

## 60 Years ago: The Foundation of EEC and EAEC as Crisis Management

*Wilfried LOTH*

With the failure of the EDC in August of 1954, the project of a political Europe receded into the distance for the time being. Essential security functions were now to be carried out by NATO. In an upsurge of emotion, a group decisive for making a majority in France had turned against the supranational principle; and in the remaining countries of the Community of the Six, the French rejection had had a demoralizing effect. Yet, the problem clearly still remained of the independence of the Europeans *vis-à-vis* the US as the leading power, though under the changed circumstances of inclusion in the nuclear security community. Also, the problem of incorporating the Germans, which was ever more clearly a problem of incorporating German economic strength, had not yet been satisfactorily resolved. The problem of economic unification became more urgent, not only because the sectoral integration of coal and steel was oriented toward expansion but also because there was a growing number of firms and branches urging the elimination of hindrances to trade. In this situation, what mattered more than ever was skillful crisis management: Only if the remaining interests in unification were successfully bundled was there a prospect of overcoming the hurdles stemming from the consolidation of nation-state structures that had in the meantime been achieved.<sup>1</sup>

### The Difficult “Relance”

In the search for unification projects that could be implemented without major resistance and were therefore suitable for overcoming the paralysis of the integration process resulting from the EDC shock, the High Authority of the ECSC firstly aimed for the extension of the union to other energy branches and to transport policy. This seemed logical because coal was in many ways linked to other promising sources of energy and because the pricing of coal and steel was to a great extent dependent on arrangements involving transport costs. The German vice president of the High Authority, Franz Etzel, who had floated the idea of extension, therefore hoped that it would not be any too difficult to find the necessary majorities for it in the parliaments of the Six. On 2 December 1954, the Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC voiced

1. This article is mostly drawn from a chapter in my recently published book on the political history of European integration: *Building Europe. A history of European unification*, De Gruyter Oldenbourg, Berlin/Boston, 2015. The separate publication here is motived by the obvious parallels with the present situation of the EU.

its approval for an extension of ECSC competencies into the realms of gas, electricity, nuclear energy, and transport.<sup>2</sup>

Jean Monnet placed his hopes especially on the integration of nuclear energy. It seemed urgent to him mainly for two reasons: firstly, to meet the growing energy demand of France and the other European countries cheaply and at the same make them independent of oil imports that gobbled up currency; secondly, to keep the civilian use of nuclear energy by the Federal Republic under supervision (after the elimination of the occupation statute, such use was no longer forbidden). Given that there were not yet any established national nuclear industries and the lobbyists of the French nuclear energy commission realized that they could not accomplish their ambitious plans unilaterally there was no appreciable opposition in sight. Instead, concentration on this energy sector promised to unleash new enthusiasm for Europe; it was quite clear that the future belonged to this sector and that this new initiative could bring it a significant step forward after so few successful efforts aimed at securing independence up to that point. After Louis Armand of the French atomic energy commission convinced him that the creation of a European atomic energy pool was indispensable if France and the other Europeans wanted to keep pace in the third industrial revolution, Monnet decided to seek the creation of Europe's own atomic authority alongside and before the expansion of the ECSC.

Unlike in 1950, Monnet could not mobilize the French government to get this project underway. After the fall of Robert Schuman in late 1952, Monnet no longer had direct access to the leaders responsible for French foreign policy. Pierre Mendès France, French Prime Minister in the crisis year 1954, even sought to have him replaced as head of the High Authority at the end of his first term. In order to forestall such a loss of confidence, Monnet declared on 9 November 1954 that he would not be available for a second term so as to be able to devote himself wholly to the struggle for the development of the Community without being bound by government directives. He offered the new unification initiative to Paul-Henri Spaak, who agreed to it – though admittedly only after Mendès France had fallen from power and after the Council of the Republic (as the second house of parliament) had confirmed the vote of the National Assembly for the Treaties of Paris. On 2 April 1955, he sent identically-worded letters to Konrad Adenauer, Italian Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino, and Antoine Pinay, who had assumed the post of Foreign Minister in the French government of Edgar Faure that had been formed in February. In this communication, Monnet proposed that a delegate conference of the Six be summoned to discuss the expansion of economic integration. As goals, he cited the expansion of ECSC responsibilities over the other energy sectors as well as transport, along with the establishment of a special organization of the ECSC for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The reaction to this initiative was not particularly encouraging. Dutch Foreign Minister Jan Willem Beyen saw in the expansion of sectoral integration new

2. Cf. P. GERBET, *La "relance" européenne jusqu'à la conférence de Messine*, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio dell'Europa e i Trattati di Roma*, Giuffrè, Milan, 1989, pp.61-91; also on the following.

hindrances to the Common Market that the Dutch government was seeking; Beyen immediately developed a counterproposal. In a memorandum submitted to Spaak on 4 April, the Dutchman condemned sectoral integration as an integration hostile to consumers at the cost of non-integrated economic sectors, which would more likely lead to new cartels than to increases in overall economic productivity. Instead, he wanted to suggest to the Foreign Ministers of the Six the establishment of a “supranational community” that “via the path of a customs union was to progress to the realization of an economic union”. More clearly than during the talks on the European Political Community in 1952-53, Beyen was now aware that a supranational orientation of the Economic Community was necessary from the beginning, not only in order to cushion economic modernization but also to develop a feeling of responsibility for the Europeans’ common future. Given that in the meantime the engagement of the Dutch public for European unification had intensified, he was largely able to prevail with this position in the cabinet vis-à-vis the still-reserved Prime Minister Willem Drees.<sup>3</sup>

Conversely, French opposition to the Common Market had increased even further: Added to the fear of the sell-off of economic sectors that were not yet competitive there was now also the widespread aversion to supra-nationality. With the danger of another parliamentary rejection in mind, the Faure government was wary of embracing a project that threatened to draw the unanimous protest of all trade and workers’ organizations. The sole portion that the government did endorse, after some hesitation, was the plan for a community for civilian use of nuclear energy, which was promoted by both the planning commission and the nuclear energy commission. The stipulation that nuclear weapons were to remain the responsibility of individual countries was retained; an isotope separation facility to be erected jointly would only secure the supply of enriched uranium necessary for nuclear arms.<sup>4</sup> Faure only spoke vaguely about the collectivization of the other energy sectors and transportation.

