

“matrilocale” et “uxorilocale”, doivent être tenus pour de quasi-synonymes et l’expression patri-uxorilocale est définitivement à bannir.

Un tel flottement dans les usages de ces concepts résidentiels est de toute façon assez courant. L’on remarquera ainsi que les anthropologues distinguent souvent dans leurs écrits entre “matrilocal”, désignant le fait d’aller vivre chez les parents de l’épouse, et “uxorilocal” pour signifier celui d’aller s’installer au domicile de la femme (*uxor*) elle-même. Or, là aussi, un tel distinguo est trompeur et aller vivre chez l’épouse (uxorilocal) revient à dire *soit* que l’on va vivre au domicile des parents de l’épouse (matrilocal), *soit* que l’on va vivre dans un nouveau domicile ce qui équivaut *de facto* à une résidence néolocale. Rappelons enfin, pour conclure sur ces notions, que, selon une autre définition “classique”, la résidence est dite “matrilocale” quand le couple réside chez les parents de la femme et “uxorilocale” quand il réside chez ou près des parents de la femme, mais ce en l’absence d’une règle de succession matrilocale bien déterminée. C’est ainsi que ces termes furent définis par exemple par G. P. Murdock dans son “Ethnographic Atlas”, travail auquel les auteurs de ce livre se réfèrent à maintes reprises: “Matrilocal, i.e., normal residence with or near the female matrilineal kinsmen of the wife . . . Uxorilocal. Equivalent to ‘matrilocal’ but confined to instances where the wife’s matrilin are not aggregated in matrilocal and matrilineal kin groups” (G. P. Murdock, “Ethnographic Atlas: A Summary”, *Ethnology* 6.1967: 156; voir “Codes” pp. 154–169).

Mais laissons de côté ces questions de définition, d’une importance toute relative, pour en revenir au corps de l’ouvrage. Si celui-ci se donne donc pour objet d’étudier l’impact sur la notion de personne et sur le concept de genre d’une orientation très “gynocentrée” des institutions que se sont données certaines sociétés, en posant l’exigence d’un cadre à la fois matrilineaire et patri- ou uxorilocale, ses auteurs (notamment N.-C. Mathieu dans sa préface) se défendent pourtant, avec conviction et force arguments, de lier un tel complexe “matrilineaire/matrilocale” à l’idée ancienne de matriarcat.

On voit en revanche poindre l’idée – elle est posée explicitement et constitue la toile de fond du volume – selon laquelle ce que A. R. Radcliffe-Brown aurait appelé un “faisceau de droit et devoirs” qui détermine l’appartenance au groupe de filiation et la résidence, s’il est plus orienté vers l’univers féminin pourrait avoir pour corollaire l’émergence d’un pouvoir politique et social plus éminent des femmes.

Il convient alors de signaler que ce recueil fait suite à un précédent travail de N.-C. Mathieu ([dir.], *L’arrondissement des femmes. Essais en anthropologie des sexes*. Paris 1985) et qu’il se comprend et s’apprécie bien mieux à partir de ce dernier. Dans ce texte plus ancien, en effet, elle évoquait la question converse : celle de l’identité de sexe et de genre dans des sociétés très marquées par une accentuation agnatique des institutions, par un complexe patrilineaire et patri- ou virilocal. Or, cette auteure remarquait alors que dans ces sociétés

très “viricentrées”, il semblait que “la maternité . . . sert moins à mettre au monde des enfants des deux sexes qu’à produire biologiquement la socialité des hommes” (2).

Si N.-C. Mathieu écrivait naguère que, dans ces sociétés patrilineaires et patrilocales, le statut des femmes est celui d’un “sujet quasi biologique”, alors il n’est guère étonnant qu’elle ait voulu tester avec ce nouveau volume une hypothèse qui en est le corollaire immédiat, à savoir : est-ce que dans ces cadres institutionnels plus sensibles à l’importance des agents féminins, les femmes sont d’emblée constituées en tant que sujet “pleinement social-humain” (3) ? Autrement dit, est-ce que dans ces sociétés où la résidence et la filiation laissent la part belle aux hommes, les femmes sont reléguées du côté de la nature, là où dans celle où ces deux institutions accordent une place de choix aux femmes, elles accèdent finalement au monde de la culture ?

