Gökhan Telatar

The European Union's role in the maintenance of international peace and security in the 21ˢᵗ century

Abstract

Foreign policy and security have been significant issues for the European Union since its foundation, and the EU's role in the maintenance of international peace and security has been discussed intensively. This article explores the international role and approach of the EU in this area in the light of arguments in the relevant literature and official statements of the EU. It goes on to investigate whether the EU has succeeded in developing policies corresponding to its international role and approach in the 21st century within the framework of policies in regard to the Second Gulf War; the issue of Iran's nuclear activities; and the Arab Spring. Additionally, the effects of these three issues on the international role of the EU and on its approach towards the maintenance of international peace and security are also studied. In considering that the US has the leading role in all these three issues as the hegemonic actor, the article explores whether the EU could be an attraction centre in the international community as an alternative to the US via a self-determined international role.

Keywords: *European Union, civilian power, normative power, soft imperialism, Second Gulf War, Iran's nuclear activities, Arab Spring*

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has attracted the intention of international communities with strong economic integration since its foundation; it was structured to eliminate security concerns, indeed, because the idea underlying the foundation of the EU was to cease the historic conflicts between European countries, especially Germany and France. Economic integration was taken as the most effective way of bringing enemy states together on common ground to establish a secure and prosperous territory in western Europe. The EU has, therefore, long been focused on the establishment of peace and security in western Europe.

Upon the conclusion of the Cold War, the Union embraced a wider perspective towards the security issue. In the post-Cold War period, Europe has started to deal with instabilities in the Balkans, which adversely affect peace and security on the continent; and problems outside the continent which indirectly affect security in Europe. The development process of the EU since its foundation, and the policies it has followed, have formed its international role and its approach to the maintenance of international peace and security.

This article considers the EU's international role and its approach towards the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of this role. At

13

the outset, the type of international role adopted by the EU will be analysed. To that end, the concept of power in international relations will be addressed; then, arguments concerning the nature of the EU as an international power will be considered. Hence, an answer will be sought to the question of the type of international role which is assumed by the EU for itself. The international role of the EU shapes its approach towards maintaining international peace and security. Thereby, the type of approach adopted by the EU regarding the maintenance of international peace and security may better be understood.

In the rest of the study, the stance adopted by the EU towards the maintenance of international peace and security in the 21st century will be examined. With that in mind, the EU's approach will be analysed in the case of three major issues in the 2000s: the Second Gulf War (the 2003 Iraq War); the issue of Iran's nuclear activities; and the Arab Spring. All of these issues have been experienced in the middle east, but they have been the most significant issues which have kept the international community intensively busy regarding the protection of international peace and security in the 2000s.

This article seeks to reveal whether the EU has developed policies concerning these three issues which are appropriate to the international role it has assumed for itself. Furthermore, how the EU's policies concerning these three issues affect its approach towards the maintenance of international peace and security will also be investigated. That is, it will seek to explain the evolution of the EU's approach concerning the maintenance of international peace and security during the 2000s. Finally, the article will discuss the capability of the EU to uphold in our contemporary world the international role it has assumed.

International role of the EU

Rise of the EU as an international actor

Power, in its simplest meaning, is the capability of an actor to acquire desired results and to manipulate the behaviour of other actors to accomplish this. In order to acquire desired results, an actor is required to have certain resources. Therefore, power is usually taken as a synonym of having resources, such as military capacity, economic capacity, natural resources, population and extensive territory (Nye, 2003: 5).

The most essential criterion determining an actor's power is usually seen as its military force. Therefore, it may be seen in the definition of power that the realist point of view, which claims that material capacity is the single component which constitutes power, is influential. Liberals put the emphasis on material capacity as well but, for them, economic power is more important than military force. Some liberals, furthermore, think that material capacity is not the single component of power; on top of this, they consider elements such as culture, ideology and political-economic structure (Lebow, 2007: 379). In this regard, Joseph S. Nye suggests the concept of 'soft power' against 'hard power', which includes military and economic powers. According to Nye, soft power is the skill of achieving objectives without using hard power. Nye emphasises the importance of the use of state characteristics that are attractive to others (culture, political values and foreign policy); that is, the importance of manipulating the

desires of other actors through soft power and taking these actors on side (Nye, 2005: 14-16, 20).

The changes that have occurred in the definition of power, one of the most significant concepts in international relations, have introduced different approaches in the determination of the places of international actors within the international system. During the period until the 1970s, when the serious armaments race that existed between eastern and western blocs was at its peak, military force was the sole element on which the parties could have relied to sustain their existence. Therefore, the international roles of both the US and the USSR (the 'super powers') were determined by their military forces as the criterion. In the very same period, both the US and the USSR were 'military powers' in the international system. In spite of their weak military capacity, countries such as Japan and Germany were exhibiting a challenging level of economic capacity; thus, they were considered as 'economic powers'.

During the 1970s, when the Cold War started partially to slow down, when the hierarchical structure in the western bloc became loose and when some European countries started to express behaviours independent of the US, it was observed that the significance of economic capacity within international relations had increased. Respectively, the economic powers took on a more active role within the international system. In this environment, the EU (then still known as the European Communities) gained the attention of international society with its strong level of integration in the economic area. Various views existed that the EU was an active actor in the international system and that it could be an attraction centre within the international community, as an alternative to the US, a prominent country with its military power.

The remarkable rise of the EU, as an international actor, encouraged efforts to define the international role of the Union. Was its relatively weak military power a factor which decreased the EU's international role? Alternatively, did the EU represent the sample of countries which were internationally active players but without relying on military force? Was the determining criterion in defining the international role of the EU its effort to keep a distance between itself and military force and a force-oriented policy? Or what else were the values under which the Union was acting? The debate concerning the definition of the EU's international role was oriented around these questions.