The West German government was not enthusiastic about either the Common Market or the Atomic Community. Economy Minister Ludwig Erhard saw in the customs union of the Six only a statist impediment to a worldwide system of free trade that suited the export interests of the West German economy. Special Minister Franz Josef Strauss (who was entrusted with responsibility for nuclear issues in October of 1955) preferred cooperation with the far more technically-advanced British and Americans to an atomic community that clearly would be of primary benefit to France. Chancellor Adenauer, who viewed the integration of the Federal Republic into the West as still much too uncertain, was keenly in favour of continuing political integration so as to secure West German integration over the long term. However, he feared that economic integration would not be of any help in reaching that goal: In light of divergent economic interests, efforts toward convergence in this area threa-

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3. A.G. HARRYVAN, A.E. KERSTEN, *The Netherlands, Benelux and the reliance européenne 1954-1955*, in: *Ibid.*, pp.125-157.
4. P. GUILLEN, *La France et la négociation du Traité d'Euratom*, in: *Relations internationales*, 44(1985), pp.391-412.

tened to strengthen resistance to integration in both France and the Federal Republic.<sup>5</sup> He prevailed with his ECSC partners in postponing the Foreign Ministers conference (which was to discuss the Belgian initiative) until the Treaties of Paris had come into force; and he let Spaak and Monnet know that he considered their initiative “premature”.<sup>6</sup>

Given the multifarious opposition, Monnet once again decided to take the bull by the horns. A conversation with Carl Friedrich Ophüls, leader of the Europe division of the Foreign Office in Bonn, had made clear to him that the consent of the West German government to an economic community would indeed be easier to achieve than to an atomic community. Monnet then sought to win over Spaak and Beyen for combining the proposals for expanding the sectoral integration and the plans for a Common Market. The prospect of a Common Market was to move the Dutch and the Germans to participate in sectoral integration as well; at the same time, realization of the Atomic Community was intended to ease French opposition to the Economic Community. In a draft of a common declaration of the Six that his colleague Pierre Uri revised for him on 13 April, he specified that the delegate conference proposed by Spaak for expanding the tasks of the Community should work out treaty texts “in the areas of transport, energy, and nuclear energy” and “in a second step the program and the terms for a general integration of the economy” should be determined. With an eye to French resistance, he hastened to add that there of course must be transition regulations regarding the Economic Community, and that there must be a social fund along with an investment fund in order to shape the unification in a socially-bearable way. He recommended himself for the chairmanship of the conference; he also offered to remain in office as President of the High Authority if the governments embraced this “relance”.<sup>7</sup>

In terms of his own person, he had gone too far here. Beyen, who discussed the draft on 23 April together with Spaak, struck the name Monnet from the submission out of consideration for the French government; the two then decided to nominate René Mayer for the office of President. Beyen also insisted on striking the reference to the ECSC and the mention of an adaptation fund. In principle, however, he accepted

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5. In his memoirs, he gives as the reason for his reluctance only the fear that economic integration could distract from political integration: K. ADENAUER, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1967, p.27. That he had in mind opposition in France and the Federal Republic is seen in his behaviour during the negotiations the European Political Community; see LOTH, *Building Europe...*, op.cit., p.40.
6. Cf. H.J. KÜSTERS, *Adenauers Europapolitik in der Gründungsphase der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, in: *Vierteljahrsshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 31(1983), pp.646-673; W. LOTH, *Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen in der Gründungsphase der EWG*, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.585-602; W. LOTH, *Deutsche und französische Interessen auf dem Weg zu EWG und Euratom*, in: A. WILKENS (ed.), *Deutsch-französische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1945-1960*, Jan Thorbecke, Sigmaringen, 1997, pp.171-187; M.L.L. SEGERS, *Deutschlands Ringen mit der Relance. Die Europapolitik der BRD während der Beratungen und Verhandlungen über die Römischen Verträge*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2008, pp.96-99 and 113-116.
7. Text excerpts in P. GERBET, *La “relance”...* pp.79 f. Cf. also the report by Pierre Uri in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.166 f.

the compromise suggested by Spaak and then won over his cabinet. It was then possible to communicate the revised Uri memorandum to the other ECSC partners on 18 May as a joint proposal of the Benelux governments. Parallel to this, Faure signalled that his government could also support the compromise: On the fringes of the Atlantic Council meeting of 9 to 11 May, he assured his ECSC colleagues that the Common Market would not fail because of France. After the Benelux proposal was already on the table, the West German government fundamentally accepted the idea of a Common Market: In its answer of 27 May, it spoke in favour of a progressive liberalization of trade and capital movement among the Six, linked with the free movement of labour, the establishment of rules for competition, and the creation of an investment fund.<sup>8</sup>

Yet, that was not sufficient for the success of the undertaking. Bonn's memorandum said nothing about the institutions that were to regulate sectoral or horizontal integration; in concrete terms, it only proposed the establishment of a consultative organ within the ECSC that was to present the Council of Ministers with proposals for the configuration of "economic cooperation". The French government did not present a memorandum at all and thus left more open as to the framework and the time frame in which it would accept the continuation of economic integration. In order to avoid the danger of a failure of the initiative, Beyen helped push a proposal to hold an expert conference first, which, independent of government instructions, would review all the possibilities for economic integration; the report of this commission would then serve as the basis for the treaty negotiations. Spaak added to this proposal by suggesting that an established "political personality" function as general secretary of the expert group so that it did not end up suffering the same unfruitful confrontation of irreconcilable viewpoints that had been the case with the EPC expert rounds.<sup>9</sup>

In fact, at the Conference of Messina where the six Foreign Ministers met from 1 to 3 June 1955, agreement was reached only on this minimal step. After Pinay had rejected a binding commitment to the Common Market and after Walter Hallstein, who had to represent Adenauer, had rejected the creation of new institutions, the accompanying officials were compelled to declare on the evening of the second day of negotiations that there had been no agreement at all. In great haste, in a night session following dinner and a ballet, a declaration was passed that listed the integration goals of the Benelux memorandum and of the West German memorandum as subjects for study and commissioned a group of experts under the leadership of a "political personality" to examine them. As Beyen had suggested, the British government was to be invited to participate in the conversations of the experts; representatives of existing

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8. Text of the Benelux Memorandum as well as the Italian and West German replies in: *L'Année politique 1955*, pp.714-718. On the French reaction, see E. FAURE, *Mémoires II*, Plon, Paris, 1984, p.211; on the origins of the West German memorandum, H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1982, pp.112-119; M.L.L. SEGERS, op.cit., pp.117-127.
9. On this and the following, see A.G. HARRYVAN, A.E. KERSTEN, op.cit., pp.153-156; M.L.L. SEGERS, op.cit., pp.127-135.

