


Figure 6: Trusteeship Council Resolutions on Petitions (1952–1956)



Source: Own creation. Based on Smith 1957, p. 73.

For the unificationists it became clear that from then on only oral petitions before the General Assembly could still exert some degree of influence. Yet, the British administration already had deliberated which petitioners from the Gold Coast and British Togoland could be brought before the Fourth Committee as an “antidote to Antor.”³⁷⁰ They had Komla Gbedemah in mind. Gbedemah was an Anlo-Ewe from the Gold Coast and a former member of the AEC. Yet, since the Olympio-faction of the AEC espoused Togoland unification, which would unify the Ewes of French and British Togoland but leave out the Ewes of the Gold Coast, Gbedemah decamped to Nkrumah and the CPP in the hope of unifying the Ewes of British Togoland and the Gold Coast.

6.5.2 Political Development under Security Surveillance (1952)

In December 1951, the *Assemblée Représentative du Togo* (ART) was re-elected. However, partly due to the criticism levelled by the unification parties at the General Assembly, the French administration was forced to abolish the dual college system for the ART. Thus, only three months after the ART election, in March 1952, the administration held elections for the newly constituted *Assemblée territoriale du Togo* (ATT). Thus, apart from Senegal, French Togoland became the only sub-Saharan territory under French rule without electoral discrimination. However, as with the composition of the ECC before, the expansion of the electorate was not an altruistic act by the French government. Rather, the expansion of the electorate, coupled with active French support for the UCPN and the PTP, was well timed to break the previous supremacy of the CUT and Juvento.

370 TNA (London), CO 554/668, *Togoland under UN Trusteeship: future policy*, The Togoland Unification Issue before the United Nations, 1952, p. 2.

Table 3: Results Togolese Assembly, Elections (1946–1952)

	ART (1946)	ART (1951)	ATT (1952)
	First College		
French Citizens	6	6	
	Second College		
CUT	14	1	9
PTP	1	11	6
UPCN	-	12	15
Independent	9	-	-
Total	30	30	30

Source: Own creation.

Because of the incidents in Agbétiko and Vogan, Governor Digo had a bad reputation with the Overseas Ministry. Following the Agbétiko and Vogan incident, Digo's governorship came to a premature end when disputes between him and the PTP leadership broke the camel's back. The quarrel reportedly centred around John Atayi and Pedro Olympio, who were ousted from the PTP, while Digo wanted them reinstated.³⁷¹ The PTP representative Robert Ajavon, in particular, went out of his way to complain to Louis Jaquinot, the Minister of Overseas France, about Digo, who allegedly created the myth of a rift within the PTP in the first place. Ajavon painted Digo's course as a danger.

However, in 1954, Pedro Olympio and John Atayi eventually founded the *Mouvement Populaire du Togo* (MPT), which ideologically positioned itself between the CUT (pro-unification) and the PTP (gradual evolution toward self-government within the French Union). Digo's complaint about the PTP on the other hand was likewise an expression of the disappointment of the French administration and the French Overseas Ministry with the PTP regarding its performance vis-à-vis the CUT in the March 1952 elections to the ATT.

As Digo's successor, the Overseas Ministry appointed, of all people, Laurent Pechoux. Pechoux had previously served as a colonial officer in French Togoland but had gained reputations as the governor of the Ivory Coast, where he organized the crackdown on Felix Houphouët-Boigny's *Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire* and the *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (RDA) some months earlier.³⁷²

As the Administering Authorities refused to allow equal representation in the *Joint Council on Togoland Affairs*, the CUT, the Togoland Congress, and the Togoland Union called for a meeting in Lomé on the evening of 6 June 1952. Another meeting was held on 8 June, again in Lomé, where 300 delegates decided to boycott the *Joint Council*. Although

371 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/3297/1, *Affaires politiques*, President of PTP to Minister of Overseas France, 23 April 1952.

372 TNA (London), FCO 141/5026, *Gold Coast: Anglo-French cooperation on security matters in West Africa*, Note of discussion with M. Lefèvre, 28 July 1949.

the unificationist parties participated in the elections to the *Joint Council*, by the third meeting on 5 August 1952, the four British Togoland and the two CUT representatives left the Council in protest to the unequal representation of the two territories in the Council. The remaining Council members, consequently composed only of representatives of the UCPN and the PTP from French Togoland, decided that equal representation should not be introduced, adjourned, and never met again. Instead of participating in the *Joint Council*, where they would be a permanent minority, the unificationist parties decided to approach the UN Visiting Mission, which was scheduled to arrive in the area by August 1952.

