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Here to Stay! Embedding Nationalism in an Inclusive European Framework of Peace

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Abstract: Ever since its first appearance on the world stage, nationalism has had violent consequences. There is reason to worry that its current resurgence is no exception and will eventually also result in violent conflicts within and possibly even across European borders. To understand why this might be the case, and to identify ways that could contain renewed nationalist violence, this article looks beyond the populist nationalism of the past years and provides a nuanced picture of the nationalist principle and its macro-historical significance. Looking at evidence from research and remembering empirical examples from the inclusive, liberal post-Cold War period, it shows that violence is not inevitable and that the most heinous forms of nationalism can successfully be contained through accommodative and inclusive power-sharing arrangements. The article ends with some preliminary policy proposals and a first glimpse at alternative forms of identities that allow embedding the nationalist principle in an inclusive European framework of peace.

Keywords: nationalism, exclusion, inclusion, power-sharing, ethnic conflict, peace order

Schlagwörter: Nationalismus, Exklusion, Inklusion, Machtteilung, ethnische Konflikte, Friedensordnung

1. Introduction

With the world's tectonic plates in motion, there are today only few developments in world politics whose existence remain uncontested. One trend where there seems to be particular agreement among scholars and political analysts is the widely discussed and skeptically viewed rise of nationalist tendencies in Europe and its periphery.[1] However, unlike what the current debate would suggest, nationalism is not a resurging phenomenon of a long-forgotten time. Nationalism has been deeply enshrined in our system ever since the eighteenth-century revolutions.

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1   In line with the thematic focus of this issue, I restrict my analysis to Europe and its periphery, knowing that the rise of nationalism is a global phenomenon, as the examples of India, the Philippines, or the United States illustrate.

As a political principle, it is much more widely accepted than what its widespread condemnation would have us believe. Over the last two centuries, nationalism has transformed vast multinational empires into the current system of nation-states[2] by challenging the legitimacy of former state regimes and by putting into question the previously held view that a government's right to rule is independent of the will of its subjects (Hechter 2000). Although often rightly portrayed as an illiberal and dangerous ideology of a bygone era, nationalism has shaped the current European state system like no other doctrine and as such has become nothing less than the dominant political framework of the modern era.

Reducing nationalism to the form and shape of its current populist resurgence would thus not do it justice. It would not only belittle its macro-historical significance, but also ignore how profoundly nationalism has shaped some of civilization's most progressive achievements. In the West, nationalism provided the ideological foundation for liberal institutions such as democracy, the welfare state, and public education, which could only be made possible "in the name of a unified people with a shared sense of purpose and mutual obligation" (Wimmer 2019: 28). In the Global South, nationalism was the driving force behind the anticolonial movements that swept across post-war Africa and Asia and liberated people from European colonial domination.

Above everything else, nationalism is the understanding that members of a nation, defined as a group of equal citizens with a shared history and identity, should rule their own state and reject foreign rule. This is reflected in Gellner's (1983: 1) standard definition that describes nationalism as "primarily a political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent". Even the most outspoken critics of the current nationalist resurgence would probably agree that Gellner's nationalist principle is preferable to most other doctrines of state legitimacy that justify power by referring to, for example, divine guidance (theocracies such as the Vatican or the caliphate of the Islamic State), ancestry (dynastic kingdoms such as Saudi Arabia) or the affiliation to a specific party or class (one-party states such as the former Soviet Union).

If Gellner's principle of congruent national and political borders is fulfilled, nationalism as such is much less problematic and as mentioned before may even be an incubator for social progress. However, congruent political and national units were, if anything, the exception. There is hardly any border on the European continent that is not the result of violent confrontations fueled by the desire to fulfil Gellner's principle and to "render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit" (Hechter 2000: 7). The war in Eastern Ukraine is just the latest example of this phenomenon. Hence, while shaping the current European state system and constituting the

foundation for some of its most progressive institutions, nationalism is today mostly known for providing the setting for the modern era's large-scale violence.

