Philipp Rückheim

Democratic Nationalism in Scotland

Inclusion in Political and National Collectives

Global Studies & Theory of Society

[transcript]

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Editorial

Since the 18th century, society is world society. The book series documents research that explores this hypothesis, with particular focus on the polity, the system of religion, world science and higher education as four global function systems. All these systems are based on inclusion, that is everybody can and should participate in them; they are all responsive in observing their environments and identifying problems of society and producing problem solutions. They are all extremely diversified and at the same time claim to be singular: Studies on the genesis of these systems and the global comparison of function systems make the unity and diversity of world society visible. Which are the societal problems that can only be solved by the polity, religion, science and by universities?
The series is edited by Adrian Hermann, David Kaldewey and Rudolf Stichweh.

Philipp Rückheim is an associate member of the Department for Comparative Research on Democracies at Forum Internationale Wissenschaft of Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, where he completed his doctorate. He studied sociology and economics in Lucerne, Friedrichshafen, Bielefeld and Beijing. His research focuses on the sociocultural evolution, world society and the political sociology of nationalism. He also works in the construction industry.

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Acknowledgement

In 1991 Buchanan wrote,
About secession, states, and what he'd note,
Democracy and small states, a link so clear,
New ethnic and political collectives will appear.
As law and economy globalise their ride,
New nationalists worldwide, up the Clyde, coincide.

World politics and sports that sway,
Education, faith, all and more in play,
My book shows, with Scotland's might,
How statehood forms in world society's light.
In the nation's embrace, identity's swell,
Politics navigates its own distinct trail.

At FIW, I found my ground,
A place where questions do abound.
Multidisciplinary and so grand,
Politics, science, religion: research hand in hand.
Lunchtime chats and colloquia bright and wide,
In proposals and publications we unite and divide.

Rudolf Stichweh, thanks to you,
For insights witty and questions true.
To Mrs. Laube, Mrs. Bernard too,
Making global research becomes true.
Evelyn, Pascal, friends that reapper,
Through cycling, research, always near.

My family, thanks for standing by,
From mason to science, aiming high.
Late nights, we did endure,
Your love and strength, my constant cure.
To my wife, kids, endless dear,
This book I dedicate, so near.
The basis 'for all that' is to read,
Thanks to Anneliese, I did succeed.

1 Introduction: Scotland's democratic nationalism

300 years after Scotland and England founded Great Britain in 1707, the Scottish National Party (SNP) is in charge of creating a Scottish government. The SNP has long pushed for Scotland's independence. With a mandate ahead of the Labour Party, the SNP succeeded in forming a minority government in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections, thereby raising the question of secession. In the next Scottish Parliament election, the SNP increased its support and achieved an absolute majority in the Scottish Parliament in 2011. This was despite the mixed electoral system of majority and proportional representation, which aimed to avoid it. A few months later, Scotland decided its constitutional future through a binding referendum. On 18 September 2014, the time had come. They asked the Scottish people to answer this question: Should Scotland be an independent country? The majority voted against (55.3 %).

The present study focuses less on the result and more on the independence movement underpinning the referendum. Scotland's movement for autonomy continues to have an impact beyond the decision taken on 18 September 2014. For the first time, the following study puts forward the thesis that the Scottish independence movement is the paradigmatic case of democratic nationalism. It is *democratic* because it is based on the principle of individual self-determination. It is *nationalist* because it seeks the self-government of the national collective. The political *inclusion* of the population through elections, referenda, consultations and the various mechanisms of the welfare-state are at the forefront. Scotland's claim to autonomy is primarily legitimised by the political inclusion of the population. The focus is on political inclusion (i.e. self-government and public opinion as input to politics). However, social inclusion through politics is also sought (i.e. welfare as output inclusion through politics). But beyond this political collective, the question of national belonging also arises in the Scottish quest for autonomy. Even this, however, is discussed primarily as a possibility of individual self-determination. While the Scottish nation is an autonomous collective, it is determined by the politics of the people. For these reasons, the drive for political autonomy in Scotland is democratic nationalism. Whether as an independent state or as a regional substate within the United Kingdom, the most important element of Scottish aspirations for autonomy is popular participation. This aspiration extends to those who,

for whatever reason, choose to live in Scotland. That is why the word 'exclusion' is missing from the subtitle of this study. Political *Inclusion* is at the heart of Scottish independence.

A typical advert for Scotland's secession, the Declaration of Opportunity, illustrates this democratic nationalism. Scotland's then First Minister Alex Salmond (SNP) presented this declaration in Arbroath on 18 August 2014. A month before the referendum, Salmond said:

> "Earlier today I took the opportunity to visit Arbroath Abbey where the famous Declaration was written in 1320. The importance of the Arbroath document was as the very first European document to point to an authority beyond King and Nobles, beyond monarchy and feudalism, to the people – the whole 'community of the realm'. And so today, the declaration we make is a declaration of opportunity, not just for the country but for the people of Scotland." (Salmond 2014)

As a long-time supporter of Scottish independence and member of the SNP, Salmond also speaks out in favour of secession in this statement. But on what grounds? In its core, it is the opinion that it is always "better for all our futures if decisions about Scotland are taken by the people who care most about Scotland – the people who live and work here." (Salmond 2014)

Let's pause here for a moment. Salmond is not talking about Scotland as a country or a nation. He is campaigning for secession. He argues that the people living in Scotland should determine their own future. This is because they depend most on the future of this country. What the future holds remains to be seen. Yet, it is promised that if the people govern themselves, it will be a better future for everyone. Secession would democratise Scotland:

> "[I]ndependence creates one undeniable, unquestionable certainty. Our democratic deficit will end. The people of Scotland will finally get the governments we vote for. […] [S]hould we take the powers we need, to create a more prosperous country, a fairer nation, a better society? That is the choice, the opportunity, that this country faces on September 18th." (Salmond 2014)

The people living in Scotland should be at the centre of governance, focusing on their interests, aspirations, and concerns. I refer to this below as democratic nationalism, by which I mean the attitude that the people living in Scotland should govern themselves. Self-government by the people is the starting point of democratic nationalism.

1.1 Scotland's separatist nationalism

Scottish separatist nationalism has only emerged since the 1970s. It has especially grown since the beginning of the 21st century. Before, if it existed at all, this nationalism was a rebellion aimed at reforming the existing state. For a comparison of rebellious and separatist conflicts, see (On the distinction between rebellious and separatist conflicts cf. Wimmer 2013; Wimmer/Cederman/Min 2009). In the 18th- and 19th-centuries, the aim was to reform the entire kingdom (see Pentland 2004; Plassart 2015). As late as the early 20th-century, the focus was on expanding regional autonomy in the British Empire or the United Kingdom (cf. Hanham 1969; Marr 2013; Mitchell 1998; Newby 2012; Lloyd-Jones 2014).

For a long time, Scottish nationalism aimed at secession was very unlikely. Scotland's political union with England was already on the agenda long before the Act of Union was decided in 1707 (see Devine 2012: 8-16, 54-63; cf. Bowie 2007). It then lasted for two and a half centuries without serious threats of Scottish secession. There were many nationalisms in continental Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Ireland seceded in 1921, but Scotland did not.

The United Kingdom has had universal suffrage since 1929. Since then, the Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland have campaigned for more national self-determination. The Scottish National Party (SNP) emerged from these parties in 1934 (Hanham 1969: 133). Yet, the electorate in Scotland was not convinced by separatist nationalism for a long time. You can see this in the election results of these parties in national elections. The following diagram shows the electoral success of the SNP and its two predecessor parties.

Figure 1: Average vote share per candidate by party (bars, right axis) and number of MPs (lines, left axis) in Scotland in UK House of Commons elections, 1929–2019



There were small spikes during the oil and gas discoveries in Scotland in the 1970s, then again since the late 1980s and finally the big gains for the SNP following the 2014 secession referendum (this corresponds to the use of Scottish symbols in the party programmes see Leith 2018). Since 2010, Labour has gone from an average of 18,000 votes per candidate to 9,000. Over the same period, the Conservatives have increased from 7,000 to an average of 12,000 votes per candidate. In contrast, the average number of votes per SNP candidate has almost tripled from 8,000 to 21,000.

Surveys confirm this trend. They show that the nationalists managed to break with the longer-term trend during the two-year secession campaign (2012–2014). While an average of more than 1/4 (28 %) of respondents were in favour of secession between 1999 and 2011, this figure rose to 45.7 % in the referendum. Since then, it has remained at this level. Today, polls show that roughly as many people are in favour of Scotland's secession as are in favour of Scotland remaining part of the United Kingdom.

Figure 2: Polls using the 2014 referendum question, from 27 October 2014 until 25 January 2024 (based on Wikipedia)



The 259 polls conducted since the independence referendum on 18 September 2014 with the same question of "Should Scotland be an independent country?", indicate the willingness to secede is around 2 % lower than the willingness to oppose secession from the UK.[1] When asked whether Scotland should become an independent country, on average 46.7 % said no, 44.3 % said yes and 9 % were undecided. The positions for and against secession from the United Kingdom are roughly equal.

1 This data is from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_on_Scottish_independence (Accessed 27 January 2024).

These polls and the SNP's electoral successes in Scotland show how new separatist nationalism is in Scotland. It became important in the 1970s and then, especially at the beginning of the 21st-century. However, what is the call for Scottish autonomy in the most recent decades? The Scottish hip-hop band Stanley Odd provides a first attempt at an answer in their song Son I Voted Yes. It mentions critical factors that led to the Scottish quest for autonomy:

Table 1: Excerpts from 'Son I Voted Yes', which Stanley Odd performed three and a half days before the referendum on Scotland's secession from the United Kingdom on 18 September 2014 as part of the 'Night for Scotland' event.

Cause the hurt and anger she [Thatcher] left is deep seated
In school they stopped our free milk
It could be said in a wider context they stopped our free will
You can't always separate feelings from cold facts
[…]
This isn't about the colour of skin
Or where you were born, or who you call kin
It's about pure and simple geography
And caring for everyone responsibly
[…]
It's time to change how we 'do' politics
Responsibility and independence
Leading by example of the messages we're sendin'
[…]
In a time of recession, food banks and destitution
Worldwide turmoil with very little resolution
Violence and terror as press wizards cast their best illusions
We were part of a peaceful revolution
[…]
They say yir home's where yir heart is
From Oor Wullie's shed to Doctor Who's Tardis
But it's also true that yir hearts where yir home is

Each of these issues is in the following analyses as a reason to vote for Scottish secession in Son I Voted Yes. Scottish nationalists problematize Margaret Thatcher's reforms because they believe that these reforms generate "feelings from cold facts". Politics should not exclude emotions but should take them into account. Politics should not restrict the will and freedom of every person, even if it may be factually correct but emotionally undercooled. Voluntarism, one's own idea of what the desirable future of the social system in which a person participates should be, is at the forefront of democratic nationalism. It is about 'how we 'do' politics'.

But which collective should this policy relate to? To those who, for whatever reason, live in Scotland. Neither the actual or fictitious kinship of clans or tribes ('kin') nor skin colour or religion should limit political participation in Scotland. A person's decision to live in Scotland should be sufficient to have a say in the politics of that nation. The collective is simply geographically demarcated.

It continues to promise that Scottish politics will establish a role model: "Leading by example". But how does this nation become a role model? It becomes a role model by the fact that each person is prepared to take risks for their own cause. At the same time, one's own goals should always be pursued with a willingness to compromise. Violence must be avoided.

The journalist Barton Swaim emphasises this last aspect in particular. What is fascinating about Scottish nationalism is that nobody would die for it:

> "Scotland's is a post-national nationalism – one that cares far less about who governs than about what that governance looks like in practice. It is peaceable and beautiful in its way, but no one would die for it. […] What strikes me about today's Scottish nationalism is that it's entirely political and not in any substantial way cultural." (Swaim 2016)

1.2 Two problems of research related to Scottish nationalism

Analysing Scottish nationalism helps to address the following current questions in research on nationalism:

1. What is the significance of the national collective in nationalism in the 21st-century political system? What legitimizes Scottish nationalism? Is it primarily a claim of a collective that is characterized by national cohesion based on tradition, language and ethnicity, or is the political participation of the population living in Scotland in the foreground?
2. How can 21st-century society, based on the various modes of inclusion and exclusion of function systems such as religion, education, politics, sport, economics and more, bring about or hinder Scottish political autonomy? Why does a primarily functionally differentiated society produce Scottish nationalism?

The answers to these questions illustrate the difference between democratic and autocratic nationalism. They also show the mechanisms for a transition from a democratic to an autocratic variant of nationalism.

1.2.1 The Collectives of nationalism

Research on nationalism begins by characterizing how nationalism can be categorized with regard to its national-cultural and political collectives. In some nationalist research, scholars emphasize that nationalism strives for a unity of the political and national collective of cultural affiliation through history, religion, ethnicity etc. This research defines nationalism as primarily determined by the national-cultural collective. The nation is then the imagined political community based on ethnographic fieldwork providing the community with its national symbols like a common language. The national community imagines itself as sovereign and limited, as Benedict Anderson puts it (Anderson 1983). In the other research tradition, nationalism is primarily understood through the principle of individual self-determination. Ernest Gellner, for example, argued that: "Nationalism is primarily a political principal, which holds that the political and the national should be congruent." (Gellner 1983: 2)

Yet, a common research problem is which collective justifies a concrete endeavour for national autonomy (cf. Smith 2009). In the Scottish case, I argue, the political collective has the upper hand. For self-government is not primarily sought for those who see themselves as a culturally united collective of the Scottish nation, but for those who in fact live in Scotland.

A distinction is often made between claims to nationhood and claims to statehood. For example, in his recent book, "Scottish Nationalism: History, Ideology and the Question of Independence", Richard Finlay argues that the Scottish independence movement is largely based on a desire for statehood, given its national history and regional autonomy: "although the British state was a unitary one, it was nevertheless comprised of two distinct legal entities and jurisdictions." (Finlay 2022: chapter 3) Others, however, see a hidden ethnic and cultural nationalism in this quest for statehood (Mycock 2012). Against this background, I argue that it is both. But the focus is clearly on the question of the political inclusion of the population living in Scotland, which is crucial to the political system. The Scottish independence movement is first and foremost about the political independence of the population, which is the political collective rather than the national collective. The distinction between the political and the national collective is paramount within this movement, making it the paradigmatic case of democratic nationalism.

As Scottish nationalism is primarily defined by common residence in Scotland, we need to address another research problem. It is about how movements of national self-determination are determined by the guiding distinctions (Leitdifferenz) of politics. In relation to nationalism, we should consider the guiding distinction between democracy's individual self-determination and autocracy's prioritization of the collective.

We must distinguish Scotland's democratic nationalism from autocratic nationalism.[2] Democratic nationalism emphasizes the self-determination of individuals. Further, democratic nationalism applies this principle also to interpretations of the feeling of national solidarity. In this definition, nationalism is either democratic or autocratic. The distinction depends on how nationalism manages to create the national collective in terms of a primacy of either individual self-determination (hence democratic nationalism) or in that of a primacy of a culturally imprinted national collective, which makes the latter an autocratic nationalism.

I do not think I am exaggerating when I state that for Delanty's concept (Delanty 2019: 98), as for Rainer Bauböck (Bauböck 2016: 23, 42) and as for many other theories of political inclusion, nationalism is always autocratic from this moment on. However, the following study proves that this diagnosis is not correct. It also shows the circumstances in Scotland that made the emergence of democratic nationalism probable.

One important circumstance was the declaration known as the 'Edinburgh Agreement'. In it, the UK government agreed with Scotland's regional government to hold a binding referendum on Scotland's secession: "The two governments are committed to continue to work together constructively in the light of the outcome, whatever it is, in the best interests of the people of Scotland and of the rest of the United Kingdom." (United Kingdom Government 2012: § 30; cf. Tierney 2013).

In this declaration, the Scottish Parliament was given the responsibility to determine the time and question of the binding secession referendum, as well as the definition of the electorate. In contrast to the unilateral secession wars of the 18th to 21st centuries, this agreement was reached without a prior war or—as in the case of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Pavkovic/Radan 2007)—the threat of war.

As Anna L. Ahlers et al. (Ahlers et al. 2020) as well as (Delanty 2019) rightly points out, democracy/authoritarianism is the new guiding distinction in politics, and this has changed nationalism (also Fazal/Griffiths 2008; and see in contrast the assessment by Nassehi 2020). For democracy in particular, Delanty notes, secession can now only be explained by itself, because it can no longer invoke an "external source of domination" if, as in the case of Scotland in the United Kingdom, it takes place in a democracy.

However, an external source of domination is still relevant for the autocratic nationalism. The former is understood as *The Revolt Against Globalization* as the subtitle of a book by journalist John B. Judis puts it (2018). Others refer to cultural

2 Delanty assumes a process of civilization and distinguishes between two phases here: On the one hand, he calls it "secessionist nationalism" and refers to the nationalism in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, Corsica, Wales and Scotland, and on the other, the "pro-democracy movements" that have led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia since 1989 (Delanty 2019: 95-96).

backlash (Norris/Inglehart 2018). They link it to the populist nationalism of Donald Trump, the Brexiteers (Goodwin/Heath 2016), or the Polish Law and Justice Party (Cichocka/Cislak 2020).

1.2.2 Forms of nationalism and functional differentiation

The ethnic-exclusionary form of nationalism is attracting a great deal of attention in research in the wake of the rise of populism. This explanation clarifies that nationalism aims for national affiliation and the corresponding exclusion of foreigners. Above all, the universalistic, heedless globalization of function systems unsettles individuals, leading them to seek security in "identity politics" (Appelbaum 2019). Francis Fukuyama, for example, writes about this rebellious nationalism that it only arises under the condition of world society. The ruthless globalisation of expectations, which affects even the population of the most remote villages, leads to a first-time preoccupation with the question of who am I:

> "For the first time in his life, Hans can make choices about how to live his life, but he wonders who he really is and what he would like to be. The question of identity, which would never have been a problem back in his village, now becomes central. […] The psychological dislocation engendered by the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* laid the basis for an ideology of nationalism based on an intense nostalgia for an imagined past of strong community in which the divisions and confusions of a pluralist modern society did not exist." (Fukuyama 2018: 64f. reinforced again by the 'triumph of the therapeutic' that happened in the 1960s, p. 96)

Ethnic nationalism gives people a sense of orientation in a pluralistic world society—according to the research programme on world society published by Niklas Luhmann shortly before his death:

> "The differences in participation in and dependence on global social modernisation give a boost to seemingly anachronistic tendencies, especially in the area of religion and the ethnic movements developing within nation states. The universalism of the functional systems operating in world society does not exclude particularisms of the most diverse kinds, but actually encourages them. The ease with which world society changes structures is thus compensated for by more down-to-earth, or at any rate strongly demarcating, ties." (Luhmann 1998: 170 translated by the author; cf. Luhmann 2000: 218)[3]

3 "Die Unterschiede der Teilnahme an und der Abhängigkeit von weltgesellschaftlicher Modernisierung geben scheinbar anachronistischen Tendenzen Auftrieb, vor allem im Bereich der Religion und der innerhalb von Nationalstaaten sich entwickelnden ethnischen Bewegungen. Der *Universalismus* der weltgesellschaftlich operierenden Funktionssysteme schließt *Partikularismen* der verschiedensten Art nicht etwa aus, sondern regt sie geradezu an. Die

Autocratic nationalism, which strives for national cultural cohesion, is linked to globalisation. It serves to combat rapid modernisation and "hyperglobalisation".

However, there is also another form of nationalism that is linked to the globalisation of function systems. I call it democratic nationalism. For democratic nationalism, inclusion in the political collective is of paramount importance, not exclusion from the collective because of a person's ethnicity. The inclusion of the entire population is what is most important in democratic nationalism. As Tamir puts it:

> "Present-day nationalism appears in two different forms, both grounded in the weakness of the state: the first […] represents the desire of national groups, concentrated in distinct territories, to capture the opportunity and demand self-rule. As this claim is voiced in the name of the people, such national movements try to recruit as many fellow nationals as possible. Consequently, they are inwardly inclusive, bringing on board each and every member of the nation. […] Separatist national movements challenge the boundaries of existing states for both national and economic reasons. […] The second kind of nationalism is the nationalism of the less well-off, those left defenseless by the process of hyperglobalization. The vulnerable revoke national feelings in order to convince the elites to come back home from their global voyage and put their nation first." (Tamir 2019: 8f.)

Accordingly, we must distinguish between two forms of nationalism in the world society of the 21st century. Both are dependent on the globalisation of the functional differentiation of world society. On the one hand, there is a selfish, inclusive and "globalisation-friendly" nationalism, to which Tamir also counts Scottish nationalism. This type of nationalism, Tamir argues, is intent on secession because it does not want to share prosperity. Based on Scotland's independence movement, my study analyses this form of nationalism. It calls it democratic nationalism and shows that it also raises questions of solidarity. However, social cohesion is always discussed against the background of individual self-determination in Scotland.

On the other side is "anti-globalisation" nationalism. This is a national-populist rebellion within the existing state. Globalisation is understood against the background of the advantages it offers to one's own collective, united by history, language, religion or another ethnic factor. This nationalism does not reject globalisation, but calls for it to be limited where it harms the national-cultural collective's "distinct identity".

Based on this state of research, I propose to distinguish between an autocratic and a democratic variant of nationalism. The autocratic variant legitimises its claim to statehood by referring to an ethnically exclusive collective, i.e. nationhood. Its alternative is the democratic variant of nationalism, which legitimises itself through

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Leichtigkeit, mit der die Weltgesellschaft Strukturen ändert, wird so kompensiert durch eher bodenständige, jedenfalls abgrenzungsstarke Bindungen." "

political inclusion. In both nationalisms, the collective formed through political inclusion and the collective strengthened by ethnic affiliation must be distinguished from each other. The decisive factor is which of these collectives is more important. In 21st-century Scottish nationalism, it is the political collective of the population.

1.3 Thesis on Scotland's democratic nationalism

Scotland is the paradigmatic case of democratic nationalism. It is striving for political autonomy in the form of statehood or as an autonomous region of the United Kingdom. Nationalism means a collective strives for self-determination. This collective sees itself as belonging together through history, language, tradition, or religion. Cultural aspects of national unity typically take centre stage. This is not the case with Scottish nationalism.

The Scottish quest for autonomy is different because here the sense of national belonging takes a secondary position. The self-government of people living in Scotland is more important than the shared culture of the national collective. At the same time, Scottish politics and government services exclude all people who do not live in Scotland but can nevertheless identify with the Scottish nation. In one of the oldest and most famous nations in the world, we are witnessing a nationalism that is largely defined by the demand for self-government by its inhabitants (Leith 2018; Leith, M. S./D. Sim 2020).

The collectives described above emerged against this background. The Scottish endeavour for autonomy primarily relates to the political collective sustained by the political inclusion of the people living in Scotland. The political collective demands self-government. Secondly, the autonomy endeavour refers to the unity of the Scottish nation, which is created by the belonginess and cohesion of the national-cultural collective.

Scotland's democratic nationalism is characterised by the fact that it distinguishes the political collective of inclusion from the national-cultural collective. It puts both collectives in the form of a hierarchical opposition (Stichweh 2000b: 54, 2005: 62). As shown schematically below, in democratic nationalism the national-cultural collective is pre-structured by the political inclusion collective.

The political collective of inclusion interprets the exclusion associated with the cultural component of nationalism. The Scottish nation is interpreted as enabling national autonomy in the form of a separate state or within the United Kingdom. More important than citizenship for Scots scattered around the world (cf. Murphy 2016)—and more pragmatic, for that matter (see IDEA 2007)—is to demand some form of independent or regional statehood for those who actually live in Scotland. Scottish nationalism is based on a political collective of inclusion consisting of voters

and elected representatives. In this collective, only those who actually live in Scotland should have a say in politics and be able to receive state benefits.

Figure 3: The hierarchy of democratic nationalism in Scotland



This is distinguished from the national-cultural collective in the Scottish quest for autonomy. The difference is explained using case studies on the national anthem and the organisation of the Scottish regional parliament. It consists in the fact that the national-cultural collective is not limited by the Scottish population. Its boundary is drawn along the will to identify with Scotland, regardless of where the individual lives. In contrast, the boundary of politics, which is crucial to the pursuit of nationhood, is defined by where one lives in Scotland. The separation of the national-cultural collective from the political collective and the coupling of the two collectives by the expectation that the collective of political inclusion is prioritised is at the heart of democratic nationalism.

The factors that favoured democratic nationalism in Scotland, specifically, are discussed in the individual Chapters. These include the world society of the second half of the 20th century, differentiated primarily into function systems, and the success of small, social democratic states (Chapter 2). Migration and demography are a further factor (Chapter 3) as well as the reflection of politics as a national value commitment (Chapter 4). In addition, the demands of international competitive sport on nations are identified as a central cause for the development of a national identity (Chapter 5).

Another important aspect is the regional factors of functional differentiation in world society. These explain Scotland's democratic nationalism from the constellation in the United Kingdom. The special nature of British majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy as one of its alternatives are of great importance in this context (Chapter 6). A further regional factor is the relationship between state and

religion in the United Kingdom (Chapter 7). The continuing effectiveness of the Scottish university for the inclusiveness of the national collective is discussed in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 covers the economic factors of currency and international trade. Finally, Chapter 10 looks at Gaelic as a hierarchical and multicultural integration of the national collective that is compatible with democratic nationalism.

1.4 Outline of the Study

The study begins with everyday life. Chapter 2 examines the motives in favour of or against Scottish national self-government (secession) at the micro level of social systems. The theory of 'greed' nationalism forms the basis for this search for motives. This theory has the advantage of describing the state as a cost-benefit function that external factors shift. The increasing globalisation of the economy (free trade), military protection alliances and reliable restrictions on weapons of mass destruction are important factors as to why we are experiencing the shrinking area of states and increase in the number of (Griffiths 2014; Sambanis/Milanovic 2011).

As David A. Lake and Angela O'Mahoney (see Lake/O'Mahony 2004: 703) shows, the average state area doubled during the 19th-century from just under 1 million km² to around 2 million km². In contrast, we can see how the average state area has decreased again since the First World War. First rapidly and then more slowly until the phase in the 1970s, which looks like stagnation. Much has changed during these three phases and yet in 1998 the average state area has returned to around the 1815 level.

But does this explain Scottish nationalism? It is at least an important factor. The ability of small states to survive and the prosperity of small states, like Norway, motivate secession in Scotland. However, these are not motives of individual benefit maximisation, as this so-called 'greed' research on nationalism assumes, but motives of social systems.[4]

What is meant by this? Social systems are always systems structured by expectations. Motives are then not to be understood as individual expectations, but as expectations that are formed through the communications of the respective social system and that are used for the self-observation of the system. Motive is simply another name for the action attributed to the respective system:

4 The "greed" theory explains the willingness to engage in conflict through individual preferences, opportunities or perceptions: "Is war mainly due to hatred and ingrained pugnacity (preferences)? Or to the prospects for gain at the expense of weaker victims (opportunities)? Or is war mainly due to mistakes in evaluating others' motives and capacities (perceptions)." (Hirshleifer 1995: 172; for examples see Blattman/Miguel 2010; Esteban/Mayoral/Ray 2012; Lim/Metzler/Bar-Yam 2007)

> "Actions are constituted by attribution processes. They come about because selections, for whatever reasons, in whatever contexts and with the help of whatever semantics ('intention', 'motive', 'interest'), are attributed to systems. It is obvious that this concept of action does not provide a sufficient causal explanation of action, if only because it ignores the psychological. What is important in the conceptualisation chosen here is that selections are related to systems, not to their environments, and that on this basis addressees for further communication, connection points for further action are determined, whatever serves as the reason for this." (Luhmann 1984: 228 translated by the author)[5]

As an observation of communication, motives do not explain actions, but they do give us information about where the observers locate themselves. Are political motives cited for nationalism, and if so, which motives? What are the motives of Scottish nationalism that C. Wright Mills (1940: 906) rightly described as "typical" and what are the equally typical motives against them?

Here, we analyse these motives by examining the referendum campaign that occurred from 2012 to 2014 and the vote in the referendum. This referendum took place on 18 September 2014 and posed the question, if Scotland should be an independent country.

In the campaigns, Chapter 2 outlines the motives that supporters and opponents used for and against secession. The thesis argues that Scottish nationalism is a political-democratic nationalism because it primarily aims at the political participation of the population. A second motive for secession is the new prosperity of the small states. The change in the social environment of politics that has just been described is triggered by external factors. The increasing number of other states, norms of international law, restrictions on weapons of mass destruction, globalisation of the economy, tourism and much more make small states viable and competitive today.

The central motives against secession confirm the thesis of Scotland's democratic nationalism. This is the reason why the Better Together campaign in favour of Scotland remaining in the UK could not find any democratic arguments to reject this nationalism. Instead, it emphasised, and to some extent created, economic concerns of secession. In addition, and shortly before the referendum, politicians

5 "Handlungen werden durch Zurechnungsprozesse konstituiert. Sie kommen dadurch zustande, daß Selektionen, aus welchen Gründen, in welchen Kontexten und mit Hilfe welcher Semantiken ('Absicht', 'Motiv', 'Interesse') immer, auf Systeme zugerechnet werden. Daß dieser Handlungsbegriff keine ausreichende Kausalerklärung des Handelns vermittelt, schon weil er Psychisches außer Acht läßt, liegt auf der Hand. Es kommt in der hier gewählten Begriffsbildung darauf an, daß Selektionen auf Systeme, nicht auf deren Umwelten, bezogen werden und daß auf dieser Grundlage Adressaten für weitere Kommunikation, Anschlußpunkte für weiteres Handeln festgelegt werden, was immer als Grund dafür dient."

emphasized political inclusion and promised the Scottish people further regional autonomy within the UK.

But if the leitmotif of the secession campaign and the Scottish nationalism on which it is based is an increase in democracy, then the next question is how democracy and nationalism can be increased together. Particularly, we face the problem of defining a national collective democratically.

The following Chapters focus on the social structures of the Scottish collective. Chapter 3 examines how political inclusion and exclusion are regulated. Chapter 4 describes the extent to which the Scottish autonomy movement is guided by a vision of a desirable policy. Chapter 5 explores how Scotland identifies itself as a nation in relation to others. How the Scottish nation and politics are united is the subject of Chapter 6.

The political inclusion and exclusion of nationalism receives a great deal of attention in current research. The demarcation of the national collective is discussed under the still recent guiding distinction between democracy and autocracy. Rainer Bauböck says that the national-collective inclusion and exclusion of a polity must be clarified before democracy can even come into being:

> "The legitimacy of jurisdictional boundaries is a question that must be solved before individual inclusion claims can be addressed. […] Each type of polity has to rely on a basic membership rule that must not be exposed to the political will of its demos because the rule is what constitutes its legitimate demos in the first place." (Bauböck 2016: 23, 42)

But what about the difference between a "basic membership rule" and the "political will of its demos" when there is no independent national citizenship? The Scottish case allows us to analyse this problem in greater depth. In the Scottish case, inclusion in politics is regulated by politics itself. This residential inclusion and exclusion of the nation is shown in Chapter 3. To this end, the normative expectations formalised in laws about inclusion and exclusion in the Scottish nation are examined. Overall, Scottish nationalism has found a way to fulfil a democratic self-determination of the nation. The political collective of Scotland, created through political inclusion and exclusion based on residence in Scotland, forms a nation of presence (Anwesenheitsnation).

Chapter 4 explores the question of what lies behind the social democratic self-description of Scottish nationalism. Behind it stands a knowledge-centred politics that constantly scans the social environment of politics for the requirements of welfare state intervention. Firstly, I demonstrate this connection through the observations of Scottish nationalism, which stand in marked contrast to the observations of UK politics. Secondly, I draw on statistics to measure local inequality and develop a

model that shows the importance of multiple inequalities in favour of Scottish secession.

Inclusion in the outputs of Scottish politics by the process of welfare reinforces non-ethnic opportunities to identify with the Scottish nation. By recognising equality as a national value commitment, Scottish politics clearly expresses a much lower tolerance of inequality than the Anglo-American model. Furthermore, inclusion as a beneficiary offers the advantage of enabling political inclusion beyond the sporadic and isolated electoral events and thus strengthens identification with independent Scottish politics beyond election day (Luhmann 1981: 25; on these "double interchanges" Stichweh 2005: 76). This also applies to the immigrants addressed and longed for by the drive for Scottish autonomy.

Having described the rules of national inclusion/exclusion and the desired political regime, the question arises as to when and how the people of Scotland came to see themselves as a nation. This is where the twin-track perspective of cultural and political nationalism proposed by Scott Hames comes into play. This is primarily concerned with the contributions of artists, intellectuals and journals—a kind of cultural elite—to the understanding of Scotland's national culture (Hames 2020: 178, 193; Lauder 2021). In contrast, the Scottish national culture examined in the following Chapters provides insights into particularly popular elements of Scottish identity. Examining the emergence and meaning of national symbols, the book explores factors such as the Scottish university and religion in the quest for autonomy.

I begin the examination of the national sense of belonging with an extraordinary quasi-experiment offered by the Scottish case: the search for a national anthem. How did this search come about and how is this search responded to? Existing research either assumes the identity of the Scottish nation or derives it from surveys or expert judgements. Both variants are inadequate when it comes to describing the nation as a collective of presence, as shown in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 therefore deals with the question of how the Scottish population describes itself as a national collective.

What is striking about this is not only which national anthem the Scottish people actually use to represent their cultural unity, but also how the topic is dealt with. Who should be allowed to decide on such an important cultural symbol as the national anthem? Is it even possible to talk about a "decision" that consolidates the alternatives and then excludes everything else? The answers go beyond the delimitation of the territorially defined collective of Scotland's political inclusion. The representatives elected by the population living in Scotland—bearers of political power roles (politische Leistungsrollen) such as committee members and MPs—withdraw from decisions on the cultural definition of the nation. Political power roles monitor whether and how people (politisches Publikum) identify with Scotland as a nation. Only those who live in Scotland should have a say politically, but deciding what culturally characterises the Scottish nation is detached from this mechanism of res-

idential demarcation. Culturally, the Scottish nation is to be determined by those who identify with the nation of their own free will (voluntary) – regardless of where the person in question actually lives.

Chapter 6 focuses on the inward-looking nation-building process, analysing it in the narrow time window from 1997 to 1999. This Chapter asks how the political collective is coupled with the national collective. What is expected of the symbol unifying the people of Scotland with the Scottish nation? What can be considered as an inward-looking symbol that adequately integrates the population as a nation?

This question is answered by analysing the decisions on the construction of the Scottish Parliament. The Chapter comes to the following conclusion: the spatial delineation of the national collective is now joined by the question of how political decisions should ideally be made in Scotland. The way in which collectively binding decisions are made is staged as a national particularity in the United Kingdom and it is symbolised with minerals, architecture and semantics.

Chapters 7 to 9 examine the development of the Scottish desire for autonomy against the background of functional differentiation. The regional constellation of Scotland is of particular importance here. As sociocultural factors, Scotland's democratic nationalism is related to the function systems of religion (Chapter 7), higher education (Chapter 8) and the economy (Chapter 9).

A central factor is religion, which is analysed using the example of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum in Chapter 7. What was the significance of religion in the Scottish community regarding the independence movement and how did the individual denominations deal with it? In Scotland, too, religion continues to be an explanatory factor for nationalism that should hardly be underestimated. The voting relationship between the two largest denominations reveals an enormous potential for conflict about the question of Scottish statehood.

Chapter 8 points to a connection, albeit mostly latent, between the educational system in Scotland and the political endeavour for autonomy that can still be felt today. Beginning with the Reformation, it describes five mechanisms that lead to the universalism that is important for individual self-determination. Ceremonial practices and surveys are used to reveal how powerful this universalism has already become today.

The conflict between the secessionist and unionist campaigns over the issue of currency is the starting point in Chapter 9 for analysing the economy as an independent explanatory factor in the Scottish quest for autonomy.

Finally, Chapter 10 examines the significance of Scotland's national collective claim that Gaelic is central. It argues that Scotland's identification as a Gaelic-Celtic nation strengthens democratic nationalism. It justifies minority protection and multiculturalism and provides Scotland with a national self-definition based on sentimentality rather than virtue.

Chapter 11 briefly summarises the results and discusses the most important thesis of this study by comparing Scottish and English nationalism. Furthermore, each chapter demonstrates the autocratic potential of democratic nationalism when the collective interpretation of national self-determination begins to prevail.

2 Motives for and against secession

Should Scotland be an independent country? The Scottish population had to answer this question with a yes or no on 18 September 2014. 85 % of those eligible to vote took part in the binding referendum. Their answer was clear but surprisingly close. Around 45 % voted in favour of Scottish independence, but even more voters (55 %) decided against it. What were the reasons for this decision? Part I of this study examines the recurring motives for supporting or opposing Scottish secession.

The motives for and against the statehood of Scotland were different. The results of the two by-election surveys already show these differences. The most important reason for favouring secession sounds like a tautology. The majority, who supported secession, believed that Scotland should govern itself. 70 % said, "All decisions about Scotland should be made in Scotland" (see Lord Ashcroft 2014). For only 20 %, a better overall future ("on balance") and for only 10 %, avoiding "Conservative governments" was most important.

The main reasons for opposing Scottish secession were concerns about economic and political risks on the one hand. On the other, people mentioned their collective identity. According to 47 % of those who voted against Scottish independence, the economic and political risks of secession were too great. The risks were summarised as currency, EU membership, economy, jobs, and prices. Being part of the UK and a "shared history, culture and traditions" were most important to 27 % of respondents. Twenty-five percent of respondents cited hope for Scotland to gain further regional autonomy within the UK (known as DevoMax) as the main reason they opposed secession.

The post-election survey conducted by Ailsa Henderson et al. in the week following the referendum shows similar results. They interviewed 389 people who voted in favour of secession and 421 who voted against secession in the referendum. Of those who were in favour of secession, 20 % said that "separate statehood would have made Scotland better off economically." Only 2 % said "because it would have helped protect public services" (Henderson/Mitchell 2015: 23). One in two of those who voted in favour of secession cited motives of national self-determination. Twenty-five percent wanted to "always" have the government in Scotland elected. Twenty-two per-

cent saw "independence […] as the natural state of nations like Scotland." 24 % of responses were categorised as "Westminster system is rotten".

This by-election survey also shows a very different pattern among the 421 respondents who rejected secession (Henderson/Mitchell 2015: 22). "I feel British and believe in the Union" was most important to 30 % of these people. Almost as many respondents decided against secession because they felt the uncertainty (28 %) or the economic risks (26 %) were too great. The following diagram (based on the eleven response options in Lord Ashcroft (2014)) shows a closer look at the two to three most important reasons.

Figure 4: "What were the two or three most important issues in deciding how you ultimately voted" concerning Scotland being an independent country?



Two reasons for favouring secession were significant. 74 % of mentions cited dissatisfaction ('disaffection') with Westminster politics. 54 % mentioned dissatisfaction with the national health service provider NHS Scotland. In addition, for one in five of those who voted in favour of Scottish secession, oil was one of the most important reasons, compared to only 6 % of those who voted against secession.

Those who voted against secession cited currency (57 %), pensions (37 %), and military and security (29 %) as the most important reasons.

However, there were two reasons that many people on both sides felt were important: the national budget and jobs. For one in three people on both sides, government revenue and spending were significant (33 % of those in favour to 32 % of those against), and jobs (18 % to 21 %) were significant for one in five people. Social benefits, EU membership and prices were not among the most important reasons.

For those favouring secession, Scottish self-government was therefore at the forefront. Dissatisfaction with Westminster's policies was most pronounced among these people. Another motive for secession can be recognised in these personal assessments: Optimism about Scotland's future if it were to become a separate state. The national budget, oil and gas reserves, and jobs are relatively important. Social benefits, EU membership, currency, pensions, and prices are relatively unimportant. This shows confidence that an independent Scotland will become an economically prosperous and socio-politically egalitarian state. They aim to be like Scandinavia. While some saw secession as an economic and socio-political opportunity, the majority viewed Scottish independence primarily as a project fraught with economic and socio-political risks.

Consequently, both sides focussed on Scotland's economic and socio-political future. However, the visions of this future differed. Even more critical for those in favour of secession, however, was the question of who should be able to decide Scotland's future.

Political inclusion of the population of Scotland was the most crucial motive for voting in favour of independence. What is essential for inclusion and exclusion is not what someone communicates but who is authorised to communicate (cf. Stichweh 1988, 2020b). The "democratic deficit" was to be remedied by a separate state. This deficit was seen in the fact that the interests, values and problems articulated in Scotland needed to be considered in politics. As stated in a secession campaign brochure, the primary motive for secession was the political inclusion by self-government: "Independence isn't about policies or parties. […] All you have to decide on the 18th of September is who should choose the future governments of Scotland: the people of Scotland, or the people of England?" (Campbell 2014: 7)

In the campaign for Scotland to remain in the United Kingdom, referred to below as the union campaign, political inclusion was only of secondary importance.

2.1 Motives for secession

We begin the description of the communication in favour of secession with the most crucial motive of those who spoke out in favour of Scotland's secession on 18 September 2014: The Scottish people's repeated call for self-government.

2.1.1 Input-Inclusion: Self-Government

On 12 July 2013, Scotland's then-first minister, Alex Salmond (SNP), delivered the first of his Six Union speeches. Salmond names 'five unions' that Scotland should retain, which would be strengthened and improved by secession. These include the Eu-

ropean Union, the defence union (meaning NATO membership), the pound-based monetary union, the "union of the crowns", and the "social union" of the British Isles:

> "But one key Union – the political and economic union – must change fundamentally. This highly dysfunctional state controlled from Westminster feels threatened by any challenge to its privilege and power. All attempts to change it have been resisted – reasonable calls for Devo Max or real economic powers were rejected out of hand. Yet it does not work for Scotland any more. Instead it holds Scotland back and imperils our future. It will not bend, and it will not change of its own accord. So we will – we must – change it." (Salmond 2013)

We address both motives below but begin with the principled judgement that the Scottish people are a collective that should take its future into its own hands. This motive underlies the communications that emphasise political inclusion. As a result, interests articulated in Scotland would not be considered in politics. However, for this argument in principle, known as the "democratic deficit", it is not decisive which interests are specifically involved. Instead, the decisive factor is that there needs to be an adequate opportunity in the United Kingdom to take account of interests originating in Scotland. The demand to extend regional autonomy has failed, so secession is the next step. A new democracy will be created with a single unassailable principle: individual self-determination. The autonomy of the individual, guaranteed by human rights, has been declared the only inescapable principle of this democracy to be established. Thus, there were proposals for the organisation of the Scottish state, but there was only one restriction. The White Paper of the secession campaign published by the Scottish SNP government states that: "Key equality and human rights principles, including the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), would be embedded in the written constitution. Beyond those there are certain provisions that the present Scottish Government will propose for consideration by the constitutional convention" – and these included, for example, a ban on nuclear weapons in Scotland as well as public services, children's rights and environmental protection (Scottish Government 2013: 352f.).

Nevertheless, inclusion through the self-government of the Scottish people took centre stage. It was often pointed out that since the end of the Second World War, Scotland has had governments that were not elected by a majority of the Scottish people. These governments have implemented policies contrary to the Scottish people's interests. This democratic deficit is illustrated with a graphic at the beginning of the Chapter Building a Modern Democracy (see Scottish Government 2013: 333). The colours of the then coalition government of the United Kingdom (blue Conservative Party, orange Liberal Democrats) represent Scotland's political irrelevance in the United Kingdom. For half of the last 68 years, governments have ruled in Scotland that did not achieve a majority in Scotland. According to the graphic relating to

some of the policies of the then coalition government, these governments have taken and implemented collectively binding decisions that have been rejected by a majority of MPs who owe their seats to constituencies in Scotland. Not only the Scottish people voted against the government on the day of each House of Commons election. Most MPs elected in Scottish constituencies also voted against the policies in question. Such attempts at temporal and factual de-contextualisation of collectively binding decisions—several House of Commons elections, voting days, and policies (topics of political communication) are cited as examples—explain that Scotland is trapped in a democratic deficit.

This is also how the brochure from Wings over Scotland—a think tank of the secession campaign—describes the motive of political independence. Of the five motives in The Wee Blue Book of the secession campaign, the first is to remedy the so-called democratic deficit. If Scotland is a country, it must always have a government elected in Scotland:

> "This is perhaps the simplest aspect of the debate to deal with. Scotland rarely […] gets the governments it votes for. […] [T]hat's not democracy. With all due respect to Wales and Northern Ireland, 85 % of the population of the UK lives in England, and that means that in practice England always decides what government everyone else gets. Most of the time […] that's been a government Scotland rejected. We believe Scotland is a country, and therefore should always get the government it votes for every time" (Campbell 2014: 6).

Campbell distinguishes between Scotland and England and then explains an apparent motive for secession: To remedy the democratic deficit. The aim is the most direct possible political inclusion of the Scottish population. Whether the interests articulated by the majority in lower house elections in Scotland are heard in collectively binding decisions, so the argument goes, depends on others—namely, the majority in England.

Issues like the welfare state or the rejection of nuclear weapons, which journalists and politicians often cite, are examples for secession activists to signal the need for collective self-determination in Scotland. The nuclear weapons programme, British involvement in the war in Iraq or tax reforms (the so-called 'poll tax' and 'bedroom tax') are intended to illustrate the need for secession. One secession activist from Labour for Independence said that secession was about:

> "not just about political gains it is about political decision. That the entire people of Scotland or almost the entire people of Scotland disagree with, but had no saying, for example the Iraq war. […] But also renewal and the cost of nuclear weapons that occurred is just a short, just a few miles away from here." (Waters 2014)

Deborah Water's account makes it clear where this need comes from. They are all collectively binding decisions presented as primarily affecting the people of Scotland. Despite these concerns, the people were not allowed to vote on these measures, even though, according to Waters, most people in Scotland would have rejected them if given the choice.

Similarly, this SNP activist in Kelvin (Glasgow) explains his turn to secession through an imbalance between concern and political self-determination:

> "who decides you know to take nuclear waste and transport it all the way up to the far north of Scotland when you know people object to that. And ahm most decisions seemed to be made really remotely […] I thought it's just completely absurd that system of government is so remote from ahm from views of the people of Scotland." (SNP Activist in Kelvin (Glasgow) 2014)

Westminster's policy shifts dangers such as the disposal of nuclear waste and tax experiments ('poll tax') to Scotland, regardless of the will of the Scottish people: "Why […] when […] people object to that?" It was not a single event that was important, but a linking of events (e.g. of "certain events") established via the political election. Various collectively binding decisions are attributed to "Conservative governments", which are then rejected by secession activists as "imposed because we do not vote for it". Although hardly ever elected in Scotland, this governing party has brought about "things like the nuclear dumping and the poll tax" (SNP Activist in Kelvin (Glasgow) 2014).

Another example cited here is Gerry Hassan's turn to his Scottish identity, which he describes as relevant and political:

> "Feeling particularly Scottish did not really register high on my radar. It was not […] until 1987, when in my early twenties, with the poll tax, Scots Tories representation halved at the election and 'the Doomsday Scenario' that I began to think of Scottishness as an important part of my identity – and my political identity." (Devine/Logue 2002: 94)

Instead of a specific policy or political decision, it is about the will of the Scottish collective expressed in the vote. The focus was on whether or not the majority opinion articulated in Scotland on this decision could be taken into account.

Linked to this was the strategy of mobilising Scotland's population. In some cases, the political mobilisation of the Scottish population was more important than the result of the referendum. The aim was to find every person eligible to vote, register them and ultimately motivate them to vote. An example is the aforementioned activist Deborah Waters, Labour for Independence. She said that, ultimately, it was necessary to vote at all. Even deliberate non-voting is better than staying away from

the polling booth. Ideally, those who do not want to vote should still take part in the communication and communicate their non-vote by destroying their ballot paper:

> "I would rather want somebody went into the voting booth and spoil the paper and vote whatever is on it. And draw a picture or something. I would rather like somebody did that and spoil the paper and say 'I don't want to vote', than don't go at all. […] Because people have died! People and women have died, and people have fought for the vote for everybody." (Waters 2014)

Passivity was attributed to external circumstances. Passivity was attributed, for example, to a lack of interest from the mass media in this national issue (see the interviews with John Robertson in Greenwell 2014) or a lack of interest in politics. Political participation was praised, whatever was voted for and whatever that meant for one's life in concrete terms.

The primacy of political inclusion is also crucial in the following example. It is about an interview with a mid-20-year-old ceramic artist who was living in Glasgow at the time. She was an activist with Radical Independence, an initiative that specialised in persuading Labour supporters and non-voters to secede:

> "We had so many more people registered than we could have done before, but even actually in terms of the artist community like we live in quite precarious conditions a lot of people are avoiding council tax […] so they are not on the electoral register, so… ahm. One of the things that I have been doing is trying to like register people as 'homeless' so they can still vote. […] [I]t's important to get these people engaged, because ahm you know they are just as important as anyone else is. And in a sense they got the most gain from independence. And it's people who have the least to lose that are most likely to vote Yes as well, so yeah." (Activist of Radical Independence 2014)

Once again, political activism is valued. Nothing should prevent the political participation of the Scottish people – not even whether someone wants one of the proposed alternatives (Waters) or, as in this second quote, whether someone pays their council tax. Even those who do not contribute financially to the community but still live in Scotland are "as important as anyone else".

For the activist, the extension of political inclusion, i.e. participation in collectively binding decisions, is central: "make division not about like replacing Westminster power with power in Edinburgh. Not about that moving of power, but about actually a democratisation of power." (Activist of Radical Independence 2014)

The secession campaign had "engaged so many more people in politics", and that was already a success, regardless of the referendum result:

> "I just hope that the people, people, who have been actively campaigning for a Yes, people who haven't been involved in politics before don't get to put off and don't just go back to being apathetic and compliant. And I hope, we kind of somehow managed to kind of build that energy and you know have a more, a more kind of: just act. Be more challenging and challenge Westminster more and actually being more organized and use that kind of communities and groups and their links to be blaring." (Activist of Radical Independence 2014: Herv. P.R.)

At the core is the call for political participation: "Just act. […] [B]e blaring." A call to revolt. As Ben Jackson writes in The Case for Scottish Independence, confirming these assessments by a Radical Independence activist, this part of the secession campaign formulates "an unashamed argument for independence as a blow to British imperialism and capitalism" (Jackson, B. 2020: 125). Radical Independence mixed republican and socialist ideas to promote Scotland's secession. In their leaflet UNDECIDED? HOW WE CAN CHANGE SCOTLAND, Radical Independence campaigns for state intervention in the labour and housing markets but emphasises self-government as the most crucial motive in large letters: "SAY GOODBYE TO THE TORIES BECAUSE WE'LL ALWAYS GET THE GOVERNMENT WE VOTE FOR" (Radical Independence 2014).

Nevertheless, it is also evident from the assessments of this activist that the main issue is the self-government of the Scottish population. Political inclusion in the input is at the forefront. It is about participating at all. regardless of what is articulated in detail as an interest.