Particularly important for the further development of the Togoland unification issue was the regional reorganisation of the Gold Coast in 1952: the southern mostly Ewe-populated part of British Togoland was merged with the Trans-Volta Province of the Gold Coast to form the region of Trans-Volta-Togoland (TVT), that is, the later Volta Region. The newly formed region united the Ewe-speaking areas of the Gold Coast with those of southern Togoland. Thereby, the British cemented the gradual incorporation of British Togoland into the Gold Coast, while making the unification of just French Togoland with British Togoland even less likely. This, of course, reinforced the border that quite accurately divided the Ewe settlement area into one half under French administration and one half under British administration. The TVT, on the one hand, was considered by many unificationist as a step toward Ewe unification,³⁷³ and on the other, it consolidated British efforts to bind British Togoland permanently to the Gold Coast.

As the British trusteeship territory became more intricately linked administratively to the Gold Coast, the reorganisation also affected political developments. Prior to 1951, Togolese were not represented in the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly. The lack of participation in the political institutions of the Gold Coast and the absence of such institutions in British Togoland were, on the one hand, the reason for the strong unification drive of the AEC, the Togoland Union, and the Togoland Congress and, on the other hand, the defence why this stance remained unchallenged.

However, the new institutional interdependence of the two territories enabled the CPP to enter and gain a foothold in Togoland politics. In May 1952, members of the Togoland Congress warned the Gold Coast government in a telegram not to allow Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah to visit Togoland and interfere in Togoland affairs.³⁷⁴ In June, the Togoland Congress eventually resolved to set up roadblocks to hinder Nkrumah coming to Togoland. Since the Togoland Congress demanded to reverse the political entanglement of Gold Coast and Togoland territories, it decided to boycott the newly formed legislative body for the TVT Region, the Togoland Council.³⁷⁵

It was not only political but also economic reasons that motivated this attitude: Antor was aware that the Gold Coast was obtaining much more revenue from cocoa produced

373 TNA (London), FCO 141/5027, *Gold Coast: Anglo-French cooperation on security matters in West Africa*, Copy (without number), 16 August 1953.

374 TNA (London), FCO 141/4997, *Gold Coast: Special Branch Summaries*, Special Branch Supplement No. 40, May 1952.

375 TNA (London), FCO 141/4997, *Gold Coast: Special Branch Summaries*, Special Branch Supplement No. 41, June 1952.

in British Togoland than was being spent in the territory. Therefore, he demanded the break-away from the Cold Coast Cocoa Marketing Boards and the formation of an independent Togoland Cocoa Marketing Board.

The 2nd Visiting Mission (1952)

Above all, it was the security authorities who prepared for the arrival of the UN Visiting Mission in French and British Togoland. In British Togoland, the Permanent Secretary, Michael de Normann Ensor, requested from the SLO Gold Coast, Kirby-Green, and the SLO West Africa, Major Hodson, security relevant material, which MI5 and MI6 had on Ralphe Bunche.³⁷⁶ A month before the arrival of the UN Visiting Mission, the 1952 June summary of the Special Branch reported for French Togoland:

"In the Akposso area a Government-sponsored plan is afoot to imprison Theophile MALLY, the leader of the Unite Togolaise in the area, so as to prevent him from contacting the Visiting Mission. Pressure is being brought to bear on village chiefs to concoct a story accusing Mally of collecting their taxes without paying them into the Government chest."³⁷⁷

Governor Péchoux ordered the cancellation of a procession by Juvento on 3 July 1952, threatening to break it up with firearms if necessary. The procession of about 2,000 people took place anyway, but informants of the Special Branch stated that many armed police were in the vicinity during the rally. The report concluded that "the French authorities will do their best to prevent Togoland political leaders from contacting the U.N.O. Visiting Mission."³⁷⁸

