

# Theoretical Framework

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This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the current discussion in civil society research and lays out the theoretical building blocks for this book. First, I give a detailed definition of local civic action communities and differentiate them from social movement communities. Second, I discuss literature on the consequences of mobilization based on existing studies in civil society research. Specifically, I draw from voluntarism/non-profit studies, and social movement studies. As discussed in the introduction, both strands of literature have given little attention to the enduring effects of mobilization and whether events such as the pro-refugee mobilization of 2015/16 manifest in sustained interactions and strengthened networks. However, there is limited understanding of interaction dynamics in the post-mobilization phase. Therefore, in the third section, I review the literature regarding the factors and conditions that serve as drivers and obstacles to interorganizational and inter-group networking outside of the subject of mobilization. This review informed my conceptual lens when I further theorized the concrete drivers and obstacles in the following empirical chapters. More specifically, I identified the three following themes that are relevant for organizations' and groups' sustained interaction and network formation: (i) political opportunity structures, (ii) resources and capacity, and (iii) ideology and culture.

## Local Civic Action Communities

In this book, I examine whether and under what conditions the pro-refugee mobilization of 2015/16 led to the development of new pro-refugee communities in four German cities. As I highlighted earlier, these communities represent a case of the broader concept of local civic action communities, which I developed based on Staggenborg's concept of social movement communities

(2013, 2020). As briefly described in the introduction to this book, I conceptualize local civic action communities as communities consisting of a wide range of actors involved in local issues. These actors range from grassroots groups, community organizations, and sports clubs to church congregations, welfare organizations, and humanitarian organizations. Actors within local civic action communities aim to address specific local problems they have identified. Rather than working independently or in isolation, they interact, creating networks among the various actors and entities involved. Although these communities often start working in a specific locality, they are not primarily defined by their location in a particular territory. That is, local civic action communities are not necessarily tied to a city or district. For example, the relevant local civic action community might extend beyond the boundaries of the respective city and include some of the neighboring villages or act region-wide.

Let me briefly specify what I mean by civic action and where the concept stems from. Civic action is a term developed by Paul Lichterman and Nina Eliasoph (2014). Civic action is similar to what is also known as civic engagement. With the term civic action, Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014) have created a less normative understanding of civic engagement. In addition, they have emphasized that civic action is not necessarily a practice only found in the institutionalized voluntary sector.

More specifically, Lichterman (2021, p. 5) has underscored in a recent study that people engage in civic action when they “work together, voluntarily, to address problems they think should matter to others”. He has further outlined that these activities

“may or may not be contentious [...]. Civic action may or may not address government, and may take up issues that are local, national, or global. [...] Participants in civic action act in relation to some shared understanding of ‘society’, no matter how expansive or restrictive. Put simply, civic action happens when citizens work together to steer society, identifying problems and collaborating on solving them.”

Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014, p. 799) have suggested that in the Neo-Tocquevillian tradition<sup>1</sup>, it is assumed that all actors in the institutionalized vol-

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1 With their civic action approach, Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014, p. 799) criticize the research tradition that focuses almost exclusively on the democracy promoting function of volunteering and on the assumption that voluntary engagement only exists in the institutionalized voluntary sector. They call scholars in this more traditional civil

untary sector act “civically”. However, they have emphasized the significance of searching for civic action first, regardless of the sector in which the actors are mainly active.

The term civic action describes the phenomenon I am researching at the local level well. In the years 2015 and 2016, we could observe an immense increase in civic action at the local level in Germany and many other European countries like Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, and Spain (Alcalde & Portos, 2018; Boersma et al., 2019; Kleres, 2018; Povrzanović Frykman. & Mäkelä, 2020; Schiffauer, 2022; Schiffauer et al., 2018; Simsa et al., 2019; Toubøl, 2019). As discussed in the introduction, around 5 million people in Germany alone engaged in civic action by supporting refugees with housing, clothing, or counseling (Schiffauer et al., 2017). As the concept of civic action mirrors, this support was not limited to the institutionalized voluntary sector but was heavily driven by people and initiatives from the informal voluntary and activist sector. While my study has empirically focused on civil society, I have also interviewed some people who engaged in civic action in multiple roles as volunteers, business owners, and social workers. They, too, were highly involved in refugee support during the mobilization.

Another example is a Civic Alliance that consisted of many volunteers and activists acting as members of civil society and city officials. Social workers are another example of the blurring boundaries between sectors. As an employee of the city government, one of my interviewees combined her paid job as a social worker in a refugee shelter with her desire to volunteer and improve the living conditions of the refugees she got to know through her work. She shared this desire with other volunteers and activists in her city. As a result, she connected with many of them and established a network of volunteers via WhatsApp.

The examples suggest that this study is suitable for civic action because it is not restricted to normative or sectoral expectations. However, it is essential to note that sectoral differentiations are still present. In this study, emphasizing the differences between civil society and state is vital due to the significant power differences between civil society and local government.

