

Introduction: Representing Revolts across Boundaries in Pre-Modern Times

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Since the heyday of research on late medieval and early modern social unrest in the 1960s-1980s, historians have referred to the fact that contemporaries had already considered the manifold revolts (and revolutions) of their epoch as a phenomenon transcending particular countries and reigns.¹ Stating thus researchers tried to release their own approach from the limitations of 19th century national historiographies. Both Soviet-Marxist and Western historiographies sought to embed early-modern expressions of protest into a broader analysis of historical structures. Accordingly, they examined them as symptoms of a deeply-rooted societal crisis that characterized the problematic process of transition from the middle Ages to modernity.² Boris Porshnev and Soviet historiography alongside him interpreted revolts in terms of “class struggles” between peasants and feudal lords, whereas Roland Mousnier and his successors perceived them as an interrelation of “challenge and response” between a modernizing state and the purely reactive, conservative estates, or else the population at large.³ In spite of the

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- 1 Winfried Schulze, “Europäische und deutsche Bauernrevolten der frühen Neuzeit – Probleme der vergleichenden Betrachtung”, in *Europäische Bauernrevolten der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Winfried Schulze (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), 10–60, 12; Wolfgang Reinhard, “Theorie und Empirie bei der Erforschung frühneuzeitlicher Volksaufstände”, in *ibid.*, 66–99; John Elliott, “Revolution and continuity in early modern Europe”, *Past and Present* 42 (1969): 35–56; Yves-Marie Bercé, “Troubles frumentaires et pouvoir centralisateur. L'émeute de Fermo dans les Marches (1648)”, *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* 73 (1961): 471–505; Andreas Suter, *Der schweizerische Bauernkrieg von 1653: Politische Sozialgeschichte – Sozialgeschichte eines politischen Ereignisses*, Frühneuzeit-Forschungen, ed. Peter Blickle et al., vol. 3 (Tübingen, 1997), 320.
 - 2 Hagen Schulze, *Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte*, Europa bauen (München, 1994).
 - 3 Roland Mousnier, *Fureurs paysannes. Les paysans dans les révoltes du XVIIe siècle: France, Russie, Chine*, (Paris, 1967); Yves-Marie Bercé, *Histoire des Croquants. Etude*

significant differences, however, both interpretations observed a structural similarity between the manifestations of social upheaval in different countries. Nevertheless did the contemporaries' own perceptions and their *cross-border comparisons* – if quoted at all – remain mere illustrations.

HISTORICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY

Two trends in present day historiography seem to have paved a way for a reevaluation by now: 1) the increasing influence of anthropological approaches and 2) the growing awareness of “transnational” dimensions.

Firstly, the turn to cultural history, historical anthropology and renewed political history made the historical agents' views, interpretations and semantics themselves an object of enquiry. Although revolts have become less popular in scholarly research since the fall of the Soviet empire and the concomitant marginalization of Marxism, concepts such as “moral economy”, “language of the crowd”, or symbolical orders have ousted the prevalence of external structural models. For this reason, the common reference to economic factors and other measurable items shaping the social actors' behavior however unconsciously was given a new framework.⁴ Ricoeur characterized such structuralism as an “interpretation of suspicion”, thus criticizing a perspective which had devalued the agents' views solely as surface phenomena that would hide deeper and more significant social, economic, psychological etc. mechanisms – mechanisms that were said to be the true determination or at least a profound instigation of human behavior.⁵ This shift

des soulèvements populaires au XVII siècle dans le sud-ouest de la France (Genève, 1974).

- 4 On moral economy see Edward Palmer Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 18th Century”, *Past and Present* 50 (1971): 76–136; on the language of the crowd see especially idem, “Eighteenth Century English Society. Class Struggle without Class?”, in *Social History* 3, 2 (1978): 133–165.
- 5 This includes all interpretations seeking for invisible driving forces behind the phenomena, forces that are considered to be more real than phenomenal reality. In the “interprétations du soupçon” the protagonists' own arguments are mainly rationalisations that they might believe in themselves, but that are superficial for serious observers because they hide more than they reveal. Compared with this, Ricoeur's phenomenological approach pleads for taking seriously the protagonists' statements, similar to what is often championed in historical anthropology. Paul Ricoeur, *Du texte à l'action. Essais d'herméneutique II* (Paris, 1986).

to a more balanced view of contemporary accounts has gradually triggered innovation in the study of social unrest and uprisings, which goes into opposite directions. On the one hand the focus on the contemporaries' voices, representations and "worldviews"⁶ has led to an emphasis on the peoples' struggle for the "old right" or the topos of the "good king and his bad councillors", which supported Mousnier's or Charles Tilly's hypotheses on the "backward" role of the peasantry or of the larger population. On the other hand, this new focus has enabled important studies questioning such images of one-sided re-activity in order to claim that the population's protest was in fact the engine of many innovations and a hitherto neglected source of the emergent idea of "human rights". In opposition to Habermas' influential *Theory of communicative action* that had located the genesis of a public sphere in urban (bourgeois) Enlightenment reasoning through the written word, historians of pre-modern revolts observed the subalterns' potential to create such public spheres well before.⁷ Andreas Würgler has therefore argued that a recurrent element of revolts had been to insist upon the publication of acts guaranteeing privileges and rights to the population, documents that the authorities systematically tried to conceal. In this light the focus on "old" rights inherent in the insurgents' rhetoric rather seems to be a disguise for change and is in any way superseded by the novelty of the call for publicity.⁸