Debate concerning the EU's international role

The focal point of the debate concerning the EU's international role has been the issue of what type of power is the EU. Concerning the EU's role in the international arena, there is almost a consensus about it, such that it is a rather different international power compared to the classic super powers which, primarily, rely on their military capacities. This characteristic of the EU has been considered to be a favourable situation by several authors, although others describe this as a source of its weakness as an international actor.

In this period, the prior concept in defining the role of the EU in the international arena, which gained in prominence, was 'civilian power', as suggested by François Duchêne. According to some authors, and led by Duchêne (Duchêne, 1973: 19-20; Maull, 1990: 92; Maull, 2005: 779-781; Moravcsik, 2003), civilian powers are long on

economic power and relatively short on armed force. Accordingly, civilian powers prefer non-military tools in their foreign policies. Civilian powers co-operate with other states in order to accomplish their international objectives. Additionally, civilian powers spend effort on the rule of law, protection of the weak and sustaining social justice at the international level. Civilian powers try to ensure that other states conform to these principles and common rules in their foreign policies. Thus, they try to transform international relations and civilise the relations among states.

These authors claim that, at an international conjuncture in which the significance of military power is reduced and which has, instead, handed the dominance over to civilian power, the EU can play an effective international role as a civilian power. Based on the Union's international-scale activities in the promotion of democracy and development through trade, foreign aid and peace-keeping, such authors argue that it is a 'quiet superpower', as an actor in the international arena with as much influence as the US.

The view arguing that the importance of military power has decreased has gained a reaction from several authors, especially Hedley Bull. This group claims that the EU cannot be an autonomous actor in international relations without a strong military capacity; and cannot act independently of the US (Bull, 1982: 149-170). Moreover, they correlate Europe's efforts to strive for a world surrounded by law, rules and diplomacy going beyond power with its weakness in terms of its military power. According to this point of view, Europeans, as a result of their military weakness, are searching for the transformation of an anarchical Hobbesian world, in which military power is determinant, into a peaceful Kantian world (Kagan, 2005: 11, 19, 50).

Similar to Duchêne and others, Hettne and Söderbaum argue that the EU, as a civilian power, deals with the external world on a different basis than a great power driven by geopolitical interests. According to Hettne and Söderbaum, the weakness of the EU in terms of military power is seen as the most important reason for the EU being a civilian power. The weakness of the EU leaves civilian power as the only available option for the Union. However, soft imperialism may be another option for the EU as the Union grows stronger. By soft imperialism, the authors imply soft power being applied in a hard way; that is, an asymmetric form of dialogue and the imposition of norms. The difference between civilian power and soft imperialism lies in loyalty to values and norms, and in relations with other actors whether conducted in a symmetric and dialogue-based way or an asymmetric and coercive one (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005: 536, 538-539, 549). Hettne and Söderbaum consequently argue that there has indeed been a redirection in the EU's policies from civilian power towards soft imperialism.

The debate concerning the international role of the EU has continued around whether the EU being a civilian power, and weak in terms of military force, was a favourable situation. Ian Manners argues that, in order to comprehend the international role of the EU, it is required to understand the power of ideas and norms instead of material capacities. The concept of 'normative power', suggested by Manners, gives an answer to the question of which principles may be taken as a foundation for the world of which the EU has been in search. According to Manners, EU member countries embrace the norms and principles on which the Union was established, but they spend

effort in diffusing these norms in the relations that they maintain with other international actors. Thus, it would be possible to create a long-term peaceful, secure and prosperous environment by ensuring that the structures causing international problems are changed (Manners, 2002: 235-258; Manners, 2004).

Among the different views concerning the international role of the EU which have been proposed by various authors since the 1970s, the 'civilian power' and 'normative power' concepts have come to the forefront and have been supported from within academic circles. Actually, defenders of both civilian power and of normative power think that the EU is a power for good by means of its discourses and actions (Larsen, 2014: 897). Moreover, both groups argue that, should international relations be transformed based on certain principles, a peaceful and prosperous world would arise. Nevertheless, the path of transformation in international relations, and the determining factors in this process, will be the main points of disagreement regarding both concepts. The essential point emphasised by the civilian power concept was that the EU uses civilian tools in foreign relations. At this point, elements such as a preference for non-military tools, especially economic ones, in foreign policy as well as multilateral action may be emphasised. On the other hand, the essential point in the emphasis of the normative power concept is the value-centred foreign policy of the EU and the accomplishment of normative objectives through this policy. At this point, norms and values are underlined, such as democracy, sustaining the freedom of individuals and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The statements of European officials and the official documents of the Union have been part of this debate within academic circles about the EU's international role. In other words, it is possible to conclude some results about the characteristics of the international role undertaken by the EU, in line with official discourses and relevant documents. For example, Javier Solana, former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, described the EU's global role as a credible force for good (Solana, 2005). According to Solana, the EU should move from building peace in Europe to being a peace-builder in the world (Solana, 2007). Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission, argued that the Union must aim to become a global civil power in the service of sustainable global development (Prodi, 2000). The EU's former enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn, declared that a European state must relinquish power politics and spheres of influence as their modes of operation inside the EU (Rehn, 2005). These quotes from Solana, Prodi and Rehn clearly indicate that the EU perceives itself as a civil power, because it was deliberately expressed in these statements that European states have abandoned force-oriented policies, with the result that the EU would be a be pioneer concerning the institutionalisation of peace in the world as an actor who had realised peace on its continent.

The EU Security Strategy, issued in 2003, emphasised the transformation of relations relying on power among European countries into a peaceful and co-operative form via the establishment of the EU. Moreover, this Strategy manifests shows that the EU is aiming to act in foreign relations by adopting a civilian power role, having placed great emphasis on international issues being resolved through various tools other than military power, in a multilateral way (*A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, 2003: 1, 9, 11-14).

According to all of these, it can be concluded that the EU acts as a global power and feels responsible for the maintenance of international peace and prosperity; and that it views the abandonment of power policy as a prerequisite in the accomplishment of this purpose.