En pratique, cette hypothèse qui traverse de part en part les questionnements des auteur(e)s de cet ouvrage ne sera toutefois pas toujours explorée jusqu’au bout, ni poussée à son terme. Ce, en raison de la diversité des centres d’intérêts des participants à ce volume, bien entendu, mais aussi dans la mesure où ce sera surtout le critère de l’uxorilocalité qui sera retenu ici comme déterminant *en dernière instance* puisque plusieurs sociétés étudiées (par exemple les Puyuma de Taiwan, ou encore les Shipibo-Conibo d’Amazonie péruvienne) sont en réalité cognatiques (elles ne reconnaissent que la parentèle comme mode d’affiliation d’Ego à un groupe de parents) et non pas matrilineaires.

Mais finalement ce relâchement subreptice du cadre hypothétique de départ est plutôt le bienvenu. Il ajoute en effet à ce volume un surcroît de diversité et donc d’intérêt chez le lecteur désireux de comprendre les modalités de construction du genre et de la personne dans des sociétés – qu’elles soient ou non matrilineaires – qui apparaissent *globalement* moins marquées par la domination des institutions et du pouvoir masculins que ne le sont celles qu’on nous présente en principe dans des recueils collectifs et comparatifs organisés autour d’une aire géographique particulière par exemple.

À ce titre, cet ouvrage se donne comme une alternative crédible, actualisée et plutôt réussie au classique “Matrilineal kinship” de David M. Schneider et Kathleen Gough ([éds.] 1961), ce qui, il me semble, n’est déjà pas un mince exploit.

Laurent Barry

**McLeod, Hugh:** *The Religious Crisis of the 1960s*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 290 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-929825-9. Price: £ 45.00

This is not the first book by Hugh McLeod, Professor of Church History in the Department of Theology at Birmingham from 1973 to 2004 (<http://www.historycultures.bham.ac.uk/staff/mcleod.shtml>), about the violent, radical, drastic, and profound changes in Christianity in modern times. He has published among others, “Class and Religion in the Late Victorian City” (1974), “Religion and the People of Western Europe 1789–1970”

(1981, a revised edition), “Religion and Society in England, 1850–1914” (1996), and “Secularisation in Western Europe, 1848–1914” (2000), which are pioneering attempts at identifying the long-term patterns of religious development within Christianity, giving a synthesis with special reference to the relationship between religion and politics, and between religion and social (cultural) change. He is also the editor of the ninth volume of “The Cambridge History of Christianity: World Christianities, c. 1914–c. 2000” (2006), and the author of five of its chapters as well as the editor of the Routledge series “Christianity and Society in the Modern World.”

McLeod’s latest book, “The Religious Crisis of the 1960s,” is a penetrating analysis of religious change in the long 1960s (from about 1958 to 1974), orientated at the development in Christianity in the last three centuries, especially at the decline of religion (e.g., the rapid decrease in churchgoing) on the one hand, and at the revival of religion (new religious movements) on the other. These have been times of explosive innovation and in some aspects almost a revolution (a “new theology” and “new morality”) in all Christian churches, a time of social and cultural change when Christianity faced challenges from Eastern religions, Marxism, feminism, and above all from a new “affluent” lifestyle. The book focuses on the democratically governed countries of western and northern Europe (principally on England), on North America, and on Australasia, stressing the similarities and differences between their social and religious trends. It passes over the diverse religious situation in the Communist-ruled countries of eastern Europe, and of Spain and Portugal, ruled by right-wing dictatorships. Because the sixties were an international phenomenon, McLeod not only describes what happened to Christianity at that time, but (more difficult) tries to explain why it happened, and how these events shaped the rest of the 20th century. For the situation in England he draws on primary sources, particularly oral history (personal testimony, especially unpublished) in order to show how the changes were experienced by “ordinary people”; in the case of other countries he depends mainly on secondary sources.

Convinced that the gradual decline of Christendom should be a central theme in the history of western Europe and North America during the last three centuries and that the 1960s were a time of cultural, social, political, and religious (although largely unsuccessful) revolution, McLeod looks for the long-term preconditions and the short-term precipitants of the 1960s crisis. He sets himself the task of identifying the main religious changes across the Western world, explaining why these changes were happening, suggesting which common factors meant that the patterns of change in different countries were often so similar, and understanding how these changes were experienced by “ordinary people.” In describing and explaining the changes he highlights four major themes: first, the enormous increase in the range of beliefs and worldviews accessible from the 1950s to the 1970s to the majority of the population; second,

the change in the way people understood the religious identity of their own societies (not believing anymore that they live in a “Christian country”); third, a weakening of the process of socialization by which the great majority of children become members of Christian societies and are given their confessional identity and basic knowledge of Christian beliefs and practices; fourth, the deepening of divisions within Christian churches because of the intense conflict between conservatives and moderates.