With the rules-based international order eroding, with old alliances, such as NATO, becoming more fragile, and with competition between global powers increasing and American hegemony waning, there is good reason to worry that the current nationalist surge will also result in violent tensions or – in the most extreme case – another regional war on European soil. After presenting a number of examples of the current nationalist resurgence, this article will first discuss the causal mechanism that could trigger such an outbreak of violence. Then, looking at evidence from research and practice, it will show that violence is not inevitable, and present examples of cases from the liberal post-Cold War period where nationalism could successfully be contained. The last section presents preliminary proposals on how policymakers could translate the lessons from these examples into policies. It ends with a first glimpse at alternative forms of identities that allow embedding the concept of nationalism in an inclusive European framework of peace.

2. Back with a Vengeance: Nationalist Exclusion on the Rise

In the two decades following the end of the Cold War, it appeared that – at least in the European sphere of influence and with the exception of the Yugoslav Wars – the violent face of nationalism could effectively be contained. Optimistic analyses even went as far as predicting that the new system of liberal norms and institutions would eventually 'defang' nationalism entirely (see e.g. Fukuyama 1989). However, the last couple of years have made very clear that nationalism is here to stay. In several European states, we are currently witnessing an increasing number of people turning their back on liberal values and embracing populist parties that propagate illiberal forms of nationalism and exclusive definitions of identity.

Hence, instead of an ever more liberal and integrated Europe, we are currently observing an ethno-nationalist backlash and – as a consequence thereof – increasing levels of ethnic exclusion in the realms of political, economic, or cultural life. One consequence of these exclusive definitions of identity and citizenship is a reciprocal nationalism by excluded minorities, who withdraw their loyalties from the jurisdictional center by which they do not feel represented and focus them on a center of their own. This desire to reduce control by the central authority – in the most extreme case through a complete territorial disintegration in the form of secession or merger with the cultural motherland – is one of the most problematic, and potentially furthest-reaching aspects of the recent nationalist backlash. It not only calls into question existing state borders and threatens countries' right to territorial integrity, it also enables a growing acceptance of certain forms of intervention and ultimately undermines a fundamental pillar of the liberal European peace order.

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2   The nationalist doctrine equipped nation-states with a competitive advantage over multinational empires as it allowed the former to raise more taxes from the ruled, to count on their political loyalty, and to raise large armies whose soldiers were motivated to fight for the self-determination of their fatherland. According to Wimmer (2019), roughly 35 percent of the globe's surface was governed by nation-states in 1900. By 1950, this share has already grown to 70 percent. Today, only a handful of dynastic kingdoms or theocracies remain.

Manifestations of nationalist resurgence in the European Union

Examples of renewed nationalist exclusion are found across the continent. In Spain, the recent electoral success of the far-right nationalist Vox party, which not only condemns Catalan separatists but wants to ban separatist parties entirely, is probably the most visible evidence of mounting support for exclusionary identity politics in a country that for a long time seemed immune to the West's rising tide of nationalism. Rajoy's ideological intransigence and his government's repressive action against Catalan separatists in October 2017, together with the persecution of members of the former government of Catalonia for having organized the referendum on independence, provide additional evidence in that regard; they illustrate the strong aversion against inclusive and accommodative approaches among a large segment of Spain's political elite.

In the United Kingdom, Brexit is often seen as both the cause and the consequence of rising English nationalism[3] that is largely ignorant towards the other constituent parts and threatens the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom. The most recent annual Future of England survey, the longest-running study of English constitutional attitudes, has shown that large majorities of English Conservative voters would accept or even support Scottish independence (79%) or the collapse of the peace process in Northern Ireland (75%) as the price of Brexit (Center for Constitutional Change 2018). At the same time, nationalists in Scotland and Ireland are seizing on the Brexit 'mess' and push for a second Scottish independence referendum,[4] or call for a united Ireland,[5] respectively.

