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Indigeny–Exogeny

The Fundamental Social Dimension?

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Abstract. – The indigeny–exogeny dimension has received little attention from sociologists and anthropologists, even though it underlies most of the problems they have been interested in. Exogeny (inherited estrangement *from* place) is the basis of modernity and of several earlier social forms. Reciprocally, indigeny (inherited embodiment *by* place) is the key factor in generating the cultural attitudes and social forms that are usually characterised as "traditional." This claim is discussed with reference to such issues as the difference between tribality and indigeny; relations between indigenes and exogenes; the linkage between exogeny and relative economic success; ideological uses of indigenism and exogenism; the relations between exogeny, politics and culture. *[Social theory, cultural theory, Indigenous studies, modernity, colonialism, political anthropology]*

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Introduction

The Fundamental Dimension?

In this essay I argue that exogeny – inherited estrangement *from* place – is the basis of modernity and of some earlier social forms. Reciprocally, I argue that indigeny – inherited embodiment *by* place – is the key factor in generating the cultural attitudes and social forms that are usually characterised as "traditional." Indigenes, whose ancestors (as far as they know) have occupied their places of habitation from time immemorial, necessarily maintain a different approach to their social and physical environment than exogenes, who inhabit territories that they or their ancestors moved into from elsewhere. Indigenes' understanding of their own circumstances is tacit, non-articulated, and constantly sustained by the imponderabilia of daily life. Exogenes, on the other hand, suffer much less from such constraint, being emotionally and cognitively free to take an exploitative approach to their surroundings. Before proceeding further, a note of caution is necessary. Indigeny must not be confused with tribality, which has its own sociology, overlapping only partially with that of indigeny.[1] Indigeny also overlaps only partially with the societal features pointed to by the more frequently used term "indigeneity." I distinguish between these and other related terms later.

1 Benjamin (2002: 12–17); Scott (2009: 208–219); Wawrinec (2010).

The contrast between indigeny and exogeny corresponds to Marx's distinction between "land as subject of labour" and "land as object of labour." Exogenes think of territories as commodities (object) open to exploitation, while indigenes think of land and the places on it as the foundation (subject) of their being (Marx 1970/I [1867]: 178 f.). In other words, indigenes and exogenes see different worlds. This is akin to the difference between peasants or tribespeople (whose homes are also their workplaces) and proletarians or entrepreneurs (whose workplaces are separate from their homes). Indeed, the difference has much to do with the latter's migrational experience – to large cities, especially – with a consequent exogenisation of their mode of consciousness.

In what way then does indigeny–exogeny form the fundamental and most proximal of the several factors accounting for the differences between sociocultural traditions? How does this relate to other social-science attempts to instil explanatory order into societal comparison? Let us start with Ernest Gellner's discussion of the established distinction between "many-stranded" and "single-stranded" social activities (Gellner 1988: 43–49). Increasing single-strandedness of social relations is associated with greater societal complexity; contrariwise, many-stranded interpersonal relations are typical of less-complex societal patterns.

> In a complex, large, atomized and specialized society, single-shot activities can be "rational." This then means that they are governed by a single aim or criterion, whose satisfaction can be assessed with some precision and objectivity. Their instrumental effectiveness, "rationality," can be ascertained. A man making a purchase is simply interested in buying the best commodity at the least price. Not so in a many-stranded social context: a man buying something from a village neighbour in a tribal community is dealing not only with a seller, but also with a kinsman, collaborator, ally or rival, potential supplier of a bride for his son, fellow juryman, ritual participant, fellow defender of the village, fellow council member (Gellner 1988: 44).

On this view, single-strandedness is the prerequisite for the emergence of what Max Weber called formal rationality (or just "rationality"), for it predisposes people to believe that they can do just one thing at a time. Where Weber (1958a [1918]: 139) talked of formal rationality as the belief that one can in principle master all things by calculation, Gellner (1988: 44) re-states it as "the single-minded pursuit of maximum gain (say maximum economic gain)." Many-strandedness, on the other hand, makes it very difficult for people to hold that view, for it predisposes them to talk and act in the kinds of ways that anthropologists and others have characterised variously as "traditional," "premodern," "simple,", or even "primitive." Gellner insists, however, that it is modern single-stranded formal rationality that should be seen as unusual and emergent, rather than as the unspoken norm of most sociological discourse:

> … is there any reason to suppose that this neat separation of functions is … everyone's birthright, or is it, on the contrary, the special accomplishment of one rather eccentric tradition, the fruit of very unusual circumstances? Is the division of labour, and the separation of functions, inscribed into the very constitution of nature and thought or, on the contrary, does not nature, and society for that matter, prefer to use one tool for a variety of ends, and one end to be served by many tools? We, who have been drilled into acquiring a fine sensitivity for the difference of aims and functions, must beware of projecting it onto all others. It may be an eccentric, perhaps even a pathological accomplishment (Gellner 1988: 43 f.).

Thus, the degree of strandedness affects the character of day-to-day life in a profound way – not least, as Gellner goes on to show, through the shaping of language use. At the many-stranded end of the scale, cultural representations will be of the undifferentiated, monophysite kind typical of indigeny. In contrast, the more single-stranded societal situations – "modernity" and city life, especially – allow the division of labour and the associated separation of functions to be "inscribed into the very constitution of nature and thought." This is precisely what characterises the context-disregarding exploitativeness of true exogeny – just as it is precluded in the many-stranded circumstances of typical indigenes. The fewer the people, the more conflated things get, whereas "large societies can afford the luxury of neatly separated activities" (Gellner 1988: 45).

A direct connection can therefore be drawn between division of labour, population size, and formal rationality. The initial step in generating such a separation of activities is migratory population movement: by breaking the people-to-place nexus, this turns indigenes into exogenes, favouring single-strandedness over many-strandedness. Consequently, both modernity and formal rationality are the apotheoses of exogeny. The classical sociological views of urban life fit here, suggesting that an overt concern with formal rationality has been more marked in urban contexts than in rural ones.[2] Wirth (1938: 12 f.) explicitly associated single-strandedness (which he variously labelled "segmental roles,"

2 Engels (2005 [1845]: 68 ff.); Weber (1958b [1922–23]: 284); Simmel (1964 [1903]).

"fractionalised aspects," "secondary contacts") with rationality and urbanism.

However, the link between population, exogeny and formal rationality is not new; it extends back at least as far as the Old Testament account of the takeover of the Promised Land (Joshua 12). Indeed, as Weber (1963 [1922]: 138 ff.) argued, monotheism has maintained a close elective affinity with both formal rationality and the invasive "colonial" outlook exhibited even today in the universalistic, proselytising approach of the two major monotheisms (Wright 2009). Julius Caesar's efforts at rationalising Roman law (Coleman-Norton 1956) probably belong here too, for this followed his earlier colonising activities in northern Europe, recounted in brief but systematic ethnological detail in the opening chapter of his "Commentarii de bello gallico." Formal rationality and colonialism (both ancient and modern) thus share a close elective affinity, with exogeny as the linking mechanism between them. More recent forms of colonialism, including the internal colonialism practised in many postcolonial countries even today, have further predisposed people to accept the imposition of formal rationality by reducing overt discussion of societal progress to *single* dimensions – "growth," "development," "democracy," and so on.

In the following pages I seek to show that the interplay of indigeny and exogeny has profound effects not only on the actions of elites in extending their political control, but also on the practical rationality of ordinary people in their daily lives. Exploitative asymmetrical political relations cannot be maintained for long in a cultural and interactional vacuum, for they require a concrete *modality* before they can take effect. Indigeny–exogeny is probably the most efficient of such modalities, since, for reasons argued below, it is a self-regenerating, praxis-embedded ideology.