Secondly, and simultaneously to the cultural turn, historical research has become increasingly attentive to transnational dimensions. This is certainly due to present day entangled world economy as well as the ever growing importance of transnational organisations and agencies while the national ones loose momentum. Probably first and foremost, however, the transnational outlook is due to the process of European integration, which is, unlike the aforementioned phenomena of globalization, (still) regarded as a politically desired aim rather than an automatic process that cannot be halted anyways. For that reason efforts to ideologically and

6 Cf. on "moral economy" Edward Palmer Thompson, *Plebeische Kultur und moralische Ökonomie. Aufsätze zur englischen Sozialgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*, trans. Günther Lottes, intro. Dieter Groh (Frankfurt am Main, 1980).

7 Winfried Schulze, "Der bäuerliche Widerstand und die 'Rechte der Menschheit'", in *Grund- und Freiheitsrechte im Wandel von Gesellschaft und Geschichte*, Veröffentlichungen zur Geschichte der Grund- und Freiheitsrechte, ed. Günter Birtsch, vol. 1 (Göttingen 1981), 41–56.

8 Andreas Würgler, "Das Modernisierungspotential von Unruhen im 18. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitr. zur Entstehung der politischen Öffentlichkeit in Deutschland und der Schweiz", *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 21 (1995): 195–217. See also David Zaret, *Origins of democratic culture. Printing, petitions, and the public sphere in early-modern England* (Princeton, New Jersey, 2000) for the particularly ample case of the English Civil war.

scientifically foster Europeanization by exploring historical roots of a common European culture often receive privileged funding. Many studies and projects on the closely intertwined European history have thus taken shape. Europe is often conceptualized as an overlapping communicational space. Among other key developments the printing revolution and, even more so, the emergence of regular newspapers during the 17th century are identified as stepping-stones of European integration.⁹ For a long time studies on the press have apparently lived in the shadows, and maybe they are still to a certain extent marginalized within the field of historical research; but historians begin to revise their views and to take the wide range of early-modern media more seriously. There has been done considerable work in order to digitalize early-modern newspapers, and this provides new facilities for research.

An important genre that combines both the transnational dimension and the anthropological interest for contemporaries' perceptions and world-views is the travelogue. In literary studies it has been popular for decades, but historians followed suit. The perception and description of foreign and particularly exotic peoples made authors sensitive to what was normally taken for granted in one's own culture. Even if this was not explicitly reflected, the descriptions often focused on what was perceived as unfamiliar. Much profit can be drawn from post-colonial studies that examine the interactions between colonizers and the colonized, for in these circumstances the cultural difference was particularly huge or at least incited strong presentations of contrast and discord. What is sometimes overlooked within the emphasis on difference is that travellers, when comparing and juxtaposing different countries and cultures, also drew parallels. They registered parallels between countries they knew, sometimes referring to home and host country only, but sometimes even reflecting upon a series of countries they had visited consecutively. One example, for instance, was Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), who travelled to India, South-East Asia and Japan via Russia and Persia.¹⁰ In middle and Western Europe whose kingdoms and principalities were certainly less

9 *Die Entstehung des Zeitungswesens im 17. Jahrhundert. Ein neues Medium und seine Folgen für das Kommunikationssystem der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Volker Bauer and Holger Böhning, *Presse und Geschichte – neue Beiträge*, ed. Holger Böhning et al., vol. 54 (Bremen, 2011); Asa Briggs and Peter Burke, *A social history of the media. From Gutenberg to the Internet* (Cambridge, 2010); *The dissemination of news and the emergence of contemporaneity in early modern Europe*, ed. Brendan M. Dooley (Farnham, 2010).

10 *Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716). Ein Gelehrtenleben zwischen Tradition und Innovation*, [Vorträge, gehalten anlässlich eines interdisziplinären Arbeitsgespräches am 20. und 21. September 2001 in der Herzog August Bibliothek], ed. Detlef Haberland (Wiesbaden, 2004).

divided in terms of nationality/ ethnicity than religiously and even more so socially and legally), many parallels simply imposed themselves on the observers (and those who wrote were generally not peasants). Ethnographic alienation and analogy have thus to be seen as complementary forms of representation. Observers pre-selected information more or less consciously when writing down their experience and observations for the reading public at home that generally judged on the basis of what was familiar. But even the very perception of foreign reality was a genuine process of filtering that obeyed patterns of both *identization* and *alterization*, which we might rather call *assimilation* and *dissimilation*.¹¹