The primacy of the inward inclusion of the people living in Scotland explains the observation that the activists of the secession campaign who were defeated in the referendum behaved more like the winners in the days and weeks that followed. They neither withdrew nor incited riots. They celebrated because the campaigns gave them hope. It were "ordinary people" exchanging ideas of a better society in the campaigns for and against Scotland's secession. According to Iain Macwhirter, a journalist living and working in Edinburgh at the time:

> "The Yes campaign set up a stage and an open mic so that ordinary people, who would never have dreamed of public speaking, talked their 'journey' to the independence cause and their dreams of a better society. It was sometimes naive, but it was optimistic, humane and above all peaceful. […] Holyrood may have been empty on the morning after the referendum, but in subsequent weekends thousands of people staged demonstrations outside the Scottish Parliament under banners like 'Hope over Fear' and 'Voice of the People'. […] Meanwhile, a bizarre reversal of roles, the Unionist parties have lapsed into acrimonious divisions and even, in the case of the Scottish Labour Party, virtual civil war." (Macwhirter 2014: 15f.)

In the approaching referendum, the Scottish people seized the opportunity for self-government and focussed on the following question based on future scenarios: "What could be a better society?" (Macwhirter 2014: 69).

Interviews, campaign material, surveys and observations of the secession campaign show that the self-government of the Scottish people was the most essential motive for secession. In the words of Alex Salmond: "For almost two-thirds of my life, Scotland has been ruled by Governments that it did not elect." (Salmond 2013) Secession is intended to tear Scotland out of this state, as Salmond put it in his last Six Union speech. Once again, he sees secession as a solution to the "current democratic deficit". He describes the state in which Scotland currently finds itself as a result of the reform of state housing benefit, colloquially known as the 'bedroom tax', which has just been passed:

> "The bedroom tax is a perfect example of our *current democratic deficit*. *Not just because it's unjust* – although it is, deeply unjust; 80 % of the households affected include a disabled person – *but* because it is legislation which would *never have been passed by a Parliament with Scotland's problems and priorities* at its heart. It is a *policy driven primarily* by rising rental and housing benefit costs in London and south-east England, *not here* in Scotland. […] I just want to outline some of the positive choices an independent Scotland could make. These are just four options out of hundreds – *the real point is that we would have the ability to make these choices*. […] *We could* abolish the bedroom tax and establish a *welfare system* which *meets* Scotland's *needs* and Scotland's *values*." (Salmond 2013)

Only secession would make it possible to politically address the problems facing the population in Scotland, which do not necessarily coincide with the problems in the rest of the United Kingdom. Scotland has other problems than "London and south-east England", which Salmond describes abstractly as "needs". He adds "Scotland's values" but leaves open what is meant by these values. In addition to the self-government of the Scottish people, the hope of an economically prosperous future that would enable the autonomy of the individual was another central motive in favour of secession, as the next section shows.

2.1.2 Output-Inclusion: "the favourable winds of globalisation"

Globalisation has changed the world in recent decades, opening up undreamt-of opportunities for more equality and prosperity for small states. With this diagnosis of future opportunities, economist Alex Salmond explains a second central motif of the Scottish independence movement. In the speech entitled Free to Prosper: Creating the Celtic Lion Economy, he speaks of a:

> "'New Deal' for *small countries at the heart of globalisation*. During the first half of the last century and perhaps later, smaller nations faced two major disadvantages in the global system. One was guaranteeing their security. The other was gaining access to markets. However, over time global markets have opened to countries large and small while the threats to international security do not come by and large from territorial acquisition but from international terrorism. And in this environment, the disadvantages of smaller nations have disappeared, and they are now exercising their natural economic strengths. Flexibility. Speed of decision-making. And the ability to clearly define national interests in pursuit of a clear economic strategy. Where this occurs within the framework of a European Union and single market place of 600 million people, it creates the ideal environment within which small nations can take the most of their comparative advantage. *It is against this back drop that the case for an independent Scotland has re-emerged*". (Salmond 2008a: Herv. P.R.)

As an independent state, according to Salmond, explicitly following Alberto Alesina and Tom Nairn, Scotland is facing a successful future. It will be one of the winners of globalisation and form an "Arc of Prosperity" with Ireland, Iceland and Norway.

Salmond underlines this future orientation with the United Nations Human Development Index, led by small countries comparable to Scotland (see also the Foreign Policy Globalisation Index used by Nairn, 2014 [2008]) (see also the Foreign Policy Globalisation Index used by Nairn 2014[2008]). This index, like Ireland's "Celtic Tiger economy", shows that "among the big winners of globalisation are the small, dynamic trading nations of Europe – those countries with the skills and the flexibility to claim a major stake in the knowledge economy and the sectors of the future. […] [T]here are no limits to success in the modern global economy." (Salmond 2008a)

Political independence will also ensure economic success for Scotland. However, this requires the right strategy, which for Scotland is to invest in education and economic development, for example through tax breaks for businesses: "[T]he economic strategy of any nation tries to achieve two linked aims. To maximise the potential of its people – the stock of human capital – and to match it to the major sectors of comparative advantage." (Salmond 2008a)[1]

At the University of Virginia, the next day, Salmond repeats his assessment and again emphasises that it is about future orientation: "as we consider our nation's future". In addition to the economic independence premium of flexible small states focusing on their competitive advantages, the increase in political responsibility should also be considered here. By the latter, he means alliances, i.e. "the pooling

1 Specifically: "My government will not only protect the potential of our people. We are enhancing it, with new investment in our schools, colleges and universities – and with our historic move to restore free education at all levels in Scotland. […] We will build an economy that is the envy of Europe."

of sovereignty at the international and global level" in order to achieve "large and visible benefits for collective international action" (Salmond 2008b).

However, how important were these factors in the Scottish secession campaign leading up to the referendum in 2012? In the following, I would like to explain this question using official and unofficial campaign material and surveys. Egalitarianism and economic prosperity were fundamental in the secession campaign's future vision.

In the secession campaign's white paper, Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, Scottish independence is repeatedly described as an economic and societal benefit. The very first page states:

> "If we vote Yes, […] the most important decisions about our economy and society will be taken by the people who care most about Scotland, that is by the people of Scotland. […] Scotland's future will be in Scotland's hands. If we vote No, Scotland stands still. […] Decisions about Scotland would remain in the hands of others." (Scottish Government 2013: i)

Scotland's self-government would allow it to achieve the "independence advantage" of comparable but independent states that have managed to increase economic growth and egalitarianism together, as it says a few pages further on:

> "Seeking to become a more equal society is not just the right thing to do. It also makes sense for the economy. We know that the most equal societies also have the highest levels of well-being and are most prosperous. They are also, more often than not, nations like Scotland; the fairest and most successful countries in the world are independent European nations of similar size. […] Even without North Sea oil, Scotland's economy produces almost exactly the same amount of output per head as the rest of the UK. With oil and gas, we produce nearly a fifth more. […] Nations that are similar to Scotland – such as Norway, Finland, Denmark and Sweden – sit at the top of world wealth and well-being league tables. […] They do not leave the important decisions about their economy to parliaments whose interests necessarily lie elsewhere. That is their independence advantage and they have used it to build societies that deliver a higher quality of life for their citizens." (Scottish Government 2013: 41ff.)

The comparison to the democracies mentioned above is drawn again and again. In the foreground is the view that national independence can lead to a better future because it holds the opportunity to increase egalitarianism and prosperity. Independence will allow Scotland to become the more egalitarian society it aspires to be. Without independence, this would be unlikely due to the UK's tolerance of economic inequality.

Another example is the following (unofficial) leaflet by activist Alexander Prior.

Figure 5: Leaflet by a secession activist on the success of small states



This leaflet also attempts to 'empirically' illustrate Scotland's desirable and possible future. The successful countries of our time tend to have small populations and are democracies. In terms of prosperity, satisfaction, fairness and gender equality, the United Kingdom ranks in a position that Scotland would probably surpass in the future if it were independent. The conclusion: "The most successful countries in the world are small. Scotland has the wealth, resources & people to be one of them."

The same argument was repeatedly made by other secessionist activists in the context of poverty. Over 70 thousand people in Scotland visit a Trussell Fund Food Bank every year and at least a fifth of these are children.[2] In contrast, representatives of Women for Independence argued that children are better off in small democracies. Once again, Scotland's secession was promoted with the hope of a better future.

Similarly, representatives of the then Scottish Government (SNP) campaigned in favour of secession, promising that Scotland could catch up with the successes of other small democracies as an independent state. Across a range of indicators, in March 2014, the then Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Constitution and the Economy, John Swinney (SNP), commented that Scotland's position in the UK was "strong":

> "There are no longer arguments over Scotland's wealth. We are one of the wealthiest nations in the developed world and wealthier per head than the UK as a whole." (Swinney 2014: 66)

Using various economic and socio-political indicators such as gross value added, economic inactivity rate, unemployment, etcetera, Scotland's values over the period in which Scotland has had its parliament in the United Kingdom—since 1999—are compared with the current value (2012/13). Except for household income, Scotland has risen relative to the twelve other statistical regions of the UK across all indicators since legislative devolution in 1999 and ranks in the upper midfield. It is argued that the expansion of national self-determination shows Scotland's potential to take political decisions into its own hands.

However, despite these successes, the annual growth rate of Scotland's gross domestic product from 1999 to 2007 still lags behind the growth rate of the United Kingdom as a whole. At 2.9 % per annum, the Scottish economy grew 0.3 % per annum, slower than the UK economy and the economies of other small democratic states. This is not only linked to economic issues; Swinney also refers to "well-being and inclusiveness", citing various "international social justice and competitiveness measures". This again compares the United Kingdom as a whole with small democratic states. As a result, the United Kingdom is inferior compared to the selected small democratic states. Only secession would make it possible to pursue an economic, tax and welfare policy adapted to Scotland and thus exploit the "advantage[s] of Scotland's unique strengths, size and situation(Swinney 2014: 57).

Secession is seen as a liberating blow. According to Swinney, statistics show that Scottish politicians know how to utilise their resources successfully. The legislative

2 These statistics include the "three-day emergency food supplies" handed out, which rose rapidly between 2011 and 2013 in particular and (until 2015) especially in Scotland (see The Trussell Trust 2020).

power conceded in 1999 has already helped Scotland greatly economically. However, it has still not created the economic growth comparable states achieved in the same period. Another example of future orientation is the following mailshot from the Yes Scotland campaign.

The front promises that independence could make Scotland "the most powerful nation in Europe" (Yes Scotland 2014). The hand and lightning bolt represent the borders of Scottish territory. In the south-east of this territory, as in Scotland itself, there is darkness (probably referring to England), whereas energy flows from the north-east (Norway).

Inside this mailing, the topic of energy resources takes up half of the descriptions. Photographs collected under the title "Scotland's got what it takes" show that the future is limitless. The "sources of energy that can't be exhausted" are emphasised and referred to Scotland's future: "By their nature they are forever, capable of generating billions of pounds and thousands of jobs far into the future." After oil and gas are also mentioned and "wealth of brainpower" and economic sectors are discussed, the question arises: "Yet how many of us see this prosperity reflected in our daily lives?" It is not just the exhaustible oil and gas resources but the other energy resources of the future, which, according to the presentation, are inexhaustible, that are presented as the room for manoeuvre that will only open up for Scotland's policy through secession: "we can create a fairer, greener, more prosperous country for all." (Yes Scotland 2014)

Many of those favouring secession were convinced that secession would increase prosperity in Scotland. Over three years (2012, 2013, and 2014), representative personal interviews were conducted to find out what consequences those in favour of secession expected secession to have (see ScotCen 2014: 12-13). Two-thirds of those who said they favoured Scottish secession in the respective polls believed it would lead to a better future.

However, what were the reasons for being confident in this regard? The survey asked about the anticipation of economic consequences, consequences for inequality as the "gap between rich and poor" in Scotland and "Scotland's voice in the world". Only 5 to 6 per cent of those surveyed who were in favour of secession linked Scotland's political independence to a deterioration in the economy. Around 80 % were convinced that secession would (still) improve Scotland's economic situation in the future.

While this assessment of economic consequences and the question of national self-determination remained constant at 2 to 3 percentage points over the three-year survey period, the assessments have changed significantly in another dimension. I refer here to the anticipation of inclusion mediation by the welfare state. Particularly during the last two surveys before the referendum (2013 and 2014), optimism regarding the reduction of inequality as the "gap between rich and poor" increased significantly (by 14 percentage points) to 75 %.

Those in favour of secession were convinced that secession was the path to a successful future that would bring Scotland more economic growth and reduce inequality at the same time. The appreciation of egalitarianism can also be seen in the referendum result. In none of the other four dimensions—last voted party in regional or EU election, respondent's ancestry, national identity—did Stephen Ayres find a higher correlation between the proportion of votes in favour of secession than with the number of recipients of state welfare and unemployment benefits (Ayres 2014). These inclusion-mediating benefits of the welfare state show a correlation coefficient of 0.807 with the referendum result. A powerful and positive correlation exists between welfare state benefits and the willingness to vote in favour of Scottish secession in the referendum (Foley 2024: 139). Already receiving state benefits—unemployment benefits or social assistance—was more likely to lead to a vote in favour of secession (exceptions are the two border regions with England: Dumfries and Galloway and Scottish Borders).

This suggests that tackling social inequality was not interpreted as a contradiction to secession but was seen as an opportunity offered by secession.

According to Lord Ashcroft's post-election survey (Lord Ashcroft 2014), government revenue and spending were as important an issue for those favouring secession as it was for those against it. For example, many favouring independence were convinced that "free NHS healthcare" could only be preserved through Scotland's statehood, as stated in the leaflet "Learn why only Yes can save our NHS". In the secession campaign, state benefits were taken so much for granted that their future was not one of the most critical issues.

Scotland's Future, the white paper of the secession campaign, explicitly distinguishes this future, particularly in terms of social and economic policy, from that of the United Kingdom as follows:

> "In the longer term, this Scottish Government will pursue policies which conform with the idea that welfare is a 'social investment' – an investment across a person's life that is designed at all stages to promote equality, fairness and social cohesion. […] It offers an alternative approach to that being pursued by Westminster." (Scottish Government 2013: 160, 162)

The focus of Scotland's future fiscal and regulatory policy should not be on minimum security, but on "[i]nvestments in childcare, education, health and active labour market policies" (Scottish Government 2013: 162; for more details see Wiggan 2017; Mooney/Scott 2015, 2016).

Scotland's self-government and future orientation in economic growth and egalitarianism were the central motives for voting in favour of secession in the referendum. Hence, for Scotland's democratic nationalism, the future orientation

concerning the opportunity to live by the national commitment of egalitarianism (see Chapter 4) is more important than the history of the national cultural collective.

2.2 Motives against secession

Gloomy predictions for the economy's future were at the forefront of the UK government and Labour-backed pro-union campaign. In his last speech before the referendum, David Cameron explained that he did not want to spread fear but had to warn of the foreseeable consequences of secession, which would affect generations:

> "To warn of the consequences is not to scare-monger it is like warning a friend about a decision they might take that will affect the rest of their lives – and the lives of their children. I say all this because I don't want the people of Scotland to be sold a dream that disappears." (Dearden 2014)

The attempts to campaign for Scotland to remain in the United Kingdom referred to below as the union campaign, had an unmistakable strategy. It spread economic predictions to deter the Scottish people from secession. The by-election polls showed how successful this strategy was. Not only did the union campaign win the referendum, but it won the victory primarily by emphasising economic concerns about the future. Currency uncertainty was the most important reason for voting against secession. Worries about pension rights followed concerns about the currency, the NHS and Scotland's taxes and public spending (Lord Ashcroft 2014).

The currency and other complicated arguments allowed the union campaign to campaign actively against Scottish independence. In addition to this set of motifs linked to economics, a promise of the union campaign aimed at political inclusion is analysed.

2.2.1 Costs

National independence promises uncertainty above all else. See, for example, Jim Gallagher's assessment. As a strategic advisor to the union campaign, he explained to me three weeks before the referendum that the strategy is to recognise and highlight dangers:

> "[I]n the Yes Campaign it is only the Scottish government argument. It is that independence is not very much of a change at all. […] [A]n independent Scotland [would] keep the Queen, it would keep the Pound, and it would probably keep the BBC, it would share the administration of welfare and so on. And this is all an attempt to de-risk the argument for independence, make it sound much less like a

> radical change and much more like a small development. A part of our own task at the BTC [Better Together Campaign] is to make clear actually independence would be quite different. And I think we have been reasonably successful on that." (Gallagher 2014)

Secession would cost jobs, cause economic uncertainty and raise the question of how an independent Scottish state should finance its public spending. This is the assessment of another adviser to the union campaign, MSP Jackie Baillie, also a Better Together Campaign Board member for the Scottish Labour Party. She said,

> "the main issues that we thought, the key issues that people would make decisions on, were principally about jobs and the economy because everything boils down to you, how individuals feel, they would be better or worse off financially. Whether that was their job, their mortgage, how much they paid for things, ahm, you know all of that matters to the economy overall, and it matters to business, but it matters in a very personal way, to people sitting at home. So the principal thing was jobs and the economy. A secondary issue: But one we – I think – we exploited quite well – was about the finances of the nation beyond the economy. Ahm, the fact that we would have a fiscal gap […] So it was a combination of the hard arguments – around about the economy and the fiscal deficit, and how we would afford to do things, ok, and then the emotional kind of, you know, we are a family of nations – don't leave! Which worked quite well. Which actually was copied I think from what happened in Québec and the rest of Canada." (Baillie 2015)

The union campaign emphasised negative economic future scenarios that would occur as a result of secession. As Gallagher explains, the experiences that Canadian governments had with the secession movement in Quebec at the end of the 20th century played an important role. Ken Symon says the same about his strategy for campaigning against Scottish secession. Symon, who was responsible for engaging businesses on the union campaign side, had tried to "[to] convince more Scottish businesses […] to go public with their worries, the way Montreal's business community famously bolstered the federalist side in 1995 with talk of having to move jobs out of the province following a vote to separate." (Mackinnon 2014)[3]

As with the currency issue, economic concerns were used to campaign against secession. The focus was on regionally essential jobs and economic sectors, as Baillie explains:

3 "BBC economics editor Robert Peston said that Downing Street accepts that the Prime Minister has been putting pressure on bosses to go public with their concerns that prices would rise in an independent Scotland." (BBC 2014b)

> "Our campaign was different in the sense that we didn't do every street, we didn't go out – you know, the SNP and other people would go out and campaign and they do every street and singing, and lots of activity and fun and whatever – ours was much more focused. […] So, it depends where you were, what issues were important. If you were in Edinburgh, financial services, a lot of people working in financial services didn't want this to happen because of the impact on their jobs and their sector. If you worked in the defense sector, similarly. […] So there were difference in how we targeted people, but there are also differences in how we spoke to people working in different sectors, because actually that mattered to them on a very personal level. So we were less fun, less visible, more effective." (Baillie 2015)

An example is the jobs associated with the UK nuclear bases in Scotland. The SNP, Greens and some independent MPs have repeatedly spoken out in favour of dismantling these nuclear bases. In motions and election programmes, they rejected these bases because nuclear weapons, as weapons of mass destruction, do not differentiate between the military and the civilian population in their effects. They also rejected them because of the economic costs: The population share of operating costs to be provided by Scotland alone was estimated in a 2011 SNP response at £170m per annum, and the renewal announced by Westminster in July 2014 at a share of an additional £240m per annum. There were also risks to ongoing operations.[4] With political independence, according to SNP MPs, the UK's nuclear weapons programme in Scotland will also come to an end in the first parliamentary term, and Scotland will campaign for nuclear disarmament in global politics (see Scottish Government 2013: 53). This is also the wording of motion S4M-10724, which was supported by the current First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon and triggered parliamentary debates in Scotland five weeks before the secession referendum and against the background of the renewal of the nuclear weapons programme announced by Westminster.

Jackie Baillie and other Labour MSPs asked about the alternatives for the jobs reliant on these nuclear weapons bases. Baillie had already tabled an amendment to an earlier SNP motion (S4M-00045.1). In it, she argues that these bases in the west of Scotland are one of the most important local employers. Secession and, therefore, closure of these bases would threaten up to 11 thousand jobs. A quarter of all full-time employees in her West Dunbartonshire constituency are directly affected by the security of these jobs. In terms of annual operating costs of £170m (2011), this would have meant that one of these jobs would have cost Scotland £15,454 a year, slightly more than the gross value added in these constituencies of £14,135 (2011). Taking into account the projected additional costs of refurbishing the nuclear weapons bases totalling GBP 410 million at the time, one job would cost GBP 37,272 (2014), two and

4 Especially after collisions (see the motion S3M-03460) and reports such as If Britain fired Trident (S4M-0573, S4M-05784) and most recently The Secret Nuclear Threat (see S4M-13201, S4M-14260).

a half times the average gross value added in this region at the time (own calculation based on Office for National Statistics 2016b). Although this constituency is one of Scotland's economically weakest local authorities, it was one of the constituencies in which the majority voted in favour of secession and the probable loss of these jobs.

Another example of the union campaign's strategy of using economic concerns about the future to campaign against Scottish independence is the 'facts' of the following Better Together mailshot (Better Together 2014).

Figure 6: Mailshot from Better Together



Scotland's national independence would lead to losing the currency union with the pound. Not having the solid currency of the pound would cost: Increases in in-

terest rates and mortgages and a higher "FAMILY SHOPPING BILL" are mentioned. Uncertainties regarding pension entitlements and public spending on schools and hospitals are also mentioned. These are "THE FACTS YOU NEED FOR YOUR BIG DECISION", as it says in large letters on the front.

On the back of this folded mailshot, one of the main sponsors of the union campaign looks on sympathetically. Introduced as the author of Harry Potter, J.K. Rowling appears as an author who knows all about the creation and dangers of fantasy worlds. Living in Edinburgh at the time of the publication of her first Harry Potter novel and then on welfare, Rowling is now arguably the wealthiest woman in the world. She supported the union campaign with GBP 1 million. Implicitly, Rowling is being promoted as a role model because her career shows what is possible in the real world of the UK. Rowling calls on voters to think carefully about the reasons for their decision. Reasons given in this mailshot emphasise financial concerns that would loom in the event of secession: rising interest rates on loans and food costs, uncertainty over currency and pension entitlements, and how the current "£1,200 higher public spending per Scot" would be funded. Are we prepared to accept these threats to Scotland's political independence, especially economic ones?

Not in the slightest. At least, that is the view in the following example. It is a television advert by Better Together, entitled *The woman who made up her mind* (Better Together, 2014b), which puts reality centre stage.[5] This advert was first broadcast three weeks before the referendum. As seen in the advert, a woman dressed in the colours of Labour (red) enters the frame, sits at the kitchen table and enjoys the quiet to reflect on her decision. In an accentuated Scots, she lists arguments in favour of and against secession, talks about the excitement her husband is experiencing in this regard and the exaggerated hopes Alex Salmond is making on television for the future after secession. In order to reach a decision, she emphasises community ties ("local hospital" and school) and several family roles that she has to anticipate as a mother, wife, housewife, grandmother and daughter about her vote in the referendum. In contrast, the secession campaign seems naive in its hope of being able to pay for everything with the oil resources: "Independence seems to be like one big gamble". However, she will not gamble with her children's future and will vote against secession.

On the one hand, this advert also discusses secession, especially against irreversible consequences for the welfare state (healthcare and schools). On the other hand, this leads into the next set of motifs; this discussion is linked to a person's communal and family ties. The Scottish accent and the quote from the campaign as the closing words that she wants the best for Scotland emphasise the identification with Scotland. Work, living in a functioning community, the well-being and security of one's family and the appreciation of Scottish characteristics such as the

5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLAewTVmkAU (Accessed 27 January 2024).

accent are, according to the actress in this Union campaign advert, more important than the question of whether Scotland always gets the government that most of Scotland's voting electorate have chosen. As a housewife and worker, responsibility is emphasised in this union campaign ad and contrasted with the promises of the secession campaign. Finally, the actress emphasises two limitations of the policy. Both contrast with the central motif of the secession campaign (self-government) and emphasise the environment of politics. It is about family and the future of her children and grandchildren. She also talks about the fact that there are other and more important things besides politics: with "time to get to work", she steps out of the picture, and the advertising film ends.

2.2.2 Regional autonomy

The economic uncertainty of secession was why most people opposed Scotland's secession. Another category of reasons followed this. These reasons have to do with personal attachment to the United Kingdom: 27 % of those who opposed Scotland's secession in the referendum justified this decision based on 'shared history, culture and tradition', 25 % believed in the extension of regional autonomy and thus self-government in the United Kingdom (see Lord Ashcroft 2014; cf. Henderson/Mitchell 2015). The following section shows how vital these pseudo-nationalist motives were in the union campaign.

The union campaign argued that Scotland should be understood as the nation of the multinational and democratic state that the United Kingdom is through its regional autonomies. The union campaign has sought to stage the United Kingdom as a thriving multinational democracy. This staging went so far that promises were made to extend Scotland's regional autonomy in the final days before the referendum.

One example is the speech given by then-Prime Minister David Cameron in February 2014. In this speech, the people of the Kingdom are called upon to commit to the union campaign because Scotland is a constituent nation of the United Kingdom. "[A]ddressed not so much to the people of Scotland but to the people of England, Wales and Northern Ireland" is this speech, which Cameron delivered seven months before the referendum. In it, he calls on the population to actively campaign for Scotland to remain in the United Kingdom by "phone, get together, email, tweet, speak". In addition to the advantages that the United Kingdom offers the Scottish people—several "compelling practical reasons" such as "pounds and pence, institutional questions"—Cameron mentions another motive. According to Cameron, Scotland's secession could cause the world to lose this island of liberal and multinational democracy, thereby jeopardising democracy itself:

> "We've shown that democracy and prosperity can go hand in hand; that resolution is found not through the bullet, but the ballot box. Our values are of value to the world. In the darkest times in human history there has been, in the North Sea, a light that never goes out. And if this family of nations broke up, something very powerful and very precious the world over would go out forever." (Cameron 2014a)

Secession was presented as an issue of global political significance rather than just a domestic ethno-national affair. Scotland's secession would also destroy the most critical example of multinational democracy, as Cameron repeated in his last speech before the referendum:

> "If Scotland votes yes, the UK will split, and we will go our separate ways forever. […] The United Kingdom would be no more. No UK pensions, no UK passports, no UK pound. The greatest example of democracy the world has ever known, of openness, of people of different nationalities and faiths coming together as one, would be no more. […] We are a family. The United Kingdom is not one nation. We are four nations in a single country. […] Don't let anyone tell you that you can't be a proud Scot and a proud Brit. Don't lose faith in what this country is – and what we can be. […] So please […] vote to save our United Kingdom. Don't forget what a great United Kingdom you are part of." (Dearden 2014)

The United Kingdom is interpreted as a multinational democracy consisting of four constituent nations: 'We are four nations in a single country'. The loss of a single nation would dissolve the United Kingdom. Britishness is understood as an identity still superior to the individual nations. Overall, the United Kingdom has a multinational character based on the following four constituent nations: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Multinationalism also takes centre stage in the following example. In it, the leaders of the three main national parties – David Cameron (Conservative Party), Ed Miliband (Labour Party) and Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrats) – content to the Vow:

> "The Scottish Parliament is permanent and extensive new powers for the Parliament will be delivered by the process and to the timetable agreed and announced by our three parties, starting on 19th September. And it is our hope that the people of Scotland will be engaged directly as each party works to improve the way we are governed in the UK in the years ahead. We agree that the UK exists to ensure opportunity and security for all by sharing our resources equitably across all four nations to secure the defence, prosperity and welfare of every citizen. […] People want to see change. A No vote will deliver faster, safer and better change than separation." (Clegg 2014)

The party leaders have agreed that the Scottish people should continue to govern themselves to an increasing extent. However, the timing and extent of these new concessions will be left to the agreement of the three main national parties.

The Vow was agreed on 15 September and published on the front page of the Daily Record the next day, two days before the referendum. According to Murray Foote, the editor at the time (2015), the Daily Record's editorial team initiated the Vow. Murray asked a former staffer who now works for another former columnist for the paper, Gordon Brown, the following question: "Would Gordon be able to get the three party leaders to sign an agreed wording Daily Record pledge for more devolved powers for Scotland? We could then present that as a front page document." (Foote 2015)

The employee agreed. Brown contacted the current Prime Minister, David Cameron, Murray contacted Ed Miliband and the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, also responded to the request. At the end of this short chain of contact between the leaders of the parties in the governing coalition (Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats) and the largest opposition party (Labour Party) came the vow. Although the request for "more devolved powers" came from the Daily Record, the wording of the oath came exclusively from the offices of Brown and the three party leaders, as Murray reports. After its publication, the oath was interpreted as a binding concession in the final speeches of Gordon Brown, Ed Miliband and David Cameron. A No to secession, as Cameron, for example, said in the final speech in Aberdeen quoted above, would set off a "trigger" for "a major, unprecedented programme of devolution with additional powers for the Scottish Parliament"(Dearden 2014).

Scotland's national inclusion, the emphasis on national characteristics and the autonomy required for this would continue to have a place in the United Kingdom in the future. Scotland's national inclusion should not lead to self-exclusion, which takes the form of secession, but exclusion should be avoided. Scotland should remain an integral part of the United Kingdom despite its particular ways.

This attempt at national integration of Scotland into the United Kingdom is particularly evident in the following speech by former Scottish Prime Minister Gordon Brown. He makes this speech several times during the final days of the campaign.

A brief digression to clarify the dramatic context of this speech is clarifies this point. The report by Ben Riley-Smith (2014) on the work at Better Together headquarters is helpful here. According to this report, they were primarily guided by a survey which showed that around 20 % of undecided voters had no emotional attachment to the UK. The conclusion was to emphasise "economic risk": "We scared them on the basis that if people didn't understand the consequences they would vote Yes", as he quotes one of these strategists (Riley-Smith 2014). The first televised duel between the two opponents – Alex Salmond for the secession campaign and Alistair Darling from the then opposition party in the United Kingdom (Labour Party) – on 5 August 2014 confirmed this assessment.

According to a poll, the duel went 56 to 44 in favour of the union campaign. A central theme of this televised duel was uncertainty over the currency. For Better Together, this was followed by "the best two or three weeks of that campaign", in which nothing other than the currency was debated, as one employee reported. But after the second and final televised duel, the situation came to a head: Salmond presented "Three Plan Bs" on the currency issue. The secessionist campaign focused on other 'emotive' issues in the three weeks between the televised duels—in particular, concerns about the privatisation of the NHS Scotland. According to the subsequent poll, the secession campaign won this second televised debate on 25 August by 71 votes to 29. Over the next few days—particularly since 6 September, the polls predicted an increasingly close result between Yes and No. At the end of that first week of September, two weeks before the referendum, there were frenetic scenes at Better Together headquarters, as Riley-Smith notes. Senior politicians from the national parties travelled to Scotland to respond to the surprisingly close polls. The vow described above and the following speech in which Gordon Brown campaigns against secession date from this period.

Brown's acquitted speech in Glasgow the day before the referendum repeats the content of a speech made in Clydebank the previous evening. However, the nature of the message "wasn't so much a speech as a prayer", as John Grace, responsible for day-to-day politics at the Guardian, commented (Grace 2014). Brown begins by distinguishing between "our patriotic vision" and the SNP's "nationalist vision" (cited from LabourList 2014). His patriotic vision, as the signs in the background say, is based on a "Love Scotland", a pride in Scotland, the core of which Brown sees in "sharing" and "collaboration". In contrast, the nationalist vision promises "to break every single constitutional and political link with our friends, neighbours and friends in the United Kingdom". Tomorrow's referendum, he continues, is not about whether Scotland is a nation, whether Scotland has a parliament or whether it will get more political power: "We are a nation", Scotland has a parliament and "we are all agreed to increased powers." The real question is whether you agree "to break and severe every link". This point-by-point depiction of the consequences of secession emphasises what Brown calls entering an "economic minefield". Brown lists seven welfare state and economic risks before outlining a "vision" for Scotland in the UK that echoes the contents of the Vow. Nevertheless, beyond Scotland and the United Kingdom, what a "message sent to the world" would it be if secession were declared should be considered.

Another striking aspect of this speech is the localisation of the United Kingdom. As well as trying to portray secession as an economic minefield, Brown talks about the UK as a multinational democracy. The "emotional kind of, you know, we are a family of nations—don't leave" argument, as Baillie calls this strategy (Baillie 2015), is expressed in this. Scotland is interpreted as one of the four constituent nations

of the United Kingdom and thus attempts integration as a nation within the United Kingdom.

What the multinational democracy of the United Kingdom also implies became apparent a few hours after Brown's final speech. When the result was known the morning after the vote, and the majority of those who voted (55.3 %) favoured remaining in the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister made the following speech. Cameron begins with the result "have kept our country of 4 nations together" and comes to the following implication a few sentences later:

> "I am a passionate believer in our United Kingdom – I wanted more than anything for our United Kingdom to stay together. But I am also a democrat. And it was right that we respected the SNP's majority in Holyrood and gave the Scottish people their right to have their say. […] Just as the people of Scotland will have more power over their affairs, so it follows that the people of England, Wales and Northern Ireland must have a bigger say over theirs. The rights of these voters need to be respected, preserved and enhanced as well. It is absolutely right that a new and fair settlement for Scotland should be accompanied by a new and fair settlement that applies to all parts of our United Kingdom. […] I have long believed that a crucial part missing from this national discussion is England. We have heard the voice of Scotland – and now the millions of voices of England must also be heard. The question of English votes for English laws – the so-called West Lothian question – requires a decisive answer. So, just as Scotland will vote separately in the Scottish Parliament on their issues of tax, spending and welfare, so too England, as well as Wales and Northern Ireland, should be able to vote on these issues and all this must take place in tandem with, and at the same pace as, the settlement for Scotland." (Cameron 2014b)

After Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, it is only democratic if the largest national population of the United Kingdom is now also heard: England. Emphasising the large population, the Prime Minister speaks here of the millions of votes from England, who must now have their turn to decide on themselves as a nation. As a democrat, he was convinced of this. The highly different population figures between the four constituent nations of the United Kingdom are used to prioritise England. The concession of Scotland's regional autonomy, as well as the patriotic appreciation of the Scottish nation, have their significance in that they also allow England to be understood as a nation which, due to its numerical superiority, is also to be conceded a 'democratic' prerogative in the United Kingdom (see Geser 1992: 645).

This is how, for example, the secession advocate Gillian Martin (SNP) interpreted the British Prime Minister's assessment just quoted. Martin was convinced that the rapid growth in SNP membership after the referendum was due to Cameron's speech:

> "He just mentioned how England would going to get more power and I think the people were so angry that they decided to support the SNP because it was very apparent in that speech that he was not going to keep to his promise. And that he was going to use the Scottish result as an opportunity to further marginalize Scotland." (Martin 2015)

Martin repeats the secession campaign centred on Scotland's self-government. Whether or not the problem of England's national self-determination, which was again addressed in Cameron's speech, can be solved institutionally in the United Kingdom (for suggestions see Gallagher 2015), it certainly shows the orientation towards the concept of multiple nations of the United Kingdom. As a multinational democracy that values majority rather than consensus democracy above all else, as shown in the Chapter on national symbolism, these nations cannot be denied the right to national self-determination within the UK. The 'British' appreciation of majoritarian democracy suggests that the different numbers of the four national populations should also be recognised institutionally, as David Cameron suggested at the time. What applies to Scotland and what perhaps brought about the Scottish autonomy movement in the United Kingdom in the first place cannot be denied to the most populous nation in this Kingdom.

2.3 Conclusion

Let us summarise the results of this Chapter on motives. The union campaign reacted to the upcoming Scottish independence referendum. They emphasized the social environment of Scottish politics. The focus was on the economic dependencies of Scottish politics. In the event of independence, we could expect higher consumer prices, job losses, a gap in the national budget, and uncertainties about pension entitlements and payments. And for what? For Scotland's self-government. At least, that was the response of the secession campaign. The principle of self-government convinced them. They tried to involve as many people as possible in Scotland's politics to emphasize the claim to statehood.

Yet, those who favoured Scotland's political independence from the UK firmly believed that they did not have to renounce prosperity. Against the backdrop of increasing economic and political globalisation, including trade alliances and military alliances, secession will pave the way to a prosperous economic future. This future will be economically successful if it increases economic growth. It must also create opportunities for an increasingly large part of the population to benefit from it. It must also increase political participation. Scotland's quest for independence has been focused on self-government. It has also focused on social and economic poli-

cies, with an emphasis on egalitarianism. The months leading up to the 2014 referendum demonstrated this.

The secession campaign was, above all, a democratic movement. It framed the collective from the side of the people in favour of statehood. The next Chapter will explore the extent to which the individual's autonomy is rooted in the population living in Scotland.

The focus of the union campaign to keep Scotland in the United Kingdom was different. The extension of internal autonomy was a late argument used to promote Scotland's membership of the United Kingdom as a national cultural community. Scots were repeatedly reassured that they were a constituent nation of the United Kingdom. Therefore, they are an integral part of this multinational majority democracy. The unionist campaign conceptualized the Scottish people as a national collective – i.e. united by dialect and pride. Autocratic Nationalism legitimises itself from the collective perspective. It is to be located on the side of the union campaign. Democratic nationalism is on the side of the Scottish aspiration for statehood.

3 Political collective

Scotland's regional nation of presence

Only Scotland's population should decide on its policies. Political self-rule by the population of Scotland was the main reason for voting in favour of Scotland's secession in the referendum. However, who should be able to participate in Scotland's national politics? As the song Son I Voted Yes by Stanley Odd puts it, simple geography should decide this question of political participation, e.g. foot voting. In the Scottish political system, and especially in the quest for autonomy, the typical demarcation of the collective at the regional level is radicalised. First and foremost, Scotland is a regional nation of presence.

Sociologically, the demarcation of the collective centres on a core process of world society. It is about the development process of function systems. According to Rudolf Stichweh (Stichweh 1988, 2005), function systems only attain their autonomy by succeeding in opening up opportunities for inclusion for an ever-larger proportion of the population. Politics is a function system. It is primarily differentiated in territorial states called polities. Today, almost all are nation-states. In this Chapter, I argue that Scotland's quest for autonomy shows the emergence of a polity through increasing absorption of the population. An increasing proportion of the Scottish population participated in Scottish politics in one way or another. Scotland gradually emerged as a political system in its own right. All this occurred through a radicalisation of the territorial demarcation typical of political inclusion at the level of a region.

On the one hand, the population is included as voters in the performance roles of the political system (e.g. self-rule). On the other hand, the population is included in complementary roles or as a public. Someone might participate as a recipient of the political system in Scotland and, therefore, is included in public role provided for by the welfare-state. In addition, there is the inclusion as a public and in the form of public opinion, for example about what it means to be Scottish. Chapter 3 asks about the possibilities and limits of inclusion in the performance roles of the political system in Scotland. The following Chapters deal with inclusion via the welfare-state of the Scottish political system (Chapter 4) and with inclusion as a public/public opinion (Chapters 5 and 6).

In order to participate in Scotland's national politics, it is not essential to be born in Scotland, to have parents from Scotland or to have distinguished oneself through merit. What counts for Scotland's national inclusion/exclusion today is whether a person is present in Scotland and whether they have their centre of life there.

Based on this diagnosis, in this Chapter, I develop the thesis that the political collective increases national inclusion and exclusion through internal political structures. In the Scottish case, this is through presence within the territorial boundaries (see Roeder 2007, 2014). Like the other function systems, politics—in the case analysed here—creates its collective out of itself by the process of inclusion as well as by the threat of becoming excluded through for example a 'power grab' (Siroky/Cuffe 2015; Cunningham 2014; Wimmer/Cederman/Min 2009; Wimmer/Min 2006). This enables democratic politics to govern itself increasingly precisely through its population, as only those who actually live in the respective polity can be included as a population.

However, how can the definition of the collective on which the Scottish quest for autonomy is based be analysed? Through self-assessments by Scottish nationalists and through the electoral law of Scottish politics. Specifically, I demonstrate the primacy of residence-based inclusion/exclusion by the following four sources:

1. The Scottish National Party (SNP) its campaign for secession
2. Self-assessments of SNP members concerning becoming Scottish
3. Voting eligibility in the secession referendum
4. Recent electoral reforms in Scotland

Self-assessments of autonomy-seeking activists and low-threshold inclusion in Scottish politics illustrate the interpretation of the political collective as a community. Self-rule is demanded for the population settled in Scotland at any given time. In the Scottish political system, and especially in the quest for autonomy, the typical demarcation of the collective at the regional level is radicalised. First and foremost, Scotland is a regional nation of presence.

In contrast, considerations of Scottish citizenship reveal how the national cultural collective, which is to be distinguished from the people, is formed. Access to a hypothetically assumed citizenship in the draft constitutions is not based on presence in Scotland. It depends on a person's ancestry, albeit comparatively inclusive. The final section of the Chapter explains why the territorial demarcation of the Scottish collective was more important than a collective based on ethnicity. The explanation is based on the specific demographics of Scotland.

3.1 Voluntarist and residential demarcation

The political collective in the quest for national autonomy is not demarcated by descent but simply geographically, as the song Son I Voted Yes by Stanley Odd puts it:

> "This isn't about the colour of skin
> Or where you were born, or who you call kin
> It's about pure and simple geography" (Stanley Odd 2014)

As paradoxical as it sounds for a secessionist movement, statehood is being sought for those living in a specified territory at any given time. The address of residence demarcates the Scottish collective of political inclusion. In one of the oldest nations in Europe, as the separatists point out, the nation in our day is defined by the people and national history is superseded (cf. Leith, M. S./D. Sim 2020).

An example of this is the Scottish National Party (SNP) advertising, favouring Scottish statehood, as an SNP election manifesto from 1997 shows. At that time, a vote was held on legislative and fiscal devolution. The manifesto promised a Scotland "that doesn't ask where you've come from, but where we are all going together" (Leith 2008: 88). The expected future of the political collective, not the shared national history, is, therefore, the point of reference for belonging or not belonging to the Scottish collective.

At the beginning of the secession campaign, an SNP MP again emphasised this. This was "based on the community […] rather than it being based on some kind of strange ideal of what it means to be ethnically Scottish" (cited in Hepburn 2015: 4). The MP distinguishes the community from the principle of ethnicity. Being Scottish, therefore, has nothing to do with ethnicity or Scottish descent.

The then First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond, comparably campaigned for secession. For example, in his "Declaration of Opportunity", which Salmond presented one month before the referendum on Scottish secession:

> "[T]he declaration we make is a declaration of opportunity, not just for the country but for the people of Scotland. […] We need to end the desperate situation where we educate so many bright people, only to see them leave Scotland. Our aim will be to ensure as many people as possible can reach the top of their career ladder here in Scotland." (Salmond 2014)

The future takes centre stage. We are not talking about Scottish history or descent but about competition for people who do not necessarily come from Scotland but who have settled there and should, if possible, remain in Scotland. In order to achieve the latter, according to Salmond, it would be advantageous to base political

decisions on who is affected. According to his logic, those affected by the political situation in Scotland are those who, at a given time, live and work in Scotland:

> "It is better for all our futures if decisions about Scotland are taken by the people who care most about Scotland – the people who live and work here." (Salmond 2014)

People who live in Scotland and see their future there are being addressed. Over the years, this phrase about the Scottish people, i.e. those who live and work in Scotland, has become a guiding principle of the Scottish autonomy endeavour. It does not refer to the Scottish people but to the people in Scotland, not "the Scottish people" but "the people of Scotland".

First Minister Nicola Sturgeon (2016) used this formula to recall the secession referendum and linked it to the referendum on the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union: "[T]he big decisions about Scotland—including the decision about our EU membership—should be taken by those who live and work here." Shared living space takes centre stage.

Ruth Breeze also comes to this conclusion. She examined the election programmes of the four major competing parties in Scotland for the 2010 and 2015 elections to the House of Commons. According to her, "Scottish" in the SNP's two election manifestos is limited to political institutions such as the Scottish Parliament or the Scottish Executive. It is not used as 'Scottish people'. In general, the SNP has only half the number of mentions of 'people' in the 2010 and 2015 manifestos compared to the other parties, particularly in contrast to Scottish Labour. What stands out in the SNP's election manifestos, on the other hand, are the geographical references, which are almost twice as frequent at 4.3 per 100 words (2010) and 3.5 per 100 words (2015) (see Breeze 2019: 34-35). These are mostly the personifying and possessive form of "Scotland", such as in 'Scotland's got what it takes'.[1] This illustrates the importance of residential demarcation.

I take a final example from a survey of SNP party members. James Mitchell et al. (2009) asked 7,112 SNP members (2007/2008) what it means to them to be 'truly Scottish'. The respondents were staunch Scots and separatists: 77.4 % described themselves as "Scottish not British", 16 % as "more Scottish than British". Only 11.9 %

1 "Although the SNP also uses combinations such as *people in Scotland* […], its manifesto notably contains no fewer than 85 examples of the possessive form *Scotland's*, which only appears 9 times in the Liberal Democrat manifesto, 5 times in the Conservative manifesto and once in the Labour text. […] Although these differences are small, it does seem that in this particular case, the Liberal Democrat, Labour and Conservative tendency to situate things and people 'in Scotland,' just as they might be any other geographical area, contrasts with the SNP representation of Scotland as an entity in its own right, often personified, and often with rights of entitlement over the resources and qualities attributed to it." (Breeze 2019: 42-43)

favoured 'devolution' (more regional autonomy), but 87.2 % favoured secession (see Mitchell et al., 2009: 73). Arno van der Zwet (2015: 73) has taken up the opinion poll by James Mitchell et al. and worked out the following result: Feeling Scottish was rated by SNP members as the most important criterion for being 'truly Scottish'.

These results show how important it is to SNP members what a person thinks about themselves in terms of their membership of a national social collective. From the point of view of SNP members, self-determined identification with the Scottish nation is the most important criterion for belonging to this nation. On a scale of 1 (unimportant) to 4 (important), this voluntaristic component was assigned the highest relevance with a mean value of 3.73. The appreciation to choose your national identity by yourself is also reflected in the second-placed value of 3.5: the willingness to respect Scottish laws and institutions.

This is followed in third place by the residential community. With a value of 3.2, respondents answered that "[t]o live in Scotland now" is essential to be truly Scottish.

Less critical, on the other hand, are Scottish descent (2.64), being born in Scotland (2.81) or having spent most of your life in Scotland (2.85). The very inclusive language category (English, Gaelic or Scots) is one of the more critical dimensions at 3.01 but does not necessarily indicate ethnic or cultural nationalism (cf. Reeskens/Hooghe 2010).

In order to be Scottish from the perspective of SNP members, the criteria based on individual self-determination, identifying oneself as Scottish and respecting Scottish institutions are the most important. Criteria related to parents (ancestry, place of birth, and socialisation) are therefore less important. In contrast, criteria related to individual choice are more highly valued among SNP members: national self-identification, respect for Scottish institutions and current residence in Scotland.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to distinguish here between voluntarist and residential orientations. From the perspective of SNP respondents, the two most important aspects of being genuinely Scottish are voluntaristic. People decide which nation they belong to and which institutions and laws they defend. Autonomy creates itself out of itself.

Many who see themselves exclusively as Scottish (around a quarter of the population) are committed to Scotland's national self-determination and have spoken out in favour of secession in the referendum and in surveys afterwards (see Curtice 2017: 5). Nevertheless, Scottish nationalism addresses "the people who live and work here". From the assessments of SNP members, it must be concluded that they essentially agree with the residential interpretation of the Scottish collective, provided that the person concerned and living in Scotland wants to see themselves as Scottish: "If you live and work in Scotland, you're a Scot, and if you want to be. […] You need to want to be part of it." (Interview SNP MSP [L1] in Meer 2015: 1487)

'To be 'truly' Scottish, voluntarism is most important to SNP members. However, voluntarism is distinguished from the view that only those who live in Scotland should have a say in Scotland's politics. Regarding reflecting on who in Scotland can and may make collectively binding decisions, Scotland's political inclusion is based on the people living in Scotland.

The socio-structural effectiveness of the nation's voluntarist and residential demarcation is illustrated below using the example of the franchise and its most recent reforms.

3.2 Voting rights: "the people who live and work here"

Who could vote for or against the creation of a Scottish state in the referendum on 18 September 2014? It was promised that those who live in Scotland would decide. The Scottish Government justified this orientation towards the principle of residence on the basis of international law and Scotland's popular sovereignty:

> "The franchise […] most closely reflects residency in Scotland and has been chosen for that reason. The choice of this franchise reflects the internationally accepted principle that the franchise for constitutional referendums should be determined by residency and the Scottish Government's view that sovereignty lies with the people of Scotland." (Scottish Government 2012b: 20; zum Vorrang schottischer Volks- statt Parlamentssouveränität Lord Advocate 1953)

However, how important was residential demarcation in the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013? This Act governed registration and voting in the secession referendum. The residential demarcation of Scotland is at its heart. Under the Act, anyone who has a residential address in Scotland within the registration period and registers to vote in the referendum in the relevant constituency is entitled to vote. To register, the annual canvass was sent to all households in Scotland by post from 1 October 2013 to 10 March 2014. Anyone who did not receive this invitation to register was not registered or moved to Scotland at a later date was able to register at their constituency office ('rolling registration'). The registration deadline to be allowed to vote in the secession referendum was 2 September 2014 (see Electoral Commission 2014: §3.13, §4.11). In extreme cases, anyone with a residential address in Scotland on a single day of the registration period (1 October 2013 to 2 September 2014) had the opportunity to register for the referendum on 18 September 2014, provided they met the other criteria.

In addition to residence, there were other restrictions: Minimum age, limitation by eligible citizenship and legal incapacity to vote (2013: §2) of the person in question. Persons entitled to vote must be at least 16 years old on the day of the refer-

endum, 18 September 2014. In addition, the person must have one of the following citizenship: British, Irish, EU, or Commonwealth countries (the latter only applies if the person has a permanent UK residence permit or is exempt from this requirement).

A total of 4.284 million people registered for the secession referendum. This corresponds to around 80 % of the total population of Scotland (Electoral Commission 2014: 4.10). Around 2.6 % of those registered were young people who were eligible to vote in Scotland for the first time due to the lowering of the minimum age from 18 to 16.

3.2.1 Comparison with the UK

There are only two similarities between the access conditions of the voting collective in Scotland's secession referendum and the UK's right to vote. Firstly, Scottish-born military and royal personnel were eligible to vote in the secession referendum, regardless of their current residence or location (2,750 eligible voters as of March 2014, see National Records of Scotland 2015).

Secondly, as in UK electoral law, prison inmates were excluded from voting in the secession referendum. How many residents were excluded from the referendum by this legal ineligibility limited to prison inmates? As the Scottish Government's statistics only categorise the prison population by ethnicity and not by citizenship, it is only possible to make an estimate. The ethnic distribution of those imprisoned in Scotland shows that there is only a small population of foreign nationals in prisons (less than 4 % of all inmates Allen/Dempsey 2016: 20). In this respect, many of the average 7,900 prisoners in Scotland in 2013 would have been eligible to vote had they not been excluded by this rule. Prison is an institution of political exclusion in the UK.

In this regard, however, it is essential to recognise the significance of these two commonalities. They only affect a tiny number of people, i.e. a maximum of 11,000 out of a total of 4.283 million who successfully registered to vote in the referendum on Scottish secession (Electoral Commission 2014). Therefore, many Scottish people tended to perceive differences from ordinary voting rights in the United Kingdom. What differences?

Four differences exist in the primary residence-based voting rights of the Scottish secession referendum compared to the right to vote in UK House of Commons elections. All four differences lead to an increase in residential inclusion and exclusion. Importantly, this increase relates to Scotland's political future. Exclusion is increased because voting rights are more closely aligned to a person's place of residence. Inclusion is increased because the minimum age has been lowered, and the number of citizens eligible to vote has been extended.