On the other hand, there are data that support the claim that the EU views itself as a normative power. For example, Olli Rehn also declared that a state must respect European values and, most importantly, that it must be able to live up to them in order to be a member of the Union (Rehn, 2005). In the same Security Strategy issued by the EU in 2003, it was outlined that the existence of values such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights across Europe contributes towards the establishment of a secure and peaceful continent. Moreover, it was stated that generalising these values is the most effective way to strengthen international order (*A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, 2003: 1, 10). The Lisbon Reform Treaty, executed in 2009, also contains a number of expressions similar to this. According to Article 2 of the Lisbon Reform Treaty, the EU is founded on the value of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of people belonging to minorities. Article 3 goes on to state that, in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. These expressions, assuming that the EU embraces these values and seeks to extend them across the world, supports the claim that the EU is a normative power.

We can see that the disagreement experienced in academic circles concerning the issue of the definition of the EU's international role finds a reflection in the official documents and discourses of the Union. When we consider the official documents and statements of the senior officials of the EU, it is not possible to define the EU solely as a civilian power nor, similarly, by normative power concepts. The desire to refrain as far as possible from military power, and to resolve international issues by means of civilian tools and methods, can be understood from the EU's quotations and actions. Several steps taken recently by the EU to develop its military capabilities have been interpreted by some authors as a weakening of its civilian power characteristic, but it is not possible to agree with this claim because of the intention of the EU to use its military capabilities legitimately to sustain peace and prevent conflict. Furthermore, the foundation of the EU on values such as democracy, human rights, justice and the rule of law, outlining the adoption of these values as a prerequisite to gain admittance to EU membership, and following a policy in its foreign relations which encourages the adoption of these values, deliberately exposes the normative characteristic of the Union. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the EU assumes an international role for itself that consists of both civilian power and normative power characteristics.

The EU's role in 21st century to maintain international peace and security

One of the most essential priorities of the EU as a global actor is the maintenance of international peace and security. The desire to deal with this issue can be observed clearly in the official documents of the EU because the Union is aware that the protection of peace and prosperity on the European continent in a globalising world can only be possible by sustaining peace and stability at international level (*A Secure Eu-*

rope in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 2003: 1, 6-7). It can be concluded that an EU that has assumed an international role containing civilian and normative power characteristics has an approach that prioritises diplomacy and the rule of law, and that it adopts soft power tools regarding the protection of international peace and security.

It can be deduced from official statements and documents that the EU prefers options excluding military power for the resolution of issues, preferring especially diplomacy (*A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* 2003: 6-7). In case military power is required, the Union tries to carry out operations according to international law, and multilaterally. The Union argues that all states are required to act according to international law in regard to the principle of the rule of law; and believes that the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter (*A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, 2003: 9-11; Council of the European Union, 2004: 23; Council of the European Union, 2007: 27). The EU is of the opinion that embracing values such as democracy and human rights would prevent conflicts around the world and make possible a sustainable peace (*A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, 2003: 10; Prodi, 2000). Thus, by prioritising the application of civilian foreign policy tools, acting in the light of the adoption of liberal values and aiming at the maintenance of the international order based on multilateralism, the EU is on a journey towards being an attraction point as an alternative to the US, a hegemonic actor in the international order which largely applies its hard power. The EU believes that international peace and security can be sustained as long as other countries adopt this policy approach.

The EU, which has placed great emphasis on economic integration since its foundation, has accelerated integration within the framework of its foreign and security policies after the extinction of the Cold War. In the Maastricht Treaty, that took effect in 1993, one of the three pillars on which the EU was founded was a joint foreign and security policy. Additionally, the Amsterdam Treaty, that had taken effect in 1999, saw the establishment of the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, that would act as the ministry of foreign affairs of the EU. Thereby, member countries of the EU were determined to make the Union a stronger international actor and allow it to play a more effective role in the international arena by taking significant steps in the area of foreign policy and security, which had been neglected over a long period. Therefore, this suggests an investigation of whether the EU is able to play an effective role concerning the maintenance of international peace and security in the 21st century.

In the following section of this article, the policies of the EU concerning the Second Gulf War (the 2003 war in Iraq), the issue of Iran's nuclear activities and the Arab Spring, which have predominantly occupied the agenda of international society in the 2000s, will be investigated. It will investigate whether an EU that has assumed an international role containing, as an integral part, civilian and normative power characteristics, is acting according to this role concerning the maintenance of international peace and security in the 21st century by considering its policies concerning these three issues. An investigation of its policies in these three areas will be helpful in comprehending the evolution of the EU's approach toward the protection of international peace

and security during the 2000s. Furthermore, since the US had the leading role in all three issues, it will explore whether it would be possible for the EU to be an attraction point in the international community, as an alternative to the US, through the international role that it has assumed for itself.

The EU's role in the Second Gulf War

The conclusion of the Cold War and the removal of the communist threat to the western world did not, in contrast to what was expected, create a more peaceful world. A number of new threats, such as rogue states, failed states, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and illegal immigration, which threaten international peace and security, have come to prominence. The well-known 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 revealed how destructive these threats toward the western world could be. The global campaign initiated by the US against global terrorist organisations and countries that support these organisations after the 9/11 attacks emerged at a very different international conjuncture. The EU was trying to be more effective in its foreign and security policies and needed to develop policies which conformed to this state of affairs. Accordingly, the EU took sides with the US in its war against terrorism, and supported the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Union took a number of measures in regard to the fight against terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2001).

That the US targeted several countries (e.g. Iraq, Iran and North Korea), based on an allegation that they were supporters of global terrorism and aspiring to possess WMDs, within the scope of the war on terrorism, putting the military force option on its agenda, exposed the EU to confront a very difficult decision. Therefore, the first major foreign policy test faced by the EU in the 21st century was the Second Gulf War, initiated by the US on 20 March 2003. However, the EU did not institutionally support this war, because there was no UN Security Council resolution ordering the use of military force against Iraq. The Union argued that the Iraq issue should be resolved under the leadership of the UN, according to the resolutions of the Security Council (Council of the European Union, 2003b). By avoiding supporting the war, the EU adopted a particular attitude towards the resolution of the Iraq issue through civilian means and appropriate methods conforming to international law instead of military power. This attitude of the Union conforms with an international role that contained civilian and normative power characteristics.

