

The venerable pair (Vickery on the sciences, Foskett on the social sciences) are now at long last a trio, by virtue of the addition of Langridge on the humanities. Together they comprise a survey not excelled. The new work, like its siblings, will be of great use to theorists, practitioners, and (advanced) students.

The first chapter, "The Universe of Knowledge and Bibliographic Classification", tries to see the universe of knowledge as a whole, and, within it, the humanities. But it shows that this universe is not a unity: what might do for the sciences (natural and social) will not necessarily do for the humanities. There is a radical discontinuity between disciplines or at least between disciplinary domains. Langridge states in the Preface that "the first chapter is the most important in the book"; I would not agree to this, but I might that ch. 1–3 together are, for in ch. 2 and 3 Langridge develops his idea of the different-ness of the humanities. In ch. 2, "The Theory of Bibliographic Classification" he discusses such topics as logical division, cross-classification, categories, relationships, and citation order, all from the point of view of the differences in their application or avoidance that must obtain in the humanities. In ch. 3, "Defining the Humanities", the truly central attempt is at last in full view: definition, delimitation. And definition is expected not merely to separate the humanities from the sciences, but to allow a clear view of the inner structure of the domain itself and of its constituent disciplines. One of the best and most convincing inner distinctions is that between the creative, vision-forming disciplines (art and religion) and the scholarly, explicative ones (history and philosophy). (History is defended against the bid to absorb it into the social sciences by the argument that these latter primarily concern generalizations about behavior, whereas the humanities primarily concern individuals of various sorts: the concrete as against the abstract.)

The next three chapters deal with more narrowly bibliothecal concerns in "History and Biography", "Philosophy, Religion and the Occult", and "Arts, Crafts and Entertainments", comparing their treatment in the various widely-used general classification schemes, BC, CC, DC, LC, and UDC. That CC does not invariably get all praise and no criticism is a tribute to the perspicacity and open-mindedness of the author, given his enthusiasm for it. Then, not really central to the apparent predilections of the author, come ch. 7 and 8, "The Construction of Special Classification Schemes in the Humanities" and "Indexing in the Humanities"—that is, they seem less than fully part of the whole, esp. the last (one has by that point entirely forgotten the mention of 'indexing' in the title of the book)—the first of which contains the best description I've ever encountered of how to go about such a construction: not mere *rules* for it but a true-to-life illustration of the process, with problems and pitfalls not scant.

Though the central part of the book is a survey of what is done, Langridge by no means confines himself to pure reportage: he makes suggestions for improvement, criticizes shortcomings, etc. But while I find much

of value, I am in disagreement with several points minor and major. To take some minor ones first:

- Though Langridge points out the temporal discontinuity that plagues the attempt at a general classification (3, 34), and though he usually draws upon a wide range of philosophical as well as bibliothecal authorities, he here ignores Foucault's very valuable investigations.
- Though he implies that there is something too pro-scientific about logical division to make its application to the humanities healthy (13), he himself uses it throughout.
- Though he argues (against a proposal of my own) that the works of 'classic' philosophers should be kept apart from philosophical 'topics' and in national or time groups (65 f.) (whereas at least at one time I argued for a single alphabetic array of them), he does opt for a single array of Western composers (88) and of cricket players (115).
- Though the paramount importance of individuals in the humanities (philosophers, artists, etc.) is strongly upheld, no mention is made in the rich bibliographical apparatus of the Rescher-Richmond-de Grolier debate over Leonardo's *Last Supper*; and the idea of a citation index in the humanities is denigrated (121) though it could clearly be even more useful than those in the natural and the social sciences.
- Misleading mention is made several times (e.g., 21, 51) of the prevalence of "one-place" catalogs, i.e., non-multiple-entry ones; but this is only very late (127 f.) explained as single entry in the classified part of the classified catalog, with multiple subject and author index references to it. What therefore seems outlandish, to a librarian more used to multiple subject-headings in a dictionary catalog, is not really so very distant—but such a reader might well miss the final corrective passage. Again, since a one-place catalog is clearly one in high need of good citation-order rules, this need is viewed as a preventive of placing the same compound subject in several places (cross-classification), ignoring the even more likely mistake, without such rules, of cross-classifying parallel-formed compounds. (Finally, in the otherwise useful examples of different levels of compounding resulting from the inverse relation between facet order and citation order (194), a line is left out (third from the end) which would read "Religion/Activity/Time".)
- While Langridge sees biography as quite distinct from history he hesitates to separate them in all cases because (45) biography so often includes criticism; but I would point out that while this is often the case, what can almost always be seen to be the case if that biography includes the social-historical background of the target person's life.
- Since autobiography is often more a reflection upon meaning than a mere recounting of events, it is seen by Langridge as closer to 'wisdom literature'; he would accordingly put it with this than with biography (46). But there is no such class available in most general schemes except within ethics, to which subsumption objection is made (59 f.); I must then ask What discipline of Philosophy or even of the whole humanistic domain is more appropriate for wisdom ("... to show others how to live ...") than ethics?