Exogeny and Indigeny

Urbanism, the long-term consequence of rural-urban migration, is the most familiar contemporary manifestation of exogeny. But there are other sources, among them the colonial activities of European and other powers (especially since the rise of the modern nation-state) and the pioneer movements that have characterised some tribal (non-state) populations. In these situations, people who were exhausting their own resource base thought it necessary to take over others' resources. Consequently, relations of exogeny–indigeny are inherently political in character, with profound effects on both the exogenous and indigenous cultural traditions – especially in territories where an originally migrant population has come to achieve dominance over an indigenous population that still survives in place.

Much has been written on the effects of these circumstances on the dominated indigenous populations. But the submergence of indigeny by exogeny and its subtle effect on the dominating population continues to deserve study. I refer of course, not to any *imagined* or ideologically elaborated "indigeneity" or "exogeny", but to the *real* circumstances – taken-for-granted and embedded in people's daily activities. People of exogenous background, who now constitute most of the world's population, rarely recognise that exogeny itself is a key factor shaping the way they live.[3] Likewise, unselfconscious embedded true indigeny does not usually figure in the indigenes' overt discourse – at least, not until it is challenged by invading exogenes.

Indigeny

What Indigeny Is *Not*

The word "indigenous" is widely employed. All too often, however, it is employed imprecisely. Sometimes this is done unwittingly, because the adjective "indigenous" serves four different nouns – indigeny, indigeneity, indigenousness, and indigenism. But the imprecision is often deliberate, especially – as discussed later – when employed rhetorically in furtherance of political aims. Despite its profound analytical importance, therefore, indigeny proper is forced to hide behind the less-than-clear labels "indigenous" and "indigeneity." Rather than referring to the concrete, directly experienced reality of *places*, indigeny is all too frequently confused with tribality, political indigen*ism*, or minority status. Each of these is important in its own right, but to retain analytical leverage, they should each be distinguished from what I am calling indigeny, which requires to be treated on its own terms.

3 My thoughts on this were initially stimulated by Bernard Smith's argument (1980) that in Australia the invasive "White" culture has been profoundly affected by the Aboriginal presence, in ways that the Whites themselves have barely acknowledged. An even richer argument has been mounted by Jack Weatherford in his detailed studies (1988; 1991) of the immense cultural debt owed by the United States (and the wider world) to the indigenous "Indian" populations that it came to encapsulate.

Indigeny Is Not Tribality

The tendency to replace the term "tribal" with "indigenous" has clouded the issue. The 1993 International Year of Indigenous Peoples was partly responsible for this, but the substitution had begun a few years earlier (Colchester 1995: 60). "Tribal" properly refers to uncentralised and/or segmentary social formations that eschew or avoid centralised (state) organisation. The label "indigenous," on the other hand, places emphasis on land rights, the most pressing issue that confronts tribal and recently tribal populations today. By indicating the specially *localistic* attachments of tribespeople, as opposed to the more generalised allegiances to remote political centres held to by non-tribal state-incorporated people, "indigenous" is now the preferred form of self-identification among the more activist members of the populations in question. But this has not led to analytical clarity.

In the Americas and Oceania the equating of "indigenous" to "tribal" does not cause much confusion, as "indigenous" there refers fairly unambiguously to tribal and formerly-tribal populations.[4] In the USA and Canada at least, the tribal (or formerly tribal) peoples themselves sometimes prefer to be called "nations," in accordance with the literally diplomatic manner in which they were treated by the earliest European settlers of the eastern seaboard (Salisbury 1996: 454 f.), and which still applies to a limited extent in some places (Akam 2009). In contrast, throughout most of Africa and Asia the distinction between "tribal" and "non-tribal" falls *within*, rather than across, the category "indigenous." In Peninsular Malaysia, for example, a significant proportion of the non-tribal Malays (Orang Melayu) are indeed indigenous; but two of the twenty or so tribal aboriginal (Orang Asli) populations are not strictly indigenous, since their ancestors arrived in relatively recent times from Sumatra, with which they still sometimes retain kinship links.

Indigeny Is Not Indigen*ism*

A second misleading usage of the term "indigenous" is in referring contrastively to people whose origins lie within the country or broader region that they currently inhabit, as opposed to those whose ancestors came as settlers from elsewhere.[5] For example, the Indonesian term *pribumi*, often translated as "indigenous," refers to those whose ancestors originated anywhere within the vast territory of the current Republic of Indonesia, in contrast to those whose ancestors came from outside Indonesia, especially China. True indigeny, however, is concerned with concrete places, not abstractly or politically defined territories. States and provinces are territories, not places. Thus, Javanese who "transmigrate" to North Sumatra from Central Java are not especially indigenous in the sense employed here, even though they are undoubtedly *pribumi* (Sairin 1996: 2–4). *Pribumi* and its Malaysian equivalent *bumiputera* (Indic – and therefore exogenous – words meaning "son of the soil") are *political* terms, relating to nation-state concerns; they are not proper tools of sociological analysis.[6] Modern states seek to destroy indigeny-based forms of consociation, for political domination is maintained by imposing the hegemony of just one place – the capital – over other places within the state's territory. Citizenries are *imagined* communities (Anderson 1983), inimical to the maintenance of true indigeny. They are expected to work within a transcendental "there-and-then" worldview rather than the "here-and-now" orientation that characterises most tribespeople and many peasants. The necessary transcendentalising cultural shifts are frequently carried out through forced population movements that break the linkage to place, usually under the neutral-sounding labels of "resettlement" or "relocation."[7]

4 A few populations, such as the Aztecs, Incas, and Hawaiians, were indigenous but not tribal.

5 Maybury-Lewis (1997: 7) defines "indigenous" with respect to country (that is, the territory of a nation-state), but it is clear from the rest of his text that he is referring to *tribal* populations. Of these, he says: "Since they had not developed their own states and are not integral to the states that now actually or potentially rule over them, indigenous peoples are often referred to as 'tribal.' The phrase *tribal peoples* is unfortunately imprecise, but it is nowadays used as a kind of shorthand to refer to small-scale, pre-industrial societies that live in comparative isolation and manage their affairs without any centralized authority such as the state."

If there is any imprecision here, it surely lies in the fusion of "indigenous" with "tribal." Each of these terms can and *should* be used on its own with at least as much precision as terms like "state," "class," or "ethnicity."

6 For informed discussions of the terms *bumiputera* and *pribumi*, see Siddique and Suryadinata (1981/82), Aguilar Jr. (2001), and Nah (2006). The *pribumi* category is supposed to have been abandoned in 2006, following the passing of a national citizenship law (Wawrinec 2010: 102); but there has been no such relaxing of the *bumiputera* concept in Malaysia.

7 Such resettlement ignores the community's resource zone, treating them as if they were merely moving house. Places that outsiders see as physically abandoned may remain directly connected with a living population through such spiritual tokens as the shrines and cemeteries that they leave behind to keep their indigeny intact (Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2006).

Indigeny Is Not Minority Status

In modern states indigeny usually overlaps with minority or subordinate status; but these are not the same thing. Minorities often suffer a range of social disabilities: but, as is shown by the differing situations of African-Americans and "Native" American Indians in the USA, the disabilities suffered by the indigenous minorities usually follow a quite different pattern from those suffered by the non-indigenous minorities. European colonists in America, for example, worked hard to keep relations between Indians and Negro slaves to a minimum, partly because they feared that the two populations would join together in an anti-White rising.[8] And, as one anonymous commentator put it in a review of Wickett (2000), "while Native Americans were being invited into white society, African Americans were being segregated and pushed to the periphery of American society. The irony of course is that Native Americans mostly did not wish to join white society, while African Americans were more than willing to do so." In any case, quantitative demography – minority or majority status – is a poor guide to issues relating to indigeny.