However, the policies of some member countries concerning the Second Gulf War were not in harmony with the anti-war stance of the Union. The determined approach of the US for a military campaign, compelling countries to take part in it, led to some EU member countries supporting this war. Therefore, a serious divergence arose among member countries: the leadership of France and Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg and Sweden opposed the war; while the leadership of the UK, Denmark, Italy, Holland, Portugal and Spain were together with the US in this war (Roter and Sabic, 2004: 525-526). The support presented by some European countries toward the Iraqi War, without taking diplomatic options, suggests that hard power may yet be preferred to diplomacy, which is not an appropriate attitude in relation to the civilian character of the EU. Furthermore, the EU may have adopted the principle of the rule of law, but it was not explicitly an opponent to a war that was against interna-

tional law, since it was not in pursuit of a UN Security Council resolution, indicating that the Union had contradicted its own normative power characteristic.

During the Iraq War, similar to the claims proposed by Hedley Bull and underlined on previous pages, the lack of a capability to act independently of the member countries that compose it and to follow a consistent policy institutionally put the Union, as an international actor, into a controversial position. Therefore, the contradictory stance of the EU during the Iraq crisis adversely affected its efforts to create a common foreign policy and to pursue the international role, which includes civilian and normative power characteristics, that it had adopted. The approach of the EU, prioritising diplomacy and the rule of law, and adopting soft power tools in the protection of international peace and security, was severely wounded during the Iraq crisis.

The stance in opposition of France and Germany, the most powerful countries in the Union and bold supporters of integration against the war, which were of the opinion that the crisis should be resolved under the UN umbrella, together with the majority of member countries not supporting the Iraq War, indicates that the civilian and normative characteristics of the EU were still strong. Nevertheless, the support for the War exhibited by the majority of prospective member countries, whose membership would be finalised in 2004 and 2007, illustrated an unfavourable picture for a future international role for the EU which included civilian and normative power characteristics. This is because a pro-war attitude here highlighted that member countries adopting soft power tools which prioritised diplomacy and the principle of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security would only be a minor part of the Union.

The EU's role during the issue of Iran's nuclear activities

The EU made efforts to restore its reputation as an international actor, tarnished during the Second Gulf War in 2003, and in this regard, took initiatives to deepen integration in foreign and security policy areas. Spending efforts on the European Constitution and the Lisbon Reform Treaty, the Union sought to increase its strength.

Nevertheless, in this period, when the EU started to play a more ambitious role in the international arena, new threats against international peace and security have emerged. One of the most significant threats was the issue of Iran's nuclear activities.

On 14 August 14 2002, upon the discovery of Iran's secret nuclear activities, a new dimension was added to the 'Iran Issue' that had existed since the Islamist Revolution in 1979. The EU expressed officially, in the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, approved in December 2003, that it was important for the Union to prevent the proliferation of WMDs (Council of the European Union, 2003a). The Union worried over the allegations of Iran's secret nuclear activities being aimed at the development of nuclear weapons.

France and Germany, the sharpest opponents of the Iraqi war, did not wish the scenario in Iraq to be repeated, and took steps to resolve the issue by diplomatic means, and according to international law. Gaining the company of the UK, France and Germany (the EU-3) took a diplomatic initiative in October 2003 seeking a resolution (Dryburgh, 2008: 259). After this date, regular meetings were held between the EU-3 and Iran (Kibaroğlu, 2006: 82). In the Strategy mentioned above, it was argued that diplomacy and international law should be followed to prevent the proliferation of

WMDs. The efforts led by these three prominent members revealed the desire of the EU to resolve the issue of Iran's nuclear activities according to diplomatic methods and supported by this Strategy. Thus, the EU was taking steps appropriate to an approach which prioritised diplomacy and the rule of law, and adopting soft power tools regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. Additionally, taking such steps would restore the EU's civilian and normative power reputation which had been tarnished during the Iraq crisis.

Upon Iran's resumption of uranium enrichment activities in August 2005, which had been suspended in November 2004, endangering diplomatic negotiations, the EU started to support the adoption of compulsory measures against Tehran (Meier, 2013: 7-8). The issue was put on the agenda of the UN Security Council in 2006, with the help of the EU, and the Council adopted resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803, on different dates, concerning Iran's nuclear programme. The EU was against sanctions and supporting a resolution by diplomatic means, but the Union came into line with the stance adopted by the US as a result of Iran's attitude which did not appear to show a willingness for resolution. However, in defending the implementation of sanctions through the decisions of the UN Security Council, the Union maintained its desire to resolve the issue within international law.

From 2007, there were signs which indicated that the EU had started to deviate from the line of resolving this issue within diplomacy and international law. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, elected in May 2007, argued that more severe sanctions, even unilateral ones, should be declared by the EU on top of the resolutions of the Security Council (Meier, 2013: 9). Moreover, together with the UK, Sarkozy objected to the intention of the Obama administration, that had come to power in January 2009, to resume talks with Iran with no preconditions (MacAskill, 2009; Erdbrink, 2009; Meier, 2013: 11-12). Hence, the US was adopting diplomacy as a priority, at a time when the EU was starting to deviate from diplomacy. This situation was a development that reversed the perception that the EU was an international actor that prioritised soft power tools in the resolution of international issues, in contrast to Washington. In adopting a hard-line and unilateral foreign policy, the actions of France, which had exhibited the toughest opposition, together with Germany, against the US's policies relying on hard power after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, saw a bottleneck develop in the EU's efforts to restore an international role on the basis of civilian and normative power characteristics.

