

4 The ‘Globalisation’-Discourse and the ‘New World’

Globalization is an idea whose time has come.

DAVID HELD, ANTHONY MCGREW, DAVID GOLDBLATT AND JONATHAN PERRATON (2003: 1)

It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, but one is ‘in the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one has to reactivate in each of one’s discourses.

MICHEL FOUCAULT (1981: 60)

In the previous two chapters, I focused on the contemporary adjective *global*. I concluded these chapters by conceptualising *global* as a ‘new word’. What is ‘new’ about the contemporary *global* and what makes it intriguing, I argued, is that it is inextricably interlinked with the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

This brings me to the issue of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Above, I explained that I use the term ‘globalisation’-discourse to refer to the reproduction of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. This requires explication and substantiation. In this chapter, I focus on what I mean by ‘globalisation’-discourse.

I start by providing a brief reflection on how I use the word *discourse*. This includes a discussion of what is distinct about my conception ‘globalisation’-discourse, in contrast to other uses of this term, such as in Hay (2008), Hay and Rosamond (2002), Hay and Smith (2005), and Rosamond (1999). Moving on from this and interpreting Nick Bisley’s overview of the development of the concept ‘globalisation’ (Bisley 2007), I sketch a picture of the ‘life’ of what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Following this diachronic sketch, I zoom in to provide a more detailed and nuanced picture of

the 'globalisation'-discourse. In this context, I identify and discuss five facets that characterise it.

One of these facets is that the idea 'new world' plays an important and, I argue, constitutive role in the life of this discourse. It was the notion that the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s brought about a 'new world', which gave birth to the 'globalisation'-discourse. I argue that it was the conceptual vacuum, which this event produced, that allowed the neologism *globalisation* to enter the language and enabled idea/s called 'globalisation' to come to be "in the true" (Foucault 1981: 61).

This latter point serves as the ground for the argument that forms the centre of this chapter. I propose to understand the 'globalisation'-discourse as the re-production of a web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, that is usefully labelled 'new world'. In other words, I argue that the use of the word *globalisation*, no matter in which context and in which sense it is used, constitutes the re-production of a web of meanings that brings out an object that is best called 'new world'.

CLARIFICATION OF THE WORD *DISCOURSE*

As Helge Schalk (in Landwehr 2009: 16; my own translation) puts it, "the word *discourse* has come to be a vogue word, the enigmatic meaning of which makes it almost impossible to define it exhaustively". Dealing with the word *discourse* is not made easier by the fact that it is not exclusively an academic concept but also appears in everyday language. In the English language, there is a common understanding of *discourse* as 'conversation'. In the German language, the noun *Diskurs* is usually associated with the idea of a publicly discussed issue, a specific chain of argumentation, or a statement of a politician or other kind of official representative; it is rarely used in everyday language. In French and other Romanic languages, the word *discourse* is commonly associated with the idea of a lecture, an academic speech, or homily (for the above see Keller 2004).

A prominent use of the word *discourse* in the political studies and IR scholarship are instances, in which Jürgen Habermas' concept is denoted. Habermas' concept 'discourse' plays a central role in theories of deliberative politics and democracy (especially Habermas 1992). It is a *normative* concept, which is linked to a distinct form of communicative action, juxtaposed with 'ordinary communicative action'. As Martin Nonhoff (2004: 67) explains, in essence, 'discourse' is Habermas' answer to the question of how moral statements need to be legitimised so that they are accepted as 'good' and 'reasonable' and, consequently, as 'true'. For Habermas, 'discourse' stands for a rational and pre-conditioned way of communicating. It is a process of regulated argumentation that opens the chance of tracing 'truth' and the 'validity' of statements. It is the institutionally secured spheres and pro-

cedures of 'discourses' that are taken in his theory as providing the opportunity to reach rational (political) decisions.¹

In talking about the 'globalisation'-discourse I do not use the word *discourse* in a Habermasian sense. Rather, I use it in the way, in which it is used in the social scientific scholarship that acknowledges, in one way or other, "that the relationship between human beings and the world are mediated by means of collectively created symbolic meaning systems or orders of knowledge" (Keller 2013: 2). In this vein, I do not refer to an ontological object when I use the word *discourse* (see Keller quoted in Landwehr 2009: 21). A 'discourse' does not exist as such, waiting to be unveiled through (textual) analysis of the right data corpus (see Landwehr 2009: 20). Rather, the word *discourse*, as it is used here, is to be understood as an analytic tool that is applied by a second order-observer. As Landwehr (*ibid.*) stresses, to apply the concept 'discourse' implies and expresses the *presumption* that a

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- 1 At the core of this thinking is the assumption that the human communicative competence implies four validity claims (*Geltungsansprüche*) (see Habermas 1976: 176). These validity claims are implicit in every speech act of communicative action as they are mutually expected by the communicative partners of the speech act. Although the four validity claims are always mutually expected in ordinary communicative action, they are normally not explicit subjects of speech acts. As soon as they do become subject to the discussion, in other words, as soon as the communication becomes problematic in that the validity claims are questioned and the ordinary communicative action gets distorted, the level of 'discourse' is entered. 'Discourses', accordingly, deal retrospectively (one can say as an interruption of ordinary communicative action) with the question of if and how the specific communicative action can be justified. Habermas distinguishes between two main forms of 'discourses': 'theoretical discourse' on the one hand, and 'practical discourse' on the other hand (see Habermas 1984a: esp. 23). While the 'theoretical discourse' is understood as addressing questions of truth (Habermas 1981a: 39), the 'practical discourse' addresses social norms (*ibid.*). Both forms of 'discourses' aim to reach an intersubjective consensus based on rational and reflexive argumentation. Like the communicative action, Habermas' 'discourses' too are subject to an (presumed) idealization (see further Habermas 1984a: esp. 23). This idealization is what he conceptualises as the 'ideal speech situation' which, to simplify the complexity of the issue, holds that there is equal opportunity for participating in the communication and that power relations that might exist outside the discourse are irrelevant; he speaks of a 'power free discourse' (*herrschaftsfreier Diskurs*) (for a formulation of the four concrete conditions of the 'ideale Sprechsituation' see Habermas 1984: 177pp). Given these conditions, Habermas sees it as being guaranteed that, in a 'power free discourse', the better argument 'succeeds'. For this brief overview I relied on my reading of Habermas' referenced original texts, as well as on Held (1980: espec. 247-350), Nonhoff (2004: 66-70), Strecker and Schaal (2001), and Krallmann and Ziemann (2001: 281-307).

network of meanings disciplines what is thinkable, sayable and doable in a distinct historical moment. In this sense, 'discourse' indicates a distinct approach to the social world, rather than constituting a pre-existing object of study.

In the broadest sense, this meaning of the word *discourse* springs off Michel Foucault's work and the many discussions and extensions of it that continue to proliferate in the social scientific literature (see, for instance, the many different contributions in Angermüller et al 2014; also in Kerchner and Schneider 2006).

Foucault's notion 'discourse' arises from his investigation of the development of what he calls 'human sciences'. By 'human sciences', he refers to all those sciences that are in one way or other concerned with human beings and their actions. As outlined in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault (1972: 156) considers these sciences, firstly, as being situated in a specific historical context, and, secondly, as being a conglomerate of 'statements' which belong to one specific system. Based on these two general claims he develops his idea 'discourse'.² With the word *discourse* Foucault refers to, on the one side, concrete historical formations of the production of knowledge and meaning. On the other side, the word refers to specific structures and dynamics that can be described in an abstract way.

