state-building*, while following its own socialist state model. Apart from constitutional law and administration, this also included the promotion of the armed forces in general, as well as the establishment of a state security apparatus to support and secure the rule of the Yemeni counterpart of the GDR's SED, the YSP. East Berlin also intended to promote the *integration of society* in the sense of its own "homogenization of society" and the creation of the "new human." In this regard, East German foreign policy activities focused on the "third sphere" of foreign policy making outside party and state: Cooperation between East German society actors and the Yemeni population, such as the media and friendship societies, but especially the field of education. Last but not least, in the case of socialist nation-building in South Yemen, the "integration of society" necessarily was supported by the communication and acceptance of an *integrative ideology*.[18]

All in all, the GDR's particular interpretation of Marxism-Leninism offered both the motivation and the goal for this "superimposed"[19] developmental policy. As the SED shared this ideology with a majority of political actors of the YSP,[20] "ideology" not only served as the basis for building trust between South Yemen and East Germany, but also served as the point of departure for Soviet and East German political. Especially during the 1970s, East Germany was considered the young South Yemen's role model, as Aden's functionaries never ceased to emphasize.[21] Due to the GDR's activities during Phase I and II of its foreign policy in Aden, South Yemen's years of state-building offer numerous examples of the GDR's long-term influence in almost any political field. Apart from the determined and intensive creation of South Yemen's security apparatus, the biggest impact was on the genesis of the PDRY's constitution and legal system, which from the very beginning followed a noticeable path-dependency of East German development. The justification behind East Germany's nation-building policy first of all was an ideological one: In the socialist version of state- and

18 | East-Berlin for example was highly influential in this respect on the training of NF/YSP Party cadres in the GDR and the PDRY.

19 | Interview with Heinz-Dieter Winter July 3 2012.

20 | Meaning after Salmin was removed from office in 1978.

21 | Stenografische Niederschrift der Beratung mit der Delegation der NLF Südjemen am 2.11.1970 im Hause des ZKs, in: BArch SAPMO/DY 30/11407.

nation-building, all three elements of nation-building intertwine and double-back on each other in such a way that the ideology's logic appears as an inevitable outcome, defying any critical scrutiny.

2.2 A New Perspective on Nature and Interests of East German Activities in the Global South

The majority of analyses occupied with the GDR's policies in "developing countries" focus on the economy and the military as the major "fields of engagement." This study explicitly included a differentiation of the "fields of engagement" in its analysis, which leads to fundamentally different conclusions on the nature of East German activities and interests in the Global South: Despite the sometimes considerable substantial financial and material support provided to the economy and the military in Aden, it was other fields in which the GDR's involvement had been the most intense. This involvement also developed a considerably higher impact on the receiving country: Administration and state institutions, legal affairs and the media, and above all education. Thus, modest military support and economic aid were merely used as a means to an end: To strengthen the bonds with the supposedly socialist or socialist-friendly regimes of the host countries and to stabilize their position. At the end of the day, the SED aimed for the policy fields most relevant for state- and nation-building to have an impact on the regimes with "socialist orientation" – to guide them towards the East German interpretation of the "planned development of socialism."[22]

Socialist state-building had been one of the major strategies of Soviet engagement in Eastern Europe to multiply its political system led by a vanguard party of "the new type." Thus, East Germany's foreign policy in South Yemen can be interpreted as a copy of the Soviet approach toward the GDR itself: The creation of a proxy state by providing the plans and the means necessary to establish a socialist state very much like its own. However, by applying this comprehensive policy approach, the GDR also felt competent enough to mimic Soviet foreign policy toward its so-called satellite states and even toward Eastern Germany of the 1940s and 1950s on a lower scale of intensity, though no less ideologically dedicated. However, East Berlin had clearly aimed not just to reproduce the Soviet model, but the East German interpretation of it. East Berlin tried to transfer its own experiences of the socialist path of development to South Yemen. In the process, the GDR applied a rigid, intrusive foreign policy to further its national interest, while at least some of its foreign policy actors clearly believed in a "higher purpose" of their engagement in South Yemen in the sense of "solidarity" and

22 | Schroeder, 1999, 119ff; Schroeder, 2013, 110ff.