Firstly, in contrast to the UK House of Commons elections, EU citizens are also eligible to vote in this referendum if they live in Scotland. At the last census (2011), 134,910 people living in Scotland were born within the EU (excluding Ireland and the UK). Estimates of how many of these people were eligible to vote in Scotland as EU citizens totalled around 60,000 (BBC 2012). 94,122 EU citizens eligible to vote were already registered in March 2014 (National Records of Scotland 2015). This highlights the prioritisation of residency over political inclusion through citizenship.

Secondly, the referendum lowered the minimum age from 18 to 16. For the referendum alone, lowering the minimum voting age increased political inclusion in Scotland by around 110,000 people.[2] This was accompanied by more precise residential registration for political inclusion in this referendum. It was more precise than is usual in British electoral law. Usually, the minimum age is not measured by the date of voting and birthday but always by the person's age on 1 December of the following year. Accordingly, anyone who reached the minimum age two and a half months after 18 September 2014 and met the other criteria would also be eligible to vote (see Khadar 2013: 3). In contrast, a more precise electoral register was created and used in the secession referendum. Instead of the year beginning on 1 December, the voting date and birthday were used as the basis for registration about the minimum age. The Young Voter Registration Form, which was sent to households alongside the annual registration form, requested that all 15-year-olds who reached the minimum age of 16 at the time of the referendum on 18 September 2014 be registered. This excluded all those who would have reached the minimum age between 19 September 2014 and 30 November 2014 and would usually be included in UK voting rights (but based on a minimum age of 18 instead of 16).

Thirdly, the referendum considered residential boundaries, as members of the House of Lords were also included to decide Scotland's constitutional future. Unlike the elections to the House of Commons, but like the elections to other vertical levels of decision-making in the UK (local, regional, EU), Lords were entitled to vote in the referendum. However, here, too, the criterion of a residential address in Scotland applied when registering. As of March 2014, 53 Lords were registered to vote in the secession referendum (National Records of Scotland 2015).

Fourthly, British citizens living abroad in the United Kingdom were excluded from Scotland's secession referendum. British citizens who used to live in Scotland were not allowed to vote in the secession referendum. In most countries, citizens living abroad can only vote in national elections (IDEA 2007). However, this difference demonstrates the primarily residential rather than civic inclusion in the Scottish secession referendum. UK electoral law allows British citizens who no longer live in the UK to vote in elections to the House of Commons and the European Parliament.

2 Around 110,000 people in this age group registered for the secession referendum and it is estimated that 75 % of these young people voted (Electoral Commission 2014: 4.10).

Up to fifteen years after leaving the UK, they may register to vote in the UK in their former constituency. Provided they had previously registered there or had not yet reached the minimum age. The right to vote for British emigrants was introduced in the Representation of the People Act 1985, when it was limited to five years after emigration from the UK, but was extended to 20 years in 1989 and restricted to the current 15 years after emigration in 2000 (cf. White 2016).

This rule also applied to the referendum on the UK's EU membership held on 23 June 2016 (hereafter EU referendum). However, it did not apply to the Scottish secession referendum. There is an essential difference in this regulation regarding the voting rights of British citizens abroad, which is described in more detail below. This again illustrates Scotland's particular path: the closure of political input inclusion related to the Scottish territory and tied to the person's residence.

In contrast, in recent years, there has been a tendency in the United Kingdom to abandon the temporal-spatial restriction of 15 years for elections to the House of Commons. At this highest vertical decision-making level in the United Kingdom, it is demanded and promised by the coalition government in office at the time that the right to vote should be allocated primarily according to citizenship. The right to vote in the United Kingdom should not be linked to a person's residence but to their citizenship. This tendency is evident in the demands of British citizens who live abroad. This refers to those who do not want to accept a time limit on their right to vote in the UK. This demand was included in draft legislation, party manifestos and, finally, in a cross-party working group in Westminster (White 2016: 11-18). The (active) right to vote for British foreigners is justified by their contribution to the United Kingdom simply by being abroad. For example, Geoffrey Clifton-Brown justifies his bill to abolish the time limit by arguing that these British emigrants are "the unofficial ambassadors, trade envoys and representatives for our country around the world" (Clifton-Brown 2014).

A government cabinet draft was recently published to abolish the time limit. It proposes that this "vote for life" should be made available to all British emigrants in their last registered constituency in the UK, regardless of their current place of residence (Cabinet Office 2016: 7; this would currently mean around 5 million additional eligible voters in the UK).

Furthermore, this tendency to strengthen British citizenship vis-à-vis residential demarcation in the United Kingdom is reflected in calls to exclude other citizens from the right to vote in the United Kingdom. For example, in elections to the House of Commons, citizens of the 50+ Commonwealth countries are eligible to vote in the UK if they have permanent residence in the UK. There are calls to abandon these residency-based aspects and grant this right to vote exclusively to British citizens. This residence-based voting right of other Commonwealth citizens is an "outdated relic from Britain's [sic!] Empire and colonial past", according to one MP in the

House of Commons (see Khadar 2013: 6-11; cf. Weinbach 2005a; Weinbach 2005b; Dorling/Tomlinson 2019: Kap. 9).

As seen in the referendum authorisation, the exact opposite is in Scotland. In Scotland's secession referendum, not only were multiple citizenships eligible to vote, but place of residence was the primary criterion for voting eligibility. A person's place of residence mattered. Anyone who could provide proof of a residential address in Scotland by the registration deadline of 2 September 2014 and met the other criteria mentioned (age, citizenship, criminal law) was entitled to vote in the secession referendum. This narrower definition of voting rights based on place of residence was debated in the Scottish Parliament. On behalf of the Scottish Labour Party, Labour MP Elaine Murray tabled the following motion on 18 January 2012:

> "That the Parliament notes that for generations Scots have taken up opportunities to work in other parts of the UK and beyond and that many have subsequently returned to Scotland to use the skills and experiences that they have gained elsewhere. […] Scots living outwith Scotland should be able to register to vote in the independence referendum on the same basis as expatriate UK citizens can vote in UK elections". (Motion S4M-01596)

Unlike Clifton-Brown above, who campaigned in the House of Commons for an extension of voting rights for British emigrants, Murray justified voting rights for Scottish emigrants by assuming that they intended to return (on the discussions about "Let Wallace Vote" at the time, see Ferguson 2014; Miller 2014). Many young people from Scotland would have to leave Scotland temporarily due to their qualifications and career aspirations. As many of these people, according to Murray, are temporary residents abroad, they should be entitled to vote like those currently living in Scotland. As with elections to the House of Commons, British emigrants to Scotland should be allowed to vote until fifteen years after their migration. This is a "once-in-a-lifetime vote" (Scottish Parliament 2004: 5414). It is estimated that including Scottish emigrants would have increased the electorate by over 20 per cent. Estimates ranged from 920,000 (Berry/Berry 2014) to 1.15 million people (Miller 2014). However, the right to vote for British emigrants described above is rarely utilised. From its introduction in 1987 until 2014, an average of 15,990 so-called 'overseas voters' registered in the UK (see White 2016: 25). A new high was reached in the EU referendum. A total of 135,629 'overseas voters' registered for this (based on Electoral Commission 2016). This shows how little widespread the expectation has been in the UK to date to participate in referendums in the UK as a British citizen abroad. Scotland is no exception.

These statistics were not cited in the debate in the Scottish Parliament. Instead, Murray countered that she was implying an ethnic definition of citizenship. However, such an ethnic definition contradicts the view of the governing party in Scot-

land (SNP). The SNP is in favour of a person's place of residence being used to determine whether or not they are allowed to participate in collectively binding decisions. SNP MP Chic Brodie rejected the right to vote for British citizens living abroad, arguing that it only showed that the interests of those living in Scotland were not sufficiently considered. This would lead to more and more emigration unless secession occurred. Similarly, other SNP MPs replied that it was not about identity or citizenship but about the interests of those who actually live in Scotland and contribute through taxes and voting:

> "If it was about identity," asks Kenneth Gibson, "why would the SNP have so many members […] who were born outside Scotland?" and says it is about the "people who live in Scotland, whether they are Scottish, Pakistani, Indian or Chinese, or English, Welsh or Northern Irish, by birth – the people who pay Scotland's taxes, who elect the members of the Scottish Parliament and who have chosen to make a life for themselves here – are the most important stakeholders in the wider debate. They must decide Scotland's future." (Scottish Parliament 2012: 5424)

Christine Grahame (SNP) objected to Murray's motion, arguing that democratically interpreted, there should be a "direct connection" between the right to vote and the consequences of voting (policies):

> "The democratic principle, as I understand it, is that someone is on the electoral register to vote in various elections in which they are affected by those policies. […] I cannot follow the argument that people – goodness knows how to define them – who say that they are Scottish but will perhaps never return to Scotland, or have no intention of doing so, should have a vote on the future of this nation and whether or not it is free and independent. That cannot be democratically right in principle alone, if one follows the logic of the argument." (Scottish Parliament 2012: 5424)

Similarly, Jamie Hepburn (SNP) asks who is a Scot. She believes that this question can only be answered on the day that Scotland has its own citizenship. Independence is the precondition for that. Until that happens, she sees no reason why people living abroad should vote in the referendum. An explicit distinction is made as "a separate matter" between the referendum vote and the criteria that determine who is Scottish:

> "Who is a Scot? The only clear and concrete fashion in which we will be able to decide that is when we can grant citizenship. At the moment, we are not Scottish citizens. We can grant citizenship only in the context of independence. I would be quite relaxed at the prospect of people from outwith Scotland demonstrating at that stage their willingness to become Scottish citizens and participate in Scot-

> tish Parliament elections. However, that is a separate matter." (Scottish Parliament 2012: 5421-5422)

Bruce Crawford, cabinet member of the Scottish government, summarises: The Scottish Government agreed that in the secession referendum, "voting rights […] be based firmly on residency" for two political reasons (Scottish Parliament 2012: 5426). Firstly, practicability argues favouring a primarily residential demarcation of the voting collective, as identifying those entitled to vote is difficult. Against the background of the elections to the Scottish Parliament, a right to vote for Scottish emigrants would mean creating a new electoral register, for which there is no model in the United Kingdom yet (however, see for example the case of France or Italy in IDEA 2007: 29). In contrast to the House of Commons elections, the register would not only have to consider the lowering of the minimum age but also the EU citizens included in the regional parliamentary elections. EU citizens who have had a residential address in Scotland within the last 15 years must be included in the electoral register. Precedents in the United Kingdom and the "internationally accepted principle" also support this primarily residential demarcation of the voting collective in the secession referendum. Crawford speaks here of "constitutional referendums" and includes not only secession referendums as precedents. He cites the referendums on devolution in Scotland (1997) and Wales (2011) as role models, as these referendums also involved a primarily residential demarcation. By the internationally accepted principle, he is referring, in particular, to the residential demarcation in the referendum on the secession of Montenegro.

3.2.2 Comparison with other secession referendums

Crawford cannot be entirely agreed with, as there has never been such a radicalisation of residential demarcation in an independence referendum. The UK devolution referendums on Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland are not precedents as they were not about secession but regional autonomy within an existing state. Furthermore, secession referendums in other democracies have tied voting rights to a minimum period of residence and/or to a single citizenship. In the Scottish secession referendum, these restrictions were minimised. The residential demarcation of the voting register has been tightened to the registration day. A comparison with other secession referendums illustrates the radical nature of the residential demarcation of the voting collective used in the Scottish secession referendum.

Québec Citizenship and minimum residency were combined in the Québec secession referendums; for example, the Québec Referendum Act stipulates that the voting collective on the secession of this Canadian province must comply with the Québec Election Act. This provides for Canadian citizenship as a criterion for eligi-

bility to vote (Ziegler/Shaw/Bauböck 2014: 16f.). However, the decisive differences to Scotland are not only the limitation of citizenship but also the limitation of the electorate by the minimum duration of residence and type of residence. Accordingly, only those who have had their primary residence in Québec for at least six months before the referendum are eligible to vote in Québec. For example, students who did not study and live in Québec but had their primary residence with their parents in Québec were eligible to vote. The principal residence is arguably a more accurate residential demarcation than the residential address used in the Scottish secession referendum. However, the exclusion of other citizenships and a minimum period of residence weakened this residential demarcation in the 1995 referendum on Québec's national independence.

Catalonia The 2014 referendum on Catalonia's independence also shows a primary difference in residential demarcation from the Scottish secession referendum. This referendum linked the right to vote to a minimum period of residence and a place of residence both within and outside Catalonia. Spanish citizens (minimum age 16) living in Catalonia were eligible to vote, EU citizens only if they had been living in Catalonia for at least one year (non-EU citizens for three years). In addition, Spaniards who previously lived in Catalonia but now live abroad were eligible to vote. Catalans living in the rest of Spain were not allowed to take part in the referendum:

> "[A]ccording to the draft bill, apart from regional electors (Spanish citizens ordinarily resident in Catalonia), citizens of other EU states resident in Catalonia for more than a year and registered therein would be eligible to vote, whereas citizens of non-EU states must satisfy a three years registration period from the day they have obtained a residence permit in Catalonia. Catalans residing abroad may vote in the consultation if they register in a voluntary registry. At the same time, Catalans who live and are registered in the rest of Spain will not be able to vote." (Ziegler/Shaw/Bauböck 2014: 20)

Precisely the opposite of the Scottish secession referendum, the decisive factor for eligibility to vote in this case was an affiliation to Catalonia based on current or former residence. Anyone who lived as a Catalan emigrant in a non-Spanish country was also entitled to vote. This is precisely the ethno-nationalist opposite of what was said in the debate in the Scottish Parliament about the voting rights of people formerly living in Scotland. It was not the residence of the past but only current residence that was the criterion for eligibility to vote in the Scottish secession referendum, and people living abroad were indiscriminately excluded. Scotland's political collective is based on its presence in Scotland, not, as is the case in Catalonia, by the threat of national cultural extinction (cf. Dalle Mulle/Serrano 2019).

Puerto Rico In the four 'plebiscites' (1967, 1993, 1998, 2012) on the political status of Puerto Rico, which were held in a similar way to a secession referendum, there is also a residential demarcation like the Scottish secession referendum (Ziegler/Shaw/Bauböck 2014: 40). People with US citizenship who live in Puerto Rico are eligible to vote. Unlike the 'Edinburgh Agreement' in Scotland, however, a vote in favour of changing Puerto Rico's political status is not binding. It would require a decision by the US Congress. As this is a national House of Representatives, the residential boundaries only play a subordinate role here. The eligible voters who live in Puerto Rico decide first, followed by the representatives of the state as a whole. State constitutions with the right of secession have similar rules. For example, in the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1977, the right to secession was linked to the approval of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (see Harbo 2008: 136). In Scotland, the sequence was reversed. The secession referendum, which was agreed as binding, came about after an agreement had been reached between the regional and national governments ('Edinburgh Agreement'). A primarily residential Scottish Parliament election also preceded this agreement. The current constitution of Ethiopia contains a comparable provision in Article 39 on the "unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession" (see de Villiers 2012: 86).

Montenegro Finally, the case of Montenegro: During the discussion on inclusion in the secession referendum, this case is also mentioned in the Scottish regional Parliament. This secession referendum was accompanied and elaborated on, in particular, by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. The law on the referendum, which came into force on 1 March 2006, also provided for a primarily residential demarcation of the collective living in Montenegro, but this was primarily for ethnic-nationalist reasons. The incumbent Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Đukanović pursued ethnic nationalism. He celebrated, for example, the "separate Montenegrin Orthodox Church, the distinct Montenegrin language and orthography and the 'genuine Montenegrin' (Dukljan) Academy of Science" as national cultural institutions (Jovanovic 2008: 139).

Although eligibility to vote in the referendum in Montenegro was linked to residential communities within the affected region, there was a vital peculiarity here. Only those who had a residential address in Montenegro for 24 months before the day of the referendum were eligible to vote (see OSCE 2006: 8). The minimum period of residence included thousands of Serbian citizens in the referendum who had resided in Montenegro for this period. More crucial, however, was who was excluded. According to Jovanovic's estimate, this residential demarcation excluded 260,000 Montenegrins whose principal place of residence was registered in Serbia and who mostly, often because of labour migration, had no interest in Montenegro's statehood (Jovanovic 2008).

A qualified majority of 55 % had to be achieved for secession. 88 % of those eligible to vote (484,717 people) voted, and 2,300 votes exceeded the qualified majority. At 55.5 %, a narrow majority voted for Montenegro's statehood. It remains doubtful that a less restrictive voting register (e.g. without a two-year minimum period of residence in Montenegro) would have led to this result and, thus, to secession.

3.2.3 Concluding the comparisons

A comparison with the referendums in Montenegro, Québec and Catalonia shows how radically democratic the Scottish electoral register was designed. In the referendum on Scottish statehood, voting rights were not tied to a minimum period of residence. In contrast to voting rights in the United Kingdom and other secession referendums, the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 increased residence-based inclusion and exclusion. In the referendum held in Scotland in 2014, only those with a residential address in Scotland were eligible to vote, aside from the other criteria. Those who currently live in Scotland should vote on Scotland's future. Scotland's referendum was radical. It was more accurate in terms of timing than the right to vote in the EU referendum (2016) and the right to vote in the UK because inclusion was linked to a person's birthday rather than their birth year. At the same time, it was also more accurate than the right to vote in Montenegro's secession referendum, where there was still a minimum period of residence.

3.3 Radicalising the regional inclusion and exclusion

Following the referendum held in 2014, the voting register for elections in Scotland was adopted, and the minimum age was lowered to 16 accordingly. Subsequently, a new proposal for electoral reform in Scotland was implemented in July 2020—i.e. the *Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Act 2020*. I want to present this latest electoral law regarding inclusion and exclusion. It has radicalised the residential inclusion and exclusion in Scotland's political participation.

The basis of this reform proposal was laid by the union campaign's Vow, published on the front page of the Daily Record on 16 September 2014, as outlined above. In it, the Scottish people were promised that regional autonomy in the United Kingdom would be extended if they voted to remain in this country in the referendum. After most of the population voted to remain in the United Kingdom on 18 September 2014, the Smith Commission developed proposals to extend Scotland's regional autonomy in the following months. This led to the Scotland Act (2016), enacted on 23 March 2016. With this legislative package, the Scottish Parliament now also has the opportunity to change the electoral law for local and regional parliamentary elections by a two-thirds majority. Following two consultation processes by the Scottish

Government regarding the extension of voting rights for foreign nationals and prisoners living in Scotland, the Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Bill was introduced on 20 June 2019. The policy memorandum explains:

> "Democratic participation challenges the inequalities of power and influence that exist in society. The Bill seeks to ensure an electoral system that supports and empowers the engagement in elections of all those who have chosen to make Scotland their home. […] The Scottish Government wants Scotland to be a country where every individual who has chosen to live here is equally valued, no matter where they were born. With this in mind, the Scottish Government wants to allow all foreign nationals who are legally resident in Scotland to vote at Scottish Parliament and local government elections." (Scottish Parliament 2019: §6, §40)

The new law will allow around 55,000 non-EU and non-Commonwealth foreign nationals to vote for the first time in Scotland's parliamentary and local elections. People claiming asylum will be added to Scotland's electoral register, as will people who have temporary protection or "humanitarian protection or other forms of leave to remain in the UK" status and are resident in Scotland (Scottish Parliament 2019: §42). In addition, the electoral law reform is intended to ensure that EU citizens resident in Scotland retain their right to vote in Scotland even after the United Kingdom leaves the EU. Noting this intention and difficulties in legal implementation, it says:

> "The Scottish Government has made a public commitment to ensuring that the rights of EU citizens to vote are protected after the UK leaves the EU. The amendments to the franchise for devolved elections in the Bill make clear that all foreign nationals living in Scotland and with a legal right to be in the UK will be able to vote in devolved elections." (Scottish Parliament 2019: §45)

Regarding the right to stand for election in Scotland, it is stipulated that 16 and 17-year-olds are still not allowed to stand as candidates. The same applies to offenders. Councillors will be disqualified from standing if they are sentenced to more than three months in prison, and Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) if they receive a prison sentence of at least one (see Scottish Parliament 2019: §72, §57). It is also proposed to extend the right to vote on a residence basis to those who have indefinite leave to remain in Scotland as foreign nationals:

> "The Bill seeks to allow all foreign nationals with an indefinite right to live in Scotland to stand as candidates in devolved elections and hold office following those elections. Although foreign nationals with a limited right of residence will be able to vote in a devolved election, there are reasons not to allow a person with a limited right of residence to stand as a candidate". (Scottish Parliament 2019: §51)

On 20 February 2020, a final decision was made on this bill in the Scottish Parliament (see Scottish Parliament 2020). For the first time in its history, this Parliament required the necessary two-thirds majority of 86 of the 119 voting members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) for this decision. However, was the majority achieved? It was exceeded. There were no abstentions, except 27 Conservative Party MPs; all 92 remaining MSPs voted in favour of the electoral reform. On 1 April 2020, the Queen declared the proposed Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Act 2020, and the new electoral law came into force in July of the same year.

Except for the Conservative Party, all parties in Scotland have decided to open and close political participation based on residence. In social terms, i.e., regarding the communicative consideration of individuals, Scottish politics closes and opens along its territorial boundaries. Whether or not someone is allowed to vote or stand as a candidate in Scotland and thus be included in the core of Scottish democracy is increasingly a question of where they live.

Compared to the Scottish electoral register (lower house election), the reform of Scottish regional and local electoral law has led to faster growth, as the following graph shows in terms of the number of voters registered (National Records of Scotland 2022a: Fig. 1).

Figure 7: Scottish electorate at local and regional elections (dotted line) and parliamentary elections (solid line), 2011–2021



The reasons for this difference lie primarily in the motives for registering to vote in the first place. Apart from this, lowering the minimum voting age for Scottish

elections and extending voting rights to all foreign nationals resident in Scotland, including EU citizens and prisoners, is particularly important. Scottish local and regional voting rights are much more linked to Scottish residency than UK-level voting rights.

This highlights the difference between the vertical levels of political systems. Scotland's local and regional electoral register is based on the principle of presence linked to residence. In contrast, the UK's national electoral register is based on citizenship, tolerating a maximum 15-year absence (residential address abroad).

However, the orientation towards the residential address in Scotland is also remarkable in comparison to other regions of European states. Except for Estonia, where, as in Scotland, EU foreigners are entitled to vote at the local and municipal level as soon as they have a residential address, in all other regions of European states, there is always a minimum period of residence before EU foreigners are entitled to vote at these levels:

> "The prerequisite for exercising the right to vote is usually a certain length of residence. This ranges from six months in Ireland and three years in Denmark and Sweden to five years in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands." (Bauer 2021: 99 translated by the author)[3]

In contrast, Scottish electoral law is not tied to a minimum period of residence. Anyone with a residential address in Scotland within the respective registration period is entitled to vote at local and regional levels. There is no minimum period of residence, as in the Swiss cantons of Jura and Neuchâtel, which are the only cantons with voting rights for foreigners at the cantonal level (SWI 2022). Furthermore, voting rights for foreign nationals in Scotland do not differentiate between EU citizens and other foreign nationals. In contrast to local elections in Germany, France and Austria, all residents of Scotland, regardless of their citizenship, have the right to vote (from the age of 16) and stand as a candidate (from the age of 18). This is in stark contrast to Bavaria, where even for EU citizens, there is a 3-month minimum period of residence before they are eligible to vote in Bavaria. There is an additional restriction that only German citizens may stand for the office of district administrator or mayor in Bavaria, provided they have lived in the municipality for at least six months (Chardon 2020).

Before turning to an explanation of the residence-based delimitation of the Scottish collective, we need to address a countervailing trend in the social structures of

3 "Die Voraussetzung für die Inanspruchnahme des Wahlrechts ist zumeist eine bestimmte Aufenthaltsdauer. Diese reicht von sechs Monaten in Irland über drei Jahre in Dänemark und Schweden bis zu fünf Jahren in Belgien, Luxemburg und den Niederlanden." "

the Scottish social collective. The primary residence-based determination of electoral and voting registers is at odds with considerations of Scottish citizenship, as the next section on the drafts of a Scottish constitution will demonstrate.

3.4 Automatic citizenship: Traces of ethnic exclusion

How is the Scottish collective defined in the draft constitution for an independent Scotland? What is the meaning of the territorial demarcation of the collective? A constitution raises a region to the level of a state, i.e. a polity. It defines the political and social structures. It requires a correspondingly strong will on the part of those concerned.

Against this background, the draft Scottish constitution must be analysed as plans or projections of the national collective at the level of the formation of a polity. Such a nation cannot entirely dispense with mechanisms that create a sense of belonging, such as history, custom, ethnicity etc. In fact, as the following pages will indicate, these considerations and their ethnic interpretations have become stronger in recent decades.

There are four constitutional drafts of Scotland. They differ increasingly clearly from a collective characterised purely by place of residence. These draft constitutions were drawn up for Scotland in the last half-century between 1964 and 2014 (Scottish Provisional Constituent Assembly 1964; Scottish National Party 1997, 2002; Scottish Government 2014).

So far, only individual drafts have been analysed. The focus has either been on a comparison with the national constitutional tradition (see Bulmer 2015) or the history of their development has been traced (e.g. on the 1964 draft Hanham, 1969, p. 178; cf. on the Scottish Constitutional Convention Marr, 2013, p. 196ff.; Münter, 2006, p. 207f.) (e.g. on the 1964 draft Hanham 1969: 178; cf. on the Scottish Constitutional Convention Marr 2013: 196; Münter 2006: 207).

Sociologically, however, the question arises as to how national inclusion and exclusion are regulated in these four draft constitutions. What significance is attached to the demarcation of the political collective from the residential community, as we see in the contemporary Scottish autonomy movement, where Scotland is a nation within the United Kingdom? The regulations on automatic citizenship can answer this. Automatic citizenship regulates who automatically receives Scottish citizenship during Scottish independence. The reference problem of automatic citizenship lies in the fact that secession is a particularly politically relevant event. When a territorial state secedes, the future citizenship status of the people living on the territory in question must be largely clarified. Otherwise, the inhabitants of this territory, and thus the territory itself, threaten to be removed from the communicative reach of world politics (Lake/Fariss 2014; Luhmann 2000: 226).

The unique event character is also referred to in the explanatory notes to the latest draft constitution: "In legislative terms and under international law, independence is an event" (Scottish Government 2014: 26). A distinction is made between the entitlement to automatic citizenship and the possibility of acquiring Scottish citizenship after secession (naturalisation). The latter is conceded in the draft constitution of the future policy and, for this reason, cannot be analysed here. However, the entitlement to automatic citizenship in Scotland is regulated.

In the constitution's first draft, the residential demarcation was decisive for automatic Scottish citizenship in the event of secession. It stated that Scottish citizenship would be automatically granted to all persons who resided in Scotland on the date of the declaration of independence:

> "All persons who were domiciled in Scotland at the time of the promulgation of this Constitution shall be citizens of Scotland. Thereafter the acquisition of and loss of Scottish citizenship shall be determined by law, but no person who is a citizen of any other country can be a citizen of Scotland except in cases where the National Assembly by a unanimous resolution shall confer Honorary Citizenship." (Scottish Provisional Constituent Assembly 1964: §2)

In contrast to the later drafts of the Constitution, this first draft excludes multiple citizenship, except honorary citizenship. Neither parentage, place of birth, nor previous citizenship are taken as the basis for determining automatic entitlement to Scottish citizenship. Only the place of residence on the date of the official promulgation of this Constitution counts. At the end of the draft constitution, this residential demarcation of Scottish citizenship becomes clear again. An exception is made for persons living abroad who were born and raised in Scotland to obtain Scottish citizenship. Such a person living abroad would be eligible for Scottish citizenship if he or she worked in the state administration in Scotland or stood for and was elected to the first Scottish National Assembly (Scottish Provisional Constituent Assembly 1964: §94-95). However, the prerequisite for one of these two mechanisms for obtaining Scottish citizenship despite living abroad is moving to Scotland. In addition, this exception is limited in time to the first National Assembly and, for civil servants, to four years after the promulgation of the Constitution. These limitations in terms of relocation and time illustrate the primarily residential demarcation for access to Scottish citizenship in the first draft of a Scottish constitution.

The 1997 draft constitution also establishes a link between the place of residence when the constitution comes into force and automatic citizenship:

> "Citizenship of Scotland will be the right of everyone whose principal place of residence is in Scotland at the date on which the Constitution comes into force." (Scottish National Party 1997: 8)

In contrast to the previous draft constitution, multiple citizenship is no longer prohibited here. However, the following difference is even more important. In this draft, people born in Scotland are granted the right to Scottish citizenship. This possibility exists irrespective of the person's current residence and without the time limit in the previous draft. With this provision, the 1997 draft constitution already softens the demarcation of the collective in terms of place of residence. Birth in Scotland is introduced as a further mechanism for gaining automatic entitlement to Scottish citizenship. The collective on which this draft constitution is based is thus not understood as a political collective but as a national-ethnic collective.

The two subsequent constitutional drafts show a further weakening of citizenship based on place of residence. In the 2002 draft, the "principal place of residence […] at the date on which this Constitution comes into force" is again established as an automatic criterion for Scottish citizenship, provided that this place of residence is in Scotland (Scottish National Party 2002: Art. 1.4(a)). However, in the next paragraph, birth in Scotland and the person's descent through their parents' citizenship are introduced as further qualifying criteria. Parental descent is interpreted inclusively, as it is sufficient for one parent to have been born in Scotland. Once again, we find a temporal restriction here. Not only is descent restricted to the generation of the parents, but the principle of descent is also linked to the qualifying parent still being alive at the time the Scottish Constitution comes into force: "being a person who is alive at the date at which this Constitution comes into force" (Scottish National Party 2002: Art.1.4(b)).

In the 2014 independence referendum, the Scottish Government promised an "inclusive model of citizenship" allowing multiple citizenship. The Scotland's Future handbook also states that the Scottish population is used to living together with a wide range of identities. The nation is committed to multiculturalism:

> "People in Scotland are accustomed to multiple identities, be they national, regional, ethnic, linguistic or religious, and a commitment to a multicultural Scotland will be a cornerstone of the nation on independence." (Scottish Government 2013: 271)

Nevertheless, compared to the earlier drafts, it is noticeable that the latest scheme deviates increasingly significantly from the residence principle of the Scottish electoral register. As shown in the following table from the Secession Campaign Handbook, eligibility for Scottish citizenship is divided into three groups of people: 1) those who are automatically granted Scottish citizenship on the day of independence; 2) those who can register for it after independence; or 3) those who can apply for naturalisation.

Figure 8: The regulation of Scottish citizenship in the event of secession (2014)

CURRENT STATUS	SCOTTISH CITIZENSHIP?
AT THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	
British citizen habitually resident in Scotland on day one of independence	**Yes, automatically** a Scottish citizen
British citizens born in Scotland but living outside of Scotland on day one of independence	**Yes, automatically** a Scottish citizen
AFTER THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	
Child born in Scotland to at least one parent who has Scottish citizenship or indefinite leave to remain at the time of their birth	**Yes, automatically** a Scottish citizen
Child born outside Scotland to at least one parent who has Scottish citizenship	**Yes, automatically** a Scottish citizen (the birth must be registered in Scotland to take effect)
British national living outside Scotland with at least one parent who qualifies for Scottish citizenship	Can **register** as a Scottish citizen (will need to provide evidence to substantiate)
Citizens of any country, who have a parent or grandparent who qualifies for Scottish citizenship	Can **register** as a Scottish citizen (will need to provide evidence to substantiate)
Migrants in Scotland legally	May **apply** for naturalisation as a Scottish citizen (subject to meeting good character, residency and any other requirements set out under Scottish immigration law)
Citizens of any country who have spent at least ten years living in Scotland at any time and have an ongoing connection with Scotland	May **apply** for naturalisation as a Scottish citizen (subject to meeting good character and other requirements set out under Scottish immigration law)

Only British citizens who live in Scotland or were born in Scotland have an automatic right to citizenship (Scottish Government 2014: §18). Otherwise, someone must either have been born in Scotland or their birth must be registered there. In addition, the principle of descent ius sanguinis applies to this first group of people. Persons born in Scotland are only entitled to automatic citizenship if at least one parent is eligible for Scottish citizenship. Scottish descent is of great importance.

For the second group of people, i.e. Britons living abroad and foreigners of Scottish descent, descent from a parent or grandparent is also important to register for Scottish citizenship in substantiated cases ("substantiate"). From a comparative perspective, what is striking about this formulation of the principle of descent is how inclusive it is regarding gender and generation (de Groot/Vonk 2018: 327). For example, no distinction is made as to whether the parent is the mother or father and,

in the case of foreigners, even the grandparents' generation is taken into account in order to be able to establish a claim to Scottish citizenship from one's ancestry.

The third group includes those who are non-nationals living in Scotland with a legal residence permit and those who have lived in Scotland for at least ten years, for example as a child. In addition to the legal residence title, length of stay and "good character", access to Scottish citizenship for this group of people also depends on Scottish immigration law, which is not explained further in the handbook.

To summarise, the considerations on automatic citizenship, initially based purely on the person's place of residence, are increasingly pointing in a different direction. The most recent draft constitutions, in particular, emphasise the inclusive interpretation of the principle of descent to regulate automatic citizenship distribution. The distance between the considerations of hypothetical Scottish citizenship and the provisions of Scottish electoral law relevant to the Scottish population is increasing.

At the level of expectations of statehood, a vertical differentiation emerges. *We need to distinguish the collective based on political inclusion in Scotland as a region within the UK from a more national cultural Scottish collective that is emerging with the likelihood of Scotland becoming a fully-fledged nation-state*. With the shift within the vertical differentiation of political systems, for example from a region to a nation state, the significance of the political and national-cultural collective also changes, according to the results of this study. Until now, the Scottish endeavour for statehood emanating from the region has been based on the regional inclusion collective of the nation of presence (Anwesenheitsnation). But this need not remain the case. Reflections on Scottish citizenship already show that the founding of a polity is often accompanied by a nation*al*-state phase, in which the exclusion based on national culture takes centre stage (Tilly 1992: 2, 107). Bishai puts this small but critical change from a region into a state in perspective:

> "The important point here is that 'power' and 'control' are not to be exerted on the self, but by the self against others. This is the goal of national identities in search of a state because this is what an international border provides—the power to make decisions which affect the 'other' by defining and controlling it." (Bishai 2004: 103).

The region is a genuine political system. It is a system of territorial inclusion rather than a national cultural collective based on cohesion delineated by national citizenship (Keating 2013, 2015; Painter 2008; Tatham/Mbaye 2018). The national community defined by the place of birth or ancestry of the still fictitious Scottish citizenship already indicates this conclusion. Levelling a region like Scotland into a fully-fledged nation-state clearly has the potential for autocratic nationalism.

3.5 Explaining the political collective

Although Scotland's autonomy movement is placed at the level of a region (i.e., without the need for the national cohesion of citizenship), the question arises as to why the involvement of the population is so important. What function does it fulfil to promote Scotland as a country of immigration?

One critical explanatory factor is demographics. Scottish MPs often talk about the cost of public goods in this regard. In Scottish politics, which is convinced of egalitarianism, public goods can only be provided if there is a corresponding refinancing of the community through employees subject to social security contributions. However, Scotland's demographic situation has led to the need to recruit people of working age globally. This is the reasoning behind the Fresh Talent Initiative launched by Scotland's First Minister Jack McConnell (Labour) in 2003: "If Scotland is to achieve a balanced economy, with a stable tax base to support strong public services, then we must boost the working age population, particularly the 25 – 45 age group." (Scottish Executive 2004: 3)

Scotland's unequal distribution of its population is another factor driving up the cost of public goods. The population in Scotland is very concentrated in some parts and very dispersed in others. A good indicator of this is the road network. In terms of population, Scotland has 59.3 thousand kilometres of roads, almost twice as many as England with 303 thousand kilometres (own calculation based on Office for National Statistics 2016c). If this figure is related to the area, Scotland's high concentration of settlements compared to England is striking. On average, England has 2.3 kilometres of roads per square kilometre of land, compared to just 0.8 kilometres of roads per square kilometre of land in Scotland. The concentration of settlements in Scotland's so-called 'Central Belt' includes many urban regions – from Paisley, Glasgow, Stirling, and Edinburgh to Dundee—and is accompanied by many remote villages and individual houses. The low number of roads compared to England indicates that of Scotland's 7.8 million hectares of land, 82 % of the population live on 6 % of this area. Nevertheless, there are approximately 336,000 people whose homes are more than half an hour's drive from a major settlement of at least 3,000 (Scottish Government 2011: 7f.).

More important than the financing of public goods, however, is another aspect that links demography with majoritarian democracy. Since the population censuses of the mid-19th century, Scotland has drastically lost population and, hence, it has lost political power within the United Kingdom.

As recently as the mid-19th century, there were six people in England and Wales for every one person in Scotland. Today, this ratio of 1:6 has become 1:11.[4] The differ-

4 The exact figures are 1:6.3 in 1855 and 1:10.8 in mid-2015 (own calculations based on Office for National Statistics 2016a).

ent growth paths of the two populations have driven the population figures further apart over this period. The following diagram shows the absolute population figures for both countries (Scotland's continuous line and left Y-axis, England and Wales's dotted line and right Y-axis).

Figure 9: Population in Scotland (solid line, left axis) and England & Wales (dotted line, right axis), 1855–2015



With the exception of the two world wars and the period 1974–1983, the absolute population of England & Wales has grown steadily. Since 1855, the population of England & Wales has tripled—it has grown by 307 %. In the same period, the population of Scotland has increased by 180 %. The graph shows the distribution of Scotland's population growth. From 1855 until shortly before the First World War, both populations show a similar growth curve. The population of Scotland falls for the first time in 1912 (-0.2 %), that of England & Wales in 1915 (-4.55 %). From 1855 to 1914, Scotland's population increased by 47 %, while that of England & Wales increased by 68 %. Thereafter, the two growth curves differ significantly: during the World Wars, Scotland's population falls by 1 % (1914–1945). During the same period, the population in England & Wales grew by 4.2 %. This difference continues in the post-war period: England & Wales' population increases by 43 % between 1946 and 2015, while the Scottish population only increases by 14.4 %. Almost half of Scotland's population growth (310,060 people) occurred after 2001. Population growth, the secession campaign concluded, goes hand in hand with an increase in Scotland's political autonomy.

The main mechanism that has led to these population differences between the two countries is differences due to migration—not differences in mortality. Differences in net migration rates have increased the inequality in the population ratio between Scotland and England & Wales from 1:6 to 1:11.

Michael Murphy (2016: 231) has calculated this effect of net migration rates. For the period from 1850 to 2013, he related the natural rate of population change (annual births minus the death rate) to the net migration rate (immigration minus emigration) of the respective country. Of the eleven countries in his analysis, Scotland shows the greatest population loss due to emigration and differs significantly from the population development in England and Wales. At the start of the period analysed in 1850, England and Wales had a population of 17.6 million and Scotland (1855) 2.8 million. Without migration, the population in England and Wales would have risen to 53.8 million by 2013. Taking migration into account, there was even a slight population increase above the natural rate of change of 5 % to 56.8 million people.

In Scotland, the result is the opposite. While 2.8 million people lived in Scotland in 1855, this figure rose to 5.1 million in 2013. If there had been no migration in Scotland over this period, Scotland would have a population (and the political power) of 11.4 million people today. England and Wales have therefore gained 5 % of their population through migration since 1850, while Scotland has lost 53 % of its population through migration over this period. Without migration, Scotland's population ratio to England and Wales would be 1:5, but in 2015—as a result of net emigration—the population ratio was 1:11 (2015). Since the interwar period, the population in England and Wales has had a net emigration rate, which has only been achieved in Scotland since the 1990s. For Scotland's demography, net migration is more important than natural change (births minus deaths): Despite net migration since the 1990s, the natural change rate is falling to zero, while it is rising in England and Wales (see Anderson 2016: 85). With the exceptions of 1989 and 1993, more people emigrated from Scotland than moved to Scotland until 2000 (National Records of Scotland 2016: 42).

Therefore, the first Scottish Government, with the participation of the SNP, set population growth as one of its targets. It adopted a National Performance Framework in 2007, which it confirmed and supplemented in 2011 and 2016. One of the targets is the 'Purpose Target' of achieving population growth at the average level of the 15 EU member states between 2007 and 2017. Alongside health, migration is identified as one of the policy areas for achieving this aim (Scottish Government 2012a).

Democracy, which potentially includes every single person as an individual, is therefore a reinforcing factor in the focus on the Scottish collective based on presence (Anwesenheitsnation). With the introduction of universal suffrage, Scotland's population loss to England and Wales, is a loss of power of the Scottish collective within the United Kingdom. The latest forecasts from the Office for National Statistics illustrate Scotland's dramatic democratic situation. Without statehood or minority protection through regional or other autonomy, Scotland's political position

in the UK is likely to be increasingly weakened. As the table below shows, Scotland's population growth over the next 25 years (2018–2043) is expected to be in line with the average of the 28 EU member states (see National Records of Scotland 2020: Figure 13).

Figure 10: Projected population development in Europe, 2018 to 2043



However, compared to the UK, it is striking that Scotland's population continues to grow much more slowly than England's population, which is already ten times larger. There is another peculiarity. Compared to England and Northern Ireland, immigration is particularly important for Scotland's projected population growth (also Wales National Records of Scotland 2020: Figure 11).

Figure 11: Components of population growth in the United Kingdom, mid-2018 to 2043



As a result, the demographic gap between the Scottish and English populations is expected to widen further in the foreseeable future.

Since 1999, inward migration from outside the UK has been more important to Scotland's population growth than immigration from the rest of the UK (National Records of Scotland 2022c). The majority of net immigration to Scotland from the rest of the UK comes from England and Wales. Since 2000, more people have moved to Scotland from England and Wales than vice versa. This is shown by the following chart (based on National Records of Scotland 2022b).

Surprisingly, Scotland has managed to maintain net immigration from England for over twenty years. Surprising, because the state of research suggests otherwise (on Scots in England see Leith, M./D. Sim 2020; Leith/Sim 2017). For example, the essays compiled by Tom Devine and Paddy Logue on what 'Being Scottish' means. In them, Scotland's demarcation from England is repeatedly expressed thematically and often as an "anti-English" attitude (see Devine/Logue 2002: 265).[5]

5 Likewise, Winnie Ewing opened the first Scottish Parliament in 1999 with the hope of "better relations with England, Wales and Northern Ireland" (Scottish Parliament 1999a).

Studies of national identity, while recognising the Scottish population's openness to so-called Black Asian Minorty Ethnicity, reveal resentment towards those originating from England or speaking with an English (cf. Bond 2006: 619). And English people living in Scotland also sometimes misrepresent their national identity. Jackie Abell et al. have shown in interviews that people moving to Scotland from England do not primarily describe their identity in national terms, but in terms of "Britain's status as an island" (Abell/Condor/Stevenson 2006: 219). Nevertheless, in recent years Scotland has attracted more people from England and Wales than vice versa. Comparatively, Winnie Ewing opened the first Scottish Parliament in 1999 with the hope of "better relations with England, Wales and Northern Ireland" (Scottish Parliament 1999a).

Figure 12: Net migration from England & Wales to Scotland, 1991 to 2020



However, international migration is even more important for Scotland's projected population development. Due to the high relevance of international immigration for Scotland's population development, the so-called BREXIT is a reinforcing factor in Scotland's desire for autonomy. The UK government interpreted the

narrow majority's vote to leave the European Union as a demand for immigration control. In the words of the then Prime Minister: "the message from the public before and during the referendum campaign was clear: Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to Britain from Europe. And that is what we will deliver." (May 2017)

The Scottish Government views such statements as exclusionary and rejecting nationalism. The following tweet from Scotland's then First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon (SNP), is exemplary. She emphasises that Scotland is dependent on immigration: "If the UK government's immigration paper is as expected it be devastating for the Scottish economy – our demographics make it essential that we attract people to live & work here." (Tweet from Nicola Sturgeon on immigration, 19/12/2018, @NicolaSturgeon)

Both positions are understandable. They illustrate an important difference in the Scottish and English migration history of recent decades. In the secession campaign, migration has been linked to the demographic divide between Scotland and England. Alex Salmond referred to this in his Declaration of Opportunity:

> "If I had to pick a single statistic which shows why Scotland needs independence, it is this one: Scotland's population has increased by just over 10 % in 100 years from 1901 to 2001. Over the same period the population of England increased by almost 60 %. Under devolution, the 10 years from 2001 to 2011 saw Scotland's highest population growth in a century." (Salmond 2014)

According to Salmond's argument, Scotland's regional autonomy, referred to as 'devolution', makes Scotland attractive, as can be seen from its population growth.

Scotland's relative and absolute population loss to England is dramatic in the context of shared democracy. In the democracy of the state as a whole, which as a democracy excludes collective special rights because it places individual inclusion at the centre, the Scottish population loss leads to a structural imbalance of power in relation to England. Almost at the same time as the first party to campaign for Scottish independence, the centre-left National Party of Scotland, universal suffrage was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1928. Two decades later, it was finalised by the Representation of the People Act 1948. The latter abolished 'multi-member seats' and 'university constituencies' (see Johnston 2013: 46-47). This democratic principle of equality "one person, one vote" emphasises the loss of power of the Scottish population.

Differences in demographic development have political consequences. This is a common place in the Scottish quest for autonomy. For example, in the Claim of Right published in 1988 in favour of Scottish regional autonomy: "So far as the Scots vote for United Kingdom parties, these parties will themselves regard Scottish issues as a subsidiary to the winning of British votes." (Edwards 1989: 3.2) As issues in Scotland

affect fewer and fewer voters, attention to them is diminishing. They are governed by the majorities achieved in English constituencies, as the secession campaign puts it by referring to it as the democratic deficit (Campbell 2014). Without institutional arrangements such as regional autonomy or minority protection, the widening and accelerating demographic gap between Scotland's and England's populations will become what Scottish activists have labelled the 'Westminster power grab' problem for shared democracy (Torrance 2020a).[6] Demographics are a distal factor in Scotland's immigration-seeking drive for autonomy, making Scotland a nation of presence.

The reason for the strengthening of the Scottish presence nation is to be found in the constellation of the majoritarian democracy of the United Kingdom and the unequal demographic development of the constituent nations. It lies in the loss of power through the majoritarian democracy and in the different demographic development between the Scottish and English populations. By emphasising the political collective of inclusion, the Scottish aspiration for autonomy reacts to the Matthew effect (Merton 1968) of the disparate demographic development of Scotland and England. The initial discrepancy in demographic development between Scotland and England continues to accelerate today and leads to a correspondingly increasing imbalance of power in the democracy of the UK.

3.6 Conclusion

Scotland's quest for statehood is based mainly on the self-government of a territorial delineated collective. This collective primarily includes the Scottish population. In order to join this collective and shape common interests, it is vital to live in Scotland and to want to belong to this collective. Every person settling in Scotland should have the right to choose their nation and help shape Scotland's future. Considerations of citizenship differ from this political collective of inclusion. In these considerations, the state is more important than the region. Particular importance is attached to ancestry and place of birth because, with few exceptions, states today are national cultural polities.

If Scottish citizenship existed in this ancestral form, but voting rights continued to follow the principle of residence, two distinct social collectives would emerge. People who do not live in Scotland could become Scottish citizens, but Scotland's national politics would be decided by those who live in Scotland. Would the nation based on citizenship follow the inclusive collective of the people already structured

6 According to the SNP on the Internal Market Bill (https://www.snp.org/westminster-power-grab/ Accessed 27 January 2024).

by Scotland's regional devolution? At the moment, the Scottish collective of inclusion is much more important than the ethnic collective.

As a result, this primacy of the political collective of inclusion stylises Scotland as a regional nation of presence. Subject to age, the low-threshold inclusion collective enables political participation for anyone living in Scotland. Uno actu, this social structure excludes those who live outside Scotland from Scottish politics. In Scottish politics, a territorial boundary between inclusion and exclusion becomes clear for the entire world population (that is a modern function of the national polity, see Stichweh 2005: 41; cf. Bishai 2004: 104). The boundary of the collective is drawn by presence, and this notion was one of the founding principles of the world's first modern democracy:

> "Democracy was initially a political form linked to, and seemingly dependent on, interaction between those present. In the revolutionary United States, democracy was said to depend on being able to reach all the places in the country within a day on horseback, thus enabling rapid interactive contact (Thomas Jefferson)." (Stichweh 2007: 31 translated by the author)[7]

However, the emergence of the Scottish presence nation is due to the consequences of the cumulative inequality of the different demographics of Scotland and England. This is because demographic inequality leads to democratic inequality, since Scotland and England both belong to the same majoritarian democracy. Of course, regional autonomy can prevent secession. However, with regional autonomy comes the realisation of a distinct Scottish politics and culture, as the following Chapters show.

7 "Demokratie war zunächst eine politische Form, die mit der Interaktion unter Anwesenden verknüpft war und auf diese angewiesen schien. In den Vereinigten Staaten der Revolutionszeit war dann davon die Rede, dass Demokratie davon abhänge, dass man mit einem Pferd alle Orte im Staat innerhalb eines Tages zu erreichen imstande sei und in diesem Sinne schnelle interaktive Kontaktaufnahme möglich sei (Thomas Jefferson)." "

4 A national commitment

"Scottish Conviction"

Regional autonomy has given Scottish politicians the ability to make decisions that are collectively binding on the people who live in Scotland. But how is this capacity being used? Does Scotland have an independent policy, and if so, how can it be recognised? This question has often been investigated in terms of specific policies (Mulvey 2018; Hepburn 2015; Cairney 2015; Cairney/Widfeldt 2015). The idea behind this is that the welfare state, and thus the 'polizey' itself, could become an important resource for Scottish politics and the autonomy movement.

In reflections on Scotland as a nation, Scottish activists and MPs alike draw on a particular interpretation of egalitarianism associated with Scotland. They reflect on the Scottish nation "itself as distinct from [its] environment" (Luhmann 1984: 601, 626).

Accordingly, Scotland is said to be a nation committed to egalitarianism. The credibility of this statement contains an element that stabilises Scottish democracy by itself. Egalitarianism, interpreted as a national value commitment, motivates Scottish politicians to prioritise individual self-determination over collective self-determination. It is an expression and a reinforcement of democratic nationalism.

To demonstrate this, I outline below how Scottish political-national performance roles talk about this nation. Identifying a research gap in this shift in perspective to the performance side of Scotland's political system, Nasar Meer argues that "the study of elite political actors in Scotland is relatively sparse, but is consistent with a broader tendency where social and political scientists 'too rarely "study up""" (Meer, 2015, p. 1481).

First, the following Chapter explains why Scottish egalitarianism is a value commitment. It then shows how the Scottish independence movement used egalitarianism to shape its political ideology. The Chapter concludes by discussing how effective this egalitarianism was in the 2014 referendum.

4.1 National value commitment

What kind of a community should Scotland be striving to become? Such reflections on Scotland as a national community can be explored through a critical event in the history of the Scottish nation: The opening ceremony of Scotland's first democratic Parliament, which took place on 1 July 1999.

