

The West versus the Rest? A Pluralist English School Perspective on the Ukraine War

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Abstract

This chapter shows how the pluralist thoughts within English School Theory contribute much better to our understanding of India's and Brazil's view of the Ukraine War than Realism does. Those countries refrain from choosing sides and emphasise the role of diplomacy in finding a solution. They do not think or behave along power concepts and do not bandwagon with China, Russia, nor the West. What they are striving for, is a fair share in resources, knowledge, and the economy; and – most important – in the institutions of the Cold War, like the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and indeed the UN. Only a reform of the United Nations Security Council and the veto power, the countries of the global South believe, can bring equality and a true international society, the core of English School theory. The Ukraine war triggers, once again, this reflex by the global South and in particular by India and Brazil.

Keywords: English School, Realism, Pluralism, BRICS, India, Brazil

1. Introduction

When commenting on the BRICS meeting in August 2023, Günther Maihold correctly observed: ‘G7 needs to be aware that the formation of BRICS+ is more than a mere political manoeuvre to advance China’s vision of international order. All the BRICS+ members and the future group of partner countries have their own agendas, and the BRICS forum is one of the various platforms on which member countries try to promote their vision of the wor(l)d, especially for their participation with better conditions in the global economy.’¹

The former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, David Miliband (2007-2010), elucidates the behaviour of those non-Western countries: ‘Western conviction about the [Ukraine, JN and SdL] war and its importance is matched elsewhere by skepticism at best and outright disdain at worst,’ holding that ‘it threatens the renewal of a rules-based order that reflects

¹ Maihold “The geopolitical moment of the BRICS+.”

a new, multipolar balance of power in the world.”² According to him, “[m]uch of the fence-sitting [of non-Western countries, JN and SdL] is not driven by disagreements over the conflict in Ukraine but is instead a symptom of a wider syndrome: anger at perceived Western double standards and frustration at stalled reform efforts in the international system.”³ Miliband then lists many frustrations of countries like India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil that the war and Western competition with China are pushing ‘urgent issues such as debt, climate change, and the effects of the pandemic,’⁴ to the background.

The observations by Maihold and Miliband stand in stark contrast to those analysts leaning toward (neo-)realist explanations. Whether it is power, power play or geo-political changes, the behaviour by those non-NATO or EU states and in particular Brazil, India and South Africa, are often explained by bandwagoning with China and Russia. Bandwagoning, as neo-realist theory tells us, means that weaker states align with a great or superpower because they have (almost) no other choice within the anarchic system. Either it is actively promoted by China with the Global South Initiative (GSI),⁵ or the US lost its influence and nations jumped on the bandwagon of the alternative world vision offered by China and Russia.⁶ But those analysts often err.

The behaviour of non-aligned countries is much more diverse than it looks at first sight. Many of those countries outside Europe clearly reject taking sides with Russia and/or China. Instead, the countries in the global South are showing more and more protecting their national interests, while at the same time staying non-aligned.⁷ Yet, this cannot be explained by reducing their motives to (neo-)realist rationalisations. The reasons for their behaviour can be much better found in past and present actions by the Western countries, in particular those countries related to G7 and OECD.

To understand the behaviour of non-Western countries, we need to turn to more rigorous theories. However, while being right in his analysis of the possible motivations of non-Western countries, Miliband only reluctantly and more implicitly touches upon possible deeper, theoretical explanations. At best, he is using the term ‘Realpolitik,’ almost in its original meaning. As von Rochau more than 150 years ago stated, ‘successful statecraft depended on an appreciation of the historical

² Miliband “The world beyond Ukraine: The survival of the West and the demands of the rest,” 36.

³ *idem*, 37.

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ Lin and Blanchette “China on the offensive: How the Ukraine war has changed Beijing’s strategy.”

⁶ Labgrima “A growing BRICS shows U.S. is losing the battle for the global South.”