When the four-member Visiting Mission arrived in August 1952, both Administering Authorities frequently drew the attention to the fact that the Mission itself was provoking unrest between political parties. In the hope to claim the Mission's attention, oppositional parties sought to demonstrate their strength and importance by holding mass rallies, which would inevitably clash with each other. This occurred at Jasikan in the cocoa-growing area north of Hohoe, in British Togoland. The Visiting Mission had intended to visit a co-operative but curtailed their itinerary "when it observed that the two rival factions were beginning to demonstrate and grow rowdy."³⁷⁹ Some days after the Visiting Mission had left, the people of opposing rallies eventually clashed, leading to the arrest of 7 people.³⁸⁰

376 TNA (London), FCO 141/5022, *Gold Coast: United Nations Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission to West Africa, 1952; special report on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem*, 1952, Secret Letter OF.176, SLO West Africa to Ministry of Defence & External Affairs, Accra, 26 June 1952.

377 TNA (London), FCO 141/4997, *Gold Coast: Special Branch Summaries*, Special Branch Supplement No. 41, June 1952.

378 TNA (London), FCO 141/4997, *Gold Coast: Special Branch Summaries*, Special Branch Summary No. 42, July 1952, p. 13.

379 TCOR, "13th Session: Visiting Mission 1952 Report on Togoland under United Kingdom Administration" Supplement No. 2 (T/1107) (1954), p. 4.

380 Emphasis added, TCOR, "11th Session: Special report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1952, on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem" T/1034 (1952), p. 126.

The news of this clash reached the Visiting Mission when it was in French Togoland. Although explicitly mandated to report on the issue of Togolese reunification, the Visiting Mission had rejected an invitation by the CUT to attend a public meeting organised at the de Souza estate, that is, the main party in French Togoland campaigning for reunification. In fact, the Mission would not attend a single meeting by the unificationists in Togoland under French administration. The French Governor, Laurent Péchoux, had succeeded in persuading the Mission to keep away from those meetings to preserve the peace and public order.³⁸¹

However, it is noteworthy that the mission was divided on this course of action. Like the Council itself, Visiting Missions were equally composed of representatives from Administering and Non-Administering Authorities. This meant that the divide that already existed in the Trusteeship Council between Administering and Non-Administering Authorities extended to the Visiting Mission. The Chinese and Salvadoran member of the mission, that is, members of two Non-Administering Authorities, wanted to meet the CUT, but the Belgian and Australian members of the Mission, that is, the two members of Administering Authorities, did not.³⁸² Péchoux unabashedly and racially stereotyped the non-Western members of the Visiting Mission:

"Among the non-administering powers is the delegate from El Salvador, who is twenty-eight years old, very inexperienced and light-minded. [...] The best way to neutralize him is undoubtedly to offer him distractions to which he is sensitive during this trip. The Chinese delegate, Mr. YANG, is more serious in appearance. Like all Chinese, he is first of all vain. I therefore had the impression that we could more easily get him on this level, by reminding him that he is the representative of an old civilisation, of an intelligent race, free of passions, and that he is therefore naturally the moderating element of this Mission."³⁸³

Upon the Mission's return, its report explained its decisions on the ground that Governor Péchoux warned the mission that "if it accepted invitations to attend the mass meeting in Lomé organized by the Comité de l'Unité togolaise, the Parti togolais du Progrès could also demonstrate its strength and this could lead to *bloodshed and even 'a state of civil war'*."³⁸⁴ By employing securitisation tactics, Governor Péchoux successfully persuaded the Visiting Mission to abstain from conducting the investigations explicitly assigned to it.

381 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/3341/2, *Entretiens franco-britanniques sur le Togo-Cameroun*, Péchoux to Ministry of Overseas France, Cablegram N°416 DS/AP, Séjour au Togo Mission de visite, 28 August 1952, p. 3.

382 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/3289/4, *Affaires Politiques*, Secret Cablegram, Péchoux to France Outremer, 21 August 1952.

383 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/3341/2, *Entretiens franco-britanniques sur le Togo-Cameroun*, Péchoux to Ministry of Overseas France, Cablegram N°416 DS/AP, Séjour au Togo Mission de visite, 28 August 1952, p. 6.

384 TCOR, "11th Session: Special report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1952, on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem" (1952), p. 19.

Photo 12: Chairman of the 1952 UN Visiting Mission (2 September 1952)³⁸⁵



Source: UN Photo.

