

## Challenges for Nationalism Proposed by JKLF

Faheem (2006) notes that the strategic vision of JKLF was straightforward. It hoped to generate enough popular resistance that it would force India to withdraw from Kashmir, and JKLF would be able to form an independent state. However, the strategy was full of miscalculations, given social resources and institutional capacities. JKLF produced an agitational model of militant nationalism utilising restlessness and impulsive behaviour of the people. However, it could not be transformed into something concrete due to the state action from India and Pakistan.

In the initial stage, JKLF was able to intensify and channel the grievances of common Kashmiris towards collective action. While the initial interest helped recruit members, it had shortcomings in giving a long-term political direction. One reason for this could be the extermination of the central leadership of JKLF in the initial years. In the early years of the militant movement, despite having a limited cadre, the four original organisers of the HAJY group handled the central processes. As the first-tier leadership got arrested or killed, there was no second-tier leadership to take control of the situation. Neither was an institutionalised structure in place to deal with a situation like this.

Secondly, JKLF had considerably weaker social penetration in rural areas than in urban areas. There was a deficient social infrastructure that could mobilise masses for a more extended period. Weak vertical ties meant that the recruitment and expansion of the organisation would be difficult in the long run. Since the organisation had no patronage from a caste, class, or religious network, it meant dangerous consequences. The urban-rural gap visibly worked regarding training and control within the organisation.

Equally, a stringent crackdown was placed by security agencies, which led to JKLF recruiting several individuals and local subgroups with which it did not share its ideological and organisational commitment. This had serious ramifications, creating risks of revolts from below and decapitating the organisational hierarchy. These new fighters often tried to control the resources they got after the armed training. There were also instances when these groups retained important in-

formation for individual good. Moreover, there wasn't a solid policy to deal with the splinter groups, paving the way for chaos. Staniland (2016) also writes about how JKLF could not build a durable organisation, particularly locally. It could not convert mass mobilisations into resilient institutions that can handle expansion and conflict shocks. In a way, JKLF had an idea, not a base. The problems were equally propounded by the weak horizontal ties between the JKLF on the Indian side and the JKLF on the Pakistani side, which later became evident by multiple splits within the JKLF.

Evans (1999) writes that as the cadre strength of JKLF was decimated by constant killings and arrests from 1992 to 1993 from both Indian security forces and pro-Pakistan gunmen, there was a complete takeover of the movement by Pakistan and its intelligence agencies. Thus, JKLF lost its ascendancy to the radical groups, resulting in a unilateral ceasefire by Yasin Malik in 1994.

One can evaluate that JKLF utilised all the elements mentioned above in the section to awaken subaltern consciousness. JKLF catered to the class that was historically on the defensive and helped them achieve self-awareness. JKLF's taking over traditional leadership introduced a new set of class polarities and formed a class of new political actors. These actors had a redefined position of Kashmiri nationalism and also posited a vertical conflict between the latest and the old actors. In a way, the arrival of JKLF on the political scene introduced a new set of individual and group dynamics in Kashmiri society. JKLF mobilised ethnicity in defence of culture and to establish political boundaries.

## Rise of Hizbul Mujahideen

The rise of JKLF was becoming an aversion for the Pakistani state, which always deterred any attempts at the creation of a separate state in Kashmir. During the 1980s, the Pakistani state headed by Zia-ul-Haq tried to intervene in Kashmir by using Jamaat-e-Islami as its client. Zia had already set things in motion in a couple of meetings with a founding leader of Jamaat-e-Islami-Maulana Abdul Bari. Jamaat-e-Islami was to