⁷ Shidore “The return of the global South: Realism, not moralism, drives a new critique of western power.”

circumstances in which the statesman operated.’ Yet, even more important ‘was the ability to anticipate, and adjust oneself to, the changing conditions of modernity.’⁸

When looking at non-Western states, however, their policy towards the Ukraine conflict can best be understood not with realism or with Realpolitik but from an English School perspective. In particular pluralism, one important line of thought within English School, sheds light on the reactions of non-Western countries. It advocates that states do not have to be all the same (democracies), instead embracing diversity for as long as minimal standards of coexistence – an international society – are met. This resembles the rule-based order Miliband is referring to.

Our chapter looks at two important countries in the global South, India and Brazil, to figure out what the reasons might be for not univocally sharing the Western narrative and to what extent those countries interpret the actions by the West as a confirmation of their criticism. We do not want to criticise the Western support of Ukraine but want to use the insights of English School to analyse how India and Brazil argue and what the consequences might be for future relations of the West with the rest.

To that end we first explain in short, the core of English School theory, focusing on the pluralist thought. In the second part, we are using what Buzan calls pluralist primary institutions to develop a framework for analysing selected contributions by Brazil and India.⁹ What follows is the analysis and interpretation of our findings.

2. A short introduction to English School

The English School, although coming of age since its beginnings in the 1960s, is an important yet often overlooked concept within International Relations theory. Contrary to realism, with central concepts like anarchy and power, and liberalism and its strive for an international government or world society, the English School adheres much more to the concept of international society. Hedley Bull wrote that it ‘comes into being “when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”’¹⁰

Order is a basic condition wherein international society resembles the national society that provides security against violence; stability of property, private or public; and observance of agreements. It is associated with Grotianism/Rationalism

⁸ Bew, *Realpolitik: A History*, 6.

⁹ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*, 9.

¹⁰ Bull cited in Linklater “English School.”

and ‘about the institutionalization of mutual interest and identity among states and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, norms, rules and institutions at the center of IR theory.’¹¹

There exist two competing lines of thought within English School, i.e. solidarists and pluralists. Nicholas J. Wheeler defines solidarism as ‘the solidarity, or potential solidarity, of the states that make up international society, concerning the enforcement of the law.’¹² Solidarism recognises that individuals have rights and duties under international law but acknowledges that these rights for individuals can only be enforced by states. Solidarism assumes that states serve the interests and goals of people, not the other way around. Human rights and security are more important than the sovereignty of states, in other words, morality takes precedence over the principle of sovereignty.¹³

Contrary to solidarism, pluralism states that international society gains most by respecting the independence of states. It is important to respect the central role of interstate consensus in the international order, the importance of ethical diversity among states, and the fragility of normative progress.¹⁴ Pluralism assumes that states reach an agreement with each other about certain norms and disciplines of behaviour through past interactions and experiences. This agreement ensures that order is maintained at the international level, but this process of agreement is affected by the wide diversity of ethical principles and views of governmental systems. It makes agreements fragile and difficult to push in a progressive direction.¹⁵

3. Primary institutions of international society

Primary institutions are institutions of international society that are durable practices that evolved and ‘are constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each other.’¹⁶ Table 19.1 gives an overview of those primary institutions.

Some of the concepts, or masters as Buzan calls it, in Table 19.1 come close to realism and realist thought. The important difference is that English School does not consider those masters to enlarge individual countries’ power, but to contribute

¹¹ Buzan “An introduction,” 12–13.

¹² Wheeler *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*.

¹³ Lis *Do English School ‘Solidarists’ Provide a Convincing Justification for Humanitarian intervention?* For an analysis of BRICS countries’ and solidarism, see Tüzgen and Oguz Gök “Understanding the policies of the BRICS countries in R2P cases: An English School perspective,” 3–29.

¹⁴ Williams *Pluralism, the English School and the Challenge of Normative Theory*.

¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶ Buzan “The primary institutions of international society,” 167.

Primary Institutions	
Master	Derivative
Sovereignty	Non-intervention
	International law
Territoriality	Boundaries
Diplomacy	Messengers/ diplomats
	Conferences/Congresses
	Multilateralism
	Diplomatic language
	Arbitration
Balance of Power	Anti-hegemonism
	Alliances
	Guarantees
	Neutrality
	War
	Great power management
Equality of people	Human Rights
	Humanitarian intervention
Inequality of people	Colonialism
	Dynasticism
Trade	Market
	Protectionism
	Hegemonic stability
Nationalism	Self-determination
	Popular sovereignty
	Democracy

Table 19.1: The nested hierarchy of international institutions

to a stable international society by adhering to those principals. In other words, if countries respect sovereignty and territoriality, using diplomacy to come to terms, starting to improve the equality of people – less in a liberal sense but much more as a basic condition – then a peaceful coexistence would be possible.

