

which was frequently considered a potential security threat to the Global North. While critics find fault with the quasi-colonial structures of the top-down processes in the societies concerned and conclude that interventions are controversial and problematic in themselves, in practice they are often employed as a necessary evil driven by security considerations. In the following, it will be established that scholarship on the new interventionism since the 1990s, although not clearly distinguishable from each other chronologically, can be divided into five cohorts or 'generations'.<sup>3</sup>

### 2.1.1 Antecedents: From Transitional to Structural Problems (1960–1970s)

The year 1960 was the “Year of Africa,” when seventeen African states, including French Togoland, gained their independence. During the first wave of decolonisation between 1945 and 1970, it was modernisation theory, which postulated that the ‘underdeveloped countries of the Third World’ were simply on their way to catch up with the West. Under modernisation theory’s paradigm, neither the foreign policy of Western powers nor the United Nations were too keen on interfering in the internal affairs of the so-called developing countries. As promising as the post-colonial future of these new, sovereign states seemed, disillusionment quickly spread in the face of the continuity of global inequality, insecure statehood, economic dependency, and especially the increasing number of autocracies, including in Togo, where after an initial coup d’état in 1963, Gnassingbé Eyadéma finally seized absolute power in 1967.

Thus, in the early 1970s, perspectives from dependency theory, particular by André Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, rallied against modernisation theory by arguing that the problems in the so-called ‘Third World’ were not transitional but structural.<sup>4</sup> In the early 1980s, despite decades of aid and technical assistance, the deteriorating economic performance of many countries in the ‘Third World’ ended the relative neglect by the West, which focused attention on domestic economic structures.

### 2.1.2 The 1<sup>st</sup> Generation: Of ‘Quasi’ & ‘Failed States’

With modernization theory going into deep eclipse and the West taking renewed interest in the internal affairs of formerly colonized countries, in the early 1980s the idea of the “liberal peace” made the rounds in International Relations, that is, the conviction that liberal democracies do not wage war against each other,<sup>5</sup> and therefore the spread of this particular form of government is a prerequisite for peace. Drawing on Immanuel Kant’s theory of eternal peace, it was particularly Michael Doyle, who argued that democracy,

3 Beate Jahn, “Liberal Internationalism,” in Richmond; Visoka, *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*, Vol:

4 Michael S. Wesley, “The state of the art on the art of state building,” *Global Governance* 14, no. 3 (2008): 370; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The modern world-system I: The capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world-economy in the sixteenth century*, Studies in social discontinuity (San Diego: Academic Press, 1974); Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*, The Pelican Latin American library (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1971).

5 Vivienne Jabri and Oliver P. Richmond, “Critical Theory and the Politics of Peace,” in Richmond; Visoka, *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*, Vol. p. 97.

trade-interdependence, and membership in more intergovernmental organisations constituted the basic prerequisites for sustainable development and peace.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the spotlight of critique shifted from dependency-theory-based explanations to growing concerns about the capacity of 'good governance' of developing countries.

In this respect, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg's analysis attributed the pervasive underdevelopment paradigm of 1980s to the weakness of the 'African state.'<sup>7</sup> The debate of the 1980s was trailblazing for the transition from advice and requests for assistance to the direct physical intervention in the 1990s. Especially the notion of liberal peace would serve as a guiding principle for the United Nations concept of peace developed in the early 1990s. Thus, in the 1980s, the 'developed world' became more interventionist in its responses. Following the emergence of state-led development strategies in the post-war period, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which emphasised the problem of market failure that needed to be corrected through state intervention, the *Washington Consensus*, that is, the paradigm of neoliberal economic doctrine was soon applied to development economics. As the internal economic policies and institutions of developing countries came under scrutiny, with particular focus on state intervention in the economy, corruption, and distributional inefficiencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and individual states began to advocate a mix of structural adjustment programmes, macro-stability, liberalisation, and privatisation for the economic policies of developing countries.

In the early period after the Cold War, Amitav Acharya identified that most of the wars fought in the so-called 'Third World' were intrastate wars.<sup>8</sup> Primarily Western scholars and policymakers attributed this state of affairs to what in the 1980s Jackson and Rosberg called "weak" or "quasi" states.<sup>9</sup> By the early 1990s, these came to be commonly known under the term "failed states" – a nomenclature which described regions where organized government has collapsed. Moreover, Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait in 1991 and the fear of yet another international oil crisis were taken as indication that out-of-control-autocracies did not only pose a threat to their own populations but to the fabric of international, that is, western, dominated economy and security at large.<sup>10</sup> Yet, driven by the writings of Jackson and Rosberg or Jean-François Bayart's *Politics of the Belly*,<sup>11</sup> state failure was commonly associated with African states.