Maybe the strong (anthropological) focus on *dissimilation* in recent investigation of trans-cultural perception has contributed to the researchers' preference for contemporaries' descriptions of unfamiliar and seemingly strange customs, manners and everyday practice – at the expense of the narration of extraordinary events. Of course, wars have always been treated: and because all of them indisputably involved different countries, mutual perception and depiction have finally lent themselves to transnational approaches.¹²

REGARDING REVOLTS ACROSS BORDERS: FOREIGNERS AS PRIVILEGED OBSERVERS

Events like social unrest and revolts, however, which were seemingly beyond the ordinary and of purely local or regional character, have rather been disregarded. The two underlying assumptions (held by historians) obviously were 1) that revolts were indeed rare events, and 2) that they did not really have an impact on other countries. Our objective is not so much to question these assumptions about what revolts actually were, but to examine how contemporary observers depicted and conceptualized them. If we take metaphors comparing the people (*populus*) to the

11 Even though Wolfram Lutterer, *Identitäten, Alteritäten – Normativitäten? Die Bedeutung von Normativität für Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, in *Normen, Ausgrenzungen, Hybridisierungen und 'Acts of Identity'*, ed. Monika Fludernik and Hans-Joachim Gehrke (Würzburg, 2004), 23–43 already employed the German terms *Identisierung* and *Alterisierung*, they are no current concepts in theoretical debates. But in contrast to the polar opposites *identity/alterity* they emphasize the ascriptional aspect and show to what extent *sameness* and *otherness* are discursively constructed. Even more appropriate seems to be the conceptual duality of *assimilation* and *dissimilation* (although the latter is also used in biology in order to describe metabolic processes).

12 Cf. for instance *Kriegsniederlagen: Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen*, ed. Horst Carl, Hans-Henning Kortüm, et al. (Berlin, 2004).

ocean and defining the task of rule as the (captain's) art of steering the ship of state through tempests into account, this equation of social unrest and bad weather rather implies that revolts were regarded as periodically occurring phenomena. And a didactic poem from as early as the 13th century suggests the same when advising nobles to put up *with their peasants' hate*.¹³ It seems as if the etiological question *why* revolts happened, coexisted and often combined with the question *how* they were to be prevented, the latter implying at least a certain degree of normality. Concerning the allegedly local character of revolts, other recurrent metaphors in contemporary writings on seditions might similarly lead to doubts: when revolts were compared to a wildfire, a contagion or epidemic it was clear that they had no reason to come to a halt at borders, at least if their spreading was not actively prevented.

Without any doubt, cases where insurgents themselves referred to foreign models are rather rare; on some occasions rebels would have quoted or tried to imitate the examples of the Swiss Confederacy or the Dutch Republic, for instance.¹⁴ Such cases occurred mainly in the Italian seaports that were nerve centres of a vivid flow of information, with merchants bringing in information from around the Mediterranean. Thus, during the revolts of the mid-17th century in Southern Italy one can find references to the insurgents in Catalonia, Portugal and the Netherlands, all of them having previously rebelled against the Spanish Habsburgs. Especially the successful secession from Spanish rule by the Portuguese and the Dutch nourished hopes when the inhabitants of the Italian seaports saw themselves unjustly overburdened with taxes since they had to pay the bill for the extensive warfare (similar to the subjects of other European monarchies in and

13 On representations of the people as “stormy sea” cf. A. Collurafi, *Le Tumultuazioni della Plebe in Palermo* (Palermo 1651), 12-20, quoted from Peter Burke, “Some Seventeenth-Century Anatomists of Revolution”, in *Storia della Storiografia* 22 (1992): 23–35. In this vein the state is often compared to a ship that has to be steered through the open sea. Cf. for instance Philipp Andreas Oldenburger, *Tractatus iuridico-politicus de rebuspublicis turbidis in tranquillum statum reducendis, in eoque conservandis* (Geneva, 1677), 21, 70, 390. On the didactical poem cf. <http://www.litde.com/das-hfische-gesellschaftsideal/das-ritterliche-tugendsystem.php>, consulted August 29, 2011.

14 The Swiss model of the *Eidgenossenschaft* (Confederacy) was most notably followed in the German Peasants' war, where the insurgents founded their Upper-Swabian *Eidgenossenschaft*. On the Venetian and the Dutch model see Eco O.G. Haitzma Mulier and Gerard T. Moran, *The Myth of Venice and Dutch Republican Thought in the Seventeenth Century* (Assen, 1980).

around the 30-Years War).¹⁵ When a rebellion reached a certain level and attracted influential and internationally connected groups or individual personalities, insurgents often even forged transnational alliances. This applies to the well-studied case of the English Civil war against Charles I and the ensuing republic whose principal agents entertained diplomatic relations well before the kingdom was abolished. This pattern recurs in many revolts in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where both the Ukrainian Cossacks under Khmel’nyts’kyi and the dissenters under Lubomierski relied on foreign partners, not without having some difficulties in justifying these alliances as Frank Sysyn’s and Angela Rustemeyer’s papers show.