This is why pluralism helps to understand the reluctance of parts of the world to share and defend support of Ukraine by the West, notwithstanding the

conundrum of not rejecting or even supporting this war. The analysed countries solve this conundrum of being pluralist and not condemning the intervention at the same time, by blaming both Russia and Ukraine for being responsible for the war. Pluralism repeatedly emphasises that interventions by the West are leading to the 'West versus the Rest.' To come to an international society, states must agree on basic norms and values that are shared by all. Pluralists are afraid that any intervention of the West interferes with that principle and that this in turn leads to yet another alienation between the West and the rest of the world.

We expect that the countries under scrutiny, Brazil and India, are using arguments related to the primary institutions of international society. To show that we are basing our analysis on the derivatives of Table 19.1, we are analysing selected documents, speeches and other public utterances by officials of the countries. We also refer to publications from pundits to put the behaviour of the countries into perspective. We are using the masters from Table 19.1 and their derivatives and are skimming the texts, i.e. a first quick read of the text to find relevant passages. After that we are scanning those more relevant parts and placing them into context.¹⁷ Given the scope and range of our research, we are not looking for other indicators that might reflect solidarism, liberalism, or realism. Our aim is solely to show how Brazil and India are arguing along pluralist thought lines.

4. India

After its independence in 1947, India balanced between the two superpowers during the Cold War. At the same time the country was always emphasising its independence and its right to choose its own way. This is expressed, among others, by its founding initiative of the Non-Aligned Movement, named in 1950 during Nehru's reign, and its role within the Group of 77 in the UN.

Nowadays, the country has the largest population in the world and its economy accounted for 7.2% of the global economy in 2022.¹⁸ Its top trading partners are the US, China, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and countries in the region, like Singapore, Indonesia and Australia.¹⁹ At the same time, the country relies on Russia for its energy supplies and weapons. Although Russia's share of total Indian arms imports fell from 64% to 45% over the last years on average, the country is still the largest supplier of weapons and India is the largest arms industry market for Russia. The

¹⁷ Doorewaard, Kil, van der Ven *Praktijkgericht kwalitatief onderzoek. Een praktische handleiding*.

¹⁸ Statista India: *Share of global gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) from 2018 to 2028*.

¹⁹ Cogoport A *Showcase of India's Top 10 Trade Partners*.

second supplier of arms is France and the third the US.²⁰ India is depending on several sides (in)directly involved in the Ukraine War. India was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2021-2022.

4.1 India and the Ukraine War

When analysing the speeches during UNSC meetings and by the Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, the pluralist attitude of the country becomes apparent. India demanded ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States,’ during the first days of the Russian invasion in Ukraine.²¹ Modi reiterated this during an address to the Joint Session of the US Congress on 23rd June 2023: ‘With the Ukraine conflict, war has returned to Europe. It is causing great pain in the region. Since it involves major powers, the outcomes are severe. Countries of the Global South have been particularly affected. The global order is based on the respect for the principles of the UN Charter, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.’²² This quote not only reflects pluralist’s masters, but directly addresses its core, global order and the principles of UN, e.g. sovereign equality, peaceful settlement of conflicts, refraining from threat, and – important in this respect – the non-intervention principle of the UN in internal affairs.²³

The master primary institutions: diplomacy	Source	Page
[...] focusing diplomacy to address all issues concerning the situation	5974th meeting	6
[...] with international law and with agreements [...]	5974th meeting	6
[...] sustained diplomatic dialogue between de concerned parties.	5974th meeting	6
Dialogue is the onlty answer te settling differences [...]	8979th meeting	7
[...] return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue	8980th meeting	5
[...] return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue	8983th meeting	10
[...] call for dialogue and diplomacy.	PM speaks with President Putin	1

Table 19.2: India Diplomacy

²⁰ Peri “India remains biggest arms importer between 2018-22 despite drop in overall imports.”