In his opening speech, the then First Minister, Donald Dewar, referred to performance of Robert Burns' song A Man's A Man For All That as a "very Scottish conviction". This is an egalitarianism on the basis of the soul of every human being:

> "A Scottish Parliament, not an end: a means to greater ends. And those, too, are part of our Mace. Woven into its symbolic thistles are these four words: 'Wisdom. Justice. Compassion. Integrity'. Burns would have understood that. We have just heard – beautifully sung – one of his most enduring works. And that half of the song is a very Scottish conviction: that honesty and simple dignity are priceless virtues, not imparted by rank or birth or privilege but part of the soul. Burns believed that sense and worth ultimately prevail. He believed that was the core of politics and that without it, our profession is inevitably impoverished." (Dewar 1999)

According to Dewar, sound politics can and should exist in Scotland. It can be recognised by the fact that it actively strives for egalitarianism, summed up in Robert Burns' song A Man's A Man For All That. The nation is understood from below, i.e. from the side of the people.[1] With his statement that politics should not be "an end" in itself, with which Dewar refers to Burns and egalitarianism as a national obligation, an instrumental understanding of politics emerges.

Five years later, George Reid repeated this assessment. Again, it is a momentous day in the history of this nation. At the grand opening of the completed Scottish Parliament building, Reid proclaims:

> "Our land and our history have shaped us as an egalitarian society, reflected in our founding principles of Accessibility, Accountability, Equality of Opportunities, and the sharing of power between our government, Parliament and people. These are the real foundation stones of this new Parliament. If we listen to the building, it will help us." (Reid 2004b)

1 "From the perspective of a theory of inclusion, 'people' signifies an inclusion from below. People were originally the ordinary, simple people who had no claim at all to a privileged place in society. […] With 'nation' a shift in the opposite direction occurs. The original usage of 'nation' primarily meant the higher strata of society […]. In this case inclusion is from above." (Ahlers et al. 2020: 29)

Dewar and Reid speak of egalitarianism as a fundamental characteristic of the Scottish nation. This characteristic can and should become more important in the Parliament. Both bearers of political performance roles understand egalitarianism, interpreted as equality of opportunity, in the communication medium of value commitment identified by Talcott Parsons. Egalitarianism becomes "conceptions of the desirable type of society held by the members of the society of reference and applied to the particular society of which they are members." (Parsons 1968: 136) Egalitarianism is not only claimed and valued as a national characteristic but should also be applied in this "particular society" in Scotland.

However, how did this individualistic interpretation of egalitarianism, closely linked to the active realisation of equal opportunities, become possible in Scotland? Behind this lies a historical semantic of this nation, which originally stems from the religious context of the Reformation (see Dawson 2014: 164f.; cf. on "marital" and "fictive kinship" as functional equivalent Cathcart 2008). Today, egalitarianism is reflected as a national value commitment of Scottish politics.

Dewar explains this "very Scottish conviction" with the song A Man's A Man For All That, which was chosen for the opening ceremony. The very genesis of this song is closely linked to the self-description of the Scottish nation. It was included in the encyclopaedic collection of the 'most favourite of our national melodies', published under the title Select Melodies of Scotland from 1822 to 1825 (Lockhart/Currie 1835: 391 Letter from Thomson to Burns, September 1792). George Thomson had commissioned Robert Burns with the melodic revision of the verses of this encyclopaedia. In the course of this work, Burns wrote A Man's A Man For All That and enclosed it with a letter to his patron in 1795 with the following assessment: "I do not give you the foregoing song for your book, but merely by way of vive la bagatelle; for the piece is not really poetry." (Lockhart/Currie 1835: 419 Letter from Burns to Thomson, January 1795) Thomson took a different view and replied: "Your *vive la bagatelle* song, *For a' that*, shall undoubtedly be included in my list." (Lockhart/Currie 1835: 420 Letter from Thomson to Burns, 30 January 1795)

This song deals with the historical semantics of the Scottish nation. The song is based on a religious interpretation of the Scottish nation, which emphasises the equality of all people before God and calls for a struggle against the inequality of the estate-based society. This is John Stuart Blackie's assessment:

> "'A man's a man for a' that,' and the fagged weaver brightens up. […] Certainly in this song he [Burns] soars far above all party feelings, and merely announces plainly what is the poet's mission no less than the prophet's, to preach from the house-top that there is no respect of persons with God, and that whosoever pays worship to anything in any human being independent of personal worth and character, is an idolater and a heretic, with whom no professor of a moral and catholic Christianity can hold any fellowship." (Blackie 1889: 28, 382-383)

The song expresses the expectation that every human being has a unique value. The equality of human beings is indisputable. This attitude is expressed in the appreciation of the 'The man o' independent mind', as Ferdinand Freiligrath's (Freiligrath 2014[1844]) translation into German puts it. The original lyrics of A Man's A Man For All That are characterised by egalitarianism. The prayer in the last verse, which Freiligrath translated as "jeder fleh'" and Burns wrote as "let us pray", speaks out against the social differentiation of the estates and calls for a brotherhood that includes all people (on this solidarity as a pacemaker of political freedom and equality Schieder 1972: 565).

This religiously based equality is also expressed in the following verses of the fourth stanza, which I have emphasised:

A prince can mak a belted knight,
A marquis, duke, an' a' that;
But an honest man's abon his might,
Gude faith, he maunna fa' that!
For a' that, an' a' that,
Their dignities an' a' that;
The pith o' sense, an' pride o' worth,
Are higher rank than a' that.
(Burns 1795)

Ein Fürst macht Ritter, wenn er spricht,
Mit Sporn und Schild und alledem:
Den braven Mann kreiert er nicht,
Der steht zu hoch trotz alledem:
Trotz alledem und alledem!
Trotz Würdenschnack und alledem – Des
innern Wertes stolz Gefühl
Läuft doch den Rang ab alledem!
(Freiligrath 2014 [1844])

In reference to faith ("Gude faith"), each person is ascribed "independent mind" (3rd stanza) or "The pith o' sense, an' pride o' worth" (4th stanza), which explains "That Man to Man, the world o'er, shall brothers be for a' that", as it says in the last two verses.

In favour of Dewar's politics reflected as Scottish, it speaks above all in favour of imputing relevant perceptions and preferences to everyone. The value commitment of egalitarianism claimed to be Scottish demands "that sense and worth ultimately prevail", as Dewar put it in 1999. The equality of people implied in the lyrics of the song is not only to be established but the politics of this nation is to be interpreted as an attempt to orientate itself towards this equality and thus actively strive for it.

This striving for egalitarianism can also be recognised in how this song was performed at the opening of the Scottish Parliament. Although a small orchestra was placed next to the singer Sheena Wellington, she sang this song in Parliament without accompaniment, solo (a cappella) (see the recording by Bruce Davies 1999).[2] This

2 For the recording see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hudNoXsUjoo (Accessed 27 January 2024).

signalled a concentration on the person—singing without instrumental accompaniment—which was typical of the singing in Presbyterian churches in Scotland: "music was limited to the plainest singing. Instrumental accompaniment was forbidden" (Mallinson 2015: 71; still practiced in the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, see Caswell 2016: 312). Scotland's reformers endeavoured to put the will of the person first.[3] As Liam McIlvanney argues, this egalitarian value of the Calvinist-Presbyterian Reformation is the leitmotif of Burns' A Man's A Man For All That:

> "The philosophy of 'A Man's a Man', one might argue, derives less from Tom Paine than from Calvin and Old Light Presbyterianism. […] Burns's egalitarianism, like that of Erskine, betrays the unmistakable influence of Calvinism, founded as it is on the repudiation of outward splendour ('tinsel show'), the distrust of sensual indulgence ('silks' and 'wine'), and the sense of a god-given gradation of worth behind the man-made distinctions of rank and fortune." (McIlvanney 1995: 145-146)

These implications are expressed in A Man's A Man For All That as the historical semantics of the Scottish nation. The staging of this song for the opening ceremony of the Scottish Parliament puts the pursuit of equal opportunities centre stage.

For the SNP spokesperson, A Man's A Man For All That symbolises a "restating" of Scottish "identity on the international stage". Similarly, singer Sheena Wellington said the song "sums up what we want the Scottish Parliament to be about." (both quoted in Calney/Burdman 1999: 48)

Anthony P. Cohen's observation that a debate structured in such an egalitarian way, which gives every person living in Scotland the chance of political participation, speaks in favour of a 'personal nationalism'. This nationalism is inalienably centred on the individual and starkly contrasts the extreme massification and subordination of the individual that otherwise prevails in nationalism (Cohen 1996: 803-811).

A similar conclusion was reached by David Brown, who interprets the right of all to have a say as a lasting influence of John Knox on Scottish national identity. Today, it manifests as a sentimental "encouraging concern for the downcast and oppressed" (Brown 2014: 91, 96; Cohen 1996: 807). While recent research based on general population surveys does not find significantly more egalitarian attitudes among the Scottish population than in England (Rosie 2020: 457), the clergy and laity's discussion

3 From the sermons and works of Presbyterians of the time that he analysed, Williamson concludes: "[God] enjoined political life linked with political forms which emanated from human will and consent" (Williamson 1993: 20; likewise on the "principle of parity" Wormald 1991: 30, 123). Brown points to the egalitarian social structure of Scotland's Presbyterian church constitution: "Fundamental to the system was the classis, or presbytery – made up of ministers and elders of several neighbouring parishes. Within this 'Presbyterian' system, all ministers were to be equal and none was to exercise individual authority over another." (Brown 2012: 81)

of the referendum shows that equality was an important value (Stoddart 2014), as discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 below.

Referring to A Man's A Man For All That for describing Scotland as a nation is about the pursuit of equality of opportunity. From a sociological perspective, this is a core value of modern society, but one that is usually overlooked. Even today, rather than asking how equality of opportunity came to be important in the first place, Talcott Parsons would probably still note that research tends to assume equality of opportunity and look for the causes of inequality: "Sociological interest has tended to focus on inequality and its forms, causes, and justifications. There has been, however, for several centuries now, a trend to the institutionalization of continually extending bases of equality." (Parsons 1977[1970]: 14)

Having shown here that national celebrations are used to reinforce the focus on equality, we now want to ask about the impact of this national value commitment. How widespread is egalitarianism in the independence movement and in Scottish politics?

4.2 Political ideology

In the pursuit of statehood, political ideology is of particular importance. This is closely linked to the historical semantics of Scottish egalitarianism. As Dewar said above, a separate parliament or independent politics is not just an end in itself but a means of realising equal opportunities in Scotland as far as possible, thus coming closer to the population's desire for an egalitarian community.

Activists in the Scottish autonomy movement and the SNP governments that have been in power since 2007 take up egalitarianism as a value commitment. They link it to the political ideology of social democracy. Social democracy prioritises a democratic and socially just social order, which sees uncaused inequality as its most important problem to be tackled through political intervention (Berman 2002; Jackson 2013). This distinguishes it from direct democracy, which is more orientated towards direct co-determination, and liberal democracy, which focuses on individual freedom and the market economy (Ahlers et al. 2020: 227-229).

How powerful is the social democratic interpretation of the historical semantics of Scottish egalitarianism in the autonomy movement? In particular, the Scottish autonomy movement's social democratic interpretation of egalitarianism has become very important in recent years.

Egalitarianism and the political ideology of social democracy are hugely crucial to Scottish self-understanding. The Rev Martin Johnstone, Council Secretary of the Church and Society Council of the Church of Scotland, explains to me in an interview that the Scottish population is convinced that it is more progressive and egalitarian than the rest of the population: "The surveys that have been done about attitudes ac-

tually don't really demonstrate that Scotland is more progressive or egalitarian than other parts of the UK but it has that sense about itself that it is. I think that has been one of the things that is going on." (Johnstone 2015)

The question of Scotland's autonomy had led to reflection on the desirable policy. They came to the conclusion that something had to change. This is the assessment of the band Stanley Odd in their song Son I Voted Yes: "It's time to change how we 'do' politics. Responsibility and independence". (Stanley Odd 2014)

With its social democratic self-image, Scotland is on a particular path in the United Kingdom, as journalist Iain Macwhirter writes. Feeling committed to egalitarianism can mean striving for political autonomy if the state institutions and policies of social democracy are jeopardised:

> "The Scots were not hypnotised by identity politics, but turned against Labour because of the Iraq war, Trident and Tony Blair's promotion of market reforms to public services like NHS. […] Scots were quite content with the United Kingdom as it emerged from the Second World War – with the welfare state, nationalized industries, regional policy, the NHS and social security. But as these values have been eroded, first by Margaret Thatcher and then by Tony Blair (at least in Scottish eyes), the Scots found themselves turning to nationalism the better to defend the achievements of social democracy." (Macwhirter 2014: 104, 108)

At the centre of the Scottish autonomy movement is the defence of a political ideology. The welfare state institutions, first created by social democracy, would have to be defended by secession if necessary. John McGurk, also a journalist, takes the same view:

> "Working in Scottish newspapers in the 1980s, at the height of Thatcherism, rammed home the archetypal image of downtrodden Scots at the hands of those English. The miners' strike; the shutdown of Ravenscraig; the further erosion of real shipbuilding on the Clyde; the protests over the poll tax; the loss of big business as our nation was sacrificed. How it would all change, we believed, if we got rid of those dreadful Tories and were able to run our own affairs." (Devine/Logue 2002: 166)

The post-war welfare state had created the expectation in Scotland that the State should be seen as an instrument of social control. Thatcher, in particular, broke with this expectation and thus brought about Scottish nationalism:

> "The de facto devolution of administrative powers to Edinburgh had, if anything, heightened expectations that the state should provide solutions for problems of the Scottish economy. […] Given the prevalence of a consciousness of Scottish identity and interests and a longstanding concern over 'external control' of the

> Scottish economy, the Conservatives have been from 1979 prone to be regarded as an external imposition with little local base of support. This response has intensified with the growing unpopularity of the last two Thatcher administrations." (Clarke/Mooney 1987: 50-51)

In Scotland, the expectation has become entrenched that addressing inequality is the responsibility of the State and not, as Margaret Thatcher suggested at the opening of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1988, the responsibility of Christian love of self and neighbour (Finlay 1998; cf. Thatcher 1980; Thatcher 1983).

In his book Building a Nation: Post Devolution Nationalism in Scotland, then SNP strategist Kenny MacAskill explains the social democratic strategy as a contradiction to Thatcher's phrase, "Who is society? There is no such thing!" (Thatcher 1989). To this, MacAskill replies:

> "Fundamentally, Social Democrats believe that it's not just the interests of the consumer that matter, but that there is such a thing as society. […] The role of the State in the 21st century economy is to provide the framework in skills and infrastructure upon which enterprise can develop; to promote the national interest and protect the rights of the citizen. It is not to run business or micro-manage the economy." (MacAskill 2004: 44, 54f.; cf. the 'Nordic Council' in Newby 2009: 310)

Not only should the economic interests of consumers be addressed by state policy, but state policy should be used to enable previously unimaginable careers in Scotland. Scotland's 'kent is faither' syndrome—literally: 'I knew your father' syndrome – is to be combated with expectations projected onto the State. Political interventions have the task of ensuring equal opportunities:

> "For too long a 'kent is faither' syndrome has been prevalent and festered. The support to so high but go no further, to do well but not to excel, to shine, but not too brightly. This attitude is simply unacceptable. […] This is a national malaise and indicative of a society lacking in self-confidence. […] It's ironic that such a destructive attitude should prevail in a Nation that venerated education, promoted self-improvement and was the home of the Enlightenment. Success abroad was laudable, but success at home becomes a liability." (MacAskill 2004: 72-73)

MacAskill links these views to the hope of "Independence in Europe" and distinguishes them from Anglo-American, Southeast Asian and transatlantic alliances:

> "The global economy is seeing the creation of major trading blocs whether in Europe, the American continent or South East Asia. The logical one for Scotland formed both from trading alliances and social perspectives is to align with Europe. Not just Scotland's economy but much of her social perspectives are in tune and

> harmony with the European not transatlantic model. From the rights of citizens to the duty of the State; from war in Vietnam to conflict in the Gulf, Scotland has greater affinity with European colleagues than Atlantic cousins. Scotland is a European Nation not the 51st state. It's a social and economic union not a NAFTA for us." (MacAskill 2004: 65)

Based on by-election surveys, Mooney and Scott also conclude that Scotland's secession campaign is not about a nationalist ideology but a "social justice movement", defending the welfare state against measurements of austerity (Law/Mooney 2012; Mooney/Scott 2015, 2016). The national value commitment to egalitarianism is politically interpreted as the ideology of social democracy. Scottish ethnicity is not at the centre of Scotland's desire for autonomy, but the fight against social problems is made possible by the welfare state and its policies. Scotland's secession campaign and the SNP are fuelled by protests against austerity imposed by the State (Glen 2015; Jackson 2014; Scott-Samuel et al. 2014).

In The Case for Scottish Independence: A History of Nationalist Political Thought in Modern Scotland, Ben Jackson looks for "the precise rationale political actors have offered for supporting state-seeking nationalism […] in late twentieth-century Scotland" (Jackson, B. 2020: 4). What does he find? The political ideology of social democracy oscillating between state control and economic liberalism:

> "Nordic social democracy on the one hand – which requires high levels of direct and indirect taxes and social spending as well as active labour market policies – and the low tax and low social spending of Ireland. As Maxwell observed in 2009, 'over the last decade, as the SNP's social heart has become more attached to social democracy, its economic head has inclined to neo-liberalism', leaving it with 'a persisting ambivalence about the social democratic model itself'." (Jackson, B. 2020: 124; Harvey 2015)

Analysing the social and economic policy proposals in the secession campaign's White Paper (Scotland's Future), Michael Keating and Malcolm Harvey come to the same conclusion: "The SNP continues, as it long has, to mix market-liberal and social-investment strategies." (Keating/Harvey 2014: 64) James Foley examines the ideological shifts that have occurred in Scottish nationalism over the last century. He also notes that the political ideology of Scottish nationalism can be characterised, at least for the moment, as the ideology of social democracy with leanings towards liberalism. At least in the current circumstances among the leading parties at Westminster, he argues, "the broad Scottish independence movement led by the SNP could become a force of protest simply by promising to conserve the post-Thatcher remains of the welfare state." (Foley 2024: 128, 140; White 2015; Wiggan 2017)

Indeed, the political ideology of social democracy is at the centre of Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland. Under the keywords "equality", "unequal", "inequality", "fairer Scotland" etc., there are numerous entries that are orientated towards the egalitarianism described above and hold out the prospect of social democratic policies. One example:

> "Within the UK, Scotland is part of an increasingly unequal society. […] Seeking to become a more equal society is not just the right thing to do. It also makes sense for the economy. We know that the most equal societies also have the highest levels of well-being and are most prosperous. They are also, more often than not, nations like Scotland; the fairest and most successful countries in the world are independent European nations of similar size." (Scottish Government 2013: 44, 47)

The differentiation of Scotland's political ideology as social democracy from the neo/liberalism associated with Thatcher is important in Scotland's quest for autonomy. This is the observation of literary scholar Fiona McCulloch. McCulloch uses a character from a contemporary Scottish youth book to illustrate the contrast between English market orientation and Scottish state orientation, between "neoliberal" and social democracy:

> "[P]ost-referendum Scotland demonstrates the powerful desire of a grassroots collective people to shape a nation that shows compassion rather than Thatcherite individualism. […] [B]oth literature and nation have set a route that rejects the austerity measures and self-interests of a neoliberal globalisation that Westminster's Conservative Government has whole-heartedly embraced despite its painful impact on the vulnerable sectors of society. […] Anais, the socially discarded yet intelligent teenage narrator of Jenni Fagan's The Panopticon, observes: Kindness is the most underrated quality on the planet." (McCulloch 2015; cf. on James Robertsons 'Republics of the Mind' see Kaličanin 2018: 93)

The political left was at the centre of Scottish secessionist activism. Most of the 933 activists Iain Black and Sara Marsden interviewed following the 2014 referendum categorised themselves as being on the political left, as seen in the following table. The table shows where Scottish secession activists place themselves on average on a scale of 1 (left) to 11 (right) and where they see the respective party (Black/Marsden 2016: 6).

With a score of 3.19, those actively campaigning for Scottish secession also ranked far to the left of most parties. The exception is the Scottish Socialist Party (1.86).

Table 2: Average political self-assessment and parties of Scottish separatist activists

	Self-assessment on a political scale from left (1) to right (11)	Party membership of respondents
Self-assessment of the 933 activists for secession	3.19	
Scottish National Party	4.31	654
Green Party	3.35	84
Scottish Socialist Party	1.86	29
Labour Party	8.42	3
Liberal Democrats	7.76	1
UKIP	10.17	0
Conservative Party	10.2	0
No party membership		162

However, the party membership of respondents in favour of secession also shows this left-wing, mainly social democratic orientation. 83 % of respondents declared a party affiliation during the survey. The distribution is shown in the second column of the table. It is interesting to note that, at 654 people, most of the activists surveyed are SNP members. This is interesting because, on average, these respondents placed themselves further to the left (3.19) than the SNP (4.31).

Figure 13: Labour vote share in Scotland compared to England in 27 House of Commons elections (1918–2017)



It is also striking how far to the right those committed to Scottish nationalism place Labour. Only 3 of the respondents are Labour members. However, 143 of the 933 activists surveyed said they had recently been a Labour party member (Black &

Marsden, 2016, p. 6). Therefore, the Labour Party, which has enjoyed significant electoral success in Scotland, particularly in the decades since Margaret Thatcher's first government, can no longer do so since the secession campaign launched in 2012. As can be seen in the following two charts, Labour performed better than average in Scotland—compared to Labour's share of the vote in England—until 2010.

When Margaret Thatcher was first elected Prime Minister in 1979, Labour gained 5 % more of the vote in Scotland than in England. Including the 2010 general election, just before the start of the secession campaign, this remains the case. In 2010, Labour won 14 % more votes in Scotland than in England and, in relative terms, won 40 % more seats in Scotland than in England. The latter is shown in the chart below.

Figure 14: Share of MP seats for Labour in Scotland compared to England in 27 House of Commons elections (1918–2017)



In the next elections to the House of Commons (2015 and 2017), however, Labour loses many votes and seats in Scotland. This was due to the surprising electoral success of the nationalists in Scotland following the Scottish secession referendum (2014).[4]

The SNP won 56 of Scotland's 59 seats in the House of Commons election held the year after the Scottish secession referendum. In the subsequent House of Commons election (2017), the SNP won 35 of the 59 seats. From the 1959 to the 2010 general election, Labour always won most seats in Scotland. In the two subsequent elections to the House of Commons, Labour lost these seats mainly to the SNP.

Nationalist constituencies are, as a graph by Alasdair Rae shows, typical Labour constituencies (Rae 2019). In this diagram, Rae has plotted all 650 constituencies

4 Previously, the SNP had won an average of 4 of the 71 seats in the Scottish House of Commons since the 1970s. During a constituency reform in 1983, the number of seats for MPs elected in Scotland in the House of Commons increased to 72, and since the reform that came into force in 2005, Scotland still has 59 seats in the House of Commons.

in the 2017 House of Commons election, from the most deprived constituency (1) to the most affluent constituency (650) from left to right. 10 of the 35 constituencies won by the SNP in the 2017 general election are among the 30 % most deprived constituencies in the UK (measured multidimensionally and standardised based on Abel/Barclay/Payne 2016). The remaining 35 of the 59 Scottish constituencies won by the SNP are in the upper middle (4th to seventh decile). This also shows that the SNP competes primarily with Labour. It helps to understand why social democracy is the main political ideology of the Scottish independence movement.

As abstract value commitments, egalitarianism does not specify what must be done. However, it provides a "direction of choice, and consequent commitment to action" in the Scottish autonomist endeavour (Parsons 1968: 136). As seen above, this value pattern is, for the moment, interpreted in the political ideology of social democracy. Against this background, the distinctions between a Scottish state orientation and the English market orientation (see Jackson 2014, 2018), as well as the left-wing political self-assessment of the secession activists and their parties—SNP, Greens and SSP (on the SNP Wiggan 2017: 646)—appear as interpretations of the egalitarian value commitment of this nation.

4.3 Conclusion

As explained above, egalitarianism is structuring in Scotland's quest for statehood. Activists, the SNP, and their professional observers in academia and journalism have pointed to the enormous importance of egalitarianism and its interpretation as social democracy. For this reason, we can causally conclude that the social democratic ideology convinced the majority of those who voted in favour of secession. Consequently, in municipalities where there is a greater need for the inclusionary services of the welfare state, an above-average number of people voted in favour of secession (see Foley 2024: 139; Glen 2015).

Policy enlarges the political space and promotes the visibility of the Scottish nation. An independent Scottish policy will then be visible not only as a democratic deficit in a particular election, but also in the services provided by the welfare state, such as the free provision of toiletries for girls in schools and universities. Social democracy increases the possibilities of political inclusion and strengthens the differentiation of Scotland as an independent political system within (devolution) or outside (secession) the United Kingdom.

An example of the Scottish population's extensive room for manoeuvre in politics can be seen in the YouGov survey from March 2015 shown below, in which respondents categorised themselves on a scale of 1 to 5 between left/right and individualist/collectivist ("libertarian/authoritarian"). There are apparent differences between the Scottish and British populations.

Figure 15: Self-assessment categorised by political left/right and individualist/collectivist based on YouGov opinion polls conducted in Scotland and the UK in March 2015 (graphic from Jordan, 2015)



William Jordan summarises the difference: "Scots are to the left of the rest of Britain on almost every issue" (Jordan 2015). Underlining Scotland's particular social democratic path, the Scottish population attaches above-average importance to the government. Compared to the UK population, we also see a greater willingness to redistribute and intervene among the Scottish population. The open-mindedness towards the values associated with Europe increasingly distinguishes the Scottish desire for autonomy from English nationalism. The smallest injustices must be de-

tected immediately and addressed with political measures. It may also be possible to anticipate what is only just beginning to emerge and anticipate it with policies. This political responsiveness can turn social democracy into an authoritarian expertocracy anytime. A current example of this is the initiative, supported mainly by Nicola Sturgeon, to enable the individual self-determination of transgender people from the age of 16 and without a medical certificate. Her prominent opponent, J.K. Rowling, sees this as a battle between "authoritarians and liberals" as she fears unforeseeable consequences for young people and an increase in violence against women (BBC 2022).

However, how does one understand Scotland as more than just a territory in which a parliament and a government, some of which have their sentiments about what should be influential in politics, are elected? Let us move on to the question of when and how the people living in Scotland describe themselves as a nation.

5 National collective

Anthem as national self-description

How does democratic nationalism create a sense that the collective has a common culture that binds it together as a nation? What importance is attached to shared customs, traditions, languages, religious beliefs and other ethnic factors? As case studies of the symbols of national unity, this and the subsequent Chapter 6 show that the sense of national cultural belonging is primarily determined by those who live in Scotland. Nevertheless, Scotland's past is of great importance in terms of its relationship with England. Democratic nationalism also claims to represent a national cultural collective, which, according to the argument in the following Chapters, is pre-structured by the collective of political inclusion, demarcated in terms of residency.

In order to demonstrate the emergence of two different collectives that underpin the Scottish quest for autonomy, we begin with a simple question. What is associated with identification as Scottish in Scottish politics? Suppose you ask members of the Scottish Parliament this question in the hope that they, as experts on Scottish politics, will be able to summarise the cultural specificity of this nation. In that case, you will often hear one answer in particular: Scottish is what it is not. Moreover, it is certainly not British or English: "Many were at pains to separate Britishness and Scottishness—proclaiming the former to be 'very English dominated'." (Leith/Soule 2011: 126)

With "Scottish as not being British or English", Murray S. Leith and Daniel P.J. Soule summarise this paradoxical attitude of Scottish MPs. Leith and Soule have presented the only study to date on the reflections of Scottish MPs. Their study is based on interviews with 64 Scottish MPs on the "nature of national identity in Scotland" (Leith/Soule 2011: 121). Members of the Scottish (MSP) and UK (MP) parliaments between 2003 and 2009 were surveyed.

The results reveal the extent to which Scottish MPs differentiate the Scottish nation from England: "Perhaps it is easier to define oneself by what one isn't", says one Scottish MP and adds, implying this paradox, "and I am not English." (Leith/Soule 2011: 127 Interview 9)

This demarcation from England is also expressed with respect to Britishness. Of the 64 MPs Leith and Soule spoke to, four said they were British, 20 were Scottish and British, and just over half (34) said they were exclusively Scottish (six people chose not to say). Many respondents accept that a person can be both British and Scottish, but they also emphasise the difference. As a result, British is a constitutional category to which you either formally belong or not. Nevertheless, Scottish, say the MPs, is a national identity that a person chooses or deselects at will (similarly McCrone distinguishes between Scottish, English etc. as a national identity and British as citizenship McCrone 2017: 453). Several people distinguish between their self-chosen national identity in the UK (English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh) and their formal citizenship status as a subject of the British monarchy: "I recognise I am a subject of the British state, but I am not British" (Leith/Soule 2011: 126 Interview 49).

However, what characterises this will to belong to the Scottish nation? There are two reasons behind it: firstly, national egalitarianism should also apply to internal relations with other nations. Secondly, the will is based on the experience described in Chapter 3 of the Scottish collective's rapid and increasing loss of power in relation to the English collective. The value commitment to the egalitarianism of the Scottish nation should also determine the internal relationship between the nations of the United Kingdom:

> "I feel not a single British fibre in my body … I am pro-European but it is not a strong part of my national identity … growing up it became clear to me that we are not equals in the United Kingdom, this was an English state and it bore no sense of identity for me." (Leith/Soule 2011: 132 Interview 27)

As an identity, this MP contrasts the British with the European and categorises it with the United Kingdom as a state. As a state, the argument goes (see Chapter 2), the United Kingdom and thus also the identity of Britishness is dominated by England. In some cases, the relationship between the English and Scottish populations is even understood as the relationship between two foreign nations: "Everybody in Scotland, whether they consider themselves Unionists, supporters of independence, British, or anything else like, would never stay quiet if somebody said they were English". (Leith/Soule 2011: 133 Interview 18)

Implicitly or explicitly, Scottish MPs ascribe England the status of a nation—a nation that some Scottish MPs see as violating the egalitarian internal relationship in the UK. However, how widespread is this demarcation of Scotland as a separate nation, particularly distinct from England? Is there more to say than that Scottishness, at least, is neither English nor British?

To answer these questions, the Scottish case offers an extraordinary quasi-experiment: discussions of the Scottish national anthem that allow us to recognise how and by what means the Scottish people describe themselves as a nation.

John Stuart Blackie was already of the opinion that a nation is best understood through its songs. Songs that the respective collective has internalised. Songs in which the collective is not concerned with who composed or wrote them but which the collective associates so strongly with itself that everyone can sing them, and everyone knows when they hear them that they are the familiar song:

> "The songs that please the great mass of the people are the songs that flowed *most directly* and most potently from the heart of the *people*; and *whosoever wishes to know the people, must know to love their songs*. […] [G]enerally, we may say that the song of the people is natural, not artistical; catholic, not special, breathing always the common breath of humanity modified by nationality, but affording no field for the display of individual talent, abnormal genius, or brilliant transcendentalism. In Shelley's poetry you always see Shelley, and in Byron's Byron; but in 'Bonnie Jean' and 'Wandering Willie,' though you may know that there was a Burns, you never feel personally that he is there. In his songs, whatever he may be in his letters, Scotland is everywhere. Burns nowhere." (Blackie 1889: 4, 21)

I follow on from Blackie's reflections here in order to understand the collective identity of Scottish nationalism from what it claims and to categorise it sociologically. Such an investigation is also consistent because Blackie belonged to the "small bodies of ultra patriots" (Hanham 1969: 40). Contemporary patriots regarded him as "the foremost son of Edinburgh and Scotland", as Patrick Geddes put it in his famous obituary of Blackie, "The Scots Renascence", "the leader of nationality in ripest age, the leader of literature in fullest prime (Geddes 1895: 131). Moreover, Richard Jenkins claims: "we should be as much concerned with how nationalisms and nationalists define themselves […] as how we as social scientists should define them." (Jenkins 1995: 372)

But unlike the literary and musicologist Blackie, the intention in this Chapter is a sociological one. The search for folk songs that each and every Scot knows is one thing. But what is sociologically interesting here is the search for the Scottish anthem. In other words, the song that the Scottish collective currently identifies as an independent nation. This is the first step. Furthermore, it is important to analyse the specific anthem as a national symbol. How does the anthem succeed in giving the population a sense of national cultural togetherness?

The national anthem is sought to understand the cultural demarcation of the Scottish collective and what should be avoided. So, what is the national anthem of the Scottish nation from the perspective of the members of this social collective? "Flag and anthem are conspicuous in that," Rudolf Stichweh has noted concerning the relevance of such an investigation, "they can embody the nation's own culture in a pure sense—without an ethnic background" (Stichweh 2000b: 53 translated by the author). However, what is this intrinsic culture of the contemporary Scottish nation,

under what historical conditions did the need for a separate anthem arise in the first place, and is the collective on which this national culture is based different from the political inclusion collective of residential demarcation?

In order to find answers to these questions, the following Chapter is divided into two sections. It begins with a sociological reconstruction of the problem to which the Scottish national anthem is supposed to offer an answer. In the second section, the anthem currently in use—The Flower of Scotland—is presented, and discussions on the use of this anthem are outlined.

5.1 Context of origin: Globalisation of sport

Why does the question of the Scottish national anthem arise at all? This question has arisen in connection with the globalisation of sport. The Scottish collective competes with its own national team in most international sports competitions. The only exception is the Olympic Games, which have been organised since 1896. Scotland participates in events organised by the International Olympic Committee under the designation 'GBR' or 'Team GB' with the other three constituent nations of the United Kingdom, the Crown Dependencies and some British Overseas Territories. In other international sporting competitions, Scotland competes with its national team. For example, Scotland competes in football, rugby, cricket, boxing and the Commonwealth Games as a national team called 'Team Scotland'.

As the following examples show, due to the globalisation of international competitive sport, these events have demanded a Scottish national anthem—a need to identify Scotland that does not exist within politics. Indeed, as part of the United Kingdom, Scotland has the same national anthem as the UK: God Save The Queen.[1]

The following quote from a UK Foreign Office memo shows how international sporting competitions are linked to the question of the Scottish national anthem. It is about an amateur boxing competition held in Prague in 1969: "the Scottish officials threatened to make a fuss and go home if they did not get their own way. […] We are not sure whether *Scotland The Brave* is a National Anthem of Scotland or merely a national song, and if the latter, whether it would be proper for it to be used instead of God Save The Queen." (cited in BBC 2003)

There were repeated comments during this period stating that parts of the Scottish population did not recognise the official national anthem of the United Kingdom—God Save the Queen. For example, booing can be heard from some stands in Scottish sports stadiums when this anthem is played, suggesting "impatience from youthful enthusiasts" and "a few hooligans" (Hansard 1976b: 1339; for a more recent

1 The title God Save The Queen is used below, as the primary period of interest here is the reign of Queen Elizabeth II.

example see ianjmcd 2010). Others have described this disdain and the practice of singing Scottish hymns at these events as 'anti-English' (Hansard 1976c: 1724). In particular, The Flower of Scotland, currently used by many Scottish national teams, was seen as nationalist politicisation even then, in the late 1970s. Scottish nationalists would use sports competitions to express disloyalty to the UK and demand more independence for Scottish policy (see Hansard 1976c: 1724). In general, there was too much discussion in Scotland about the national anthem and too little about policy, as Labour MP Roy Hughes described the situation at the time: "There are arguments about what anthem should be played on the rugby field or the football field, and arguments on the constitution, but the important issues of jobs, housing, and education, are neglected." (Hansard 1976a: 525)

For a time, the question of a Scottish national anthem disappeared from political communication. It was in the 1990s that it was discussed more frequently again. With the referendum held in 1997, in which the majority voted in favour of the concession of a Scottish Parliament (devolution), the search for an official Scottish national anthem was launched at various events. As early as 1998, the daily newspaper The Herald and the Scottish Media Group organised a competition for this purpose (Jackson 2015). The convening of the first Scottish Parliament in 1999 led to further discussion. Once again, sport, in particular, has raised the issue of Scotland's national anthem in politics.

The following two petitions show the link between the national anthem and modern sport. In both cases, the respective petitioner related the question of the Scottish national anthem to events in international competitive sports. Although God Save the Queen is formally recognised as the national anthem, sport shows that other songs are used for the Scottish national team instead of this anthem. This difference needs to be corrected.

In a petition, George Reid quoted the two best-known songs of Scottish national sports teams. These pieces of music are out of date and should be replaced by an official Scottish anthem:

> "In past years 'Scots Wha Hae' has been sung as the Scottish Anthem but the aggressive sentiments it embodies belong to times of division and strife and is no longer appropriate to twenty-first century Scotland. The doggerel that passes now for a Scottish anthem, 'Flower Of Scotland' (though never intended as such) is ungrammatical, backward looking and vindictive and probably embarrasses as many (perhaps more) Scots than it pleases." (Reid 2003)

He cites two songs. On the one hand, Reid talks about Scots Wha Hae, which has been used for the Scottish team since 1958, especially in rugby, and on the other hand, he mentions The Flower of Scotland, which has been used as the Scottish national anthem in rugby since 1990. The Scottish football team followed in 1993. Fol-

lowing a decision by the Scottish athletes in 2009, it has also been the anthem for the Scottish teams in the Commonwealth Games since 2010.

The petitioner, Chris Cromar, has also modelled his latest petition on international competitive sport:

> "'Flower of Scotland' […] is widely recognised as Scotland's unofficial national anthem. The song is used as Scotland's national anthem in the Commonwealth Games and also for Scotland's football, rugby union and rugby league teams and was sung at the opening ceremony of the 2012 Summer Olympics in London." (Cromar 2014)

In both petitions—Reid's petition as an alternative to the anthem used in sport and Cromar's, which argues in favour of this anthem being adopted as the official Scottish national anthem—the discussion is guided by two expectations: Rejecting God Save the Queen as Scotland's anthem and looking to sport to find an anthem.

As these examples show, the regular competitive nature of modern sport (see Werron 2010) provides political communication with possible contributions to attribute or deny the population a sense of belonging to a national collective. As sport begins to differentiate itself from politics and other function systems like education/cultivation (Tang 2010), the question arises as to which song should be used to greet and honour Scottish athletes at international competitions. Against the background of this problem of finding a national anthem for sport, the question of the self-description of the Scottish collective—here using the example of the national anthem—in political communications is addressed.

Sociologically, national teams in modern sports can be understood as structural couplings of the function systems of politics and sport, which are operationally closed through their communications (on this concept Luhmann 1998: 107-108). For example, teams financed by the state or state-owned companies or symbolically identified with a nation are founded and operated (see the former cycling team Euskaltel-Euskadi and cf. on Russia Abt, 2009) (s see the former cycling team Euskaltel-Euskadi and cf. on Russia Abt 2009). State-led doping initiatives prove how important this structural link between politics and sport is about the national team (on the GDR cf. Osterhans 2000; and the slump in performance after the Olympic Games, see Treutlein 1994: 153). In the Scottish case, the political relevance of international competitive sport lies above all in the regular and widely watched significant events such as World Championships and Commonwealth Games. Scottish nationalists use opening and honouring ceremonies to identify the Scottish people as their nation, as the following pages illustrate.

International sports provide events for the self-description of the Scottish people as a nation. Waving the flag and singing the anthem shows that people identify with the Scottish nation on their own terms.

The following juxtaposition of the Union and secession campaigns exemplifies this strategy. Before the secession referendum, the then Prime Minister David Cameron campaigned in favour of Scotland remaining part of the United Kingdom by referring to the 2012 Summer Olympics in London, among other things:

> "Everyone cheering as one for Team GB. And it's Team GB I want to talk about today. Our United Kingdom. […] Think of what we've done together, what we can do together, what we stand for together. Team GB. The winning team in world history. Let us stick together for a winning future too." (Cameron 2014a)

Conversely, in his last public speech before the secession referendum, Alex Salmond recalled the Commonwealth Games that had just ended and was being held in Glasgow (see 2' to 3' in WeeWildyCamper 2014). Scotland has been participating in these games, which were held in Scotland for the third time, with its national teams since 1930. These competitions, in which Scotland competes as a national team (Team Scotland), are used in the Scottish autonomy movement to distinguish Scotland from 'Team GB'.

Initially, the British Empire Games, which were held for the first time in 1911, were intended to strengthen solidarity within Great Britain, as stated in the following report on the Games in Hamilton at the time: "at Hamilton, where Britons alone were concerned, there was a warmth of comradeship, a spirit of cordiality and even self-sacrifice which will assuredly bear fruit among those young men and women of the British race." (Report of the Council for Great Britain and Statement of Account vom 10.11.1930 zitiert in Moore 1989: 249) Today, the opposite is the case.

Regarding the theory of inclusion, this already reveals a weighting explaining why 'Team Scotland' suits Scottish nationalism. It is not only the name that differs between 'Team GB' and 'Team Scotland' but also the importance attached to the inclusion of the individual and the collective. The inclusion of individuals is much more important for 'Team GB' than the question of whether the individual in question belongs to a specific political collective. Citizens from the entire United Kingdom and Ireland can participate in 'Team GB'.[2]

Conversely, this does not apply to participation in the Scottish team. Implicitly, 'Team Scotland' emphasises inclusion and exclusion in the political collective determined by place of residence. This is because the citizenship of a person, their place

2 This stems from an agreement between the British and Irish Olympic Associations and is still defended by the British Government today, as the relevant Under-Secratary responded in 2004: "The longstanding practice relating to athletes in Northern Ireland who qualify for participation at the Olympic Games is that an athlete born in Northern Ireland who qualifies for participation at the Olympic Games and who holds a UK passport, may opt for selection by either Team GB or Ireland. The British Olympic Association (BOA) and the Olympic Council for Ireland (OCI) have recently confirmed this agreement." (Hansard 2004)

of birth or their parents determines whether this person can be a member of the Scottish national team (see Commonwealth Games Federation 2014: §25(2)).[3] Sports competitions, taken up in the secession campaign, thus emphasise that the individual belongs to Scotland as a distinct political collective of inclusion.

For the aims of Scottish nationalism, the collective semantics of 'Team Scotland' are anticipatory. Team Scotland offers the Scottish secession campaign a "preadaptive advance" brought about by international competitive sport (Luhmann 1980: 49; Stichweh 2006b: 4). With 'Team Scotland', international competitive sport provides a semantic that can be politically instrumentalised. The national team recognises a team. Moreover, an audience that identifies with this team as a nation that belongs together becomes visible. Against this background, Scottish nationalism references the national symbols used in sports, as the following example shows.

This time, it is a naturalisation ceremony in the United Kingdom. Since 2004, naturalisation in the UK has been no longer finalised by post but through a citizenship ceremony. These ceremonies take place near the applicant's place of residence. The incident of interest here took place in Glasgow. Before the first naturalisation ceremony, Glasgow City Council announced that it would not use the flag or anthem of the United Kingdom (see also BBC 2004b; on Glasgow BBC 2004c). This announcement led to the following motion in the Scottish Parliament, in which Phil Gallie (Conservative) labelled this threat a "constitutional insult" and demanded: "That the Parliament considers the refusal by Glasgow City Council to fly the Union flag and include the national anthem citizenship ceremonies to be unacceptable" (Gallie 2003).

Scottish nationalists responded to this demand with an amendment tabled by SNP MP Nicola Sturgeon. The intention of Glasgow City Council is not "unacceptable", but as Sturgeon puts it in her amendment:

> "courageous, worthy of support and fully in keeping with the pride in their Scottish identity that new Scots feel and notes that more and more Scots consider themselves to be Scottish rather than British and that British identity is becoming increasingly artificial as the recent English rugby victory celebrations, with not a Union flag in sight, demonstrated." (Sturgeon 2003)

3 Paragraph 3 of this article stipulates that athletes may later compete for another Commonwealth member, provided they receive the approval of both national federations, the respective international sports federation and the Commonwealth Games Federation and announce the change at least one year before the next Games. Pedigree is prioritised over place of residence to get into a national squad. The place of residence can serve as a basis, provided that the person can prove that they have lived in the other Commonwealth member country for at least five years – and the respective federations agree to the change (for example Scottish Cycling 2016: Appendix 1:5).

In this amendment, Sturgeon calls for a cognitive approach to national identity in the United Kingdom. She calls for the use of flags and anthems that are used by the population. In the case of the "new Scots", Sturgeon's assessment of the national collective is based on the above-mentioned collective of political inclusion that promotes immigration.

How do you know which anthems and flags these are? Sturgeon mentions sports (rugby) in which Scotland and England participate with their national teams. Naturalisation should, therefore, not be finalised ceremonially by emphasising the local level but rather through the references expressed in the anthems and flags used to the demarcation chosen by the population itself as a trans-local collective.

Bridget Byrne's (2012) study of the speeches at these naturalisation ceremonies produces a similar result. According to this, the rights of new citizens towards the UK as a state would be described against the backdrop of the duties they assume towards the local community. In contrast, in the one Scottish example that Byrnes discusses, the obligation of the new citizen is related to a universalist principle (i.e. tolerance) and not to a specific local community (see on "tolerance" in South Ayrshire and "Community" in London-Barnet, Manchester und West Sussex by Byrne 2012: 537 and 539f.).[4]

George Reid makes a similar argument in his petition on the national anthem. He also emphasises that national symbols such as the anthem must reflect the will of the people who actively identify with Scotland as a collective. The national anthem is about the "distinctive culture" and history of this "country of ours", but this should imply an orientation towards the future, towards the "aspirations of the Scottish people" (Public Petitions Committee 2003; Reid 2003). What Sturgeon's 'new pride' implies is reflected in Reid's distinction between the history and aspirations of the Scottish collective. What is meant is a discontinuity. The Scottish population would no longer describe itself (only) through the national symbols of the nation-state. Reid, therefore, calls for a "Scottish anthem" to be identified, which would have its place "proudly alongside the national song" God Save the Queen (Public Petitions Committee 2003).

In various discussions, this break with the past was emphasised and the question of what the Scottish national anthem should be followed these considerations. For example, Sandra White (SNP), member of the Petitions Committee, expressed her dissatisfaction that there was no "national song" for Scotland. The Deputy Convener (Conservative) responded by referring to the official anthem of the United Kingdom:

4 See also the differences in the historical semantics of English and Scottish collectives. According to Robert Allan Houston (Houston 2016), a local-community self-image prevailed in England, whereas a religious-universalist self-image of the collective dominated in Scotland (Dawson 2014).

> John Scott (Conservative): "As things stand, we have a national anthem: it is 'God Save the Queen'."
>
> Sandra White (SNP): "That may be yours, John, but it is not mine. It is not the national anthem of anybody I know, either." (Public Petitions Committee 2005)

Concerning her own experience and with insinuations about the preferences of others, Sandra Whites rejects the continuity-orientated adherence to God Save the Queen—"[a]s things stand".

Surveys show how natural this attitude already is in Scotland. The distance from God Save the Queen as a binding anthem is also recognisable. Polls on the Scottish national anthem always ask for several candidates, but none of the polls asked for God Save the Queen. The Scottish national anthem must be a different song (see Broadfoot 2015; Kelly 2015; BBC 2010; Royal Scottish National Orchestra 2006).

The Scottish national anthem needs to be discussed. The Scottish collective has only begun to recognise itself as a collective 'we', which leads to the problem of a national sense of belonging, as Shiona Baird (Greens) explained in a committee meeting on the issue. We are only just beginning to get clear about ourselves as a national collective:

> "The fact is that we have a Scottish Parliament and are trying to strengthen our identity as a nation. We can still be a nation within the UK […] but, because we are trying to establish clarity on what we are about, there is a need for such a debate. We do not have to spend a great deal of time on it. I would really like to know how other countries resolved the issue of having a national song." (Enterprise and Culture Committee 2006)

Yet, who, if not the Scottish Parliament or its committees, should clarify "what we are about"?

5.2 Taking the national anthem from the people

Is Mycock's (Mycock, 2012), Miller's (Miller 2008) and Keating's (Keating 2010, 2013, 2015) assessment that it is the political elite who decide on the need for and content of national symbols correct? Whose responsibility is it to specify the national symbols of the Scottish nation? With the national anthem as an example, this section tests the following thesis: Performance roles (i.e. political elite) of the Scottish nation refrain from specifying the national culture, that is, the culture to which they are committed as bearers of a performance role. Politicians leave the definition of Scottish culture to their complementary audience collective—i.e. the people.

However, the people implied here are not delineated by their ordinary place of residence in Scotland but by the fact that they identify with Scotland. In the national cultural collective, autonomy is based on voluntarism. It differs from the inclusion collective of Scottish politics based on common residence in Scotland. This becomes clear in the following comment on the question of what the Scottish national anthem is: "We also can't forget the anti-Scots rhetoric in later verses of Goad [sic!] Save the Queen although principally aimed at Jacobites. The people chose Flower of Scotland first through singing it at international sporting events and then by making it our anthem." (BBC 2004a) Others ad: "We already have a national anthem. No-one I know in any generation sings God Save the Queen up here. Everybody knows our national anthem is Flower of Scotland". (BBC 2004a)

The commentary argues that individuals with a sense of national belonging choose their national anthem. Implicit is the assumption that experts should not be consulted to decide what the Scottish national anthem should be. Instead of considering the limitations of the setting—which instruments could even be used to play the melodies convincingly—the people are left to decide on their national anthem.

Reid's second petition on this subject was discussed using the same logic. In his petition, Reid called on the Scottish Parliament to decide whether there should be an official Scottish national anthem (Reid 2004a). The Petitions Committee responded cautiously to this request. The decision to raise the prospect of an authoritative Scottish national anthem through Parliament was described as 'starting the ball rolling'. It was considered whether the decision by the Scottish Parliament to seek a Scottish national anthem would not already be an unauthorised encroachment on "the public":

> "Could that not be perceived as the politicians pushing something on to the public, who would want to choose a song that was relevant to their own circumstances? […] There are times when we should not legislate but allow people to do what they feel most comfortable doing." (Public Petitions Committee 2005)

Labour MP Helen Eadie concludes that politics should not give an anthem but instead take its national anthem as soon as such an anthem emerges. Similarly, SSP MP Rosie Kane concludes: "It might be about taking an anthem rather than being given it." (Public Petitions Committee 2005) Once again, national cohesion refers to a collective united by will and not by a common place of residence. The Scottish nation is an independent collective formed by the expression of will but pre-structured by an appreciation of individual self-determination. Moreover, it is the people who give the nation and its political elite their national anthem. In Scottish nationalism, the nation is bottom-up, created by the people, rather than imposed top-down by

the nation on the people. The bottom-up emergence of the nation demonstrates a democratic nationalism based on self-determination.

In the discussion of a motion on this topic, which took place in the Enterprise and Culture Committee, the inclusion of the population is also called for. The motion was tabled by Michael Matheson (SNP), who had already tabled another motion on this subject two years previously (Matheson 2004). Although Conservative MP Murdo Fraser does not want to spend time on this issue, he agrees with Matheson on the basic approach:

> "Philosophically, it is not for politicians to try to dictate what song should emerge as our new anthem if we want one. […] If we are to get a new anthem for Scotland […] a song will emerge in time, it will be adopted by the people, who will start singing it on the terraces and stands and we politicians will take our lead from the people and adopt it as our anthem. We need a bottom-up approach, not a top-down one". (Enterprise and Culture Committee 2006)

Once again, sport is used as an example ("singing it on the terraces and stands") to assess the relevance of the question of the Scottish national anthem.

