

formation for individual good. Moreover, there wasn't a solid policy to deal with the splinter groups, paving the way for chaos. Staniland (2016) also writes about how JKLF could not build a durable organisation, particularly locally. It could not convert mass mobilisations into resilient institutions that can handle expansion and conflict shocks. In a way, JKLF had an idea, not a base. The problems were equally propounded by the weak horizontal ties between the JKLF on the Indian side and the JKLF on the Pakistani side, which later became evident by multiple splits within the JKLF.

Evans (1999) writes that as the cadre strength of JKLF was decimated by constant killings and arrests from 1992 to 1993 from both Indian security forces and pro-Pakistan gunmen, there was a complete takeover of the movement by Pakistan and its intelligence agencies. Thus, JKLF lost its ascendancy to the radical groups, resulting in a unilateral ceasefire by Yasin Malik in 1994.

One can evaluate that JKLF utilised all the elements mentioned above in the section to awaken subaltern consciousness. JKLF catered to the class that was historically on the defensive and helped them achieve self-awareness. JKLF's taking over traditional leadership introduced a new set of class polarities and formed a class of new political actors. These actors had a redefined position of Kashmiri nationalism and also posited a vertical conflict between the latest and the old actors. In a way, the arrival of JKLF on the political scene introduced a new set of individual and group dynamics in Kashmiri society. JKLF mobilised ethnicity in defence of culture and to establish political boundaries.

Rise of Hizbul Mujahideen

The rise of JKLF was becoming an aversion for the Pakistani state, which always deterred any attempts at the creation of a separate state in Kashmir. During the 1980s, the Pakistani state headed by Zia-ul-Haq tried to intervene in Kashmir by using Jamaat-e-Islami as its client. Zia had already set things in motion in a couple of meetings with a founding leader of Jamaat-e-Islami-Maulana Abdul Bari. Jamaat-e-Islami was to

gather international support for the Kashmiri cause from international movements. Subsequently, Bari travelled to Indian-administered Kashmir and met with politicians and activists. However, the Jamaat-e-Islami (Kashmir wing) was not keen on making the Pakistani army their benefactor. Subsequent meetings were arranged between General Zia and activists of Jamaat-e-Islami in Saudi Arabia.

JKLF was also a threat to small Islamist militant groups as it was a nationalist secular party with no allegiance to Pakistan. Consequently, a new militant organisation was envisioned, and Jamaat-e-Islami would sponsor it. The new origination would replace JKLF and also lead the militancy in Pakistan's interests.

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in Jammu and Kashmir was formed in the 1940s, and ever since, it has played a crucial role in the politics of Kashmir. The JI in Jammu and Kashmir shares the common ideological framework with Jamaat elsewhere, based on the writings of Maulana Sayed Ala Maududi. Till the onset of militancy, the core support base for JI was the middle class, propagating adherence to Islamic law (sharia). For JI, Islam functions as a complete code of life covering all the aspects of a collective as well as individual existence of a Muslim's life. And, for the establishment of Islam entirely, according to JI, the creation of a Muslim state guided by Sharia is mandatory. Accordingly, Jamaat sees democracy as going against the sharia, and for the same reason, the separation of religion and politics is condemned. Sikand (2002) notes that JI in Kashmir urged men and women to play an essential role in establishing the status based on din. For this purpose, a solid representative party, JI, was required. The required membership is open to any group, irrespective of the affiliation of class, caste, or tribe, who agrees to follow the guidelines of Jamaat.

Consequently, Jamaat-e-Islami surveyed the political landscape and decided that decisive action was needed to control the situation in their favour. Subsequently, informal relationships with smaller Jehadi groups were strengthened, with many Jamaat-e-Islami leaders taking direct roles in the activities of underground mujahideen. The smaller groups like Zia Tigers and Al Hamza shared their pan-Islamist vision with Jamaat. The most critical group, the largest and the most

effectively organised, was Ansarul Islam. To broaden its appeal and pull the movement out of JKLF's hands, Ansarul Islam was renamed Hizbul Mujahideen- the party of holy warriors- on June 11, 1989.