As he points out, 'discourses' are constituted by linguistic signs. Yet, these signs are not to be understood as simply *referring* to any kind of referent (objects, subjects, relations etc). Rather, they have a discursive function, which means they 'produce' these referents. Producing references does not mean that a material referent is actually 'produced' – it means that the linguistic signs within these formations of statements (in other words, within 'discourses') ascribe meanings to these referents and with that make them accessible in the first place (see *ibid.* 74). Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1982: 86pp) elaborate on this aspect of Foucault's theory and point out that, consequently, his notion of 'discourse' must not be understood as an entity of signs. Rather, discourses are processes, in which the linkage between sequences of signs and referents leads to the actual production of these referents – or, more precisely, to the production of the meanings of these referents. This is what I meant in the previous chapter when I spoke of the '*object*' that the 'globalisation'-discourse produces.

Building on this, and in the context of his interest in 'human sciences', Foucault intends to show that forms of knowledge are actually productions of discourses and not natural, *a priori* given entities. Discourses "systematically form the objects of which they speak", he argues (Foucault 1972: 49). A discourse constitutes

2 In addition to my reading of the referenced works by Foucault, I build for the above and in the following on Andersen (2003), Dreyfuss and Rabinow (1982), Keller (2004, 2013), Kerchner and Schneider (2006), Landwehr (2009), Nonhoff (2004), and Nullmeier (2001).

“its object and work[s] it to the point of transforming it altogether. So that the problem arises of knowing whether the unity of a discourse is based not so much on the permanence and uniqueness of an object as on the space in which various objects emerge and are continuously transformed.” (ibid. 32)

A closer look at Foucault's differentiation between 'statement' and 'utterance', and, what can be called, 'referent', helps to further grasp the essence of his understanding of 'discourse'.³ 'Statement' differs from his idea of 'utterance'. An 'utterance' is a single event, in which linguistic signs are interlinked with each other. In other words, an 'utterance' takes place within a single, specific context. A 'statement', on the other side, stands, as it were, for a specific *function* of 'utterances'. It can be detected in 'utterances' (Foucault 1972). This does not mean that one can automatically find a 'statement' in every 'utterance'. Rather, a 'statement' (in other words, a specific function of 'utterance') evolves when the respective connection of signs (in other words, 'utterance') is related to a 'referent'. Again, as mentioned above and as Foucault explains in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, a 'referent' must not be misunderstood as a fixed, *a priori* existing 'object' or 'fact'. Rather, a 'referent' is the laws / orders / rules, which permit and restrict the ways in which 'objects' and 'facts' are related to each other, and, consequently, which ultimately permit and restrict the ways in which 'objects' and 'facts' are ('allowed' to be) understood in the first place. Every 'utterance', then, the 'statement' of which does not confirm the rules, is automatically questioned, if not automatically rejected.

By taking Gregor Mendel's theory of hereditary traits as an example, Foucault (1981: 59-60) illustrates the nature of this rejection and the relation between 'discourse' and 'truth'. While Gregor Mendel's theory of hereditary traits is today a well-accepted and well-established scientific insight, and, indeed, while one can wonder with Foucault (ibid. 60) “how the botanists or biologists of the nineteenth century managed not to see that what Mendel was saying was true”, it was dismissed by biologists for a long time. This was due to the fact that although Mendel “spoke the truth, [...] he was not ‘within the true’ of the biological discourse of his time” (ibid. 61).

“It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, but one is ‘in the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one has to reactivate in each of one's discourses.” (ibid.)

As Niels Akerstrom Andersen (2003: 3) puts it, with this understanding of 'utterance' Foucault “challenges individual will and reason by showing how every utterance is an utterance within a specific discourse to which certain rules of acceptability apply”. These rules are being approved, questioned and / or changed at the level of 'statements'. Yet, as soon as 'objects' and

3 For the following paragraph see Nonhoff (2004: 71-72).

'facts' are regularly reproduced within functions of 'utterances' (in other words, within 'statements') they are more and more readily confirmed. They establish and cement a distinct (view of an) 'object'. More precisely, they establish a 'legitimised' stock of knowledge. These networks of 'statements' are what Foucault (1972: 31-39) calls 'discursive formations'. Within 'discursive formations', legitimate knowledge comes into being, develops and becomes established. However, despite the fact that they produce what *appears* to be a stable constellation, 'discursive formations' are, of course, not stable or fixed entities as such. On the one side, as Martin Nonhoff (2004: 72) notes, with reference to Michel Pecheux, it is surprising that the natural unpredictability of the flow of 'statements' enables the development of relatively stable structures. On the other side, Foucault recognises this unpredictability as the reason or foundation for social procedures that restrict the 'unhindered' use of language. These are, for instance, manifest in the restriction of access to privileged, in the sense of discursively accepted speaking positions, which he describes in *The Order of Discourse* (1981). These restricting procedures, in turn, help to stabilise the 'discursive formations.' They stabilise what is (perceived to be) 'natural' and 'normal' which, in turn, has disciplining effects because, clearly, "to question the normal and natural is to invite marginalisation, ridicule, condemnation, or even punishment" (Hoffman and Knowles quoted in Nadoll 2000: 16).

The above provides a general account of some of the premises, which underlie the concept 'discourse' that has come to be popular in parts of the social sciences. To be clear, there is no single research field on 'discourse'. These premises have been amended, critically rewritten and translated by scholars into different research programmes, research agendas and methodologies (again, see, for instance, the diverse contributions in Angermüller et al 2014 and Kerchner and Schneider 2006; also Keller et al 2004, 2004a).

In Chapter 6, I come back to these premises and amend them for my own purposes. For the time being, however, the above is sufficient to provide a general sense of the ideas and presumptions that surround my use of the word *discourse*. On this ground, I return to what I mean by 'globalisation'-discourse.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, I use the term 'globalisation'-discourse to refer to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. Referring to the above, this web of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, does not *mirror* but *is* social reality, in the sense that it brings out its 'object', namely in this case 'globalisation'. Putting it the other way around, I conceptualise every use of the word *globalisation*, no matter in which thematic context, as a contribution to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings, that, for the time being, I call 'globalisation'.

Despite being generally committed to the above sketched 'discourse'-concept, in my phraseology that the 'globalisation'-discourse is the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances which contain

the word *globalisation*, I initially take inspiration from Böke et al (2000). Yet, while they conceptualise the 'migration'-discourse as a "web of *thematically* linked statements, which are manifest in texts" (ibid. 12; translation my own; emphasis added). I initially conceptualise the 'globalisation'-discourse not based on any *thematic* commonalities but based on a *linguistic* commonality, namely based on the appearance of the word *globalisation*. With that, my concept 'globalisation'-discourse also differs from ideas, which those IR scholars hold, who speak explicitly, in one way or other, of 'globalisation discourses', such as, Hay (2008), Hay and Marsh (2000), Hay and Rosamond (2002), Hay and Smith (2005), and Rosamond (1999). These scholars grasp distinct *thematic* debates with the term 'globalisation discourse'. They identify these debates as '*globalisation* discourses' based on their pre-set idea of the signified of the word *globalisation*. This is usually an idea of 'globalisation' as "heightened economic integration and interdependence" (Hay and Smith 2005: 124).

In comparison, my concept 'globalisation'-discourse grasps more than that. As we will see in the following sections, my concept takes seriously that the word *globalisation* – just like the adjective *global* – is highly polysemic. *Globalisation* "means different things to different people" (van Aelst and Walgrave 2002: 467). Hence, conceptualising the 'globalisation'-discourse in the way I do here, allows me to capture all the different uses of the word *globalisation* with all its different meanings, and take these uses as constituting *one* web of meanings that brings out its object 'globalisation'. What this object 'globalisation' is, then – i.e. what the web of meanings is about that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation* – is not pre-set by me in a definitional move through the application of a pre-set definition, such as 'heightened economic integration and interdependence'. Rather, it is something to be analytically carved out from a study of these utterances that apply the word *globalisation* and from an analysis of the way they interact in bringing out this 'object' 'globalisation'.