Far more frequent, though, was the explicit or implicit comparison between different revolts by contemporary *observers*. Their search for comprehensive explanations shows to what extent revolts were seen as interrelated and a coherent phenomenon. The contributions of this volume draw on such contemporary observations and subsequently try to combine a general focus on transnational dimensions with the quasi-anthropological attention to historical actors’ perceptive and conceptual patterns, their way of seeing and interpreting the world. The volume is a first attempt to examine the “transnational representation” of pre-modern revolts, to explore perceptions and descriptions of revolts across borders. It cannot claim to be systematic as yet. But it shall give a fresh impetus in order to inspire further research in this direction, an undertaking that requires intense cooperation of specialists with different regional, linguistic, disciplinary and methodological competences. The first step has been taken at a conference at the Centre of Interdisciplinary Studies (Bielefeld) in June 2009 and most contributions of the present book are elaborations of what we have discussed there.

To be sure, *explicit* juxtapositions and comparisons of revolts are not innumerable in early modern times.¹⁶ It is, however, not for this reason alone that in the present study *implicit* comparisons have often been privileged. Considering contemporary awareness of the ubiquity of revolts, one of my leading hypotheses is that many descriptions of uprisings in *foreign* countries were at the same time, or at least to some extent, reflections on analogous phenomena *at home*, even more so since revolts were an extremely delicate matter to deal with for a writer. However

15 Wayne Te Brake, *Shaping History. Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500 - 1700* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1998), 129-137, for quotations see especially 109-110.

16 Burke, *Anatomists* gives a list of contemporary histories of revolt, many of them explicitly comparative. Focusing mainly on 17th century Italian authors writing on revolts and what they often called revolutions, Burke examines their use of metaphors for describing phenomena of unrest. He claims that these metaphors are more than decorations, but were supposed to contribute substantially to the explanation of contemporary phenomena.

far-reaching or narrow-minded their concrete aims had been, revolts were generally registered as a broadside towards the authorities and treated as *crimen laesae majestatis* in court. Such classifications considerably limited the scope of interpretation for an observer, especially if he himself was subject to the contested authority. He could not but paint the rebels in rather dark colours if he wanted to avoid a serious conflict of loyalties. Intimate knowledge of internal matters was thus outweighed by a somewhat biased view, whereas foreign observers, less familiar with political and cultural specificities of the country they were writing about, were freer in their interpretation and in their quest for explanations.

Therefore did the Muscovite envoy to England in 1645-46, serving at a time when the civil war was in full swing, rather sympathize with Parliament in its conflict with Charles I (1645-46). He was certainly influenced by his English merchant-interlocutors,¹⁷ but he did not in the least bother to conceal this attitude in his report to the ambassadorial office, i.e. for the tsar and the Muscovite governing elite concerned with foreign affairs.¹⁸ Inversely, the foreign residents in Moscow showed much sympathy for the plight of the urban population that rose to rebellion at the same time as in many other European countries. The correspondents did not mince matters in depicting the authorities' corruptive practices and deliberately contrasted them with the rebels' common good-oriented argumentation and their considerable efforts to avoid any exploitation of the general chaos for personal enrichment; and thus they steered clear of bringing into discredit the legitimacy of their actions and objectives.¹⁹ This is even more remarkable for observers who personally suffered from the uprisings, whenever their residences were devastated or further harm was done by the insurgents who seemed to regard them as unduly privileged. Foreigners, indeed, would not dare present the insurgents as heroes, but often they depicted them as pitiable victims of misery and abuse, whose actions were at least understandable if not to a certain extent legitimate.

17 Cf. M.A. Alpatov and L. V. Cherepnin, *Russkaya istoriceskaya mysl' i Zapadnaya Evropa XII-XVII vv.* (Moskva, 1973), 335-342.

18 The Russian chronicles that relate the extraordinarily ferocious events in Moskau, Pskov and Novgorod (1648-51) are written with big temporal delay. The accounts on Moscow are inexact to a degree, that it is even hard to identify the uprising; the simultaneous uprisings in many other towns are practically not represented at all.

19 See numerous references to sources in *Volksaufstände in Rußland. Von der Zeit der Wirren bis zur "Grünen Revolution" gegen die Sowjetherrschaft*, ed. Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, ed. Holm Sundhaussen, vol. 65 (Wiesbaden, 2006), where the insurgents' motives are identified as being oriented towards legality and the reestablishment of the "old law", but the external standpoint of the authors is never considered on the background of their original cultural baggage and experience.

Beyond the tricky question of legitimacy Peter Burke has pointed to the problem of literary genre conventions that many authors of Renaissance and Baroque faced when writing on *popular* rebellions in particular. On the one hand, tragedy seemed the most appropriate genre. On the other hand, were people of low status worthy of being represented in tragedy, the most respected genre of the Antique tradition which had so far been reserved for personalities of high status? Comedy was not a convincing solution, neither. Sometimes writers resorted to tragicomedy. The question remained an object of debate.²⁰ In any case, foreigners had a larger scope to ponder on the motives and grievances that moved people to rise in rebellion; their quest for explanations of early modern revolts was less limited.