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society research “Neo-Tocquevillians” (e.g., Berman, 1997; Verba et al., 1995; Warren, 1999; Warren, 2001; Wuthnow, 2002).

## Distinguishing local civic action from social movement communities

The following section introduces the concept of social movement communities and explains how it relates to and contrasts with the notion of local civic action communities I have developed. Local civic action communities are related to social movement communities, a notion originally coined by Steven Buechler (1990) but was further conceptualized by Suzanne Staggenborg (2013, 2020). Staggenborg (2013, p. 125ff.) has outlined three key characteristics of social movement communities by exploring how social movement communities form, mobilize, and sustain themselves over time. First, social movement communities house diverse types of organizations, from SMOs to cultural groups, alternative organizations, and established entities supporting movement activities. Second, at the heart of these communities are the interactions among these various actors and spaces, including coalitions, organizations, individuals, and other entities. A third defining feature of social movement communities is the diverse actors engaging in political and cultural conflicts. Thus, similar to social movements, social movement communities consist of formal and informal interaction networks of individuals and organizations that work on a shared goal or political cause. Staggenborg (1998, p. 182) has specifically outlined what types of actors and entities encompass social movement communities. In contrast to social movements that include actors who are in contentious interaction with authorities, elites, or other opponents, a movement community also includes feminist health clinics or women's music festivals. These spaces can bring people from the movement community together and, therefore, contribute to sustaining a movement's culture and collective identity.

Staggenborg (2013) has argued that her concept of social movement communities differs from social movements mainly in its scope. As she has pointed out, many social movement scholars, such as McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Sampson et al. (2005), have mainly focused on social movement organizations when studying mobilization. While acknowledging their importance, Staggenborg (2013, p. 125) has further developed the concept of social movement communities to understand the "diffuse nature of social movements and their changing structures". She highlighted the diversity of today's mobilization structures consists of:

"social networks, cultural groups, movement habitats with institutions, movement-related commercial enterprises, coalitions, alternative insti-

tutions, and more established organizations that sometimes become movement allies, such as labor unions and community organizations“ (Staggenborg, 2013, p. 125).

As highlighted above, social movement communities consist not only of social movement organizations or formal and informal interactions but of the combination of all these actors, entities, spaces, and their interactions. Furthermore, the concept of social movement communities allows us to identify and study collective identity because it is in these communities that collective identity can grow and be sustained:

“Community implies mutual support among people who are connected to one another in various ways. Movement culture, in the sense of symbols, rituals, values, and ideology, is shared and developed within movement communities and creates a collective identity. Groups and individuals within a movement community are linked by culture (and through it, by collective identity), social networks, and participation in movement activities” (Staggenborg, 1998, p. 182).

To sum up, social movement communities comprise formal and informal network ties between a wide range of organizations and groups, sustained interaction over time that strengthens the community’s networks, and a culture that revolves around common practices, boundaries, and goals. In the following section, I will elaborate on how the concept of local civic action communities differs from that of social movement communities.

As highlighted at the beginning of the subsection on local civic communities, they are made up of individuals, organizations, and groups, as well as formal and very informal entities with a shared vision who work together to address a collectively identified local problem. Although not strictly defined by geographic boundaries, they are rooted in the civic landscape of a city or district and are connected through formal and informal networks and collaboration among participating actors.

While Staggenborg’s (1998, 2013, 2020) concept of social movement communities and my concept of local civic action communities have similar features, they are two distinct types of communities. I suggest they differ in six features listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison between social movement and local civic action communities

|                             | Social Movement Communities                                                                                                         | Local Civic Action Communities                                                                                                   |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Goals and Objectives</b> | Address broader, often national or global causes and systemic change. Goals are political, and actors have a political agenda.      | Focus on localized, specific issues that may be local or regional manifestations of global problems.                             |
| <b>Origin</b>               | Often, they emerge from social movement campaigns or protest activities.                                                            | Usually emerge from a new local problem that may arise from a crisis-moment, disaster, or another form of juncture.              |
| <b>Political agenda</b>     | Often highly politicized, emerge from campaigns and protests. Actors often have political agendas and make claims                   | Lack of a formal political agenda. May involve actors with varied levels of politicization, including sports clubs and churches. |
| <b>Opposition</b>           | Focus on opposition, i.e., authorities, politicians, elites.                                                                        | Emerge from collectively addressing local problems without necessarily opposing authorities.                                     |
| <b>Territory</b>            | Often involve individuals and groups in a specific local setting but may include actors from various regions, states, or countries. | Emerge and operate at the local level, which promotes familiarity among actors. Yet, they are not bound to a specific territory. |
| <b>Collective Identity</b>  | Collective identity develops in the community through a shared culture over time.                                                   | Collective identity is not a significant characteristic but may develop in the long-run.                                         |

First, the goals and objectives of social movement communities extend beyond local concerns to broader, often national or global causes and advocacy for systemic change. In contrast, local civic action communities focus primarily on local and specific issues. While global issues may eventually be considered, they are not the central or immediate focus. Local civic actors often engage in collective action to address immediate community needs before potentially expanding their scope.