Exclusionary identity politics at the expense of national minorities is also prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe. In Hungary, Roma are excluded from various areas of social and economic life and face discrimination in the fields of education, employment, health and housing. Violence against Roma and refugees by right-wing radical paramilitary groups is accused of only being weakly prosecuted (European Court of Human Rights 2017). In Estonia, the consequences of the 1991 decision not to grant citizenship to approximately 32 percent Russian-speaking immigrants who arrived to the country during Soviet times, are still noticeable (Vogt et al. 2015). While the number of those non-citizens has since decreased to below 7 percent due to voluntary emigration and naturalization (Kivirähk 2014), the de-facto exclusion from the labor market and educational system through "a system of rigorous language and citizenship requirements for employment and limited possibilities of studying in minority languages in higher education" (Amnesty International 2006) remains in place. In Bulgaria, Macedonians remain politically discriminated in what the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2014) labelled a "climate of intimidation and harassment" as the government continues to deny existence of Macedonians as an ethnic minority, and as the constitutional court upholds the ban of the ethnic Macedonian party UMO Ilinden–PIRIN amidst accusation of foreign government-funded separatism. Macedonians face a similar situation in Greece, where the government has not just excluded the Macedonian minority from political power but has denied its existence entirely (BBC 2019).

Exclusion in the European periphery

Ethnically narrow governing ideologies and exclusionary politics do not only threaten the EU's security from within. In Europe's periphery, there is a large space spanning from the Western Balkans to the Caspian Sea, where nationalist ambitions and territorial claims fuel the exclusion of ethnic minorities and challenge the political stability of the region. Almost all of these challenges are connected to the collapse of the three great multi-ethnic empires that had dominated Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the Middle East until World War I – the Habsburg Empire, the Empire of the Russian Tsars and the Ottoman Empire – or the disintegration of two of their multinational successor states, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Their disintegration and the subsequent formation of new nation-states has led to new lines of exclusion, which in turn has triggered grievances and new ethnic conflicts. Spillover effects from this post-imperial space are currently one of Europe's biggest security challenges.

In Turkey, the cornerstone of NATO's southern flank, the AKP government – after re-launching the war on Kurdish insurgents in 2015 and after the failed coup attempt a year later – has further intensified its exclusionary policies against the Kurdish minority. Using terrorism charges and alleged threats to national security as a pretext, the government in Ankara repeatedly took control of municipalities won by the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) or its sister party, the Democratic Regions Party (DBP), and replaced democratically elected mayors with loyal trustees ("kayyums"). The seizure of Kurdish municipalities is only the most recent evidence of a development that saw Erdoğan move from an advocate of religious inclusiveness and pro-Kurdish rights – a stance that earned him more Kurdish votes than the pro-Kurdish HDP in the 2007 elections[6] – to an authoritarian leader relying on divisive Turkish nationalism and ethnic exclusion as the key path to preserving power. This development towards ethnic exclusion is also reflected in a recent study on public attitudes regarding Turkish self-perception that finds "strong consensus across party lines about Turkey's overall identity" and a "new nationalist spirit grounded deeply in Islam and opposition to Western nations and non-Turkish citizens" (Halpin et al. 2018: 19).

In the Western Balkans, identity politics are far from being overcome. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, divisive nationalist rhetoric and appeals for ethnic loyalty have accompanied the elections in October 2018, which selected nationalist hard-liner Milorad Dodik as chairman and Serb member of the tripartite Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. His repeated announcements to organize a unilateral referendum on secession (New York Times 2018) and the recent decision by Bosnian Serb lawmakers to establish a new reserve police

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3   The Guardian: "Don't blame the Irish: the Brexit chaos is all about England" (9 November 2018).
4   Financial Times: "Brexit makes the case for an independent Scotland" (2 May 2019).
5   The Guardian: "A progressive, united Ireland seems more likely than ever – thanks to the DUP" (11 July 2019).

6   Washington Post: "Turkey's Kurdish conflict has surged again. Here is why." (21 March 2017).

force – a move which risks triggering an arms race within the federation and stands in direct challenge to the Dayton Agreement that regulates the number of police units in the entities – continuous to cement what the International Crisis Group (2014: 1) once called a "wall of nationalist prevarication and procrastination".


