

lar Kashmir vision and political actors' mobilisation towards this imagination. Political activists, academics, and ordinary people have shaped and articulated the idea of community through various factors such as relative freedom, political mobilisation, and frames of imagination. This imagination was enhanced with the growth of satellite television and social media. Ellis and Khan (1998) found universal support for the reunification of Kashmir in all sections of society, but the majority favoured independence for the re-United States. Most believed that this should be decided through a referendum among Kashmiris on both sides of the divide and in the diaspora. The majority assumed that such a vote would favour independence. The diaspora has played a vital role in promoting the debate on Kashmir in the international arena, be it by physical actions or by attending meetings in Britain to advance aspirations for the unification of Kashmir within the near future. Kashmiri diaspora has utilised trauma and the memories (images, myths and practices) associated with Kashmiri nationalism to alter the political imagination. The trauma is remembered repeatedly through symbols, cultural practices, and public memory. Thus, diaspora refigured itself as a social form, a type of consciousness, and a mode of artistic production.

Diasporic Contribution

The diaspora and its contribution to Kashmiri nationalism foster an understanding of self-determination, political legitimacy, and social integration on civil and religious grounds. It has espoused voluntaristic, organic, and universalistic nationalism and denounced illiberal, ascriptive, and particularistic forms of nationalism. The diaspora has constantly used the language of civic nationalism to present their status, especially to an international audience. Organisations representing the Kashmiri diaspora have, in particular, adopted a universalistic and rationalist understanding of nationhood. The nation is always imagined as a voluntary association of culturally differentiated individuals. Kashmiri national membership is prioritised over Pakistani or British membership. An analysis of organisational patterns reflects the im-

portance of individual assent based on shared values and the influence of social interactions. Through the remembrance of the events of 1947 and the subsequent post-dam displacement trauma, a novel sense of community evolved, which maintained a constant yearning for an obtainable homeland. This sense of community transcended the frontiers and promoted the return of a movement. The troubled relationship with both the Pakistanis and the British added to the urgency of return. This sense of attachment and connection to the land where exile was forced operates as a powerful metaphor. It is helpful to abstract the idea of force as motivation and thus in the potential creation of diaspora.

Within the diasporic circles, the discourse on Kashmiri nationalism emerges at diverse levels. The repetitive appeal of the return ensures the presence of Kashmiri nationalism on the global scene. There has been a growing conviction within the diaspora to make their case through civic nationalism, using contextualised and historical details to expand its appeal. Despite the continuous status quo on the ground, the very idea of returning to the homeland is used to concretise the idea of Kashmiri nationalism. This is amplified by requesting that the global civil society build a narrative around the political and deteriorating human record in Kashmir.

Punjabis' disdainful views of Kashmiris as being backward and uneducated have also complicated the issue of Kashmiri identity. The Kashmiri identity was seen as a class identity in Pakistan, and hence, the remittances sent back by the diaspora were a way of accentuating the Kashmiri position. Ali (2002), in her research on Kashmiris living in the United Kingdom, highlights how the Kashmiri identity was expressed on cultural and territorial lines. The residents bring about the historical continuity of their ancestry and the distinctness of their homeland. Though there is religious identification with Pakistan, there is a greater identification with the territorial idea of Kashmir.

The constant geographical movement of the diaspora has enabled a situation where people have moved multiple times. This continuous movement has enabled connections in faraway lands through various frameworks in terms of understanding the politics of Kashmiri nationalism and the evolution of nationalism through the changing economic

character of the diaspora. In particular, remittances contributed to the evolution of communication and technology, creating a virtual Kashmiri identity and enabling the displaced groups to maintain proximity and contact. This way, the diasporic experience sharpened a particular narrative and forged continuity between the Kashmiris who stayed back and those who went away. Sayyid (2000) notes that the terms home and home away become insignificant as the concept of diaspora is no longer just an empirical category but also an increasingly metaphorical one. Diaspora exemplifies a condition of political and social homelessness, more than a physical displacement from an imagined homeland and an eagerness to return.