As mentioned above, eventually, at the end of this chapter, I suggest that we label this symbolically produced object 'globalisation' with the term 'new world'. Before reaching this point, however, I provide a sketch of the 'globalisation'-discourse through a brief diachronic view at its 'life', as well as, a more nuanced account of its nature and five facets that I identify as shaping it.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 'GLOBALISATION'-DISCOURSE

"Globalization is an idea whose time has come" – this is how David Held and his colleagues open their study *Global Transformations* (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 1). In his seminal work *Agendas, Al-*

ternatives and Public Policies public policy analyst John Kingdon (2003[1984: 1]) observes that

“[t]he phrase ‘an idea whose time has come’ captures a fundamental reality about an irresistible movement that sweeps over our politics and society, pushing aside everything that might stand in its path.”

Although Kingdon writes in a different context and well before the neologism *globalisation* gained ground,⁴ his claim aptly captures the rise of the popularity of the word *globalisation* and the birth and rise to prominence of what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. As Scholte (2005: 14) puts it, “[i]t is today pretty much impossible to avoid the issue” of ‘globalisation’; it has reached a “status somewhat below that of motherhood and apple pie”, finds Ian Clark (1999: 35).

Nick Bisley (2007: 12-16) provides a short and compelling overview of the life of what he understands as the *concept* ‘globalisation’. In the following, I reformulate Bisley’s elaborations in a subtle but meaningful way as I read them as providing insights into the life and nature of what I take as the ‘globalisation’-discourse. In particular, when Bisley speaks of ‘understandings of globalisation’, I use expressions such as ‘the use of the word *globalisation*’ and ‘the signified of the word *globalisation*’. Arguably, this makes my account sound less smooth. Yet, it is an important measure because it acknowledges that there are various different ideas of social and political phenomena associated with the word *globalisation*. Referring to what I sketched above, ‘globalisation’ does not exist as such, despite the fact that it is common practice to take it as if it was simply a ‘thing’ ‘out there’. Rather, ‘globalisation’ is the object that is produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

To begin with, following Bisley (2007: 11), we find that ideas, which are referred to with the word *globalisation*, “appeared to flower rather suddenly in the early 1990s” and it is only since then that – I am paraphrasing the above quoted Kingdon – they have ‘swept over our politics and society’, capturing the public, political and academic imagination with “a remarkable forcefulness”, as Bisley (*ibid.* 12) puts it.

Building on Bisley’s account and re-interpreting it for my purposes here, the ‘globalisation’-discourse can be seen to have developed in five main phases.

In the first phase, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars, such as Anthony Giddens (1990) in sociology, Kenichi Ohmae (1990) in business studies and James N. Rosenau (1990) in International Relations, started to use the word *globalisation* to argue that the world was experiencing developments, which resulted in distinct socio- and economic-structural transformations. As Bisley (2007: 12) explains, although “earlier work had iden-

4 Kingdon investigates the question why certain public policy issues make it onto the US policy agenda and others not.

tified developments that we now associate with globalization", it was this diverse group of scholars at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s that made the point explicit. The 'globalisation'-discourse, as I understand it, was born. Over the 1990s, the word *globalisation* became a "talismanic term, a seemingly unavoidable reference point for discussions about our contemporary situation" (Low and Barnett 2000: 54).⁵

In the second phase of its development, which took place in the first half of the 1990s, the 'globalisation'-discourse was subject to institutionalisation within the academy. "[I]mportant debates in core areas of concern (for example, integration in economics, sovereignty and the state in IR, and modernity in sociology)" started to take place (Bisley 2007: 13). In this phase, the 'globalisation'-discourse – the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation* – came to be shaped in particular by economic interpretations of the world. As Bisley (ibid.) puts it, these interpretations "cemented the idea of a truly global economic system that influences the success of the world's states and societies in the popular imagination". Furthermore, an understanding that "the social realm is in the midst of a broad-ranging transformation" (ibid.) was reinforced through a handful of works in this institutionalised context, such as the writings by the earlier mentioned Martin Albrow (1996) and the above discussed Scholte (1993). Notably, interpreting Bisley's insights, it was at

5 This does not mean that the word *globalisation* was not used before the 1990s. In his *Begriffsgeschichte* of 'globalisation' Bach (2013: 93) finds that the sociologist Paul Meadow uses the word *globalisation* in a 1951-article on the "new culture pattern" that results from "industrialism" (Meadows 1951: 11). Bach (2013: 94) also points to IR-scholar Trygve Mathisen, who applies the word in his *Methodology in the Study of International Relations* in 1959, and to Inis Claude's 1965-use of *globalisation* in an article, in which Claude characterises the UN as having "tended to reflect the steady globalization of international relations" (Claude 1965: 387). Nick Bisley (2007: 5) refers to George Modelski's 1972 *The Principles of World Politics* as "[o]ne of the earliest references to globalization". And linguist Wolfgang Teubert highlights Theodore Levitt's use of the word *globalisation* in a 1983-*Harvard Business Review* article (Levitt 1983) as a particularly influential, early application of the word (Teubert 2002: 157). As a study of the archive of the Public Papers of the US Presidents shows, the first US President who uses the word *globalisation* in his Public Papers was Ronald Reagan (1987) in 1987; and a look into the archive of *The New York Times* reveals that it appeared there for the first time in an article in 1974, was then used once in 1981, not at all in 1982 and 1983, appeared again once in 1984. Thereafter, it experienced a sudden accelerating popularity, reaching a peak in 2000, in which 453 separate articles use the word at least once. An examination of *The Washington Post* provides us with a similar picture, and so does a study of *The Times* (London) and *The Guardian*. Each of them shows a similar trend in the use of the word *globalisation*.

this time that the word *globalisation* moved from the vocabulary of a handful of specialists to the language of a wide-range of scholars, policy-makers, political commentators and the public.

The third phase in the life of the 'globalisation'-discourse was shaped by two noteworthy developments. To begin with, debates, in which the neologism *globalisation* was used, widened and diversified. Different kinds of scepticism were directed towards various arguments that were advanced with the help of the word *globalisation*; the group of these sceptics include Philip G. Cerny (1997), Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996), and Michael Mann (1997). Furthermore, the re-production of the 'globalisation'-discourse widened with a shift away from mainly theoretical and conceptual contributions towards political arguments that utilised the word *globalisation*. "[A]ctivists and scholars began to associate [particular signifieds of the word *globalisation*] with malign forces and to question the motivation of those advocating [them]" (Bisley 2007: 15). At the same time, the institutionalisation of the re-production of the 'globalisation'-discourse moved forward through publications such as *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (2003). These publications were sufficiently influential as to 'tame' the 'globalisation'-discourse. They were "particularly successful in solidifying contemporary understandings of globalization", as Bisley (2007: 15) puts it.

The trend towards more activist contributions to the re-production of the 'globalisation'-discourse that started in the third phase significantly shaped the fourth phase in the life of the discourse in the early 2000s (see *ibid.* 16). In this fourth phase, public intellectuals and political activists, such as Joseph Stieglitz and Naomi Klein, entered the re-production of the discourse. They used the word *globalisation* to express concern and critique about various established stances adopted regarding the interpretation of the state of the world. In particular, they voiced concern about the kind of signified of the word *globalisation* that they considered to be responsible for increasing global inequality and its consequence of "no space, no choice, no jobs" (Klein 2000).