In eleven chapters, beginning in the period after the Second World War and ending around the middle of the 1970s, McLeod describes and explains in chronological order what happened and why, leading to the contemporary situation of Christianity. Chapters 1, “The Decline of Christendom” (6–30), 2, “Late Christendom” (31–59), and 3, “The Early 1960s” (60–82), characterize the social and religious situation immediately after the Second World War and the institutional changes responsible for the religious crisis of the 60s. The author raises three key questions of interpretation: Was the religious crisis of the sixties the culmination of a long historical evolution, or a period of revolutionary rupture with the past? What is the possible relationship between the decline in churchgoing, the numbers of clergy, church reform movements, and the theological modernization taking place at the same time? Which social or religious groups were then the key agents of religious change? The general answer is that the 1960s were explosive not because of one key ingredient, but because many factors, initially separate, came together with currents of change and interacted with one another. The most important of these factors – affluence (5, “Affluence” [102–123]), the growth from the late 1950s of ideologically based subcultures (6, “New Worlds” [124–140]), theological radicalization (7, “1968” [141–160]), the “sexual revolution” (8, “Sex, Gender, and the Family” [161–187]), political radicalization and women’s search for greater freedom, self-fulfillment, and independence (10, “From ‘Christian Country’ to ‘Civilized Society’” [215–239]) – are the subject of consecutive chapters.

Chapter 4, “Aggiornamento” (83–101), describes the “new reformation” of Vatican II and the polarization within Catholic Christianity. The growing criticism of the churches and the emergence of the critical approach to the Bible were connected with the rejection of a legalistic code of morality in favor of situation ethics and with demands to interpret the Christian faith in a language appropriate to the twentieth century. The most dramatic expression of the spirit of reform in the Catholic church was the Second Vatican Council, especially as it did not fulfill many of the initial promises of progressive Christians, who underestimated the strength of more conservative forces within their own denomination. In consequence even if – because of growing ecumenical contacts – the differences between Christian denominations were losing much of their significance, the battles between liberals and conservatives within both Catholic and Protestant churches have dominated in the ecclesiastical history of the later twentieth century.

A very important factor (chapter 5), influencing the gradual decline of Christendom, was the arrival of millions of immigrants from the “south” and the “east,” attracted by the booming economies of western and northern Europe. The large numbers of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs in historically Christian countries changed their social and religious identity from mainly Christian countries to multicultural and multifaith societies, in which knowledge of and respect for a variety of traditions was needed. Interestingly, Christians at first welcomed the Muslims and Hindus as allies against secularism but in the longer term the strong religious identities of many immigrants provided an argument for seeing Europe as “multireligious” and weakened the privileged position of the Christian churches. Moreover the “fundamentalist” nature of many immigrant religions caused anxiety, and provided arguments for those who were hostile to all forms of religion.

The numerous social and religious changes initiated the emergence of some exotic counter-cultures (hippies), resistant to all established norms of respectable behaviour (chapter 6). Most counter-culturalists treated mainstream religion and churches as a part of conventional society, which had to be rejected, along with all kinds of religion. Religiously minded counter-culturalists were much more likely to take their inspiration from the East. At the same time the counter-culture met with many new forms of Christianity, especially the Jesus Movement and the Charismatic Movement (Charismatic Renewal). For that reason “the 1960s have been called by some historians ‘the secularisation decade’ and by others a time of ‘spiritual awakening’” (140) involving a large number of young people. On the other hand, the counter-cultural forms of Christianity gave way to a mood of eclecticism, which mixed elements drawn from different traditions and belief-systems.

Because of its importance McLeod pays a special attention to the year 1968 (chapter 7), when the desire to link the construction of a truly democratic society with the maximization of personal freedom based also on the gospel, was the strongest. But the role of religion was many-sided and even contradictory. Some activists were strongly influenced by Christianity (left-wing priests and the emerging Liberation Theology in Latin America); others had little interest in religion, and saw its rejection as an integral part of their liberation programme. It was in particular Marxism, that provided various forms of a total worldview. The Second Vatican Council raised great expectations among Catholics, but many progressivists (also some priests and nuns) left the church disappointed after the encyclicals “*Humanae Vitae*” and “*Sacerdotalis Celibatus*” issued by Paul VI. Unexpectedly, the encyclicals changed fundamentally the way Catholics saw their church and their place within it, making room for individual conscience and decision-making, eroding the authority of the pope and bishops.