European institutions would also be brought in as needed.<sup>10</sup> That did not seem to be much. When the Ministers left the session at four in the morning, officials and journalists present had “the impression that they were interested in the sunrise over Mount Etna rather than full of admiration for their work”.<sup>11</sup> In any event, the decisions put the governments under a certain pressure to act, pressure that they could not so easily avoid if the committee were once to reach common viewpoints.

The pressure coming from the decision at Messina became all the greater when as a follow-up to the conference, the governments reached agreement by diplomatic means that Spaak should be appointed chairman of the committee of experts. The man himself had not sought this position because he saw difficulties in reconciling it with the office of Belgian Foreign Minister. After the job had become his, however, his firm and independent leadership of the talks ensured that the delegates, some of whom he knew from the ECSC work, grew to become a genuine expert group. Right at the beginning of the talks in early July in Brussels, he got approval for having the representatives of the High Authority continuously participate with an advisory voice in the work of the steering committee, while the representatives of the OEEC, the Council of Europe, and the European Conference of Transport Ministers would be brought in only as needed.

After the four technical committees and four subcommittees had left a whole series of substantial questions open at the planned deadline, Spaak concentrated his work from November onward with the national delegation leaders. Also, with Pierre Uri and Hans von der Groeben, he brought in two more conceptually-gifted experts.<sup>12</sup> He indicated to the leader of the British delegation, which had up to that time participated as observers, that in future conversations only the unambiguous supporters of a customs union could take part. The British cabinet then made the decision on 11 November not to participate in the planned Common Market.<sup>13</sup>

In the smaller circle, there soon emerged a recommendation for a Common Market with external tariffs, rules of competition, and promotion of modernization; it was to be realized in three steps of four years each. This Common Market was to be directed by a Council of Ministers initially making decisions unanimously and by a Commission appointed by the Council of Ministers; the Commission was autonomously to

10. Text of the declaration in: *Europa. Dokumente zur europäischen Einigung*, vol.3, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1962, pp.1240-1242; on the course of the conference, also the reports of Jean-Charles Snoy et d'Oppuers, Max Kohnstamm and Christian Calmes in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.168 f. and 175-178, as well as B. THOMAS, *Die Europa-Politik Italiens. Der Beitrag Italiens zur europäischen Einigung zwischen EVG und EG*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005, pp.71-81.
11. According to the report by Christian Calmes, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., p.178.
12. On the conception of von der Groeben, having an institutionally-regulated internal market in mind, see J. ELVERT, *Weichenstellungen für die Römischen Verträge – Akteure und Überlegungen der Bundesregierung 1955*, in: *Integration*, 30(2007), pp.301-312.
13. Cf. the negotiation reports in: H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung...*, op.cit., pp.135-218, 232-251, and M. DUMOULIN, *Les travaux du Comité Spaak (juillet 1955–avril 1956)*, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.195-210. See also the reports of Hans von der Groeben and Baron Snoy in: *Ibid.*, pp.294-300; on the British stance, also R. BULLEN, *Britain and 'Europe' 1950-1957*, in: *Ibid.*, pp.315-338, here pp.333-337.

oversee adherence to agreed-upon regulations. Both a mere free-trade zone and an expansion of the ECSC were rejected as unachievable and to an extent undesirable too. For its part, the French delegation under the leadership of Félix Gaillard opposes setting a binding timetable. Instead, the French sought flexible responses to developing economic conditions, harmonization of social costs, and a common investment fund to make it easier for underdeveloped branches of the economy and regions to catch up. Even when the representatives of the Federal Republic agreed in principle to the idea of promoting modernization, the French stuck by their opposition to a binding commitment to the integration program. Conversely, the Germans under the leadership of State Secretary Walter Hallstein showed little inclination to warm to the Atomic Community, which was being vigorously promoted by Gaillard. In late November, the negotiations thus ended in an impasse for which no quick solution was to be found. After Faure's government fell on 29 November, Spaak interrupted the work and then made efforts to move the British government to alter its decision; he believed that only in this way could French opposition to the Common Market be broken in the end.<sup>14</sup>

Clearly, Spaak's emphatic warnings that the Western Alliance would fall apart after Adenauer were only successful in making the Eden government refrain from attacking a customs union of the Six. A breakthrough in the negotiations of the Spaak Committee only came after Adenauer – with reference to his policy-making authority as Chancellor – had instructed his Ministers on 19 January 1956 not to allow the talks to fail and after French President René Coty had on 31 January appointed in Guy Mollet as Faure's successor a figure who was likewise urgently interested in the success of the Messina project.<sup>15</sup> At a hastily-called Foreign Ministers conference of the Six on 11 and 12 February in Brussels, Spaak was now able to convince West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano to agree to the preparation of a recommendation for the Atomic Community. At the same time, the Belgian was able to win from French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau the concession that a recommendation for the Common Market would be prepared as well. Hence, the path was now clear for the vote on the fundamentals of both projects, and things progressed to such an extent by 9 March that Spaak was able to give Uri and von der Groeben the task of editing a summary report based on the prepared working papers. The result, which was ready four weeks later, did run into opposition on both the German and

14. On this action, P.-H. SPAAK, *Memoiren eines Europäers*, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg, 1969, pp.309-314.

15. On Adenauer, cf. his *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, op.cit., pp.253-255; the letter to the Ministers in: K. ADENAUER, *Briefe 1955-1957*, Siedler, Berlin, 1998, pp.139-141; on Guy Mollet, the report of his Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio....*, op.cit., pp. 281-286; as well as F. LAFON, *Guy Mollet. Itinéraire d'un socialiste controversé (1905-1975)*, Fayard, Paris, 2006, pp.491-497.

the French sides once again;<sup>16</sup> but the national delegation leaders then adopted the report on 20 March without major changes.<sup>17</sup>

Along with the basic principles of a Common Market, the proposal for an atomic community was thus now on the table, though the French delegates did have to accept some deletions to their conception. Euratom, as the new organization was to be named at the suggestion of Armand, was only to have control over the trade monopoly for nuclear fuel; the call for ownership rights to be transferred to the Community was not incorporated into the report. Research was only to a lesser extent to be organized by the Community itself. Also, in the industrial application of the results of research, enterprises owned by the Community were only to play a subordinate role; instead of an atomic fund directing the build-up of industrial capacities, there would only be support for public and private enterprises via resources from the general investment fund of the Common Market.<sup>18</sup> In all its sections, the Spaak Report thus bore signs of the compromise between differing conceptions of economic policy and integration policy. One could see how difficult it had been to bring it about at all.<sup>19</sup>

The production of the Spaak Report did not however mean that the two new integration projects had turned the corner. Guy Mollet was indeed resolved to push through not only the Atomic Community but also the Economic Community so as to bind the Federal Republic to the West over the long term and help provide the Europeans with more autonomy from the leading power the US. He was the head of only a minority government, however, which also included Jacques Chaban-Delmas, a representative of the Gaullists; Mollet could not be any more certain of a parliamentary majority for the Common Market than his predecessor. Together with Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and Maurice Faure (Secretary general of the Radical Party who had been appointed State Secretary for European questions), Mollet thus sought to win over partner governments for passing the Euratom Treaty first and then, based on this success, hope to be able to bring about a change in public opinion in France to the benefit of the Common Market. “We had to create a kind of

16. Uri and von der Groeben worked (while being shielded) at Cape Ferrat on the French Mediterranean coast, supported by Spaak’s colleague Albert Hupperts and the committee secretariat official Giulio Guazzugli; cf. the report of Pierre Uri in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.305-307.