The current, fifth state of the 'globalisation'-discourse is shaped by a situation, in which the various contributions to its re-production are grounded in and committed to fixed positions. Current contributions to the 'globalisation'-discourse are "less inclined to engage substantively with one another", observes Bisley (2007: 16). This lack of critical engagement with each other and across different interpretative stances is particularly remarkable because the 'globalisation'-discourse constitutes an influential aspect of the construction of social reality today.

In general, as John Tomlinson (1999: 2) puts it,

“[t]he idea of ‘globalization’ [...] is an extraordinarily fecund concept in its capacity to generate speculations, hypotheses and powerful social images and metaphors which reach far beyond the bare social facts.”

In particular, the signified of the word *globalisation* is not only treated as an *explanandum*, i.e. as something that is to be explained, but as an *explanans*, i.e. something that *explains* all sorts of social phenomena. As such, it is closely inscribed in the production of (knowledge about) the contemporary world.

A prime example of the signified of *globalisation*, understood as something that is to be explained, can be found in the above mentioned *Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture* by Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (2003). The authors provide a theoretical and empirical account of the various dimensions of what they associate with the word *globalisation*, which is a

“process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 16)

For an example of an understanding of the signified of *globalisation* as something that *explains* something, we can turn to Mary Kaldor’s work on ‘new wars’ (2006[1999]) and her writings on ‘global civil society’ (2003). As mentioned in Chapter 3, Kaldor re-conceptualises ‘war’ and ‘civil society’ because she understands them to have been changed due to ‘globalisation’; as quoted above, she argues “[w]hat is new about the concept of civil society since 1989 is globalization” (ibid. 1). The signified of the word *globalisation* is taken here as the *explanation* of changes in ‘war’ and ‘civil society’. Another, very different example, in which the signified of *globalisation* is imagined as an *explanans*, is US President George W. Bush’s (2008) understanding of the relationship between energy prices and the economic development of China. Bush describes it as “a very interesting and important relationship made complex by globalization”. In each of these cases it is because of the respective signified of the word *globalisation* that a social phenomenon, such as ‘war’, ‘civil society’ and the relationship between energy prices and economic development, looks as it looks. As such, these examples demonstrate that the ‘globalisation’-discourse is now closely inscribed in and takes an influential position in relation to the knowledge-production about social reality.

FOUR FACETS OF THE 'GLOBALISATION'-DISCOURSE

Above, grounded in an interpretation of Bisley's history of the concept 'globalisation', I sketched a broad overview of the life of the 'globalisation'-discourse, divided into five main phases. In the following, I zoom in and have a closer look at the discourse's re-production. My aim is to provide a more nuanced picture of this discourse. I provide an account of the various positions, scholarly practices, as well as, understandings of the signified of the word *globalisation* that play into the 'globalisation'-discourse; to remind us, with 'globalisation'-discourse I mean the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*.

I suggest there are five facets of the 'globalisation'-discourse. In this present section, I examine four of these five facets. The subsequent section focuses on the fifth facet, which is the relevance of the idea 'new world'. This fifth facet is worthy of a deeper discussion; hence, I deal with it in its own section. Overall, though, the identified facets of the 'globalisation'-discourse are intimately interwoven.

Economic and socio-political ideas of 'globalisation'

To begin with, the 'globalisation'-discourse, i.e. the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, is shaped by two broad understandings of the signified of the word *globalisation*. First, the signified of *globalisation* is understood as an economic phenomenon. Second, it is understood as a socio-political phenomenon (see Bisley 2007: 21-23).

Economic conceptions of the signified of *globalisation* ascribe particular significance to the integration of markets and to the consequences of such market integration (e.g. Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000; Wolf 2004). The socio-political conception of the signified of the word *globalisation* takes it as a process that changes "the fundamental structure of social life by recasting the role that territory plays in organizing social structures, such as political institutions or sovereignty" (Bisley 2007: 23). This process is understood as the result of a "complex interaction of changes in economic, political and cultural relations" (ibid.). The signified of the word *globalisation* is understood in this conception to be the driving force that changes practices of governance, the nature of statehood and the notion of sovereignty (see further ibid.). Seminal works that fall into this second category are the above mentioned Held et al (2003), Albrow (1996), Giddens (1990), and Scholte (2005). In addition, and related, in this second category, the word *globalisation* is also associated with processes that lead to a "sense of cultural fragmentation and dislocation" (Featherstone 1995: 1).

Transference, transformation and transcendence

Adding to the above, Jens Bartelson (2000) helps us to distinguish between three different kinds of conceptions of the signified of *globalisation*, which play out in the 'globalisation'-discourse and which, together, constitute the second facet of the 'globalisation'-discourse. These are: 1. 'globalisation' understood as being about *transference*, 2. 'globalisation' understood as being about *transformation*, and 3. 'globalisation' understood as being about *transcendence*.

In the first conception, the signified of the word *globalisation* is understood as a process that is shaped by an "intensified transference or exchange of things between preconstituted units" (Bartelson 2000: 184). In other words, it is understood to be a development that is 'different in degree' from past developments. The majority of contributions to the 'globalisation'-discourse, i.e. the majority of uses of the word *globalisation*, fall into this first category. This is despite the explicit and strong critique that has been directed towards such a conception of 'globalisation'. Critical voices argue that an understanding of the signified of *globalisation* as something that merely constitutes a 'difference in degree' from past developments makes the use of a neologism redundant. It is not clear, these critics argue, why established nouns, such as *internationalisation*, *liberalisation*, *universalisation*, and *westernisation*, are not sufficient to capture the world in this sense. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Scholte is one of the critics of such a use of the word *globalisation*. He argues that it does not "open insights that are not available through pre-existent vocabulary" (Scholte 2005: 54). Going further, he sees such applications of the word *globalisation* as instances, which turn the word into a buzzword that does not provide any "distinct analytical value-added" (ibid.).

The second of Bartelson's conceptions refers to a conception of the signified of the word *globalisation* that implies the idea of "a process of *transformation* that occurs at the systems level" (Bartelson 2000: 186; emphasis added). The above mentioned work by David Held et al (2003) falls into this category, as does Mary Kaldor's rethinking of the nature of 'war' and 'civil society' (Kaldor 2006[1999], 2003). These works are based on an understanding of the signified of the word *globalisation* as a contemporary process, which implies some sort of transformation of socio-political reality (either then taken and discussed as an *explanans* or *explanandum*).

Finally, contributions to the 'globalisation'-discourse, which fall within Bartelson's third conception, understand the signified of the word *globalisation* as a process that accounts for

"the transcendence of those distinctions that together condition unit, system and dimension identity. Globalisation is neither inside out nor outside in but rather a process that dissolves the divide between inside and outside." (Bartelson 2000: 189)

Examples of scholarly conceptions of 'globalisation' that fall within this category include Morten Ougaard and Richard Higgott's use of the word *globalisation* as an effort to conceptualise a 'global polity' (2002) and, in general, the various attempts of "pondering postinternationalism", as they are collected in Heidi H. Hobbs (2000). Sociologist Ulrich Beck's use of the word *globalisation* also falls into this third category (e.g. Beck 2004a).

In contrast to the first, the latter two categories encode an idea of a world 'different *in kind*' from the past. These latter two conceptions of the signified of the word *globalisation* capture and express the idea that contemporary socio-political reality is subject to essentially innovative and innovating changes. As Bartelson (2009: 92) puts it, understood in these two latter senses,

"the concept of globalisation has had a destabilizing impact upon the entire array of sociopolitical concepts that together constitute the main template of political modernity making their meanings contestable and dissolving the distinctions upon which their coherent usage hitherto has rested."