"socialist internationalism,"[23] presenting a socialist version of Kipling's "The White Man's Burden."[24]

The GDR's "policy of socialist state-building" has to be considered an "imperial variant of external nation-building" that demonstrated the temptation "to create one's counterpart in one's own image."[25] This reveals that the GDR's attitude toward the Global South was based on the assumptions of "modernization theory":[26] The "underdeveloped" states of the "Third World" should and could "catch up" with the states of the developed world by imitating their process of development.[27] As a mélange of rational national interest and ideology, Walzer would summarize the GDR's intentions in Aden as "mixed motives" of the intervening state.[28] Armed with the belief of bringing "socialism" to an underdeveloped country, South Yemen above all served East German national interests. Examples like the PDRY were meant to fulfill the SED's hunger for international prestige: Publications of the time presented the GDR as a progressive, industrialized nation state, granting generous support and assistance to build a "Socialist Civilization" in a developing country.[29] Without doubt, East German intentions in South Yemen had a "neo-colonial" tinge to them and thus transgressed the boundaries of foreign policy acceptable under international law.

3. The Impact of Socialist Nation-Building on South Yemen and its Society: A Truly Marxist State in the Arab World?

> "[M]aking the socialist revolution means transforming existing relations."[30]
>
> The NLF in Mukhalla before the British Pullout in 1967

The main questions that now needs to be answered to reach a normative conclusion on East German policy are whether the YSP regime was able to react to East German and Soviet engagement and direct it in its own interest, and whether the socialist approach in the end was embraced by Yemeni society or not. The actual impact of an external "policy of state-building" may be rather difficult to assess. In case of South Yemen, and with the benefit of hindsight, the analyst can, for example, ask for the

23 | Kl. Polit. Wörterbuch, 1973, Außenpolitik, in: 86; Also see: Scholtyseck, 2003, 36.

24 | Kipling, 1899.

25 | Hippler, 2005, 177.

26 | On "modernization theory" see: Badie/Berg-Schlosser/Morlino, 2012, 1609-1613.

27 | On the emergence of "Developmentalism" and "Modernization Theory" as part of US Foreign Policy due to the perceived threat of Communism during the Cold War see: Baber, 2001; For a critique on "Developmental Theory" see for example: Berberoglu, 1992.

28 | Walzer, 1977, 101ff.

29 | See e.g.: Gambke/Jacob/Mätzig, 1974 and Schußter, 1987.

30 | Dresch quotes the Mukalla NLF before the British pullout, in: Dresch, 2000, 120.

reasons why the policy failed in the end. The following subsection seeks the reasons for the PDRY's failure as a state to approach the questions outlined above.

Yemeni Traditions Trump "Socialist Revolution"

The outcome of South Yemen's process of nation-building can be connected to the notion of collective identities' degree of responsiveness to change: While the success and failure of establishing stable state institutions has been a major focus of analysis in studies on the emergence of states,[31] the other two elements regularly receive less attention. This shortcoming could be remedied by including the degree of "responsiveness" of collective identities as an additional explanation for success or failure of the state-and nation-building process. This hypothesis of the correlation between social change and the character of collective identities was merely introduced and interpreted very briefly, due to the framework of this study, but was included nonetheless as it without doubt supports the argument for the failure of the YSP regime to impose its ideology on the Yemeni population.

In the process of nation-building, ideology often, though not always, turns out to be the most influential source of social power, contributing to the process in three major ways: First, by legitimizing political measures taken; second, by mobilizing support for the new system and its implications; and third, to facilitate the "integration of society." The claim made here is that the fulfillment of the last two "functions" of ideology in the nation-building process ultimately depends on the characteristics of the collective identities exposed to this ideology. Ideology can support the formation of a national consciousness and construct national identity if, and only if, the prevailing identities are receptive to this ideology. Ideally, this consciousness will facilitate the integration of society by increasing political participation in the political sphere in scope and intensity and allow the mobilization of political action – from below or above.

In the mid-1980s, SED officials claimed that the YSP had "little impact on the population and [the party's] efforts to expand its basis in society remain insufficient."[32] The Soviet Union and GDR had identified "tribalism" as the major obstacle to socialist nation-building by the NF/YSP-regime.[33] But while the newly emerging state could only rely on weak state structures, this fact cannot not be equated with a lack of social or political structures. Yemen is an example of the

31 | Hippler describes three intertwined elements as the preconditions for successful nation building: Effective and stable state institutions, the integration of society, and an attractive ideology, Hippler, 2003.