Over time, the diaspora has maintained institutional practices that nurture Kashmiri nationalism. Political activity is encouraged through the biradari networks. Literature on the Kashmir conflict is shared to keep the settlers informed. Community welfare organisations also contribute to maintaining the social side of Kashmiri nationalism, such as Eid celebrations, Kashmir Day, etc. The goal of returning to the homeland is reified through clothing and the performance of Kashmiri nationalism at sociocultural gatherings.

In totality, the diaspora asserts Kashmiri nationalism through civic variables, articulating how to be Kashmiri outside the historical and geographic idea of Kashmir. The diaspora's identity evolves through its identification with the homeland. While displacement changes the context, Kashmiri nationalism is defined and redefined according to the contexts where settlers find themselves.

In addition, Kashmiri refugees in PCK have played an active part in politicising the space and maintaining a continuity in the narrative of Kashmiri nationalism. (Khan and Ellis). Since 1947, the cross-border flight has been in one direction only, from Indian-administered Kashmir into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Subsequent migrations in 1947, 1965, and 1971 produced a constituency of refugees who were relatively absorbed in society. However, those who fled after the 1990s have yet to be absorbed into the local population, as the groups that arrived before lived

in a series of tented refugee camps. The government in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has classified them as refugees. There are a series of tented refugee camps in which people have been made to live for many years in some cases. Sneeden (2012) writes that the refugees who have chosen to live in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir over any other Pakistani city make a major political statement. Even while being displaced, many need to remain within Kashmir and not enter Pakistan. The presence of the refugee Kashmiris in Pakis-cn Controlled Kashmir acts as a reminder that their plight is due to the unresolved nature of the Kashmir conflict. The insistence of refugees to stay in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir also brings in the citizenship question. Jammu and Kashmir citizenship, as defined in the Dogra Maharaja's promulgation in 1858, applies to all those living in Kashmir then and up to two generations of those living outside. The ruling stands still as it was never revoked, and Kashmiris who fall in this category are legally entitled to being citizens of Kashmir. This provides a basis for a sense of Kashmiri nationalism for those who have been displaced.

An additional undertaking describes refugees with a Pakistani passport as natives of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir. This is included in the production of the Pushtani Basindha document confirming a person's origin from Kashmir. This reinforces Kashmiriness within the citizenship narrative and through the modern state's controlling mechanisms.

Refugees from 1947, 1965, and 1971 have established themselves at various societal levels. Several senior bureaucrats from refugee families have exerted their position for community gain at multiple levels. The other way that refugees have adopted is active participation in liberation politics, alongside participating in the domestic politics of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The second way for refugees has been through a refugee-specific structure. The Legislative Assembly in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has 48 seats in all, out of which 12 have been reserved for Kashmiri refugees. The 12 refugee seats are very influential in determining the composition and nature of civil administration. These 12 refugee seats have primarily served as an ideological benchmark for

Kashmiri nationalism. Thus, Kashmiri refugees impact the boundaries of citizenship and political community.

Pakistan as an External Factor in Kashmiri Nationalism

Pakistan's position on Kashmiri nationalism can be determined through its relation to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Lamb (1991) records that the first Indo-Pak war over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir culminated in the division of the state into two entities, with the bulk of the valley of Kashmir and Jammu, Ladakh, and a portion of Poonch coming under the Indian administration. The Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, living under the Pakistani administration.

Though Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has been projected as an independent state, however in effect, the government remains administered mainly by Pakistani officials. Theoretically, this part never joined the country, but the need for recognition internationally, regionally, and within Pakistan subsumed its status. Until 1948, the Azad Kashmir government appealed to international bodies like the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan for de-facto recognition of Pak as an independent state. However, it could not get recognition regionally or internationally, resulting in the further degradation of the local government to that of the local authority. Korbel (1954) notes that despite Pakistan's insistence that de-facto recognition be given to Azad Kashmir, UNCIP explicitly stated that the government there was like a local authority with responsibility for the area assigned to it under the ceasefire agreement.

The Karachi Agreement of 1949 concluded between the Government of Pakistan and the provisional Muslim Conference of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir and allotted control of the defence, foreign policy, negotiations with UNCIP, and the affairs of Northern Areas to the former, while local administration was handed to the latter. This indicated the broad canvas within which Pakistan-controlled Kashmir could exercise its autonomy in managing affairs. The United Nations also dealt restrictively with the Pakistan government on all Jammu and