The Obama administration adopted the option of more severe sanctions after it realised its inability to resolve the issue through diplomatic talks with Iran, and France and the UK found common ground together with the US. Following UN Security Council Resolution 1929 of 9 June 2010, which contains quite severe sanctions (United Nations, 2010), the EU additionally took the decision to include fresh sanctions (European Union Delegation to the United Nations, 2010). Moreover, upon the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency in November 2011 that Iran's nuclear activities had been in search of the development of nuclear weapons (*New York Times*, 2012), the EU adopted a resolution prohibiting the import of oil from Iran after June 2012, on the suggestion of the French administration (Council of the European Union, 2012). Then, in addition to the activities of some member countries, the EU as an organisation initiated unilateral sanctions against Iran.

When we consider that the Obama administration has taken the option of military force against Iran off the agenda, it is possible to state that there is no longer any difference between the EU and US concerning the issue of Iran's nuclear activities. This situation means that the EU has taken a step back concerning its orientation towards the resolution of issues concerning international peace and security within the UN umbrella. Thus, the EU has deviated gradually from an approach prioritising diplomacy and the rule of law, and the adoption of soft power tools, regarding the maintenance of international peace and security.

Subsequent to a number of talks held in the meantime, consensus was reached in Geneva on 24 November 2013. According to the agreement that was executed, Iran was required to limit its uranium enrichment activities; in exchange for this, sanctions on the country would be loosened (*Radikal*, 2013). This agreement remains in effect. Moreover, the parties agreed to carry out negotiations in order permanently to resolve the issue (*New York Times*, 2014). It is possible to consider this achievement as a successful diplomacy on the part of the EU since the Union managed to sustain negotiations on behalf of the western world with the Tehran administration in spite of all the troubles experienced in this process since 2003.

Ultimately, in a period when the US threatened Iran with the use of military power, the EU's diplomatic initiative through the EU-3, and its persistent efforts not to allow the Tehran administration to leave the negotiation table, can be viewed as representing the strong desire of the Union to resolve the issue. Furthermore, applying sanctions upon the failure of talks, and after following diplomatic negotiations as the primary means of resolution, and preferring the execution of sanctions within the framework of UN Security Council decisions, indicated that the EU was seeking to interpret an international role that encompassed civilian and normative power characteristics. Nevertheless, that France changed its attitude, starting to follow unilateral policies relying on hard power, after 2007, in the face of earlier attempts alongside Germany to keep the EU on a civilian and normative foreign policy track, and the trend towards a unilateral organisational attitude within the EU after 2010, demonstrated that the capacity of the Union to sustain its assumed role had weakened. This situation made the possibility of the EU emerging as an attraction centre in the international community, as an alternative to the US's following a hard-line foreign policy, more difficult because the EU too had started to follow a foreign policy based on hard power.

The EU's role in the Arab Spring

The EU found itself, in the circumstances of the last days of 2010, after the uprisings in many Arab communities in support of the demand for greater democracy, in a situation in which the Union's civilian and normative characteristics were sorely tested. The Arab Spring had the potential adversely to affect the international role of the EU since it emerged in a period in which the Union was starting to deviate from its civilian and normative foreign policy line. Moreover, the EU did not have a good reputation in terms of supporting the democratisation of the middle east. After the mid-1990s, the EU had aimed to transform the middle east through instruments such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy, within the framework of values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. However, the

policies of the Union were oriented towards maintaining the *status quo* on the grounds of its prioritising of security matters, such as illegal immigration, religious radicalism and the fight against terrorism in practice (Dandashly, 2015: 38, 41; Torun, 2012: 81-83, 87). On the other hand, the Arab Spring offered the EU the opportunity to restore the unfavourable image resulting from its former policies among domestic societies by developing policies which were more in line with the requests of local communities. Additionally, the Arab Spring exposed the opportunity for the EU to rejuvenate its international role on the basis of civilian and normative power characteristics by contributing to the democratic transformation of the Arab world.

The EU took several initiatives that would contribute to the democratic transformation of the region as a means of taking advantage of these opportunities. In this regard, the Union issued two documents entitled *Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean* in March 2011; and *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood* in May 2011. Through these documents, the EU reviewed the European Neighbourhood Policy, which had been maintained since 2004, structuring its approach into a new framework. The Union loudly expressed its intention to support the Arab world in building deep democracy. Furthermore, the Union developed preconditions for its aid. That is, the EU stated that the more reform was passed, the greater the level of aid to a country (European Commission and HR, 2011a; European Commission and HR, 2011b). In order to advance these intentions, the EU increased its financial aid for Arab countries, especially democracy aid. For instance, the EU Commission suggested a doubling of the budget reserved for the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for the 2014-2020 period (Noutcheva, 2015: 28).

Thus, the EU acted like a normative power by taking steps to ensure that values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law were adopted by the Arab world, where these values are rather neglected.

The EU took some initiatives to prevent these uprisings from transforming into armed clashes and to fulfil communities' democratic needs. The EU delayed developing policy for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, but it followed a rather active policy in the Libyan insurgence. The Union condemned the precautions taken by the Muammar Gaddafi regime to suppress the uprising by means of harsh methods; and took the decision to apply economic and military sanctions against the Gaddafi regime. Furthermore, they sent humanitarian aid to Libya and decided to establish 'EUFOR Libya' that would assist the UN's humanitarian aid by military operations (Koenig, 2011: 3-5).

In Syria, the EU has not played a role as active as in the Libya case, but it did make efforts to stop the Bashar al-Assad regime committing violence against its opponents. In order to put pressure on the al-Assad regime, and to prevent the insurgency from becoming a civil war, the decision was taken to impose severe sanctions on the al-Assad regime (Seeberg, 2014: 6). A diplomatic process to stop the insurgency, that has been continuing for four years, was also supported. The EU sent humanitarian aid to Syrians worth more than €3bn; and has become the biggest international donor in the Syrian crisis (European Commission, 2015).