The concession expressed in these examples by the performance role bearers of the Scottish nation to the people who identify with the Scottish nation to specify the Scottish nation's culture also explains why sport is used to raise the question of a Scottish national anthem. What is essential about international sports for politics is that they allow preferences to be ascribed to the national collective. The cultural definition of the nation should be determined by those who identify as Scottish. The Scottish national anthem is an issue where the political elite retreats. It is not parliamentarians who should decide on the national anthem, but the people who feel they belong to this nation. The performance roles of Scottish politics leave the definition of national culture to their complementary roles, including those who sometimes do not even live in Scotland but feel a sense of belonging to the nation and express this, for example, in song at the sports stadium. I want to illustrate this argument empirically with all the motions tabled in the Scottish Parliament to date on the Scottish national anthem.

Motions allow Members of the Scottish Parliament to initiate discussions in this Parliament. By April 2018, there had been seven motions concerning the national anthem. All motions, including the number of their supporters (signatures), are listed in the following table.

Table 3: All motions in the Scottish Parliament on the national anthem (May 1997 to April 2018)

Motion	Supporters of the 129 MSPs in total
Scottish Women's Football Anthem (Denham 2017)	20
Scottish National Anthem (Matheson 2004)	18
National Anthem (Ballance 2004)	3
Glasgow City Council Constitution Insult (Sturgeon 2003)	17
Rugby World Cup (Watson 2003)	2
James Thomson Memorial (Allan 2003)	2
Hamish Henderson (Peattie 2002)	17

Three of the seven motions refer directly to sport to discuss the issue of the Scottish national anthem in Parliament. Nicola Sturgeon's motion, cited above, refers to the national rugby teams (Sturgeon, supported by 16 MSPs in 2003). The motion also refers to sport, with Mike Watson (Labour) criticising England's exceptional position. In rugby, England uses the official anthem of the entire United Kingdom God Save the Queen. Watson "hopes that, before defending the title in 2007, England might commission a National Anthem of its own." (Watson 2003) This hope, which has only been supported by Carolyn Leckie (SSP), once again puts sport front and centre—and has yet to be fulfilled (see Syxius 2018; Rugby 2015[2003]). International competitive sport is also at the centre of the following and the last motion on this topic. In it, SNP MP Ash Denham calls on the Scottish Parliament to recognise Girl (Daughter of Scotland) as the official national anthem of the Scottish women's football team (Denham 2017).[5] This proposal, which once again explicitly recognises the theme of the national anthem from what has been decided by a national sporting body, was supported by 19 other MSPs out of a total of 129.

Even if the other four motions do not explicitly refer to sport, the argument is factually the same. This is because these four motions are also orientated towards the preferences of the majority of the Scottish population to address the issue of the Scottish national anthem. In some cases, reference is made to the majority, as in

5 That the Parliament recognises that the song, Girl (Daughter of Scotland), by the singer/songwriter, Sharon Martin, is the official anthem of Scottish Women's Football; appreciates that Sharon wrote the song to promote gender equality, celebrate Scottish women *and Scotland's contribution to the globe, as well as to be a message of self-belief* […]; supports Sharon's vision and ambition *to make the song a Scottish women's national anthem, and notes that the song can be heard at scottishfa.co/girl/.*" (Denham 2017)

this motion by an SNP MP, which was supported by 18 other MPs out of a total of 129 and called for: "it [is] necessary to have a Scottish national anthem that is endorsed by the majority of Scotland and that embodies the rich cultural heritage and strong character of Scotland" (Matheson 2004).

Two other motions are based on major political events or Scottish national heroes. Emphasising a major political event of the Scottish nation, Chris Ballance (Greens) proposes A Man's A Man For All That, chosen for the opening of the Scottish Parliament, as the Scottish national anthem (Ballance 2004). Only two SSP MPs supported this motion. In memory of Hamish Henderson, who did so much for the Scottish language, Cathy Peattie, Labour, describes The Freedom Come All Ye as a very special anthem. Many believe that this song should become "Scotland's (inter)national anthem" (Peattie 2002: supported by 16 MSPs).

Finally, there was a motion by Alasdair Allan (SNP) criticising a monument to the author of Rule, Britannia and interpreting the Scottish nation as a Jacobite nation. In it, SNP MP Allan calls: "to call on the UK Government formally to disassociate itself from the offensive verse still associated with another song from the period, the UK national anthem, which refers to crushing rebellious Scots." (Allan 2003) However, this motion only received one other support (also SNP).

In Scotland's autonomy movement and politics, its national anthem emerged as a product of the spontaneous will of the people. The national anthem is what those who identify with the Scottish nation use as an anthem in sports or at major political events.

For example, members of the Scottish Culture Committee call for an "organic" or "bottom-up approach" to the search for an anthem (Enterprise and Culture Committee 2006). This committee sees itself as a "facilitator". A Scottish national anthem must emerge from the people that sees itself as a nation.

This view is also shared by the person responsible for the Scottish Government. In his response to the latest petition on the Scottish national anthem, he says that although Scottish ministers are convinced that a national anthem is "an important part of a nation's culture and heritage", the Scottish Government has decided to refrain from deciding in this regard at the moment, because:

> "it is important that any choice has wide public support. […] Scottish Ministers believe that consideration of whether Scotland should officially adopt a national anthem and if so, what that might be, should not be led by the Scottish Government or by any single political party. We therefore have no current plans in this regard." (Scottish Government 2015)

According to the government representative, the demarcation of the Scottish nation symbolised by the national anthem should be separate from everyday political decision-making. The role of government and political parties is not to build the Scot-

tish nation. Rather, the political elite protect what the people have chosen to identify with as a national collective. The political elite interpret the people as a population of changing opinions that form the nation. According to the last petition to date, the question of a national anthem is "an important issue for Scotland and we should give other people an opportunity to comment." (Public Petitions Committee 2015)

5.3 The meaning of the anthem

If the people are to choose the national self-description themselves (see Chapter 5.1), can they agree on an anthem at all? Either an entirely new composition is chosen, or a song is chosen that has been considered as a possible anthem from time to time. The latter applies to these seven songs:

- Auld Lang Syne (*1788)
- Scots Wha Hae (*1793)
- A Man's A Man For All That (*1795)
- Scotland The Brave (*1950)
- Freedom Come-All-Ye (*1960)
- The Flower of Scotland (*1968)
- Highland Cathedral (*1990)

Some of these seven pieces have already been performed at important national events. For example, A Man's A Man For All That opened the first Scottish Parliament in 1999. Hamish Henderson's Freedom Come-All-Ye served as the opening song of the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow. Holders of Scottish national performance roles have variously associated these songs with the identification of the Scottish nation (e.g. in Calney/Burdman 1999; Dewar 1999; Scottish Government 2015; see Peattie 2002; Ballance 2004). Some of these have been used as national anthems for Scottish sports teams. In the past, Scotland The Brave was mainly used for this purpose, but since the 1990s, The Flower of Scotland has generally been played everywhere to welcome Scotland's national teams. These songs have also been put forward in polls and political consultations as candidates for a Scottish national anthem (see Public Petitions Committee 2003; Broadfoot 2015; Royal Scottish National Orchestra 2006; Kelly 2015; Murray 2019).[6]

Which of these seven songs is the anthem with which the Scottish people currently identify themselves as a nation? It is The Flower of Scotland, written by The Corries in 1968.

6 The exception is Scots Wha Hae, which is rarely considered as an option today (it was only surveyed as an option in Kelly 2015: where it ranked fourth with 12 %).

Table 4: Favourite Scottish national anthems based on the latest polls

Candidates	**Results in the surveys**					
The Flower of Scotland	41 %	93 %	65 %	40 %	26 %	Yes
Scotland The Brave	29 %	7 %	8 %	8 %	6 %	Yes
Highland Cathedral	16 %		5 %	4 %	5 %	
A Man's A Man For A' That	7 %				8 %	Yes
Scots Wha Hae	6 %				9 %	
The Freedom Come-All-Ye					19 %	Yes
Auld Lang Syne					5 %	
Others	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Poll	Poll by the Royal Scottish National Orchestra (June 2006, 10k votes)	Binary decision by Scottish team members (Jan. 2010, 226 votes)	Scottish Football Association survey (Feb. 2015, 22,6k votes)	Poll by the SSC (Feb. 2015, 12,6k votes)	Poll in a Blog (Feb. 2015, 710 votes [Kelly, 2015])	Candidates named by the Scottish Government (Feb., 2015)

The Flower of Scotland has won all polls concerning the Scottish national anthem in recent years (since 2006). The following lines, written by the journalist Peter Ross, give us an idea of how closely this song is linked to the Scottish quest for autonomy. In it, he describes the hustle and bustle in so-called "Independence Square" (George Square, Glasgow) on the day after the Scottish referendum on secession:

> "[A] few dozen, a mere rump in comparison with the thousands of recent days, gathered around a man with a guitar and sang a frail, lamenting 'Flower of Scotland'. 'But we can still rise now and be a nation again' – many choked on that line. […] 'Rule Britannia', one side sang. 'Flower of Scotland' was heard from the other." (Ross 2017: 8, 10)

The popularity of The Flower of Scotland is to be recognised among those actively campaigning for Scotland's secession. The popularity of this song as a Scottish national anthem is also evident outside of the separatist movement. For example, during the onset of winter in March 2018, when Lesley Mair wrote a tweet quoted "tens of thousands of times" (Clark 2018) in which she rewrote The Flower of Scotland into the song "No flour in Scotland!". Another example is Anne Bardsley, who distances herself from the "radical nationalist who believes that Scotland should be an independent nation". In response to the question "What's it like to be Scottish?", Bardsley replies: "The sound of the pipes and drums stirs national pride like no other musical instrument that I know. Can you really imagine singing 'Flower of Scotland' to the piano or the guitar? It just does not have the same ring to it." (in Devine/Logue 2002: 13)

Hence, The Flower of Scotland is also popular as a Scottish national anthem because it can be played with instruments—Great Highland bagpipe and drum—associated with Scottish national culture.

Let us summarise this first result: One song is particularly favoured from the repertoire of possibilities: The Flower of Scotland. It has won all surveys by a large margin and is used as the Scottish national anthem in sport and nationalism.

How does the people describe itself as a nation when it uses this song as its national anthem? By remembering its history and, in particular, the defence of national independence with respect to "Proud Edward's Army".

In terms of content, the three verses of The Flower of Scotland are about the Scottish Wars of Independence in the late Middle Ages. The Battle of Bannockburn, which took place in 1314 in what is now Scotland, takes centre stage. The three stanzas are shown in the box below.

The italicised insertions (Against WHOM?) show how the song is actually performed in sports and on numerous other occasions. I will refer to this variant below as the 'Against WHOM?' version of The Flower of Scotland (see for football AllezVusal 2016; Rugby Syxius 2018; in a fundraising gala Kiltwalk 2018).

In terms of content, the very first verse commemorates the Battle of Bannockburn, in which the outnumbered Scottish troops defeated the English. A comparable collective achievement to the victory over the English monarchy at that time is metaphorically expressed in this stanza with the admiration for the flower of Scotland. With the subsequent question of when we will see something comparable again, this strength and the reasons for using it are also actively longed for. In contrast, the second verse deals with the present. References to the emptiness, the silence despite the autumn and the loss of the dearly loved and defended land reveal sadness. However, the next verse breaks with this grief. Here, the impression is created that the loss is a temporary compromise. The defeat should not be seen as a defeat of the Scottish nation. Even if the Scottish wars of independence are a thing

of the past, there is always the possibility of rising as a collective to be a/the "nation again" and achieving a victory as improbable as that of Bannockburn.

Table 5: Lyrics from The Flower of Scotland (the insertions correspond to the frequently used 'Against WHOM?' variant)

O flower of Scotland,
When will we see your like again,
That fought and died for
Your wee bit hill and glen,
And stood against him
[Against WHOM?]
Proud Edward's army
And sent him homeward tae think again.

The hills are bare now,
And autumn leaves lie thick and still,
O'er land that is lost now,
Which those so dearly held,
And stood against him
[Against WHOM?]
Proud Edward's army
And sent him homeward tae think again.

Those days are passed now,
And in the past they must remain
But we can still rise now
And be the nation again.
And stood against him
[Against WHOM?]
Proud Edward's army
And sent him homeward tae think again.

The following links are recognisable in the song and music video: the past is linked with longing (1st verse); the present with mourning (2nd verse); and the future with the threat of dissolving as a nation again at any moment (3rd verse). This can also be seen in the choice of colours and scenes. The Corries pose under a cloudy sky in front of the ruins of a fortress with a severe look to the south.

5.3.1 Forging the Scottish nation

As a national self-description, The Flower of Scotland emphasises national independence from England. It forges the people who identify with Scotland into a nation based on its history. Specifically, the story told in the song is about Scotland's national independence in relation to England. This emphasis makes the song both likely and dangerous as a national anthem. The meaning of the song can be precisely identified with the pattern variables proposed by Talcott Parsons. The semantics implicit in the song are to be understood with the variable pair universalism/particularism, whose disjunctive alternatives Parsons describes as follows: "between evaluating the object of an action in terms of its relations to a generalised frame of reference [i.e. universalism], on the one hand, and evaluating it in terms of its relations to the actor and his own specific relations to objects, on the other [i.e. particularism]." (Parsons/Shils 1951: 48 insertions by the author)

Therefore, the meaning of the current Scottish anthem can be interpreted either as a universal or a particular interpretation of this nation. The former is the case when the self-description is orientated towards an abstract framework. The Flower of Scotland is then interpreted as a national anthem that construes the self-description of the Scottish nation in a universalistic way. Scotland's national self-description is thus bound to the rules of the respective category—in this case, nation. Normative standards of the function system are in the foreground as a "generalised frame of reference". This universalist interpretation can be found in the third stanza, where the nation is interpreted as the self-defence of a collective that unites to form a nation. However, this universalistic interpretation differs from what is associated with this song as Scotland's nationalistic-cultural self-description. As a nationalistic self-description, the song primarily emphasises the particularistic, historically and regionally-based enmity between Scotland and England, representing the second variant.

This particularistic interpretation becomes clear from the fixed rhyme with which each verse of The Flower of Scotland ends: "And stood against him …". Each stanza ends with this reminder of the Battle of Bannockburn and the underlying enmity between the Scottish and English monarchies. Scotland is primarily demarcated from England. These are the interpretations of the wars of independence in the 14th and 15th centuries, which point to the "strong monarchy" of Scotland:

> "Already in the 1370s John Barbour's epic, The Bruce, had laid out an anti-English history of the Wars of Independence and lauded freedom as the goal and meaning of Scottish identity. […] This flowering of poetic and prose 'histories' became the basis of subsequent assertions of Scottish identity, and fed the popular hostility to the English which culminated in the disaster of Flodden in 1513 and the death of James IV." (Smith 2008: 103-104)

In the official lyrics, this implication can be recognised using the definite article to describe the Scottish nation ("be the nation again" instead of "to be a nation again").[7]

This particularistic demarcation is emphasised by the variant "Against WHOM?". The fixed rhyme "and stood against him", which recurs in every stanza, is answered by the stands with "Against WHOM?" before being followed by "Proud Edward's army". This adds a stanza to the fixed rhyme that reduces the Scottish nation to hostility towards England (on the problem and strategies concerning potentially incessant struggles see Hahn 1989; Heuer 1998).

Accordingly, the Scottish nation is formed from the memory of sacrifices. These sacrifices make Scotland contrast above all with England. With this particularism of the nation, i.e. pointing to the historical and regional conditions of its emergence, Ernest Renan had distinguished the nations of Switzerland and Italy from the example of expansion-oriented Turkey:

> "A nation is thus a great community of solidarity, sustained by a sense of the sacrifices one has made and the sacrifices one is still willing to make. It presupposes a past, but it is summarised in the present in a tangible fact: the agreement, the clearly expressed desire to continue the common life. The existence of a nation is – allow me this image – a daily plebiscite, just as the existence of the individual is a continuous assertion of life." (Renan 1993 [1882]: translated by the author)

The nation is interpreted as a nation of will. This interpretation characterises the meaning between the stanzas of The Flower of Scotland: Shared sacrifice (1st stanza) and shared grief (2nd stanza) as well as the prospect of being able to achieve as a national collective such improbable things as victory at the Battle of Bannockburn at any point in the future again (3rd stanza). These three stanzas create a sense of belonging for those who identify with Scotland. They forge the people into a nation of will and history in terms of national independence from England.

The national symbolism of this song is also expressed in the title: The Flower of Scotland. For what flower symbolises the Scottish nation in the collective singular? Even if it is not explicitly mentioned, this focus on Bannockburn clarifies that only the thistle can be meant (for domain-specific inferences in expressive self-descriptions, see Boyer 2018: 262f.). Accordingly, the original music video from 1968 begins with a close-up of a thistle blooming in front of a ruined fortress.

However, why is the thistle a national symbol of Scotland today? For two reasons, which once again make Scotland stand out above all England. Firstly, the thistle

7 In contrast, in the version used here by the Scottish Royal National Orchestra, "a nation" is used as an indefinite article (Royal Scottish National Orchestra 2006), which makes Scotland's national self-description universalistic. In the version with the indefinite article, Scotland is one nation among others.

symbolises Scotland's oldest and most continuous monarchy—the Stewarts (Muirhead 2015: 7). The thistle was probably imported from France as a symbol of the Scottish monarchy as early as the end of the 14th century—the Order of the Thistle was founded in France in 1370. However, the symbol has been used in Scotland since the 15th century. Mary of Guelders (1434–1463), married to James II (1430–1460), had already used the thistle as a symbol and a motto comparable to the Stewarts' "Nemo me impune lacessit" motto—'Do not touch me or I will prick you' (Dickson/Walker 1981: 107, 116). In any case, the thistle has come to symbolise the Scottish monarchy and nation since the coinage of James III (1451–1488).

Secondly, the silhouette of the thistle should be noted. It is reminiscent of the war formation of the Battle of Bannockburn, as the writer Richard Mabey notes in a handbook on botany: "Possibly the thistle also emblemised the Scots' chosen arm of defence—a prickly fence of massed spears, the schiltron." (Mabey 1996: 455)

Thistles, such as Cirsium Vulgare, native to Scotland and used on coinage since James III, are an image of schiltron formations due to their long and prickly leaves (see Dickson/Walker 1981: 110).[8] This formation was typical during the Scottish Wars of Independence and secured victory for the Scots in the hopeless Battle of Bannockburn (1314). This battle is also the subject of The Flower of Scotland, and the silhouette of the thistle shown in the video corresponds to it.

How widespread is the thistle today as a national symbol in Scotland? Veerle van den Eyndens writes that the thistle is omnipresent as a national symbol in Scotland:

> "The thistle is truly used everywhere in Scottish society nowadays, as a logo for businesses and national institutions (Scottish Natural Heritage, National Trust for Scotland, the Scottish rugby team), as well as on stamps, Scottish pound coins, jewellery, biscuits, in architecture etc.". The Scottish Tourism Board awards not stars, but thistles, to value tourism facilities. The thistle represents Scottish identity, both to Scottish people themselves, and to visitors." (van den Eynden 2011: 240)

In addition, van den Eyndens spoke to over 80 people in the Scottish Highlands and Islands and surveyed 38 students at the University of the Highlands and Islands (van den Eynden, 2011, p. 241). His results confirm the naturalness with which the thistle describes Scotland as a nation.

The results of his survey also highlight the link between the thistle and Scotland's national independence. A third of respondents recited the legend that was created in 1829. According to this legend, an attack by the Vikings was thwarted because they

8 Paradoxically, the schiltron formation can be recognised in the silhouette of the Cirsium Vulgare introduced by James VI (Dickson/Walker 1981: 107), who as James I became joint king with England in 1603.

stepped on a thistle and gave up their nightly cover in the ensuing clamour. The thistle protected Scotland from invasion. It symbolises Scottish independence not only from the troops of English monarchs but also from the Vikings.

The connection between the thistle and independence can also be seen in the other answers (two-thirds). According to these responses, this plant symbolises qualities that the people living in Scotland need due to the climate and geography:

> "[T]he thistle as embodying the Scots character and personality (resilient, prickly, tall and proud) or ascribe the symbolism to the thistle's common habitat on waste ground. The Scottish thistle does not refer to any particular species of thistle, although botanists have tried, without success, to establish a botanical link." (van den Eynden 2011: 241)

Attributes that emphasise the independence of a person and Scotland are mentioned here as typically Scottish characteristics. This also explains the references to the lack of identification of a particular thistle and the thistle's habitat. Comparable to the phoenix rising from the ashes, the thistle blooms on scorched earth—"waste ground", as thistles belong to ruderal vegetation.

Scotland's conflict-related self-description centred on England is also evident in the discussions on the use of The Flower of Scotland. The discussions always centre on that Scotland should be described through something other than this historical enmity with England. Take, for example, the assessment of the song by singer Bob Murray. During the Edinburgh Festival Fringe (2019), Murray suggested and commented on eight potential anthems on his website. He also criticised the hostility towards England implied in this song:

> "[The Flower of Scotland] holds that position which only good anthems do; it carries some official status, yet it is still sung voluntarily by people when drunk! In my view, the worst thing about the words is that they refer to things past, to one victory in a history that records just as many defeats. […] [It] [c]arries an attitude which is insular and negative, and can be seen as anti-English. Much of the section of the population who like it so much think of it as being anti-English." (Murray 2019)[9]

9 Finally, Murray asks: "Who should decide? Being all in favour of democracy, I don't think this is something for a popular vote! I once stood in the street during a very large Devolution demonstration in Edinburgh, and ran a questionnaire past numerous people, asking them about the songs listed above. Interestingly, Flower of Scotland received almost a 100 % vote from those people who knew little or nothing of most of the other possibilities. […] Of those people I questioned who did know most or all of the contenders, only very few voted for F.o.S. That is, Flower of Scotland got the large but largely ignorant vote, the knowledgeable voters going elsewhere, and quite well spread also." (Murray 2019)

Murdo Fraser also saw the problem with this song as a national anthem in this particularistic or relativistic-regional interpretation of Scotland. Individual passages in The Flower of Scotland are chauvinistic and anti-English ("jingoistic and anti-English"), which is why this song is "inappropriate" as a national anthem. Tam Dalyell concluded of this song: "That is all anti-English", emphasising a potential conflict between the Scottish and English nations (Hansard 1976c: 1724).

The same aspect was also discussed in the subsequent petition on the Scottish national anthem. At that time, Chris Cromar had called for The Flower of Scotland to be adopted as the Scottish national anthem in his petition. As the petitioner, Cromar anticipates this issue of "anti-English" and objects because the song attributes this hostility to the past: "It has been said that the song is anti-English and stuck in the past, but it is anything but, as is shown by the lyrics: 'Those days are past now, And in the past they must remain'." (Public Petitions Committee 2015)

However, the very first question in the petition committee comes back to this:

> "I believe that "Flower of Scotland" is a good song about a historical event, but does that make it a good national anthem? I believe that the song has an anti-English theme […] and is about things that happened nearly 700 years ago. I would like to think that, some 700 years on, Scotland is a forward-looking, welcoming country and that things that happened in the past should be left in the past." (Public Petitions Committee 2015)

The objections sent to the Petitions Committee about this petition express the same view. The Flower of Scotland should be rejected as the Scottish national anthem because it reduces the Scottish nation to its old antagonism with England. This, for example, is the argument in the letter from singer Alan Garrity:

> "Part of the sentiment it expresses is anti-English – and I suggest that the predominant thought of a new anthem should not be anti any other group, nation, race etc. – but should be for justice, equality, inclusion, promotion of what enriches the life of the nation and its relationship to other nations etc." (Garrity 2015)

Garrity's description of the desirable alternative to The Flower of Scotland as the Scottish national anthem once again reveals the disjunctive distinction between particularist enmity and universalist nationhood. Enmity should be entirely replaced by an anthem that expresses values that are particularly important to the nation: "[J]ustice, equality, inclusion", as well as everything that enriches the life of this nation against the background of its relationship with other nations is indispensable for its differentiation as a nation.

The same 'progressive'-inclusive rather than degressive-conflictual attitude shows the final verse of the following proposal, which John Walker submitted to the

Petitions Committee at the time as a national anthem: "We are close-bound forever by joy that we share –/our love of fair Scotland, home beyond compare." (Walker 2015) Although the Petitions Committee did not take up this proposal, it once again illustrates the universalist expectations of the Scottish nation.

As in George Reid's petition, the song is located in a context to be rejected because the past and conflict determine it. According to Reid's assessment, this song does not correspond to the future-oriented convictions of the "Scottish people": "'Flower Of Scotland' (though never intended as such) is ungrammatical, backward looking and vindictive and probably embarrasses as many (perhaps more) Scots than it pleases." (Reid 2003)

Instead of emphasising values, The Flower of Scotland offers a bleak song of mourning ("a dreary dirge"), as is also stated in the discussions: "Many Scots cringe when 'Flower of Scotland' is sung." (Public Petitions Committee 2003) The same association with hostility and orientation towards the past is also expressed in Anne Mackay's letter, which she sends to the petitions committee during the renewed discussion. She also rejects The Flower of Scotland as an anthem because this song motivates "enmity with our nearest neighbour" (Mackay 2015).

These discussions also show that The Flower of Scotland is primarily interpreted as a reminder of Scotland's enmity with England. Even if the song motivates Scotland's quest for independence from England/UK, it is unlikely that it will officially become the Scottish national anthem. It is improbable because the particularism it expresses violates the political system's fundamental norm of national self-determination. By the end of the First World War at the latest, the norm of national equality no longer referred only to the internal relationship of the nation (Wimmer/Min 2006) but also to the relationship between nations (see Mayall 2013; Weitz 2015; Wilson 1918; Stichweh 2000b: 57; on the most recent "break point", see Meyer 1999: 135)

Nevertheless, the song lends itself to calling for Scotland to be removed from the democratic social system of the UK demographically determined by England. As the anthem of Scottish nationalism, the song has its plausibility and appeal.

5.3.2 Modern sports, auld enemies

The Battle of Bannockburn was a long time ago. But why is the interpretation of Scotland as England's enemy still so popular today? The cause is to be found in the emergence of modern sports. Modern sports competitions give nationalists a platform to call themselves a nation (Chapter 5.1). They have also brought back old, hard-to-shake memories, giving Scotland a national anthem that defines it through its rivalry with England. The hostile interpretation of these two nations is compelling in sports, especially rugby and football, because there are special global situations here.

An example of this is the following meeting between the Scottish and English rugby teams at the annual Six Nations tournament in February 2018 (Syxius 2018).

Of particular interest is the Scottish rugby team's welcome ceremony. First, the visitors from England are welcomed with God Save the Queen played by an on-field orchestra. The Scottish team are then greeted by a solo bagpiper accompanied by the drums of the orchestra. Contrary to what you might think, this soloist is not on the pitch, but on the roof of the stadium. From the roof of the stadium she plays The Flower of Scotland.

This performance clearly identifies Scotland as a nation. The soloist is playing the anthem (The Flower of Scotland); the instrument she is playing (the bagpipes) and the clothing (the kilt), which shows the tartan pattern as a recognisable symbol of Scottish clans, make the Scottish nation identifiable. The fact that the soloist is standing on the roof of the stadium reinforces this (kilt and family tartan are recent inventions originating from England, see Trevor-Roper 1983: 23 belegt). On the other hand, it also implies hostility, as tartan became the pattern for uniforms of all UK troops stationed in Scotland in 1881 (Devine 2012: 240f.). This performance is reminiscent of the military, which may suggest an agonal interpretation of this ceremony, especially when the threat comes from a part of one's army (the troops stationed in Scotland).

This agonal interpretation is also evident in the singing. In this performance, too, the audience sings The Flower of Scotland in the version of Against WHOM?

Another welcoming ceremony, the football match between Scotland and the Czech Republic (September 2011) at Hampden Park (Glasgow), also reveals this hostile interpretation. Again, The Flower of Scotland is performed, at least by the audience, in the Against WHOM? version. But unlike the rugby match described, some Scottish players do not join in. Four Scottish players assembled on the field judged this song too much of a commitment to a different function system (i.e. politics instead of sports) and remained silent. Apart from Allan McGregor, who was born in Scotland and played for Glasgow Rangers (a team historically associated with the British Empire), the other three silent players are individuals who play their professional club football roles in England, and two of these three players are from England themselves (James Morrison and Phil Bardsley).

A final example of the handling of the particularist, hostile interpretation of The Flower of Scotland comes from two surveys. In the course of Chris Cromar's petition, the petition committee commissioned these surveys in the Scottish Football Association. The results showed that members of the official national football supporters' organisation, the Scotland Supporters Club (SSC), were far less likely to favour The Flower of Scotland as the national political anthem. 40 % of the responding SSC members (fans' association) affirmed the question: "Should Flower of Scotland be recognised by the Scottish Government as the official national anthem?". However, in the Scottish Football Association survey, which was not restricted to SSC mem-

bers only, 65 % of the votes affirmed the same question, and a clear majority voted in favour of The Flower of Scotland as the national anthem (Broadfoot 2015).[10]

How can these results be interpreted? I suggest that the organised fans of Scottish football are aware of this anthem's conflictual nature, which is why they use it as an anthem in sports. However, the majority are sceptical about using this anthem of sport as an anthem of the Scottish nation for self-description of national politics. In football, there can be relativism between Scotland and England. This is because, in football, the clash between Scotland and England (comparable to rugby) is a historically significant encounter for world sport, if only because England is involved. Most modern sports based on the accurate measurement and improvement of physical performance originated in England: "This transition from traditional to [measurement based] modern sports took place in England much earlier than in the rest of Europe. In this sense, the English can be said to have invented modern sports." (Guttmann 2004: 196-197; an exception is cycling, invented in France at the end of the 19th century, see)

Modern sports were invented in England. That is why the enmity with England associated with The Flower of Scotland is not particularist-provincial to the same extent in sport, as it declares the historical centre of modern sports to be the enemy.[11] As an official nuclear power, the United Kingdom is also vital in politics, and London is still a cosmopolitan city. However, as a state, it no longer has a global political relevance that would allow it to be seen as a centre of world politics. This illustrates the interdependency-interruption of functional differentiation of world society: what is a historically explainable circumstance in sport cannot be adopted one-to-one as a self-description of politics from the audience's perspective but instead encounters its expectations determined by the function system of politics. What is expected is an egalitarian self-description of the nation that is orientated towards the internal relationship between nations.

The variant The Flower of Scotland offers as an anthem to present the Scottish collective to the world as a national entity demonstrates the improbability of finding such an anthem. Nations are historical individuals, as can be seen by the fact that the Scottish people currently use an anthem that is primarily associated with Scotland's particular and regional history. However, this history associated with hostility to England is to be forgotten. Although the song's emphasis on national independence motivates the Scottish independence movement, its equally implied hostility

10 A total of 12.6 thousand votes were cast by SSC members, while 22.7 thousand votes were counted in the other, more extensive survey.

11 From a Scottish perspective, the persistent relativism in national team football can be recognised because the Scottish team is primarily perceived by the public as different from the English team and the public is more indifferent towards other nations (see the poll from May/June 2018 by Smith 2018).

is incompatible with Scottish democratic nationalism. The song contrasts the democratic principle of individual self-determination with a focus on hostile collectives. Reciprocal migration would be extremely unlikely under this ethnic interpretation of Scottish politics.

With the inclusive imperative of politics and its collectives, democratic nationalism is more likely to produce an anthem with the "dreary uniformity" that characterises all national anthems, according to Yuval Noah Harari. Harari argues that anyone and everyone can sing all the hymns, and they all sound the same (Harari 2018: 2013; cf. Gellner 1983: 124). This conceals the phenomenon of an inclusive reinterpretation of exclusionary mechanisms like the national-cultural collective (Stichweh 2019)

5.4 Conclusion: Two collectives

Scottish politics and the Scottish independence movement search for a national anthem based on what those who identify with the Scottish nation use as their anthem. Even the SNP government is reticent regarding a collectively binding definition of the national anthem. For example, the latest draft of the Scottish constitution deals with the issue of the Scottish national anthem as follows: "The Scottish Parliament may choose, as it sees fit, a national anthem for Scotland." (Scottish Government 2014: §8(2))

The national cultural collective that identifies with Scotland creates the national anthem. This leads to a 'long-standing debate' (Scottish Government 2014: 30). As shown above, this debate is either about a more inclusive and forward-looking nation and its anthem. Or, it is about forging the Scottish nation through a sense of being anti-English due to the history of the Scottish nation. The first is the variant of democratic nationalism, which is based on individual self-determination and orientation towards the future and those who actually live in the territory. The second, hostile interpretation is the autocratic variant of nationalism, which is based on the history of a particular collective for which it claims self-determination.

Nationally determined politics observes these debates and adopts the national symbols from them. However, the collective of the national anthem differs from the political inclusion in Chapters 3 and 4. Residing in Scotland demarcates political inclusion. The national cultural collective should decide the national anthem, formed by a sense of belonging.

The role of the Government and voters determined by residence in Scotland is not to construct the Scottish nation but to protect what the people recognises as its national culture. Members of the Government or party differentiate between the definition of the nation and the individuals who should be included in political performance roles of the Scottish nation. In Scotland, the people elected to represent

them in politics retreat when they need to make an important decision about the country's national culture. The Scottish autonomy movement is a spontaneous ordering of the people claiming a to represent a national-cultural collective. It should only include those who voluntarily identify as Scottish. This has nothing to do with residency.

Sociologically, the discussion of the Scottish national anthem shows a separation between the boundary-building mechanism of the political collective (residential inclusion in the input and output of Scottish politics) and the national-cultural collective (voluntarism). On the other hand, a link determined by democracy is also recognisable. In petition committees, petitions or motions deal with the issue of a Scottish national anthem. Politicians assume in their arguments that there is a Scottish national cultural collective. This collective is not conceptualized as a mass, but as a 'population' that takes the individuality of its members as its starting point. It has distributed and constantly changing opinions about its national cultural identity as a collective (Stichweh 2005: 87). For this reason, people constantly observe chants in stadiums, surveys, and tenders. They want to find out which national anthem the Scottish population prefers.

However, is the national anthem an exception because it is primarily an outward-looking symbol for other nations seeking support for the autonomy movement (see the legitimacy competition of scarcity nationalism in Werron 2012: 348-349, 2018: 35)? What about the symbolisation of national unity in one's own country? In connection with the national cultural symbols, we also find the democratic orientation of the Scottish autonomy movement here. The following Chapter shows this in decisions about the architectural design of the Scottish Parliament.

6 Coupling the political and national collectives

Parliament as a national symbol

In 1997, Scottish politicians were tasked with defining the cultural component of the Scottish national collective by creating a national symbol from scratch. In a referendum on 11 September 1997, a majority of 74 % of the Scottish population voted in favour of a Scottish Parliament. This election promise by Tony Blair's Labour government was preceded by the referendum held in 1979. Although a majority of 51.6 % voted in favour of the Scottish Assembly at the time, this majority fell short of the pre-determined quorum of 40 % of the population.

However, the Parliament, decided on in 1997 and opening in May 1999, was able to meet temporarily in the General Assembly Hall of the Church of Scotland. It was clear from the outset that this could not be a permanent solution. The UK Government therefore commissioned Scotland's most senior politician, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar, to find a venue for the Scottish Parliament. It was to be a new building in Edinburgh. However, what should it look like, and how should politicians decide on the cultural component of the nation?

I answer these questions by the expectations that underpinned the decisions concerning the design of the Scottish Parliament. Planning began in 1997, and the building was completed in autumn 2004, three years too late and nine times more expensive. Completion was planned for autumn 2001 but only took place in October 2004. In 1997, construction costs in the range of GBP 35–40 million were planned for the new building and set at GBP 40 million in the White Paper (see Fraser 2004: 23-26). The new building actually cost GBP 414.4 million.

This resulted in the Holyrood enquiry. It was led by Lord Fraser. The enquiry provides original data for the following sociological study. In terms of time, I will concentrate on the early planning phase. I begin with the initial correspondence, meetings, inspections and tenders for the planning of the Parliament, which took place in the spring of 1997, and progress to the final decision on the design of the Chamber, taken in September 1999.

The following pages explain the key expectations for the design of the Scottish Parliament. The building was planned as a "symbol" of Scottish "society", as SNP MP Michael Matheson puts it (Scottish Parliament 1999b). To this end, "decision[s]

about what will probably be one of the most important buildings to be constructed in Scotland for 300 years" had to be made, according to the then Minister Henry McLeish. Dewar was looking for a building emphasising the expansion of national self-determination: "to symbolise the new approach" (quoted in Fraser 2004: 4.3).

What is also interesting about this case is that these decisions could not be postponed. Although the move took place three years too late (2004 instead of 2001), decisions had to be made about the design of this national symbol if Parliament was to have its own building.

In order to analyse the formation of this national symbol, the Chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, it is shown that the nation itself wanted to determine its symbol and how attempts were made to ensure this self-determination. The second section explains how this orientation manifests itself in the design of the building. Decisions and expectations regarding the design are also at the centre of the final section. Here, however, the focus is on reconstructing the decision-making process concerning the design of the plenary Chamber.

6.1 Planning a national symbol: It takes a team

At the outset of planning this Scottish Parliament building, there was a debate about what it should represent. How to create a building uniting the population for generations by a national symbol? The importance of this interpretation of the Parliament Building as a symbol of the Scottish nation is reflected in the first meeting to produce the Building User Brief (Scottish Parliament 1998). This blueprint was later used for the tendering process. It was subsequently further concretised. Among other things, the following ten "keywords" were agreed at the first meeting, which were to guide the design:

Symbolism – importance of
Efficient and effective conduct of business
Dignified/Gravitas/not somber
Modern
Scottish
Egalitarian/for the people
Openness/Accessibility
Quality/Fit for purpose/not lavish/Durable/Functional
"Made in Scotland" (from girders!)
"Scotland in Europe" (all keywords based on Doig 1997: SF/7/8)

There are no explicit references to Scotland's national cultural component in seven of these keywords (symbolism, modern, egalitarian etc.). These keywords emphasise

expectations that apply to every nation-state and that stem from the universalism of the political function system.

However, three keywords explicitly refer to Scotland. The first is "Scottish", referring to the expectation that the nation, the people who identify with it as a national collective, and the state can be addressed by a name (Scottish nation, Scot or Scot and Scotland): "The name of the State, by which it is to be known formally, is Scotland" (Scottish Government 2014: 29).

The other two keywords directly linking the building with Scotland are "'Made in Scotland' (from girders!)" and "'Scotland in Europe'".

The first keyword in particular stands out in the expectations for the design of the building: "'Made in Scotland' (from girders!)". This keyword guides the choices to find an architecture, and it also structures the artistic design of the building. Behind the keyword is the primacy of the political, territorial demarcated collective in defining what can still be considered a national culture. The political collective of inclusion pre-structures the possibilities of the national collective. As a national symbol, the Parliament must be able to integrate the people who live in Scotland as a nation.

The very choice of the tendering process is instructive in recognising this focus on national inclusion. The tendering process was an attempt to create conditions for the Parliament to be designed in a self-determined and gradual way. A competitive interview process was chosen to gain the external expertise required for the construction. The purpose of the "competitive interview" procedure is not to find a ready-made design for the building in question, but to find experts who can be temporarily deployed as service providers and colleagues in order to fulfil the tendered task step by step together.

The task formulated in the tender was to design the building of the Scottish Parliament jointly and to realise the construction project with a budget of around GBP 50 million from July 1999 to June 2001. Professionals in architecture, structural engineering and building services engineering were sought. The tender text states: "The services required are the provision of architectural, structural and services engineering design. (A Quantity Surveyor will be appointed separately.)" (Grice 1998a). Together with those responsible for Scottish politics, this team was to design the Parliament. A team was to be created.

However, why was this procedure chosen? There were two primary considerations. The design of the symbolic building should not be rushed. It was important to allow the necessary foreign and architectural expertise against the background of national self-determination. As the future symbol of the nation, the design of the building was ultimately to remain "in the hands of the client". This was the judgement of John Gibbons, the lead architect of the Scottish Office commissioned by the British Government to build the building (Gibbons 1998: §6).

I illustrate this below by discussing the choice of this tendering procedure. In the beginning, Dewar, who was in charge of the construction then, held out the prospect

of a typical competition procedure to find a design. In the first press release, Dewar announced an international "design competition" that would enable "architects in Scotland and further afield" to submit designs for a Scottish Parliament in order to find a design that met the "demands of a modern democracy" (Dewar 1997).

However, this press release of 16 July 1997 was followed a few days later by a frequently quoted letter from Sebastian Tombs, Secretary of the Royal Incorporation of Architects in Scotland (RIAS). In his letter to the chief architect of the Scottish Office, John Gibbons, Tombs writes of the "great danger in taking a competition too far". A majority should not decide on the architecture, but the architecture of the Scottish Parliament should emerge through numerous small and collegial consultations.

Tombs recommends that, under the current circumstances, it would be better to concretise the design of the Scottish Parliament step by step in consultation between clients and service providers ("designers") than to invite tenders for finished design-concepts: "[T]he best buildings derive from strong positive working relationships between clients and designers where the brief is hammered out and honed down in considerable detail prior to design work being taken too far." (Tombs 1997)

In this context, Tombs turns to politics. Because "the nature of the client" raises the question of who can represent the "client's interests". In addition to the "judges" and a board, Tombs proposes "public consultation", which must take place "prior to the jury's [final] deliberations".

The "better contact with the public, for information", according to Dewar, is one of the reasons why he now speaks out against the search for a design and in favour of the search for a team. Exhibitions should provide the public with "opportunities for comment on options, but with no power to decide outcomes." (Dewar et al. 1998: §1b, §8)

As with the national anthem, Scottish politicians have also spoken out in favour of leaving the design of the national symbols to the people who identify with Scotland. Under no circumstances should the design of the Parliament be left to the vote of the political collective alone, whether as elected representatives or in the form of a referendum. This illustrates the division between the political collective, which comprises the people living in Scotland at any given time, and the national cultural collective, understood as a nation of will.

On the one hand, the Scottish nation of will has been included by "two lay people". To this end, journalist Kirsty Wark and architecture professor Andy MacMillan were appointed to the jury (Grice 1998c: §13-§16).

The public should also have the opportunity to comment. The project portfolios of the five finalists selected by the jury from the 70 applications received were exhibited in seven cities in Scotland (in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee, Aberdeen, Inverness, Dumfries und Selkirk, see Grice 1998d: §7.2). On the first page of the folder, the company or joint venture introduced itself; on the following pages, considerations and initial drafts of the Scottish Parliament were outlined.

Visitors to the exhibition could indicate which of the five finalists they favoured on the "comments sheet[s]" on display. A total of 4,675 comments were received. These were quantitatively analysed for the jury in order to assess the public's preferences. For this purpose, the number of positive comments counted per finalist was compared with the number of negative comments favouring this (Doig 1998: 165, 2003: §170-§179). This yielded the following result:

Table 6: Results on the public comments on the finalists

Finalists	**Positive comments**	**Negative comments**
Rafael Vinoly (New York) and Reiach & Hall (Edinburgh)	39 %	10 %
Enric Miralles Benedetta Tagliabue (EMBT Barcelona) and RMJM (Edinburgh)	23 %	24 %
Richard Meier (New York) and Keppie Design (Glasgow)	11 %	12 %
Glass Murray (Glasgow) and Denton Corker Marshall International (Melbourne)	13 %	21 %
Michael Wilford (London)	13 %	33 %

The "Public Information/Consultation Exercise" evaluation showed that the public preferred Rafael Vinoly and Reiach & Hall. It can also be seen that the London-based office of Michael Wilford received mainly negative comments. However, the jury chose someone else as the winner. Following an intervention by MacMillan, the professor of architecture representing the public, the jury shortlisted the application of Enric Miralles and Benedetta Tagliabue (EMBT). However, this office did not fulfil some of the selection criteria required at the time (in addition to insurance-related aspects, the willingness to work was questioned). This was the project manager's assessment, William Armstrong, who later resigned: "With Miralles's other commitments, devoting 21 hours a week to this project was totally inadequate. […] I just could not imagine that somebody who had scored 44th out of 70 could suddenly come forward as a contender. […] [H]e did not have the resources to do the job." (Armstrong 2003: §601-§671)

Similarly, jury member Joan O'Connor emphasises Miralles idiosyncrasies in her testimony but sees them as a controllable and promising risk:

> "Miralles's presentation and concept were unquestionably head and shoulders above the others and by consensus he came out on top. In deciding on EMBT/RMJM, we were alert to an element of risk arising from the personality of Enric

> Miralles and the working methods of the design studio. […] My note […] records the panel asking itself whether Miralles was 'controllable'. As per my note, we all identified this as a significant risk but a risk that was worth taking." (O'Connor 2003: §9, §15)

The senior representative of the Scottish Office (project sponsor of the Holyrood Building Steering Group), Barbara Doig, also were aware of the risk and summarised:

> "Enric Miralles was a particular type of architect, and we needed to manage and to be able to respond to that. […] We certainly were considering all sorts of ways of supporting the design team to be able to form a relationship; to be able to make it productive; to be able to tap into what Miralles could bring to this building, and we did." (Doig 2003: §304-§316)

The jury decided in favour of Miralles' office, which entered into a joint venture with RMJM. In addition to how the client successfully involves the national-cultural collective based on will, Tombs emphasises politics for procedural reasons in his letter. He argues against Dewar's intended international tender: "On the political front, the UIA [International Union of Architects] only recognises national bodies, and that would imply a London-based organisation being the principal agent in administering such a competition." (Tombs 1997).

In contrast, the tendering rules of the European Union offer the advantage of insisting on the participation of a company based in Scotland, provided that "national security, […] serious economic disadvantage […], or […] cultural and artistic reasons" are invoked (Tombs 1997). The European tendering procedure was also chosen, and RMJM, an Edinburgh-based company, was involved, whose contributions lay primarily in the realisation rather than the design of the construction project.

The subsequent minutes of the meeting show that Dewar heeded Tombs' advice. Dewar changed course from looking for a design to looking for a team. A member of the administration at the time recalls Dewar as "captain of the ship. We absolutely realised that the devolution project, in political terms, was clearly his." (Alistair Brown quoted in Fraser 2004: 3.41)

In the meetings held at the beginning of January 1998 on the construction of the Parliament, these references were repeatedly made because the primary aim was to design a building that would become a symbol of the Scottish nation.

In addition, those involved at the time referred to the Architectural Competitions Manual (McGhie/Girling 1996) to weigh up the various options for the tendering process. According to this handbook, the tendering of an object ('design competition') gives rise to expectations of eccentric architecture: "Many leading architects have made their names through design competitions." (McGhie/Girling 1996:

7) In contrast, searching for the inclusion of professionals through competitive interviews is more effective. Although these interviews generate less "public interest", and the architectural excellence of new talent is not to be expected, they are cheaper and faster. In addition, this process enables more coordination between clients and architects to concretise the design, if necessary, gradually. Competitive interviews "make possible a close working relationship between client and architect; they allow the brief to develop; and, if necessary, they can accommodate step-by-step public consultation. All these things are difficult to achieve in design competitions." (McGhie/Girling 1996: 29)

This explanation was taken up by the chief architect of the Scottish Office, John Gibbons, in a letter to Dewar's then Under-Secretary, Henry McLeish, as follows:

> "The advantages of the competitive selection process, intended to find a designer rather than a design, are that it is quicker and cheaper than a classic design competition and that it allows a creative dialogue to take place between architect and client at a much earlier stage in the process. This method is also less likely to be subjected to external influence as the selection process is more clearly in the hands of the client." (Gibbons 1998: §6)

Once again, the choice of this tendering procedure is justified by the possibilities of self-determination of the client, i.e. the Scottish nation. What is sought is not architecture that stands out worldwide but a building with "more of a Scottish than an international flavour", as Gibbons continues in his letter:

> "to find a designer would make for an altogether narrower exercise. There would probably be more of a Scottish than an international flavour. A greater degree of ministerial/departmental control would be retained […]. […] the architectural community might criticise this approach as lacking in imagination and vision, and significantly reducing the weight given to aesthetic considerations in the design of the new Parliament." (Gibbons 1998: §15-16)

In the "exploratory meeting" that Dewar convened a few days later, on 14 January 1998, he informed those present that he was looking for a "prestigious project" but not "heroics". Andrew Wright (representative of the Lord Cameron Royal Fine Art Commission for Scotland) also called for "a need to stop architects going too far" (both quoted in Dewar et al. 1998: §11, §14).

These reflections on the choice of process reveal a recurring expectation that the nation itself should decide on its symbol. The design of the Scottish Parliament should be based on the national performance roles. The will of the people, who identify as Scottish, is indirectly included through representatives and the public. At least the culture of the Scottish nation is created by the people who identify with it.

6.2 The nation: designed and engraved

What should the Parliament symbolise? Looking at the concrete design of the building, especially the accentuated visible parts of the building complex, one expectation stands out. The design should symbolise the unity of the Scottish people as a nation. The people living in Scotland should be integrated into the nation with this building. I show this in two steps. Firstly, I will outline what convinced the jury about the tender winner's project portfolio and how this conviction was realised.

6.2.1 Designing the nation with the people

Let us start with the project portfolio of the "partnership" EMBT & RMJM, which was selected by the jury from 70 applications for the design. The two companies are introduced on the first page of the project folder. There are explanations of the companies, photos of projects that have already been completed but may be important for the design of the Scottish Parliament and the division of tasks is indicated. The architectural design is mainly the responsibility of the Catalan firm Enric Miralles Benedetta Tagliabue (EMBT), which presents itself as an "international architecture studio". At the same time, the subsequent realisation is being managed by the Edinburgh-based firm RMJM. Looking back, Benedetta Tagliabue describes her joint studio with Enric Miralles and the priority of this studio for the entire building project as follows:

> "Enric Miralles and myself we were a couple sharing life and work. This is a situation becoming more and more common in the architectural and artistic scenario. […] Our involvement with the academy and architectural school was very important, being the studio not only a business world but also a continuation of the act of learning. […] Our division of tasks though was not radically defined […] The main idea of this type of architectural office is to provide a project to the client following carefully EVERY PHASE of the project, breaking the general erroneous idea that an architect can give a sort of preliminary sketch that then can later be developed by some general 'technicians'." (Tagliabue 2004: 1.2, 2.1, 2.3, 5.1)

What is striking about the project folder is the orientation towards Scotland as "your place", as Miralles expresses it, with his signature "Enric" on the first page (EMBT&RMJM 1998: 1). The title of the second page emphasises this attitude and formulates a claim that encompasses all regions of Scotland: "THE PARLIAMENT SITS IN THE LAND … SCOTLAND IS A LAND … IT IS NOT A SERIES OF CITIES. The Parliament should be able to reflect the land which it represents." (EMBT&RMJM 1998: 2)

Not only is the Scottish central belt to be included by the parliament but every province and locality, however remote, is to be taken into account. This is also linked to a guiding principle of this design that was later taken up by the jury:

> "THE PARLIAMENT SITS IN THE LAND, because it belongs to the Scottish Land This is our goal. Since the beginning we worked with the intuition that individual identification with land carries collective consciousness and sentiments." (EMBT&RMJM 1998: 2)

On the next page, this guiding principle is concretised under the title "THE PEOPLE[/]THE PARLIAMENT SIT IN THE LAND. THE PARLIAMANT IS A FRAGMENT OF A LARGE GATHERING SITUATION". This reference to the people is maintained throughout the draft. It makes it clear that the Parliament intends to create a symbol of the nation that brings these people together: "[T]he act of sitting together in the land" (EMBT&RMJM 1998: 4). In contrast to Holyrood Palace, which is "a building *situated on the landscape*", the Scottish Parliament would sit in the land: "the new Scottish Parliament would *sit within the land*". (EMBT&RMJM 1998: 3)[1]

These voluntaristic ("Mental Place", "act of sitting together") and residential ("within the land", "Gathering") interpretations of the Scottish nation convinced the jury. That the Parliament "sits in the land because it belongs in the land" was the recurring reason why the jury decided in favour of this design (see Fraser 2004: §4.41). Similarly, Dewar explained to the other members of the Scottish Parliament: "The way in which the project grows out of the landscape is attractive. […] I was much taken by the piece of script on the first panel, which said that Parliament was a mental place." (Scottish Parliament 1999b)

Similarly, other MPs emphasised that the new building would be a symbol for the next hundred years or more and, therefore, had to have access for everyone "at its heart".[2]

We can see from these discussions how important considerations of inclusion of the whole population living in Scotland were in planning the building. The na-

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1 "The PARLIAMENT building should come out of a clear and strong statement … in a way independent of site and circumstances … Any strong statement should carry political implications", it is said. "Citizens sitting, resting, thinking … but in a SIMILAR place and position as members of Parliament." (EMBT&RMJM, 1998, p. 3)

2 See Cathie Craigie (Labour): "The parliamentary complex has been designed with access at its heart, not as an afterthought and not as something that can be adapted at a later date, but as a building that will hold no barriers. […] The proposals before us would have Scotland leading the world, with a Parliament building that had open access for all people." Similarly, Michael Matheson (SNP): "The Parliament should be built to ensure that, during the next 200 years, every member of our society, no matter that they have a disability, can access the building and every part of the building." (Scottish Parliament 1999b)

tional cultural component of the Scottish nation and the collective associated with it should be pre-structured by the politically inclusive people living in Scotland. The Parliament must emphasise the sense of connection, but it must also consider the people who live in Scotland.