6 Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (1983), available from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265298>.

7 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (1982), available from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010277>; Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24, no. 1 (1986), available from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/160511>; Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World*, Cambridge studies in international relations 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

8 Amitav Acharya, "The Periphery as the Core," in Krause; Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, Vol, pp. 300–301.

9 Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist."

10 Stephen M. de Luca, "The Gulf Crisis and Collective Security Under the United Nations Charter," 3, no. 1 (1991); Acharya, "The Periphery as the Core," p. 309.

11 Jean-François Bayart, *L'État en Afrique: La politique du ventre*, L'espace du politique (Paris: Fayard, 1989).

The idea of state failure found much resonance in the West: the debate on the West's new role certainly rode within the slipstream of Francis Fukuyama's widespread *end of history* thesis,<sup>12</sup> that is, the conviction that the end of the Cold War cleared the way for the principles of Western liberalism in the form of market economy, democracy, and human rights, to finally prevail everywhere. Thus, the argument for increased interventionist commitment of the West seemed compelling: from early on Peter Lyon, Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner sparked the idea of "international trusteeship" as a possible means of coping with the problem of so-called "failed states."<sup>13</sup> This prompted voices within the scholarly debate and Western press calling for the West to return for a 'new' kind of "benign colonization."<sup>14</sup>

A common feature of many of these proposals was (and still is) the idea that decolonisation came too quickly: Expressing criticism that decolonisation was too hastily pursued, Jackson speaks of "negative sovereignty,"<sup>15</sup> that is, the new post-colonial states were assured of their sovereignty at the international level, regardless of their ability to govern their population and territory as a viable state entity. Similarly, William Pfaff argued that "Colonialism lasted long enough to destroy the pre-existing social and political institutions, but not long enough to put anything solid and lasting in its place."<sup>16</sup> Tom Parker concluded that because of the "rush to self-government little thought was given to their long-term survivability. [...] Against a majority in the General Assembly eager to consign all vestiges colonialism to the 'dustbin of history' even the Trusteeship System could not protect territories from premature statehood."<sup>17</sup> Parker argues that independence, and its central assumption of self-determination as an indispensable prerequisite of peace, security, and welfare, have been turned on its head, insinuating that the hazards of premature independence constituted state failure.

Even disapproving scholarly interventions, such as Mohammed Ayoob's "subaltern realism,"<sup>18</sup> did not escape the state-centric arguments of the 'failed states' maelstrom. In the end, the fragility of statehood, identified primarily in the Global South, resulted in a new form of intervention after the end of the Cold War to prevent 'fragile states' from compromising global and regional security.<sup>19</sup>

12 Francis Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

13 Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (1992); Peter Lyon, "The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship," *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 31, no. 1 (1993), <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662049308447651>.

14 Ali Mazrui, "Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign Colonization," *International Herald Tribune*, 04 August 1994; Charles Krauthammer, "Trusteeship for Somalia: An Old-Colonial-Idea Whose Time Has Come Again," *Washington Post*, 09 October 1992; William Pfaff, "A New Colonialism?," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (1995), <https://doi.org/10.2307/20047013>.

15 Jackson, *Quasi-states*, 26, 95–101.

16 Pfaff, "A New Colonialism?," p. 361.

17 Tom Parker, *The Ultimate Intervention: Revitalising the UN Trusteeship Council for the 21st Century* (Sandvika, 2003), accessed 29 July 2019, available from [www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/centre-for-european-and-asian-studies/pdf/03-03the\\_ultimate\\_intervention.pdf](http://www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/centre-for-european-and-asian-studies/pdf/03-03the_ultimate_intervention.pdf), pp. 31–32.

18 Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security," in Krause; Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, Vol:

19 Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, "Securing Humans in a Dangerous World," *International Politics* 43, no. 1 (2006), <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800129>. Duffield and Waddell discuss how the War on Terror refocusses human security approaches to issues regarded as important for

## Human Security & the Responsibility to Protect

The first wave of ‘failed state scholars’ turned some of the central assumptions of traditional security studies on their head: while in the context of the Cold War, realism’s state-centrism preached primarily security measures directed to safeguard the integrity of the state, the state was now conceptualized as a potential source of insecurity for its own population and (only as a consequence of this) to the international community.<sup>20</sup> As such, the concept of security of the *state* (national security) expanded to the notion of security of the *people*.<sup>21</sup> This shift was most clearly illustrated by the 1994 UNDP report introducing the concept of *human security*:

“It will not be possible for the community of nations to achieve any of its major goals – not peace, environmental protection, not human rights, not democratization, not fertility reduction, not social integration – except in the context of sustainable development that leads to *human security*.”<sup>22</sup>

The concept of human security extended the traditional understanding of security as “freedom from fear” to include the Western individual-centred components of “freedom from want,” which encompassed economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Though not entirely novel,<sup>23</sup> the 1994 UNDP report clearly placed “human security” in the development context,<sup>24</sup> which the literature discussed as the *Security-Development-Nexus*.<sup>25</sup> Besides the UNDP report, five additional UN reports, namely the UN Secretary-General’s Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace*,<sup>26</sup> the 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*,<sup>27</sup> the 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Opera-*

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homeland security; Jeremy Weinstein, Stuart E. Eizenstat, and John E. Porter, “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs*, 2005, accessed 30 November 2021, available from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2005-01-01/rebuilding-weak-states>.

20 Acharya, “The Periphery as the Core.”

21 Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in *On security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, New directions in world politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); An allusion to this is also the title of the book by Simon Chesterman, *You, the people: The United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building*, Project of the International Peace Academy (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

22 UNDP, “Human Development Report” (New York, 1994), emphasis added.

23 See discussion of Truman’s speech of 1949 below.

24 Eckart Conze, *Geschichte der Sicherheit: Entwicklung – Themen – Perspektiven*, V&R Academic (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2018), p. 64; Meera Sabaratnam, *Decolonising intervention: International statebuilding in Mozambique*, Kilombo: International Relations and Colonial Questions (London, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 18.

25 Lars Buur, Steffen Jensen and Finn Stepputat, *The security-development nexus: Expressions of sovereignty and securitization in Southern Africa* (Uppsala, Cape Town: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; HSRC, 2007); Mark Duffield, *Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development and security*, Critique, Influence, Change (London: Zed Books, 2001); Paul Jackson, ed., *Handbook of International Security and Development* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015).

26 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping” (New York, 1992).

27 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace” (New York, 1995).

tions, the so-called *Brahimi report*,<sup>28</sup> the 2001 *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*<sup>29</sup> and the Kofi Annan's 2005 report *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*,<sup>30</sup> have identified defective states or even total state failure as the causes of war, arguing that the only way to achieve lasting peace was to address state deficiencies that led to war and collapse in the first place.

Although the *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, a UN ad-hoc committee, proposed to turn away from a policy of 'humanitarian intervention,' it advanced at the same time the infamous *responsibility to protect* (R2P) concept: Should a state fail to live up to this responsibility, then "human security" was a normative claim and subsidiary right for the international community to intervene.<sup>31</sup> If a state proved to be insufficiently functional to ensure order and stability, international administrations take over the maintenance of peace and security for a transitional period, sometimes by means of military intervention. At its core, R2P changed the long-held principle of state sovereignty and non-interference. While the UN's sovereignty paradigm previously postulated non-interference into the affairs of a state, R2P made a state's responsibility for the "human security" of its citizens a condition of sovereignty – a general shift, which failed state scholars such as Dominik Zaum coined approvingly as "sovereignty as responsibility."<sup>32</sup> A whole series of states, particularly African states, have taken a critical stance on human security and R2P as the basis of a new intervention policy under the umbrella of the United Nations, not least because they have experienced Western interventions in some form in their colonial past.<sup>33</sup>

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the first generation of UN observation and verification missions administered elections and plebiscites, such as in Angola, monitored ceasefire agreements and the long-term commitments of the parties, such as in Guatemala and El Salvador. In the mid-1990s, the humanitarian debacles in Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, Haiti, and Yugoslavia, gave rise to a significant increase in UN peace-keeping missions. These missions initially intervened to *enforce* peace with the aim of preserving the existing state and containing the conflicts by strengthening state institutions. To facilitate political reconstruction, these administrations took over the monopoly of violence, including the main functions of a state (including financing and administration). The execution of these mandates was a multi-stage process: the first stage focused on security, order, and the provision of humanitarian aid. The second stage focuses on (re)building institutions and public administration. The third stage

28 United Nations, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" A/55/405-S/2000/809 (New York, 2000).

29 ICISS, *The responsibility to protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

30 Kofi Annan, "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" A/59/2005 (2005).

31 Conze, *Geschichte der Sicherheit*, p. 64.

32 Dominik Zaum, *The sovereignty paradox: The norms and politics of international statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207435.001.0001>.