But when at last I come to major disagreements, I find only two. The first is more general, and concerns

order. We are told (19) that the order of a compound subject's elements is not the same as the order of collocation—nor is it an inversion of any macro-order beyond the discipline—. This may seem true if we compare the order between categorial instantiations in a single subject-heading or class number with the order between (say) the natural and the social sciences; but it explicitly ignores (while it implicitly demonstrates, e.g. on 104) that the order between any two or more whole headings is wholly determined by the order of their categorial elements. And while a one-place catalog (mentioned above) is seen as necessarily (for the sake of consistency) being governed by citation-order rules, the possibility is raised of a factorial number of orders among the categorial elements of every compound heading—ignoring the most important of all factors in citation order, namely that order which confers meaning and which, when changed, changes meaning. The problem of the relation between the ultimate limits of ordered entities in the library (from categorial elements at the lowest limit to collocation of disciplinary domains at the highest) has not been solved, but it would seem that Langridge would at least be the one to try it (rather than, as here, shoving it aside) just because of his deep concern for the effect of outside (tool) disciplines as they form parts of the literature of any target discipline: if psychology, philosophy, sociology, physics, etc. are part of the literature of music, what order is best for them there and what retroactive effect does this order have on their order *as* disciplines on their own, rather than (as here) as secondary to the target discipline of music?

This brings me to the second major disagreement. (The answer to the question just above is that the problem is largely kept from arising for Langridge by virtue of his argument that each discipline is best kept all together, rather than being treated as secondary to various target disciplines. Thus we do not concern ourselves too much for the order between psychology of music, philosophy of music, sociology of music, and physics of music, as if they were parts of the target discipline of music (safer: the main class of music), because we prefer to let each such study be located within the 'applied' sector of each tool discipline.)

The primary example of this predilection of Langridge's is *history*:

history is concerned with all aspects of human activity. Are not religious, intellectual and cultural history equal in importance to political, social economic? . . . Economic history is not the history of economics; it is history written from a particular point of view. (40–41)

To which I counter: No, it is neither; it is the history of economic events, just as church history is the history of ecclesiastical events, etc. This does not in any way denigrate the general social-historical *importance* of economic history or of church history; but to be a source for general history does not make a document itself class with general history, as Langridge himself explicitly argues (41 f.) in the case of novels.

While the same sort of argument is applied to the philosophy of this and that target discipline (63), it is not so done for education, organization theory, etc. (perhaps because these are not within the humanities?). But then conflicts arise: archaeology should be compact, not strewn about with the history of the various sites

(44: I wholly agree, but see this as contradictory of Langridge's own position; or is there a higher principle at work here which has not been made explicit?); in a special classification (here, of cricket) the tool disciplines must be kept inside the target discipline rather than be left in the 'fringe' (113).

Another fairly serious objection: why the confining of the authorities cited to English-language ones only? In particular, why no use of Gardin, Soergel, or Dahlberg?

All in all, then, though there are points that occasion serious debate, this volume is a worthy exemplification and explication of Langridge's assertion (which I wholeheartedly endorse) that "the central discipline of librarianship . . . [is] classification." It is true both that the general organization and conduct of the argument is exemplary and that the detail is appropriate and illuminating. Many of these details are worth individual commendation:

- the insistence that characteristics on which to class must be obvious and generally agreed on, and non-judgmental (35, 48);
- the argument that dictionaries and the like do not well enough show the use of concepts (especially in compounds) to be used as the sole basis of the analysis of a vocabulary for a special classification (99);
- the urging that history schedules include a facet for kinds of event (55);
- the well-organized and carefully argued distinction between the several types of indexing.

In this last instance we see well how fundamental classification is to librarianship and indeed to any serious intellectual endeavor: it is the analysis of indexing into its facets and foci and their re-synthesis into the named types which renders the discussion so clear and fruitful. Langridge fully justifies his assertion (V) of "the educational (rather than merely instrumental) value of classification" in this work, at both the macro- and the micro-level.

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MALTBY, Arthur (Ed.): *Classification in the 1970s: a second look*. London: Clive Bingley 1976. 262 p. ISBN 0-208-01533-7.

The blurb states that this book "has been revised in the light of developments in classification during the first half of the present decade." Apart from the General Introduction and an interesting new paper by Karen Sparck Jones, the actual revisions could probably be accommodated comfortably on about five pages. One measure of them can easily be made by studying the citations; this journal, *International Classification*, which one would have thought rated at least a mention, is quoted once, in reference to a little-known piece of specialised work by A. J. Mayne.

The papers cover the same ground as before: the main general schemes, and a series by B.C. Vickery, E.M. Keen, D. Austin, and R. R. Freeman, mostly on classification because their original efforts were, on the whole, forward-looking, and not a great deal can happen in five years. It must have been difficult to arouse any enthusiasm for real revision so soon. Even the chapter on the