The EU has acted like a civilian power by exhibiting in several ways its disapproval of the violent reactions of anti-democratic regimes against democratic protests; taking

the initiative to ensure that protests are carried on in a peaceful way; and seeking co-operation with all international actors, especially the UN Security Council.

However, there are arguments that the EU cannot be considered successful in acting according to its assumed international role, based on civilian and normative power characteristics, during the Arab Spring. The basic reason on which such arguments rely is that the EU has not been able to take efficient, decisive and consistent steps to support the democratic transformation of the Arab world. The EU has begun to worry that an unstable and chaotic environment could arise upon the overthrow of current regimes that maintained stability, even though they were anti-democratic (Pace, 2014: 981; Dandashly, 2015: 52). For instance, the EU took the decision to send more aid to those Arab countries that made democratic reforms, but it did not anticipate taking any sanctions on those countries that did not embark on reform. Thus, this decision was not sufficient to persuade anti-democratic regimes to review their actions and change (Noutcheva, 2015: 32). Furthermore, the EU avoided supporting the protesters in Tunisia and Egypt until their regimes were overthrown (Balfour, 2011: 1). After the military coup on 3 July 2013 against Mohamed Morsi, who came to power through elections after Hosni Mubarak's overthrow, the EU avoided condemning the military intervention, in a way that was deliberately similar to the US. The Union contented itself with making a call to establish a democratic order as soon as possible (NDTV, 2013).

It can be seen that the EU was determined to push the Arab world into a transformation process within the framework of values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, but the Union's approach to the protests which could lead to such a transformation, taken from the angle of the security issue, raised doubts about the normative characteristics of the Union.

During the Arab Spring, it is also possible to observe that some behaviours of the EU or its member countries were not appropriate to the adoption of a civilian power characteristic. It was very interesting that France, the strongest supporter of a foreign policy approach for the EU that included civilian and normative characteristics, was notably willing to see military intervention in Libya (Mikail, 2011: 1). In company with the UK, France was one of the more prominent supporters of the idea of arming the Syrian opponents to the al-Assad regime during the civil war in order to weaken the al-Assad regime and compel it towards negation (Trombetta, 2014: 33-34). From this point, it is possible to see that France, that had drawn attention with its support for a hard power stance after the Sarkozy administration came to power in 2007, was adopting a stance preferring the effective usage of military power in the resolution of international issues.

Germany, the other leading member of the EU, did not support military intervention in Libya, abstaining during the voting at the UN Security Council. Moreover, Germany argued that arming the Syrian opponents would further intensify the clashes going on in Syria; accordingly, this action would be contrary to the EU's values (Trombetta, 2014: 34). Thus, Germany kept a distance from the option of using military power in the resolution of issues, supporting the idea of giving more chance to other options in the place of military intervention. Germany expected the EU to follow a foreign policy in line with a civilian and normative stance, whereas France was of the opinion that

military tools were required to be used more efficiently if the Union was to become a global power.

The approach of France in its foreign policy, putting the emphasis on hard power, has damaged the EU's civilian power characteristic, but it has to be said that the Union has itself exhibited some actions which do not fit this characteristic. The EU did not react, in line with its civilian power role, towards the violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations in Bahrain and to Saudi Arabia's military intervention in Bahrain under the Gulf Co-operation Council (Küçükkeleş, 2013: 14). Furthermore, Germany, the most prominent supporter of the EU in regard to maintaining its civilian power characteristic, sold tanks to Saudi Arabia to the value of €1.5bn within a short time of these incidents (Kundnani, 2011). These were not appropriate actions within an approach which prioritised diplomacy and the rule of law, nor the adoption of soft power tools concerning the maintenance of international peace and security.

It is scarcely possible to say that the EU, which has not been successful at playing an international role that includes civilian and normative power characteristics, has followed a policy on the uprisings of the Arab Spring that could be expected from an international actor. The EU has participated in the ongoing efforts to manage the Arab uprising process peacefully. However, it has not been sufficiently effective in its contributions to these efforts. The most essential reason for this was that the foreign policies of individual member countries have come to the forefront more than has the foreign policy of the Union as an organisation. For instance, contradictions between member countries concerning the recognition of Libyan opponents, the arming of rebels, military intervention in Libya and opening borders to Libyan immigrants have come to fore much more notably than the steps taken by the EU (Küçükkeleş, 2013: 23). Additionally, upon the chemical assault in Syria on 21 August 2013, the EU acknowledged the necessity of military action against the al-Assad regime, but it expected this step from other actors. Upon the US taking a decision for military intervention, the EU was not able to develop an attitude since its member countries were in conflict about this step (Larive, 2013). This disparity among member countries made it difficult for the EU to follow an active policy as a global actor. This situation created the perception that the EU was away from being a global actor contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Considering the EU's policies toward the Arab Spring, the Union has taken significant initiatives, but it may be observed that the EU has not been able to exhibit a consistent and determined organisational stance in general; however, the policies of France, Germany and the UK have left a lasting impression on the memories of member countries. This has led once more to questions over the ability of the EU to sustain international peace and security and over the Union's role as a global actor. Most importantly, the EU has been determined to transform the middle east from the mid-90s within the framework of values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, but it has not succeeded in determining policies in line with these values during the uprisings that may facilitate such a transformation. That is, an EU that has, in the past, prioritised security concerns within its policies designated for the region, has not been able to change this approach, which has tarnished its civilian and normative image. It

is even possible to say that the policies it has adopted during the Arab uprisings have weakened this image still further.

Hence, in this process, the world is of the view that the EU did not clearly express its stance against dictators; that member countries even continued to sell arms to some oppressive regimes; that some attitudes of France, a primary member of the Union, were to prioritise a hard power response; and that Germany and France were making efforts to align the EU in different foreign policy directions.