READING CROSS-BORDER ACCOUNTS OF EARLY-MODERN REVOLTS

With respect to the exploitation of such transnational sources Russian studies – frequently labelled as backward as is (labelled) their object of enquiry – can provide new insights. Historians of medieval and early modern Russia have always been obliged to rely heavily on foreigners' accounts, simply because of the scarcity of domestic narrative sources.²¹ The writings of Sigismund von Herberstein, Adam Olearius or the above-mentioned Engelbert Kaempfer are only the most famous accounts of Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries, well-known also among non-specialists. The trustworthiness of their testimonies, as well as the prejudices and limitations of their knowledge on Russian culture have been debated at length. But just like the writings of less known foreigners – mercenaries of the Time of Troubles (the civil war at the beginning of the 17th century), physicians at court,

20 See Peter Burke, *The renaissance sense of the past*, Documents of modern history (London, 1969).

21 This makes the situation of early modern Russia to some extent comparable to the colonial world that has been authoritatively described and interpreted by the colonizers who thus (by the use of the written word) imposed their own categories of evaluation and made the natives regard themselves with European eyes. In postcolonial theory this epistemological conquest is considered much more profound and long-lasting than political rule and military oppression. To be sure, in the Russian case the story is much more complex. There has been neither military colonialism, nor Western political rule. But the emergent Russian historiography in the 18th and 19th centuries had to draw on foreigners' descriptions. This could actually make Russia the litmus test for the validity of epistemological hypothesis.

diplomats, travellers and others –, their descriptions constitute bedrocks in our record of late medieval and early-modern Russian history in general, and of revolts in particular, be they town uprisings, or large-scale rebellions occurring in the vastness of the Cossack peripheries.²²

However, a shift of perspective is required in the use of these documents. We should not consider them primarily as sources of facts anymore, as it has been done for ages of historical research. Instead of focusing exclusively on the objects of description, i.e. the revolts on Russian soil, we should have a closer look at the people who put pen to paper and explore their role as transcultural mediators. Their accounts have thus to be read as both 1) representations of the events in the foreign culture they describe, and 2) as more or less implicit reflections of the authors' own cultural backgrounds and often their domestic (direct or indirect) revolt experience. From this point of view these representations are *mediation acts*. The lacking comprehension of Russian culture that is often deplored in historiography of Muscovite revolts can be put to an advantage, if we adopt the idea of the authors as cross-border commuters who (more or less consciously) compared and juxtaposed their two (or sometimes more) cultures of reference. What has traditionally been dealt with as a shortcoming turns out to be a gain when viewed from the perspective of contemporaries' transnational comparisons of revolts or revolt-cultures. The testimonies should accordingly be read on this double ground leading into a connected history or a *histoire croisée* of revolt-perceptions and -representations.²³

Similar to Russian studies, researchers of West- and central-European revolts suspected representations from abroad to be ignorant of national or regional specificities and therefore less reliable than internal descriptions. And since domestic sources including chronicles, court records and others are abundant despite constraints and conflicts of loyalty, foreign descriptions and interpretations of revolts have hardly been taken into account. Apart from the different level of writing and print culture, this prolificacy might be attributed to the rulers' attempts to rapidly launch their hegemonic interpretations of these challenges wherein they focussed on punishment and the spectacle of suffering; quite on the contrary, the Russian government rather tended to silence revolts and would have them narrated only with considerably hindsight, often decades after they had happened. Furthermore, most of these official chronicles were designed to preserve the medieval style for long, almost until the end of the 17th century. This circumstance

22 The classical bibliographical survey of these foreigners' writings on pre-petrine Russia is Friedrich von Adelung, *Kritisch-literarische Übersicht der Reisenden in Russland bis 1700, deren Berichte bekannt sind* (St. Petersburg, Leipzig, 1846).

23 Cf. Michael Werner, Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Penser l'histoire croisée. Entre empirie et réflexivité", *Annales* 58 (2003): 7-36.

of a deliberately continued pre-Gutenberg Age connects the case of Muscovy and the available sources in some respect to medieval France and England, treated by Bettina Bommersbach and Helmut Hinck in this volume.

Winfried Schulze, one of the most distinguished scholars of early modern revolts in the Holy Roman Empire, raised the question whether “revolt and uprising have inspired new and salutary laws”, taking up the question posed by the early-modern political scientist Neumair von Ramsla, who specifically dealt with the phenomenon of sedition.²⁴ Thinking along these lines, one has to consider that the adjustments and learning processes that generally evolved in the long term were hardly ever the result of the immediate revolt experience made by the authorities, but were in fact mediated by complex detours, by multiple forms of reception and representation that must be retraced and examined with respect to their agents and (af)iliations in time and space – including the transnational level. If we think of Schulze’s far-reaching hypothesis that a process of increasing legal consolidation (*Verrechtlichung*, “juridicization”) has taken place as a result of the experiences of social upheaval in early modern times²⁵, the development of legal systems and criminal justice gains particular significance. This development has to be regarded in a process of close transnational interaction. Growing penal awareness often drew on public and secret representations of uprisings, which were generally classified as treason, *lèse-majesté* or political crime.²⁶