According to Governor Arden-Clarke, the Salvadorian and Chinese member of the Mission

“had clearly formed an unfavourable impression during the few days they were in Lomé and the two non-Administering Members were contemplating considerable criticism of the French regime in the report. To forestall this Mr. Peachy has written to the Commissaire de la republique in Lome advising him, it is understood, to remove the restrictions which the Mission had formed the impression had been placed on public gatherings.”³⁸⁶

Regarding the unification issue, the Mission's report confirmed that in the south of the two trusteeship territories the demand for Togoland unification was widespread. Even the PTP and the UCPN were open to unification if it came about under French administration and the CPP was open to unification of French and British Togoland as long as Togoland as a whole would be integrated into the Gold Coast. The problem the Mission found was only that there was no particular form of unification that would be acceptable

385 Roy Peachy, Australian Chairman of the Visiting Mission, together with the Chief of Krachi.

386 TNA (London), FCO 141/5022, *Gold Coast: United Nations Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission to West Africa, 1952; special report on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem*, Saving Telegram 1333, Governor of Gold Coast to Secretary of State, 20 September 1952.

to all parties or a clear majority of the inhabitants of the two trusteeship territories. The Visiting Mission reiterated the view already held by the 1949 Visiting Mission that the border problem was not an economic but a political one. It had received over 2,899 communications calling for the unification of the Togolands under a United Nations administration.³⁸⁷ The French administration approached the Mission not to publish these statistics in its report.³⁸⁸ Due to the considerable number of allegations against the French administration made by the unificationists, the Visiting Mission felt compelled to annex them to the report. Again, the Mission was divided on the alleged repression and therefore avoided taking a clear position:

"Two members find it difficult to express satisfaction on the matter. However, they did not in any way overlook the fact that much of the political tension which gave rise to many complaints about the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedom was largely due to misunderstanding between the Administering Authority and leaders of some of the political parties.

On the other hand, it appeared to one Member of the Mission that the political atmosphere in Lomé was obviously not as calm as he would have desired it to be, since: [...] (b) The Comité de l'Unité which is allegedly *supported by influences foreign to the territory* and which certainly *finds encouragement in the communist press*, had been faced with decreasing power in the last few years and adopts a hostile attitude towards its rival party. In dealing with the latter, it uses *methods of a terroristic and fraudulent character*. (c) The Parti togolais de Progrès condemns the platform of the Comité de l'Unité which it considers does not serve the interests of Togoland but is inspired by private interests. The methods used by the CUT against the PTP provoke on the latter's part a certain reaction.

(d) This situation obliged the Administering Authority to be constantly watchful in order to maintain public order while respecting the right of all. It has never prohibited meetings."³⁸⁹

In the end, the allegations of the unificationists were included in the appendix, followed by the official (and expectedly refuting) response of the French administration.

The long-awaited report of the 1952 UN Visiting Mission was received at the end of the Council's prolonged 11th Session (1952).³⁹⁰ An American-sponsored draft resolution expressed general satisfaction with the report as a basis for further consultations and recommended its forwarding to the General Assembly.³⁹¹ The Soviet delegate attacked the report stating that for six years the Ewe had asked for unification. The political importance of Ewe movement had been stressed by the report, but its conclusions failed

387 Emphasis added, TCOR, "11th Session: Special report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1952, on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem" (1952), p. 18.

388 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/3289/4, *Affaires Politiques*, Cablegram No. 1961, "Haussaire Yaounde" to "France Outre-Mer", 11 October 1952.

389 TCOR, "13th Session: Visiting Mission 1952 Report on Togoland under French Administration" Supplement No. 3 (1108) (1954), p. 12.

390 TCOR, "11th Session: Special report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1952, on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem" (1952).

391 T/L.322 in TCOR, "11th Session: Annexes" (1952).

to contain any proposals to meet the Ewe claims. Therefore, the USSR could not accept the justification in the preamble of the report that no change was desirable in view of the present administrative arrangements. The Chinese representative congratulated the Mission's zeal and thoroughness but regretted that they had not had time to conclude their study and submit concrete proposals. He highlighted from the report that from the 2,899 communications the Mission had received, 2,479 were in favour of some form of unification and that the Visiting Mission had complained that there was not enough time to review and undertake necessary research on important communications.³⁹²