Second, local civic action communities do not emerge out of a social movement campaigns or protest activities, as Staggenborg (1998, 2013, 2020) has outlined, but mainly from mobilizations around local problems people want to address. Note that in the case of my empirical work, the local problem arose

during the reception of refugees at the local level in Germany. As a result of the quick increase in refugee numbers and the ill-prepared public authorities (Eckhard et al., 2021), the situation created momentum for people to provide emergency support. This momentum was the starting point for the mobilization of millions of individuals and thousands of organizations, groups, and other entities to become involved in refugee support.

Third, and closely related to the previous point, social movement communities are often much more politicized than local civic action communities, which involve more and less politicized actors. The actors involved in a local civic action community may be sports clubs, churches, and community organizations with a less politicized repertoire of actions and no formal claims or political agenda. While Staggenborg (2013, p. 182) has mentioned some entities, such as feminist health clinics, that may be less political, the distribution of non-politicized or less politicized actors is certainly higher in local civic action communities.

Fourth, local civic action communities do not necessarily act in opposition to opponents, authorities, or elites. Unlike social movement communities, they can form when people engage in collective action to address a local problem. Their collective action revolves around ameliorating or elevating a problem. Thus, it is collective action for something rather than in opposition to something. Yet, over time, local civic action communities may also develop political claims.

Fifth, while social movement communities per se are not conceptually tied to a specific territory, local civic action communities emerge from a mobilization at the local level in a particular territory. By local level, I mean on a city or district level in Germany where actors potentially know each other or know of each other.

Finally, while social movement communities are often connected through a collective identity that emerged through a boundary towards the outgroup, a common culture, and rituals, local civic action communities are not necessarily bound through a strong collective identity. As collective identity is a fluid concept, local civic action communities may exhibit certain features of collective identity. However, collective identity is not the focus and part of the primary definition of the communities I am studying in my work.

To sum up, local civic action communities provide a valuable framework for studying community building in a local civic landscape outside of the classical social movement realm. Local civic action communities are measured based on

sustained forms of interaction between actors over several years that manifest in new and strengthened network ties.

To assess local civic action communities, I examined network connections between organizations and groups and patterns of interaction as key metrics. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, I explored whether interorganizational and intergroup networks intensified during the mobilization period and throughout the post-mobilization period after 2016 up to 2021 and whether I observed ongoing interaction among the actors involved in refugee support and advocacy.

### **Civil Society Literature on Mobilization Effects**

In the civil society literature, periods of heightened mobilization are often depicted as large campaigns and protests organized by individuals engaged in social movement organizations, alliances, and coalitions (della Porta, 2020a). In contrast, other types of mobilization periods are pretty overlooked. In recent years, civil society scholars have paid more attention to mobilization periods that involve an upsurge in solidarity actions, humanitarian support, and advocacy after intense social and financial crises or natural disasters.

Recent instances of these types of mobilization periods that were realized at the local level the solidarity actions and demonstrations in support of migrants and refugees (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020; Carlsen et al., 2021; della Porta & Steinhilper, 2022; Stjepandić et al., 2022; Toubøl, 2019), the community support and activism during and after the financial crisis in Greece (Malamidis, 2020; Tzifakis et al., 2017), and the mobilization in response to emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina (Hawkins and Maurer 2010; Rodríguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli 2006), and the earthquake in Haiti (Nolte & Boenigk, 2013; Twigg & Mosel, 2017). These periods all have a few features in common: (i) the spontaneous ad hoc mobilization of volunteers and activists, (ii) the emergence of new initiatives and informal groups, (iii) the increased interaction of different actors on a large scale, and (iv) a rapid decline of ad hoc activism after its peak.

The literature on civil society does not provide much research on the impact of such periods on local community building. Neither research focusing on social movements nor research focusing on voluntarism and the non-profit sector has paid much attention to lasting effects such as changing interaction patterns and network impacts (but see Corrigan-Brown, 2022; Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009).



In the following part, I discuss what I found in both strands of civil society literature, voluntarism/non-profit studies, and social movement studies, about the effects of mobilization periods on civil society, especially interaction and network dynamics. There is little evidence on the mechanisms behind lasting changes in interorganizational and intergroup networks and sustained interaction. However, there is some empirical evidence in both strands on the immediate consequences of mobilization periods, which I will outline.

### Effects of heightened mobilization in social movement studies

Social movement scholars have recently paid more attention to the consequences of mobilization periods, such as policies, culture, and institutions (Bosi et al., 2015). However, the same literature has rarely shed light on how movements transform due to periods of mobilization. While this is understandable, given social movements' innate striving for agency and change (Giugni, 2008), social movement mobilizations' effects on movements should not be underestimated.