What Indigeny *Is*

To understand better what indigeny is, consider the character of social reality in communities that have continued to live for very long times in the same place. By this measure, the most fully indigenous populations in the world may well include those Hopis (Arizona, USA) whose mud-walled *pueblos* occupy sites, such as Old Oraibi, that some authorities claim to have been continuously occupied by the same population for around a thousand years (Ragsdale Jr. 1987: 339–343, 353). A sensitively made ethnographic film "Hopi. Songs of the Fourth World" (Ferrero 1983), illustrates just how completely the self-image of many Hopis, even today, is bound up in the physical and biotic details of the place they inhabit. When invited to discourse on their personal biographies, they end up talking about their immediate environment, and especially about the maize plant in all its transformations. In other words, they do not see themselves as possessing autonomous selves, separate from the rest of existence but as part of the very place in which they live, and as subtended *by* that environment.

Similar findings have been made in many other such communities. For example, Nancy Munn (1970) reported that some tribal Australian Aborigines still viewed themselves, dialectically, as being simultaneously the objects of subjective creative powers manifested in specific environmental features and the representatives of the subjectivities that produced those environmental features as objects. As Rapoport (1975: 43) says,

> [Australian] tribal lands are not owned even though groups of people had rights over it [*sic*]. Our concept of property ownership has no relevance to the aborigines' spiritual approach. More important to them is the fact that the people are "owned" by the country – it knew them and gave them sustenance and life.

Among the Temiars of Peninsular Malaysia the fusion of territory and personhood was made complete through the institution of burial names (Benjamin 1968: 116 f.). Consequently, the people's deceased relatives are each known after they die only by the name of the site where they were buried; a taboo is placed on the personal names by which they were known when alive. In this kinship-organised society, genealogies thereby become recitations of each group's place-linked history – thus constituting what Fox (2006: 8–17) has labelled "topogeny," the recitation of an ordered sequence of place names as a means of transmitting social knowledge. Fox's account presents many other examples of such familial embodiment by place from throughout the Austronesian-speaking world and beyond.

Such undifferentiated monophysite notions of the person are almost impervious to the kind of psychic engineering that politicians, psychologists, preachers, and others employ in attempting to establish the autonomous, explicitly conceptualised "Self" typical of the citizens of modern states.[9] In the latter circumstance, territory is viewed as an "object," open to exploitation by the subjectivity of the selves who inhabit it. But the opposite is true of people who are highly indigenous to the particular place where they live, for they typically hold undifferentiated, dialectical views of the cosmos and of their situation within it. Consequently, they cannot view the land as an objective good. Indigenous attitudes and orientations are coded in the habitus of daily life and transmitted tacitly rather than by formal teaching – not through explicitly stated "values" but by the em-

8 Willis (1963); Green (1988); Wickett (2000).

9 Differentiated "selves" are also typical of earlier classical states, such as those in Vietnam, Thailand, and Burma, that were subjected to a high degree of cultural suppletion (Benjamin 2005: 268–271). I suggest that the contrast of place and territory, indigeny and exogeny, is the missing dimension in the classic studies of the Self's genealogy by Mauss (1938), Bellah (1964), and Dumont (1965).

bedded patterns of language-use, kinship, religious action, customary clothing, music, or vernacular architecture. Tradition, not innovation, is the mode of cultural communication in such cases, and the *gemeinschaftlich* will far outweigh the *gesellschaftlich* as the locus of authority.

At this point, the reader may object to the phrase "*highly* indigenous." Surely, people are either indigenous to a particular place or they are not. However, it seems that indigeny is indeed a graded rather than absolute phenomenon, since it is the vector-result of place, time, and descent. One can be *more* or *less* indigenous with respect to any or all of these features. Place, for example, can be narrowly or broadly defined. One's own ancestors may have lived in that place longer than someone else's ancestors, leading to a further potential distinction of "priority" or "precedence" between the more and the less "aboriginal" indigenes (cf. Gray 1995: 39). Some ancestors may be considered more salient than others, especially in unilineal or unilaterally biased systems. Moreover, individuals may be of mixed descent with respect to indigeny. The latter case presents especially difficult problems of quantification – as I discovered when supervising a piece of research (Samsiah 1986; see below) that attempted to provide scalar measurements of individuals' degree of indigeny.

If indigeny is indeed a scalar phenomenon, it becomes appropriate to ask who then are the *least* indigenous (that is, the most exogenous) people in the world? Among others, these might include European-Americans (North and South), African-Americans, Overseas Chinese, European-Australians, most Jews (including the majority of Israeli Jews), and the 8 million European Roma ("Gypsies", putative "Egyptians"). These populations are not just exogenous; they wandered into or implanted themselves on top of indigenous populations. This relates directly to one of my key points – that the suppression of indigeny affects the exogenes' culture too. Indeed, the European-Americans are the very exemplars of exogeny, as the historian Arthur Schlesinger (1943: 217, 236 f.) well recognised, in a passage that tallies with Marx's claim that exogenes view land as object rather than subject.

> What, then, is the American from the historian's point of view? … This "new man" is the product of the interplay of his Old World heritage and New World conditions. Real understanding dawns only when the nature of these two factors is properly assessed. … Since the agriculturist regarded his farm only as a temporary abode, an investment rather than a home, he soon contracted the habit of being "permanently transitory." Distances that would have daunted the stoutest-hearted European deterred "this new man" not at all. Many an Atlantic Coast family migrated from place to place across the continent until the second or third generation reached the rim of the Pacific and the next one began the journey back. "In no State of the Union," wrote James Bryce in 1888, "is the bulk of the population so fixed in its residence as everywhere in Europe; in many it is almost nomadic." … The Department of Agriculture reports that the average farm family remains on the same farm for only five or six years and that nearly half the children ultimately go to the towns and cities. … Geographic or horizontal mobility was the concomitant of a still more fundamental aspect of American life: social or vertical mobility. The European notion of a graded society in which each class everlastingly performed its allotted function vanished quickly amidst primitive surroundings that invited the humblest persons to move upward as well as outward. Instead of everybody being nobody, they found that everybody might become somebody.

Exogenous populations usually acknowledge the existence of "home" countries to which they could in principle return. But the Roma – whose ancestors are known on linguistic grounds to have begun migrating from northwest India around 800 years ago – seem quite uninterested in any such concept. They are probably the least indigenous population of all – an image that must lie behind the constant persecution they have suffered over the centuries in Europe (including attempted extermination by the Nazis and current maltreatment in Eastern Europe). In particular, it is their transhumant nomadism – their apparent lack of linkage to places – that has generated persecution (Brearley 1996: 5–7). As one Roma leader put it: "Romanies are, after all, the only true Europeans," precisely *because* so many of them (perhaps one in ten) travel across national boundaries in Europe every year (Brearley 1996: 13). Are the Roma therefore an authentically tribal people who nevertheless remain thoroughly exogenous in their sociocultural profile? If so, they would represent an important test case for the analytical separation of "tribal" from "indigenous."

"Indigenism," "Indigenousness," "Indigeneity"

"Indigeny" is an uncommon word, easily confused with the slightly more common terms "indigeneity," "indigenism," and "indigenousness."[10] True embedded indigeny should nevertheless be distinguished from the other three labels, which all refer to self-conscious and explicit political stances, and

10 The standard dictionaries are only now catching up with most of these words.

are, therefore, as discussed later, manifestations of exogeny rather than indigeny.

"Indigenism" and "indigenousness" (Gray 1995: 40 ff.) typically refer to political stances that assert a degree of nativist autonomy from the state;[11] but the same words also frequently refer to stances adopted *by* the state for its own purposes (Benjamin 2002: 54–58). Examples will be discussed later. More recently, the term "indigeneity" has appeared in the literature as the almost exclusive cover-term for all varieties of supposedly "indigenous" action. Intentionally or otherwise, therefore, "indigeneity" hides several distinct meanings. Some authors bring these various meanings together uncritically. Others appear to use "indigeneity" intentionally, aiming to dissolve the distinction between true indigeny and political indigenism. Little is gained by this procedure, however, and much analytical leverage is lost. This is not to claim that the term "indigeneity" is devoid of utility. For example, in a potentially valuable approach, the term has been used by Hirtz (2003: 889) and Dove et al. (2007: 130–132) to label the *images* of the "indigenous" produced by non-indigenous (exogenous) individuals concerned to construct a model of alterity, especially in discussing environmental or traditional-knowledge issues.