32 | Informationsmappe für den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der JSP [...] Ali Nasser Mohammed, November 1984, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr. 28712, 150.

33 | In 1982, a Soviet research mission even began "compiling a tribal and ethnographic map of the Hadramaut and Socotra" which potentially could provide extensive knowledge on the power distribution among the tribes, in: Cigar, 1985, 779 and October 14th, Daily South-Yemeni newspaper, April 9 1984.

most complex social relationships, which have grown and stabilized over hundreds of years. During the "Socialist revolution" in Aden, these traditional social structures and identities turned out to be extremely sound and rigid:[34] Despite the implementation of radical measures to abolish tribalism and tradition as early as the late 1960s, traditional social structures clearly withstood the policies of the YSP regime. Even within the lower ranks of the YSP, people first and foremost followed the local and tribal leaders according to the established patronage system, pretty similar to the socio-politico conditions in other Arab states of the time.[35]

But while the Marxist-Leninist ideology and its values had proven to be alien to the South Yemeni people and their social reality, even the radical political leaders had a hard time escaping their collective identities. Even though the figureheads of the NF propagated the dissolution of tribal affiliations, they mostly drew their political power from their tribal ties.[36] These affiliations explain why it was mostly "tribeless" Ismail from the north who advocated convincingly for a profound change of society towards socialism. But even the chief ideologue Ismail appears to have recognized the lack of coherence between his ideological aspirations, the imposed political system, and the actual society on the ground: One of his final decisions was to abolish the enumeration of the provinces and give them back their traditional names in March 1980.[37] Ideological principles apparently had never reached the degree of entrenchment within the population that was needed for a social transformation of socialist connotation in South Yemen. In addition to that, the fundamental encroachments into peoples' everyday lives driven by the YSP regime not only caused displeasure, but also outright rejection of the political system. Just as in the GDR before 1961, there was a "constant stream of people leaving, mainly the best-educated and most talented."[38]

In this study, nation-building has been identified as a policy that can be pursued from the inside and from the outside, in which the latter can "make nation-building easier or harder." Hippler concludes that even though some developments can be initiated or promoted from the outside, others "are very difficult or even impossible to furnish from [there],"[39] especially ideology. This is where one may find an explanation for the failure of the YSP and its Marxist state in the end: Even though the regime may have invited socialist state- and nation-building, most of the effort came from outside Yemen's society. The YSP regime was only a very

34 | Na'ana, Hamida, 1988, in: Dresch, 2000, 120.

35 | Brehony, 2013, 36.

36 | "The tribal chiefs had gone, but were in fact replaced by the NF officials from the tribe," in: Brehony, 2013, 70.

37 | BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/6365 (8 March 1980), in: Brehony, 2013, 121.

38 | Brehony, 2013, 59.

39 | Hippler, 2005, 9.

small part of South Yemen's "inside" and clearly had not been able to rally the support of the majority of the Yemeni population.

4. South Yemen: Subject or Object of Foreign Policy?

> "Our relations are not merely multifaceted. They are characterized by completeness, by their "totality." Do you understand what I mean? They are all-embracing."[40]
>
> Valery Sukhin, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official on Soviet-South Yemeni relations in 1984

> "[I consider the Yemenis] a very proud people who were fully convinced of their own importance. [...] We felt the independence of the South Yemenis at all times – which they understandably wanted to maintain."[41]
>
> (Hans Bauer, consultant and MfS resident of the GDR to the PDRY)

Halliday argues that both superpowers refrained from direct involvement in the Middle East, though both got involved in proxy conflicts.[42] Taking into consideration the results of the "levels of engagement approach," this judgment has to be questioned – at least for the Soviet Union. In South Yemen Moscow's actions constantly hovered between the levels of "involvement" and active "intervention." The intention behind these actions furthermore must be reconsidered in the light of this study with regard to the GDR's involvement in the PDRY: With the GDR as vicarious agent, the Kremlin apparently aimed to "impose" its own political system on South Yemen. Hence, one may see the Soviet Union's ultimate goal in Aden as the inclusion of the PDRY in its sphere of influence – and thus clearly to exceed the limits of foreign policy.