33 Thorsten Bonacker, "Wann Werden Die Vereinten Nationen Truppen Nach Kalifornien Senden?," in *Menschliche Sicherheit und gerechter Frieden*, ed. Ines-Jacqueline Werkner and Bernd Oberdorfer, *Gerechter Frieden Politisch-ethische Herausforderungen* 4 (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019), p. 58.

was concerned with the rule of law, the promotion of democratic processes and the economy.<sup>34</sup>

The UN missions in Somalia (UNOSOM, 1993–5), Cambodia (UNAMIC & UNTAC, 1992–3), Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1993–6), Liberia (UNOMIL, 1993–7), Haiti (UNMIH, 1993–6) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996–to-day) already exercised *partial* administrative functions, which were representative for this first “limited” approach of UN peace-keeping missions.

### Reactivating the Trusteeship Council?

In the slipstream of the ‘failed states’ and ‘human security’ debate, many scholarly proposals had emerged that either the Trusteeship Council, other UN bodies, or regional organizations should be partially or even fully entrusted with the administration of the affairs and supervisory functions of complex UN missions.<sup>35</sup>

Inactive since 1994, when Palau (the last remaining trusteeship territory) was released into independence, the Trusteeship Council has been regularly described as a success story in the history of the United Nations.<sup>36</sup> In 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Director of Communications, Edward Mortimer, suggested to “revive and reform the Trusteeship Council, using it as a mechanism through which the community of nations could effectively exercise its tutelage and responsibility for the interests of those unfortunate peoples who may from time to time find themselves in need of international protection.”<sup>37</sup> Still by 2013, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, praised that although trusteeship might seem old-fashioned “It testifies to the great success of the United Nations. I wish other UN bodies could finish their business with the same effectiveness of the Trusteeship Council.”<sup>38</sup>

Although the UN Charter does not even allow for the placement of its member states under the former Trusteeship System, the idea of trusteeship had three core elements:

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- 34 Wesley, “The state of the art on the art of state building,” p. 373.
  - 35 Tom Parker, *The Ultimate Intervention: Revitalising the UN Trusteeship Council for the 21st Century* (Sandvika, 2003), accessed 29 July 2019, available from [www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/cent-re-for-european-and-asian-studies/pdf/03-03the\\_ultimate\\_intervention.pdf](http://www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/cent-re-for-european-and-asian-studies/pdf/03-03the_ultimate_intervention.pdf); Lyon, “The rise and fall and possible revival of international trusteeship”; Henry H. Perritt, “Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship,” *Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs* 8, no. 2 (2003); Henry H. Perritt, “Providing Judicial Review for Decisions by Political Trustees,” *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law* 15, no. 1 (2004); Gerard Kreijen, *State failure, sovereignty and effectiveness: Legal lessons from the decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa* (Leiden, Great Britain: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004); Richard Caplan, *A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn Territories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Edward Mortimer, “The Politics of International Administration,” *Global Governance* 10, no. 1 (2004), available from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800505>.
  - 36 A. J. R. Groom, “The Trusteeship Council,” in *The United Nations at the millennium: The principal organs*, ed. Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, 1st ed. (London: Continuum, 2000); The question that Groom does not ask is, of course, “Successful for whom?”
  - 37 Mortimer, “The Politics of International Administration,” p. 13.
  - 38 UN News, “UN Trusteeship Council Chamber Reopens with New Hopes for the Future, Ban Says,” 26 April 2013.

legal accountability of the trustee to third parties, that is, that they report to someone besides themselves; a commitment to improve the conditions of the people under trusteeship; and respect for the ability of the people eventually shape their own lives.

Yet, these proposals were criticised in particular for their “neo-colonialist notion,” disavowing them as an “ultimate intervention.”<sup>39</sup> Steven Ratner, for his part, rejected the ‘colonial’ tag for international territorial administration,<sup>40</sup> but the criticism stuck that reactivation of the Trusteeship Council implicitly hierarchized the security challenges in the world: while acute threats to (international) security were to be brought before the Security Council in the first instance, the administration of threatened (and threatening) regions (the majority of which were in the Global South) was to be transferred to a subsidiary body, so to speak, that is, the Trusteeship Council.