²¹ S/PV.8979, UNSC 8979th meeting; S/PV.8980, UNSC 8980th.

²² Modi *Address to the Joint Session of the US Congress on 23 June 2023*.

²³ United Nations *Charter Chapter 1*.

From the start of the conflict, India emphasised diplomacy as being key to a solution (Table 19.2). In India's view, both sides – Russia and Ukraine – must engage in a diplomatic solution respecting other key concepts of UN and pluralism, like sovereignty and territorial integrity. Modi repeated this in a personal engagement with Putin.²⁴ A year into the conflict, during a special session of the General Assembly, India again abstained from every vote – either on amendments brought to the table in favour of Russia or against it.²⁵ During that meeting, Mrs. Kamboj, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative, declared, again: 'India remains steadfastly committed to multilateralism and upholds the principles of the United Nations Charter. We will always call for dialogue and diplomacy as the only viable way out. While we take note of the stated objectives of today's resolution, given its inherent limitations in reaching our desired goal of securing lasting peace, we were constrained to abstain in the voting on it.'²⁶

India is reluctant to choose sides or even interfere in the conflict. There are different reasons for that. The country is not willing to give up its economic and military relations with Russia, given the rising tensions with China. This, however, does not exclude critical talks with Putin.²⁷ India fears that the conflict leads to an increase in prizes and the country seeks to keep trading with Russia, while it aims at the same time for diversification in its arms imports.²⁸ And, given its still unsettled issues of trade currency, it is trying to enlarge its own exports to Russia. Since the Western sanctions, it is difficult for Russia to trade in dollars. This is why India is trying to have all trade paid in Indian rupees. The biggest obstacle is the large imbalance in trade. While the country is exporting \$2.8 billion in the last fiscal year to Russia, it imported \$41.56 billion from the country, mainly crudes and weapons.²⁹ The country needs and wants to enlarge its exports to Russia with for example electronic items.³⁰ India, although trading with Russia and China, is relying on the US for security, too.³¹

In the end, it is unlikely that India will ditch Russia. It is critical, but also dependent. It 'refuses to form exclusive alliances with any great power';³² and the country is making clear that it demands a fair share of the UNSC and a reform,

²⁴ Pasricha "India remains steadfast in partnership with Russia."

²⁵ A/ES-11/PV.19, General Assembly, Eleventh Emergency Special session, 19th plenary meeting.

²⁶ A/ES-11/PV.19: 10/12

²⁷ Pasricha "India remains steadfast."

²⁸ Menon "The fantasy of the free world: Are democracies really united against Russia?"

²⁹ Sharma "Trade in Indian rupee with Russia shows hiccups in 'de-dollarisation' concept."

³⁰ Reuters "India hopeful of rupee trade with Russia after imports surge."

³¹ Menon "The fantasy of the free world: Are democracies really united against Russia?"

³² Lalwani and Jacob "Will India ditch Russia? Debating the future of an old friendship."

‘pitching for a permanent seat in the expanded membership of the UNSC, arguing that the existing body does not truly reflect the contemporary world realities.’³³

5. Brazil

The largest country on the South American continent, Brazil, is one of the five original BRICS countries. ‘As part of this group of emerging powers Brazil has played an increasingly vocal and central role in the evolution of major international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and adopted an important position as provider of economic, political, and physical security in the Americas.’³⁴ Until today, Brazil is playing an important role in expressing the global South’s thoughts about the Ukraine War and the frustrations with the West.

Being one of the largest countries in the world, it should come as no surprise that only 39.2% of its GDP accounts for foreign trade. Its largest trading partner – by far – is China which accounts for 26.8% of exports and 23.2% of imports. In comparison, to the US as the second most important trade partner Brazil is exporting 11.4% and importing 18.6%. Brazil’s main export products are iron ores, soya beans and petroleum oils.³⁵ Like almost all countries in the world, Brazil had to cope with a significant inflation up to 16% in 2021.³⁶

As will be seen, Brazil’s argumentation resembles that of India. There exists, however, one important political difference. Prior to 1st January 2023, Jair Messias Bolsonaro was president of the country, since that date, it is Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Brazil was a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2022-2023.