The 1960s and early 1970s were a time of crisis for the churches in most Western countries but the

nature, extent, and causes of this crisis are hotly debated by historians. It is generally agreed that the “sexual revolution”, connected with the “second wave” of feminism and the gay liberation movement (also Gay Christian Movement), had important implications for religion (chapter 8). However, as McLeod admits, it is hard for the historian to account for the relationship between religious belief and sexual practice as the data, for example, do not provide any explanation of the observed correlation between early sexual experience and non-churchgoing.

Even if the churches still retained a major voice in public debate in the 1960s (and indeed in the 1970s and 1980s), their ability to regulate the private sphere of individual behaviour was fast diminishing. Declining church attendance and the involvement in the 1960s in church organizations of women, who so far had been mainly responsible for passing on religious beliefs and practices to the younger generation, were key factors in the weakening of the religious socialization of the next generation and a major source of alienation from the churches. This link between sex, gender, and rejection of the church was much clearer in predominantly Catholic countries, because of the prohibition of contraceptives (“*Humanae Vitae*”), and of the confrontations between the Catholic Church and the women’s movement over abortion.

Around 1967 nearly every church in the Western world saw a major decline in religious practice (chapter 9, “The Crisis of the Church” [188–214]). The impact on the Roman Catholic Church was particularly intense with a mass movement of resignations from the priesthood and an abandonment of churchgoing, while leaving conservative movements and more conservative branches of Protestantism largely unscathed. The later 1960s and early 1970s offered also a climate in which atheists, agnostics, or those who simply had no religion found it easier to “come out.” The main novelty was that those who rejected Christianity were increasingly ready to say so loudly and openly. The causes of this decline in the Catholic Church are hotly debated. One interpretation sees the abandonment of regular churchgoing as an emancipation from an oppressive obligation which could hardly have been maintained without considerable community (ethnic identity) pressure.

Chapter 10, “From ‘Christian Country’ to ‘Civilized Society’” (215–239), characterizes the legislative revolution and the unclear role played by religious arguments, by the churches and other religious groups, and by humanists in the debates. The 60s were a period when religious controversy evoked widespread interest, religious arguments played an important part in public debate, and legislators took serious notice of the positions taken by the churches. However, a lot of this interest in Christianity was of a critical kind, reflecting a dissatisfaction with conventional answers. It was indeed a period when nothing was any longer sacred, and taboos existed only to be broken. The key campaign was about the liberalization of the laws on abortion and divorce but more generally at issue were individual human

rights in societies consisting of people with different religious and moral convictions. The nineteenth- and twentieth-century version of Christendom – as a social order in which, regardless of individual belief, Christian language, rites, religious and moral teachings were taken for granted – assumed simply that the non-Christian minority had to respect the convictions of the majority. As the ideas of religious equality and individual freedom came to the fore, nearly all former laws came under attack, and have been modified or even repealed.

In McLeod's opinion the churches played a significant part in the debates on four most important issues: the abolition of capital punishment, and the reform of the laws on homosexuality, abortion, and divorce. Rather than claiming a unique status for Christianity, "liberal" and "pragmatic" Christians expected for themselves freedom of choice in the basic decisions of marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the upbringing of children and tried to act as the conscience of a pluralist society. Summarizing the legal reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, McLeod states that they marked an important stage in the decline of Christendom, and in the move towards a pluralistic society with many contrasting moral standpoints.

McLeod discusses "The End of Christendom?" in greater detail in the last chapter (240–256). He sees the decline of Christendom (but not necessarily of Christianity) as a long drawn out process: from the toleration by the state of a variety of forms of Christianity in the 18th century, to the open publication of anti-Christian ideas, to the separation of church and state and to the fourth and most complex stage of a gradual loosening of the ties between church and society. The "long 1960s" defined the patterns of religious belonging and practice in the Western world for the rest of the twentieth century. One manifestation was a sharp drop in attendance at church services by adults; another was the decline in the Christian socialization of the younger generation. The feminist revolution, when women rejected the current definitions of their femininity, the moral rules and career options prescribed by the churches, and then abandoned the task of passing on religious beliefs and customs to younger generation, had the most devastating effect on Christianity.