Conclusion

The EU is a unique example of the successful supranational integration of countries that had been fighting with each other over a long period. Therefore, there is a range of assessments about the EU, with the debate regarding the definition of the EU's international role clearly demonstrating this. There is no consensus in the literature about the nature of the EU's international role. However, when we evaluate the development processes of the EU, its policies concerning international issues and its official documents and quotes since its foundation, it is possible to conclude that the Union has assumed an international role for itself that includes both civilian and normative power characteristics. Furthermore, it is also possible to conclude that the EU has an approach which has prioritised diplomacy and the rule of law, and the adoption of soft power tools concerning the maintenance of international peace and security, on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.

This article has investigated whether the EU has developed policies appropriate to this international role and style of approach in the 2000s, based on the framework of the cases of the Second Gulf War, the issue of Iran's nuclear activities and the Arab Spring. These three issues have concerned the security both of Europe and the whole world in the 2000s. On the one hand, these issues have given the opportunity to the EU to be an effective global actor in the maintenance of international peace and security. On the other hand, these issues have tested the Union's adoption of civilian and normative characteristics. The result has been that the EU has become closely concerned with these three issues.

Among them, that concerning Iran's nuclear activities is the one in which the EU has followed the most active policy and in which it has gained the most successful results, with the acquisition of a partial success concerning the opening up of Iran's nuclear activities to international inspection. The Second Gulf War in 2003 was the issue on which EU policies experienced the most remarkable failure, since the EU was not able to prevent war and where it failed to develop an explicit policy as a Union in contrast to the US decision to go to war with Iraq. In terms of the policies of the EU on the Arab Spring, there a partial success was gained. The Union took an active role in the overthrow of the anti-democratic Gaddafi regime and in ceasing the armed clashes in Libya. However, the Union's role in the termination of the civil war in Syria lagged behind that of the US and Russia. Ultimately, it can be concluded that the EU has had trouble in following an effective policy on these three issues, as is required by its global role.

The really difficult point for the EU has been in developing policies for itself which are appropriate to an international role that encompasses civilian and normative power

characteristics. Considering its policies on these three issues, it can be observed that the EU has had a tendency to deviate from this role. The Union's civilian and normative reputation was tarnished during the Second Gulf War, but there were two strong member countries, in France and Germany, which viewed the EU as a power which had such a characteristic, and other countries supported them. That France adopted a unilateral foreign policy relying on hard power after 2007 (a trend which continued in François Hollande's presidency) suggests that these two countries now have a different vision for the EU. In addition to the change in France's stance, the foreign policy trends followed by member countries who joined the Union after 2004 are not promising as regards their address to the civilian and normative identity of the Union. Therefore, the civilian and normative actor reputation of the Union, which was shaken during the Second Gulf War, has been tarnished still further as a result of the policies on the issue of Iran's nuclear activities and the Arab Spring which ensued in the following years.

Therefore, it is possible to argue that the foreign policy of the EU has seen a redirection from a civilian and normative line toward a soft imperialism, as Hettne and Söderbaum have claimed. In some circumstances, either member countries or the EU as an organisation have acted in a way which has put diplomacy into the background, viewing military power as an effective foreign policy tool and disregarding the UN as a place for the basic resolution of international issues. That is, the EU has applied its soft power in a hard way, as Hettne and Söderbaum pointed out in their definition of the concept of soft imperialism. Furthermore, there is some evidence that either the Union or its member countries has acted in a way which has hesitated to generalise democratic values across the world and has failed to react in a proper way against human rights violations. Ultimately, and following Hettne and Söderbaum, the EU has not acted in a manner which is adequately loyal to its values and norms.

All these points support the view that the EU has deviated from being an actor with a civilian and normative character and has been in a trend towards soft imperialism. The result, owing to the Obama administration following a more moderate foreign policy compared to its predecessor, is that, today, the proportion of the international community that thinks the EU is a centre of attraction as an alternative to the US has decreased.

References

A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003) Brussels: 12 December.

Balfour, Rosa (2011) *The Arab Spring, the changing Mediterranean and the EU: Tools as a substitute for strategy?* European Policy Centre Policy Brief, available at: http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=3&pub_id=1311 [last accessed: 15 November 2013].

Berenskoetter, Felix (2011) 'Caught between Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germany's abstention on Libya' *LSE Ideas Today* 8.

Bull, Hedley (1982) 'Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21(2): 149-170.

Council of the European Union (2001) *Presidency Conclusions* European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December, No: SN 300/1/01 REV 1.

Council of the European Union (2003a) *EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction* 10 December, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/august/tradoc_118532.en03.pdf [last accessed: 17 November 2013].

Council of the European Union (2003b) *Extraordinary European Council* Brussels, 17 February, No: 6466/03.

Council of the European Union (2004) *Presidency Conclusions* European Council Meeting in Brussels, 12 and 13 December, Brussels: 5 February, No: 5381/04.

Council of the European Union (2007) *Presidency Conclusions* European Council Meeting in Brussels, 14 December, No: 16616/07.

Council of the European Union (2012) 'Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 January 2012' *Official Journal of European Union* 24 January, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:019:0022:0030:EN:PDF [last accessed: 17 November 2013].

Dandashly, Assem (2015) 'The EU response to regime change in the wake of the Arab revolt: differential implementation' *Journal of European Integration* 37(1): 37-56.

Dryburgh, Lynne (2008) 'The EU as a global actor? EU policy towards Iran' *European Security* 17(2-3): 253-271.

Duchêne, François (1973) 'The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence' in Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Heger (Eds.) *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community* London: Macmillan, pp. 1-21.

Erdbrink, Thomas (2009) 'Ahmedinejad says Iran is ready for talks with United States' *Washington Post* February 11.

European Commission (2015) *Humanitarian aid and civil protection: Syria crisis* ECHO Factsheet, January, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf [last accessed: 1 February 2015].

European Commission and HR (2011a) *A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean* Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Brussels, 8 March.

European Commission and HR (2011b) *A new response to a changing neighbourhood: a review of European neighbourhood policy* Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, Brussels, 25 May.

European Union Delegation to the United Nations (2010) *The EU approves new sanctions against Iran* 17 June, available at: http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_9871_en.htm [last accessed: 17 November 2013].