Figure 1: Transnational settlement areas of ethnic groups in Central/Southeastern Europe

This form of identity politics in the Western Balkans is not confined to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina but spreads across a region, which is already characterized by a high mismatch of national and political boundaries – as illustrated in Figure 1[7] – and therefore particularly vulnerable to exclusive identity politics. This is currently manifested in growing animosities between Serbia and Kosovo amidst talks about partition of Kosovo, continued exclusion of North Macedonians and Greeks in Albania, or anti-Albanian rallies in Skopje protesting plans for a coalition government between the Social Democratic Union of North Macedonia and parties from the country's Albanian minority.

Third, in the post-Soviet space on Europe's eastern flank, the breakup of the Soviet Union did not create homogenous nation-states, but has brought into existence fifteen multi-ethnic Soviet successor states with new minorities and new lines of conflict and exclusion. In Ukraine, the Russian minority has seen repeated linguistic discrimination, from the 2014 decision of the Ukrainian Parliament to repeal the language law that allowed many cities and regions to declare Russian a regional language in their jurisdictions, to the recent decision in April this year, when the Ukrainian Parliament approved a law that makes the Ukrainian language mandatory for public sector workers. The ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh or the de-facto independent status of Transnistria and Gagauz in Moldova are further illustrations of the devastating consequences of exclusionary practices in Europe's neighboring region.

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7   The illustration in Figure 1 was created with the program R by the author and is based on the 2018 update of GeoEPR (see Wucherpfennig et al. 2011).

Growing exclusion in numbers

The above examples of rising nationalism and exclusionary politics are not simply subjective assessments based on individual cases, but are part of a broad trend away from the inclusionary, accommodating politics by many European governments in the past 70 years. This trend is also reflected in a number of large-N datasets. Figure 2 combines two such datasets and depicts data on 1) ethnic exclusion and 2) governmental concessions to ethnic self-determination groups in 45 countries in Europe and its periphery[8].


Figure 2: Combined size of politically excluded population as a share of the total population between 1946 and 2017 (line) and bi-yearly number of governmental concessions to self-determination groups between 1945-2012 (bars) for 45 countries in Europe and its periphery

The line in Figure 2 depicts the combined size of politically excluded population (i.e. the population belonging to an ethnic group that is excluded from executive state power[9]) as a share of the total population of the 45 countries in Europe and its periphery. The graph is based on the 2018 update of the *EPR Core Dataset* by Vogt et al. (2015), which provides annual data on all politically relevant ethnic groups and their degree of access to executive state power by those who claim to represent them.[10] The line in Figure 2 shows an often constant, but overall decreasing level of ethnic exclusion across Europe and its periphery since 1946, with a major plunge after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the release of many titular nations into independence. After constantly low levels of ethnic exclusion since the end of the Cold War, the last years have witnessed a reversal of the trend and a significant

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8   Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Germany Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, North Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia (Turkey not included as data only available from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR) by Vogt et al. (2015)).

9   EPR defines executive power as follows: "depending on where political power is effectively exercised, this can be the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration in democratic regimes; the army command in military dictatorships; or the ruling party leadership in one-party states". Based on this definition, ethnic groups were then categorized according to the degree of access to executive state power along a roughly ordinal scale composed of seven categories: Monopoly, dominance, senior partner, junior partner, powerless, discrimination, self-exclusion, of which the latter three are considered politically excluded (EPR Codebook).

10 The dataset covers the period from 1946 to 2017 and all countries with a population of at least 250,000.

rise of ethnic exclusion. Although relatively small in absolute terms, the recent increase is unprecedented in the period since 1946 and provides clear evidence that the trend towards more inclusionary and accommodative politics has been reversed.