The 60s brought an explosion of new ways of understanding the world. As Christianity was less central, new options widened enormously, to include not only many new forms of Christianity (and Socialism), but also various non-Christian religions and many kinds of "alternative spirituality" (the Charismatic Movement). The growth in the number of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs (mainly through immigration) and also the growth in the number of professed atheists and agnostics contributed to the emergence of a religiously pluralistic society. But it would be a mistake to think that religion has been "privatized" in Europe. Certainly, there has been a secularization of many areas of everyday life, yet churches, and indeed mosques and temples, continued to be among the most significant institutions in Europe. But even if in the pluralist and relatively secular societies of the later

twentieth century, the Christian churches continued to play an important role, few people assumed any longer that they were living in a Christian society: the laws no longer purported to be based on Christianity, the links between religious and secular elites had diminished and in most churches both clergy and congregations were made up disproportionately of the middle-aged and the elderly.

In "Conclusion" (257–265) McLeod tries to explain why the years 1955–1975 were a period of such decisive change. There is no one simple explanation, as the historians and sociologists remain divided in their attempts to explain these changes. One of McLeod's arguments is that the crisis did not have any one overriding cause, but arose from the cumulative impact of a variety of smaller factors. In particular, it was the interaction between social changes of different kinds, as well as the interaction between social change and developments in politics and in the church, that made the 1960s such an explosive decade. Hence, an appropriate explanation must operate on three levels: the long-term preconditions, the effects of more immediate social changes, and the impact of specific events, movements, and personalities. To the long-term conditions belong especially the growth of religious toleration since the 17th century, intellectual critiques of Christianity going back to the 18th century, movements of political emancipation since 1789, and changes in thinking about ethics generally and sexual ethics especially since about 1890. The immediate social changes that happened after the Second World War were enabled by ideas previously limited to an avant-garde or to socially marginal groups. In this respect the 1960s were a key decade, separating the 1940s and 1950s from the 1970s and 1980s, and sharing aspects both of the period before and the period after.

As can be seen, according to McLeod, at least four areas have been responsible for the dramatic changes: the wide-ranging effects of "affluence," which had a major influence on patterns of home and neighborhood life and gradually brought about changes in mentality, and in the areas of gender and sexuality; the impact of new movements and ideals, which came to a head in 1968; the conflicts arising from attempts at church reform and theological modernization; and from the resistance which these encountered. The weakening of churches and orthodox Christianity in the "long 1960s" was due in part to the multiplication of alternatives, and to the emergence of a climate of thinking in which individual searching and a degree of eclecticism were more approved than strict adherence to any system of orthodoxy. But the distancing of individuals from Christianity and the church was a gradual process and is as yet far from complete. What did change much more quickly was the way in which people in Western societies defined their nation's religious identity, referring to Western societies as "pluralist," "post-Christian," or even "secular."

The body of literature on the religious situation of the 60s is quite large. Professional historians will certainly find some causes for objection to McLeod's sometimes

provocative theses. The book's title is somewhat misleading: it is not about religion in general, as it says, but about the religious situation of Christianity. The book stands out above other similar publications in clarity of argumentation and depth of understanding. Though it is about the past, it gives – thanks to clear questions and answers well testified by evidence – a better understanding not only of turbulent changes in the past but of the contemporary situation of Christianity in Europe as well, presenting the decisive factors which contributed to its contemporary social and cultural situation. In particular, it shows the gradual dismantling of the presence of Christianity in public life very well. In portraying the decline of Christianity the author concentrates in a way typical for a sociologist on quantitative (objective) data (especially the tables in chapters 2 and 3): churchgoing, confirmations, infant baptisms, Easter communicants, and Sunday School. Reading this book is an enriching experience, making the reader wiser. At this point let me mention some another stimulating book, "The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity" (Oxford 2002), by Philip Jenkins. I was studying this at the same time as I was reading McLeod and I find the two complementary. His book is about Christianity's past; Jenkins's about its future. Andrzej Bronk

**Michaud, Jean:** "Incidental" Ethnographers. French Catholic Missions on the Tonkin-Yunnan Frontier, 1880–1930. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2007. 279 pp. ISBN 978-90-04-13996-1. (Studies in Christian Mission, 33) Price: € 104.00

Im allerersten Aufsatz dieser Zeitschrift, "Le rôle scientifique des Missionnaires", schreibt Alexandre Le Roy: "Le rôle du missionnaire en mission, quel est-il, avant tout? ... il faut que le missionnaire – le chef de mission surtout – se fasse comme un plan de campagne, impliquant avant tout l'étude et la connaissance du pays et de ses habitants, des mœurs indigènes, des lois, des religions, des langues etc. Cette étude n'est pas étrangère à l'accomplissement de sa mission: elle lui est nécessaire, et mieux il connaîtra le milieu dans lequel il travaille, moins il s'exposera à faire des fautes, plus il se donnera des chances humaines de succès" (*Anthropos* 1906: 4). Die Rolle des Missionars als Ethnologe ist auch das Thema des vorliegenden Buches von Jean Michaud, dargestellt und diskutiert am Beispiel einiger französischer Missionare der Pariser "Missions Étrangères" (MEP), die Ende 19. Jh./Anfang 20. Jh. in Tonkin (Nordwestvietnam) und im angrenzenden chinesischen Gebiet von Yunnan tätig waren und dabei "beiläufig" (incidental) auch zu Ethnographen und Ethnologen wurden.