There is evidence in the social movement literature that periods of heightened mobilization do not just influence their external environment and structure. Mobilization periods, in particular, are also vital periods for movements and activists themselves as they may potentially strengthen their networks and social capital (della Porta, 2020b; Diani, 1997; McAdam, 1988; Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009). While there are rarely systematic studies on the lasting effects of mobilization periods on the emergence of new communities, new forms of interaction, and social networks, some social movement scholars have outlined the potential of such periods. For instance, Diani (1997) pointed out that social ties are rarely unchanged after certain protests and other social movement activities. Occasionally, they even foster the development of new bonds of unity and solidarity (Diani, 1997, p. 134).

In this regard, della Porta (2020b, p. 562) has also theorized the profound relational impacts of "eventful protest," which amplify and reshape interactions among diverse actors. In her view, eventful protests happen in the context of a crisis, the abrupt imposition of grievances, a moral awakening, or a disaster (della Porta, 2020b, p. 569). Eventful protests can only be defined as eventful ex-post because the relevance of the protests can only be evaluated once a protest period is over and the meaning and consequences of the protest event are examined (della Porta, 2020b, p. 569). Examples of eventful protests are the protests around the democratization efforts in Central East-

ern Europe in 1989 and the Arab Spring in 2011. In her view, eventful protests have “relational impacts by intensifying and transforming interactions among different actors. Rather than being spontaneous, they are produced through a convergence of preexisting nets and contribute to building new ones at great speed” (della Porta, 2020b, p. 562). While della Porta (2020b) has shed light on the impacts of protest mobilization on relational changes, other scholars have shed light on different forms of collective action and their effects on relational changes within movements (e.g., Corrigan-Brown, 2022; Diani, 1997; McAdam, 1988; Small & Gose, 2020; Taylor, 1989, p. 19).

McAdam (1988), for example, has examined the biographical effects of volunteers who participated in the so-called Freedom Summer of 1964 and found that activists’ social ties were strongly influenced by their participation in that period. The Freedom Summer Project was a volunteer campaign in the United States to register more black voters in Mississippi. Along with thousands of black Mississippians, the 1,000 or so volunteers, mostly white college students from the North, came to support the civil rights movement, register black voters, and teach in the so-called Freedom Schools, alternative free schools for black Americans in the 1960s. McAdam (1988, p. 161ff.) tracked down over 40 volunteers for his study (plus surveys) and interviewed them about their life stories after the summer of 1964. He found that while not all of them remained politically active, many of them developed lasting friendships, political partnerships, and romantic relationships. Thus, his study showed that their participation in the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign permanently altered the volunteers’ networks.

Similarly, Corrigan-Brown (2022) and Gose and Skocpol (2019) showed in the context of the Women’s March rallies that this period was critical for those involved in building networks. Corrigan-Brown (2022) followed newly emerged volunteer and activist groups after the Women’s March in 2017. After former President Donald Trump was inaugurated in January 2017, approximately 5.3 million people participated in Women’s Marches in Washington D.C., New York City, Los Angeles, and other cities across the United States. The goal of the marches was to show resistance to Trump’s presidency and to advocate for women’s rights, including LGBTQ+ rights, reproductive rights, racial equality, and related issues. After the people who participated in these marches in Washington, D.C., and other major cities returned to their hometowns, such as Atlanta and Portland, Amarillo, and Salt Lake City, many formed local groups to stay connected and continue women’s rights activism. Corrigan-Brown (2022) followed over 30 of these groups over several

years. Some disappeared, and others were still active five years after they were founded. She was interested in why some groups disappeared, and others remained active. Factors that drove their survival were: "(1) tactical selection and diversity, (2) the use of coalitions, (3) practices to facilitate individual engagement, and (4) the use of online technologies" (Corrigall-Brown, 2022, p. 2).

Similar to Corrigall-Brown (2022), Gose and Skocpol (2019) have studied the local resistance groups that formed during Trump's inauguration in 2017, which they pointed out were formed through friendships and social media contacts. They highlighted that for the groups to survive, it was essential for them to reach out to surrounding communities. Many of them changed leadership, suggesting that leadership is not easy to maintain and that when leadership is successful, generating and supporting candidates is an important factor for a group's survival (Gose & Skocpol, 2019, p. 310f.).

The studies of Freedom Summer (McAdam, 1988) and the Women's March (Corrigall-Brown, 2022; Gose & Skocpol, 2019) have outlined how networks and groups of volunteers and activists emerge and survive after periods of heightened mobilization. However, no study explicitly focuses on relational impacts, the lasting effects of periods of heightened mobilization on interorganizational and intergroup networks, whether after the intense volunteer experience of the Freedom Summer or the feminist rallies following Trump's inauguration. Mechanisms mentioned in the studies included the formation of friendships and intense contact during the mobilization period, as well as leadership tactics such as coalition building and using online technology to keep groups alive.