A similar message is conveyed by the bars in Figure 2 that depict the number of governmental concessions to ethnic self-determination groups between 1945-2012 in the same 45 countries. The data show a steady increase – again with an extreme outlier caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union – in accommodative policies until the mid-2000s and a downward trend since. The data for the graph is provided by the *Self-Determination Movements (SDM) Dataset* (Sambanis et al. 2018) that identifies violent and non-violent ethnic groups around the world that make claims for increased self-determination between 1945 and 2012. The dataset tracks policies by the government that increase a group's level of self-determination, including concessions on regional autonomy[11] and policies that increase a group's cultural, linguistic, or religious rights[12]. As with political exclusion above, the data are an indication that inclusion and accommodation are not necessarily the preferred concepts anymore in the political and institutional management of ethno-cultural diversity in Europe's multinational states.

3. The Scientific Rationale: From Nationalism to Conflict

Throughout the last 250 years, nationalism has been associated with some of the most destructive wars of human history. There is reason to worry that the above-described resurgence will also result in violent conflicts within and possibly even across European borders. To understand why this might be the case, this chapter presents evidence from research on the causal link between nationalism and violent conflict, and shows, why ethnic exclusion makes armed conflict so much more likely.

Understanding the nationalist resurgence: The 'cultural backlash' theory

The reasons and motives for the current nationalist resurgence are manifold. To fully understand them would require a meticulous investigation that goes beyond the scope and purpose of this article. Yet, in order to address the problem and to understand its hazardous potential as a trigger of violent conflict, a deeper understanding of the current nationalist resurgence is indispensable. In a much-noticed article on the subject, Inglehart and Norris (2016) provide a comprehensive

analysis of the debate. Looking at survey data from 38 European countries, they identify the 'cultural backlash' theory as the most powerful explanation for the rise of identity politics and populist nationalism in Western societies. Unlike the widely-held view of the 'economic insecurity' hypothesis[13], the 'cultural backlash' hypothesis explains the nationalist resurgence with hostile reactions among social conservatives who feel threatened by the erosion of traditional values and the growing support for progressive, post-materialist values in Western societies.[14] As a consequence, they become more susceptible to populist discourse and more likely to switch their voting preferences to parties with narrow definitions of citizenship that portray themselves as defenders of traditional values against a globalizing world in which traditional ties of nationhood are being dissolved. Using a historical analogy, one might compare the current trend as a move away from the territorially inclusive state-building nationalism of post-revolutionary France, towards a more exclusive nationalism that is closer to the German unification nationalism of the early nineteenth century, which defined citizenship as a community based on common descent and cultural factors (Brubaker 1992).

From nationalism to ethnic exclusion

Ethnic exclusion has been a faithful companion of the nation- and state-building process. To illustrate this, one can compare the macro-historical process of nationalism with a game of musical chairs in which there are many more ethnic groups than there are viable governance units. As a consequence of this "state-to-nation deficit" (Gellner 1983: 2), many nations found themselves without their own state but incorporated into a foreign state, where power was captured by the elites of another group and where they fell victim to political exclusion, discrimination, repression or – in the most extreme case – ethnic cleansing.[15] In that scenario, nationalism is likely to become a generator of what Tilly (1999: 172) calls "categorical inequalities" or what is generally known as "political horizontal inequalities", i.e. inequalities in political dimensions between culturally defined groups within the same state.

These horizontal inequalities arise in cases where rival aspirants to nationhood seek political influence by pursuing inclusion of their own group and simultaneously excluding other groups from access to power. Horizontal inequalities resulted, for example, from the attempt to consolidate, modernize and centralize the newly established Turkish nation-state that suppressed any challenge to the Turkish national ideology and identity. Exclusive ethno-nationalism was also at the core of the aggressive nation-building projects of Milošević in Serbia and Tuđman in Croatia that targeted ethnic minorities and reversed the multi-ethnic, federal system of former Yugoslavia after its

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11 These concessions are the most frequent government policies regarding self-determination movements. They include cases such as the Belfast Agreement ('Good Friday Agreement') that led to significant devolution of power to the Northern Ireland Assembly (McGarry and O'Leary 2004) or the Basque Autonomy Statute of 1987 which gave the Basque Country – among other things – its own Parliament and Prime Minister, its own police force and the right to raise and spend tax money (Weaver 2002).