However, the Arab countries may not be considered helpless with no agency at all during the Cold War, as Halliday rightly summarizes:

> "[T]he elites of Turkey, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia were not simply tools of Washington, any more than were the radical leaderships of Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq or the PDRY agents of Moscow."[43]

Halliday's statement can be expanded by concluding that the bipolar structure of the Cold War enabled rather than restricted actors of the Global South in general and of the Middle East in particular: Between 1946 and 1990, the "developing world" was able claim a certain power in the international sphere, by either using the permanent

40 | Al-Thawra, September 22 1984, quoted in: Cigar, 1985, 781.

41 | Interview with Hans Bauer June 20 2011.

42 | Halliday, 2005, 125.

43 | Halliday, 2005, 128.

competition between East and West to strike the best bargain for themselves, or, as in the case of radical South Yemen, to opt for the "alternative" in the international system.[44] As a consequence, one has to take into consideration *South Yemen's actual interests* and behavior towards Moscow and East Germany to be able to conclude first on Aden's agency in the relationship, and second to be able to unmask the double-moral standard of East German foreign policy engagement.

Security, that is securing its existence as a state, was the foremost priority of the newly independent South Yemeni state after the British withdrawal in 1967. Naturally, this led to a certain paranoia towards any foreign interference and a possible return of "imperial" powers. This mindset may serve as an explanation for Aden's initial rejection of Western support, the leadership's extremist political position, and the resulting close relationship with Moscow and East Berlin, who readily offered material support and consultancy. As opposed to other post-colonial states, however, the colonial power hadn't left behind a fully functional administrative apparatus in South Yemen. Due to Britain's focused interest in the harbor, "administrative resources"[45] in 1967 were restricted to Aden and its vicinity, and thus the bigger part of South Yemeni territory was not fully integrated into the state apparatus in the sense of a "modern nation state."[46] As a consequence, the Aden regime was confronted with the task of building a new state almost from scratch. Even though British administration was expanded over the South Yemeni territory successfully, functioning state organs and institutions, above all police and military forces, had to be established. For this effort, the impoverished country needed financial and technical assistance, and above all, due to the lack of education in leadership and population, know-how and training.

In retrospect, the PDRY not only consented to Soviet engagement, and especially the East German policy of socialist state- and nation-building, but explicitly demanded this kind of support, based on the ideological approach offered by Moscow and East Berlin. This analysis repeatedly revealed the South Yemeni belief in Lenin's three inseparable elements,[47] as references to all three of them can be found in the Party Program of the YSP of 1978.[48] Without doubt, this ideology served as a comprehensive and cohesive blueprint for nation-building in South Yemen, and Moscow provided the assistance it considered necessary for its implementation. The GDR advanced as the most active and influential Soviet ally in this undertaking. This included the integration of South Yemen in a wider

44 | See for example, Howell, 1994.

45 | On the role of "imported" administration for "post-colonial states" see: Giddens, 1983, 272.

46 | Giddens, 1983, 255; Also: Weber's def. of the state as the agent claiming and owning the "monopoly of the legitimate use of [physical] violence," in: Weber, 2009 (1919), sine pagina.

47 | Schroeder, 2013, 716.

48 | JSP – Avantgarde des jemenitischen Volkes. Auszüge aus dem Programm der JSP (I) und (II), in: horizont No.50/51 1978, in: BStU MfS HA II Nr.27368, 9.

community of states, that is the Eastern Bloc and its allies, clearly an upside of Aden's close ties to Moscow for the otherwise isolated radical regime of South Yemen. Cigar even speaks of "a sense of acceptance" and the "reassurance [for the PDRY regime] that it [was] on the right path."[49] Thus, apart from rational considerations of security and economic development, Soviet acknowledgment also meant moral confirmation and support for the young Yemeni regime.