In Diani's (1997) conceptual study on social capital building during mobilization periods, he showed one fascinating example of mobilization's effects on interorganizational networks. He emphasized that unsolved conflicts between groups of different ideological orientations during the mobilization period can inhibit future cooperation. Studying the oppositional movement against nuclear weapons and energy production in Italy, Diani (1997, p. 136) argued that internal conflicts between radical-left and moderate groups hardened between 1976 and 1978. Since these conflicts were not solved, they strongly affected the network structure of the environmental movement in the 1980s.

In sum, social movement scholars consistently demonstrated that when mobilization intensifies, it leads to greater engagement among individuals and organizations. During such periods, people change their patterns of inter-

action, strengthen their connections, and often either reinforce existing ties or form new ones (see della Porta, 2020b; della Porta & Mosca, 2005; McAdam et al., 1996; Staggenborg, 2020). At the same time, the same literature has yet to emphasize studying the mechanisms behind strengthening network ties and the factors that lead to sustainable community building. Only Diani's (1997) work provides insights into what effects unsolved ideological conflict can have on movement networks even a decade later.

Scholars in the field of social movement studies have conducted extensive research on the interaction dynamics and the underlying mechanisms of these dynamics, whereas scholars of voluntarism/nonprofit studies have not. However, my analysis of the literature on the latter revealed that there is also evidence of increased interaction during mobilization periods.

### **Networking after heightened mobilization in voluntarism and non-profit studies**

Scholars of voluntarism and non-profit studies have recently demonstrated increased interest in mobilization periods. Even though these periods have not lied at the heart of this subdiscipline, scholars have begun to research these periods concerning the effectiveness of networks during disasters, the recruitment of ad hoc volunteers, and organizational capacities and resources (Aldrich, 2012; Boersma et al., 2019, 2021; Doerfel et al., 2013; Hawkins & Maurer, 2010; Kim et al., 2022; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013; Shaw & Goda, 2004; Toubøl, 2019).

These scholars have not yet explicitly focused on the effects of mobilization periods on sustained community building and network development among actors involved in mobilization. Yet, their studies point to some interesting empirical observations suggesting that mobilization during and after humanitarian emergencies and disasters can catalyze increased interaction. It is important to emphasize that the observations from the studies I share in the next section relate only to the duration of mobilization periods and not to developments in the post-mobilization period. Moreover, these were not the focus of the cited studies but secondary findings I identified in the studies.

This literature has shown that civic action increased in the aftermath of several natural disasters, including the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in the United States, the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, the 1923 Tokyo earthquake in Japan, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake. These actions involved various civic networks

and groups of actors (Aldrich, 2012; Hawkins & Maurer, 2010; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013; Shaw & Goda, 2004).

For example, Nolte and Boeringk (2013) observed increased collaboration and joint activities among a wide range of organizations during the civil society response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The authors collected data from 288 active disaster responders during the Haiti earthquake and examined the network drivers in well-functioning ad hoc networks in 2010. The drivers of emergent, well-functioning ad hoc networks were adequate task coordination, a strong sense of reciprocity among organizations, and prior experience working together. While their findings shed light on short-term network changes, they did not examine long-term changes beyond 2010.

Similarly, in a study of the power of social capital for New Orleans residents to rebuild their communities, Hawkins and Maurer (2010, p. 1786) have found that some communities were able to benefit from existing ties and form new coalitions across class, race, and religion shortly after the hurricane. In their study of Hurricane Katrina, the authors examined how 40 families in New Orleans used their social capital to cope with the hurricane and rebuild their lives and communities. While they found that they could use the bonding, bridging, and linking forms of social capital to ensure the short- and long-term survival of their families and communities, they also made new connections within and across neighborhoods. While the issue of new network connections was not the focus of Hawkins and Maurer's study, they did show that the experience of shared grievances and criticism of the lack of government assistance fueled local coalition building. In an interview, one resident described this coalition: "We are the real rainbow coalition: different races, different classes, people of faith with nonbelievers" (Hawkins & Maurer, 2010, p. 1786). In need of financial resources, residents formed various associations, such as the Gentilly Civic Improvement Association. They began working with local groups, the American Red Cross, and a newly created government agency, the Louisiana Recovery Authority, to organize the rebuilding of New Orleans neighborhoods (Hawkins & Maurer, 2010, p. 1786).

One study even examined the lasting effects of such civil society response to a natural disaster (Shaw & Goda, 2004). Examining the devastating 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, Shaw and Goda (2004) have shown that community networks were created and sustained in the aftermath. Nine years after the earthquake in Japan, the authors have examined whether the increase in civil society activities was sustained and found that many initiatives were sustained by strong government leadership and financial resources. In addition to the sus-

tainability of activities, they found that the volunteers who began to engage in recovery efforts in 1995 continued to interact with each other through celebrations and town hall meetings almost a decade after the disaster. While Shaw and Goda (2004, p. 28f.) have not explicitly examined the reasons for this continued interaction, they have mentioned that the city government played an essential role in facilitating community interaction. For example, cooperation between the Kobe city government and an NGO network led to the construction of a new assembly hall used for volunteer meetings and festivals. Thus, the involvement of civil society in urban planning and community rebuilding efforts by members of the city government was an essential factor in promoting relationships among volunteers in the city.