6.2.2 Engraving the nation: National artefacts

How was this expectation of national integration, i.e. expressions such as "sit within the land" or "'Made in Scotland' (from the girders!)", realised? National artefacts were created. The building has several places intended to represent Scotland as a nation. To this end, natural materials from Scotland combine semantic definitions of meaning to create national artefacts.

The first version of the Building User Brief from November 1998 already states that local materials should be favoured for the construction and design of the Parliament:

> "The following criteria must be adopted by the design team; the use of low maintenance materials; maximise the use of daylight and natural ventilation; avoid over complicated design features or systems which are expensive to operate and maintain and costly to replace. […] Where they meet the above criteria preference should be given to indigenous materials used, quarried or grown in Scotland. Brick is considered to be an unsuitable material for the external cladding of this building." (Armstrong 1998b: §7.4.4, §7.4.7)

To create unity, indigenous materials were deliberately used (cf. an MSP emphasising the "role of indigenous companies and the use of indigenous resources" on the "most prestigious 'front of house' parts", see, Scottish Parliament 2001). Materials originating from Scotland have been placed in highly visible parts of the building, some of them tagged with their place of origin.

One striking example is the Canongate Wall. This 39-metre-long and 6-metre-high Canongate Wall stretches along the main thoroughfare of Parliament. Viewed from the main thoroughfare, the Canongate Wall looks like a girder on which the Scottish Parliament stands.

However, it is not only this perspective that shows the territorial closure of the nation expressed by the keyword "'Made in Scotland' (from the girders!)". A closer look also reveals the expression of this expectation.

There are many national artefacts on the Canongate Wall. Four segments can be distinguished here. On the left, towards the entrance to Parliament, there is a relief of Edinburgh's Old Town. This national artefact comes from a sketch made by Enric Miralles from the view of his hotel room. It shows, among other things, Edinburgh Castle, which has been fought over many times over the centuries. To the right of

this, ten different horizontal strips of granite, basalt and sandstone have been incorporated and staged: "[A] remarkable variety of different kinds of sedimentary, igneous and metamorphic rocks, reflecting Scotland's long and complicated geological history." (Lothian and Borders GeoConversation 2011: 2).

Thirdly, there are four vertical strips of dolerite. Like brackets, these dolerite strips reach over the beams or strip foundations on which the Parliament is founded. The viewer's attention is also explicitly drawn to this dolerite stone (from the Greek: deceptive), as the following is engraved in large letters on the pavement in front of this spot: "DOLERITE AN IGNEOUS ROCK FROM CALDERCRUIX THAT COOLED FROM MOLTEN MAGMA AROUND 300 MILLION YEARS AGO etc." (Lothian and Borders GeoConversation 2011: 3).

What can be meant by this as a national artefact? First, reference is made here again to the nation's residential demarcation. Moreover, an inclusion imperative for every person living in Scotland is to be interpreted. Whether the two supporting girders continue to hold the Parliament depends on very old but deceptive brackets (dolerite). However, if the brackets are unreliable—perhaps the brackets of law, custom, history or nature—vigilance and participation are called for. This interpretation is suggested if you follow the pavement and walk towards the Canongate Wall.

If you follow this path, gradually moving away from the entrance of Parliament, you will notice two things: Firstly, the deceptive bracket (dolerite strip) soon encompasses only the lower bar, leaving the upper bar, but on which Parliament also stands, to its own devices. Secondly, you finally arrive in front of memorial plaques made of stone with short texts engraved on them (see Scottish Parliament, 2018). Four further stone plaques supplemented these original 24 stone plaques to mark the tenth anniversary of the Parliament. Scottish newspapers called on the public to submit suggestions for the texts on the new stone tablets. Bookshops and libraries put out postcards for the Scottish public to send their suggestions to the jury:

> "We are asking people to nominate a well-loved or significant piece of writing that is relevant for Scotland, perhaps something that expresses how they feel about Scotland, what it means to be Scottish, or hopes for the future." (The Scotsman 2009)

People who identify with Scotland were asked to describe their nation, regardless of whether they live in Scotland or not. Only two of the four new stone tablets have been engraved so far.

Figure 16: The numbering shows the places of origin of the 28 stone slabs on the Canongate Wall of the Scottish Parliament (this graphic is taken from Lothian and Borders GeoConversation 2011: 2)

Sociologically, these 26 engraved stone tablets are particularly interesting. Here, we learn what Scotland as a national collective claims to be worth preserving. These tablets show, how inclusive or exclusive this national community is set to be. A particular type of semantics is engraved in these stone tablets. Comparable to a millennial disc or the stone engravings in Cixin Liu's science fiction of The Three-Body Problem trilogy, these texts should be stored for generations. They are chiselled in stone so that they will last for millennia.[3]

3 Explicitly preserved semantics, which is available as a repertoire of topics for "quickly comprehensible inclusion in concrete communicative processes", are to be distinguished from other

Before we look at the semantics of these national artefacts, it is important to note the natural carrier material of these texts. These dispositives are engraved on 28 stone slabs (two of them without engraving), which come from very scattered locations in Scotland (see the numbering in the following diagram), demanding the residential-territorial closure of the national collective. In other words, the material by which the volitional nation, which is not confined to residence in Scotland, describes itself is delimited by the territory of the political collective based on political inclusion in Scotland (not necessarily in the UK).

What is the significance of the political collective demarcated by Scottish territory in these engraved texts? The texts point beyond the residential demarcation of the political inclusion collective and express attachment to Scotland as a nation. Implicitly or explicitly, these texts link the Scottish nation to the primacy of individual self-determination, suggesting democratic nationalism. For example, we read this quote from Hamish Henderson:

> So, cam' all ye at hame wi' freedom/Never heed whit the hoodies croak for doom/ In your hoose a' the bairns o' Adam/Can find breid, barley bree an' painted room." (Henderson 2000[1960])

It comes from Henderson's song The Freedom Come-All-Ye, written in the spring of 1960. The first verses of the third stanza are quoted. In the preceding verses, the old world is described as a world of exploitation. In contrast, the verses of the third stanza quoted at the Canongate Wall describe the new world as a peaceful world. The new world emphasises peace and equality between people. It enables individual self-determination. With this diagnosis, already in the first stanza ("Roch the wind […] Blaws the cloods"), Henderson's song picks up on Harold Macmillan's 'Wind of Change' speeches in Accra in January and Cape Town in February.[4]

Henderson dedicated The Freedom Come-All-Ye to Nelson Mandela, who was awarded the Freedom of the City by the city of Glasgow during South African

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semantics as well as from the generic concept of culture: "We call this repertoire of topics culture and, if it is preserved specifically for communication purposes, semantics. Serious semantics worth preserving is therefore a part of culture, namely that which is handed down to us by the history of concepts and ideas." (Luhmann 1984: 224 translated by the author)

4 In these speeches, Macmillan (implicitly) speaks out against apartheid and calls on those present to stand up for "a society which respects the rights of individuals" so that this society becomes the singular world society through prestige and emulation rather than dominance and fear: "[We] must recognise that in this shrinking world in which we live to-day the *internal policies of one nation may have effects outside it*. […] We may sometimes be tempted to say to each other 'mind your own business', but in these days I would myself expand the old saying so that it runs: 'mind your own business *but* mind how it affects my business, too." (Cabinet Office 1960: 155-156)

apartheid (Bort 2013). Scotland still honours the song as an "International Anthem" (Peattie 2002). In his speech at the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, Billy Connolly recalled The Freedom Come-All-Ye as follows: "Equality is for all of us, Freedom is for all of us", and even though Henderson had written the song in Scottish, "these words […] are just for everyone." (Commonwealth Games 2014: 2:14 h)

Connolly's speech is followed by a performance by the South African singer Pumeza, who, like Mandela, is Xhosa.[5] In addition to the global expectations of the welfare state (finding bread) and human rights (hospitality), two national characteristics are emphasised in the quotation posted on the Canongate Wall: language (Scottish) and whisky (barley bree).[6]

Another example of individual self-determination explicitly referring to Scotland as a territory through the stones used is the quote by George Campbell Hay from The Four Winds of Scotland, carved in both Gaelic and English: "It is Scotland, Highland and Lowland that is laughter and warmth and life for me." (Scottish Parliament 2018)

The final verse of this quote by MacDiarmid, which is inscribed on the Canongate Wall, also links individual self-determination with Scotland as a national collective defined by a shared history: "The rose of all the world is not for me/I want for my part/Only the little white rose of Scotland/That smells sharp and sweet and breaks the heart." (Scottish Parliament 2018)

The following two quotes read very similarly but emphasise the use of individual labour: "*Work* as if you live in the early days of a better nation" is a quote paraphrased by Alasdair Gray from the poet Dennis Lee, who was working in Edinburgh at the time (Scottish Parliament 2018). Every person is addressed to make the still young nation with its freedom of action (work) an ever-improving nation.

The other quote on this comes from Sir Alexander Gray's "Scotland": "This is my country,/The land that begat me./These windy spaces/Are surely my own./And those who toil here/In the sweat of their faces/Are flesh of my flesh,/And bone of my bone." (Scottish Parliament 2018)

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5 Pumeza's performance is praised by nationalist Alex Salmond (SNP) in his speech on the eve of the Scottish secession referendum (see minute 2 until 3 in WeeWildyCamper 2014).

6 Whisky is linked to Scotland as a nation with a quote from Edwin Morgan, who in turn refers to Robert Burns' poem "Scotch Drink" (1785): "tell us about last night/well, we had a wee ferintosh and we lay on the quiraing. it was pure strontian!" Whisky (Ferintosh) and a unique landscape on Scotland's west coast (Quiraing) as well as a village and/or the mineral discovered nearby (Strontian) and Scotland's history are linked by this quote: The Jacobites destroyed the Ferintosh distillery, whose owner spoke out against the Jacobites. After the Glorius Revolution, Ferintosh whisky was the first to be exempted from taxes in 1690. Regarding the reintroduction of taxation in 1785, Burns' poem reads: "Thee, Ferintosh! O sadly lost!/Scotland lament frae [from] coast to coast!" (see Rank 2010)

Coming from Scotland and considering the country as one's own or toiling away in Scotland (toil here, sweat) are synonymous with the cultural definition of the nation. A claimed dependence on this country unites both. Some see themselves as Scottish because they grew up there, but perhaps they now live entirely elsewhere. Others, who do not necessarily have to be from Scotland themselves, can make it their country through their own work. This also opens up the national-cultural collective to immigrants labelled as "New Scots".

Other stone tablets become national artefacts because they reveal two other languages associated with Scotland: Gaelic and Scots (rather than just English). Proverbs are used for this purpose. For example, one stone tablet bears the Gaelic proverb in the original and English translation: "[s]ay but little and say it well" and another stone tablet reads in Scots: "To promise is ae thing, to keep it is anither." In addition to the languages, the content of these stone tablets expresses a call for participation in this nation, as they demand comprehensible language and vigilance.

Many of these 26 stone tablets contain such calls for participation, often calls for political input and inclusion.[7] This expectation is formulated as a self-regulation of political power on a stone from Glasgow. The poem quoted is a Song by George Macdonald. The quotation implies that the building is to be understood as the house of the Scottish nation. The metaphor of wandering, mutually loving ghosts expresses that this house is just as 'animated' and 'unified' as its nation: "Sweet ghosts in a loving band/Roam through the houses that stand –/For the builders are not gone." (Scottish Parliament 2018)

Finally, there is an interesting reference to religion. This is a quote that also emphasises individual self-determination and is found on one of the 24 original stone plaques: "Let the words of my mouth, and the meditation of my heart, be acceptable in thy sight, O Lord, my strength, and my redeemer. Psalm 19:14" (Scottish Parliament 2018).

7 Demanding active observation/evaluation of the performance side by the public, Andrew Carnegie is quoted on stone tablets with "[p]ut all your eggs into one basket – and then watch that basket," and the trade unionist Mary Brooksbank, who stood for activism, with "oh, dear me, the warld's ill-divided,/them that work the hardest are aye wi' least provided". Another example of this is the quote from Sir Walter Scott's Heart of Midlothian: "When we had a king, and a chancellor, and parliament-men o' our ain, we could aye peeble them wi' stanes when they werena gude bairns – But naebody's nails can reach the length o' Lunnon [London]." Similarly, this now duplicated historical difference between the rulers/governed in London/Scotland (before/after the Union in 1707 and since 1707/since the regional parliament) is thematised in this quote from Andrew Fletcher: "(I knew a very wise man who believed that) if a man were permitted to make all the ballads, he need not care who should make the laws of a nation." (Scottish Parliament 2018)

So far, it is the only explicit quote from the Bible.[8] It comes from the King James Bible. It is not quoted from the Geneva Bible, which is important for Scottish Calvinists. This is because Psalm 19:14 says "mine heart" (Geneva Bible 1599) instead of "my heart" as here engraved in the Scottish nation (King James Version 1611).

On the 'house' of the Scottish nation, we find national artefacts that fill the feeling of national togetherness with life against the background of individual self-determination. In part, these are individualistic dispositives of the nation because many quotations suggest that some people identify with Scotland as a nation. In addition, there is a call to contribute to the nation, and the nation is visibly associated not only with different languages (i.e. Gaelic, Scots and English) but also with the translation of the Bible originally written for the Anglican Church (King James Bible). The nation is entrusted with history (whisky, Wars of the Roses, Jacobites, Empire) and repeatedly with the assertion that each person decides for themselves, by choice or in their heart, whether they are Scottish.

The material emphasises the sharp inclusion/exclusion through the shared living space. However, the texts on this material complement this sharp territorial demarcation with a cultural opening of the nation as a nation of will. Two collectives emerge. The collective of the nation of will and the collective of political inclusion. Chiselled into the parliament is the attempt to build a bridge between the two collectives. Scotland's national culture expands the repertoire of possibilities for stabilising the inherently unstable democracy. It is a factor, albeit latent and overlooked, mainly about "civic nationalism" in the progressive democratisation of this nation.

The progressive instability of a democracy that extends the right to vote is countered by national artefacts expanding the cultural inertia spectrum. The national artefacts contrast the residential demarcation of national inclusion with a cultural interpretation that allows belonging to this nation to be understood as individual self-determination (cf. Stichweh 1999: 462; cf. on "social system preaching" Campbell 1975: 1118).

6.3 Political tradition by and in action: Scottish politics

The plenary chamber of the Scottish Parliament is a place that is often shown on television and has a design that is atypical of British parliamentarianism. A semicircular seating arrangement characterises it. In contrast, the opposite benches are in the foreground in the plenary chamber of the British House of Commons. The

8 The other quote borrowed from the Bible is referred to as a Gaelic proverb in Gaelic and Scots ("He who sowest best reapest best"), although the proximity to Galatians 6:7-8 is unmistakable.

government is not seated in the centre but opposite the opposition. Another striking feature of the Scottish chamber is the MPs' chairs, tables and lecterns. Although the British MPs also make their speeches standing up from their seats, they sit on benches with neither a table nor a lectern.

The following section reconstructs the decision-making process that led to the design of the Scottish plenary chamber. Two aspects become clear: firstly, it was by no means certain at the outset that the Scottish plenary chamber to be planned would ultimately be so different from the layout and design of the House of Commons. Secondly, it becomes clear how the deliberations on the chamber led to political decisions being elevated to the status of a national culture. The chamber was designed to symbolise national politics. It was intended to link Scotland's cultural distinctiveness with the collectively binding decision-making of politics. This links the national cultural collective with the collective of Scottish politics. This coupling of the two collectives is achieved by emphasising the manner in which political decisions are made in Scotland. A national tradition of the way "how we 'do' politics", as it is called in the song Son I Voted Yes by Stanley Odd, is arising. A Scottish tradition of politics is emerging that symbolises the political-cultural autonomy of this nation within the United Kingdom, as Her Majesty notes (Elizabeth II 2004).

6.3.1 Westminster's majority-orientation

In order to show how a Scottish tradition of collectively binding decision-making could be invented, i.e. a distinct national-cultural tradition of politics, the starting point must be clarified. This is directly related. Therefore, the first step is to clarify what characterises the chamber of the House of Commons.

Initially planned in the 1830s and completed in 1852, the House of Commons building lasted until the Second World War. On the night of 10 May 1941, bombs again rained down from the skies of London, and in this bombing, known as The Blitz, the Nazis also reduced the House of Commons building to rubble. Two years later, there was a crucial debate. On 28 October 1943, Prime Minister Winston Churchill summoned MPs to the House of Commons Rebuilding Debate.

The arguments with which Churchill opened this debate and argued in favour of the exact reconstruction of the building, which dated back to the 1830s, not only convinced the MPs at the time but were also vital for the construction of the Scottish Chamber.

At the beginning of his speech, Churchill spoke of the Chamber of the House of Commons as a symbol of the British nation across the generations. The Chamber had attracted "the imagination and respect of the British nation," so it should be rebuilt as accurately as possible. Churchill emphasised two features of this Chamber that made it a national symbol and which should be preserved:

> "The first is that its shape should be oblong and not semi-circular. Here is a very potent factor in our political life. The semi-circular assembly, which appeals to political theorists, enables every individual or every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according as the weather changes. I am a convinced supporter of the party system in preference to the group system. […] The party system is much favoured by the oblong form of Chamber. It is easy for an individual to move through those insensible gradations from Left to Right but the act of crossing the Floor is one which requires serious consideration. I am well informed on this matter, for I have accomplished that difficult process, not only once but twice. Logic is a poor guide compared with custom. Logic which has created in so many countries semi-circular assemblies which have buildings which give to every Member, not only a seat to sit in but often a desk to write at, with a lid to bang, has proved fatal to Parliamentary Government as we know it here in its home and in the land of its birth." (Hansard 1943: Col. 403f.)

At the heart of the British House of Commons should continue to be a democracy centred on controversy. A compromise between the government and opposition parties is not desirable. Churchill attributes the willingness to compromise to the group system. Logic is used to argue in favour of this group system, but not what is decisive for British parliamentarianism: culture ("custom"). The conflict-generating party system, which replaces compromise with the rare but radical decision to defect to the opposing party, is British.

In order to motivate those involved to continue arguing between the governing and opposition parties despite this predetermination, a design decision is essential. If possible, the plenary chamber should be small so that it appears overcrowded:

> "The second characteristic of a Chamber formed on the lines of the House of Commons is that it should not be big enough to contain all its Members at once without over-crowding and that there should be no question of every Member having a separate seat reserved for him. […] If the House is big enough to contain all its Members, nine-tenths of its Debates will be conducted in the depressing atmosphere of an almost empty or half-empty Chamber. The essence of good House of Commons speaking is the conversational style, the facility for quick, informal interruptions and interchanges. […] But the conversational style requires a fairly small space, and there should be on great occasions a sense of crowd and urgency. There should be a sense of the importance of much that is said and a sense that great matters are being decided, there and then, by the House." (Hansard 1943: Col. 404)

On the one hand, the crowded space is intended to fuel the conflict between the parties, as they cannot avoid each other. On the other hand, it emphasises the urgency of making decisions. For almost all topics discussed and decided in the House of

Commons, the aim is to give the impression to themselves and the audience that critical issues are at stake.

Even today, the elements of this chamber, i.e. facing benches without tables and lecterns, are almost unique in the world. This conclusion is to be drawn from the study of the 193 plenary halls of all states (as of 2016) carried out by the architecture firm XML Architecture Research Urbanism (see XML 2016). 18 of the 193 national plenary rooms have the opposite seating arrangement to the British House of Commons. Except for the Czech Republic, which sits in a chamber built in 1720, the other plenary chambers with facing seating arrangements are all former British colonies: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica, Canada, Namibia, St Kitts and Nevis, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Suriname, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Most of these states are small islands and/or very small states in terms of population.

However, of these 18 plenary chambers, only two have the same seating arrangement as the British House of Commons. These are the Chamber of Parliament in Zimbabwe, built in 1895, and the Chamber in Uganda, opened in 1962. Both have to face benches instead of chairs. Furthermore, the MPs in both chambers have no tables. In five other plenary chambers, MPs also have no tables: in Turkmenistan (built in 2002), Singapore (1999), Iraq (the 1980s), Micronesia (n/a) and the US House of Representatives (1850).

6.3.2 Scottish consensus-orientation

How did the special features of the House of Commons influence the planning of the Scottish Plenary Chamber? At first glance, the demarcation is striking. As early as 1995, the Scottish autonomy movement and the Constituent Assembly, in particular, stated that Scotland had "a way of politics that is radically different from the rituals of Westminster: more participative, more creative, less needlessly confrontational." Scottish politics is expected to be consensus-orientated rather than conflict-orientated.[9]

9 The report of the Scottish Constitutional Convention concludes: "What this process has proven is that constructive consensus is achievable […]. That lesson is immensely encouraging, not just for the project of designing a Scottish Parliament, but for the much more important question of how the Parliament will work once it is in place. […] Every decision has been reached by agreement. None has been taken by majority vote. […] The Scottish Constitutional Convention has tackled its work on a basis that is virtually unique in British politics. It can best be described as a resolute search for consensus. […] From this process we have emerged with the powerful hope that the coming of a Scottish parliament will usher in a way of politics that is radically different from the rituals of Westminster: more participative, more creative, less needlessly confrontational." (Scottish Constitutional Convention 1995)

A good ten years later, Patrick Harvie, who supported the SNP's minority government with his party (the Greens), recalled this. He contrasts "the widespread disillusionment with confrontational and negative politics […] the spirit of the founding principles of the [Scottish] Parliament". Consensus orientation is the "founding principle" of the Scottish Parliament, and this is above party (Scottish Constitutional Convention 1995).[10]

The Scottish chamber (and Parliament) should therefore be characterised by what Churchill called the "group system" as opposed to the "party system" of the British national tradition of parliamentarianism and rejected by the latter. He was of the opinion that what mattered was a quick and informal exchange of arguments between the government and the opposition and not a search for common positions in order to reach a consensus or reach a compromise.

This tension between majority and consensus orientation, i.e. between conflict and compromise, can also be recognised in the decisions and expectations regarding the design of the Scottish chamber. On the one hand, they liked the atmosphere of Westminster. However, on the other hand, the typical confrontations between the government and the opposition should be avoided wherever possible.

This tension is already evident in the first meeting on the draft Building User Brief. The meeting takes place in June 1997. The design of the Scottish plenary chamber was discussed for the first time. The minutes of the meeting at the time contain entries such as "write" and "to circulate" under the heading "The Debating Chamber". Both are in contrast to Westminster. However, we also read this note implicitly orientated towards Westminster: "intimate style (not confrontational?)" (Doig 1997: SE/7/15).

The orientation towards the British House of Commons is explicitly discussed in Dewar's "first reactions, and not decisions" in September 1997. As in Westminster, a tense "atmosphere" should be the norm in the Scottish chamber. For this reason, Dewar rejects desks at the MPs' seats:

10 Harvie "notes the words of Donald Dewar MSP, on being elected as Scotland's first First Minister, that 'Co-operation is always possible where there are common aims and values, even though there may be great and dividing differences in other areas'; further notes the words of Annabel Goldie MSP that Scotland 'wants posturing and petty playground antics to be left at the door', those of the First Minister that 'our overwhelming responsibility is to work together in the people's interest' and Nicol Stephen MSP's commitment to be 'constructive and positive', and urges all members to hold the Scottish Government to account but also to work constructively and positively wherever possible for the benefit of the people and the country in the spirit of the *founding principles of the Parliament*." (Harvie 2007: ; The reference to Dewar stands for the Labour Party, the recitation of Goldie for the Conservative Party, and Stephens for Liberal Democrats.)

> "[Dewar] is not attracted to the idea of a desk per member, agreeing that this makes for a flat atmosphere. He thinks that the chamber should be on the small side, so that there is a sense of press and occasion for major statements and debates. He notes that the number of MSPs will decline". (Thomson 1997: SE/7/98 §2.2)

Favouring a small chamber has less to do with the declining number of MPs. Indeed, in the 1990s, Scotland recorded a net increase in population for the first time in centuries (see National Records of Scotland 2016: 42). More plausibly, Dewar selectively echoes Churchill's arguments outlined above. On the one hand, he recommended not adopting the layout of the British chamber and opting for a seating arrangement in the chamber that was somewhere between a "horseshoe to a circular layout" (Thomson 1997: SE/7/98 §2.1). On the other hand, the chamber should allow for Westminster's heated atmosphere, which makes it likely that decisions will be taken through urgency ("a sense of press and occasion").

A few months later, these distinctions are explicitly related to the British/European distinction. At that time, in February 1998, however, they were still clearly orientated towards Westminster. Again, the point is that the Westminster atmosphere is not to be dispensed with. This atmosphere is contrasted with the "good accessibility especially for disabled members and visitors" typical of the European Parliament:

> "Secretary of State continues to be keen on something which is compact and will generate atmosphere – he was not attracted to European Parliament model but Secretary of State accepted the need for good accessibility especially for disabled members and visitors though he did not want this to dominate the whole design." (Grice 1998b: SE/7/98 §3)

The first specification for the design of the Scottish plenary chamber can be found in the Building User Brief of November 1998, which was prepared for the tender and in which the plenary chamber is described as "the most important area of the Parliament building" (Armstrong 1998a: SE/7/415 §5.30.1). In explaining the plenary chamber, the departure from the British House of Commons model is recognisable. In the Scottish chamber, for example, individual and numbered seats will allocate each MP "an allocated space" (Armstrong 1998a: SE/7/416 §5.30.7). The seating arrangement is defined as a "horseshoe or semi-circular arrangement": "The arrangement of the Members' seating reflects the role of the Parliament. A horseshoe or semi-circular arrangement with the Presiding Officer at the focal point would appear to be the most appropriate." (Armstrong 1998a: SE/7/416 §5.30.3)

This led to a dispute with the commissioned architecture studio EMTB. As the wife and co-owner of the studio recalls, Miralles wanted to push through a design

for the plenary hall that contradicted the "horseshoe or semi-circular arrangement" agreed in the Building User Brief:

> "I think it was also a way to making an elongated chamber, to providing a totally different Parliament from the Westminster one. I think it was very much appreciated, because it was really the opposite of the Westminster way of debating. It was a flat room […] which puts together the use of space inside a church and the use of the elongated Chamber" (Holyrood Inquiry 2004b: §486).

The then chairman of the responsible Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body (SPCB), David Steel, refers in his testimony to the dispute over this "theatre seating". A Scottish delegation was sent to discuss the options in June 1999. This delegation travelled to the Flemish Parliament and the Second Chamber of the Netherlands. The 'European' functioning of the Parliament was discussed, but the delegation was not convinced:

> "The point of going to look at the Flanders Parliament was to see that in operation. […] you see the Flanders Parliament, it is fairly typical of the standard European type of Parliament, where Members do not debate in the Chamber; they come out and speak from a podium at the front […]. That is not what we had in the Scottish Parliament; it was not what was ordered from Mr Miralles, but that was what was in his thinking". (Holyrood Inquiry 2004a: §359-364)

For the further concretisation of the Building User Brief, the architects were mainly inspired by other 'European' parliaments and, in particular, by the new parliament of Saxony in Dresden. This new building has also a circular seating arrangement in the plenary chamber: "If there was a building from which the original brief drew heavily, it was that building". (Holyrood Inquiry 2004c: §195)

Accordingly, MPs should not speak from a podium or a stage. As in the British House of Commons plenary chamber, MPs should speak from where they sit.

The MPs then specified their expectations regarding the seating arrangement and angle of the plenary chamber. They reiterated their preference for a "hemi-circle shape […] accompanied by suitable desking and seating", as stated in the first building proposal, in order to stimulate a "more intimate atmosphere than in the Tweede-Kamer" in the Netherlands (Holyrood Project Team 1999: §5.1f.).

Miralles gave in and incorporated the "continuous curve as you were asking [for]" (Miralles 1999: RM/6/119). The elliptical form was finally adopted and, in a press release of 29 September 1999, was again only implicitly differentiated from the confrontational style in the House of Commons: "We feel that the ['ellipse'] layout meets the objective of creating a non-confrontational chamber but maintaining sight lines to allow for constructive and lively debates." (Scottish Parliament 1999c)

It was only later, with the completion of the building, that this elliptical seating arrangement of the chamber was labelled "un-British and 'European'" (Ascherson 2014: 118) and linked to the semantics of "Scotland in Europe".

For example, in her opening speech, the Queen ascribes a "European fashion" to the building due to the seating arrangement, which adds "distinctive Scottish values to the British democratic tradition" (Elizabeth II 2004; for academic studies on the issue, see Bulmer 2015; Cairney/Widfeldt 2015).

In political and cultural terms, the design of the chamber will make Scotland more distinguishable from the political culture of the UK. Compared to the UK, Scottish politics is particular in its way of collectively binding decision-making. It seeks consensus. In contrast, national politics is orientated towards majority decisions (see in particular Faux 1975; Thatcher 1980).

This is political-cultural factor, coupling Scotland's political collective with the cultural collective of the Scottish nation by tradition. The consensus-orientated design of the chamber enables Scotland to present itself as a holistic nation (Stichweh 2000a: 60). Scotland's political and national holism claims a tradition of non-majoritarian decision-making. In Scotland, the ideology of social democracy and the active search for compromise across party lines are more important than the radicalism of simple majorities. The Scottish national culture, cast in concrete and carved in stone and wood, allows the politically inclusive collective to present itself as a single entity with its own political tradition. It thus counteracts the growing demographic and democratic inequality with England by demanding Scottish autonomy within the United Kingdom or as an independent country with its own political tradition. Interestingly, this cultural tradition is based on the smallest element of politics: collectively binding decision-making.

6.4 Conclusion: Sociocultural evolution of the Scottish Parliament

The Chapter shows what expectations guided the decisions that led to the construction of the permanent parliament building in the early planning phase from 1997 to 1999. These expectations shed light on the symbolic order of the Scottish nation.

The choice of the tendering process by competitive interview instead of ready-made design proposals once again reveals a voluntarism related to the nation. As with the anthem, the nation itself is to decide on the design of the parliament planned as a national symbol. Although a direct democratic procedure was not used for this, the population was represented by representatives ("two lay people") in the decision-making body and could express its views during the planning phase through consultations.

This democratic process has resulted in a building complex in which particularly visible and staged artefacts emphasise the semantic 'Made in Scotland' (from gird-

ers!). In addition, national artefacts and dispositives are engraved on the stone slabs, which point towards as well as beyond the residential demarcation of the collective. They emphasise the history of the Scottish nation and individual self-determination. This attempts to create national symbols and carve them in stone that combine Scotland's historical and cultural identity with an openness to new ideas and an orientation towards the future. The national symbols bridge the Scottish population's political collective and the national cultural community.

The design of the Scottish "Debating Chamber" was important for the cultural component of the Scottish nation and politics. The decision favoured a 'European' variant of the consensus-oriented, semi-circular seating arrangement. In the Scottish plenary chamber, decisions are not made based on simple majorities but in the form of compromises. The debates and the design of the chamber reveal how a sense of national belonging was created. In contrast to the British national majoritarian-democracy, a tradition of collectively binding decision-making developed in Scotland, emphasising the political and cultural independence of Scotland within the United Kingdom. The sense of belonging to the Scottish nation is based on an independent political tradition of consensus-building with European features. Scotland's national sense of belonging is, as the case of the plenary chamber illustrates, based on the functional differentiation of world society. The Scottish nation is united by claiming a common political tradition of decision-making.

The plenary chamber brings together the Scottish collectives of politics and the nation under the aspect of the 'guiding values of the entire political culture' (Stollberg-Rilinger 2017: 31) and thus distinguishes it from the "theatre of dissent" of British parliamentarianism. To culturally ground the Scottish Home Rule movement, as MPs say on visits to other chamber halls, Scotland could not build a chamber as confrontational as Westminster's. The architecture of the chamber was chosen to suggest a somehow 'Scottish' decision-making programme, according to this Scottish MP:

> "the way the Scottish Parliament operates, I think there are differences in style and attitude that are there [rather than Westminster] … partly because there is a heightened sense of different nationality." (Leith/Soule 2011: 132 Interview 27)

In addition, demographics in terms of population density and psychology are also important in understanding the consensus-orientated style of politics in Scotland. A socio-psychological result should be mentioned here. Nowadays, the Scottish population seems to be more consensus-orientated than the rest of the population of Great Britain. A socio-psychological study at the local authority level in the UK between 2009 and 2011 concluded that a particular personality factor is very pronounced in the Scottish population. Of the five personality factors, Agreeableness

is the most prominent in Scotland compared to the other regions of Great Britain (Rentfrow/Jokela/Lamb 2015).

The strong expression of this personality factor can be read as an indicator of homogeneity and solidarity in Scotland. There is a noticeable correlation between Agreeableness and low population density. Agreeableness is much more pronounced in rural regions in Scotland than in the rest of Britain.

Scotland has the lowest population density compared to other regions of Britain (for the following data, see Office for National Statistics 2013). Between 1981 and 2010, Scotland's population density of 66 inhabitants per square kilometre was on a par with Mexico and Bulgaria (both 66) and one-sixth of England's (374 inhabitants per square kilometre). Against this demographic background, the consensus orientation in Scottish politics is likely to not exist in other regions of Britain. The differentiation of Scottish consensus democracy from the majority democracy of the state as a whole thus becomes another critical factor in explaining how Scotland's democratic nationalism has become likely in the early years of the 21st century.

Agreeableness may be an interpenetrating factor that makes the orientation towards consensus rather than conflict likely due to the complexity of psychological systems (Luhmann 1984: 290; with commitment, psychological personality factors become increasingly relevant for social systems see Klein 2020: 47f.; the associated "relying on inferences about dispositional traits" etc. instead of "actions and outcomes" is typical for "WEIRD people" notes Henrich 2020: 33).

Consensus is important for Scottish politics firstly because this personality factor is strong in Scotland and secondly because the population is socialised into it daily through Scotland's national politics. A large proportion of the Scottish population is politically engaged. This political engagement means that someone living in Scotland experiences themselves or others using the mechanisms of Scottish politics to achieve something of personal significance. The power and mechanisms of *Scottish politics* are adopted in many ways, as the table below shows.

In this table, I have mapped the access points—with most options being genuinely political like signing a petition—used by the Scottish population in recent years. The figures are taken from the representative population surveys of Scottish Social Attitudes conducted from 2004 to 2016. The population was asked to answer the following question: "In the last few years, have you ever done any of the things on this card as a way of registering what you personally thought about an issue?"[11] The answers are shown in the table above (based on Marcinkiewicz/Montagu/Reid 2016: 31; Marcinkiewicz et al. 2016: 52).

In most options listed in the table, a person living in Scotland uses politics to communicate what they think personally about an issue. Almost half of the popula-

11 The survey was conducted in 2004, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2015 and 2016. Until 2009, only "ever done" activities were asked about.

tion said they had signed a petition, as many as 1/5 of the population had contacted an MP (20 %), 1/4 had donated to a campaign/organisation (23 %) and/or visited the local authority to share their personal views (25 %). Politics is, therefore, very important for Scotland's social community to communicate personal value preferences. This is a distal reason why consensus—in the form of the "Debating Chamber"—is a powerful national symbol in the socio-cultural evolution of the Scottish autonomy movement.

Table 7: Social engagement in the Scottish population (2004–2016)

Social engagement in the Scottish population (2004–2016)	**Arithmetic mean in % (multiple answers possible)**
Formed a group of like-minded people	3.6
Actively took part in a campaign (e.g. leafleting, stuffing envelopes etc.)	6.6
Joined a political party (nur 2016)	7.0
Raised the issue in an organisation I already belong to	7.2
Joined an existing organisation	7.2
Contacted radio, TV or a newspaper	7.6
Contacted a government department directly	8.6
Gone on a protest or demonstration	8.8
Attended an event organised as part of a consultation exercise	8.8
Responded to a consultation document	10.6
Spoken to an influential person	13.0
Contacted an MP or MSP	20.2
Attended a public meeting	21.4
Given money to a campaign or organisation	23.0
Contacted my local Council	25.3
No, have not done any of these	33.4
Signed a petition (including online petitions)	44.8
Totals in per cent of responses (arithmetic mean)	***257.1***
Scottish Parliament turnout (county and regional vote, 2007, 2011, 2016)*	53.4
Voter turnout in the UK lower house election in Scotland (2005, 2010, 2015, 2017)	65.5
Participation in secession referendums (Scotland 2014, EU referendum 2016)	75.9
Totals in per cent of responses (arithmetic mean)	***419***

7 Religious unionism and separatism

In his article entitled "Did They Define the Outcome? Churches and the Independence Referendum in Scotland", Sergei A. Mudrov studied the importance of religion for Scotland's political autonomy. According to the study, religious officials (clergy) refrained from taking a stand in the referendum and left it up to the faithful themselves to decide whether to vote in favour of or against Scotland's secession from the United Kingdom (Mudrov 2018: 39).

The following Chapter analyses this neutrality among different religions in Scotland. It further suggests that the neutrality of the clergy highlights the importance of religion in the UK and Scotland. Religion is still a crucial factor in the Scottish nation in the 21st century. It has been one of the most critical factors in explaining the likelihood of Scotland's political autonomy, either within the British state as a region or through secession from the UK. Religion in Scotland is of particular importance because it is a regional particularity in the system of the world society. By the laws of the United Kingdom, the Scottish community was guaranteed Presbyterian church government in 1707. However, church splits (e.g. disruption) and unions, church resignations, emigration from the then-majority Protestant population and the influx of believers of different religions have significantly changed the religious composition of the Scottish population over the last century (Brown 1997; Muirhead 2015).

Against this backdrop, the various SNP governments have repeatedly called for religious tolerance, fearing ethnic strife otherwise. Furthermore, Roman Catholicism, becoming increasingly influential in Scotland (Bonney 2013), is a resource of national solidarity.

Thus, the neutrality of the clergy is to be understood based on the potential for ethnic conflict in the Scottish community. The conflict potential concerning Scotland's political autonomy is between the political collective of inclusion, which is open to all religions, on the one hand, and the feeling of national solidarity characterised by the presbyterian religion, on the other. Scottish cohesion based on a shared national religion polarises Scotland's movement for or against political autonomy. The sense of national belonging may relate to the United Kingdom's Protestantism or Scottish Presbyterianism, both making Scotland's secession from the British state improbable. Alternatively, an attempt can be made to base reli-

gious affiliation on the Roman Catholicism of the Scottish Stewart dynasty or on multiculturalism, which facilitates the attempt for Scotland's statehood.

7.1 Clergy – "present the arguments"

How did the religious communities deal with the upcoming referendum on national independence against the background of this potential for ethnic conflict? What did the clergy advise the faithful to do about the referendum?

7.1.1 Neutral churches

Peter Brierley's last census counted 83 active religious communities in Scotland, mostly churches and 3,689 congregations (Brierley 2017: 95). At the beginning of the campaign phase 2012, most of the 83 denominations opted for neutrality on the referendum, leaving the decisions to the faithful.

Scotland's most significant number of believers currently identify with the Presbyterian church, the Church of Scotland (Kirk). In the last census, 51 % of all believers in Scotland and 32 % of the population stated they belonged to this church (National Records of Scotland 2011). The Kirk emerged from the Reformation in the mid-sixteenth century. Scotland's reformers, such as John Knox, spoke vehemently against "popery", against bishops and any form of hierarchy. They wanted to realise the 'principle of parity' as far as possible (Wormald 1991: 123). As explained in the discussion section below, Presbyterianism in Scotland was secured by the Acts and the Treaty of Union 1707. Subsequent Acts, notably the Church of Scotland Act 1921, further consolidated the Presbyterian church government in Scotland by declaring in Article III that: "Church is in historical continuity with the Church of Scotland which was reformed in 1560, whose liberties were ratified in 1592, and for whose security provision was made in the Treaty of Union of 1707." (Brown/Green/Mair 2016: 32)

However, this Presbyterian church arrangement starkly contrasted with the hierarchical episcopacy supported by another major church in Scotland, the Scottish Episcopal Church. Many Episcopalians refused to take the oath of allegiance to William and Mary and their successors in 1689 because such an oath would contradict their complete submission to royal authority and the Scottish Stewart monarchy. These non-jurors and the few Roman Catholic Scots supported the Stewart cause in the following decades (Brown/Green/Mair 2016: 12; Devine 2012: 34). These Jacobite rebellions were attempts to replace the Presbyterian church order of 1690 (and 1707) with the Episcopal hierarchy. However, in the last census in Scotland (2011), only 21 thousand people described themselves as Episcopalians.

Alongside the Presbyterian Kirk and the Scottish Episcopal Church, the Roman Catholic Church plays an increasingly important role in Scotland. "[N]early oblit-

erated in Scotland at the Reformation", it now has the second largest number of believers in Scotland: 25 per cent of all believers and 16 per cent of the population (Brown/Green/Mair 2016: 31). While in 1755, they made up only one per cent of the population (16,490 people), it was mainly Irish immigrants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who contributed to the growth of this church in Scotland. In recent years, immigrants from the eastward expansion of the European Union in 2004 have also contributed to this growth. This denomination is followed by approximately 76 thousand Muslims, 67 thousand Church of England believers (who are not members of the Scottish Episcopal Church) and 26 thousand Baptists.

Due to the significant number of small and geographically concentrated denominations, in the following analysis, I focus on the most significant and most widespread denominations in Scotland and ask how these denominations voted on the Scottish independence referendum.

Most of the 83 denominations in Scotland voted in favour of neutrality at the very beginning of the official campaign period in May 2012. All nine churches members of the ecumenical movement Action of Churches Together in Scotland (ACTS), founded in 1990, voted in favour of neutrality. The following table lists these churches and the number and proportion of their faithful.

Table 8: Professing believers in Scotland according to the census (2011)

Action of Churches Together in Scotland	**Believers**	**Share of all believers**	
Church of Scotland	1.717.871	51,2 %	
Roman Catholic Church	841.053	25,1 %	
Scottish Episcopal Church	29.337	0,9 %	
Methodist Church in Scotland	10.979	0,3 %	
Salvation Army	4.100	0,1 %	
Congregational Federation	2.078	0,1 %	
United Reformed Church	2.021	0,1 %	
United Free Church of Scotland	1.514	0,0 %	
Religious Society of Friends (Quakers)	1.339	0,0 %	
Sum (based on Census 2011)	*2.610.292*	*77,8 %*	
Professing believers in Scotland (only religion)			*3.354.287*
Total Population			*5.295.403*

ACTS members include the largest churches in Scotland, such as the Church of Scotland and the Roman Catholic Church. ACTS comprises 78 per cent of all professing religious believers in Scotland.

What was the reason for the neutrality of these churches? They justified their neutrality as an alternative to conflict. Neutrality was necessary because the democratic debate was already polarised, so one could either be for or against Scotland's secession from the United Kingdom. The churches opted for neutrality to allow believers and voters to develop and discuss arguments for and against secession. An example is the Church of Scotland's (Kirk) published rationale for neutrality. The highest decision-making level, the Annual General Assembly meeting, decided in May 2012 that the Kirk would remain neutral in the referendum. The Kirk called on the campaigners to present their arguments:

> "We do not expect or wish that the Church of Scotland should take a position on the question itself, though we do hope that the Church can, at the local and national level, engage with the issues, encourage informed and respectful debate, and contribute our own vision for Scotland's future so that, whatever the decision of the people, Scotland might be a healthier, happier and more peaceful place in the years to come. The Council would urge those campaigning for or against independence to consider that they present the arguments in terms of what is their vision for the future of Scotland and then how does their preferred option help in making this vision a reality." (Scottish Affairs Committee 2012: 138f.)

The Kirk wanted to remain an active and vital player in this debate through neutrality. Churches should be places where the future of Scotland is discussed and acted upon. Campaigns should meet in church to explain their reasons on neutral ground (on the hope of inner-worldly mastering typical of Calvinism, see Parsons 1967: 65). In its decision, the Kirk identified itself quite naturally with Scotland. A reference to its self-image as Scotland's national church.

The second largest church in Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church, also decided in favour of neutrality at the clergy level. Father Thomas Boyle, parish priest in Bishopton and then Deputy Secretary General of the Scottish Bishops' Conference, explained in an interview:

> "The Catholic bishops looked at the question: Would the church its freedom be impaired remaining in the United Kingdom or being in an independent Scotland? And the answer was there was no difference. So this is a purely political question. And so it is for Catholics to look at the issues and to decide. There was no moral content. […] This is not a moral issue, this is a political issue. And when we look at what the bishops, and the pope rather, had taught in recent years, Johann Paul II has said: We make no comment on constitutional matters. You know, the only thing that we offer to society is a vision of who the human person is. […] It was on

> the basis of that sentence from one of his Encyclicals that the bishops were quite confident in saying: This is a purely political question in which we are not going to offer any view […]. So this is not a question for us." (Boyle 2015)

The bishops assessed the situation in Scotland and referred to Pope John Paul II's encyclicals, concluding that the referendum issue was a 'purely political question' that should be decided by the voters themselves. Boyle goes on to say that this distinction between political and religious issues is a relatively recent development in Scotland:

> "The leader in the 1970s, when I was at school, a man called William Wolfe was an absolute bigot. He hated Catholics. And there was no way on God's earth that my parents or grandparents would ever vote nationalist. Now the big change is that today that fear of nationalism as being an expression of Scottish Presbyterianism and anti-Catholicism that's gone. That's been the achievement of the Scottish National Party. That in 10 or 15 years they have managed to assure a great number of Catholics in the Catholic community, who have chosen to vote SNP or to vote for independence in the referendum, that they have no fear that they would lose their schools or that there would be discrimination against Catholics if there was an independent Scotland. […] [T]hey have done it very well by you know saying Scotland is a country of many cultures. You know because there is the Pakistani culture, there is a Sikh culture, there is a Muslim culture […]. And then there is this whole Irish background that many of us have which is not something to be ashamed of." (Boyle 2015)

One prerequisite for neutrality is the multiculturalism on which the political inclusion collective is based. The SNP, which has been part of the Scottish Executive since 2007, was particularly important here. Various studies have shown that the nationalism advocated by the SNP is primarily "civic", as it eschews ethnic concepts of national affiliation (van der Zwet 2015; Leith 2018; Hepburn 2015). Therefore, this quest for autonomy of the political inclusion collective has implications for the national-cultural collective of the Scottish nation. Democratic nationalism combines national self-determination with the notion that people living in Scotland should also have a say in shaping the national community. With a particular focus on immigrants from Ireland, Devine and Rosie describe this recent and multiple institutionalisation of multiculturalism in Scotland:

> "As late as the 1960s, however, the 'Scoto-Irish' remained disadvantaged in terms of occupation, income, health and education. […] Within a few decades, however, the Catholic position in Scottish society was transformed. The key drivers of this social revolution included the decline of some of the old heavy industries where sectarian employment practices had been endemic, the impact of secularisation on rigid religious boundaries, as the Christian churches came together in an ecu-

> menical spirit against the common enemy of secularism, and a huge expansion in educational opportunities for Catholics." (Devine/Rosie 2020: 278)

Studies on career choice, health and education, as well as marriage and friendship, "hardly confirm the popular image of a Catholic-Protestant divide in [contemporary] Scotland" (Devine/Rosie 2020: 281). Since the early 1990s, a party-political distancing regarding Catholicism has been observed in Scotland. This has particularly affected the Labour Party, which benefits from the Catholic population in Scotland (Walker 2020: 323-330). Comparably, Mudrov quotes a Catholic priest who explains:

> "After the 2007 elections, when the SNP took power, Scottish education civil servants, who had always kept the Church out ('no, no, we administer all things, you don't'), were sent out to ask us what our concerns were and what we were interested in, and what they could do for us. This had never happened in 100 years and this means openness to religion." (Mudrov 2018: 29)

Many causes are responsible for the multiculturalism we see in contemporary Scotland. One of these aspects is the successive Scottish governments, particularly the SNP-led governments, which have observed and politicised "anti-Catholicism; anti-Protestantism; anti-Irish racism; and anti-British racism" (Scottish Government 2018: 27).

Two weeks before the referendum, a bishop of the Scottish Episcopal Church, which has 30 thousand members, shared a similar assessment. In the Dundee Courier newspaper, he called on the faithful of this church to take an active part in the referendum. Everyone should deal openly with the issue of the referendum and ask themselves what they think about Scotland's political independence:

> "[P]articipation in the referendum is crucial and a high turnout is desirable. […] I don't believe in compulsory voting but not considering the issues or bothering to vote gives a poor example to the 16–18-year-olds newly given the vote and to our grandchildren. […] 'Should Scotland be an independent country?' is the referendum question which begs our sense of personal and political belonging. Like many households who will be voting in the forthcoming referendum my own situation is a complex emotional geography of birthplace, family membership, occupation and residence, of cross-border Scottish-ness and British-ness. True independence is to vote honestly and we should keep faith in the referendum." (Peyton 2014)

The faithful were urged to take part in the referendum. Again, the clergy only called for participation but did not specify which option the faithful should choose (see also Primus Chillingworth 2014). What did the Baptist Church in Scotland advise its believers to do? The Baptist Church also opted for neutrality and left it to the faithful to decide on national sovereignty in the referendum. Only an open discussion, ex-

plained Rev Dr Reverend Stuart Blythe, will enable the faithful to make an authentic decision on this issue:

> "referring to the more primal stage of Baptists intentionally discussing the issue with one another in the light of Scripture and in the presence of the Spirit. Such is meant to be central to the Baptist way of being the church. […] A congregational discussion may well decide, or even be predicated by conviction, but is an area where we act as the church scattered, each exercising our own 'vote' according to conscience. Yet the conversation remains critical. For it ensures that we will exercise our own conscience, informed by the Scriptures and the hopes and fears of those people among whom we now confess through faith and baptism that we find our primary identity." (Blythe 2013)

The referendum discussion also offers the opportunity to find new believers.