17. The report was published in all the languages of the Community on 21 April 1956 by the secretariat of the Spaak Committee.

18. On this negotiation thread, P. WEILEMANN, *Die Anfänge der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft. Zur Gründungsgeschichte von Euratom 1955-1957*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1983, pp.31-47 and 76-86.

19. Due to the many contradictions and open questions, one should certainly not characterize it as an “intrinsically closed concept for economic and atomic integration”, in the words of H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung...*, op.cit., p.239.

smokescreen”, as Pineau later explained. “For us, Euratom was the smokescreen behind which the Common Market had hidden itself”.<sup>20</sup>

The negotiation partners evinced little understanding for the mobilization strategy of the Mollet government. The West German government in particular was only willing to agree to the Atomic Community if the Common Market were realized at the same time. Faced with Erhard’s opposition to the Economic Community and Strauss’s opposition to the Atomic Community, Adenauer had already presented a package deal on the two entities in the cabinet meeting of 10 February; and he now was holding firm to it. He was too unfamiliar with his new French colleagues and was also too irritated by support for the demand for a package deal by West German industry to be able to push through the requisite flexibility in carrying out negotiations from the beginning. He feared that once the French had gotten the Atomic Community, they would reject the Economic Community once and for all; even greater opposition to the Messina initiative was then to be expected than was already visible.<sup>21</sup>

### The Negotiations on the Spaak-Report

At the Foreign Ministers conference of the Six in Venice on 29 and 30 May, Pineau – with a heavy heart and without prior backup from his Council of Ministers – agreed to the beginning of talks on not only the Atomic Community but also the Economic Community, doing so because of Bonn’s package deal.<sup>22</sup> Yet, he continued to seek to bring the Atomic Community to fruition before the Economic Community and specified three conditions that his government wanted for the passage of a treaty on the Common Market: Firstly, overseas territories were to be incorporated into the Common Market as a way of sharing the cost of their modernization rather than accelerating their break with the motherland by the erection of a tariff wall; this condition had especially been pushed by Socialist Oversees Minister Gaston Defferre.

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20. Report at the colloquium in Rome, 25 to 28 March 1987 in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.281-286, the quote pp.282 f. Cf. also the account of Maurice Faure, esp. pp.286-290; P. GUILLEN, *L’Europe remède à l’impuissance française? Le gouvernement Guy Mollet et la négociation des traités de Rome (1955-1957)*, in: *Revue d’histoire diplomatique*, 102(1988), pp. 319-335; Idem., *La France et la négociation des traités de Rome: L’Euratom*, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.513-524; W. LOTH, *Guy Mollet und die Entstehung der Römischen Verträge 1956-57*, in: *Integration*, 30(2007), pp.313-319; M.G. MELCHIONNI, R. DUCCI, *La genèse des traités de Rome*, Economica, Paris, 2007; on Maurice Faure, also B. RIONDEL, *Itinéraire d’un fédéraliste: Maurice Faure*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 2(1997), pp.69-82.
21. *Die Kabinettprotokolle der Bundesregierung 1956*, vol.9, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1998, p.191. Cf. M.L.L. SEGERS, op.cit., pp.180-183; on the domestic political opposition, W. LOTH, *Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen...*, op.cit., pp.591-595.
22. Cf. M.L.L. SEGERS, op.cit., pp.208-211. “We had the impression, Maurice Faure and I, of letting ourselves in for a competition”, according to Pineau in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.283. “What we had to avoid at all events was [another] non-ratification of a treaty”.

Secondly – and what Mollet's Socialist Party put the most emphasis on overall – social benefits and taxes in the Community were to be largely harmonized by the end of the first integration phase in order to avoid distortions of competition and prevent the undermining of social-welfare achievements by a market focused on promoting competition. Thirdly, the transition from the first phase to the second was not to occur automatically; instead, the governments were to determine the regulations for further phases only after the conclusion of the first phase. Over against the liberal integration concept of the free-market economists that would naturally be of benefit primarily to the Federal Republic, which was then experiencing a full-fledged boom, the French side thereby once more put up a political concept of steering that was to diminish the risks entailed by the opening of markets.<sup>23</sup>

In order to generate the necessary support in parliament for the project, the Mollet government organized a parliamentary debate on the Atomic Community in early July. It specified that France expressly held open the possibility of developing its own nuclear weapons; opponents of nuclear weapons and the West Germans, who did not want to promote the special position of the French any further with their resources, were only offered a (rather theoretical) moratorium of four or five years in which there were to be no French nuclear tests. Beyond that, the French insisted that their country would represent itself to the International Atomic Energy Agency and would not be represented, for example, by the Atomic Community. Also, different from what was provided for in the Spaak Report, there were not to be any joint organs of the Atomic Community and the ECSC. With these concessions to the champions of a “national” policy of independence and with a markedly-technical presentation of the project, the government secured a broad majority (332 to 181) for continuing the negotiations on the Atomic Community. With this success under its belt, the Mollet government then pushed for a rapid conclusion of both treaties while taking into account the French conditions; talks had begun on 26 June in the Chateau de Val Duchesse near Brussels and were once again under the chairmanship of Spaak.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, the partners had made no arrangements to cater to the French demands. German advocates of the free market regarded the call for harmonizing social benefits as downright absurd and also showed little inclination to concede France a special role as a nuclear military power or colonial power. Erhard focused his hopes on a free-trade zone among the OEEC countries, which OEEC General Secretary René Sergent presented to the OEEC Council of Ministers meeting of 17 to 19 July

23. The details of the French conceptions were contained in a memorandum that the government delivered to the five negotiation partners. Excerpts from it are in: R. MARJOLIN, *Le travail d'une vie. Mémoires 1911-1986*, R. Laffont, Paris, 1986, pp.283-286. As Pineau's cabinet chief, Marjolin had a major role in working out the French negotiating position.