In the early years of the “failed states” debate, William Bain was the first to discuss theoretically the idea of trusteeship as a security arrangement, suggesting that historical manifestations of trusteeship have always been linked to the idea of security. In fact, Bain considers Kosovo “an international protectorate not substantially unlike the protectorates that were established in nineteenth century Africa.”<sup>41</sup> Bain argues that it is a mistake to assume that “institutionalized forms of trusteeship subordinate the well-being of dependent peoples to the argument of national or international security.”<sup>42</sup> He holds that trusteeship as an *arrangement of security* is “concerned with the general welfare of certain people, rather than in [...] motives and actions that are in so many ways elusive, contested, and unsettled.”<sup>43</sup>

Nonetheless, although Bain subscribes to the failed states argument, he considers trusteeship to be an “unpromising arrangement of security,”<sup>44</sup> since “in exchange for security, advocates of trusteeship must accept the proposition that some people do not fully understand the responsibilities of liberty and that they are consequently unfit to rule themselves. Indeed, they must be prepared to overturn the normative settlement that emerged out of decolonization.”<sup>45</sup> Bain cautions that trusteeship always implies some form of non-consensual coercion:

“A trustee is someone who acts on behalf of someone else who is thought to be incapable of navigating the responsibilities of ordinary life, just as a parent acts on behalf of a child who is not yet ready to take on the responsibilities of adulthood. Indeed, it makes no sense whatsoever to speak of trusteeship if a state can consent to being a

39 Henry J. Richardson, ““Failed States,” Self-Determination, and Preventive Diplomacy,” *Temple international and comparative law journal*, 1996; Ruth E. Gordon, “Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship,” *Cornell international law journal*, 1995; Ruth E. Gordon, “Saving Failed States,” *The American University journal of international law and policy*, 1997.

40 Ralph Wilde, *International territorial administration: How trusteeship and the civilizing mission never went away* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 384.

41 William Bain, “Saving Failed States,” in *The empire of security and the safety of the people*, ed. William Bain, Routledge advances in international relations and global politics 45 (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 199.

42 Bain, “Saving failed states,” p. 196.

43 Bain, “Saving failed states,” p. 197.

44 Bain, “Saving failed states,” p. 188.

45 Bain, “Saving failed states,” p. 203.



ward and, at the same time, possess the authority to terminate that status at its own choosing.”<sup>46</sup>

Grasping the international system from the perspective of the English School, Bain essentially concludes that the application of a trusteeship principle may only find a place in a *universitas* of states, that is, states united around a common purpose, in pursuit of a recognised material objective, or in furtherance of a particular enduring interest. Yet given that some states rather resemble ‘a state of nature,’ Bain doubts their worth as arrangements of security.<sup>47</sup> In contrast, a *societas* of states, that is, states united in recognition of their mutual authority rather than the pursuit of a common substantive purpose (which according to Bain is where world affairs are more likely to be at present), offers little room for the application of the trusteeship principle *per se*. Therewith, Bain indirectly critiques the English School, including the Aberystwyth School’s conception of ‘security as emancipation’ and its associated responsibility of the community of states, as he concludes: “in a world where the fundamental ends of life remain unsettled, persons who are determined to act as if international society consists in a *universitas* of states are more likely to engender the insecurity that all too often accompanies moral crusading rather than lasting peace.”<sup>48</sup>

### 2.1.3 The 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation: From Peace-Keeping to State-Building

The literature of the early 2000s notes that the first generation of UN missions in the 1990s was generally successful in terms of peace-keeping,<sup>49</sup> yet largely failed to achieve their goal of successfully transforming state institutions, which were hoped to ensure building *lasting* peace.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, the debate gained momentum with the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent *War on Terror*, shifting the focus on ‘failed’ or even ‘rouge’ states as source for insecurity.<sup>51</sup> The 9/11 attacks reinforced the underlying perception that poorly governed states constituted weaknesses in the fabric of international society. The ‘failed state’ shifted security thinking from focusing on concentrations of state power to

46 Bain, “Saving failed states,” p. 201.

47 Bain, “Saving failed states,” p. 198.

48 Bain, “Saving failed states,” pp. 203–4.

49 Virginia Page Fortna, *Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents’ choices after civil war* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008); Michael J. Gilligan and Ernest J. Sergenti, “Do UN Interventions Cause Peace?,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 2 (2008), <https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00007051>; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

50 Roland Paris, *At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790836>; Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave over?,” *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (1996).

51 Holger Stritzel and Sean C. Chang, “Securitization and Counter-Securitization in Afghanistan,” *Security Dialogue* 46, no. 6 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010615588725>; Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August (2005); Stephen van Evera, “Bush Administration, Weak on Terror,” *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 4 (2006), <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2006.00268.x>; Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005), <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00500.x>.