'Globalisation' as a 'thing' 'out there'

Despite fundamental differences in terms of the above sketched facets of the 'globalisation'-discourse, the vast majority of contributions to this discourse, i.e. the vast majority of uses of the word *globalisation*, have something fundamental in common; they share a common approach: they take the signified of the word *globalisation* as a material-structural 'thing' 'out there'. This is the third facet that I identify as constituting the 'globalisation'-discourse.

This third facet is readily apparent in common expressions such as "governing globalization" (e.g. Nayyar 2002; Held and McGrew 2003), "taming globalization" (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2003), "responding to globalization" (e.g. Hart and Prakash 2000) and "[h]as globalization gone too far?" (Rodrik 1997). These expressions reveal the idea that the signified of the word *globalisation* is something 'material' that could be 'tamed', 'governed' and 'responded to', and that is 'out there' to be analysed, grasped and investigated. The signified of the word *globalisation* is taken as something that people are confronted with, and, consequently, as something that poses the task for scholars to look at and dismantle it.⁶ Grounded in this premise, there are two different approaches to the 'thing' 'globalisation'.

6 For some, like Mary Kaldor (2003), this 'thing' 'globalisation' is the product of social action, and, as such, can be shaped by social actors. For others, like Richard N. Haass, former Director of Policy Planning for the US Department of State, it is something like a second nature: "[G]lobalization is a reality, not a choice. 'You can run but you can't hide'" (Haass and Litan 1988: 6).

First, there are those contributors to the 'globalisation'-discourse, i.e. to the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, who take the position of a 'first order'-observer and investigate the socio-political processes that they associate with the word *globalisation*, such as economic integration, cultural fragmentation, changes in governance structures and regimes. These are the many scholars mentioned above, who, despite their diverse research interests and foci, represent the mainstream approach to the signified of the word *globalisation*.

Second, there are contributors to the 'globalisation'-discourse who set out to grasp first-order-observers' *ideas* of the 'thing' 'globalisation'. These commentators are inspired by the conviction that

"[w]hile studies on globalization proliferate, we remain relatively under-informed about discourses of globalization and associated issues of power and knowledge." (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 147)

They are interested in the "sorts of knowledge about 'globalization'" at work in policymaking, as Ben Rosamond (1999: 660) puts it. Contributions, which fall into this category, are part of a more general trend in the field of political studies and IR, in which scholars take seriously in the analysis of politics factors such as ideas, world-views and political culture. This trend has been labelled the 'ideational turn' (e.g. Blyth 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). One of the key premises, on which this 'ideational turn' builds, is the conviction that

"it is the ideas that actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs the way in which actors behave" (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 148),

or, as Alexander Wendt (1992: 396) famously put it,

"people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them."⁷

Through their focus on 'ideas' these second kinds of contributions to the 'globalisation'-discourse constitute a critical counter-weight to the earlier sketched mainstream approaches. And, yet, they share with the mainstream that they, too, start based on a pre-set idea of the signified of the word *globalisation* as a 'thing' 'out there' – except that they focus on *idea/s* of the respective 'thing'.

For instance, as mentioned above, Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond (2002: 147) are interested in "discourses of globalization and associated issues of power and knowledge". Broadly speaking, they set out to understand

7 I come back to this theory in Chapter 6.

"[t]he interpretation of the opportunities and constraints associated with globalization and the consequent appeal, in political contexts, to the language of globalization",

as Colin Hay (2008: 317) puts it in another context (see also Hay 2007; Rosamond 1999; Hay and Marsh 2000). In doing this, these scholars pre-set the signifier of the word *globalisation* to be an economic (hyper)force 'out there' (see Hay 2008). Given that this is their preconception of the signified of the word *globalisation*, they critically explore "the interpretation of the opportunities and constraints associated" (ibid.) with the 'thing' global economic integration and use the word *globalisation* for this.

Another example of contributions that set out to analyse *idea/s* of the 'thing' 'globalisation' are the studies in the edited collection *Metaphors of Globalization* (Kornprobst, Pouliot, Shah and Zaiotti 2008). *Metaphors of Globalization* is one of the few existing collections in the field of political studies and IR that is explicitly dedicated to an 'ideational approach' to 'globalisation'. As Jan Aart Scholte (2008: x) writes in his 'Foreword':

"The notion that globalization is (at least partly) an ideational construction is not new, of course. Various scholars in anthropology, sociology and the humanities have always appreciated the global largely in these terms. However, the mainstream of international studies has usually approached globalization with the methodological materialism that underpins most business studies, economics, geography and political science. Although constructivism and poststructuralism have over the past decade acquired notable places in the theoretical repertoire of world politics, ideational analyses thus far played relatively little part in international studies research on globalization."

Metaphors of Globalization sets out to fill this gap, starting on the premise that "globalization exists through metaphors" (Kornprobst, Pouliot, Shah and Zaiotti 2008: 2). On this basis, the contributions in the volume ask "how specific metaphysics of meaning emerge through metaphors, and how they influence understandings of globalization" (ibid. 2008: 4). The formulation of this task, the introductory claim, "[a]s with any aspect of world politics, globalization is *bound up* in metaphors" (Scholte 2008: x; emphasis added), as well as the very title of the book 'metaphors of globalization' indicate that here, too, the signified of the word *globalisation* is understood as a particular (pre-set) 'thing' 'out there' that is wrapped up in metaphors and waits to be investigated.

The globalisation-'debate'

The fourth facet, which I identify as constituting the 'globalisation'-discourse, was already implied in the above. The word *globalisation* is used by commentators to refer to a wide spectrum of different 'things'. Yet, despite this diversity, the majority of commentators share the conviction that there is a *debate* about a *well-defined* phenomenon called 'globalisation'. In

general, this conviction is implied in the very fact that commentators use the neologism *globalisation* to begin with. The use of the word clearly indicates that it is perceived to be useful, which, in turn, indicates the conviction that there is a common denominator that makes the talk about 'globalisation', i.e. the use of the word *globalisation*, meaningful as part of a broader debate. In particular, the conviction that there is an identifiable 'globalisation'-discourse is implied in the talk about a supposedly well-defined field of scholarship and "major new area of academic endeavour" (Scholte 2004: 1), called 'globalisation studies' (e.g. Appelbaum and Robinson 2005; Mittelman 2004; Rupert 2005; Scholte 2004; Taylor 2005), as well as in the argument that there was a "globalization debate" (Held et al 2003; also Held and McGrew 2007a; Busch 2000; Jones 2006; Rodrik 1997a). The argument that there was a 'globalisation debate' is, for instance, implied in claims that there are "[c]ontroversies about the demise of globalization", as David Held and Anthony McGrew (2007b: 1) suggest. In their *Globalization Theory* Held and McGrew (2007a: 2) argue that 'globalisation' came to face "hard times" in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City on 11 September 2001 (9/11). On the one side of what they present as 'the globalisation debate', Held and McGrew identify commentators like Justin Rosenberg (2005: 2), who argue that post-9/11 socio-political reality is evidence that "'the age of globalisation' is unexpectedly over" (Rosenberg 2005: 2) – it is *unexpectedly* over for Rosenberg because, as he argues, 'globalisation' was never more than a "craze", the "*zeitgeist* of the 1990s" anyway. Consequently, it was only a matter of time until the "follies of Globalisation Theory" (Rosenberg 2000) were exposed and the idea 'globalisation' was revealed as "the basis for a systematic misinterpretation of real-world events" (Rosenberg 2005: 10). This was finally realised, commentators like Rosenberg argue, in the face of post-9/11 socio-political developments because, as political analyst John Gray (2001: 27) declares, developments in post-9/11-world politics in general and in US (foreign) policy in particular are more of "an exercise in realpolitik in which ideas of global governance of the kind that have lately been fashionable on the left become largely irrelevant." On the other side of this perceived 'globalisation debate', Held and McGrew (2007b: 10) see commentators like themselves, who assert that "obituaries for globalization [...] are [...] somewhat premature."