Gananath Obeyesekere (n. d.) has coined the term "self-primitivisation" to describe what is, in effect, the mirror image of "indigeneity" in this latter sense. His example concerns the response of Veddas in Ceylon a century ago, who deliberately dressed in loincloths and entangled their hair to satisfy Europeans staying at the local guest house. The visiting Europeans were seeking "indigeneity" in the sense employed by Hirtz and Dove, and the Veddas' responses should, therefore, perhaps be referred to as "self-indigenisation." According to Obeyesekere, such performances are still mounted. Veddas whose ancestors long ago settled down as farmers now pose for photographs wielding bow and arrow, which they no longer have the skill to use. They do this in an attempt to impress upon the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Indigenous People that the Veddas are an endangered population, "close to nature." Similarly, Obeyesekere reports, they perpetuate this image "for those Sinhala middle class people who, in their own mimesis of colonialism, have imbibed much of the Vädda mythology created by the European" (n. d.). Thus, by schismogenetic process, play-exogeny and play-indigeny bring each other into being. In reality, however, as Obeyesekere (n. d.) and Brow (1978) both aver, there seems to be no sense in which the Veddas as a whole are any more indigenous in my indigeny-based sense than the Sinhalese. This is not to deny, though, that some *local* populations of either ethnicity may have been living under conditions of greater indigeny than other such populations.

If this last usage of "indigeneity" be accepted, analytical clarity would therefore demand that we maintain a three-way distinction, between a) (true) indigeny, b) (political) indigenism (or indigenousness), and c) indigeneity. In the rest of this essay, I concentrate primarily on indigeny and exogeny as unspoken conditions of life. I deal with such overtly ideological issues as indigenism in the final section. But I discuss indigeneity (in the sense just introduced) no further.

Exogeny

Indigene–Exogene Relations

Almost by definition, and certainly as a result of history, most people in the world today are exogenous, while most of the rest are less than wholly indigenous. The problem of indigene–exogene relations therefore looms large, especially where the locally dominant cultural tradition is exogenous in character and where the indigenous population still survives, as in most of the Americas and Australasia, and much of Eurasia and Africa. For both groups, this generates several different kinds of consequences:

- It affects their relative socioeconomic "success."
- The dominant group engages in cultural appropriation and transformation of the dominated indigenes' cultural symbols.
- It often leads the exogenous dominant group to display a heightened concern for cultural and/or racial "purity."

The most obvious of these is the question of relative socioeconomic success. The more indigenous the people, the harder it is for them to gain a foothold on the developmental ladder. The more exogenous they are, the easier is it for them to achieve that kind

11 Gray ignores the importance of *tribality*, which he fuses with indigeny. Moreover (unlike true indigeny), political indigen*ism* – especially where it affects intergroup relations – is open to the state's manipulation of the notions of "place" and "territory." For a closely examined case, see Ginting's study of indigenism among the Bataks of North Sumatra, Indonesia, in which he concludes that "members of a group said to be immigrants in a certain area can appear as indigenes in wider or narrower territorial relationships. The *concept* of migration, therefore, is not so much connected with the movement of people from one place to another as it is with the way in which places organise people" (Ginting 2002: 395–397).

of success.[12] Let me illustrate this with two examples: the transition to early modernity in Europe, and the cline of indigeny within the Malay population of late twentieth-century Singapore.

Europe

Wallerstein (1979) argues that the contrasting degrees of entrepreneurial industrialisation in twentieth-century Poland, the Mediterranean countries, and England relate to issues of indigeny and exogeny dating back to the sixteenth century and earlier. He distinguishes three types of capitalist trajectory, depending on how indigenous and "landed" were the entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Poland was a major source of primary agricultural produce in the European world-economy. The landedness of the Polish gentry made it difficult for them to engage fully as entrepreneurs in the then-emerging framework of Europe-wide trade. Instead, they employed migrant but politically powerless Germans and Jews in that role with the long-term consequence that Polish industrialisation was delayed until the twentieth century.

Venice, on the other hand, became rich because it was the focal point of long-distance trade into Asia. Its success was aided by indenturing large populations in the eastern Mediterranean to produce tradable crops on large estates, in a manner that Spain and Britain were later to follow in the Caribbean, and Holland in the East Indies. When Venice failed to hold on to this colonised labour force, it ended up living beyond its means and entered very late into more industrial modes of production.

England at that time was becoming rich as Europe's major wool producer, aided greatly by enforcing a union with Wales in 1536. This allowed for a mutually beneficial exchange of exogenes – Englishmen to take over the wool-raising hill tracts of Wales, and displaced Welshmen (such as Fluellen in Shakespeare's "Henry V") to serve as soldiers in the English army. This situation was further reinforced when, from the eighteenth century onwards, large numbers of Englishmen moved into the valleys of South Wales to work in the coal mines and smelting works. This is why Cardiff and Swansea, the two main cities of Wales, are now English-speaking, even though Welsh is still extensively spoken elsewhere in the country. Thus, Britain was able to produce an economically successful exogenous entrepreneurship from *within* its own territory by a process of internal colonisation. Today, however, the indigenous inhabitants of Mid and North Wales still suffer from the kinds of economic disabilities found in similar situations elsewhere. The alleviation of this disadvantage forms an important part of the political program of the Welsh Nationalist Party (Plaid Cymru), which is motivated as much by socialist concerns as by cultural or ethnic ones.

A similar series of population replacements took place in the Scottish Highlands, but more violently. As MacLeod (1967: 39) puts it in his wry account of Scotland's internal colonisation,

> [t]he tribal organization remained in existence all through the Scotch Highlands until their revolt in the interest of the Pretender in 1745, when the government suppressed the tribal system, forbade the use of the native costume, worked for the suppression of the Gaelic language, and so on. The disheartened tribesmen, sometimes headed by their chiefs and retaining their clan organization even in foreign parts for a time, then began a large-scale emigration to the Carolinas, Canada, and other parts. Those who remained at home showed themselves incapable of rapidly assimilating the agricultural methods of civilized peoples. The Highlands were civilized economically only as a result of the implantation of tenants from the Lowlands.

Singapore

Two studies (Ali 1984, 2002; Samsiah 1986) demonstrated that at the time of their research there were profound cultural and socioeconomic differences *within* the Singapore Malay community, between the locally indigenous ones and those who were descended from migrants. Moreover, these differences varied with the degree of indigeny involved. Many Singapore Malays are the descendants of migrants from elsewhere in the wider region, especially Java (see, e. g., Djamour 1965). It is less well known that the community also includes direct descendants of the original inhabitants of the island: the Orang Selat, the Orang Kalang, the Orang

12 It seems likely that the indigeny–exogeny dimension is also associated with gender. Gilligan's distinction between males' "justice perspective" and females' "care and responsibility perspective" (Gilligan 1995) almost exactly parallels Weber's distinction (1978/II: 979 f.) between "formal rationality" and "*kadi* justice." If this proves to be the case, then there is an elective affinity between gender, mode of rationality, and ultimately indigeny–exogeny. Babcock (2008), for example, shows that the task of representing Pueblo indigeny has fallen squarely on the women. Studies of mitochondrial DNA (matrilineally inherited) and Y-chromosome genes (patrilineally inherited) should in principle ascertain the extent to which females and males have migrated in the past. The evidence has shown varying results: women have sometimes migrated more than men, but men have sometimes migrated more than women. (See Lansing et al. 2011 for a sophisticated study of this kind in eastern Indonesia.)