24. Cf. H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung...*, op.cit., pp.294-298, and P. WEILEMANN, op.cit., pp.103-109. The corresponding intervention by Maurice Faure in the session of 26 July 1956 (*ibid.*, p.109) shows that the Mollet government actually did not wait until the Suez Crisis before accepting a simultaneous signing of both treaties and thereby confirms the criticism of Pineau and Emile Noël (E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp. 525-527) of the presentation by P. GUILLEN (*ibid.*, p.519). In any event, it still regarded the postponement of the treaty on the Economic Community as a way out if the partners did not agree on its terms.

in Paris after discussions on the issue with the British government.<sup>25</sup> Erhard accordingly encouraged the West German delegation in Brussels in its reticence. Consequently, nothing more than an exchange of differing viewpoints could be achieved; and so on 24 July, the delegation leaders decided to take a summer break.

After the resumption of talks on 6 September, the French government modified its position a bit: It no longer insisted on leaving the continuation of market integration open after the end of the first phase but now maintained that the transition to the second phase would occur only if the governments had agreed that the goals of the first phase had been achieved. In return, however, the French demanded that it be possible to retain the system of export assistance and import duties until the French trade deficit had been eliminated and in the event of renewed balance-of-payment difficulties to be able to return to such protective measures. Furthermore, the French wanted to retain the right to postpone the coming into effect of the treaty on the Common Market if the Algerian War continued to generate the exorbitant costs that was the case at that time.<sup>26</sup> This was indeed acceptable to the others. On the questions of social benefits and of incorporating overseas territories, however, the differences continued to be unbridgeable. Mollet therefore once again aimed for a chronological separation of the two treaties; and Jean Monnet, who anyway promised himself a much greater mobilization push for the Atomic Community, urged Adenauer to bring forward the completion of the Euratom Treaty. The Chancellor initially agreed but then, after having been persuaded otherwise by Etzel and Hallstein, held fast to the package deal.<sup>27</sup>

In October, the treaty negotiations thus came to a dead end, like those of the Spaak Committee hardly a year before. At a new Foreign Ministers meeting, called for 20 and 21 October in Paris, there was convergence on the question of transition regulations, however. The partners in principle granted France the possibility of taking special protective measures during difficulties over balance of payments; in return, Pineau conceded – after consultation with Mollet – that after six years, a qualified majority would suffice for deciding on the transition to the second integration phase. When the West German delegation, to which both Erhard and Strauss belonged, categorically refused to agree to reducing the workweek from forty-eight to forty hours over the course of the first treaty phase, Pineau retracted his concession on the trans-

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25. On the origins of the proposal, cf. W. KAISER, *Großbritannien und die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1955-1961. Von Messina nach Canossa*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1996, pp.71-84; A.S. MILWARD, *The United Kingdom and the European Community*, vol.1, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963*, Whitehall History Frank Cass cop., London, 2002, pp.236-247; D. KRÜGER, *Sicherheit durch Integration? Die wirtschaftliche und politische Zusammenarbeit Westeuropas 1947 bis 1957/58*, Oldenbourg, Munich, 2003, pp.417f.

26. The position was determined at an inter-ministerial session on 4 September; cf. P. GUILLEN, *L'Europe remède...*, op.cit., pp.330, and R. MARJOLIN, op.cit., pp. 301 f.

27. H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung...*, op.cit., pp.310 f. Etzel had been mobilized by von der Groeben who feared for the passage of economic “total integration”.

ition issue; after a further round of talks had brought no results, he declared the conference a failure.<sup>28</sup>

This setback was all the more dangerous to the project when on 3 October the British government officially embraced the proposal for a free-trade zone, though with the exclusion of agricultural products (for which the Commonwealth system of preferences was to continue). Erhard, who with his demonstratively-propounded liberal credo had contributed not a little to the failure of the Paris conference, then immediately urged that the negotiations in Brussels be broken off and instead that there be talks with the British on what he regarded as the “most decisive political and economic initiative for the integration of Europe in years”. It was in this way that he hoped to eliminate once and for all the danger of a protectionist and dirigiste customs union of the Six and at the same time take a significant step toward a general liberalization of trade. In this, he knew that he had on his side the West German industrial organizations and chambers of commerce along with broad circles of exporting chemical and processing industries, which likewise placed great hope in the British initiative.<sup>29</sup> In light of all this, Paul-Henri Spaak and many other advocates of the Messina project believed that its failure was almost certain.

## The Avoided Failure

Adenauer clearly did not allow himself to be impressed by Erhard’s economic argumentation. As much as he had treated the project of the Economic Community stodoffishly at the beginning because he saw no significant chance that it could win approval in France,<sup>30</sup> he was also resolved that it not be allowed to fail now owing to differences between the Federal Republic and France. After the Radford Plan for reducing the American troop presence in Europe had presented to him in the summer of 1956 the danger of a Soviet-US understanding at the cost of the Europeans, his interest in Western European security-policy cooperation had even grown. Initial arrangements for activating the Western European Union, which he had agreed on with Mollet during his visit to Bonn on 29 September “owing to concern over de-

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28. On this and the following, *ibid.*, pp.313-320; M.L.L. SEGERS, *op. cit.*, pp.257-262; as well as the account of K. CARSTENS, *Das Eingreifen Adenauers in den Europa-Verhandlungen im November 1956*; in: D. BLUMENWITZ, et al. (eds), *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit. Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers. Beiträge von Weg- und Zeitgenossen*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1976, pp.591-602. Carstens led the inter-ministerial working group that had been created for coordinating the German departmental standpoints in the negotiations.

29. Cf. W. LOTH, *Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen...*, *op.cit.*, p.595; the quote from Erhard’s declaration to the OEEC Council of Ministers on 12 Feb. 1957, in: *Europa-Archiv*, 12(1957), p.9651.

30. Not because the resolution of the Saar question and the arming of the Federal Republic had been more important to him than European integration, according to the exaggerated thesis of M.L.L. SEGERS, *op.cit.*, p.315.

velopments in America" were not to be called into question once again by the failure of the Brussels negotiations.<sup>31</sup>

On 3 November, Adenauer thus agreed to the proposal made by representatives of the Foreign Office to seek an escape from the negotiation crisis via bilateral Franco-German conversations and announced that he himself would go to Paris in order to talk to Mollet. He held fast to his travel plans even when two days later the Mollet government came under heavy fire due to the military attack on Egypt that it was then undertaking alongside the British so as to force a reversal of the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser.