It shall not be denied that the governments did everything in their power to monopolize the representation of revolt in support of their official version, which commonly aimed at thoroughly discrediting the insurgents. But from revolt to revolt, or from country to country, this denigration could be launched with very diverging thrusts. In some cases revolts were politicized as attempted coups and

24 Winfried Schulze, “Geben Aufstand und Aufruhr Anlaß zu neuen, heilsamen Gesetzen”. Beobachtungen über die Wirkungen bauerlichen Widerstands in der frühen Neuzeit”, in *Aufstände, Revolten, Prozesse: Beiträge zu bauerlichen Widerstandsbewegungen im frühneuzeitlichen Europa*, ed. Winfried Schulze (Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol. 27, 1983), 261–285.

25 See Peter Blickle, “The Criminalization of Peasant Resistance in the Holy Roman Empire: Toward a History of the Emergence of High Treason in Germany”, *Journal of Modern History* 58 suppl. (December 1986): 88-97.

26 Fabrizio Dal Vera's contribution to this volume deals with this question. See also the classical study by Mario Sbriccoli, *Crimen laesae maiestatis. Il problema del reato politico alle soglie della scienza penalistica moderna* (Milano, 1974) and Angela Rustemeyer, *Dissens und Ehre. Majestätsverbrechen in Rußland (1600-1800)*, *Forschungen zur ost-europäischen Geschichte*, ed. Holm Sundhaussen, vol. 69 (Wiesbaden, 2006), who gives a large comparative view of the criminalization of revolt in different countries.

high treason, the common-good-oriented claims and practices of the insurgents were presented as banditry, lawlessness and pursuit of egoistic self-interest and enrichment in other cases.²⁷ But the more multifarious and complex the public spaces were, the more fragile was the authorities' representational monopoly. It should not be forgotten, though, that the surviving written records are nothing but the tip of the iceberg, since public spheres were essentially based on oral communication in the pre-modern societies of presence.²⁸

CONCERNING THE STRUCTURE OF THIS VOLUME

Cross-border descriptions of social upheaval existed well before print, even though their scope was significantly inferior to what was to come with the printing revolution and especially with the age of regular newspaper-circulation in the 17th century. The **first section “Representing Revolt Before the Advent of the Gutenberg-Galaxy: A question of dissemination?”** therefore deals with revolts that occurred at times and/or in regions where the Gutenberg era had not yet started. This is definitely the case of the Hundred Years War, but also partially applies to early-17th century Muscovy. Bettina Bommersbach and Helmut Hinck focus on the times of the Hundred Years War (1337-1454). As England and France found themselves in an almost constant state of war and contemporary observers were particularly attentive to what was going on in the adversary's realm and took special interest in bigger uprisings that might weaken the enemy's forces. Even though the evidence is rather scarce, there are some notable exceptions, among them the *Anonimale Chronicle* in England and Jean Froissart's famous chronicle in

27 These reversals have been observed by Bettina Bommersbach, “Gewalt in der Jacquerie von 1358”, in *Gewalt im politischen Raum. Fallanalysen vom Spätmittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Neithard Bulst, Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Historische Politikforschung, vol. 15 (Frankfurt am Main, New York, 2008), 46–81; Helmut Hinck, “Obrigkeitliche Gewalt bei der Niederschlagung der englischen Erhebung von 1381”, in *ibid.*, 82–133 with respect to the French and English uprisings during the Hundred Years' War on the example of the two biggest revolts, the Jacquerie of 1358, and the Peasants' revolt of 1381.

28 Talk and rumour can only be retraced when occurring in files of investigation, generally occasioned by denunciation. See Würzler, Modernisierungspotential, 195-202. On the society of presence see Rudolf Schlögl, “Kommunikation und Vergesellschaftung unter Anwesenden. Formen des Sozialen und ihre Transformation in der Frühen Neuzeit”, in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 34, 2 (2008): 155–224.

France, which actually do depict the events of the French Jacquerie (1358) and the English Peasants' Revolt (1381) respectively.

On the one hand, the cross-border accounts tend to reproduce internal narrative patterns. This mainly seems to owe to a scarcity of sources. Chroniclers copied their colleagues when they had the possibility to read the manuscript or one of the rare copies. On the other hand, foreign authors appeared to be more sympathetic (or less hostile) to the insurgents than native writers, a tendency that we can observe throughout the whole pre-modern period. The most balanced – or even neutral – account, however, is to be found in Thomas Gray's description of the Jacquerie because he as an English soldier in France was able to collect his evidence on the spot and therefore ignored the French model-narratives. More striking is the example of Thomas Walsingham, a monastic chronicler from St. Albans: while offering one of the most hostile descriptions of the insurgents in his account of the English Peasants' Revolt, he almost takes sides with the rebels in his representation of the Parisian tax revolt of the early 1380s and demonizes the French king for his cruelty.