Gelam, and the Orang Seletar.[13] Although the first three of these *suku* (tribal divisions) became Muslims many generations ago, most of them were until recently aware of their sub-ethnic identification within the Malay population. They knew that they were more truly indigenous than the other Singapore Malays – even than those who regarded themselves as Orang Johor (Johor people).[14]

The fourth *suku*, the Orang Seletar, were still mostly pagans as recently as the mid-1980s, when Mariam Ali was able to describe their tribal circumstances of life on a then-remote headland on the north coast of Singapore island. The indigenous localism of their religious practices, even in the 1980s, well exemplified the historically basal religious pattern of Singapore island. For example, they treated specific large trees as spirit-charged sites, and their mediums communicated with local crocodile spirits. In other words, their religion was anchored to the particular places they inhabited and in which they made their living (fishing and strand-collecting), and it was quite unexportable. They showed little interest in economic "development" as understood within the nationally proclaimed Singaporean ethic, although they certainly took steps to ensure that they obtained good prices for the marine delicacies they caught or gathered.

Their immediate Malay neighbours, on the other hand, presented a different picture. Some of these were relatively less indigenous, in the sense that they were of Orang Kalang (southern Singapore) or Orang Johor descent, while others were of clearly exogenous origins (being mainly from the island of Bawean, off the north coast of Java in Indonesia). The Orang Kalang worked in lower-paid jobs within the wage economy; they received a mostly primary education; and they practised Islam in a non-intensive "traditional" manner. The exogenous Baweanese Malays, however, professed a much more pronounced work ethic, explicitly placing a high valuation on formal educational and religious achievement, and on employment in the formal wage-based sector – while at the same time regarding the other Malays as not worth emulating.

A related set of findings was made by Samsiah Sanip (1986), working mostly on the southern side of Singapore. Her discussion of variation in the degree of exogeny as a positive factor in Malay educational achievement was just one of the factors she examined, but her findings were nevertheless quite indicative. Her survey of nearly half of the Malay undergraduates at the National University showed that among these high-achieving individuals there were "52% (versus 89% in the [national] census) Malays of indigenous descent and 48% (versus 11% in the census) of non-indigenous descent among [the] respondents' parents and grandparents" (1986: 54). There was therefore a deficit factor of 1.7 for being of indigenous descent, against a benefit factor of 4.4 for being of exogenous descent. Put another way, Singapore Malays of exogenous descent had a 7.5 times better chance of educational success at the tertiary level than those of indigenous descent. While these figures proved difficult to analyse statistically, there seemed little doubt that being of indigenous Singaporean descent made it harder in some way to attain educational success. Being of exogenous descent (largely, though not solely, Javanese or Baweanese), on the other hand, made success easier.[15]

More broadly, Singaporean political discourse has always had difficulty in dealing with indigeny and exogeny. The Malays – *all* Malays – are guaranteed certain rights in the Constitution of Singapore (Section 152) as "the indigenous people of Singapore." But the heavily institutionalised ideology of "Multiracialism" (Benjamin 1976), under which the constituent "races" are regarded as different-but-equal, has meant that the Malays too should preferably be seen as exogenes, just like those classified as "Chinese" or "Indians." It is probably for this reason that they are nowadays formally referred to, not simply as "Malays" but as "Malay-Muslims." Presumably, the enclitic "-Muslim" adds such an obligate degree of cosmopolitanism to the ethnic imagery that people's attention will be diverted from the tricky question of indigeny. Paradoxically, therefore, explicitly labelling them "Muslims" has the effect of making the Malays *more* Singaporean, not less.

Exogeny and Relative Economic Success

The mechanisms underlying the socioeconomic differences between indigenes and exogenes are complex. For example, when examining the reasons for exogenes' greater success, it is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the toughening effect of having a migratory family history and, on

13 Each of these ethnonyms contains a place- or river-name; *orang* means "people."

14 Johor is the Peninsular Malaysian state to which Singapore is connected by a causeway.

15 A recent report (Sarah Benjamin 2012) suggests that, a generation or two later, these distinctions may have been lost, following the massive rehousing and consequent exogenisation of the population.

the other, the consequences of their being able to look "objectively" on the new territory as exploitable. Likewise, indigenes' relative lack of success may result *both* from the absence of the toughening mechanism of a migratory history *and* from their relative inability to treat their home places as exploitable commodities. Moreover, migrants usually arrive in their new country after sweeping all their unfinished business "under the carpet." At least two scholars (Turner 2008 [1893] and, as already noted, Schlesinger 1943) have identified this ahistoric attitude as a persistent element in US life, in contrast to the situation in the homelands their ancestors left behind. (Is this the source of the concern displayed by many Americans to impose "closure" on their troubles?) Indigenes, however, are more inevitably locked into their history. They consequently find it much harder to start afresh from ground (or year) zero by stepping outside that history.

For whatever reasons, free migrants *and their descendants* usually "do better" economically than indigenes (or than the descendants of unfree migrants, such as slaves or indentured labourers). In the heyday of European colonialism, the British deliberately played on this by importing foreigners to develop their colonies at a faster rate than would have been possible with indigenous labour alone: Indians in East Africa, Burma, and Fiji; Indians, Chinese, and Ceylon Tamils in Malaya; and (as slaves) West Africans in the Caribbean and America. The indigenes would have proved far less accepting of the exploitative frame of mind demanded by the colonial situation.

As with indigeny, exogeny too is graded. Active colonisers are not the same as indentured labourers or slaves brought by colonisers, nor are they like other temporary settlers who rode (so to speak) on the backs of the primary colonisers. Nevertheless, it seems that *in the long run* and *after the migrations have ceased* the different kinds of exogeny become relatively homogenised and maintain a broadly similar and continuing contrast to the consequences that attend continuous indigeny. This remains so even in the absence of any continuing overt political effort. Exogenes may be descended from colonialists, but it is as exogenes, not as colonialists, that their present-day mindsets are sustained. Exogenes with a background of slavery may for *other* reasons – usually involving issues of "race" on the world stage – continue to suffer problems at the hands of the descendants of their former slave-masters.

Indigeny–Exogeny as Ideology

So far, I have discussed indigeny and exogeny as unspoken conditions of life. But assertions of indigeny/indigeneity and exogeny are also frequently employed as explicit ideology, even contrarily to the historical facts, in pursuit of political dominance. The mere claim to exogeny, for example, can serve to justify the exploitative stance of those who otherwise would be in no position to do so. The Exodus story (in which the origin of the Palestinian Hebrews is traced to a population of Egyptian slaves, around 1300 B.C.E.) provides a primordial example.[16] As James Barr, then Regius Professor of Hebrew at Oxford, said on the BBC World Service (July 4, 2000), this is a very strange way of justifying one's claim to a land; but it fits well with the transcendentalism of a god who leads people away from their former state.[17] And an exogeny-based political ideology is more commonly adopted than its seeming strangeness might suggest. Thus, although Israeli Jews are genetically close to Palestinians (in the patriline), many of them assert their difference from the latter by reference to their own historical exogeny (namely, the "return" from diaspora) while claiming a prior right to rule the country

16 Archaeological, palaeographic, and genetic research (Stager 1998) suggests that the Hebrew-speaking people(s) of ancient Israel/Palestine had their origins from within the broader Canaanite population. (Hebrew is essentially the same language as Canaanite.) There is no empirical evidence to support the view that they actually invaded the country from across the River Jordan, or that they ever sojourned in Egypt proper. Moreover, even after centuries of geographical separation, male Jews and male Palestinians are genetically closer in the patriline (though not in the matriline) than the Palestinians are to the other now-Arab populations (Hammer et al. 2000; Nebel et al. 2001). But, as Jones (1999) – a theologian – argues in shocked detail, none of this obviates the continuing ideological and theological significance within the monotheistic traditions of the kind of exogenous cleansing of indigeny recounted in Joshua 1–12, which the later redactors of the Biblical text left unchanged.