On close scrutiny, these 'globalisation debates' and 'controversies' about the existence of 'globalisation' are everything but genuine 'debates' or 'controversies'. This is simply because, as Colin Hay (2007: 723) puts it, "protagonists in the same globalization debate repeatedly talk past one another. They talk about different things" – while all using the same linguistic sign, namely *globalisation*.

Consider the following: if we have a look at some of the claims in this supposed 'controversy' about 'the demise of globalisation' and set out to assess them by understanding the signified of the word *globalisation* as (an

ideal existence of) global governance regimes and an increasing role of international institutions, we might readily agree that 'globalisation' has suffered after 9/11. Important post-9/11-decisions were taken outside the confines of these global regimes and institutions. An obvious example is the way in which the United Nations (UN) was sidelined after 9/11. UN Resolution 1368, which was passed by the Security Council on 12 September 2001, triggered little attention. This was particularly apparent compared to the official statements of US President George W. Bush at that time. In February 2003, the position of the United Nations could have hardly been more summarily dismissed and profoundly weakened than by the US-led military intervention in Iraq, which UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2004a) explicitly considered as "illegal" and "not in conformity with the UN Charter". Indeed, in this context, sceptics have a point when they announce the 'demise' of 'globalisation' based on the fact that – in the face of the 2003-intervention in Iraq – claims, which are posed as indicators for and explanations of 'globalisation', have become questionable, such as that the US "military autonomy is decidedly compromised by the web of military commitments and arrangements in which it has become entangled" (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 144). A look at the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United Nations of America (White House 2002), especially its Chapter V (the so-called 'Bush Doctrine'), which institutionalised a specific approach to the pre-emptive use of force, as well as a look at public statements of representatives of the post-9/11 Bush Administration, such as the following one by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, support sceptics in that they provide evidence for the US administration's post-9/11 goal to free "the American Gulliver from the ties of multilateralism", as Michael Cox (2003: 526) puts it, and to move (back) to *realpolitik*:

"The United States strengthens its national security when it promotes a well-ordered world of sovereign states: a world in which states respect one another's rights to choose how they want to live; a world in which states do not commit aggression and have governments that can and do control their own territory; a world in which states have governments that are responsible and obey, as it were, the rules of the road. The importance of promoting a well-ordered world of sovereign states was brought home to Americans by 9/11, when terrorists enjoying safe haven in remote Afghanistan exploited 'globalization' and the free and open nature of various Western countries to attack us disastrously here at home. Sovereignty means not just a country's right to command respect for its independence, but also the duty to take responsibility for what occurs on one's territory, and, in particular, to do what it takes to prevent one's territory from being used as a base for attacks against others." (Feith quoted in Acharya 2007: 279)

A political world based on power politics becomes also evident in a 2002-speech delivered by then US National Security Advisor and later US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. In this speech Rice (2002) makes clear:

“when we were attacked on September 11th, it reinforced one of the rediscovered truths about today’s world: robust military power matters in international politics and in security.”

So, if the signified of the word *globalisation* is taken as an undisputed global governance system and thick multilateralism, the evidence of post-9/11 developments (especially the behaviour of the US) supports the claims of those who question it.

At the same time, however, there is solid evidence for the claims of those who consider a “post-mortem” (Rosenberg 2005) of ‘globalisation’ to be too hasty – again, depending on what one considers to be the signified of the word *globalisation*. If one considers it to be the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness” (Held and McGrew 2007b: 1) there is evidence that ‘globalisation’ is ‘alive’. Held and McGrew (2007b) demonstrate this in their *Globalization/Anti-Globalization*. More specifically, if one understands the signified of the word *globalisation* as world-wide economic integration, in general, and as the planetary spread of capitalism, in particular, claims that 9/11 brought it to an end do not hold because, as William J. Dobson (2006: 23) observes,

“[t]he global economy offered the first sign that a new, darker day hadn’t dawned. On September 10, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed at 9,605.51. Once markets reopened on September 17, it took only 40 days for the market to close above that level again. The value of the United States’ monthly exports has continued to rise steadily from \$60 billion to more than \$75 billion between 2001 and 2005. The value of global trade dipped slightly in 2001 from \$8 trillion to \$7.8 trillion. Then, once markets found their footing, they came racing back, increasing every subsequent year, topping \$12 trillion in 2005. Hard-hit businesses such as the tourist industry bounced back remarkably fast.”

If the word *globalisation* is taken to refer to the notion of an increasing mobility of people and movements across the world, aviation figures support the position that ‘globalisation’ did not ‘die’ after 9/11 (see data appendix in the Global Civil Society Yearbooks URL). As Dobson (2006: 23) finds:

“In 2001, more than 688 million tourists travelled abroad; by 2005, that number had climbed to 808 million—a 17 percent increase in four years.”

And if the signified of the word *globalisation* is understood to be about communicative integration, then the ever growing innovative forms and increasing popularity of web 2.0 and the ‘internet of things’, as well as, examples such as the North Korean case that is provided in Kaldor and Kostovicova’s 2008 study of what they call ‘involuntary pluralism’ in illiberal regimes, support the claim that ‘globalisation’ has not suffered a demise after 9/11 but, rather, that it is a force of (potentially) transforming dynamics

and power – following Kaldor and Kostovicova (2008) even in North Korea, one of the most isolated societies in the world.

Above and beyond this, it is easy to argue that the terrorist attack of 9/11 itself can be regarded as a manifestation of ‘globalisation’, if the signified of *globalisation* is understood to be the structures and means that facilitate the establishment of transnational networks. As Mary Kaldor and Diego Muro (2003) highlight, it was the ability to form a global network, just like (Western) NGOs, that ‘made’ Al Qaeda (see also LaFeber 2002). Further, there is the important role that the contemporary ‘globalised’ media and communication systems played in the 9/11-attack. On the one side, as Kaldor and Muro (2003) argue, terror networks, such as Al Qaeda, fundamentally depend on the internet and satellite TV in order to recruit followers around the world.⁸ On the other side, it was of course the ‘global media’ that made the event of 9/11 a “phenomenal sight that separates the violence of our television era from all others”, as Caryn James (2001) wrote in *The New York Times* on 12 September. Nilüfer Göle (2002: 335) points out in her study of the interwoven relationship between Islam, Modernity and violence that 9/11 was “performed in full recognition of the supremacy of the media”. In a similar vein, Heinz Steinert (2003: 654) speaks of terrorism, such as conducted and fostered by Al Qaeda, as a “CNN-adapted political crime. [...] Terrorists force their way into the field of politics through the public sphere”; he calls the TV images of the collapsing towers “the most important and effective ‘product’ of the terrorist attack” (ibid. 653). In fact, the awareness of the extraordinary role of the global media system in and for the attack of 9/11 is evident in a letter written by Osama Bin Laden to Emir Al-Momineen, in which Bin Laden highlights:

“It is obvious that the media in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.” (Bin Laden ND)

Overall, argues Robert O. Keohane (2002: 81), the September 2001-terrorist attack in itself showed that the “barrier conception of geographical space [...] was finally obsolete”. So, if the word *globalisation* is taken to refer to transborder actions and interconnections, ‘globalisation’ is ‘alive’ and played a crucial role in the lead up to and on 11 September 2001. In fact, 9/11 is a manifestation of ‘globalisation.’