12 Examples for cultural rights concession are the 2002 Omnibus Law that granted Vojvodina autonomy over cultural and economic affairs and re-established Hungarian as one of the official languages in the Vojvodina province of Serbia (Petsinis 2003), the legislative act of 1968 that recognized Muslims as a nationality of Yugoslavia and Albanian as an official language (Ognjenovic and Jozelic 2016), or the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001 that granted autonomy in the form of municipal decentralization and concessions on language to the Albanian minority in Macedonia (Bieber 2005).

13 The economic insecurity hypothesis understands the recent trend as a consequence of the profound changes that have transformed the workforce and the society in postindustrial economies and have led to rising economic insecurity and social deprivation among the 'left-behinds', who become receptive to nativist, nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric of populist movements.

14 According to Inglehart and Norris (2016), multicultural and secular values, the diversity of peoples and lifestyles in open and inclusive societies and the growing cosmopolitan support for international cooperation and multilateral organizations had generated resentment, anger, and a sense of loss among many traditionalist voters.

15 In this article, I refer to this type of power asymmetry as political exclusion.

dissolution. Turkey, Serbia and Croatia are just three cases of a large number of examples worldwide, where nationalism fueled exclusion along ethnic lines and eventually civil unrest within multiethnic states. Prominent examples outside the European continent include the assimilatory centralism of the Burmese majority in post-independence Burma, the ethnic domination in Ethiopia by the Amhara under Haile Selassie and Mengistu, or the ethno-political competition over power in post-independence Nigeria that led to the devastating war over Biafra (Cederman et al. 2013).

From exclusion to violent conflict: The grievances argument

In all of these cases, exclusion and discrimination was answered with armed conflict. From the Kurdish resistance in Turkey, the UÇK insurgency in Kosovo, to the EPRDF's toppling of the Derg regime in Ethiopia, or the uprising of armed ethnic groups in post-independence Burma, it was politically excluded groups that responded to the violation of the nationalist principle of self-rule with secessionist violence or with an insurgency aimed at toppling a government they considered illegitimate.

For a long time, the literature on the causes of political violence has relied on individualist, opportunity-driven explanations of violence that put rational economic calculations at the center of individual decisions to rebel (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Opposed to this simple rational choice approach stands an increasingly influential strain of research that dismisses opportunity-driven accounts and focuses on motivation as the primary cause of violent action. Building on the work of relative deprivation theories (e.g. Gurr 1970) and referring to, among others, the empirical examples above, these scholars understand violence as a reaction to collectively experienced frustrations, anger or alienation stemming from structural inequalities along ethnic lines (e.g. Stewart 2008, Cederman et al. 2013). Individuals, rather than seeing rebellion as an opportunity to improve their economic situation, are motivated by deep-seated grievances about their own group's political status and by the need for collective self-esteem and group worth as described in the Social Identity Theory of Tajfel (Tajfel and Turner 1979). In this process, ethnicity – defined as a socially constructed[16] concept that generates a subjectively experienced sense of belonging and solidarity based on the belief in common ancestry and shared culture – serves both as a multiplier of individual grievances (Oberschall 1993) and as a vehicle to mobilize and overcome problems of collective action (Brubaker and Laitin 1998).

This grievance-centered strain of research has brought forward some prominent findings regarding the drivers of conflict. Cederman et al. (2010), for example, find that ethnic groups that are excluded from executive, political power are significantly more likely to engage in civil conflict than groups with access to executive positions. Political inequality along ethnic lines, the authors argue, causes grievances and makes violent strategies by members of the excluded groups more likely. Their findings are the continuation of earlier work by Gurr (1993) on the effect of state-imposed disadvantages on protest and rebellion by ethnic minorities and are in line with above-described principles of nationalism and political legitimacy (Gellner 1983). According to these principles, alien rule cannot be tolerated and is therefore

often answered with violence either through an attempt to overthrow the government or in the form of separatist activity that aims to establish autonomy within or outside the host state.