To sum up, factors driving networking during the mobilization phase were collaboration with the local government, reciprocity and previous networks, and the shared experience of harsh grievances during disasters. While these studies have indicated potential effects on increasing networking among organizations and groups, these were not systematic studies specifically interested in the lasting impact on volunteer activities and networks (but Shaw & Goda, 2004).

## Factors Driving Networking, Interaction, and Cooperation

The above literature points to some critical dynamics that lead us to believe that mobilization periods can increase interaction and create new and strengthened networks in the long run. However, neither social movement nor volunteer and nonprofit studies provide sufficient information about the factors that promote or hinder the emergence of interorganizational or intergroup networks and sustained interaction after mobilization periods. Therefore, in what follows, I will provide a more general account of the factors and conditions that promote interorganizational and intergroup networking and sustained interaction outside of mobilization periods. While the literature engaging with networking and interaction dynamics does not focus on mobilization effects, they provide rich insights into mechanisms relevant to studying sustained interaction and networking.

Civil society scholars have discussed diverse conditions and factors contributing to forming and sustaining interorganizational networks. In what follows, I will discuss these factors and conditions organized around the three

themes I have identified: (i) opportunity structures, (ii) resources and capacity, and (iii) ideology and culture.

### Political opportunity structures

Various studies have highlighted (local) opportunity structures as significant explanations for when and why organizations decide to collaborate and build network ties. Among the environmental opportunities and threats for organizations and groups to enter alliances and coalitions and create new or strengthen network ties are governmental funding, the professionalization of NGOs, and policy changes and repression (e.g., Baldassarri & Diani, 2007; Corrigan-Brown, 2022; Diani, 2003; Eggert, 2014; Hathaway & Meyer, 2023; McAdam, 1999; McCammon & Campbell, 2002; Obach, 2004; Reger, 2018; Rucht, 1989).

The first issue is government funding. Government funding is often highlighted as a factor that inhibits civic action and network formation. The idea that governments “crowd out” civil society initiatives by increasing public social spending is a widely recognized factor that inhibits civic action and coalition building (Gruber & Hungerman, 2007; Gundelach et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2000, p. 2). However, some studies show that government funding increases the chances of community building and interorganizational network formation (Bloemraad, 2005; Chung, 2005; Eggert, 2014). A Chung (2005) study found that social service agency funding helped Korean American nonprofits in Los Angeles form coalitions and funding networks. Another comparative study of Vietnamese and Portuguese immigrant organizations in Boston and Toronto similarly showed that material and symbolic resources provided by the Canadian government enabled the organizations in Toronto to build broad organizational infrastructures (Bloemraad, 2005).

In contrast, immigrant organizations in Boston suffered from a structural lack of funding. Bloemraad’s (2005) findings emphasize that government funding structures enabled a significant growth of organizational capacity in immigrant communities. While these studies show how organizational capacity, membership, and activity levels in civil society are affected by government funding, it is not entirely clear in what context it helps or hinders interorganizational networks and sustained interaction.

Second, Baldassari and Diani (2007) have emphasized the professionalization of civil society, particularly of nonprofit organizations, as a threat to interorganizational networking. Specifically, they showed that an increase

in the professionalization of voluntary organizations in the United Kingdom and their participation in local politics led to more hierarchical networks in civil society. While networking was not actually reduced among professionalized organizations, others became less integrated. Thus, professionalization, sometimes even driven by governments that fund welfare organizations in countries like Germany and Sweden (Evers, 2005), can threaten diverse civil society networks. Baldassari and Diani (2007, p. 775) suggested that the mechanism behind this finding was mainly the fact that voluntary organizations could focus on more specific issues and did not need the “instrumental ties to a small number of central, highly influential actors within the sector”.

Repression or policy changes are another political opportunity structure that can both inhibit and promote interorganizational networking (Meyer & Corrigall-Brown, 2005; Obach, 2010; Staggenborg, 1986). Meyer and Corrigall-Brown (2005) have argued that new political projects can create pressure to become more active and pool resources across organizations and groups. Examining the movement against the war in Iraq between 2002 and 2003, they showed that the threat of war in Iraq generated grievances that ultimately increased the need to build a broad coalition. While it is very costly for social movement organizations to engage in coalition building (i.e., less focus on their central issue), they are more likely to join a coalition when external threats such as war in another country, exist. As shown by the case of the 2002/2003 movement against the war in Iraq, external factors can increase the propensity of social movement organizations to cooperate in common cause (Meyer & Corrigall-Brown, 2005, p. 342).