Nevertheless has most attention been paid to those riots wishing to enforce the election of an Italian pope in Rome; this event clearly outweighed the revolts in the adversary's realms since papal elections were of unquestionable importance to the whole Christian world. For the so-called "cluster of revolts" at the beginning of the 1380s (with the Peasants' Revolt in England, the Parisian tax uprising, the revolts in Flanders and the Ciompi in Italy) contemporaries seemed to assume common causes: Jean Froissart feared that the peoples all over Europe were trying to get rid of their nobility. And a prominent explicative pattern for the accumulation of heavy social unrest was cross-border imitation, which implies the observers' assumption that insurgents in different countries knew of each other – a remarkable observation for the pre-Gutenbergian era.

In Russia the printing revolution arrived only at the turn of the 17th to the 18th century. Many historians hence consider prepetrine Muscovy as a medieval country. And indeed, internally the country had much in common with medieval France and England. But we will see to what extent 17th century Muscovy and the major revolts it experienced were affected by the intrusion of revolt-representations from abroad. In early-modern times, communication at distance through print always overlapped with oral face-to-face communication and participation in print culture was socially limited. If we look at 17th century Muscovy and Ukraine from a transnational perspective, we can realize how pre-Gutenbergian regions were challenged by the printing revolution. Foreign representations of revolt could have an increasing impact on the protagonists of major events of social protest in Muscovy.

Thus Maureen Perrie explores how the First False Dmitrii, who conquered the Muscovite throne in the Russian Time of Troubles in 1605, was portrayed by foreign eyewitnesses, historians and dramatists. She shows to what extent the belief

or non-belief in the pretender's royal identity were determined by concrete interest. Since Dmitrii, supported by Polish magnates and their entourage, was believed to have converted to Catholicism, his ascension to the throne was applauded by writers like the Italian Barezzi Barezzi (alias Possevino) or the Spanish *Siglo de oro* dramatist Lope de Vega, who nourished hopes of Russia's conversion to Catholicism. In contrast to that, protestant writers such as the Swedish agent in Muscovy Petrus Petreius, fervently denounced him as an impostor and a puppet mastered by Polish and Vatican interests. Exceptions are British diplomats like William Scott, or the French Huguenot mercenary Jacques Margeret, who served Boris Godunov until the overthrow of 1605 and then became commander of the False Dmitrii's troops. Though Protestants, these writers regarded Dmitrii as the real authentic heir to the throne. As Perrie argues the attitude of the British ambassadors, who actually were merchants, was in the first place pragmatic: they were interested in smooth commercial relations with Muscovy and wanted to conserve privileges for English merchants, i.e. for themselves. Therefore they decided to support whoever detained the throne. For Margeret, if he wanted to be credible, it was even a basic necessity to dispel doubts about his master's legitimacy. It apparently was mainly a question of culture how far the foreigners referred to international precedents of royal imposture. But as soon as they referred to antique examples, and to Tile Kolup, the false Frederick II (in the Holy Roman Empire), Lambert Simnel or Perkin Warbeck in England, or the false Sebastians of Portugal, the foreign authors had a concept of imposture at hand,²⁹ whereas Russian contemporary sources indiscriminately spoke of the "villain" or the "heretic". So Perrie demonstrates that Dmitrii's back-story, his pretence to have escaped from his murderers by placing a substitute (in 1592), did not draw on internal Russian folktales, as it has formerly been claimed by Soviet historians, but it essentially built on a historical and literary narrative circulating across borders among European elites. Only gradually, through Dmitrii's self-portrayal was it assimilated in Russia where

29 The classical book on Sebastianism in Portugal is *O sebastianismo. Breve panorama dum mito português*. (Colecção Portugal ontem, Portugal hoje.). Lisboa 1978. Yves-Marie Bercé, *Le roi caché. Sauveurs et imposteurs: mythes politiques populaires dans l'Europe moderne* (Paris 1990) has compared royal pretenders in Portugal, France and Russia. Maureen Perrie herself has worked on the phenomenon of tsarish imposture in Muscovy and Russia throughout the early-modern period, see Maureen Perrie, *Pretenders and popular monarchism in early modern Russia. The false tsars of the time of troubles* (Cambridge 2002) and Tobias Hug, *Impostures in early modern England. Representations and perceptions of fraudulent identities* (Manchester 2010) has studied imposture in medieval and early-modern England, not restraining himself to pretenders to the throne, but also including alleged officials and others.

it became a veritable success-story, a major cultural topos often taken for a Russian specificity.