The ambiguity over two Hizbul Mujahideen was resolved by merging the two with Ahsan Dar as its commander in October 1989. A constitution was finalised on June 10, 1990, after secret meetings between all stakeholders- Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu Kashmir, Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, and the ISI. The constitution created the offices of the patron, Amir, the chief commander who made up the executive leadership. It also established a central *Majlis-i-Shoura* while the chief commander would be nominated. The power to appoint the patron nearly meant total control over the organisation. However, ISI wanted to run the show, pushing its major client, Jamaat, into the limelight and subordinating minor factions. Senior people were regularly demoted, and smaller organisations like Allah Tigers, Al Badr, and Tehreek-i-Jehd Islami were merged as part of this power struggle. Jamal (2009) records that to combat the influence of JKLF, ISI supported and funded a wide variety of militant organisations. By 1990, the ISI had over 100 militant organisations on its payroll. But with JKLF removed from the scene, the ISI moved to cease its support for more minor factions, becoming more selective in its support of Kashmiri militants. Subsequently, a joint front was envisioned for pro-Pakistani groups, meaning the merger of Hizbul Mujahideen, Muslim Janbaz Force, Tehreek Jihad Islami, Hizbullah, and Al -Umar to form Mutahidda Jihad Council.

However, in 1993, as the United States of America began pressing Pakistan to close its militant operations in Kashmir, the ISI decided to continue funding jihadi organisations only if they could gain sponsorship from a client political party. Thus, the Awami Action Committee became the sponsor of al-Umar Mujahideen, the Muslim Conference was directed to sponsor Jamiatul Mujahideen, the Peoples Conference was to sponsor al Barq, the Peoples League was to sponsor the Muslim Janbaz Force (MJF), Ittehadul Muslimeen was to sponsor the Karwaan-i-Mujahideen. Hizbul Mujahideen became critical of this move as it would decentralise the entire unified structure that it had bought together, and it would also dilute the chain of hierarchy and the command structure.

Haqqani (2005) writes that the Hizbul Mujahideen carried out a series of campaigns to disarm other militant groups. It also marked a consistent smear campaign against the JKLF. Pamphlets were distributed calling JKLF a secular, atheist party with limited vision. Some pamphlets explained how JKLF worked for a small territory while Hizbul Mujahideen worked for a more significant Islamic cause. The famous slogans of “*Hum Kya Chahtay, Aazadi*” were added with a qualifier- “*Aazadi ka matlab kia-La ilahaha Illallah*” (What does freedom mean? There is no God but Allah), “*Yahaan Kya Chalega, Nizam e Mustafa*” (Which System will be allowed to function here, only the system of Prophet Muhammad) “*Pakistan say rishta kya, La ilaha Illah*” (What is our relationship with Pakistan, there is no God but Allah).

This new campaign was more ruthless as the political rivals, mainly from the JKLF, were eliminated. According to JKLF figures, Hizbul Mujahideen eliminated more members than the state military apparatus. Civil society efforts at negotiation between the two also failed to yield any results. Staniland (2016) writes that the Hizbul Mujahideen marginalised the JKLF by executing and threatening its members. Street battles in Srinagar, assassinations of JKLF fighters, and public denouncement of militant nationalism were indicators of the fragile social infrastructure Hizbul Mujahideen was building.

Disappointed with the target assassinations and political differences, Hizbul Mujahideen's founding commander, Ahsan Dar, resigned from the organisation. Given his popularity, the resignation caused widespread resentment in the organisation and massive defections towards the new Muslim Mujahideen. Fair (2014) notes that in the entire history of Hizbul Mujahideen, one can observe political differences within the organisation to the level that target assassinations of fellow commanders were also done.

Strategies of Hizbul Mujahideen

Hizbul Mujahideen was intensely owned by Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan. Since the Jamaat-