In sum, the discussions about the state and nature of the world after 9/11, to which Held and McGrew (2007b) point, are rich and important. Yet, to label them a ‘controversy’ about the demise of a supposedly well-defined issue called ‘globalisation’ is peculiar. This is simply because commentators speak about different phenomena when they use the word *globalisation*.

8 For reports on how the terror network ISIS uses social media to recruit followers see for instance Callimachi (2015) and Gates and Podder (2015).

This fourth facet of the 'globalisation'-discourse, the implicit or explicit conviction that there was a 'globalisation debate', is interesting in two respects. First, this conviction, or scholarly practice, blocks focused, critical debates about the state and nature of the socio-political world. The word *globalisation* has come to step in-between scholars and the various socio-political phenomena at which they look. This leads to a diversion and fragmentation of debates. The word *globalisation* has come to take the position of a shield, which blocks focused debates about distinct empirical phenomena.⁹

At the same time, and second, the implicit or explicit conviction that there was a 'globalisation debate' is interesting because it brings out the 'globalisation'-discourse to begin with, i.e. the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, and which gives it its complex nature. The above account of uses of the word *globalisation* makes us aware that the object 'globalisation', which is re-produced in the 'globalisation'-discourse through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, is highly complex. This is because it is the product of utterances, in which the word *globalisation* is associated with many different, in fact, sometimes *fundamentally* different signifieds. This is a noteworthy observation. It requires us to acknowledge that the 'globalisation'-discourse must not be mistaken as revolving around a clearly set and confined idea 'globalisation'. Putting it differently, this observation requires us to acknowledge that it is not helpful to take the 'globalisation'-discourse as being about a clearly set and confined idea 'globalisation', such as market integration or interconnectedness. It is not helpful because it would be a distinct *position* in the 'globalisation'-discourse itself, rather than a critical take on it that holds a genuine chance of shedding new light on this very discourse. In fact, it would overlook a fundamental characteristic of the 'globalisation'-discourse.

But if it is not helpful to take the 'globalisation'-discourse as being about 'globalisation' what is the 'globalisation'-discourse about? How is the object that is re-produced in the 'globalisation'-discourse best understood and labelled? To answer these questions, it is worth considering the fifth facet that I identify as shaping the 'globalisation'-discourse, i.e. the web of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, in which the word *globalisation* is used.

9 A similar observation seems to motivate Susan Strange to criticise that the word *globalisation* is "used by a lot of woolly thinkers who lump together all sorts of superficially converging trends in popular tastes for food and drink, clothes, music, sports and entertainment with underlying changes in the provision of financial services and the directions of scientific research, and call it all globalization without trying to distinguish what is important from what is trivial, either in causes or in consequences" (Strange in Busch 2000: 22).

FIFTH: THE 'GLOBALISATION'-DISCOURSE AND THE IDEA 'NEW WORLD'

The fifth facet, which I identify as constituting the 'globalisation'-discourse, is the fact that the idea 'new world' plays a relevant role in it.

We have seen above that it was in the 1990s that the neologism *globalisation* became popular. This was despite the fact that many of the phenomena that have come to be captured with the word *globalisation* existed well before the 1990s. As Amartya Sen (2001) observes:

"[g]lobalization is not new [...]: Over thousands of years, globalization has progressed through travel, trade, migration, spread of cultural influences and dissemination of knowledge (including of science and technology)."

For instance, if we take the signified of the word *globalisation* to be about worldwide integration, the word *globalisation* could well have been in use since the 16th Century, namely since the 1582-introduction of the Gregorian calendar in Catholic European countries, which was gradually adopted across Europe and then almost worldwide in the 18th century and thereafter. Or, at least, it could have been used since the 19th century, when local time was erased by globally coordinated time in the form of time zones based upon Greenwich, England. Arguably, both developments were significant components in the emergence of what one could call a world culture and led to an unprecedented degree of worldwide integration. Yet, it was not in the 16th century, nor in the 18th nor in the 19th century that the idea of 'globalisation' was perceived as "an idea whose time has come" – as the earlier quoted Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (2003: 1) claim was the case at the end of the 20th century – and that the neologism *globalisation* was invented and became popular. Nor did the word *globalisation* enter discourses in the period between 1870 and 1914, in which many scholars find processes of economic integration similar to the ones of the late 20th century (e.g. Nayyar 1995; Hirst and Thompson 1996, 2002). None of these developments was perceived as a development that required the invention of the new word *globalisation*.¹⁰

On first sight, one might assume this was because these developments went, if not unnoticed, then, at least, not reflected upon. Yet, evidence suggests that this assumption is misguided. Commentators in the past seem to have perceived developments of integration in remarkably similar ways to the ways contemporaries perceive current developments to which they attribute the word *globalisation*. Just consider how *The Times* in London in 1858 celebrated the first transatlantic telegraph cable in strikingly similar

10 For sporadic uses of the word *globalisation* before the 1990s refer back to fn 5 in this chapter and Bach's *Begriffsgeschichte* of 'globalisation' (Bach 2013).

words as we read them today about technologies, such as the internet, which are widely understood as “a quintessential icon of globalization” (Capling and Nossal 2001: 444):

“Distance as a ground of uncertainty will [now] be eliminated from the calculation of the statesman and the merchant. [...] The distance between Canada and England is annihilated [and] the Atlantic is dried up [...] we become in reality as well as in wish one country [...] To the ties of a common blood, language, and religion, to the intimate association in business and a complete sympathy on so many subjects, is now added the faculty of instantaneous communication, which must give to all these, tendencies to unity and intensity which they never before could possess.” (*The Times* quoted in Herod 2009: 68)

So, why was it then in the 1990s that there was the perceived need for a neologism, *globalisation*, as the vocabulary necessary to grasp the state of the world? Putting it differently and with the earlier quoted Michel Foucault (1981: 61) we can ask what made ‘globalisation’ come to be “in the true” from the 1990s onwards, or what made the word *globalisation* a socially accepted and ratified way of talking about the world?

As we saw above, answers to these questions, which point to the ‘actual existence’ of ‘globalisation’ ‘out there’, are not completely satisfying. Not only do they merely refer to a single, pre-defined signified of the word *globalisation*, they also overlook that, as we saw Foucault point out earlier with reference to Gregor Mendel, even if whatever the word *globalisation* is associated with was a ‘reality’, it does not mean that one is automatically ‘in the true’ in speaking of it.

Without doubt, it is a complex set of factors that made ‘globalisation’ come to be ‘in the true’ and ensured that the neologism *globalisation* could enter debates as a socially accepted “talismanic term” (Low and Barnett 2000: 54).

In general, it was certainly the above mentioned practice of influential scholarly commentators and their established publication channels, who set out on the ‘natural’ premise *that* there was a well-defined ‘thing’ ‘globalisation’, a ‘globalisation debate’ and ‘globalisation studies’ that played an important role in the establishment of the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

In particular, I argue, it was the conceptual vacuum that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent breakdown of the bipolar bloc system produced within the imagination of scholars in political studies and IR, and in the social sciences, more broadly, and, interlinked with this, the notion that there was something ‘new’ about the world that ‘allowed’ the word *globalisation* to enter the scene.