5.1 Brazil and the Ukraine War

From the beginning, Brazil aimed at a diplomatic solution: ‘Negotiations must also [...] take into account the security concerns of all parties to the conflict and [...] aim to create adequate conditions for an inclusive political dialogue that must reflect the diversity of and include representation from all the peoples of the region. Brazil does not underestimate the complexity of the current situation, but we insist on dialogue as key to achieving a lasting settlement to this conflict. Too much is at

³³ Singh “‘Another wasted opportunity’: India criticises delay in UNSC reforms: India, Brazil, South Africa, Germany and Japan are strong contenders for permanent membership of the UNSC.

³⁴ Burges *Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, 1.

³⁵ Santander *Brazilian Foreign Trade in Figures*.

³⁶ OECD *Economic Outlook*.

stake here, above all the lives of many civilians. We owe them all our efforts to bring this crisis to a peaceful solution.’³⁷

Many of the pluralist masters can be found in this quote, like diplomacy, balance of power, and human security. In Table 19.3 we see that this has not changed during the conflict.

The master primary institutions: diplomacy	Source	Page
‘We believe that the Security Council should strive to show a united resolve in pursuing diplomatic solutions to all threats to international peace and security’	8979th meeting	6
‘we need to create the conditions for dialogue among all parties involved’	8979th meeting	6
‘Brazil attempted to seek such a balance and to maintain a space for dialogue ’	8979th meeting	6
‘there does not appear to be willingness on either side for a ceasefire in the near future’	9245th meeting	15
‘Brazil understands that initiatives such as the temporary ceasefire ... pave the way for the resumption of dialogue ’	9243th meeting	11

Table 19.3: Brazil Diplomacy

What has changed, is Brazil’s voting behaviour. In the beginning of the conflict the country voted reluctantly against Russia³⁸ – for which it felt it did not get the credit by the West it deserved³⁹ – yet it quickly abstained under both presidents.⁴⁰ Shortly before the invasion, President Bolsonaro visited Putin and said he was ‘in solidarity with Russia,’ without elaborating. He later told reporters Putin had peaceful intentions.⁴¹ Lula himself does not choose sides, but championed himself as mediator to end the conflict, infused by his frustrations with the West. ‘The Brazilian peace initiative reflects a profound sense of frustration and fatigue in the developing world with a protracted confrontation that is generating massive humanitarian suffering, material costs and diplomatic uncertainty. Accordingly, Russia bears sole responsibility for initiating the war in Ukraine, but by now, the United States and Europe’s response has become equally blamable for sponsoring

³⁷ S/PV.8974, UNSC 8974th meeting.

³⁸ Paraguassu “Despite Bolsonaro reluctance, Brazil votes against Russia on U.N. resolution.”

³⁹ Hirst and Tokatlian “How Brazil wants to end the war in Ukraine.”

⁴⁰ S/PV.8979, UNSC 8979th meeting; S/PV.8980, 8980th meeting; A/ES-11/PV.19, 19th plenary meeting. Thursday, 23 February 2023, 3 p.m., New York.

⁴¹ Paraguassu “Despite Bolsonaros reluctance.”

a sine die proxy war.’⁴² According to Hirst and Tokatlian this reflects the stances of other Latin-American countries and Lula’s frustration is for a large part grounded in the unrests, invasions and wars after the Cold War, while Lula proclaims ‘the world requires tranquility.’

The post-Cold War world also made clear that the Cold War order is outdated. Both, Lula⁴³ and Bolsenaro,⁴⁴ are using the conflict to address UNSC reforms. Brazil has been doing it for years and is using the conflict to emphasise its unease with the current UNSC and the veto power of the permanent members. Outright frustrated, the permanent representative said a few days after the invasion ‘No country, elected or non-elected, with or without veto power, should be able to use force against the territorial integrity of another State with no Council reaction. The Council’s paralysis when world peace is at stake could lead to its irrelevance when we need it most. It is our collective responsibility not to allow that to happen.’⁴⁵ Lula reiterated this during his closing remarks of the G20 summit 2023 in India.⁴⁶

6. Implications: Pluralism versus realism

At first sight, it seems a bit odd using English School theory and pluralism to analyse the Ukraine war. From its beginnings, it is central to English School to structure the debate of interventionist vs. non-interventionists to protect human rights. Above all, it seems that Russia’s aggression can only be supported by proponents of realist thought, either for defending its own sovereignty or by defending its historical claims for Ukraine being part of larger Russia. Yet, as we show, English School and in particular pluralism can much better explain non-alignment and autonomic behaviour of a state than a system centric theory can, navigating between or distracting themselves from archaic power concepts in international relations.