Hettne, Björn and Fredrik Söderbaum (2005) 'Civilian power or soft ımperialism? the EU as a global actor and the role of interregionalism' *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10(4): 535-552.

Kagan, Robert (2005) *Cennet ve güç: yeni dünya düzeninde Amerika ve Avrupa* translated by Selim Yeniçeri, Istanbul: Koridor Yayıncılık.

Kibaroğlu, Mustafa (2006) 'İran'ın nükleer güç olma iddiası ve Batı'nın tutumu: Şah'a destek, mollalara yasak' *Akademik Ortadoğu* 1(1): 76-111.

Koenig, Nicole (2011) *The EU and the Libyan crisis: in quest of coherence?* IAI Working Papers 1119 (July), available at:

http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1119.pdf [last accessed: 15 November 2013].

Kundnani, Hans (2011) 'Germany's contribution to Arab Spring: arms sales' *The Guardian* 9 July, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jul/09/germany-arms-sale-saudi-arabia [last accessed: 14 November 2013].

Küçükkeleş, Müjge (2013) 'AB'nin Ortadoğu politikası ve Arap baharına bakışı' *SETA Analiz* 63 (Ocak).

Larive, Maksime H.A. (2013) *The EU and Syria – time to play behind closed doors* Mare Nostrum Analysis, September, available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/44513/1/larive-Mare_Nostrum.pdf [last accessed: 17 January 2015].

Larsen, Henrik (2014) 'The EU as a normative power and the research on external perceptions: the missing link' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(4): 896-910.

Lebow, Richard Ned (2007) *Coercion, Cooperation and Ethics in International Relations* London and New York: Routledge.

MacAskill, Ewen (2009) 'Obama to drop uranium precondition for Iran nuclear talks' *The Guardian* 14 April, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/14/obama-iran-nuclear-talks-uranium-precondition [last accessed: 17 November 2013].

Manners, Ian (2002) 'Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2): 235-258.

Manners, Ian (2004) 'Normative power Europe reconsidered' in *From Civilian to Military Power: The European Union at a Crossroads?* CIDEL Workshop, Oslo, 22-23 October 2004.

Maull, Hanns W (1990) 'Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers' *Foreign Affairs* 69(5): 91-106.

Maull, Hanns W (2005) 'Europe and the new balance of global order' *International Affairs* 81(4): 775-799.

Meier, Oliver (2013) *European efforts to solve the conflict over Iran's nuclear programme: how has the European Union performed?* EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Non-Proliferation Papers 27.

Mikail, Barah (2011) *France and the Arab Spring: an opportunistic quest for influence* FRIDE Working Paper 110, available at: http://www.fride.org/download/wp110_france_and_arab_spring.pdf [last accessed: 14 November 2013].

Moravcsik, Andrew (2003) 'How Europe can win without an army' *Financial Times* 2 April.

NDTV (2013) *Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood feels 'coup' against Mohamed Morsi will fuel hatred towards west* July 7, available at: http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/egypt-s-mulsim-brotherhood-feels-coup-against-mohamed-morsi-will-fuel-hatred-towards-west-388930 [last accessed: 17 October 2014].

New York Times (2012) 'Iran's nuclear program (nuclear talks, 2012)' April 9, available at:

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html [last accessed: 17 November 2013].

New York Times (2014) 'Timeline on Iran's nuclear program' November 20, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-timeline.html?_r=0#/#time243_10532 [last accessed: 19 January 2015].

Noutcheva, Gergana (2015) 'Institutional governance of European neighbourhood policy in the wake of the Arab Spring' *Journal of European Integration* 37(1): 19-36.

Nye, Joseph S (2003) *Amerikan gücünün paradoksu* translated by Gürol Koca, Istanbul: Literatür Yayıncılık.

Nye, Joseph S (2005) *Yumuşak güç: dünya siyasetinde başarının yolu* translated by Rayhan İnan Aydın, Ankara: Elips Kitap.

Pace, Michelle (2014) 'The EU's interpretation of the "Arab uprisings": understanding the different visions about democratic change in EU-MENA relations' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(5): 969-984.

Prodi, Romano (2000) *2000-2005: Shaping the new Europe* Strasbourg: European Parliament, 15 February.

Radikal (2013) 'İran'la tarihi anlaşma' 25 Kasım, available at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/dunya/iranla_tarihi_anlasma-1162663 [last accessed: 27 October 2014].

Rehn, Olli (2005) 'Values define Europe, not borders' *Financial Times* 4 January, available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/26bde788-5df5-11d9-ac01-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3DqUPeovM [last accessed: 27 October 2914].

Roter, Petra and Zlatko Sabic (2004) ''New' and 'old' Europe in the context of the Iraq war and its implications for European security' *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 5(3): 517-542.

Seeberg, Peter (2014) 'The EU and the Syrian crisis: the use of sanctions and the regime's strategy for survival' *Mediterranean Politics* DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2014.896314, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2014.896314#.VORxHyzdWYI [last accessed: 27 October 2014].

Solana, Javier (2005) *Shaping an effective EU foreign policy* Brussels: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 24 January, available at: http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_4251_fr.htm [last accessed: 27 October 2014].

Solana, Javier (2007) 'Countering globalization's dark side' *Europe's World* 7 (Autumn) available at: http://www.europesworld.org.

'Treaty of Lisbon' (2007) *Official Journal of the European Union* 50(17), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN [last accessed: 17 November 2013].

Torun, Zerrin (2012) 'The European Union and change in the Middle East and North Africa: is the EU closing its theory-practice gap?' *Ortadoğu Etüdleri* 4(1): 79-97.

Trombetta, Lorenzo (2014) 'The EU and the Syrian crisis as viewed from the Middle East' *International Spectator* 49(3): 27-39.

United Nations (2010) Resolution 1929, adopted by the Security Council on 9 June, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/396/79/PDF/N1039679.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed: 17 November 2013].