4. Back to the Future? Towards an Inclusive European Framework of Peace

Ever since its first appearance on the world stage, ethnic nationalism has had violent consequences. There is reason to be concerned that the current wave of nationalism and ethnic exclusion will, too. However, looking at evidence from research and remembering empirical examples from a not so distant past shows that nationalist violence is not inevitable.

Evidence from research and practice: Power-sharing and the liberal post-Cold War Order

Advocates of the grievance argument consider accommodation in the form of power-sharing concessions the most promising instrument to alleviate grievances and prevent violent conflict from breaking out. The literature on power-sharing is as diverse as the definitions of the concept itself. Usually overlapping with Lijphart's (1969, 1975, 1977) notion of consociationalism, power-sharing definitions range from proportional electoral systems, ethnic quotas and inclusive policies in the political, economic and military realm, to federalism and other types of decentralization arrangements. Generally, one can distinguish between governmental and territorial power-sharing arrangements, with the former defined as provisions to "distribute political power in the core governing institutions of the state" and the latter as the "devolution of powers to regionally concentrated groups" (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005: 87). Common to all definitions of power-sharing is the idea that inclusive decision-making institutions accommodate grievances via the incorporation of (formerly excluded) ethnic groups into the political process and – through a set of formal and informal rules – incentivize former adversaries to collaborate and eventually turn into partners.

Although the conflict-dampening effect of power-sharing arrangements remains disputed in the academic literature,[17] many scholars (e.g. Gurr 2000) see it as the main reason for the decline in ethnic conflict in the 1990s, when the end of the confrontation between East and West allowed for a reconceptualization of the European security space and initiated a period of liberal norms and institutions. In Europe, the spirit of this new liberal optimism was mirrored in the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*. Adopted in November 1990, it declared an end to the era of confrontation and division and reaffirmed the participating states' conviction to establish relations that are founded on respect and co-operation. One central pillar of this new liberal order was the participating states' commitment to protect and promote the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities and their "right to

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16 In this article, I apply a constructivist definition of ethnicity that is based on the work of Max Weber ([1922] 1985: 237).

17 Critics argue that power-sharing, while facilitating the transition from conflict in the short run, are likely to thwart the consolidation of peace in the long run by cementing ethnic divisions, undermining crosscutting cleavages and increasing the likelihood of escalation or the dissolution of territorial integrity. See Roeder and Rothchild (2005) for an extensive review of arguments against power-sharing.

self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States" (Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990).

During this period of liberal optimism, it appeared that an increasing number of both violent and non-violent conflicts in Europe's multi-ethnic states could actually be settled peacefully through negotiated, inclusive power-sharing arrangements. The following two decades witnessed a large number of ethnic power-sharing concessions and other forms of inclusive arrangements that ultimately increased the share of people whose interests were politically represented. Gurr (2000: 52) called this a "new regime of accommodation", where threats to divide a country were "managed by the devolution of state power" and where communal fighting about access to the state's power and resources was "restrained by recognizing group rights and sharing power".

One primary example of this new regime was the Dayton Agreement of 1995 (officially the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina), which established a power-sharing government in the center and a decentralized federal system with high levels of self-determination for the constituent groups in their respective entities. Despite all its flaws and the adverse effects that the Dayton agreement has since been found to have, it can be considered a success in that it has managed to end violence and prevent its resurgence during the past 25 years. Similarly, the 1998 Belfast Agreement ('Good Friday Agreement') led to a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and significant devolution of legislative and executive power to the Northern Ireland Assembly. This accommodative, inclusive character was not only inherent to the two large peace accords of the 1990s, but also to numerous other attempts to resolve small-scale conflicts and minority issues in the post-Cold War period. A 1991 special statute granted the separatist island of Corsica administrative autonomy and elevated its status to a special territorial collectivity[18]. Three years later, the Moldovan government granted its separatist Gagauz minority far-reaching autonomy in various substantive areas,[19] in response to small-scale violence and the unilateral declaration of Gagauz independence from the newly independent country. A similarly inclusive and accommodative spirit, although less successful, was embodied by the three Annan plans that aimed to unify Cyprus as a bi-zonal federal structure with autonomous constituent entities (Sözen and Özersay 2007) or even by Yeltsin's repeated autonomy offers to separatist Chechnya in return for its reintegration into the Russian Federation (Orttung 2000, Söderlund 2006). Although unsuccessful, these latter cases cannot blind us to the fact that, by and large, accommodative and inclusive policies have helped "to stave off ethnic nationalism, prevent new conflicts and end old ones" (Cederman 2019).