As can be seen in Figure 19.1, to some extent the pluralist debate within English School indeed bears parallels with realist’s thinking, since its philosophical, legal, and theoretical foundations come close to realist thinking. ‘Although realism and pluralism start from different ontologies (system versus society), they share a similar vulnerability to pessimism.’⁴⁷ On the other hand, there must be some via-media between what Carr called utopianism – not having a relation with reality – and the

⁴² Hirst and Tokatlian “How Brazil wants to end the war.”

⁴³ Paraguassu “Brazil’s Lula says ‘neither Putin nor Zelenskiy ready for peace.UNSC.”

⁴⁴ General Assembly, Seventy-seventh session, 4th plenary meeting, Tuesday, 20 September 2022, A/77/PV.4,

⁴⁵ UNSC S/PV.8979, 10/17.

⁴⁶ Lula da Silva “Speech by President Lula at the closing of the G20 Summit.”

⁴⁷ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*, 93.

fatalistic realism.⁴⁸ Pluralism is this possible via-media, since it sees coexistence as the maximum that can be reached within international society. This coexistence is supported by what is called the primary institutions of international society.




Figure 19.1: The classical 'Three Traditions' model of English school. (Buzan. An Introduction to the English School of International Relations)

7. Conclusion

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and possibly even before, American and British troops have trained and supported the Ukrainian armed forces in their reform efforts. With the invasion of 24th February 2022, this support accelerated, and the Western world almost unanimously sent weapons to Ukraine, trained its soldiers on (advanced) weapon systems and is already making plans for the reconstruction of the country. While this support surprised many politicians, pundits, and Putin, the reactions in the rest of the world appear to be diverse. While only five countries supported Russia during a meeting of the UN general assembly shortly

⁴⁸ idem, 7-8; Noll and Rothman "Power denied? E.H. Carr and the conduct of the post Cold War interventions."

after the invasion in 2022 and more than 140 condemned the invasion, 40 countries⁴⁹ did not choose sides and abstained. One of the leading countries in abstention and navigating between the West and Russia is India. The other one is Brazil that in the first place voted against the Russian invasion but abstained after that.

This chapter has shown why the countries are not choosing univocally the side of the West and Ukraine. The main reasons are frustration about Western behaviour after the Cold War, i.e. selective invasions, wars, and selfishness by the West that made the global South suffer. That became not in the least place obvious during the Covid pandemic. Contrary to what certain pundits may expect, Brazil and India did not choose the side of China either. Once again, (neo-) Realism fell and falls short in explaining the consequences for international relations and security in the future.

As shown, English School and Pluralism are much better suited for understanding India's and Brazil's concerns the more those countries do not think or behave along power concepts. What they are striving for, is a fair share in resources, knowledge, and the economy; and – most important – in the institutions of the Cold War, like the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and indeed the UN. Only a reform of the UNSC and the veto power, the countries of the global South believe, can bring equality and a true international society. The Ukraine war triggers, once again, this reflex by the global South and in particular India and Brazil.

As a consequence, it is not multipolarity as some pundits want us to believe, but much more a networked world we are heading towards. As Shivshankar Menon pointedly mentioned ‘... dynamic of multiple affiliations and partnerships is the norm in Asia.’⁵⁰ And Sabine Mengelberg recently added, it is the EU that must get used to flexible cooperation and global connections.⁵¹ In that sense, India and Brazil might teach the EU a lot.

⁴⁹ Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi, Central African Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Senegal, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.

⁵⁰ Menon “The fantasy of the free world: Are democracies really united against Russia?”

⁵¹ Mengelberg “Wenn en aan een à la carte wereldorde.”

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