The closing of ranks between the Administering Authorities was unmissable: On the basis of the new classification scheme for petitions, the Chairman of the Mission, the Australian delegate Roy Peachy, had simply decided that most of these communications should not be considered as petitions but as communications intended for the Mission's own information. Those communications that fell under this classification were therefore not to be examined by the Standing Committee on Petitions. Although the Visiting Mission recommended that the Council should amend its *rules of procedure* for periods of time for future missions to follow up on communications, the Council would not comply with this request. Against this backdrop, the Chinese and El Salvadoran delegations, that is, the two Non-Administering Authorities, which were also represented in the Visiting Mission to Togoland, attempted to highlight the multitude of communications in favour of unification with an amendment to the American draft resolution:

"[The Trusteeship Council] Notes with interest that the majority of the communications received by the Visiting Mission requested immediate unification of the two Territories under United Nations administration."³⁹³

The Administering Authorities rejected the amendment. They argued that although most communications might have requested unification, they did not exclusively request it 'under United Nations administration.' Furthermore, they argued it cannot be concluded that communications were representative. The New Zealand representative noted that the only way to obtain a clear picture in such circumstances would be to organise a plebiscite, yet this method was already ruled out by the Administering Authorities during the previous sessions of the Council.³⁹⁴ Finally, the compromise was agreed upon that the Council ...

"Notes that, although no general consultation of the population was made, the majority of the written communications received by the Visiting Mission were in favour of unification and independence."³⁹⁵

392 United Nations visiting mission to trust territories in West Africa, 1952: report on procedures of visiting mission, T/1044 (March 16, 1953), available from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3854062>.

393 TCOR, "11th Session" (1952), 458th Meeting, p. 2.

394 TCOR, "11th Session" (1952), p. 3.

395 TCOR, "11th Session" (1952), p. 5.

Before the voting on the draft resolution took place, the Iraqi delegate, Khalidy, announced his abstention since his delegation had long recognised that the “nationalistic clamour of the Ewes was not to be ignored as a danger to peace in West Africa.”³⁹⁶ Khalidy complained that the Council had failed to find a real solution and had given no satisfaction to the Ewes. The conclusions of the Visiting Mission's report were therefore illogical, extraordinary, and baffling.

The final resolution was adopted by five to four votes, with three abstentions and resolved to transmit to the General Assembly the report “as representing not only an objective appraisal of the diverse aspect of this problem but also suggesting the soundest approach to its solution consonant with the present diversity of views of the inhabitants of the two Trust Territories concerned.”³⁹⁷

6.5.3 Securitising the French “Reign of Terror” (1952)

The securitisation of the Togoland unification issue reached its climax at General Assembly's 7th Session (1952). When the Fourth Committee had received for the second time requests by the leadership of the unification movement to be heard, once again, the colonial powers sought not to have them appear before the Fourth Committee but insisted that petitioners should always be referred to the Council first,³⁹⁸ since the Council (unlike the Fourth Committee) already had established an official procedure for examining petitions.³⁹⁹ The anti-colonial members such as the Philippine representative, Victorio D. Carpio, objected to this procedure:

“the manner in which petitions were dealt with left much to be desired. Petitions were reaching the Trusteeship Council in such numbers that a great deal of the Council's attention during recent sessions had been directed to the formulation of a procedure for dealing with them according to their importance. The Standing Committee on Petitions, [...] classified them; and petitions of a general nature were simply referred back to the Trusteeship Council, which usually decided that, as it had considered similar petitions in the past, no action was required. The chief reason why requests for oral hearings were being addressed to the Fourth Committee was the dissatisfaction of petitioners at the manner in which the Trusteeship Council dealt with petitions; they felt the General Assembly should know what was happening. The Philippine delegation, faithful to its consistent policy of championing the rights of the voiceless millions, would oppose any attempt to postpone the granting of a hearing [...] but the Council was dominated by the Administering Authorities. If the Trusteeship Council did not perform the functions vested in it by the Charter, the General Assembly should exercise some of those functions itself.”⁴⁰⁰

396 TCOR, “11th Session” (1952), p. 4.

397 See T/L.322 available at TCOR, 11th Session, Annexes (T/11S/Annexes).

398 GAOR, “7th Session: 4th Committee” (1952), pp. 14–16.

399 GAOR, “7th Session: 4th Committee” (1952), p. 102.

400 GAOR, “7th Session: 4th Committee” (1952), pp. 101–2.