It was not completely without significance for overcoming the negotiation crisis – which was causing Spaak and many others to fear that the Messina project would fail – that the Franco-German talks on the future of the Saar were successfully completed at just this time. On 23 October 1955, the statute worked out in the Treaties of Paris, contrary to expectations, had been rejected by the population of the Saar by a large majority; the Faure government had then taken up negotiations with Bonn with the goal of winning some economic compensation in the now clearly-inevitable incorporation of the Saarland into the Federal Republic. Ever since the meeting between Adenauer and Mollet on 4 and 5 June 1956 in Luxembourg, a compromise had been in the offing. This amounted to having Bonn honour a shortening of the transition period to at most three years, with partial financing of the canalization of the Mosel and further exploitation of a portion of Saar coal deposits from French soil. After a series of difficult questions over details had been resolved, it was possible to sign the Treaties of Luxembourg on 27 October, allowing the entry of the Saarland into the Federal Republic on 1 January 1957.<sup>32</sup> Naturally, the fact that this compromise succeeded contributed to an improvement in the basic sentiment between France and the Federal Republic and above all brought negotiation partners such as Faure and Hallstein as well as Pineau and von Brentano closer to each another.<sup>33</sup>

In any event, what was more important was that the unified pressure of the US and the Soviet Union – which together had forced the governments of Mollet and Antony Eden to break off their Suez undertaking in the night of 6 to 7 November – lastingly increased the feeling in France for the necessity of European unification. Mollet immediately made use of this improvement in the climate to accelerate the treaty negotiations via greater willingness to make concessions. As early as Adenauer's visit on 6 November, he instructed his officials at all events to find a compromise on the contentious issue of harmonization. A group of experts, led on the French side by Robert Marjolin and on the West German side by Karl Carstens, then negotiated a compromise formula that transformed a commitment to upward har-

31. Ibid., pp.244-249; the quote from the negotiation transcript from Karl Carstens, PAAA.

32. Cf. U. LAPPENLÜPER, *Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1949-1963. Von der "Erbfeindschaft" zur "entente élémentaire"*, vol.2, 1958-1963, Oldenbourg, Munich, 2001, pp.1094-1138; M.L.L. SEGERS, op. cit., pp.212-215.

33. Faure reports having become a friend of Hallstein through the negotiations on the Saar, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio ...*, op.cit., pp.287 f.

monization of social benefits into a vague declaration of intent: National legislation and the effects of the Common Market itself would by the end of the first phase make possible a harmonization of the workweek along French lines; if that was not achieved, then the Commission of the Community would be entitled to add protective clauses to the benefit of disadvantaged industries. On the basis of this agreement, the group once again confirmed the compromises on the issue of compensatory payments and the modalities of transition to the second phase, which had already been discussed at the Foreign Ministers meeting. When the compromise package was presented to both heads of government, Mollet had just learned in a telephone conversation with Eden that the British government had already agreed to the American demand for an immediate armistice in the Suez. Adenauer acknowledged the news with the injunction “And now we must create Europe!”. Both leaders then agreed to the results of the negotiations without further discussion and thereby cleared the path for the talks to continue at an accelerated pace.<sup>34</sup>

Mollet prevailed in the cabinet – which was very impressed by the solidarity shown by Adenauer during the Suez Crisis – with a resolution to have the treaty on the Economic Community completed as quickly as possible and for this purpose to be content with laying down “rather general principles” on other disputed issues too, which were then to be fleshed out by the “supranational authority” of the Community.<sup>35</sup> At the same time, he began to prepare the parliament as well as the public systematically as to the necessity of both treaties by presenting them as means through which such humiliations could be avoided in the future—humiliations for France both through Nasser’s expropriation manoeuvre and through the superpowers’ intervention in the Suez Crisis. In light of the distressing dependency on Arab oil and the clear distancing of Adenauer from the leading power the US, Europe seemed to be the stronghold of independence for the first time since the intensification of the EDC crisis: This impression was increased by Mollet’s propaganda offensive and so prepared the soil for a weakening of the protectionist opposition to the Common Market.

With the background of the success on the Saar issue, the solidarity in the Suez Crisis, and the growing manoeuvring room in talks shown by the French delegation, nothing less than a cordial negotiating climate developed in Brussels, one that made it possible for remaining differences to be moved out of the way step by step, with much appreciation of the domestic political difficulties of the partners and with some creativity too. Pierre Uri once again played a role in this; he had been brought into the negotiations by Spaak as a personal advisor and was now leading the talks out of bottlenecks by means of compromise formulations that he drafted on an *ad hoc* basis.

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34. Cf. K. CARSTENS, *op.cit.*, pp.599 f.; H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung...*, *op.cit.*, pp.327-330; P. GUILLEN, *L'Europe remède...*, *op.cit.*, pp.331; D. KRÜGER, *op.cit.*, pp.440-442; M.L.L. SEGERS, *op.cit.*, pp. 280 f. The quote from the report by Pineau in: C. PINEAU, C. RIMBAUD, *Le grand pari. L'ouverture du traité de Rome*, Fayard, Paris, 1991, p.223.

35. According to the communication by Marjolin in a session of the inter-ministerial committee for preparing the Common Market, quoted from P. GUILLEN, *L'Europe remède...*, *op.cit.*, p.332. Guillen’s presentation does not however distinguish clearly enough between Mollet’s views and the campaign of persuasion.

Spaak himself repeatedly gave Hans von der Groeben, whom he had named as chairman of the committee for the Common Market, sufficient backup to defend the line on economic integration found in the Spaak Report against divergent forays from national bureaucracies.<sup>36</sup>

In the process, it proved possible to come to grips with as a delicate a problem as the incorporation of agriculture into the Common Market. Negotiations on this had been going on since September of 1950 when then French Agriculture Minister Pierre Pflimlin presented a plan for the sectoral integration of European agriculture; the various rounds of talks had always failed however due to unbridgeable opposing interests. The experience that an agreement within the framework of the OEEC was not possible owing to the great a diversity of interests as well as a systematic export offensive by American grain producers since the middle of 1950 led the French to attempt to use the Common Market as an export market for its agricultural products, which offered protection from the competition of the global market via price subsidies and external tariffs.<sup>37</sup> With this, they admittedly ran into opposition from West German agricultural representatives, who feared intra-European competition, and from the Dutch too, for whom the proposed subsidies were conversely much too high.