With around 13,000 believers, the Evangelicals are another crucial religious community in Scotland. Like the Baptists, the Evangelicals are not members of ACTS. However, the Evangelical Alliance in Scotland has also decided to remain neutral on the referendum: "[T]he Alliance takes no side but strongly believes that the role of the Church is to provide spiritual leadership. God's guidance is required for the proper functioning of society, in fact, for 300 years the Church has given spiritual guidance without taking sides." (Evangelical Alliance Scotland 2014a)

In order to improve society through 'God's guidance', the Evangelical Alliance explains, the church must adopt a neutral position.

Many churches that have decided to favour neutrality locate themselves as contributors to the issue of national self-government. They have organised discussions and published reports in which hopes and fears concerning Scotland's future should be articulated. The churches were supposed to create open spaces for discussion. But two exceptions characterise Scotland as a religious nation.

7.1.2 Fundamentalist churches

Two denominations took a clear position on the upcoming referendum and spoke out against secession. These were the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland (Continuing), which also opposed secession. Both interpreted the referendum as a primarily religious question and "religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena", as Brubaker (2012: 3) calls this "research perspective". There could only be one answer: No to secession because political independence would jeopardise Scotland, united by its national religion.

The Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland has 1,197 members and has rejected secession (as of the 2011 census). In its synod in 2013, it decided to campaign vehe-

mently against Scottish secession. This decision was based on the fear of increasing secularisation and the growing political influence of the Roman Catholic Church:

> "we fear that a move away from a specifically-Christian acknowledgement in the foundation of our national life will only strengthen the powers of the kingdom of darkness in their opposition to Christ. Under a secular constitution it will be even more difficult than it is at present to introduce legislation founded on biblical principles. […] However imperfectly the United Kingdom has implemented Christian principles over the years, the fact remains that Britain is still officially committed to protecting the Protestant faith. Breaking the Union will abolish that protection. Indeed, there can be no doubt that the Roman Catholic Church will have far greater political influence in an independent Scotland than it presently does under the Union, since the proportion of Romanists is much higher in Scotland than in Britain as a whole." (Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland 2014a, 2014b)

The Free Church of Scotland (Continuing) split from the Free Church of Scotland on 20 January 2000 and was even more resolute in its opposition to secession. This church has just under 1,000 members. In the report of its Public Questions, Religion & Morals Committee, the rejection of secession is explained as follows:

> "We believe that independence as proposed will diminish the place of Christianity in our country; […] presents a grave threat to our Protestant throne and Presbyterian establishment; […] endangers our religious and civil liberties; […] [and] cannot be morally justified." (Free Church of Scotland (Continuing) 2014: 8)

Not only had God deliberately brought Scotland and England together, i.e. "the Lord was at work to bring the nations of Scotland and England together for the strengthening of His cause". but in the event of secession, the Church would be threatened with "disestablishment" (Free Church of Scotland (Continuing) 2014: 6, 4). It was foreseeable that the SNP government would attempt to undermine the religiously legitimised sovereignty of the people through secession:

> "our country's present Christian constitution being replaced by a largely secular one. […] In the White Paper "the sovereignty of the people" seems to mean that the people can choose whether they wish to be governed by the law of God or some other code. Such thinking lies behind the moral and social changes of recent decades. To the Scottish reformers, popular sovereignty meant that kings are put into office by their subjects and are under human as well as divine law, such that the people may call wicked rulers to account. The people authorise the government, so that while the parliament is legally sovereign the electorate are politically sovereign. Yet both parliament and people are under God's sovereignty and accountable to Him." (Free Church of Scotland (Continuing) 2014: 7)

This church understood the hopes of Scottish nationalism as a reversal of what it saw as the correct religious and social order guaranteed in the United Kingdom. In the event of secession, society would no longer be determined by God and Scotland would no longer be a religious nation, but the Scottish nation would be governed by the political inclusion collective of those who live in Scotland (multiple inclusion and thus 'person' would replace 'God' as a generic term see Stichweh 2005: 62; multiple inclusion of the 'person' as a characteristic of modernity is demonstrated by Bohn 2006; Bohn 2008; Fuchs 1995, 2003; Lehmann 2006; Luhmann 1993: with various arguments).

Specifically, the report of the Free Church of Scotland (Continuing) states that secession would mean that the people and the legislature would no longer have to answer to God but to the "civic society", in which the church is "just another element" according to the ideas of the secession campaign, decides and writes into the constitution.[1]

From a historical perspective, this concern is understandable, as reformers such as John Knox saw Scotland as a role model for the entire world.[2] However, this view can only be found in traces in tiny religious communities in modern world society. It is also interesting to note that these faith communities have an extremely high level of integration. For example, around 830 of the 1,200 members of the Free Church of Scotland (Continuing) attend church services every Sunday. In contrast, the "Sunday Church Attendance" rate for the other churches in Scotland is 7.2 % of the faithful (and in England 5'.3 % see Brierley 2017: 14-15). The extreme discrepancy shows that the Free Church of Scotland (Continuing), which openly opposes the guiding principles of functional differentiation, is a fundamentalist counter-structure of world

1 "Scotland's Future views the church as just another element of civic society. The approving reference to the role of various groups in "shifting attitudes to matters such as same sex marriage" is disturbing. In a future independent Scotland will churches which do not support homosexual unions continue to enjoy the freedom to oppose them, believing them to be wrong and sinful according to the Bible? […] When it is said that 'private institutions' will be expected to 'improve the diversity and gender balance of their governance' is there an implicit threat here to churches and other Christian organisations which follow the Bible's teaching on male headship and exclude women from office?" (Free Church of Scotland (Continuing) 2014: 7)

2 John Knox interpreted "the Scottish Kirk to be the 'most perfectly Reformed church' in existence. Furthermore, he sought to have *these Reformation principles applied not only in the specifically ecclesiastical sphere, but also in the life and action of the whole nation*. In this he believed that Scotland was showing the way to others – even to Geneva!" (Reid 1973: 27 Herv. P.R.; Dawson 2014) Emphasising the globalisation of this secular social order, the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643 states that "we shall […] endeavour in our several places and callings, the preservation of the reformed religion in the Church of Scotland". The "reformation of religion" is to be carried out worldwide using the "example of the best reformed churches", because God is "the Searcher of all hearts" (General Assembly/House of Commons 1643: §1, §VI; on the consequences see McCallum 2014).

society, the reasons for which are probably to be found in historical and local peculiarities (especially in the Reformation and insularity).

Overall, however, it should be noted that most churches have interpreted the decision on national independence as a personal decision that every one of them should discuss, weigh up and make for themselves.

7.1.3 Preventing ethnic conflict

The churches' neutrality about the independence referendum expresses their commitment to the Scottish community.

A good example is the "What Kind of Nation? Manifesto for a Future Scotland" report by the Evangelical Alliance Scotland. In it, the future of the Scottish nation is linked to questions of shared beliefs: "What fundamental values do we wish to live by? What kind of society do we want to live in? What kind of Scotland do we aspire to be?" (Evangelical Alliance Scotland 2014b: 6)

The manifesto calls for discussion of the "four well-known Christian values that are inscribed at the heart of Holyrood: wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity" (Evangelical Alliance Scotland 2014b: 6). The debate already taking place is "a bland economic debate focused solely on the technical aspects of independence, involving only the political classes". Instead of discussing technical details, people were asked to discuss their hopes in the context of their fears. One of the recurring themes of the manifesto is the "damage by the rampant individualism that has no regard for wider society" (Evangelical Alliance Scotland 2014b: 17).

The manifesto addresses the future of Scotland in terms of fears and problems. However, while the Evangelical Alliance itself does not take sides, it is easy to see that its manifesto, published six months before the referendum in September 2014, echoes the concerns of those who campaigned against Scotland's secession. As Jackie Baillie, Labour Party executive member of the Better Together campaign, said in an interview, the main arguments against secession were material fears, "how individuals feel they would be better or worse off financially" (Baillie 2015; see also Mackinnon 2014).

With its manifesto, the Evangelical Alliance of Scotland has added to these primarily economic anxieties, such as currency, jobs and tax policy, concerns about family and community, both of which stem from "rampant individualism" as the report makes clear.

In discussing the forthcoming independence referendum, Scotland's largest denomination, the Church of Scotland (Kirk), has taken a similar approach. It, too, has interpreted the debate primarily as a search for shared values. The Church of Scotland organised 32 events across Scotland under the heading Imagining Scotland's Future. These events were intended to create an "interesting picture of Scotland at the grassroots" (Church and Society Council 2014: 5). The church engaged with its

communities and youth organisations to develop such a picture. Around 900 people from all over Scotland took part in these events. After a short introduction by the organiser, participants were asked the following questions: "1. What values are most important to you for the future of Scotland? 2. how can we make Scotland a better place to be? 3. how do we put our aspirations into action?" (Church and Society Council 2014: 2)

The participants then discussed their answers in order to arrive at a common list of priorities. A total of 3,741 ideas were written down and statistically analysed for the report Our Vision: Imagining Scotland's Future. The ten priorities were: "1. equality, 2. fairness, 3. justice, 4. education, 5. respect, 6. honesty, 7. community, 8. opportunity, 9. compassion, 10. tolerance". (Church and Society Council 2014: 8)

The church searched for shared values and found that egalitarianism is the most essential national value of all. In the report's theological reflection, equality is explicitly linked to the nation: "[n]ations are to be judged by their care for the most vulnerable, in whom we encounter Christ the scapegoat" (Church and Society Council 2014: 41). Martin Johnstone said in the interview that his personal impression is that the church needs to work harder for equality. The Kirk "needs to work harder at demonstrating that it's about a fairer, more equal world, a just world, and a fairer, more equal, and more just Scotland." (Johnstone 2015)

This search for shared values was a strategy to avoid ethnic conflict. The report notes that the "adversarial frames that dominate political and media discourse were largely absent" (Church and Society Council 2014: 1). The actual polarisation between, for example, British Protestantism and Jacobite Catholic separatism was obscured: "A number of ideas were directly related to the Referendum on Scottish Independence and advocated independence or remaining in the Union. These have not been expanded on here, as we sought to look beyond the polarising question of yes or no during our events." (Church and Society Council 2014: 32)

As these sentences show, the Church of Scotland sought to shift attention from the question of Scotland's constitutional future to the question of shared national values. Looking back, Johnstone said of the Imagining Scotland's Future series of events:

> "I think for a period of time the Church of Scotland was left denuded of what its role might be. […] I think that's partly to do with increasing […] levels of secularism but also increasing levels of multiculturalism. […] I think that contribution [i.e. Imagining Scotland's Future] was probably a part of the shift […] from the debate being about whether or not Scotland should be independent into what sort of Scotland we wanted regardless of whether that was remaining within the Union or as an independent country." (Johnstone 2015)

From their perspective, the churches interpreted the forthcoming referendum as an opportunity to emphasise why religion remains important to the future of the Scottish community. In addition, the churches provided impulses such as values for the nationalist discourse, for example, in discussions about equality. Yet, how did the faithful decide in the referendum?

7.2 Believers of unionism and separatism

If we look at the post-election surveys on the referendum concerning religion, an ethnic polarisation linking the question of Scottish statehood with religion becomes apparent. The referendum shows a tendency towards polarisation between Protestantism and Catholicism. With 45 % in favour and 55 % against secession, the faithful voted similarly to the Scottish population as a whole in the referendum (Henderson/Jeffery/Liñeira 2015: 5; Lord Ashcroft 2014: 49). However, there is a clear distribution between the religious communities, as the following table shows.

Table 9: Voting result of believers based on post-election surveys on the referendum of 18 September 2014 (religious affiliation according to 2011 census)

	Population in k	**For secession**		**Against secession**	
		in %	**in Tsd.**	**in %**	**in Tsd.**
Final result of the referendum	*5.295,4*	*45 %*	*2.367,0*	*55 %*	*2.928,4*
Protestant	1.942,6	34 %	653,3	66 %	1.289,3
No religion	1.941,1	60 %	1.169,2	40 %	771,9
Roman catholic	841,0	61 %	517,0	39 %	324,0
Not stated	368,0	63 %	231,0	37 %	137,0
Other religion	136,0	68 %	92,2	32 %	43,8
Church of England	66,7	18 %	12,0	82 %	54,7

Protestants and Church of England believers, in particular, voted against secession with an above-average majority. Half of the 2.9 million people who voted against secession in the referendum belong to these two religious' communities.

Conversely, the result is just as dramatic. People who do not profess or conceal a religion, as well as members of Scotland's second largest church (Roman Catholicism) and small non-Christian faith communities (especially Buddhism), voted more than 60 % in favour of Scotland's independence. This non-religious population, as well as Catholics and religious minorities, accounted for almost 85 % of all votes in favour of secession in the referendum.

The result of the referendum shows a polarisation between the believers of Protestantism on the one hand and the believers of Roman Catholicism and the non-religious population on the other. Religion was important for the outcome of the referendum for both sides. Protestant support for Scotland remaining in the United Kingdom was above average. Roman Catholics, many of whom had only recently or a few generations ago settled in the country, clearly favoured Scottish independence as did those, who do not have a religion. Thus the Scottish independence movement was not only a 'social justice movement', it can also claim to be a multiculturalist movement. It was overwhelmingly supported by Roman Catholics as well as non-religious people, albeit for different reasons.

The importance of religion in Scotland's quest for statehood can hardly be overestimated. In contrast to the neutral stance of the clergy, Protestant unionism and Catholic separatism are still real and relevant in the national community of Scotland in the 21st century. Multiculturalism and religion were key factors in deciding the outcome of the referendum.

7.3 Discussion

The study raises the question of religion as an explanatory factor for the Scottish quest for political independence. In this context, three important conclusions are discussed below.

7.3.1 The clergy's neutrality as responsiveness

Mudrov interprets the position of active neutrality as a practical consideration on the part of the religious actors: "official anti-independence statements from Churches (had they come) would have looked as a sign of disrespect to the government, which was willing to show a high degree of support to religious organisations." (Mudrov 2018: 40)

Based on the "'holy trinity' of Scotland's Kirk, law and educational tradition" that was crucial in the Protestant Unionism of the first half of the twentieth century (Tor-

rance 2020b: 47), religious division between Protestantism and separatism was to be expected even today. In his interpretation, Mudrov underestimates the tense situation regarding Scotland's regional autonomy, which since 1707 has been primarily a religious autonomy. The fact that this religious social structure of Scotland was endangered by the referendum on political independence was seen not only by the supporters of the two fundamentalist churches, as the exit poll shows. Therefore, the reluctance of the clergy and church organisations to preside over the referendum must be interpreted in the light of the referendum result.

Neutrality was a strategy to avoid conflict, as otherwise, ethnic clashes between Protestant unionism and Catholic as well as non-religious separatism could have been expected. By remaining neutral, the clergy had, for the time being, defused the potential for religious and political conflict expressed in the Scottish anthem and the symbol of the thistle. Furthermore, the clergy were probably also aware of how the faithful would decide.

Through the clergy, religion became responsive to the Scottish quest for autonomy. Responsive means an action that is based on the anticipation of future states (conceptually Stichweh 1993: 202f.; programmatically Stichweh 2004; cf. Krichewsky in Ahlers et al. 2020). Responsive communication extends observation from the internal environment of the function system—in this case, religion—to the social environment, such as the socio-cultural unit of the nation. It is also characterised as responsive by drawing conclusions from this observation of the social environment, which translates into offers for interests that still need to be articulated.

First and foremost, the church sought to create a place where hopes and concerns about Scotland could be openly discussed. According to church representatives, this discussion would otherwise have had no place. By actively adopting a neutral position, the independence referendum gave the churches "an opportunity […] to ensure that the debate is about what sort of Scotland we want rather than the fiscal vehicle for delivering that", as Martin Johnstone of the Church of Scotland said (Johnstone 2015).

The clergy's neutrality was also responsive because it anticipated ethnic conflict with the question of Scottish independence. It sought to prevent ethnic conflict through neutrality. There were no escapades of conflict between unionist Protestantism and Catholic-Jacobite separatism.

Typical of responsiveness was that the decision to remain neutral was forward-looking. Most churches in Scotland committed themselves to this neutrality concerning the Scottish independence referendum at the start of the two-year referendum campaign, even though only a third of the Scottish population favoured secession at that time.

7.3.2 Explaining protestant unionism

What is the basis of British unionism that was decisive for the referendum? It can be seen in the religious determination of the Scottish nation. Much like the two fundamentalist churches expressed above, this interpretation of the Scottish nation emphasises the history of Scotland as a primarily religious community that is given its autonomy through the United Kingdom.

Thus, many Protestants promoted the 1707 Union of Scotland with England as a defence against the papacy. In the words of the then parliamentarian William Seton, the Union was "the Bulwark of the Protestant Religion and Interest" (Seton 1706). This fear of the influence of Roman Catholicism and the religious decline of the Scottish community, as the two explicitly anti-establishment denominations put it, is part of the explanation. It allows us to understand why so many Protestants voted against secession and why, conversely, many Catholics and believers in Scotland's religious minorities interpreted statehood as an opportunity. In this context, Norman Bonney speaks of competition for believers:

> "measure[s] promoted by the [Roman Catholic] Church to indicate an affinity with the cause of independence for Scotland, which would further erode the UK state in which the Church has no statutorily recognised standing and in which it is specifically excluded from key institutions of state, in favour of an independent Scotland where it would inherit certain constitutional advantages and might be able further to advance its social, religious and political influence." (Bonney 2013: 482; Steven 2008: 194)

However, this fear of the papacy is not only cultivated in the small circles of fundamentalist churches. This narrative is also important in the Orange Order, which has around 50,000 members in Scotland and still commemorates the victory of William III of Orange against the Catholic Stewart King James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. In the words of Joseph Webster, who undertook ethnographic fieldwork on this order in Scotland from 2012 to 2016, it was about protecting British Protestantism: "according to many of my Orange informants, the real choice was not between independence or unionism, but a hidden choice between bondage to despotic ultramontane Catholicism or freedom within the divine monarchical mandate of British Protestantism." (Webster 2022: 28)

Roman Catholicism will not and cannot change and therefore the 'price of freedom […] is eternal vigilance', Webster reads in a book entitled This is Rome, which he finds while working in the Grand Lodge archives (Webster 2022: 22). Fear of the Vatican, Webster reports, sometimes even led Orangemen to vote with Irish Catholics for the Labour Party in order to weaken the SNP's independence aspirations. During the referendum campaign, the Orange Order registered on the side of the Better To-

gether campaign, which was campaigning against Scottish statehood. However, due to concerns expressed by both sides (The Guardian 2014) that the Orangemen's beliefs would jeopardise the success of the union campaign, they rebranded as British-Together:

> "By relinquishing access to the political mainstream, the Orange Institution chose to sacrifice any status gains they had hoped to make by partnering with 'Better Together' in order to avoid the risk of handing the SNP the damaging opportunity to label all unionism as sectarian-by-association. The Order's alternative campaign – pointedly called 'British Together' – made a fraction of the impact it could otherwise have achieved by focusing all its efforts on getting the vote out in loyalist communities." (Webster 2022: 26)

Apart from the regular commemorative marches on 12 July, this conflict is kept alive in Scotland primarily through football: "Scottish Orangeism's membership persistence may owe something to the way Rangers-Celtic matches 'translated' sectarianism into the postmodern age. Thus even as religion declined, the ubiquity of Premiership football may have endowed Orangeism with relevance for many young Protestant Scots." (Kaufmann 2009: 15)

In his study of the global spread and influence of the Orange Order, Eric P. Kaufmann concludes that the Order had little political influence in Scotland in the second half of the twentieth century. With an increase in membership of the Order to up to 2 % of the population, Scotland showed a surprising trend worldwide in the post-war period. However, since the Pope visited Scotland in 1987, membership there has also fallen to less than one per cent of the total population. Nevertheless, the ethnic-religious conflict over the common state sometimes comes to a head in football. This was the case, for example, at the spontaneous championship celebration of the fans of Glasgow Rangers, who won the Scottish football championship after a long time. With numerous British flags, the Rangers fans marched to George Square in Glasgow after the last game of the season on 15 May 2021 to celebrate the championship. This was in breach of the Scottish Government's COVID-19 restrictions, which had just been renewed for Glasgow. From the perspective of the protagonists of the Scottish autonomy movement, there was, as the then First Minister Sturgeon put it in a tweet, "vile anti-Catholic prejudice" (quoted in The Guardian 2021).

7.3.3 Religious and political autonomy: Ecumenism

As an alternative to the Protestant-ethnic or Catholic-Jacobite interpretations of the Scottish nation, there is the tolerance of religious diversity expressed in multiculturalism. This multiculturalism promotes the Scottish quest for political autonomy based primarily on the political inclusion collective. Yet, how can this happen in a

small community like Scotland, with only about 5 million inhabitants but 83 different denominations? The answer lies in this religious diversity in such a small space.

In line with research on religion in contemporary Scotland, we find the prevalence of ecumenism at the level of religious performance roles and their church organisations. However, it was only in the second half of the twentieth century that ecumenism took hold in Scotland. The protracted struggle, for example, between Presbyterians and Episcopalians or between moderate and evangelical Presbyterians, according to Robert Louis Stevenson, is a struggle between "people who think almost exactly the same thoughts about religion" (Stevenson 1878: 17; Devine 2012: 374), for a state-sanctioned religious hierarchy was defused by ecumenism. Three hundred years ago, this ecumenism was highly unlikely in Scotland. At that time, questions of church government were closely linked to the debate about the parliamentary union of Scotland and England. W.S. Reid summarises:

> "although the covenants were not reaffirmed in the Revolutionary Settlement of 1692, yet one of the central requirements for the acceptance of William and Mary as monarchs was the guarantee of the position of the Scottish church, for while the Scottish parliament amounted to little or nothing, the church was the heart of the Scottish national identity, a position reconfirmed in the Union of 1707." (Reid 1973: 29; Mullan 1995)

Therefore, Karin Bowie concludes that the Union of Parliaments of 1707 was primarily about competing ideas about the nature of church government:

> "Yet though ordinary Presbyterians and Jacobites could join in patriotic attacks on the treaty, their unity was compromised by their loyalties to divergent forms of church government and the monarchies that supported these churches. These differences contributed to the making of the Union by preventing the opposition from cooperating to the degree necessary to stop it in 1706–7." (Bowie 2007: 71)

The protection of the Presbyterian Church government of Scotland from Episcopacy was of paramount importance in the laws and treaty of union between Scotland and England in 1707. This was achieved by ratifying the "Act for the Security of the Protestant Religion and Government of the Church" in 1707 (Jackson, A. 2020: 49).

The Act was incorporated into the Treaty of Union (Article XXV). It stated that the Presbyterian government was to be the sole government of the Church in the Kingdom of Scotland. A few years later, this provision was challenged by the Patronage Act (1711): "An Act to restore the Patrons to their ancient Rights of presenting Ministers to the Churches vacant". However, the early union between Scotland and England depended on securing the Presbyterian church government in Scotland.

For ecclesiastical affairs in Scotland, the policy of the United Kingdom became even more important in the early decades of the twentieth century. After several conflicts over Presbyterian self-government and mandates, there were the disruption, repeated church splits and reunions (Brown 1991; Muirhead 2015). At the beginning of the 20th century, several churches joined together to form the United Free Church and in 1909 entered into negotiations with the Kirk in order to "achieve the primacy of spiritual independence, […] leading eventually to the 'Glorius Union' of 1929, which brought most of the congregations of the former secessionist churches back within the fold of a greatly strengthened and enlarged Church of Scotland." (Bradley 2014: 165)

Crucially, this 1921 Act "with its privileging of rules made by the Church of Scotland over statutes made by Parliament", as Iain McLean emphasises, granted religious autonomy within the polity of the United Kingdom (McLean 2020: 125). Similarly, James Weatherhead contrasts the religious autonomy granted by the Church of Scotland Act 1921 with earlier provisions:

> "While, in terms of its own constitution, the Church of Scotland was recognised as the national Church in Scotland, it was no longer properly described as 'by law established', because the law had now explicitly recognised that the church was established by the Lord Jesus Christ. This means that, while the 1707 act may still be regarded as law protecting the Church from State interference, and is in this sense reinforced by the 1921 Act, it cannot be construed as preventing the Church from modifying its own constitution without reference to the State." (quoted in Bradley 2014: 167)

The Church of Scotland Act secures the government of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland not only by a privilege of the state, but also by Parliament granting religious autonomy even in opposition to legislation, as Weatherhead and McLean emphasise. Therefore, it was not only Scotland's political autonomy that was at stake in the 2014 independence referendum but, above all, the religious autonomy of the Scottish nation. "[T]he doctrine […] that Church and state are both institutions of God", writes Free Church Moderator John S. Ross, are at stake in the referendum because

> "what happened in 1707 was nothing less than the re-establishment of both the Church of England and the Church of Scotland through the Union. […] Abandon the Union and you cut the nation adrift from the establishment principle's legal basis in the UK's Act of Accession and Coronation Oath." (Ross 2011)

Ross criticises that in the 650 pages of Scotland's Future White Paper, there is only the following sentence on the relationship between church and state in an independent Scotland: "We propose no change to the legal status of any religion or of Scot-

land's churches." (Scottish Government 2013: 564) By remaining neutral on the outcome of the independence referendum, the Church of Scotland and other churches risked the national status of Scotland's Presbyterian church government.

The neutrality of religious performance roles is consistent with what Callum C. Brown describes as "a gradual and inexorable shift to a 'voluntaryist' position – or belief in separation of church and state" about the Scottish community that began from the end of the eighteenth century (Brown 1997: 17). As a latent component of Scottish national identity, the covenantal myth of election, which was central to Calvinist Scots in the sixteenth century, as Anthony D. Smith notes, is still important today, albeit in the form of ecumenism (Smith 2008: 42).

Moreover, unlike the Anglican Church of England, there was not just one national church in Scotland (Bradley 2014: 160). Historically, both the Scottish Episcopal Church and the Church of Scotland (Kirk) have some reason to claim the status of a national church of Scotland. As far as the Church of Scotland is concerned, Brown, Green and Mair point to numerous aspects by which this church has lost influence in recent decades, i.e. in a sense a "soft disestablishment". Apart from direct legal recognition in Scotland's advisory education committees, the Church of Scotland has today lost all privileges (Brown/Green/Mair 2016: 94).

In other words, the Church of Scotland could not have risked its status as a national church privileged by the state, as there is no such constitutional status in Scotland today. The Kirk, writes Donald Smith, has lost its national significance. It is "no longer a lead or leading national body". Referring to the Pentecostal story, Smith explains: "Christianity affirms and brings together the diversity of humanity. It does not aim to impose uniformity" (Smith 2013: 41, 114). The Kirk competes with the other churches for importance to the Scottish nation. With neutrality, it had the opportunity to win believers on both sides irrespective of the outcome of the referendum.

Another important reason for religious tolerance is the primacy of the political inclusion collective in Scottish politics and independence movement. This imperative of inclusion leads to a fear of ethnic conflict. All members of the Scottish Parliament interviewed by Nasar Meer were "positive (often very positive) about the fact of religion pluralism in Scotland" (Meer 2015: 1490). Similarly, Mudrov quotes clergy who justify their neutrality by saying they fear sectarianism (Mudrov 2018: 37). At the level of religious performance roles, the Scottish nation is pluralised. Religious pluralism is recognised and, with it, a mutual responsibility of national and religious autonomy. The "Scottish form of establishment", writes Duncan B. Forrester, is based on national identity and voluntarism and not on "statecraft" and legislation (Forrester 1999: 88).

This religious pluralism in Scotland is an indicator of functional differentiation, as Rudolf Stichweh states: "The world religious space, unlike the space of other function systems, is permanently pluralistic and in this plural inclusion in 'religion', which relies on mutual acceptance, there is a decisive contribution of religion to

modernity." (Stichweh 2020a: 186 translated by the author; in contrast, see the formation process of religion due to strife in Pollack 2020)[3]

The denominations compete with each other and recognise other religions – apart from the two fundamentalist denominations – as being of equal value. They accept the renunciation of the privileges guaranteed by the Act of Union (1707) and the Church of Scotland Act 1921. Religion is a precursor to valuing equality in social relations, as was also evident from discussions with the faithful of various Protestant denominations:

One example is the focus groups on the referendum conducted by Eric Stoddarts with believers of different denominations: "By far the most common theme across all the groups was the question of social justice and, linked to the issue of a perceived democratic deficit, whether independence would enable and result in Scotland becoming a more just society. […] We can say that 'Kindheart' is as much a myth as is 'Braveheart'." (Stoddart 2014: 339f.)

This egalitarianism was underpinned by the few clerics who openly spoke out favouring Scottish political independence, such as the cross-party group Christians For Independence, founded in 2009. Three weeks before the referendum in 2014, 33 ordained clergy from the Church of Scotland joined this group, calling for a "more socially just Scotland" and the abolition of nuclear weapons of mass destruction in Scotland (BBC 2014a). Rev Dr Doug Gay presented the group's Scotland the Nation pamphlet. In it, he promotes the vision of "participating in a free and democratic society alongside our neighbours of all faiths and none" (Gay 2020). The Christians For Independence brochure concludes with a commitment to the "spirit of co-operation and ecumenicalism" (Christian For Independence 2020: 9).

This appreciation of ecumenism aligns with the findings of Zafirovsky (Zafirovski 2014). According to him, religious pluralism is necessary to catalyse the democratic impact of Calvinism. Future research should, therefore, consider the religious autonomy expressed in ecumenism in explaining the conditions for (Scottish) democracy and nationalism (Brown 2016).

3 "Der weltreligiöse Raum ist, anders als der Raum anderer Funktionssysteme, dauerhaft pluralistisch und in dieser pluralen, auf wechselseitige Akzeptanz setzenden Inklusion in 'Religion', besteht ein entscheidender Beitrag der Religion zur Moderne."

8 Higher education and national universalism

Why does the Scottish independence movement embrace multiculturalism? Lindsay Paterson sees a Scottish specificity here. The inclusion imperative of the political collective predetermines Scotland's national-cultural collective. This is how Lindsay Paterson describes this "paradox of Scottish political culture":

> "Scotland until very recently has not asserted itself on the basis of a particular culture that marks it off from everywhere else, except insofar as it marks it off from places that do not assert universal values. Scotland has not asserted itself in the usual way of small nations seeking autonomy in the past century and a half: its assertion has not been about distinctive languages or religions or ethnicity. Scottish political culture has asserted values that are not specific to anywhere, and certainly not to Scotland. In doing so, Scotland in the past 200 years has helped to create a world in which the values to which it has held have become so general as to make Scotland not particularly different." (Paterson 2014: 292)

In Scotland, the sense of national belonging depends, above all, on what applies equally to everyone. Although, according to Paterson, these principles, which apply to the whole world, are difficult to apply to national separatism, they are one of the central explanatory factors of the Scottish quest for autonomy in the 21st century.

In sociological terms, this observation leads us to the "pattern variables" of universalism and particularism proposed by Talcott Parsons for analysis (Parsons/Shils 1951: 48). Universalism is universal in that a general standard judges the object of action. On the other hand, particularism emphasises the unique, specific meaning of an object for an actor. The Scottish autonomy movement, it will be argued below, undermines the national particularism of national culture. The national collective is pre-structured by the idea that it must encompass all the people who actually live in Scotland. In democratic nationalism, national culture is severely constrained by individual self-determination.[1] Obviously, this is a strategy to legitimise the Scottish

1 See for example: "The age of mechanical dualism is ending; materialism and spiritualism have each had their day; that of an organic and idealist Monism is begun. […] [I]n this rhythm

independence movement in the global public sphere, within the limits of attention (Heintz 1982; Werron 2012, 2018).

In research on contemporary nationalism, this distinction between nationalist-particularism and cosmopolitan-universalism is very important. According to this, current nationalist movements are often based on cathexis and are counter-structures of the world society characterised by the universalistic standards of the function systems. What Fukuyama means by vitality ('thymos'), Luhmann by 'non-trivial conflicts', Year Tamin summarises with the following story:

> "The liberal resentment of the ornamented symbolic style and its preference for a well-ordered frame of mind was echoed in the Bauhaus vision of worker housing in America. Yale- and Harvard-educated architects wanted workers' houses to have 'pure beige rooms, stripped, freed, purged of all mouldings, cornices and overhangs'. […] Yet the workers didn't share the dream of brute simplicity and universality. 'They bought houses with clapboard siding and high-pitched roofs and shingles and gaslight-style front-porch lamps and mailboxes set up on top of lengths of stiffed chain that seems to defy gravity, and all sorts of other unbelievable cute and antiquary touches'. This is not because the workers had no aesthetic preferences, but because, like all of us, they wanted their homes to be particular rather than universal. Fulfilling the task of particularisation, nationalism is at its best, and this, among other reasons, is why it is back." (Tamir 2019: 54)

This diagnosis of particularising nationalism, which fights against the universalisation of global function systems, does not apply to the Scottish quest for autonomy. Scotland's quest for autonomy is based on a universalistic value system, cultivated by the enormous relevance of education and the Scottish University (cf. Stichweh 2000a: 58 footnote 50). Before I show the mechanisms of emerging and consolidating universalist orientations in Scotland, I would like to start with an example. It illustrates the effectiveness of this orientation.

The primary collective of Scottish politics is clearly recognisable in the "sworn in" ceremonies of Scottish MPs. Before a new parliament comes into force—or when MPs die or resign from office—the new MPs must take an oath of office:

> "Every person who is returned as a member shall take the oath of allegiance or shall make a solemn affirmation at a meeting of the Parliament before the Clerk. A member shall not take part in any other proceedings of the Parliament until that member has done so. […] A member may, immediately after taking the oath or making a solemn affirmation, repeat the oath or affirmation in a language other than English." (2023: §1.2)

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of passive with active life, of contemplation with constructive energy, lies the health and the future of the Individual and of the Race." (Macleay 1895: 29, 38)

Allowing Members of the Scottish Parliament to repeat the oath or solemn affirmation in any language distinguishes this "sworn in" ceremony from the House of Commons and the House of Lords (Mansfield 2016).[2] In the following table, I have listed the language of all these repeated ceremonies as of 02 January 2024.

Table 10: Languages of the oath and swearing-in ceremonies of the members of the Scottish Parliament (as of 2 January 2024)

Scottish Parliament	English only	Gaelic	Doric	Scots	Arabic	French	Italian	Urdu	other	**sum**
1. Parliament (1999–2003)	130									**130**
2. Parliament (2003–2007)	133	1	1							**135**
3. Parliament (2007–2011)	121	5	3	1				1		**131**
4. Parliament 2011–2016)	121	5	5	1	1	1	1	1		**136**
5. Parliament 2016–2021)	121	6	4	1				1		**133**
6. Parliament (since 2021)	108	7	5	3		1		1	5	**130**

The result clearly shows the multicultural self-image of the Scottish nation. Of the 130 ceremonies (including the appointment of Rosalind McCall), most ceremonies in the current Parliament have been held exclusively in English. Most recently, 15 of the 63 SNP MPs recited the oath/affirmation in another language in addition to English: in the Doric dialect common in North East Scotland (5), in Gaelic (4), in Scots (2) or another language.[3] Some MPs from other parties have also

2 The oath or solemn affirmation in the House of Commons is only permitted to be recited in the following four national languages: English, Welsh, Scottish Gaelic, Cornish. If this sworn in is not carried out, the MP is excluded: "MPs cannot take their seat, speak in debates, vote or receive a salary until taking the oath or affirmation. They could also be fined £500 and have their seat declared vacant "as if they were dead" if they attempted to do so." (https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/swearingin/, accessed 27 January 2024).

3 The six other languages, each represented once, are: Urdu, Shona, Panjabi, Orcadian, Welsh, German.

used these or other languages. In addition, SNP MP Karen Adam repeated her oath in British Sign Language. Conservative MP Pam Gosal used the Sikh salutation, and Anas Sarwar (Labour Party) used a Muslim invocation during the ceremony.

These ceremonies, in which English is used and another language of the person's choice, are examples of an ethnic interpretation of the Scottish collective. Overall, however, there are very few cases in which this happens. Although the pro-secession SNP has been part of the Scottish government since 2007, only just over 10 % of these ceremonies have been repeated in a language other than English by 2021. At 17 %, the most recent parliament still marks no break here. Ethnicity and language, as the official ceremonies show despite numerous SNP MPs, are not "at the heart of the debate today" in Scotland's quest for autonomy (McAfee 2017: is wrong here). However, how did this universalist attitude come about in Scotland's drive for autonomy, and what were the consequences?

8.1 Mechanisms of Scottish universalism

As Lindsay Paterson points out in the essay mentioned above, the widespread universalist orientation in Scotland originated by the Scottish Enlightenment that emerged in the 18th century. This was due to the reorganisation of the education system, which was crucial for the Scottish Reformation. Without claiming to be exhaustive, I would like to name five crucial mechanisms below.

8.1.1 Protection of the Scottish Reformation

Firstly, the importance of education in Scotland must be emphasised. Education in Scotland became crucial in the course of the Calvinist Reformation. In the middle of the 16th century, Scotland's Reformation church constitution led to a general obligation to educate—at least for sons. For the church representatives, education was the most important thing. Education was "the one utterly necessary", only it allowed children and "rude persons" to be taught religion. Education made it possible "that offences be corrected and punished." Without school, the Fathers of the Constitution continued, there would be "no face of a visible kirk" (Calderwood 1621[1560/1578]: Book 1: V). The educational system introduced during the Reformation, which was organised into parish schools, colleges and universities, meant that by 1660 at the latest, every parish in the Scottish Lowlands had its own school (see Devine 2012: 98).

In cities as well as in the Highlands, other religions, which were only weakly persecuted by the Presbyterians in Scotland, provided numerous schools (on this and the reasons for this permissiveness towards other religions see Muirhead 2015). The close connection between religion and education in Scotland led to an important

provision in the Treaty of Union of 1707. In order to secure its 'Presbyterian church government and discipline', Scotland was promised the security of the then universities and colleges in Article XXV of the Treaty of Union:

> "for the greater Security of the foresaid Protestant Religion, and of the Worship, Discipline, and Government of this Church, as above established, Her Majesty, […] that the Universities and Colleges of Saint Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Edinburgh, as now established by Law, shall continue within this Kingdom forever".

This regional autonomy of higher education linked to religion was the first important mechanism in the emergence of the universalist orientation.

8.1.2 Small-Town grammar schools

It was to become the education valued in the Reformation that contributed significantly to the emergence of the Enlightenment and its universalist orientation in Scotland. Like many others, Lindsay Paterson mentions the parochial schools that emerged as a result of the Reformation because they provided the Enlightenment with an interested audience:

> "their audiences were in the local publishers, in the pamphlets and the debating societies and the beginnings of what became a national press […]. They were present also in the pulpit: Scotland was the only country in Europe where moderate ministers of religion were among the Enlightenment's leaders. And the audiences were there because of the universal literacy that the schools of the Reformation had eventually brought about. So when Adam Smith was thinking about human sociability, or about how we might buy and sell from each other without fraud or exploitation, he was not an abstract academic theorist: he was thinking about conversations in places such as his Kirkcaldy, epitomising the Scotland of small trading burghs that gave him his model of a selforganising society." (Paterson 2014: 293)

Concerning the emergence and spread of universalism, Charles Camic corrected this assessment. He identified the small-town grammar school as the actually crucial mechanism of Scottish universalism to be mentioned here. According to him, the universalism of the Scottish Enlightenment did not originate in the parochial schools, which often differentiated between pupils with a talent for Latin and the rest of the student body. The small-town grammar schools were particularly successful in conveying universalist impressions to their pupils in everyday school life (Camic 1983: 60). These schools had a high degree of student heterogeneity and assessed these diverse students according to uniform standards:

> "While not quite as encompassing of the social spectrum as educational institutions in the rural parishes, the town schools drew students of the most disparate abilities and ages from widely separated levels of the class hierarchy […]. Because these schools were principally classical seminaries, however, they did not follow the parochial practice of segregating a few privileged Latin boys from the mass of English pupils. Here most studied the classics […]. To manage the variegated groups before them, town schoolmasters were wont to divide students into several classes. […] The step-by-step progression would extend to all the classes in the school and, with the loss of the most advanced class and the entry of fresh beginners, recur each year, according to the different tasks in tum to different batches of boys on the basis of a uniform organisational logic, not because they were special. Nor was this progression merely a once-a-year matter. In Scotland's simple one- or two-room schools, students directly witnessed an enactment on a small scale of the entire process several times every day as each class took up in full public view tasks that in previous years had inexorably fallen to other groups of boys." (Camic 1983: 67-70 Herv. P.R.)

The everyday experience of being judged according to the same rules for everyone led to the spread of universalism through education in the small-town, simple grammar schools of 18th-century Scotland. Charles Camic demonstrates education according to universalist standards as an explanatory factor of the Scottish Enlightenment, right down to the level of some of the protagonists of the Scottish Enlightenment:

> "Adam Smith, John Millar, and William Robertson, the Scottish Enlightenment's most insistent proponents of universalism, were all educated from an early age in one of Scotland's small-town grammar schools. […] The situation of David Hume and Adam Ferguson differed in an important way from that of Smith, Millar, and Robertson; in their first ten years, neither of the two was in a setting organized to provide experiences for the development of universalism. Hume spent the period studying at home under private tutors, while Ferguson attended, probably for five years, a simple parish school at Logierait." (Camic 1983: 69f.)

8.1.3 Reform of university teaching

A third mechanism for the emergence and spread of universalism in Scotland is converting university teaching from regents to professorships, first implemented at the University of Edinburgh in 1708. Until the beginning of the 18th century, teaching by regents was common at Scottish universities. The Regent led the students as a class through the four-year degree programme and taught all subjects himself (for ethics taught at the time, see Schultz 2022).

William Carstairs, who was impressed by the professorial teaching system at Dutch universities and returned to Scotland in 1688 as an adviser to William III, was

primarily responsible for this reform (Whyte 1995: 320). In 1703, Carstairs was appointed Rector of the University of Edinburgh and, by 1708, had implemented the reform in Edinburgh. This reform took place at the University of Glasgow in 1727, at St Andrews in 1747 and only at the end of the 18th-century at the two colleges of Aberdeen. These comparatively early reforms produced a cumulative advantage. They "gave Edinburgh and Glasgow Universities a lead", notes Whyte, "which they never lost making them the key centres of Scottish Enlightenment." (Whyte 1995: 321)

The professorship system enabled specialisation and the establishment of numerous new professorships, such as chairs of Latin, moral philosophy (1708), natural law (1710), universal history (1719) and Scottish law (1722) in Edinburgh. The new system meant that the income of the chair holders was largely linked to tuition fees, which sometimes led to electives being offered to supplement their income.

Various other factors, such as the rapidly growing number of subjects and students, the abolition of compulsory residency, the shortening of study periods etc., further increased the personal distance between teacher and student (see Camic 1983: 72f.). The thematic dimension of the meaning of social systems was universalised with the division into professorships. This created a further prerequisite for suppressing particularism by favouring universalism, which also spread in Scottish universities.

8.1.4 Thematic inclusivity of the university

Fourthly, the Scottish Reformation's educational focus on the university and parochial school should be seen as a factor in the emergence of Scottish universalism: "Schools and universities are now part of a political jurisdiction over spiritual matters", as Rudolf Stichweh describes this "transitional formula", which was important in the 18th-century (Stichweh 2013: 163 translated by the author). The focus on general education through the parochial schools not only brought potential students and the moderate clergy mentioned by Paterson to the universities but also created room for manoeuvre for the university and higher education. Higher education no longer consisted solely of training the clergy. New and different subjects were added.

Edinburgh has a special place here, as Ian D. Whyte notes. Neither too small nor too large, Edinburgh, with its numerous societies and clubs, the first Scottish newspaper etc., was a centre of the Enlightenment and offered the university a correspondingly diverse environment. Edinburgh "was large enough to offer a wide range of lucrative professional posts and a rich social life but at the same time small enough for all the literati to be closely acquainted, unlike contemporary London or Paris." (Whyte 1995: 318)

This room for manoeuvre was exploited by the abolition of the Regent's Principle and led to an increase in the number of subjects and the formation of the Faculty

of Philosophy. The empirical-rational orientation of the Scottish Enlightenment is directly linked to this. David Hume and many others understood this to mean the universalistic "science of man", which sought to explain observations and experiences:

> "The purpose then was to discover principles that would be true of all human beings, anywhere and at any time, principles that would operate as universally for human affairs […]. Thus, the most fundamental way in which Scottish Enlightenment culture was about universal values was its aspiration to find a universally applicable science of human beings. That foundation of all modern Scottish political culture places Scotland absolutely at the heart of humanity." (Paterson 2014: 295)

8.1.5 Social inclusion of the Scottish university

The reformers' endeavour to make education as accessible as possible throughout Scotland so that everyone could study the Bible led to a fifth mechanism: inclusion into education. The first church constitution already stipulated that the financing of entry and exit (exams) should be based on the status and studies of the person concerned and that poor but talented people should be able to finance their studies through the church: The "rich and potent" families, it says, would have to finance their sons themselves "because they are able". The same applies to the "general collection" on entry to university, albeit in a more refined form (Calderwood 1621[1560/1578]: Book 1: V).

Access to university—and thus, to the centre of the Scottish Enlightenment—was to be open to everyone. Moreover, Scottish Universities were in most cases Universities, where students lived and often worked in the city instead of living on campus (for an example Struthers 1882: 244). All this adds up to Scotland's national semantic of "Lad of Parts" (Anderson 1985b).

Even if actually very few came to university, Scotland had an above-average number of students by global standards until the First World War. Whereas in the 1870s in Europe, there were around 0.3 students for every 1.000 people in the population and one student in 1914, the number in Scotland was already at this level earlier: in 1871 the figure was 1.19 and in 1911 1.24 and 1.63 for both sexes (see Anderson 1985a: 466f.). Even then, there were significantly more university places in Scotland than in England (0.17 students per 1.000 population in 1871 and 0.73 in 1911). This large number of students at the time further solidified the universalism of the Scottish Enlightenment and carried it out into the world with the graduates (Anderson/Wallace 2015).

Inclusion in higher education played a significant role in the Scottish secession campaign, as the following interview sequence with Joe Goldblatt from Academics

for Yes shows. At the time, Godlbatt was a professor at Queen Margaret University in Scotland. When asked what this sectoral group expects from secession, Goldblatt said:

> "There are three benefits: The first is the continuation of free tuition. […] Education, to those of us who support 'academics for yes', is not a privilege. It is a right. And we believe every student that is qualified to go to university should be able to go, and fees should not be a barrier. The second is the opportunity for increased research funding. […] And the third, and perhaps the most important, is the opportunity to keep a bright young man like you in Scotland. Because right now, under the UK-immigration laws, the minute you graduate from the university, you have to go home. Imagine that! We lose all your intellectual capital, which you could stay here, work in an organisation, do more research, etcetera." (Goldblatt 2014: Z4-14)

Regardless of origin, every person should have the opportunity to study in Scotland if they are qualified to do so. In order to ensure this universal access, Scotland, as an independent state, will continue to pay the tuition fees for first-degree programmes and make appropriate visa arrangements. Furthermore, it is important to keep graduates in Scotland, and here, too, it is emphasised that the origin of the person in question is irrelevant.

The universalist interpretation of inclusion in higher education goes hand in hand with two key motives of Scottish statehood. In contrast to the United Kingdom, Scotland will continue to finance first-degree programmes through the community/state. In addition, statehood would enable a visa system allowing anyone to study and work in Scotland. Once again, a universalist understanding of the collective was taken to explain the secessionist endeavour.

8.2 Scottishness and university

The starting point of Paterson's study on the universalism cultivated by the Enlightenment and education was that this universalism led to a paradox. The universalist interpretation of the Scottish collective contradicts the sense of belonging that is important for particularist nationalism. Scotland could only attempt to distinguish itself as a nation as a global role model. What can we make of this assessment?

In another study, Paterson himself provides the answer to this question. In it, he demonstrates that the secession movement, as already seen in the Chapter on religion, was supported primarily by Scotland's non-religious young population, apart from the Roman Catholic population. What characterises Scotland and resolves the paradox of universalist culture is higher education.

In his series of measurements analysing surveys on Scottish statehood from 1979 to 2016, Paterson shows that for the first time since 2012, higher education and self-identification as Scottish, which is significantly associated with a willingness to secede, no longer diverge. On the contrary, in 2016, 32 % of those who spoke out in favour of Scottish independence in the survey were students and graduates who described themselves as Scottish (Paterson 2021: 17). As at the end of the 19th century, Scottish universities have once again become the vanishing point of the quest for national statehood.[4]; Hanham 1969: 151)

Paterson rightly emphasises the difference between the secession referendum held in Scotland in 2014 and the referendum on European Union membership held in the UK two years later regarding human capital. Those who voted in favour of Scotland's secession from the UK in 2014 have, on average, a much longer tertiary education and, therefore, higher human capital than those who voted in favour of the UK's secession from the EU in 2016 (Jump/Michell 2019).

An argument for this has to do with the social inclusion of Scottish higher education. As Adams argues, Scotland continues to follow a social democratic Nordic path in education within the UK today. An important aspect of this is the constant measuring and analysing of access to educational institutions as well as the tracking of leavers in order to adapt the higher education policy that focuses even more on equal opportunities:

> "there has been concerted effort to shift Discourse away from student credentialisation as the barometer of policy success towards measures such as positive school leaver destinations and the proportion of those over 17 entering higher education. Here, policy explanations note matters such as discipline, leadership and, pedagogy […] as describing the distance between Scotland and rUK and the ways in which they cite successes in other, smaller, nations, most notably the Nordic and Baltic states." (Adams 2023: 52)

Central to access is the target set by the Scottish Government in the National Performance Framework that at least 18 % of students at Scottish universities should come from the 20 % of most deprived regions in Scotland by 2026 and 20 % by 2030. This commitment is regularly evaluated by the Commissioner for Fair Access and published as a report (see Scott 2022). These are examples of Scotland's inclusive education regime, which differs significantly from the more individualistic and market-

4 The Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association's first membership card read: "To foster and maintain Scottish Nationalism by (1) securing self-government for Scotland and (2) advancing the ideals of Scottish culture within and without the University." (MacComick 2008[1955]: ch. 3 Herv. P.R.

orientated English education regime. A central aspect of the Nordic model is the low intergenerational elasticity of educational success (Fochesato/Bowles 2015).[5]

Scotland's Nordic model of the purest possible meritocracy of upbringing contradicts the Anglo-American situation, at least empirically. As Autor et al. have shown, for example, the USA and the UK have a high elasticity of educational and income success between generations (Autor 2014: 848).

8.3 Internationalisation and nationalisation

The internationalisation of higher education is vital for the Scottish quest for autonomy, leading to increased national and global inclusion due to the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union.

Since the 2021/22 academic year, the origin of students at Scottish universities has changed drastically. The number of enrolments at Scottish universities from EU member states (excluding Ireland) has fallen by almost half compared to previous years. While 6.120 students from the EU enrolled at universities in Scotland in 2020/21, only 3.635 students from the EU enrolled in the year when the funding of tuition fees for first-year students from the EU was ended due to Brexit. More important, both quantitatively and financially, are the increasing enrolments of first-year students from China (12.985 people in 2021/22), India (7.100), Nigeria (4.010), USA and Pakistan (Mantle 2023).