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18 See Law 91-428 (*Statut de la collectivité territoriale de Corse*).
19 See the 1994 Law on Special Legal Status of Gagauzia and article 111 of the constitution (Protsyk 2011, Schlegel 2018).

5. Creating a Better Nationalism

The past years have shown that nationalism is not a phenomenon of a distant, outdated past. Nationalism is here to stay and, for the time being, it cannot be abolished. However, the post-Cold War period has shown that its most heinous consequences can successfully be contained through accommodative and inclusive power-sharing arrangements. These efforts need to be sustained. To revitalize the accommodative spirit of the post-Cold War period, European leaders will have to support liberal, inclusive policies more persistently both domestically and within multinational organizations. Domestically, moderate politicians, rather than succumbing to the electoral temptation of exclusionary and sectarian politics, need to promote and commit to inclusive practices and power-sharing arrangements that provide minorities adequate representation in the political process while ensuring their right to self-determination in line with the nationalist principle. This commitment also needs to transcend to the international and multinational level.

In the case of the EU, that could mean reducing financial support to illiberal member states or maybe even establishing a new European organization with rigorously liberal membership criteria (Cederman 2019). In the OSCE, liberal leaders need to reaffirm their commitment to a democratic, indivisible, and integrated security space as envisaged in the 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security. In this Charter, the OSCE participating states promote various concepts of territorial power-sharing as ways to both "preserve and promote the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities" and to "strengthen territorial integrity and sovereignty".

Ultimately, however, the answer to nationalism needs to go beyond institutional arrangements. With no alternative concept in sight that could realistically replace nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy in the foreseeable future, and with the European Union currently unable to gain the popular legitimacy to replace nation states, there is a good chance that European societies are stuck with nationalism for the time being. Simply condemning and fighting nationalism has thus little prospect of success. It might also not be entirely desirable, as it would deprive societies and their citizens of the cohesive, common ground without which their liberal democracies would not be able to exist. Nationalism thus needs to be confronted with other forms of identity that challenge and contain the narrow, intolerant or sometimes even aggressive forms of nationalism and at the same time provide a framework that satisfies the inherent human need for belonging, purpose, respect and dignity. This identity needs to be found in new narratives that are not restricted to exclusive definitions and fixed characteristics, but that are based on liberal, inclusive values accessible to people of all nationalities and identities. This narrative should not replace but crosscut existing racial, ethnic, religious, and other types of identities, thereby emphasizing their shared interests and incentivizing inter-identity cooperation. To achieve this, political leaders need to support policies that make citizens feel connected and committed to a meaningful community that appeals to people's inherent desire for in-group loyalty but whose raison

d'être is not drawn from classical nationalist conceptions such as the community's ethnic homogeneity or its military past, but from liberal, inclusive and cooperative principles (e.g. Sapolsky 2019 and Tamir 2019).

Such an integrative identity can only be created by political leaders and citizens alike, against an environment that is increasingly characterized by a lack of moral orientation and against competing providers of much narrower forms of identity such as politicized Islam, anti-immigrant populism, and to some extent also the sometimes exclusionary and hostile forms of identity liberalism on the left. Ultimately, with the increasingly multicultural and multiethnic character of most European democracies, new integrative identities are the most promising path toward a peaceful European order that is based on cooperation and accountability and that lives up to its democratic, liberal principles.

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