17 As already noted, monotheism too appears to be linked to the indigeny–exogeny dimension. In his essay "The Legitimacy of Solomon," Edmund Leach (1966) claimed that the Biblical texts are largely concerned with justifying the part-"foreignness" of the ancient Hebrew kings in face of the strong prohibition on ethnic exogamy. In this light, it could be claimed that monotheism is a device for overriding the indigenous/exogenous distinction, by substituting for it an egalitarian ethnicity that makes all the members profoundly "equal" in the sight of God. In Christian ideology, for example, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3:28). Whatever the case, the Old Testament (Genesis 15:18–21, for example) clearly provides many examples of indigeny/exogeny concerns, which Leach recognised as a fundamental issue.

as indigenes. The parallel with the Malaysian and Philippine situations (described below) is striking.

In a classic article, Marshall Sahlins showed how "from ancient to modern times, the rulers of a remarkable number of societies around the world have been strangers to the places and people they rule" (2008 [1981]: 178). Other scholars have since taken up this theme. In his introduction to a collection of essays on the topic, Felipe Fernández-Armesto (2008: 160) says:

> Clearly, there are general, perhaps universal advantages in enthroning the stranger. Strangers are unencumbered by existing affinities in the host society. No ties of kin or prior obligations prejudice them. They bring a fresh perspective to their work. They can arbitrate without fear or favour and can marry heirs to power without trammeling the ruling house in networks of embarrassing relations. As royal marriage partners, they are commonly welcome even in otherwise xenophobic cultures. Their experience is different from and therefore more conspicuous and – therefore again – more impressive than that of indigenous rivals.

As Fernández-Armesto points out, this ready acceptance of stranger-kings has long been typical of South and Southeast Asian societies, as well as of Europe in recent centuries. Henley (2004: 86 f.), writing primarily on Sulawesi, Indonesia, suggests a further reason: in societies where segmentary tribal formations were dominant, outsider rulers were welcomed because they could impose state-based limits on the internecine fighting that had marked the pre-state days.

The almost wholly indigenously Malay royal families of Johor, a sultanate within modern Malaysia, like to claim that they are of partly exogenous (Bugis, Arab, and Turkish) descent. According to Donald Brown (1973), a claim of part-Chinese descent has allowed the ruling families of Brunei to justify the emergence and maintenance of a political hierarchy from within what would otherwise have been an ethnically much more homogeneous population.[18] On a broader scale, the persistent Malaysian myth that the Malays are the descendants of the last (Deutero-Malay) wave of supposed prehistoric migrants from Yunnan (Southwest China) seems to play a similar role. Despite a total lack of ethnological, archaeological, or linguistic evidence for this theory, it is still so frequently repeated by scholars, journalists, and textbook writers that it must serve some continuing purpose. I suggest that this entrenched layer-cake view serves to justify the claim that the Peninsula is *Tanah Melayu* (Malay Land), regardless of the presence of a more obviously indigenous population, the Orang Asli aborigines (who, according to the layer-cake theory, represent no fewer than three of the four migratory "waves"). As remarked earlier, an overt discussion of "indigenous" issues in Malaysia falls back on the territory- and region-based concept of *bumiputera* rather than the place-based concept of *asli*. This presumably underlies the current governmental practice in Malaysia of excluding the clearly aboriginal Orang Asli from the "indigenous" category, thereby suppressing their legal status with regard to land-rights claims. Malaysian-Malay political rhetoric thus frequently manages to combine an explicit appeal to a claimed indigenousness with a more implicit appeal to exogeny. The resultant political indigenism justifies the maintenance of special land, economic and educational rights in the Malays' favour; the exogenism justifies their dominance over the country's other indigenous populations.[19]

Two of Malaysia's prime ministers, Tunku Abdul Rahman (in office 1957–1970) and Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad (in office 1981–2003) expressed precisely this view publicly on several occasions. While openly acknowledging their own part-exogenous (non-Malaysian, non-Malay) ancestry, they both acted to maintain "indigenous" ethnic-Malay political supremacy under the country's *bumiputera* policy. They asserted that the Orang Asli populations could not claim to be as indigenous as the Malays because, unlike the latter, they had never formed states. As Tunku Abdul Rahman put it in 1986, "… there could be no doubt that the Malays were the indigenous people of this country because the original inhabitants did not have any form of civilisation compared with the Malays" (*The Star* newspaper 1986). In a book that was banned in Malaysia when it first appeared and for several years after he became prime minister, Mahathir (1970: 126 f.) wrote:

> Aborigines are found in Australia, Taiwan, and Japan, to name a few, but nowhere are they regarded as the definitive people of the country concerned. The definitive people are those who set up the first governments and these governments were the ones with which other countries did official business and had diplomatic relations. There is another condition. The people who form the first effective Government and their legal successors must at all times outnumber the original tribes found in a given country ….The *Orang Melayu* or Malays have always been the definitive people of the Malay Peninsula. … There was no known aborigine government or aborigine state. Above all, at no time did they outnumber the Malays.

18 It takes just one or two dynastic marriages with outsiders to achieve the semblance of exogeny.

19 For further discussion of this layer-cake ethnology, see Benjamin (2002: 18–21).

More than forty years later, Mahathir (by then long out of office) continued to declare that the political rights of these indigenes were no greater than those of any other non-Malays (that is to say, *reduced*): "In Malaysia, the Orang Asli are as much citizens of the country as are the people of other races.[20] They had never set up their own states and governments" (Teoh 2011). Neither Tunku Abdul Rahman nor Dr. Mahathir could have been unaware of the intended meaning of "indigenous." But this did not prevent them from appropriating the label to disguise the fundamentally exogenist character of the political indigenism (*bumiputera*-ism) that they helped to establish as Malaysia's dominant national ideology. On this approach, the Malays are characterised as the most "indigenous" members of the population because they are the ones with the most "definitive" connection to the *country* viewed as a politically defined territory – though not, of course, to the land or any particular places on it. Consequently, in Malaysian political discourse "indigenous" has come to exclude those – the aboriginal Orang Asli – who are thought to have played no part in the formation of that polity.

This situation is not unique.[21] The Malays of the Riau Islands, Indonesia, for example, distinguish between those who are *Melayu asli*, "indigenous Malays," and those who are *Melayu murni*, "pure Malays" (Wee 1988: 212–214). The *Melayu asli* are members of locally derived populations, often tribal in social origin. The *Melayu murni* are mostly higher-ranking people of non-Malay (usually Bugis) origin, whose members have often tried to decide for the other Malays just what constitutes cultural Malayness.

In the Philippines, according to William Scott (1974: 7), the tribal hill populations are regarded by the lowlanders as "non-Filipinos" because they were the only true *resisters* to Spanish colonialism. In a further twist, Aguilar Jr. (2005: 612–620) has shown that the Philippine version of the ethnic layer-cake theory accords indigenous status to the "third-wave" *Indios*, because they were the reputed bringers of civilisation. As in the Riau-Malay and Malaysian cases, the Philippine rhetoric thus fuses an ideology of "indigeny" with the notion of civilisational purity. This allows exogeny to appropriate indigeny to itself, thereby legitimising a proclaimed exogeny as the basis of the right to rule. This is why I earlier characterised indigen*ism* as an example of exogeny rather than indigeny.