Similarly, Staggenborg (1986) has argued that environmental threats provide a significant opportunity for organizations to engage in interorganizational cooperation. In her study of the pro-choice movement between 1966 and 1983, she found that during periods of intense threat from countermovement activists and politicians to overturn the legalization of abortion, organizations formed coalitions. However, she also pointed out that the opportunity to form coalitions while the organizations' primary issue is under attack could be the tipping point for coalition breakup, as ideological conflicts among coalition members could lead to the collapse of the coalition.



## Resources and capacity

In addition to environmental opportunities and threats, resources and organizational capacity are frequently mentioned as explanations for why or why not organizations cooperate and build connections. Factors that are most commonly mentioned are financial resources, human resources, membership size, and leadership (e.g., AbouAssi et al., 2016; Bandy & Smith, 2005; Despard, 2017; Diani et al., 2010; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Hardy et al., 2003; Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005; Kim & Peng, 2018; McCammon & Campbell, 2002; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Morris, 1984; Nowy et al., 2015; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Robnett, 1997; Rose, 2000; Selden et al., 2006; Shumate et al., 2018; Staggenborg, 1986; Tsasis, 2009).

Concerning finances, scholars have assumed that organizations with a lot of revenue is shown to be less collaborative than those with fewer resources. Resource dependency theory has suggested that organizations must navigate their activities in uncertain terrains and thus depend on the information they gain from cooperation. Organizations with resource dependencies on external entities often incentivize cooperation and collaboration. Organizations may need to form alliances, partnerships, or other cooperative arrangements to secure the necessary resources. They also need financial and human resources to function. However, when an organization has enough financial means for staff, technologies, and projects, they are less inclined to cooperate (Guo & Acar, 2005; see also Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

However, recent evidence has highlighted that despite resource dependence, more financially stable organizations with more resources are more likely to collaborate. On the other hand, economically vulnerable organizations are less likely to collaborate, as it depends on whether an organization can collaborate, e.g., in terms of staff (Gazley & Guo, 2020, p. 227).

In addition, studies have also shown that collaboration also depends on the type of funding organizations receive. Private funding drives organizations to collaborate in contrast to the public (AbouAssi et al., 2016, p. 439; see also Irvin, 2007).

In addition, studies have highlighted that higher numbers of staff and members in an organization also drive the propensity for collaboration. In their study of environmental NGOs, AbouAssi et al. (2016) highlighted that organizations with more human capacity and technical resources were likelier to collaborate than other organizations. As collaborations and partnerships need to be planned and managed, NGOs with more staff are better equipped to

communicate with different partner organizations, seek new collaborations, and maintain existing ones. This effect was also evident when comparing the number of volunteers. The authors found that an NGO with 100 more volunteers was less likely to engage in partnerships than an organization with 10 more staff (AbouAssi et al., 2016, p. 444). But what about the various NGOs that operate with fewer than five employees? Kim and Peng (2018) have argued that small human service nonprofits in the United States need at least one or more full-time staff to engage in formal collaborations on an ongoing basis. They surveyed 248 small human service nonprofits in the United States with gross revenues of less than \$500,000 in 2016. Similar to the findings of AbouAssi et al. (2016), the main reason for this minimal human resource need was that full-time staff are responsible for funding applications and partnership meetings. Volunteers often cannot maintain these activities for long periods. Thus, the professionalization of NGOs makes collaboration more likely. In this vein, Diani, Lindsay, and Purdue (2010) also showed that resources, particularly the size of an organization's membership, are a significant indicator of coalition participation. In a comparison of interorganizational networks in Bristol and Glasgow, they found that one factor determining coalition participation in a local organizational landscape, as opposed to a movement, was an organizations' ability to devote human resources, i.e., employees and volunteers, to coalition work. While movement identity was important within movement networks, human resources may be more critical in broader civic landscapes (Diani et al., 2010, p. 228f.).

Finally, a factor related to membership size and human resources is the leadership and staff of an organization. While the studies mentioned above have assumed that the size of staff, volunteers, and activists drive cooperation, a few studies have emphasized the importance of individual skills and the role of well-connected leaders (Bandy & Smith, 2005; Morris, 1984; Robnett, 1997; Rose, 2000; Staggenborg, 1986). For example, Rose (2000, p. 176) highlighted so-called "bridge builders" as people who advanced coalition building between the labor and environmental communities by creating dialogue and developing a shared vision. Furthermore, Robnett (1997) and Morris (1984) showed in their studies of the civil rights movement how actors and entities such as bridge builders, movement centers, and movement halfway houses played an important role in linking the movement's diverse constituencies. They emphasized that these actors not only initiated contact or dialogue but also provided vital resources such as workshops and knowledge to skilled leaders so that they could bring diverse groups together and coordinate collective action.