The result of this tug-of-war was the decision to seek a European market for agriculture but to leave the task of working it out to a government conference to meet immediately after the treaty had come into effect. The French representatives were not given any guarantee that the future protection of agriculture would not be less than the existing protection via national markets; German negotiators had to give up special regulations for the reduction of intra-Community tariffs; and the Dutch had to accept that the governments would retain the right to set minimum prices for certain products. Furthermore, the dismantling of discrimination was made dependent on incremental convergence on subsidized domestic prices; and the Community was saddled with subsidizing raw materials whose processed products were destined for export to third countries.<sup>38</sup> This meant that a European agricultural protectionism of a middling sort was in the offing, linked with a promotion of modernization that was curbed by regional considerations. Clearly, there would still need to be negotiations over the methods of subsidy; here, the agreements hid many sources of conflict.

Regarding the Atomic Community, Adenauer conceded in principle to Mollet during the November meeting that Euratom would not exercise any kind of control functions in the military realm. In return, the Frenchman accepted that the community's supply monopoly could be broken if it could not deliver fissionable material

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36. Cf. the accounts by Faure und Uri, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...,* op.cit., pp.288 f. and 307 f., as well as the account by von der Groeben in: H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung...,* op.cit., p.335. On the negotiations, M.L.L. SEGERS, op. cit., pp. 286-290, 300-305, 307-309.

37. Cf. G. Noël, *Du Pool vert à la politique agricole commune. Les tentatives de Communauté agricole européenne entre 1945 et 1955*, Économica, Paris, 1989; U. KLUGE, *Du Pool noir au Pool vert*, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...,* op.cit., pp.239-280; G. THIEMEYER, *Vom "Pool Vert" zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Europäische Integration, Kalter Krieg und die Anfänge der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik 1950-1957*, Oldenbourg, Munich,1999, pp.243-260.

38. Details from the negotiation papers in: H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung...,* op.cit., pp.347-359.

in sufficient quantities or did so only under “improper” conditions. With special regulations that guaranteed priority supply to reactors already completed and to isotope separation facilities to be established over the next seven years, both sides moved further from the idea of operator functions for the community itself. In the question of ownership of fissionable material, the French side was able to gain a victory at the last moment: Monnet, who was now involved only indirectly in negotiations via an expert committee of “Three Wise Men”, was able to make it clear to Adenauer that only in this way was it possible to gain the support of the US for the development of European nuclear energy. Yet, the community’s right of ownership was limited to “especially fissionable materials”, and the users could utilize the community’s property without constraint as long as they adhered to safety regulations. In contrast, French efforts for the construction of a common European isotope separation facility remained wholly without success: Here, the disinclination of the partners was reinforced by pressure from the US, which under all circumstances wanted to prevent the development of an independent French nuclear weapons force. The project thereby lost much meaning in both military and civilian regards, and in France too it now retreated into the background compared to the Common Market.<sup>39</sup>

On the issue of institutions, there was a collision of differing conceptions leading to a compromise that was both complicated and capable of being developed in different directions. The French government advocated a strong position for the Council of Ministers, which was as a rule to decide by majority, but opposed substantial participation by the European Parliament due to the anti-European mood in French public opinion. The Dutch government, whose conceptions here were substantially influenced by Sicco Mansholt, envisioned a strong Commission that, as a non-partisan body of experts, as it were, would pursue “objective politics”. It was to have the sole right to make proposals to the Council of Ministers, which was to decide on them by majority rule. Participation by a parliament was not provided for in this construction. With this and with the binding commitment of the Council of Ministers to the proposals of the Commission, the expansion of the Community beyond the creation of a Common Market was to be prevented. Over against this, the Italian and West German governments insisted on a strong position for the European Parliament, which was to decide on the Community budget and participate in legislative acts of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Adenauer also impressed upon his country’s delegation the need to show a willingness to compromise when in doubt so that the project as a whole would not fail due to institutional questions.<sup>40</sup>

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39. The presentation in P. WEILEMANN, op.cit., pp.122-143 and 171-179 is rather unclear. Important additions in R.T. GRIFFITH, W. A. BRUSSE, *The Dutch Cabinet and the Rome Treaties*, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.461-493, here pp.482-491, and P. GUILLEN, *La France et la négociation...*, op.cit., pp.523 f.

40. Cf. G. THIEMEYER, *Die Ursachen des ‘Demokratiedefizits’ der Europäischen Union aus geschichtswissenschaftlicher Perspektive*, in: W. LOTH (ed.), *Das europäische Projekt zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts*, Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 2001, pp.27-47; J.-M. PALAREYT, *Les décideurs français et allemands face aux questions institutionnelles dans la négociation des traités de Rome*, in: M.-T. BITSCH (ed.), *Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes*, Bruylants, Brussels, 2001, pp.105-150.

A compromise on these divergent conceptions was found only at the last minute at the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Six from 26 to 28 January 1957. It essentially amounted to this: The competencies of the Council and of the Commission would be limited because the rights of the European Parliament remained limited. Regarding the budget, Parliament received only the right – as is generally known – to make amendment proposals to the Council, which was to decide on them by qualified majority. Other than that, Parliament could force the Commission to resign by a two-thirds majority but was given no influence over the composition of a new Commission. Direct election of Parliament was made dependent on a future unanimous vote of the Council. In return, the Council was established as the sole lawmaker of the Community. However, decisions in the Council could initially be made by qualified majority only in a few areas (whereby a recommendation along those lines by the Commission was adopted as a requirement in order to prevent small member states from being outvoted). Central issues such as the naming of Commission members, the shaping of common agricultural policy, and the development of common social policy were to remain dependent on unanimous votes even after the expiration of the transition period.<sup>41</sup>

After this, greater difficulties were once again caused by the French demand that overseas territories be included. As deputy delegation leader Marjolin specified on 19 November, the French government understood by this the incremental opening of overseas markets to the Community countries, the commitment to accept overseas products, and the financing of a comprehensive investment fund by the Community. This was supported by the Belgian government, which saw the same problems in the Congo, but was treated with great distance by the West German government – it was indeed agreeable to the opening of markets on the basis of reciprocity, but on the issue of financing, it initially agreed to nothing more than a nonbinding declaration of intent. In contrast to the situation with social burdens, Paris was not satisfied with that: On the one hand, the government was fascinated by the vision of a “Eurafrica” that would be independent in world politics; and on the other, this vision played a central role in mobilizing the French public, which was then primarily occupied with the drama in Algeria. Once the National Assembly had approved the continuation of negotiations on 22 January 1957 with the proviso that the association of overseas territories would be regulated “on the basis of the principles proposed by the government”, Adenauer could not avoid giving in at the closing meeting of the heads of government on 19 and 20 February in Paris. After a private conversation between him and his French counterpart, the creation of an investment fund in the amount of 581 million US dollars for the first five years was agreed upon; its continuation beyond that period was made dependent on a unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers. This was less than half the sum originally regarded as necessary by the French side,

41. Cf. the overview of the EEC procedural regulations in: H.R. KRÄMER, *Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, Metzner, Frankfurt am Main and Berlin, 1965, pp.26-40.

and it completely left out the demand for sales guarantees. Nevertheless, it naturally served as a signal for ratification in the eyes of the French public.<sup>42</sup>

The treaties on the creation of the European Atomic Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) were signed on 25 March 1957 in Rome by two representatives of each of the six founding states, mostly the Heads of government and their Foreign Ministers. The ceremony took place in the Hall of the Horatii and Curiatii in the Palazzo dei Conservatori on the Capitoline Hill; the rain that continually fell on that raw Monday in Rome marred the festive mood a bit.<sup>43</sup> This fit with the course of the ratification debates in the coming weeks and months: Nowhere did the Treaties of Rome spark great enthusiasm, but after the careful preparation neither did they meet with stubborn resistance.