On first glance, the Aden regime appears as the weaker part of this unbalanced relationship to Moscow and East Berlin. East German reports and minutes from meetings even describe PDRY functionaries as naïve and heady, ignorant of time frames and the political and economic capabilities of South Yemen.[50] However, the "1986 crisis" somewhat showed that neither Moscow nor East Berlin had full access to all spheres of politics and communication in South Yemen, not to mention control of the YSP and its cadres. On top of that, South Yemeni actors without doubt were able to develop a certain political self-confidence.[51] Supposedly small political gestures during the years that followed the founding of the YSP hint at the Yemenis' intention to emancipate themselves from Soviet and East German "guidance" and their policy of active nation-building: In 1983, the KfS awarded the "Medal of Friendship" to Mielke and the "Medal of Loyalty" to OibE "Marquardt,"[52] claiming political agency for themselves with this act. And only a few years later, a delegation of the GDR's Ministry of the Interior reports that the PDRY wished for a change in terminology for the next Protocol on Cooperation [between the security apparatuses]. Instead of consultants, the GDR was supposed to send "delegates" which clearly indicated that the YSP regime strived for more autonomy and independence.[53]

Taking into consideration the mounting drive toward more agency within the relationship between Aden, Moscow and East Berlin, as well as the impact of the "1986 crisis" on this relationship, the most decisive phase of East German presence was, without doubt, the 1970s: East Berlin's policy of socialist state-building was in full swing and the intensification of engagement worked toward the manipulation

49 | Cigar, 1985, 786.

50 | Brief Scharfenberg an Willerding, July 25 1973, in: PA AA, MfAA, C 1555/76, 52; Also see: Brehony, 2013, 81.

51 | Like the South Yemeni "VO," the liaison officer of the KfS in the GDR; German: Verbindungsoffizier, VO, in: Bericht über die erste Zusammenkunft des neueingesetzten VO des KfS der VDR Jemen beim MfS, Mohammed Abdo Mohammed, August 21 1986, in: BStU MfS, Abt. X Nr.234 Teil 1 von 2, 262-265.

52 | Brief Botschaft der VDRJ in Berlin, January 19 1983, in: BStU MfS Abt.X Nr. 234 Teil 1 von 2 438. "Marquardt" is Major-General Jänicke, ibid. 441/2.

53 | Bericht über die Reise einer Delegation des MdI in die VDRJ, January 1986, in: BStU MfS HA VII 7954, 62.

of the "internal affairs or foreign policy activities."[54] In correspondence with Soviet involvement, one may even speak of a drift towards "imposition," as the continuous existence of South Yemen as a state of "socialist orientation" depended largely on Moscow's protection. Clearly, this foreign policy aimed at changing the conditions in South Yemen in East German and Soviet interest. On the other hand, any policy steps taken by the two foreign powers happened with the explicit consent of the Yemeni regime. East German and Soviet intensive activities would not have been possible if not for the willingness of the South Yemeni political elite, that is, from the "power actors" on the inside.

The Aden regime's decisions at times clearly were not fully autonomous: A relationship of dependency had emerged with Moscow as an economic[55] and military guarantor of survival. A survival which was contested by its neighbors and the major actors of the region. Both Moscow and East Berlin pursued a policy based on an attitude one may easily describe as "neo-colonial," based on material and ideological superiority with regard to the Marxist-Leninist ideal of development. However, the attitude of merely one side of a relationship does not define the ultimate character of it. Even though the GDR first of all served its own interests when fulfilling South Yemen's requests, the Aden regime presented itself as a proactive player with clear motives. East German archival sources and contemporary witnesses agree that most of the time it was the South Yemenis who initiated further cooperation and sought for concrete support from East Berlin. Also, the PDRY apparently tried to use the GDR to feel less pressured by Moscow and to diversify its dependencies, and succeeded in doing so.

Socialism had come as an "alien arrival [to South Yemen], tied up for a time, then passed on."[56] What can be witnessed today in Yemen's South, a movement with an appetite for separation based on a separate Yemeni identity, clearly is not the re-emergence of a Marxist-Leninist state of Soviet and East German making, but rather the memories and mentalities of a very Yemeni interpretation.

> "Yemen is a happy country,
> the people die standing tall:
> they will not cower, will not surrender
> their identity."[57]
>
> (Mansur Rajih, "The Fatherland", 1958)

54 | Prados, 2005, 4.

55 | In December 1989, Aden's debt to Moscow was estimated at about 4 billion, Al-Ashmali, in: Brehony, 2013, 169.

56 | Mackintosh-Smith, 1997, 171.

57 | Rajih, Mansur, The Fatherland, 1958. Born in northern Yemen in 1958, Rajih was imprisoned for murder from 1983–1998. Amnesty International condemned trial and sentence as politically motivated.