Where the populations in question are themselves tribal or recently-tribal, such appropriations of indigeny by exogenes become especially complicated, as in the Indonesian case analyzed by Li (2000). In the modern world, tribespeople who wish to assert their citizenship- and land rights must usually rely on their more exogenised members to assume the necessary leadership roles, because the latter are better educated. This often works well; but it can sometimes spill over into a self-serving appropriation of indigeny by the exogenous ex-tribespeople. For example, the recent economic advances resulting from the opening of casinos on Indian nations' land in the US and Canada are sometimes in the hands of exogenised individuals of only partially indigenous ancestry:

> A vast divide exists at Pine Ridge between the full-blood members of the tribe [Oglala Sioux] and those with lesser native ancestry, who dominate the local administration and business community. In Wanblee, I spoke to Fred Sitting Up, a full-blood who had lost much of his vision to diabetes, which is endemic to the reservation. "The federal government allowed the Bureau of Indian Affairs to enrol anyone in our tribe," claimed the 55-year-old. "They assumed more leadership roles. They get in by saying, 'My great-great-great-grandmother was Indian.' They want our land base. Right now they're trying to dig for uranium. They're all non-Indian. They're not doing anything to protect our people, our land. Three-quarters of the reservation is owned by non-Indians. They don't like us" (Akam 2009).

On the other hand, true place-linked indigeny (as opposed to political indigenism) can also be formalised as a principle of social organisation. Studies by James J. Fox and his colleagues have shown that in the Austronesian-speaking world, ranking and land rights in non-centralised societies were very commonly organised around a principle of local indigeny: those who came "earliest" had prior rights or higher status over those who came later (Fox and Sather 1996; Fox 2006). This principle (along with such principles as "older"/"younger" or "wife-giver"/"wife-taker") has been incorporated into a more abstract principle that the researchers call "precedence." There are therefore strong grounds for according indigeny–exogeny as much weight as, say, descent, gender, or relative age in the formal analysis of social organisation. In particular, indigeny-based precedence appears to underpin many of the cognatic descent-group structures (ramages) that

20 In reality, with much of their lives governed by the "Aboriginal Peoples Act" (1954, revised 1974), the Orang Asli have had *fewer* rights under the law than all other Malaysians, including the "Native" populations of Sarawak and Sabah (Idrus 2010: 94 f.).

21 See Trigger and Dalley (2010: 50–54) for further examples of the various contemporary uses to which "indigeneity" has been put, as well as a survey of studies supplementary to those referred to in the present article.

have been reported in recent decades (e. g., Benjamin 1967: 20–22).

Exogeny, Politics, and Culture

The discussion so far has illustrated the sociological importance of indigeny when dealing not just with tribal societies but with state-based societies and macroeconomic issues as well. In situations of this kind, the real indigenes occupy a difficult and universally distinctive socioeconomic position. Moreover, the fact of having been usurped matters, and it continues long afterwards to reinforce the other consequences of indigeny.

The exogenous mindset, on the other hand, is politics at its most essential – precisely because it is so completely embedded in the actors' hegemonic taken-for-granted view. It needs a real effort of mind to "see" it at all, most often because there are so few indigenes around to suggest that circumstances might be other than what they seem. As with relative age and gender, the hegemony of exogeny (or adulthood or patriarchy) is maintained by suppressing or mocking the supposed absurdity of indigeny (or children's ways or women's ways). To remove it from serious consideration, indigeny gets tarred with the brush of primitivity, childishness, backwardness, or romanticism. This is especially characteristic of colonial political discourse – not yet dead, even within former colonies –, which would otherwise be too overt to do even its own job of persuasion properly unless aided by the more embedded forms of hegemony. Of these, exogeny is the most basic, precisely because of its intimate connection with questions of demography, social relations, and politics.

This brings us to a more general issue: the effects of the indigene–exogene dialectic on the culture of the exogenous dominant group. One such effect is that exogenes are wont to claim that indigenes fail to make proper use of the land they live on, a view that has served to rationalise the behaviour of both European and non-European settlers in many different parts of the world. Smith (1980: 21) quotes an example from James Collier's history "The Pastoral Age in Australasia" (1911). Before migrating to Australia, Collier had served as literary assistant to the influential social evolutionist, Herbert Spencer:

> There can be no question of right and wrong in such a case. The only right is that of superiority of race, and the greater inherent capacity on the part of the whites; the only wrong on the part of the blacks is their all-round inferiority and *their inability to till the ground or even make use of its natural pastures*. All other wrongs were incidental and … trivial (Collier 1911: 37, emphasis added).

In a *Playboy* interview (reproduced in Riggin 1992: 43 f.), the film actor John Wayne made a similar comment when asked whether he had any empathy with the American Indians who had played such an important role in his Westerns:

> I don't feel we did wrong in taking this great country away from them, if that's what you're asking. Our so-called stealing of this country from them was just a matter of survival. There were great numbers of people who needed new land, and the Indians were selfishly trying to keep it for themselves.

The same "lack of use" justification of exogenous hegemony appears in a pro-Zionist speech given in Wales in 1905 by the Jewish cleric Simon Fyne, some years before Zionism was a fully established movement:

> Invoking scriptural authority, Fyne argues that Jews have a stronger claim to Palestine than its then current inhabitants: "The Arabs and Turks can no more be regarded as Palestinean [*sic*] than the English element in India can be called Hindus. Palestine has no *real* [emphasis in original] native population now, and has not had any for the last 18 centuries." As proof of this lack of true belonging, Fyne shows how unsuccessfully Arabs and Turks had managed the land which "can hardly support" a sparse population of 600,000, whereas by his reckoning "at the time of David and Solomon, Palestine, sustained a population of about 7 millions in ease and affluence" (Mars 1988: 91 f.).

Present-day examples of this argument can be found in the justifications made by rich states for taking over the land and water of indigenous African peasants to grow crops (including non-food biofuels) on an industrial scale for their own citizens. In Southeast Asia, this rhetoric is apparent in the "lazy native" stereotype (Alatas 1977) that has yet to outlive its colonial heritage long after the departure of the colonial powers. A variant of this approach challenges even the right to tenure of territoriality, as Chou (1997, 2010) calls it with reference to Indonesia, when outside authorities misrecognise the existing productivity of the populations whose land and other resources they wish to develop. Li (2007: 21), also writing on Indonesia, reports that indigenous people's supposed "failure to improve (to turn nature's bounty to a profit)" is used to justify assigning their land and resources "to people who will make better use of them."

In such situations, it is not unusual for exogenes to claim that the indigenes do not even value or cultivate their own culture or language, which is

viewed as corrupted. In Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, for example, the major movers in Malay language-standardisation (correction) programs have been exogenes, rather than wholly indigenous Malay-speakers. The attempted imposition of so-called "Asian values" in Malaysia and Singapore, that was current in the 1990s and not yet fully dead, falls into the same pattern: the proponents have all been of exogenous descent – as indeed is the neo-Confucianism that they espouse.[22] A similar pattern was identified by Skinner (1957: 244–247) in his analysis of Chinese assimilation to Thai-ness. A high proportion of government officials in early twentieth-century Thailand were of ethnic-Chinese parentage; some had even been born in China. More generally, Skinner remarks (1957: 246) that "[i]t has been observed in many heterogeneous societies that individuals making a new group identification overcompensate for their background by stressing those values and prejudices, if you will, of the new group most sharply distinguished from those of the old." He cites (without giving his sources) the supposed example of officials of Jewish extraction in Nazi Germany as being even more anti-Semitic, as well as of Jews who had converted to Catholicism as being less tolerant of the Jewish religion than Catholics of long standing.[23] A more pathological example concerns the doubly exogenous character (as partly Chinese-descended and sometimes foreign-trained) of Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, Son Sen, and Kang Kek Lew (Comrade Deuch), the instigators of the brutal Khmer Rouge regime that devastated Cambodia in the 1970s in an attempt to restart the country from an ideologically pure ground zero (Benjamin 2005: 286 f.). They were especially vigorous in their maltreatment of the Cambodian Chinese.