## Ideology and culture

The factors mentioned above, and conditions regarding political opportunity structures, resources, and capacity can help answer the question of *when* organizations and groups are more likely to organize themselves and *why* they enter collaboration but not *with whom* they collaborate (Diani, 2015, p. 55ff.). Organizations' and groups' shared interests, ideological unity, and culture can further help to explain *with whom* organizations and groups want to collaborate. Since organizations are often embedded in existing networks, the knowledge they gain through being part of them determines whether they collaborate with specific organizations (Granovetter, 1973; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Based on previous ties, organizations can estimate whether they share values and align in ideology with potential partners. Thus, they understand common or competing goals (Atouba & Shumate, 2010; Diani, 1995, 2015). At the same time, preexisting cohesive clusters can keep organizations and groups from creating ties to others outside their circles. Cohesive clusters can thus hinder actors' ability to establish cooperative relationships with actors outside of those clusters (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Putnam, 2000).

While this view of network formation is more interest-oriented, many civil society scholars have also emphasized that these more rationalist notions of evaluating a potential partner are not the only ways in which individuals and organizations form ties in movements and movement communities (e.g., Obach, 2004; Rose, 2000), personal relations between key movement actors (e.g., Sabatier, 1988), regarding ideological compatibility (e.g., Kleidman & Rochon, 1997; McCammon & Campbell, 2002; Staggenborg, 1986), aligned ideology and community culture (e.g., Gongaware, 2010; Holland & Cable, 2002; Reed, 2023; Staggenborg, 2020; Taylor, 1989; Whittier, 1997).

Network formation is not necessarily a direct choice but results from how the network is structured and happens more often (Feld et al., 2021, p. 367). In this vein, Diani (2015) noted that network formation is a function of existing personal ties and collective experiences in collective action. He highlighted that

“organizational forms of civil society are rarely planned in their entirety [...]. Networks stem from heterogenous decisions, taken by individual activists, regarding their multiple memberships, their involvement in collective activities, and their personal ties to fellow activists” (Diani, 2015, p. 14).

In this regard, activists decide with whom they collaborate based on their embeddedness in existing networks and previous experiences. Here, temporality becomes crucial in network formation and demolition (see Lichterman, 2021; Staggenborg, 2020). Over time, organizations and individuals forge personal relationships, develop a community culture, and learn whether their understanding of action is compatible with those of other organizations (see Diani, 1995, 2015).

Accordingly, whether organizations collaborate in one form or another also depends on activists' assessments of cultural compatibility, positive past experiences, and the quality of personal relationships. Assessments that activists make over time. For instance, a comparative study by Guenther (2010) on the formation of transnational ties between East German, Western German, and Swedish feminist groups in the early 1990s showed that whether these feminists liked each other was much more central to coalition building than cost-benefit considerations. After the German reunification, East German feminist groups at the local level intensified their relationships with western German and Swedish feminist groups because they had already established trusting ties with each other even before reunification in the 1980s. These groups got support for their work in Eastern Germany even before 1990 despite their differences concerning views on gender, action repertoires, and their relationship with the state. In essence, these groups from different political and local contexts developed a shared understanding of supporting each other and practicing feminist solidarity.

While these are national and transnational examples of coalition-building, Staggenborg (2020) and Lichterman (1995, 2021) indicated in their studies that liking each other and having a shared understanding of how to act as a community is similarly crucial in specific localities. For instance, Lichterman (1995) showed in his analysis of two environmental communities that they can have distinct cultural bases. Whereas more ethnic or highly localized groups are based on communitarian ties, other communities emphasize a personal, more individualized sense of responsibility. These two understandings of what it means to act for the community made it difficult for them to build alliances even though the ideology and goals matched.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, I define the concept of local civic action communities and distinguish it from Staggenborg's (2013, 2020) related concept of social movement communities. Local civic action communities, comprising diverse actors, respond to novel local problems. These actors range from grassroots groups, community organizations, and sports clubs to church congregations, welfare organizations, and humanitarian organizations. They focus on localized issues that may be manifestations of global problems. Actors within local civic action communities aim to address specific local problems they have identified. Rather than working independently or in isolation, they interact, creating networks among the various actors and entities involved.

In the subsequent sections, I delve into existing studies on the relational effects of mobilization periods. While social movement, and voluntarism/non-profit studies provide limited research in this regard, social movement scholars have offered fascinating insights into the interaction dynamics during mobilization periods. These scholars have demonstrated that interaction is most likely to be more intense and active during these periods.

Given the lack of research on interorganizational and intergroup networks and interaction dynamics in the post-mobilization period, the third section of this chapter focused on networking and interaction more broadly. I identified three themes from social movement, voluntarism, and nonprofit studies: political opportunity structures, resources and capacity, and ideology and culture. A literature review on these three themes revealed important insights regarding the conditions and how and with whom organizations and groups interact and collaborate. These themes improved my conceptual lens through which I analyzed the concrete drivers and obstacles to the development and survival of pro-refugee communities. However, it is essential to note that the three themes differ from the factors and conditions I identified and further theorized in chapters 5, 6, and 7. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, these factors and conditions relate to critical actors and the role of the brokerage; the resource, strategic, and cultural divergences between highly professionalized and more informal actors, and the potential for co-production and linking social capital produced among civil society and state.