In contrast to the situation with the EDC, Mollet immediately presented the treaties to the National Assembly so as not to permit the formation of an oppositional movement. Jean Monnet, who after leaving the presidency of the ECSC had assembled an “Action Committee for the United States of Europe” consisting of about a hundred political personalities, then made efforts to have the Bundestag ratify the treaties quickly so as to bring hesitant French deputies to agreement too.<sup>44</sup> In the process, he had some difficulties with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which did not necessarily want to grant Adenauer another foreign-policy success in light of the parliamentary elections set for the coming autumn. After a conversation with Erich Ollenhauer and Herbert Wehner, Monnet was able to prevail, however. It was due to his influence and the efforts of Maurice Faure that progress continued on preparing for ratification in France despite the fall of the Mollet government on 21 May.<sup>45</sup> On 6 July, the Bundestag approved the treaties with the votes of the SPD, which for the first time had thereby backed away from its fundamental opposition to integration into the West. Only a minority of seventeen SPD deputies, among them Helmut Schmidt, voted against the treaties, doing so because of the absence of Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Likewise, the opposition parties FDP and BHE voted against the treaties, though they had earlier, as part of the government, supported Adenauer’s course on integration into the West.<sup>46</sup> Three days later, the French National Assembly also approved the treaties – with the surprising majority of 342 to

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42. H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung...*, op.cit., pp.333 f. and 379-392; R. GIRAUT, *La France entre l'Europe et l'Afrique*, in: E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio...*, op.cit., pp.351-378; on the debate in the French National Assembly, also G. KIERSCH, *Parlament und Parlamentarier in der Außenpolitik der IV. Republik*, Ph.D. Diss., Berlin, 1971, pp.287-315.

43. Cf. F. KNIPPING, *Rom, 25. März 1957. Die Einigung Europas*, DTV, Munich, 2004, pp.9-13. The treaty texts in: *Europa. Dokumente*, vol.3, pp.1153-1219 (EAEC) and 1248-1327 (EEC).

44. Cf. A. VARSORI, *Jean Monnet e il Comitato d'Azione per gli Stati Uniti d'Europa fra MEC ed Euratom (1955-1957)*, in: S. PISTONE (ed.), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, Giuffrè, Pavia, 1996, pp.349-371.

45. Cf. J. MONNET, *Mémoires*, Fayard, Paris, pp.480-499; É. ROUSSEL, *Jean Monnet 1888-1979*, Fayard, Paris, 1996, pp.715 f.; M. LIBERA, *Jean Monnet et les personnalités allemandes du Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe (1955-1975)*, in: *Une dynamique européenne. Le Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe*, Economica, Paris, 2011, pp.37-56.

46. Cf. W. LOTH, *Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen...*, op.cit., pp.592-594 and 597 f.

239. Mollet's mobilization strategy had now paid off, likewise the concessions and gestures that Adenauer had been willing to make in the interest of stabilizing the Franco-German core of the Community.

After the breakthrough in the French National Assembly, the ratification of the treaties was no longer in danger in the remaining parliaments. On 30 July, the Italian parliament approved them; on 4 October the Second Chamber of the Dutch States-General followed suit; the Belgian Chamber of Representatives and the Luxembourg parliament did likewise on 19 and 26 November, respectively. Both treaties then came into effect on 1 January 1958.<sup>47</sup>

The appointments to the top offices of the new institutions were decided only at the last minute in bilateral contacts at the turn of the year 1957-58. Jean Monnet pulled a few strings to secure the presidency of the Euratom authority for Louis Armand; he wanted the office of the President of the EEC Commission to go to Sicco Mansholt, the spry Agriculture Minister of the Netherlands who was disappointed at not having become Foreign Minister in the most recent government in The Hague. For Adenauer, however, it was unacceptable to have two Socialists in the new top offices; and so agreement was reached that Armand would receive the Euratom post and that Jean Rey, the liberal Economy Minister of Belgium, would become President of the EEC Commission. As to the latter, Adenauer would only consent if the Belgian capital were not at the same time the seat of the Commission. When Brussels refused to give up on that, he then insisted that the presidency of the EEC Commission be held by a German and presented State Secretary Walter Hallstein as his choice. Hallstein's candidacy was met with rapid agreement in the other capitals, not least because people had learned to value him as a competent and engaging West German delegation head in the talks on the ECSC as well as those on the Treaties of Rome.<sup>48</sup>

The approval of the Treaties of Rome demonstrated that the European unification movement was indeed stronger than it might have appeared at the time of the failure of the EDC. The success in creating an organizational core for "Europe" – which even with all the modesty of its functions was nevertheless capable of being developed – made possible a continuation of this movement. Problematic was only the fact that there had been very little in the way of an understanding on the political finality of this Community, nor was this arrangement concentrated on executive and bureaucratic elites well suited to making up for that in the near future – and this in a Community that, despite its economic functions, was still more strongly motivated by politics than by economics. Thus, in terms of the further course of integration history, an ambivalent result had been achieved with the Treaties of Rome: They could serve as the basis for further development, which however would again and again require unambiguously convergent interests and an unambiguous political creative will. At

47. On the ratification processes, see H.J. KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung...*, op.cit., pp.441-483.

48. M. DUMOULIN, *The Interim Committee (April 1957 to January 1958)*, in: *The European Commission, 1958-72. History and Memories*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, pp.37-49; on Hallstein as a person, W. LOTH, *Walter Hallstein, a committed European*, in: *Ibid.*, pp.79-90.

the same time, they also embodied within them the risk of lapsing into mere administration of the crisis of Community development. The European Communities thus offered a challenge that could prove the creativity and courage of the Europeans.