More subtly, in countries where the exogenes are now in the majority they frequently take on the mantle of indigeny and of mainstream culture, in a manner that they themselves do not expressly recognise and which replicates the pattern discussed earlier with respect to political hegemony. This was the basis of Smith's claims about White Australian culture, which he analysed as serving to suppress the continuing guilt at the Europeans' takeover of another, indigenous population's land.[24] This is not just a matter of such things as the featuristic incorporation of the boomerang motif formerly current in popular Australian design, but also of the "White Australia" policy that for so long kept other Asian peoples out of the country, and which has again become a key issue in Australian politics. The latercomers are dubbed "foreigners," cultural minorities, polluters, etc. The parallel with Malaysia is striking. There, exogenous "Deutero-Malays" frequently regard the indigenous "Proto-Malay" tribal populations as fit only to *be* ruled, while regarding the later-coming Chinese Malaysians as polluters of "indigenous" Malay culture.

In the USA, the British-derived populations, who are descended from the appropriators of the original "Indian" inhabitants' lands, once treated Mediterranean and Asian migrants in the same dismissive way – as the current debate in North America on the status of the Spanish and French languages still exemplifies. At the same time, European-Americans happily use American-Indian ethnonyms and culture-terms to label automobile models (Cherokee, Cheyenne, Dakota, Comanche, Navajo, Pontiac, Sundance, Thunderbird, Winnebago), military helicopters (Apache, Blackhawk, Cheyenne, Chinook, Comanche, Iroquois, Kiowa) or university sports teams (Tribes, Chieftains, Indians, Braves, Savages, Redskins – the last being especially offensive). Since 1968 at the latest, this practice has annoyed, rather than pleased, the Indians in question – often to the uncomprehending surprise of the perpetrators. There has even been a "Conference on the Elimination of Racist Mascots" organised by Indians to fight the practice. Black (2002: 607) argues that, although the colleges in question sometimes justify this on the grounds that it depicts both Indians and themselves as noble, courageous, fierce, strong, determined, obstinate, and courageous, the "mascotting of American Indian culture further perpetuates white hegemony." They exert this control,

22 These attitudes correspond to what Roy Harris (1980: 130) has called the "classical fallacy" – the idea that there is a "correct" form for every cultural manifestation, and that all others are "wrong" or "corrupt." (See Benjamin 2015: 573–575 for further discussion.) Edward Said's (1979) complaints about "Orientalism" – a clearly exogenous practice – belong here too. The very idea of "Asian values" surely falls into the same, and initially Western, trap that Said was warning against. While it is true that many of these exogenous attitudes were generated by colonialism, they nevertheless *outlive* it – precisely because exogeny is so much more culturally embedded than colonialism. Indeed, colonialism is a special case of exogeny rather than its cause.

23 These and the following cases are examples of the process that has been labelled "cultural appropriation" in recent literature. See Shanley (1997) and Kadish (2004) on the appropriation of American Indian imagery into mainstream US culture. For a broad-ranging theoretical discussion, see Rogers (2006).

24 This is curiously similar to Weber's views (1958b [1922–23]: 271) on the guilt-based underpinnings of urban, world-rejectionist religions, which he saw as a response to finding oneself significantly wealthier at other people's (the peasants') expense.

he claims, "by constructing Indigenous peoples as generic, reducing them to appropriated commodities, and blending their culture with assimilation-minded universities". He suggests that such mascotting is the twenty-first-century's version of a conquering of Native America (Black 2002: 616).

Such attitudes live on outside the universities too, as indicated in this newspaper report on the 2003 Iraq War:

> Moreover, the army's sensitivity to native American culture leaves much to be desired, says Johnson. "They still talk about 'going into Indian country,' meaning enemy territory," he says. They continue to dwell on the stereotype of native Americans as warriors, giving their missiles names like Apache and Tomahawk. "On the one hand they think of us as fierce warriors and on the other they refer to us as being hostile to American interests" (Younge 2003).

In the aftermath of an earlier war, Sapir (1924: 418–420) commented on the United States as exhibiting a "new" imported and imposed – and hence "spurious" – culture that had no local roots, but which had suppressed the (formerly) "genuine" culture of the Indians.

A comprehensive history of "playing Indian" by European-Americans is presented by Green (1988), who points out that it commenced initially, back in Europe, in the late seventeenth century.[25] Consequently, by 1775 "when colonists outraged by new taxes on tea, dress as Mohawks and dump the King's tea into Boston harbour, neither the act nor the impersonation surprise anyone" (Green 1988: 35). In present-day America, Green (1988: 47) points out, some exogenes take on the mantle of indigeny in a less playful manner:

> Mixed-blood Indians are punished, in many ways, for being "half-breeds," yet a white claim to Indian heritage is viewed positively, as long as that claimant does not attempt to live out an "Indian" life. Thus, it came to be that Indians who claimed white blood were bad; but whites who claim Indian blood are good.

In Europe, fascism made (and still makes) much appeal to a mythic and mystical "indigeny," as opposed to the despised "cosmopolitan" (that is, exogenous) rationality of the intellectual and business classes. The roots of this attitude predate the twentieth century, as exemplified in Johnson's discussion (1988: 392 f.) of the German *Burschenschaften* (fraternity movements), an important early source for Nazi ideology. They held that "every culture had a soul, and the soul was determined by the local landscape. German culture, then, was in perpetual enmity with civilisation, which was cosmopolitan and alien." Clearly, this is an imagined, not real, "indigeny," aided perhaps, as Green (1988: 31) suggests, by the Nazi "reinterpretation of their icons of origin via Wagnerian opera and Germanic folklore." But the story can be pushed much further back: the evidence of archaeology and human biology suggests that modern Europe is heir to a complicated series of cultural, linguistic, and human replacements. Much of the current German-speaking area is thought to have been linguistically and culturally Celtic until around 200 B.C.E. (Ostler 2006: 281–294), when Germanic languages began to move in from southern Scandinavia. Accordingly, there must have been a considerable degree of cultural suppletion as well as some population movements before Germany became German. This is probably connected with the emergence two millennia later of the indigenising fascist rhetoric just mentioned. Celticism in turn is today emerging as an invented (though not normally fascist) form of indigenism in parts of Europe, some of which have not heard Celtic speech for millennia, if ever (Dietler 1994). Politically, this revivalism is probably aimed at increasing the status of the component sub-national regions over that of the European Union's superordinate nation-states.

In apartheid-era South Africa, White supremacists found it necessary to "prove" that the Bantu-speakers had migrated there *after* the arrival of the first European settlers. Colonial Rhodesians used to claim that the impressive monumental ruins known as Great Zimbabwe must have been built by ancient Egyptians or Romans, since in their view the local people could not possibly have done the work. However, archaeological research has shown that the structures were indeed the work of local people (Garlake 1982: 10 ff.). Many Sinhalese in Sri Lanka believe that the Tamil-speakers must have arrived as later migrants, despite serious linguistic evidence to the contrary: Sinhalese is an Indo-European language, separated from all its sister languages by a huge swathe of Dravidian languages, including Tamil, in southern India. Members of the Singapore government still occasionally claim that the Singapore Malays have yet to "join the mainstream." Malaysian government officers, themselves mostly Malay, still often make exactly the same claim about the aboriginal Orang Asli.

On the other hand, what the elites thereby suppress is often openly acknowledged by ordinary people through the content of their religious, cu-

25 One such "Indian" play-actor was Lewis Henry Morgan (1818–1881), a key founder of modern social anthropology. Morgan, however, was sympathetic to the plight of the usurped Indians of the eastern United States, and undertook action on their behalf.

linary, and other practices. Adherents of Chinese Religion in Singapore and Malaysia, for example, know full well that they should not offer pork to locality deities of the "indigenous" (and hence "Malay") *Dato' Kong* type – just as they regularly spice up their food with chillies in a (Malay) manner that Chinese from elsewhere find inexplicable (Chua and Rajah 2003). And when elites *do* admit indigenous presence it is frequently recast into tourist-like "fourth-world" notions (such as Singapore's exanimate "Malay Village" enterprise, now defunct) that mean nothing to ordinary people – and which do little to benefit the indigenes themselves (cf. Leong 1989).

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