Allerdings sollte der Leser nicht erwarten, dass es in dem Band nur und ausschließlich um die im Titel genannte Thematik geht. Im Gegenteil, damit befassen sich in einiger Ausführlichkeit erst die drei letzten Kapitel, zusammengefasst im 4. Teil (129–233); und sie bilden damit nicht einmal die Hälfte des Buches. Denn um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, nimmt der Autor einen großen Anlauf. Doch möchte ich zunächst die einzelnen

Kapitel, resp. Teile, der Reihe nach kurz vorstellen und kommentieren.

"Setting the Scene", der 1. Teil, umfasst die Kapitel 1 und 2 (1–39). Hier informiert der Autor über Ziel und Komposition seiner Publikation. Es geht ihm darum, seinen Lesern aus dem Kreis der Ethnologen ein Stück kaum bekannter Ethnographie über Indochina (Nordindochina und Yunnan) zu erschließen, wie es von französischen Missionaren zur Zeit der Blüte von "Französisch Indochina" verfasst und veröffentlicht wurde. Zum Zweiten möchte der Autor diese ethnographischen Informationen kritisch gewichten und werten. Michaud geht kurz auf die in den letzten Jahrzehnten immer wieder diskutierte Problematik der ambivalenten Beziehung von Missionaren und Ethnologen ein; er begründet die von ihm gewählte geographische Seite seines Themas (Nordtonkin, Yunnan) und er zeigt und erläutert Anlage und Struktur seines Buches (1. Kap.). Das folgende Kapitel gibt einen Überblick über Bevölkerung und kulturellen Hintergrund der Region.

Mit dem 2. Teil, "Colonial Ethnography and the French Heritage" (41–83), zeichnet Michaud den historischen Rahmen für eine Ethnographie von französischen Missionaren, wie sie unter früheren kolonialen Bedingungen realisiert wurde und wie sie vielleicht den entsprechenden Bemühungen in Tonkin/Yunnan als Vorbild gedient hat bzw. hätte dienen können. So befasst sich das 3. Kapitel ("French Ethnography in New France") ausführlich mit französischen Ethnologen und Ethnographen wie z. B. Sagard, Lafitau und Brébeuf, die im 17. und 18. Jh. in französischen Kolonien in Nordamerika als Missionare tätig waren (43–63). Es folgt ein Blick auf die Bedingungen, denen zwei Jahrhunderte später französische Missionare in ihrer Ausbildung unterworfen waren. Dabei zeigt sich, dass künftigen Missionaren kaum nützliche Handreichung für eine mögliche Betätigung auf dem Gebiet von Ethnographie/Ethnologie gegeben wurde. Das gilt gewiss für die Missionsgesellschaft der MEP, die im Zentrum der Überlegungen des Buches steht.

Schritt für Schritt bereitet der Autor weiter das Feld für die Erörterung seines eigentlichen Themas vor. Im 3. Teil, "Upper Tonkin" (85–127), werden frühere Beiträge zu einer Ethnographie von Nordtonkin vorgestellt, zunächst überwiegend von Nicht-Missionaren (5. Kapitel), dann vor allem aber von Missionaren (6. Kapitel).

Nachdem nun die weitläufigen Vorarbeiten einigermaßen abgeschlossen sind ("The stage is now set"; 131), kann der Autor jetzt zum eigentlichen Hauptteil seines Buches kommen, zum 4. Teil: "Missionary Authors and Their Texts". Hier geht es in erster Linie um die drei MEP Missionare und ihre Rolle als Ethnographen, eine Rolle, die sie neben der als Missionar gespielt haben: Alfred Liétard (1872–1912), Paul Vial (1855–1917) und François Marie Savina (1876–1941).

Wiederum wird zuerst der Rahmen abgesteckt (7. Kapitel) und der Hintergrund gezeichnet auf dem die ethnographischen Bemühungen der Genannten vom Au-