Moreover, the more difficult recruitment of students from the EU is important, as it leads to an increasing number of people being recruited from Scotland. This can already be seen in the admission figures. The difficulty recruiting students from the EU is partly compensated for in Scotland by a higher permeability for students from Scotland. While Scottish universities admitted 14.265 students resident in Scotland for the first-degree scholarship in the 2019/20 academic year, this figure rose to 17.120 in the 2022/23 academic year. Only just under 10 % of these people dropped out of their studies just one year later (Scottish Funding Council 2023: 7f.). This Brexit-enforced permeability of the Scottish higher education system is attracting more and more people already resident in Scotland to the universities that teach the universalism important to Scotland's quest for autonomy.

5 Scotland's "scene-setting of overtly politicised matters such as poverty through their co-location at government and community levels sits in opposition to the individualising tendencies of English measures and highlights the interconnectedness of various social policy-matters North of the Border. For example, drawing on the twin aims of demonstrating competence and moving towards independence, successive Scottish administrations noted the contribution education makes to social justice, not just as a means for economic prosperity but as vital to the latter's contribution to a better society for all." (Adams 2023: 53)

In order to fulfil the expectation of being able to study the Bible independently and orientate their own lives accordingly, the reformers called for the founding of parochial schools. One effect of this primary education, which was soon available in most regions of Scotland and included both men and women, was that it reduced the relevance of particular collectives. Success in school education made careers beyond belonging to a family possible. In such an understanding, Gellner (1974) described inclusion in primary schools as exo-socialisation and as an obstacle to secession because this exo-socialisation emphasises the mobility of the person and thus contributes to the irrelevance of social collectives outside the state, which would have to bear this essential education. However, since the beginning of the political union between England and Scotland, it is not the United Kingdom that has been responsible for this exo-socialisation in primary schools, but Scotland has been given regional autonomy in educational matters due to religious autonomy.

This research has shown that the cognitive orientation of universalism is still important in the Scottish drive for autonomy today (Ozga 2017). This universalism is closely linked to the great importance of education in Scotland (Moffat/Riach 2014: 48, 175). The referendum held in 2014 and subsequent surveys have shown that an above-average number of students favour Scottish statehood. A unique feature of the Scottish desire for autonomy is the increased national identification as a striving for statehood and inclusion in higher education. In Scotland, an above-average number of students see themselves as Scottish and are highly likely to favour statehood for Scotland.

9 Political and economic autonomies

The currency conflict and global trade

No other argument has been raised as frequently in the referendum against Scottish independence as the uncertainty of what currency an independent Scotland would have. I will not repeat here the results presented in Chapter 2 but show how the problem of being able to pay with an internationally accepted currency was used to prevent the creation of the Scottish state. This is followed by a description of the measures that the Scottish autonomy movement has used in recent years to try to get to grips with the problem of its own currency.

9.1 Currency union

The secession campaign called for Scotland to leave only the political union with the United Kingdom. The monetary union, as well as membership in NATO etc., should remain unaffected. In the speech dedicated to the topic, Alex Salmond (SNP) promised on 16 July 2013,

> "we will retain the pound. We would use our sovereignty to negotiate a formal currency union with the rest of the United Kingdom. […] The Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England would consider economic conditions in Scotland when setting interest rates for the currency union area, and it would operate as a lender of last resort." (Salmond 2013)

Salmond then argues that a currency union should be possible because, for example, there are no major differences in productivity between Scotland and the rest of the UK. However, apart from this economic factor, Salmond only mentions fiscal and regulatory motives for secession: "What independence would add is a full range of powers. Not just fiscal powers, but powers over the welfare system, economic regulation, employment legislation and key aspects of energy markets." (Salmond 2013)

He links currency questions with decisions only the Scottish collective should make after secession. As I will explain in a moment, these questions about Scot-

land's budget income and expenditure and about regulation are linked to the currency union. Salmond hopes for mutual understanding and repeatedly threatens that otherwise, Scotland will not participate in the joint debt: "The UK can make the argument that Scotland has no title to a share of such assets. But if it does so there is an important corollary. If Scotland has no share of its assets, then it has no share of liability for UK debts." (Salmond 2013)

The union campaign disagrees. Through the UK government's Chancellor of the Exchequer, it announces its rejection of the proposed bilateral currency union. Here is Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne's drastic words ruling out a bilateral currency union with an independent Scotland on the eve of Valentine's Day 2014:

> "[T]he pound isn't an asset to be divided up between the two countries after break-up as if it were a CD collection. […] The value of the pound lies in the entire monetary system under-pinning it. A system that includes the Bank of England and the tens of millions of UK taxpayers […] That's part of the choice that people in Scotland are being asked to make." (Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne 2014)

The Chancellor of the Exchequer also published the assessment of his adviser, Sir Nicholas Macpherson (then Permanent Secretary to the Treasury), on the rejection of the bilateral currency union. Based on the following reasons, the adviser warns against monetary union with an independent Scotland:

> "First, the Scottish Government is still leaving the option open of moving to a different currency option in the longer term. Successful currency unions are based on the near universal belief that they are irreversible. […] Secondly, Scotland's banking sector is far too big in relation to its national income […]. An independent Scottish state would not face the same risk as it is inconceivable that a small economy could bail-out an economy nearly ten times its size. […] Finally, Treasury analysis suggests that fiscal policy in Scotland and the rest of UK would become increasingly misaligned in the medium term." (MacPherson 2014)

Concerning the first objection, it should be noted that the Fiscal Commission convened by the Scottish Government at the time had published proposals that could cast doubt on the commitments made by the Scottish side. This applies in particular to the proposal to create a Scottish Monetary Institute in order to increase currency options in the future, as stated in the report: "The gradual build-up of such institutions would also increase the flexibility and range of potential macroeconomic options for Scotland in the decades ahead." (Beveridge et al. 2013: 34)

Other proposals from the Fiscal Commission have focussed on the work of the Bank of England as a single central bank: "[A]s an explicit shareholder of the Bank, the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament should seek a role in providing

oversight of the Bank and its activities. This would create an appropriate system of accountability and representation for both governments." (Beveridge et al. 2013: 185)

In addition, both governments should influence appointments (e.g. in the Monetary Policy Committee and Financial Policy Committee) and objectives of the joint central bank. In order to achieve coordination between the governments, it was proposed that a Macroeconomic Governance Committee be established.

These ideas were rejected in the union campaign. MSP Johann Lamont, the Scottish Labour Party leader at the time, warned against nationalising the Bank of England's committees. These committees and the Bank were expected to provide expertise, not national or other representation: "all of this neglects one important point, namely that the MPC [Monetary Policy Committee] was deliberately set up as an 'expert' committee, not one that represents geographical interests." (House of Lords 2013: §61)

Michael Moore (Liberal Democrat), the cabinet member responsible for Scotland in the Secretary of State for Scotland, takes the same view. Moore also sees a contradiction here between national sovereignty and expertise. He rejects any form of national input mechanism in the Bank of England. It is not about territorial political representation (government/parliament) but about the central bank and its committees offering economic expertise: "Territorial representation on the MPC […] is quite out of keeping with its primary purpose and the way it is convened at present […] I am clearly not persuaded that would work or is desirable." (House of Lords 2013: §68)

Furthermore, what was the Central Bank's view on a bilateral currency union with Scotland? Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, gives "a technocratic assessment of what makes an effective currency union between independent nations" in his speech The Economics of Currency Unions (Carney 2014a: 2). The speech took place a few days before the Chancellor of the Exchequer's ruled out a bilateral currency union with Scotland. Based on the theory of optimal currency areas, Carney explains that neither the economic structure nor the factor mobility between Scotland and the rest of the UK offers a reliable argument in favour of or against a bilateral currency union.

However, the institutional factors—in particular, the banking union and fiscal policy of an independent Scotland, which refers to sovereign politics as the environment of the economy—need to be considered. At 12.5 times GDP, Scotland had a banking sector three times larger in 2012 than the rest of the UK, where the figure was 4.3 at the time (see Carney 2014a: 19). However, this is only possible thanks to the UK's common banking regulation, which, as the eurozone shows, is difficult to achieve between independent states:

> "The existing banking union between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom has proven durable and efficient. Its foundations include a single prudential supervisor maintaining consistent standards of resilience, a single deposit guar-

> antee scheme backed by the central Government, and a common central bank, able to act as Lender of Last Resort across the union, and also backed by the central Government. These arrangements help ensure that Scotland can sustain a banking system whose collective balance sheet is substantially larger than its GDP. The euro area has shown the dangers of not having such arrangements, as well as the difficulties of the necessary pooling of sovereignty to build them." (Carney 2014a: 8)

A banking union and a harmonised fiscal policy are decisive political factors for a successful monetary union. A successful monetary union cannot be achieved solely through a similar economic structure or high-factor mobility of labour, imports, exports and capital. It also depends on the members of such a monetary union finding fiscal and regulatory policy compromises.

Due to the social and regulatory policy divergence envisaged by the secession campaign, which is largely modelled on the Scandinavian social democracies, and because of Scotland's large banking sector, one reads between the lines here—especially when it comes to experiences of the "euro area"—there is hardly any potential for bilateral agreement. The Scottish Government is more likely to face a moral hazard. In a monetary union, the Scottish Government, which is committed to egalitarianism, could assume that it would have to be rescued by the other member of this monetary union:

> "[T]he threat of default by one country may trigger a generalised crisis, particularly if the liabilities of the crisis country are held by the banking system of the broader currency area. It will be in the interests of other countries in the union to bail out a country in crisis, and that reduces the incentives for countries to run their finances prudently in the first place. At a minimum, this 'moral hazard' problem suggests the need for tight fiscal rules, to enforce prudent behaviour for all in the union, although credible sanctions for breaking those rules are hard to develop. There is an obvious tension between using robust fiscal rules to solve this problem, and allowing national fiscal policy to act as a shock absorber." (Carney 2014a: 9)

For this reason, the question of an optimal monetary union is also a question that politicians must answer. In a monetary union, the necessary institutional arrangements can only be created by restricting national sovereignty:

> "The euro area is now beginning to rectify its institutional shortcomings, but further, very significant steps must be taken to expand the sharing of risks and pooling of fiscal resources. In short, a durable, successful currency union requires some ceding of national sovereignty. It is likely that similar institutional arrangements would be necessary to support a monetary union between an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK. […] Decisions that cede sovereignty and limit auton-

> omy are rightly choices for elected governments and involve considerations beyond mere economics. For those considerations, others are better placed to comment." (Carney 2014a: 10)

Nine days before the referendum, Carney repeated this assessment. At a trade union conference, he responded to an audience question about whether an independent Scotland could count on a bilateral currency union by again referring to the eurozone. We only have to look across the Channel, Carney said, to see what happens if one of the three mechanisms is missing, i.e. common trade (high factor mobility), co-ordinated regulation ('banking union') and fiscal policy. He, therefore, stands by his assessment that monetary union is also a political issue. At the moment, he does not recognise any political willingness to compromise here:

> "I have said before that we take note of all the positions of all the major Westminster parties to rule out a currency union between an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK. So it is in that context, if you put it together, that a currency union is incompatible with sovereignty." (Carney 2014b)

The subsequently published minutes of the meeting of the Financial Policy Committee, which discussed the issue of Scottish independence in June, July and September 2014, show that the rejection of the "main parties in the Westminster Parliament" was affirmed (Financial Policy Committee 2014).

Against the background of the alternatives discussed at the time (an overview is provided by Armstrong/Ebell 2014; Comerford 2014), the only option left to the separatists was unilateral monetary union with the British pound, known as "sterlingisation". In this case, Scotland would have retained the currency without being able to influence monetary policy.

According to Iain Macwhirter, by rejecting a single currency union, the UK government and its union campaign may have won the referendum. However, in the longer term, it will have made it clear to the Scottish people that Scotland has no place in the UK as a nation. The battle for the referendum has been won, but the war for Scotland has been lost: "The pound exclusion has changed the relationship between Scotland and England, because no one north of the border can be in any doubt now that the Union has ceased to be partnership of equals, at least as far as currency is concerned." (2014: 49)

Ultimately, political influence on the means of payment, which is essential for the micro level of the economy, created what was probably the most important motive against Scotland's secession. The aspiration for statehood emerging as a democratic revolution has been destroyed by the influence of the sovereign in the form of the Central Bank and the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The optimistic analyst reports at the beginning of 2014, which discussed the possibilities of a new and prosperous small state (e.g. Hill/Porter/Bryce 2014; Zipfel/Vetter 2014), became increasingly negative in the autumn and especially in the week before the referendum (see esp. Folkerts-Landau 2014). Secession was not only problematic due to the dependence of Scotland's national budget (approx. 19 %) on volatile oil and gas revenues. The economic danger was seen even more clearly in the concentration of trade links in imports and exports between Scotland and the so-called remaining United Kingdom (hereafter rUK). Over 70 % of Scotland's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is due to this rUK-centred trade and a small trade deficit (see the cost analysis by Comerford 2014). This deficit and the rejection of a currency union by the Union side would make it impossible for Scotland to build up the financial reserves it would need for a unilateral currency union ("sterlingisation") with the extremely high bank deposits registered in Scotland (12–15 times GDP). Hong Kong was cited as a comparative case. Hong Kong has a similar USD currency board but a USD reserve equivalent to its annual GDP. A week before the referendum, companies in the retail sector (e.g. Kingfisher, Sainsbury, Timpson), but especially in the finance and insurance industry, announced so-called "contingency plans" and threatened to raise prices and relocate their headquarters to England if secession were to occur under these circumstances of currency uncertainty.

Not only did the union campaign attempt to cite economic reasons against secession, but performance roles in the political system (i.e. political elite) used their own opportunities to darken the economic diagnosis of secession. The major parties in Westminster have decided against a bilateral currency union, and the Central Bank has followed suit. The UK's political union has merged with the currency/central bank. Leaving the political union also excludes you from the 'banking union', as the Chancellor of the Exchequer unequivocally states, and as the Governor of the Bank of England suggests, based on the institutional factors of successful currency unions.

The union campaign used currency uncertainty as an argument against secession. This argument also made sense because the secession campaign had campaigned on divergence from Westminster regarding the welfare state (fiscal policy) and economic regulation. See, for example, the welfare divergence mentioned in a report at the time: "As things stand, the economic structures of Scotland and England are very similar. […] But there are already differences, even under devolution. Public sector spending per head is 11 % higher in Scotland than the UK overall." (House of Lords 2013: 12)

Currency and self-government were played off against each other. You can opt either for the state-guaranteed currency, including the central bank, or for Scotland's self-government, including worries about with which money (e.g. currency) one pays the bills. One in two people (57 %) who voted against secession in the referendum cited currency as the most important reason for this decision (all figures

based on Lord Ashcroft 2014). This currency problem is also very real reason why property owners and pensioners voted against Scottish statehood by an above-average margin in the referendum (Foley 2024: 138). The have-nots did not have much to lose and were therefore more likely to vote for secession, as a Radical Independence activist explained. Radical Independence focuses on areas of social housing "like council estates and housing schemes" because ultimately, it is precisely those "who have the least to lose that are most likely to vote Yes" (RIC activist, 2014).

9.2 Anticipating the question of currency

As a symbol of the economy, the pound sterling has been used to combat the unity of a Scottish state that emerged in the secession referendum. By rejecting the bilateral currency union, British government has weakened the democratic autonomy aspirations of Scottish statehood. In sociological terms, this is a struggle between the economy and politics as two function systems of modern world society. Political actors initiated the battle. As a means of payment, money symbolises the unity of self-reference and external reference of the economy as a function system. Functionally equivalent, the state symbolises the unity of the political function system (Luhmann, 1984, p. 624). Let us look at how the Scottish quest for statehood attempts to win this battle in the longer term.

Nicola Sturgeon asked for economic expertise on the currency and other issues of an independent Scotland through the Sustainable Growth Commission set up following the UK's 2016 EU referendum. The report was published in May 2018. It proposes adherence to the currency union known as sterlingisation. To this day, this issue remains controversial among those in favour of Scottish political autonomy. At their party conference in November 2021, SNP members voted 481 to 38 against this recommendation and in favour of establishing an independent Scottish central bank to use the Scottish pound as a means of payment (Nutt 2021).[1]

Regardless of the currency issue, the Scottish Government is trying to increase its autonomy by seeking new international dependencies. To this end, trade relations are being deliberately pluralised. The extent to which international trade is changing and how it compares to other small democratic states, such as Norway and Denmark in particular, is measured within the National Performance Framework as "International Exporting" and has been evaluated since the government strategy "A Trading Nation" published in 2019 (Scottish Government 2019).

This pluralisation of economic interdependencies beyond the United Kingdom is vital for the autonomy sought by the Scottish SNP government. Thus, autonomy is

1 See the "Road to the Scottish Currency" of the Scottish Reserve Bank (https://www.reservebank.scot/).

currently largely limited to the United Kingdom. The Scottish independence movement seeks new dependencies beyond the United Kingdom through international trade.

Since the second half of the 18th century at the latest, Scotland has benefited massively economically and in other respects from the Act of Union concluded with in 1707, as David Hume noted at the time: "Is it not strange that, at a time when we have lost our Princes, our Parliaments, our independent Government […] that, in these Circumstances, we shou'd really be the People most distinguish'd for Literature in Europe?" (Hume 1932[1757])

The factors responsible for this, such as Scotland's geographically favourable location for sea routes to the New World; urbanisation and migration, first within Scotland and then globally with the expansion of education; the migration of the landed gentry and their repatriation of the profits made in the Empire (Devine 2008: 104f.) etc. are too numerous to go into here.

Figure 17: The international balance of trade in £bn of goods and services of the four UK nations with trading partners outside the UK, 2016–2021



The social structure of the Scottish economy is significant for what follows. Although this was initially highly specialised, similar to a colony, from the 18th century, the Scottish economy was the embodiment of the British economy:

> "Scotland became an industrial capitalist society within the context of a laissez-faire British state. […] Scotland was so well adapted to imperial opportunities in

> the nineteenth century that the collapse of the economy after the First World War was catastrophic for Scotland." (McCrone 2017: 201)

This over-adaptation to the British Empire, which at times spanned the globe, went hand in hand with the strengthening of the first Scottish autonomy movement, which at that time was still striving for autonomy within the United Kingdom (Hanham 1969; Marr 2013). Scotland's over-adaptation led to social problems, the traces of which can still be found today in the so-called city belt from Glasgow to Dundee (central belt) (Walsh et al. 2016; McCartney et al. 2012).

With the decline of the British Empire, the demand for heavy industry originating from Scotland also collapsed. While Glasgow was once called the "Second City of Empire" and Scotland was dubbed the "Workshop of Empire" in the 19th century (Hutchison, 2005), the end of the 19th century saw an emigration movement of broadly highly skilled workers and their families that lasted until the 1980s (see Chapter 3 above and Anderson 2016).

Figure 18: Exports of goods & services from Scotland (excluding oil & gas), 2019–2021



This century of emigration of a broadly skilled labour force provides Scottish politics and business with points of reference for tourism, immigration (Ruther-

ford 2009; Scottish Government 2010) and international trade (Scottish Government 2019).

Unlike the UK as a whole and its three other constituent nations, Scotland has long had a significant international trade surplus of £20.9bn, exporting more goods and services to the world (outside the UK) than it imports, as the following statistics show (Office for National Statistics 2023).

Although imports to Scotland already have a solid international linkage, exports are different. Exports of goods and services from Scotland to the rest of the UK are around 60 % (£48.8bn in 2021), three times higher than exports to the EU (£15bn) (Scottish Government 2023).

9.3 Autonomy by pluralisation of dependencies

However, what should you pay with if you do not have your own currency or at least a currency backed by reserves as a state? This question remains for the time being.

Intensifying international trade relations outside the United Kingdom and thus creating new dependencies between the trading partners involved is a so-called 'para-diplomatic' strategy to increase Scotland's political autonomy (Fabiani 2014). As James Foley writes, this focus on the opportunities to participate in international trade was already a decisive factor in the union between Scotland and England in 1707 (see chapter 4 in Foley 2024). As Andrew Fletcher notes, it was preferred to be able to participate in economic trade in Scotland too, even if this meant sacrificing the pride of the independent nation ." (Fletcher 1732[1698]: 99) With the strengthening of Scottish independence aspirations in the second half of the 20th-century, the interpretation of the European Community also shifted, as Foley rightly emphasises (Foley 2024: 135). The EU is important to Scottish nationalism as an economic trading partner, among other things, which could also offer the possibility of a monetary union.

Comparable considerations can already be found in the Scottish Enlightenment. According to this, the will to live together is neither natural nor does a social contract give it. Coexistence is only developed through repeated interaction between the parties and can create a new shared identity in this process (see Plassart 2015; for a comparable transaction-based social theory Wimmer 2011).

Adam Smith (1896[1763]: 254) illustrates this primacy of interaction in his lecture: "Wherever dealings are frequent, a man does not expect to gain so much by any one contract, as by probity and punctuality in the whole". Only the elementarisation, frequency and contingency of the interaction socialises the contractual partners into reliability. This reliability among unknowns becomes the starting point for ever new transactions with other unknowns. Instead of a few significant interactions such as world exhibitions, a global banking crisis like 2008, the Tour de France or '911', the

focus is on many small interactions. Common convictions emerge between the parties. Due to the small-scale nature of constantly new interactions, there is minimal sympathy between the participants (see 'impartial spectator' Lamb 1974; different are the major events that punctualise the entire world Stichweh 2006a). The mutual exchange of small and medium dependencies socialises mutual consideration as individuals.

10 Gaelic in democratic nationalism

Anyone travelling through Scotland today will notice a feature that makes Scotland a national culture in its own right: Scottish Gaelic. Does this contradict democratic nationalism? Are the street signs in Gaelic, the identification of Scotland as a Gaelic-Celtic nation an indication of autocratic nationalism?

Andrew Mycock makes the case of Scottish nationalism being an autocratic nationalism based on ethnicity. He argues for an ethno-Celtic identification of the Scottish nation. Mycock notes that the "coherence of how the SNP understand an independent Scottish state, nation and people" is undermined by the nation's identification as a Celtic nation (Mycock 2012: 54). For his research, he focuses on a short period from 2007 to 2011 and on a few speeches, events and programmes of the then SNP minority government.

He notes, for example, that in 2011 the then First Minister Alex Salmond spoke of an above-average number of "family ties" between Northern Ireland and Scotland (not without reason, see Leslie et al. 2015). Mycock also notes that during the 2010 election campaign, the SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales referred to themselves as the 'Celtic Bloc' to oppose the 'London parties'. Another example of ethnic nationalism is found in a 2008 SNP government document. It describes Gaelic as "a unique and essential part of our rich cultural life, it is a national language" (quoted in Mycock 2012: 60, 56).

Tom Nairn saw this as a paradox of Scottish nationalism. In Scotland, there is a "huge, virtually self-contained universe of kitsch" (Nairn, 1977, p. 134). This kitsch is a necessary counter-movement to globalisation: "The least home-bound population on earth has generated the most home-bound and nostalgic ideology of Heimat." (Nairn 2014[2008]: 397) As he aptly observes, Scotland is a "pre-globalised nation". Perhaps no other nation in the world is as closely linked to the emergence of global society as the Scottish nation, which is characterised by intellectual traditions and migrations. However, what is Scotland's "most home-bound and nostalgic ideology" about? An important part of it is Gaelic.

10.1 Multicultural integration by Gaelic

In some cases, Gaelic is reduced to economic benefits. In the often rural and impoverished communities, support for the Gaelic communities creates new jobs in education and tourism.[1] This is particularly the case in remote areas such as the Outer Hebrides, where many people actively speak Gaelic and, at 68 %, slightly more than the average (62 %) consider themselves to be exclusively Scottish (National Records of Scotland 2011: counted 11 thousand Free Church adherents; Tanner 2004: 7; for discussion see Brown 2017: 898; on Sabbath observance Rowe 2017: 27).[2] However, Gaelic is much more important in another respect. Gaelic serves the multicultural integration of the Scottish nation, as one parliamentarian says: "Gaelic has a privileged position because of the heritage and the desire to preserve the culture and the language so it's always going to get special treatment." (Meer 2015: 1490) Leith and Soule cite a case in which a member of parliament who presents himself as a Gaelic speaker sees Gaelic as a national peculiarity of Scotland: "[Gaelic] the oldest ethnic sub-group within Scotland in a way, you can almost argue that Gaelic was the language that made Scotland. What really matters to Scotland, initially identifying Scotland is the linguistic root." (Leith/Soule 2011: 135 Interview 40)

Yet, it is not about the linguistic root why Gaelic is important for Scotland as a nation. Gaelic is invoked in Scotland to unite the population as a multicultural and historic nation. In Scotland, Gaelic is valued as a central factor in national integration across party lines, regions and languages. Shortly before planning began for the Scottish Parliament building, Emily C. McEwan-Fujita wrote:

> "[T]he nationalist sentiment linked with Gaelic is not a 'political' nationalism but a 'cultural' nationalism, which can help Gaelic appeal to as large an audience as possible in order to 'save' it. […] Because Gaelic has never been successfully or continously linked to party politics, it has the potential to hold much wider appeal and to serve as an ideal mobilizer of general national sentiment." (McEwan-Fujita 1997: 142f.)

1 "The Gaelic culture exists, to a large extent, in urban pockets, rural areas and on the islands, areas where there is often social deprivation. In such circumstances, CNSA [Comhairle nan Sgoiltean Araich] groups not only offer children a place to meet, learn, play and have fun, but bring jobs – an estimated 200 full-time and 400 part-time jobs – that are important to the revitalisation of communities." (Scottish Parliament 2000: 413; cf. Tanner 2004; McLeod 2001: 18f., 24) See, for example, the Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act, passed in 2005, promoting the learning and use of this language.

2 One example is the north of the Outer Hebrides and some communities in the Scottish Highlands, where in particular many of the strict Calvinists live (National Records of Scotland 2011: counted 11 thousand Free Church adherents; Tanner 2004: 7; for discussion see Brown 2017: 898; on Sabbath observance Rowe 2017: 27).

According to this, Scottish Gaelic, a language spoken by less than 2 % of the population, has a nation-unifying function for the entire population. This unification takes the form of a "general national sentiment".

A few years later, the deputy presiding officer, George Reid (SNP), welcomed a debate on the issue as follows: "Welcome to the first Gaelic debate in the Scottish Parliament for 700 years." (Scottish Parliament 2000: 382)[3]

In the ensuing debate, dubbed the 'dialogue', the main point is that Gaelic is more than just a minority language. The promotion of this endangered language is linked to the "heart and soul of Scotland". As the initiator of the motion, Alasdair Morrison, puts it in Gaelic:

> "I open this dialogue today. […] I say dialogue rather than debate because I believe that every party in the Scottish Parliament is empathetic with and supportive of Gaelic and the heritage and culture intertwined with the language and those who speak it. […] Gaelic is a precious jewel in the heart and soul of Scotland. It is not constrained within strict boundaries or herded into tight corners. Gaelic is national, European and international. It is fundamental to Scotland; it is not on the periphery or on the fringes. It must be normalised and its rights must be secured. There are many precious components in the heritage of Scotland, but none is as ancient, as profound and as worthy as the Gaelic legacy. […] If Gaelic is a national asset, so is an education that opens doors to a bilingual and multilingual society". (Scottish Parliament 2000: 388, 391)

Scotland's sense of national belonging is linked to a Gaelic legacy. Michael Russell (SNP) takes a similar line. He stresses that the Gaelic language integrates Scotland as a multicultural nation. Furthermore, the Gaelic nation is directly linked to the question of national self-determination:

> "I think that this is the first debate in Gaelic since the Parliament, or part of it, met in Ardchattan, Argyll in 1309. King Robert the Bruce was in your chair, Presiding Officer, and freedom for Scotland was the first item on the agenda. This is not just a historically symbolic occasion; it is a chance for the Parliament to think about the importance of Gaelic for the Parliament and for Scotland itself. There is a great need for Gaelic to be at the very heart of government in Scotland. […] If our promises on Scotland's culture are to mean anything, we must make a space for Gaelic – and Scots and English […]. Furthermore, we should recognise a place for the other languages in Scotland – the languages from China, Pakistan and India which are spoken in our country and which give welcome life to our culture." (Scottish Parliament 2000: 398-399)

3 I am using the version of the debate that was simultaneously translated into English.

This shows a hierarchy of integration. Gaelic is at the top, followed by Scots and English, and then the other languages spoken in Scotland. Recognising and ironically criticising the importance of Gaelic as the national language used by less than 2 % of the population today, the first writer in residence at the new Scottish Parliament building, James Robertson, wrote the sonnet Signage. He wrote it in Scots to note that those who designed the Parliament building were sticking to Gaelic, even though it was not the language of the Scottish people, who spoke Scots.[4] George Reid refers to Gaelic, also in the context of multiculturalism, calling it a way "to express something of our multiple identities" (Scottish Parliament 2000: 410-411).

In Scotland's political self-image, Gaelic is much more than just a language. It implies the idea of a multicultural integration of the Scottish nation, with Gaelic at the top of this hierarchy.

10.2 Celtic revival: From virtue to sentimentality

Today, Scottish Gaelic links voluntarism with sentimentality. This was not always the case. In pre-modern times, Celts were seen as virtue-orientated warriors, which, if one trusts the historical sources, they actually were:

> "[T]he Tolistobogii and Trocmi took off their clothes before battle with the Romans, exposing their podgy white bodies, enhancing the vividness of their wounds as they were cut to pieces by the Roman forces. […] In sum, the evidence leaves little doubt that to fight naked was comparatively common occurrence in the Celtic world. […] Heroism is a leitmotif in classical accounts of Celtic warfare. Wounds were a source of pride and might even be opened up further by the bearer if considered to be too insignificant. Failure, particularly of a war leader, was unacceptable." (Cunliffe 2018: 222, 229)

According to Barry Cunliffe, fighting naked and having wounds served to represent the virtues with which the Celts in general and the Gaesati in particular belonged to a warrior class in the pre-modern social order.

In the culture that first came about in the modern age, however, Celts are understood quite differently. The culture that formed with the functionally differentiated world society in the mid-18th-century romanticised the originally virtuous Celtic warriors as warriors by heart: "The most blatant case of invention came from Scot-

4 "oh there wis a right stushie ower the signs/first they wrote aw that bloody gaelic oot/naebody seems tae ken whit that's aboot" (Robertson 2005: 17)

land, […] the poems of Ossian", says Barry Cunliffe and he goes on to say that this "romantic nonsense of this phase still persists" (Cunliffe 2018: 16f.).[5]

Marcus Tanner agrees with this shift from virtue to emotion through the invention of culture. He also identifies the recent "Celtic Revival" with this shift. It began in the mid-18th century, reached a peak at the end of the 19th century and has been gaining momentum again since the 1970s. In contrast to the earlier revivals of Celtic, this revival, which first emerged in modern society, is characterised by an interest in sentimentality:

> "Typical is the blurb that accompanies *Celtic Journey*, a CD I picked up on the Isle of Man: 'It means real music with real values, real ideas and real emotions. Celts are spiritual, proud, courageous and believe in meaning what they say. They are born artists, visionaries, warriors. […] [T]he 1970s and 1980s saw Celticism emerge as kind of shorthand expression for almost any unorthodox or non-traditional spirituality. […] 'A revived Celtic heart would … put women in their rightful place next to men … [for] the old Celt understood the sanctity of life and the sacred interconnectedness of everything'." (Tanner 2004: 5, 8f.)

For Tanner, as for Cunliffe, this is a sentimental romanticisation of historical facts that was only invented in modern times. It is about culture.

But what is behind it? Behind this transfiguration lies the search for a democratic identification of the nation. This idea only came about with the phase of democratic and autocratic nationalism that began in the 1970s. This is the reason why Gaelic has received much attention in recent years in Scottish nationalism and the policies of the SNP government.

In this phase of either democratic or autocratic nationalism in world society, the collective is conceptualised as an "'attitudinal' entity" (Parsons 1974). By this, Talcott Parsons means that in modernity, a view has prevailed that values "persons as individuals" and aligns collective identities with them:

> "It seems to me that what in a religious or quasi-religious context we tend to refer to as love can be interpreted in more technical sociological jargon as a bond of solidarity between persons as individuals and involving their mutual identity as members of a collective entity which is mediated not by accessibility to mutual erotic pleasure but by a more generalised accessibility to an 'attitudinal' entity, which I call affect." (Parsons 1974: 217; very interesting on this subject Burstein 2001)

5 The culture that determines ethnicity only came about through the functionally differentiated world society (see Luhmann 1995a; Stichweh 1999).

With the Celtic Revival Gaelic became important for Scottish nationalism because it is a resource for a sense of national belonging based on the voluntarism of individuals. Furthermore, Gaelic today enables a non-virtuous self-description of the Scottish nation. Fighting naked for freedom if necessary is associated with the hopes, fears and feelings of the Scottish people.

10.3 European multiculturalism

In addition, Scottish Gaelic as a Celtic language recognises the European component of Scottish identity. The Celts are being integrated into European culture. Barry Cunliffe cites many examples of how current member states of the European Union have provided the "galaxy of national heroes" with Celts in the 18th and 19th centuries: "Boudica in Britain, Vercingetorix in France, Ambriorix in Belgium, Viriathus in Iberia". The following example by Cunliffe is more important for Scottish nationalism in the era of the European Union. Cunliffe quotes from the exhibition catalogue of the 1991 Venice exhibition 'The Celts, the Origins of Europe':

> "'This exhibition is a tribute both to the new Europe which cannot come to fruition without a comprehensive awareness of its unity, and to the fact that, in addition to its Roman and Christian sources, today's Europe traces its roots from the Celtic heritage, which is there for all to see.'" (quoted in Cunliffe 2018: 25, on Scotland p. 379)

As a culture, Celtic is added to the European identity. This identification of Europe with the Celtic sentiment adds a further interpretation to Europe. Europe is thus becoming less and less a religious-Christian social system, because further interpretations are added to this interpretation with the Celtic (and others). Each new interpretation reduces the relevance of each individual cultural-collective definition. This strengthens democracy based on individual self-determination. John D. Rockefeller already recognised this in 1919 with regard to "representation in industry":

> "Surely it is not consistent for us as Americans to demand democracy in government and practice autocracy in industry. […] With the developments of industry what they are today there is sure to come a progressive evolution from autocratic single control, whether by capital, labor, or the state, to democratic cooperative control by all three." (zitiert in Wilson 2019: 550)

With the expansion of function systems, including the increasing number of nation states, each time a new 'subculture' is added to the more comprehensive cultural unit and thus each particular culture becomes a culture alongside others (on this "cumu-

lative picture" of modern civilisations Deutsch 1953: 193; cf. on Europe Stichweh 2010: 82).

As in Ireland, Celtic is part of the cultural definition of the nation in Scotland. This ethnic definition through Gaelic strengthens Scottish democracy because it now combines sentimentality with voluntarism and history. Moreover, both polities, as Cunliffe shows, offered important retreats for Celtic culture, which had been largely assimilated on the continent by 100 CE at the latest (Cunliffe 2018: 379).

10.4 Conclusion

What potential does the Scottish quest for autonomy have for transforming democratic nationalism into autocratic nationalism? First, there is the enmity with England that is addressed in the hymn Flower of Scotland. Secondly, there is the potential for ethno-religious conflict associated with the monarchy (the Stewarts) or the state (Protestantism).

Finally, Gaelic and the so-called 'Cardiac Celts' (see already Manning 1982) offer ethnic potential for the transformation towards autocratic nationalism. But Gaelic is a minority language. It is spoken by less than 2 % of the population and is threatened with extinction. Moreover, the Scottish autonomy movement is based primarily on the political collective of inclusion. Numerically and ideologically, Gaelic does not appear to be a threat to Scottish democratic nationalism. Rather, Gaelic offers a national semantics of multiculturalism which, in the words of Talcott Parsons, "secures the equality component of the normative structure of modern society". For Parsons, the equality of modern society lies in the "educational revolution" (professions) and persuasion, all part of the "fiduciary complex" (Parsons 1970: 33-38).

A Gaelic-speaking aristocracy, it is to be expected, will not transform Scottish nationalism into autocratic nationalism, nor will it be conducive to Scottish democratic nationalism:

> "The link between the Gaelic language and Scottish nationalism […] is a weak one. Support for Scottish independence by no means signals a commitment to the Gaelic language, and speaking the Gaelic language by no means signals support for Scottish independence. Language revitalisation efforts in Scotland thus have little connection, overt or otherwise, to the nationalist cause." (McLeod 2001: 8)

Nevertheless, the importance of Gaelic and its association with a multicultural hierarchy of integration should not be underestimated. The appreciation of Gaelic in Scottish politics underpins Scotland's inclusive imperative of democracy through multiculturalism.

11 Conclusion

What is Scotland's demand for statehood, and what lies behind it? This study has identified Scotland's desire for autonomy as democratic nationalism. In the process, conditions have emerged that have supported or repressed this purely political demand for self-government.

Niklas Luhmann used "self-mystification" and "additional semantics" to describe the differentiation of states in a very similar way:

> "Perhaps the state is not a result of the self-actualisation of an already existing entity, but a result of its self-mystification, which is necessary so that one can establish continuity from communication to communication, from event to event. And this view would then not lead to controversies about the essence, but to the question of the historical and regional conditions for the plausibility of such self-mystification. The state always says: L'état c'est moi. The question is which additional semantics, which 'supplements' enable it to believe this." (Luhmann 1995b: 107 translated by the author)[1]

The most important conditions identified in the individual Chapters as supporting or inhibiting factors in the Scottish quest for autonomy are briefly listed here.

11.1 Summary

The study began with those motives for secession that can be inferred from communications. These motives of national self-determination are determined by the leading political distinction between democracy and autocracy and by the global spread

1 "[V]ielleicht ist der Staat kein Resultat der Selbstaktualisierung einer bereits bestehenden Einheit, sondern ein Resultat seiner Selbstmystifikation, die notwendig ist, damit man von Kommunikation zu Kommunikation, von Ereignis zu Ereignis Kontinuität herstellen kann. Und diese Auffassung würde dann nicht zu Kontroversen über das Wesen führen, sondern zur Frage nach den historischen und regionalen Bedingungen für die Plausibilität einer solchen Selbstmystifikation. Der Staat sagt immer: L'état c'est moi. Die Frage ist, welche Zusatzsemantiken, welche 'Supplemente' es ermöglichen, ihm das zu glauben."

of functional differentiation (Chapter 2). Scotland's nationalism is a progressive demand for self-government emanating from large sections of the population, which has grown out of the opportunities that small democracies have in the global society of the early 21st century through international, military defence alliances, free trade, tourism, and so on.

The subsequent Chapters have moved from the micro-level of communicative events to the level of expectations and semantics. Chapter 3 describes that the Scottish independence movement is primarily based on a social collective of the population living in Scotland formed through political inclusion. The reason for this can be found in British democracy. The democratic principle of electoral equality has translated the measurable loss of population in Scotland compared to England to this day into a loss of power. Against this background, Scotland is being promoted in the independence movement as an inclusive country of immigration.

The semantics analysed in Chapter 4, which is important in Scotland's politics in general and in the pursuit of statehood in particular, is egalitarianism. This is a national value commitment. In the secession movement, Scotland is differentiated from the politics of the United Kingdom by the desire for social democratic politics. Through social democracy, the Scottish desire for autonomy increases its visibility within the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the inclusion in state services, which is important for social democracies, helps to give political inclusion collective relevance outside of referendums and elections. Social democracy is an inclusionary, functional equivalent to the national-ethnical sense of belonging that emphasises exclusion.

Chapters 5 and 6 analyse national-cultural social structures and semantics of the Scottish striving for autonomy using the example of the anthem and the parliament. The difference between the political inclusion collective described in Chapter 3 becomes clear through national symbols. If secession is demanded so that the people living in Scotland can determine their political future, the national symbols emphasise togetherness. In the case studies on the anthem and the design of the parliament, it becomes clear that the journey is the goal. Therefore, the question of how the national collective arrived at this symbol is paramount. It is more important than the specific symbol. Crucial is the extent to which this procedure is compatible with the democratic self-image of the endeavour for autonomy. The political collective of inclusion restricts Scotland's national symbols.

Chapters 7 to 9 also enquire into the particular conditions under which the Scottish quest for autonomy arose. However, the focus here is on explanatory factors that trace Scotland's democratic nationalism back to regional differences in functional differentiation more clearly than in the other Chapters. Chapter 7, for example, concludes that Protestantism inhibits rather than promotes Scotland's democratic nationalism. The reason for this is the low regional differentiation between the Protestant religion and the state in the United Kingdom and the region of Scotland. The

increasing importance of Roman Catholicism in Scotland in recent decades could lead to a rupture, as the religious polarisation between these two denominations has shown. However, because both Roman Catholics and non-religious people overwhelmingly supported Scottish secession, albeit for different reasons, the Scottish independence movement was not only a 'social justice movement'. It was, more importantly, a multiculturalist movement.

An external factor in politics favouring the search for political autonomy within or outside the United Kingdom is the great importance of education in Scotland. Chapter 8 shows that in our day, inclusion in higher education is vital to note. It conveys a universalism that motivates an above-average number of students to identify as Scottish and embrace democratic nationalism.

As can be read in the Chapter on motives, another important factor explains the desire for secession. This centres on the relationship between the state and the economy (Chapter 9). With the question of the currency of an independent Scotland, the state and the economy became so closely linked that secession could be prevented. Conversely, Scotland's quest for autonomy has long sought to strengthen the population's willingness to secede by pluralising international trade.

Finally, in Chapter 10, the study examines the importance of Gaelic for the Scottish nation. It is argued that Scotland's identification as a Gaelic-Celtic nation strengthens national integration. It adds to Scottish democratic nationalism, the remote but largely Scottish-identifying population. It also justifies not only the protection of minorities but also multiculturalism and provides Scotland with a national self-definition based on sentimentality.

11.2 Comparing democratic and autocratic nationalism

What characterises the Scottish quest for statehood in the early 21st century? It is a form of democratic nationalism. This central thesis of this study will be discussed in the following by means of a comparison. Scottish nationalism will be contrasted with British nationalism—i.e. English nationalism. The latter was particularly relevant in England in the context of the referendum of 23. June 2016 on the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union. England voted with a majority of 53.4 per cent to leave, while Scotland voted with a majority of 62 per cent to remain in the EU. At constituency level, the result was even clearer. In Scotland there was not a single constituency that voted majority for the so-called BREXIT, while in England there was hardly a single constituency that did not vote majority for the BREXIT. Age played an important role, as did university education, but even more important was whether a person described him or herself as English (Lord Ashcroft 2016). In the 30 constituencies where most people identified themselves as English, the majority voted for Brexit (BBC 2021; Burn-Murdoch 2016). For these reasons, it makes sense to

compare the Scottish independence referendum with the BREXIT referendum. The Scottish referendum represents Scottish nationalism and the BREXIT referendum represents English nationalism.

It is shown that the fundamental difference between Scottish and English nationalism is a question of primacy concerning the political or national collective. If the national-cultural collective is more important than the political collective, this is autocratic nationalism. If it is the other way round, i.e. if the collective of political inclusion is more important than the national-cultural collective, it is a case of democratic nationalism. In both cases, two collectives are relevant to nationalism.

In Scottish democratic nationalism, the quest for political autonomy is based on the primacy of the political collective, emerging by political inclusion in Scotland via elections, referenda, and welfare. In democratic nationalism, the national-cultural collective is distinguished from the political inclusion collective and democratically interpreted by the latter as a national inclusion collective. First and foremost, the movement for Scottish autonomy legitimises itself as a nation of presence (Anwesenheitsnation)—i.e. "the people who live here".

This was already evident in the choice and design of national symbols. It is also evident in the interpretation of the Scottish nation as a pioneer of popular sovereignty. The esteem for individual self-determination bridges the gap between the political collective of inclusion and the collective of the national sense of belonging, which itself aspires to become an inclusive collective. In this way, history is told as an endeavour in which individual self-determination was always the main issue (see Kidd 1993: 35). The Declaration of Arbroath, addressed to the Pope in 1320, has only just been rediscovered in this context:

> "For those who would like to see the Declaration of Arbroath as the fountainhead of Scottish political radicalism, the founding document of Scottish constitutionalism, animating Scottish political culture from that day to this, it is seriously problematic that for over 350 years after its composition virtually no one actually referred to it." (Mason 2014: 268; on the shifts in meaning, see Crawford 2014).

It was only in democratic nationalism that this rediscovery of the Declaration was likely because it linked individual self-determination with Scotland's national self-determination. Alex Salmond makes this link in a speech at the University of Virginia. The Arbroath Declaration is valued because it binds government to the individual self-determination of the governed:

> "Arbroath was not only a ringing declaration of the fundamental rights and integrity of an independent Scotland, but arguably Europe's first statement of a contractual relationship between government and governed. When the community of the realm articulated the view that they would back the monarch to defend

> their rights, but would remove him if he failed to do so, they embarked on a road which led to America four and a half centuries later where the Arbroath Declaration was echoed with equal clarity and force. And it is that echo which we hear today in Scotland—in the twenty-first century, as we consider our nation's future. It is to America that we can look to see the power of independence and the importance of democratic principles. […] And it is the words of Thomas Jefferson that will inspire us—today and in the years ahead: 'We are a people capable of self-government, and worthy of it." (Salmond 2008b)

In Scotland's secession campaign, Salmond emphasises that it is not primarily about preserving a culture but about ensuring that the government is more strongly determined by the interests and problems that exist among the Scottish population:

> "The Arbroath Declaration didn't simply help to ensure Scotland's survival as an independent nation. It said that the wider community of Scotland could choose a government to protect their interests. It started an embryonic concept of popular sovereignty which has had a lasting influence—in Scotland and in many other nations." (Salmond 2014)

Scotland's history is linked to the first declaration of popular sovereignty. This history is to be taken up in the referendum. Secession would enable self-government for the "wider community of Scotland", meaning the people who live in Scotland for whatever reason. Salmond explicitly distinguishes this view from endeavours that prioritise a particular ethnic or national community. Scotland's national culture is interpreted inclusively.

The notion that national culture values individual self-determination is inherent in Scotland's sense of national belonging (cf. Broadie 2007; on the Celtic 'redneck' culture of Scots-Irish immigrants in the USA cf. Webb 2004). As a cultural community, Scotland is seen as a nation that values individual self-determination. This cultural appreciation allows the instability associated with democracy to be endured (Luhmann 2009[1986]: 26) and makes the demand for progressive democratisation likely in the first place. Cultural factors stabilise Scotland's democratic nationalism. Only because this stabilisation works in the background—latency is a typical characteristic of cumulatively operating culture (see Christakis 2019: 364; Henrich 2016: 112, 220)—can Scottish nationalism successfully promote itself by claiming a nation of presence (Anwesenheitsnation).

A comparison of Scottish and English nationalism shows how important this consideration is. English nationalism currently lacks the interpretation of national culture aimed at individual self-determination. Norris and Inglehart speak here of a "cultural backlash", by which they mean movements that are directed against the globalising structures of world society. They include English nationalism in this. By

this, they mean those who voted against the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union in the referendum on 23 June 2016 (79 % of people who identify as "English, not British" voted to leave, see Lord Ashcroft 2016: 8). This English nationalism is in favour of national-cultural restrictions on individual self-determination:

> "As the old Left-Right divisions of social class identities have faded in Britain, an emerging cultural war deeply divides voters and parties around values of national sovereignty versus cooperation among E.U. member states, respect for traditional families and marriage versus support for gender equality and feminism, tolerance of diverse lifestyles and gender fluid identities, the importance of protecting manufacturing jobs versus environmental protection and climate change, and restrictions on immigration and closed borders versus openness towards refugees, migrants, and foreigners. These are the issues that divide many contemporary Western societies." (Norris/Inglehart 2018: 13f.)

Other studies confirm the result:

> "[P]eople in favour of the death penalty and harsher prison sentences in general, and who are against equal opportunities for women and homosexuals are much more likely to support leave – to the tune of around 50 percentage points. This suggests that an underlying differences in the values that people hold are important to making sense of why some people were attracted to vote leave." (Goodwin/Heath 2016)

In contrast to democratic nationalism in Scotland, in English nationalism, the political inclusion collective is determined by the national-cultural sense of belonging. Politics is closely and extensively linked to national culture. Attitudes towards immigration were the most important factor in explaining the result of this EU referendum. Analysing the new dataset Areal interpolation and the UK's referendum on EU membership by Chris Hanretty (2017) on the referendum result, Eric Kaufman confirms that it was primarily about this close link between national inclusion/exclusion and culture:

> "55 % of the variation in immigration attitudes across constituencies can be explained by Brexit vote share, a powerful association. The relationship is especially strong towards the […] strongest Remain seats far more pro-immigration than elsewhere. […] Education, ethnicity, share without a passport and age account for nearly 80 % of the variation in immigration opinion across constituencies. This means almost all of the differences in immigration attitudes over place have to do with these demographics. […] [I]mmigration attitudes are the fulcrum around which the politics of western societies are realigning." (Kaufman 2019)

The desire to decide independently on immigration from Europe in the UK in future is at the centre of many so-called Brexiteers' concerns. The reason for this desire, according to Kaufman and many others, is not primarily to be found in the economy but in the hope of being able to return to an ethnically determined and hierarchical order through the nation:

> "This is because those whose psychological make-up inclines them to see difference as disorder and change as loss are voting for parties that promise to slow immigration. This isn't generally about competition for jobs or services, which is a safer narrative to voice, but instead mainly about majority-ethnic and what I term 'ethno-traditional' national identities. Conservative voters feel that these are being unsettled by the rapid ethnic shifts sweeping across western countries." (Kaufman 2019; cf. on the USA Klein 2020: 130)

The nationalist UKIP favours a points system for immigration based on national needs (the only difference to the SNP says Revest 2016). Decisions on sentencing (death penalty), economic policy (on the automotive industry O'Toole 2018: 177), lifestyles, sexual orientations etc. are related to the guiding difference between rulers/governed. Typical words are vassal state, surrender, colony, diktat, shackle vs. free, democracy, elected governments vs. appointed technocrats, take back control (the word list comes from Buckledee 2018: 59-74). These words link political power to the collectivist culture of the United Kingdom.

Scotland's autonomy movement is to be distinguished as a democratic nationalism. Democratic nationalism also requires a sense of togetherness. However, this link between the political collective of inclusion and the national collective differs from English nationalism. Scotland's cultural-national collective is based on the idea that some people identify as Scottish wherever they live. Moreover, the national value commitment of egalitarianism is crucial. Scotland's political culture does not to tolerate inequalities to the same extent as the Anglo-American model. It is also important that collectively binding decisions tend to be taken by consensus to encourage participation by the whole population. In addition to this value orientation and political tradition of decision-making, Scotland's relationship with England is often associated with claims of Scottish nationalism. Although the cultural interpretation of this aspect with the Jacobites is much more controversial than the other factors in Scotland's national-cultural identification.

In contrast, English nationalism is based on the cohesion of the national-cultural collective. The national inclusion and exclusion, ranging from citizenship to xenophobia, observed by Kaufman and many others, dominates English nationalism and allows it to be understood as an autocratic nationalism: "Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to Britain from Europe. And that is what we will deliver" promised the Prime Minister on 17 January 2017 (May 2017).

In democratic nationalism, the autonomy of the desired Scottish state is primarily justified by the political inclusion of the population living in Scotland. Added to this is the cultural symbolism of the nation, interpreted as a spontaneous formation. Only those who live in Scotland should be able to have a say in Scotland's politics. As a national collective, finding national symbols is valued more than the actual symbol itself. Apart from valuing individual self-determination, Scotland's cultural identification is based on the fact that and through what someone identifies with Scotland. Scotland's nationalism is not against but in favour of individual self-determination.

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