To the degree the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent breakdown of the bipolar bloc system shook up global power relations, it also shook up scholarly imaginations in political studies and IR. The breakdown of the bipolar bloc system left “observers without any paradigms or

theories that adequately explain the course of events", assessed IR theorist James N. Rosenau (1990: 5). After 1989, there was a widespread perception that "old truths had lost their validity" (Daase and Kessler 2007: 412), that "basic concepts of political discourses are contested [and that] epistemological or diagnostic considerations need to be reconsidered" (ibid. 420).

"The irruptions in the established order and traditional practices of statecraft have given many of international politics' customary modes of analysis an air of nostalgia",

observed David Campbell (1998[1992]: ix). They were perceived as demanding a breakout from the "conceptual jails in which the study of world politics is deemed to be incarcerated", as Rosenau (1990: 22) put it.

All this was not least because, for specialised scholars the fall of the Berlin Wall came as much of a surprise as it did for many of those, who did not deal professionally with the analysis and prediction of world politics (see Leggewie 1994).

Given the surprise with which the course of events caught large parts of the political studies and IR community, the end of the Cold War called into question nothing less than the very self-understanding of the academic practice of political analysis in general and of the IR scholarship in particular. It called into question the very conceptual and analytical frameworks and toolboxes of experts because these failed to grasp and predict what they were meant to grasp and predict, namely trends, developments and dynamics in international politics.

The fundamental failure of political studies and IR analyses at that time is particularly apparent if one realises that the 'earthquake of international politics', as IR theorist Thomas Risse (2003a) perceived the events, was not actually entirely unpredicted. Although it hit IR specialists in 1989 widely by surprise, already in 1982 British historian E. P. Thompson wrote:

"The Cold War road show, which each year enlarges, is now lurching towards its terminus. But in this moment changes have arisen in our continent, of scarcely more than one year's growth, which signify a challenge to the Cold War itself. These are not 'political' changes in the usual sense. They cut through the flesh of politics down to the human bone." (Quoted in Kaldor 2003: 70)

Thompson's assessment is not only astonishing in terms of its foresight, it also shows why most of political studies and IR experts failed to properly assess and interpret the historical developments that were unfolding during the 1980s: they simply looked in the 'wrong place' and started their assessments based on the 'wrong' presumptions about where political changes might appear. While Thompson took seriously developments which were, as he critically reflects, 'not 'political' changes in the usual sense' in that they took place outside the realm of formal politics, the mainstream of political

studies and IR specialists overlooked them because their traditional conceptual frame constrained their view to the realm of nation-state governments and formal interactions. As Mary Kaldor (2003: 70) puts it, “[t]hose who studied Eastern Europe ‘from above’, who studied economic trends or the composition of politburos, failed to foresee the 1989 revolutions” in that they missed what Thompson observed and predicted, namely

“a détente of peoples rather than states – a movement of peoples which sometimes dislodges states from their blocs and brings them into a new diplomacy of conciliation, which sometimes runs beneath state structures, and which sometimes defies the ideological and security structures of particular states.” (Quoted in Kaldor 2003: 70)

Consequently, the political changes in 1989 prompted a reflection by many political studies and IR specialists on nothing less profound than the guiding categories of their academic discipline. At the same time, the unexpected changes made it ‘normal’ to see the world as a ‘new world’ that was suddenly unfolding in front of their eyes.

In Chapter 5, I zoom in on the idea ‘new world’ and discuss what it means to ‘proclaim’ that the world is ‘new’. At this point, it suffices to highlight that this perceived ‘new world’ stands for the vacuum in the scholarly approach/es to the world that the neologism *globalisation* (with its many different signifieds) came to fill. In other words, as much as it might have been ‘real’ developments that made ‘globalisation’ come to be “an idea whose time has come” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 1), as much it was the failure of previously guiding scholarly conceptions in the face of a perceived ‘new world’ that opened the path for the word *globalisation* to enter the scene as an acceptable term to grasp the world after 1989. It was this vacuum that allowed concept/s of ‘globalisation’ to come to be ‘in the true’ and the neologism *globalisation* to enter the language.

In this sense, the idea (that there was a) ‘new world’ played a crucial role in the establishment of the neologism *globalisation* and, consequently in the birth and rise of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. The idea (that there was a) ‘new world’ is constitutive of the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

CONCLUSION

In Chapters 2 and 3, I established the adjective *global* as a popular, free, complex and, in particular, as a ‘new word’. What is ‘new’ about the contemporary *global*, I argued in Chapter 3, is that it springs off the ‘globalisation’-discourse. It is interlinked inextricably with the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

In this chapter, I elaborated on the ‘globalisation’-discourse, which I defined as the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. In doing this, I referred to Foucault and

sketched some of the presumptions and premises that underlie the way in which I use the word *discourse*. Among them was the understanding that 'discourses' bring out their 'objects'. They produce the world of which they speak. Following from this brief theoretical overview, I stressed the difference between my idea of 'globalisation'-discourse and other uses of this term, such as by Hay and Smith (2005). Importantly, I stressed that in my conception, the 'globalisation'-discourse is about the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which have a *linguistic*, rather than a *thematic* commonality. This linguistic commonality is the word *globalisation*. With that, as I explained above, I acknowledge the polysemic nature of the word *globalisation*, i.e. I acknowledge that there are many different signifieds associated with this word *globalisation*, which, together, bring out the object 'globalisation', which is the web of meanings that is re-produced in the 'globalisation'-discourse. A look at the life of the 'globalisation'-discourse and, especially, at the five facets that I identify as constituting this discourse, made us aware of the complex nature of this discourse. More precisely, it made us aware of the complexity of the object 'globalisation', which is re-produced in the 'globalisation'-discourse through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*.

As a consequence, it became clear that it is not helpful to take the 'globalisation'-discourse as being about a clearly set and confined idea 'globalisation'. I stressed that such a practice would be an instance in the reproduction of the 'globalisation'-discourse, rather than a critical move that holds a genuine chance of shedding new light on the 'globalisation'-discourse.

Taken together, these observations brought up the questions: What is the 'globalisation'-discourse actually about? How is the object that is re-produced in the 'globalisation'-discourse best be understood and labelled?

In a separate, final section, I outlined the fifth facet that I identify as constituting the 'globalisation'-discourse. This is the importance of the idea 'new world' in and for this discourse. Triggered by the question why 'globalisation' came to be 'in the true' at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, I identified the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system as moments that opened the way for the idea/s 'globalisation' and the neologism *globalisation* to enter the stage. Given the perceived failure of established theoretical and conceptual tools to predict and grasp the course of events and the 'earthquake of international politics' (Risse 2003a) at the end of the 1980s, perceptions of the advent of a 'new world' came up. I argued that this idea, the idea that there was a 'new world' unfolding produced a vacuum in the political studies and IR scholarship that allowed the idea/s 'globalisation' and the neologism *globalisation* to become socially accepted. In this sense, I argued, the idea (that there was a) 'new world' is constitutive of the 'globalisation'-discourse; it made the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, 'possible' to begin with.

Taking the above together, brings out my concluding argument of this chapter and an answer to the questions: What is the 'globalisation'-discourse about? How is the object that is re-produced in the 'globalisation'-discourse best understood and labelled? Grounded in the above – and especially in the fifth above outlined facet that constitutes the 'globalisation'-discourse – I propose that the 'globalisation'-discourse is to be understood as a discourse that re-produces a web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, that is best labelled 'new world'. In other words, I conceptualise the use of the word *globalisation*, no matter in which context and in which sense it is used, as a moment in the re-production of a web of meanings that brings out an 'object', which I call 'new world'.