Well beyond Russia and the Time of Troubles the absence of a legitimate heir to the throne was a crucial factor that fuelled major revolts and civil wars. Contemporaries became increasingly aware of this factor. They particularly feared periods of questionable legitimacy and dubious recognition of a sovereign.³⁰ In the end David Hume acknowledged that “on opinion only” government was founded – and this would become the practical maxime of the founding fathers in the American Revolution where Madison asserted that “all government rests on opinion”. This was a “revolutionary” insight against the background of medieval and early-modern concepts of divine right as the source of a sovereign’s legitimacy. In political theory this mindset emerged only gradually and over the centuries, going along with the continuously growing importance of the print media. Of course, governments had always depended on their subjects’ belief in the legitimacy of their rule, which included amongst others the recognition of a single ruler’s divine rights. Beliefs also shaped movements of protest – and this is the focus of the **second section “Transgression of boundaries as a feat of liberty: Early-modern anthropologies of revolt”** that deals with revolts as transgression of customary boundaries and the representation of these transgressions as markers of early-modern or even transhistorical anthropologies of revolt. Beliefs could be rather stable and a purported anthropological constant, as Yves-Marie Bercé shows for the popular ideas of archaic original freedom returning during a vacancy of central power. But they could also be highly dynamic, related to a more or less spontaneous emotional eruption, borne by the enhancement of communicative space and bringing to the fore a particular mass psychology that made social actors take the initiative – and the concomitant high risk – of joint violent action, as André Berelowitch demonstrates.

In this sense Yves-Marie Bercé deals with the vacuum of power as a major trigger of unrest and revolt. The ancient tradition of suspending law and order in times of dynastic uncertainty or transition can be observed in many countries. This is hardly astonishing in regard to elective monarchies like Poland-Lithuania, where succession was reputed to be a source of ferocious struggle between different Szlachta factions and often brought the country to the margin of civil war. At the Holy See succession was defined by the conclave in a highly regulated procedure, but during almost every *sede vacante* the “anthropological utopia of a primitive free status of humanity” broke through in the towns of the Papal State – with

30 On early-modern ideas on Fama see Andreas Würzler, „Fama und Rumor. Gerücht, Aufruhr und Presse im Ancien Régime”, in *WerkstattGeschichte* 15 (1996): 20–32.

plundering, riots and the expectation of the newly nominated Pope's largesse. In contrast to such examples of riotous freedom and self-rule, the French dynasty seemed to be firmly established after the religious wars had ended and the Bourbons had acceded to the throne. Succession seemed to work smoothly, at least until the Revolution of 1789. But Bercé shows that the minority of Louis XIV has to be interpreted in a similar way as the events in Poland or Rome, as an almost complete eclipse of central power. A closer look reveals how coherent the protest movement actually was and how provincial parliaments as well as local peasant resistance opposing elite- and popular actions in the capital were choreographed by a unique urge of a return to archaic freedom. Once Louis XIV had taken over the reigns his ideologists systematically launched an incoherent and rather ridiculous picture of elite and popular resistance, while preaching the ineluctability of absolutism. This narrative was reproduced approvingly by national historiography that was mainly concerned with depicting the glory and might of the French monarchy and the teleological story of its emergence. The story seems to have been extremely successful as early as in the 1660s when French observers had apparent difficulty understanding the Magnates' rebellion in Poland-Lithuania of 1665-66 (analysed by Angela Rustemeyer). So they did not find a translation for the Polish term *Rokosz* and the concomitant idea of a "legal rebellion". It obviously did not even come to their mind to call the events a Polish "Fronde". Turning a blind eye to the more or less distinct parallels, they *dissimilated* the events in Poland from their own domestic experience.³¹

Like Ingrid Maier and Stepan Shamin, André Berelowitch also deals with the representations of the Razin uprising (1770-71) that affected huge parts of the Cossack periphery and also included other social strata of Muscovy's population. The uprising was a major challenge to the Muscovite state and encountered a huge media response throughout Europe. This was fuelled by Muscovite authorities' propaganda, but also by the rare foreign eye-witnesses such as the Dutchman Ludwig Fabritius, who had fallen into the rebellious Cossacks' hands. Foreign revolt reports often tended to paint rebels in a much more favourable light than the concerned authorities did. To some degree, this is even true of the Ukrainian Cossacks. As Frank Sysyn demonstrates, in the case of most Cossack revolts in Russia during the 17th and 18th centuries *dissimilation* was a leading perceptual

31 This might already go along with a sense of cultural superiority that tended to repudiate "the East" as barbarian and backward, and to include Poland into this general notion, although for a long time it had been a topos referring to Russia/Muscovy as a "Northern" (not an Eastern) country. On the shift from a South-North to a West-East civilizational gradient in early-modern mental maps see Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The map of civilization on the mind of the enlightenment* (Stanford, California 1994).

pattern. Muscovy was generally described as a barbarian (or backward) country. Furthermore, Cossacks and other warrior-populations of the Military Frontier further to the West (Uskoks, Kuruc, etc.) were highly mobile, partly lived on raids and significantly differed from the sedentary norms and moral standards of Middle and Western Europe. Muscovite Cossacks (or the Cossacks in Muscovy) rising up in revolt were thus a favourite projection surface for *dissimilative* representations.

As Berelowitch points out, both in official records and in foreigners' relations Razin and his followers were labelled as "rabble", "riff-raff", "curs", "scoundrels", etc. Even though one can sense some observers' understanding for serfs and slaves who had to suffer their lords' "tyranny", the revolt was unmistakably vilified. The deeply negative judgments generally extended to anybody who would join the movement, notwithstanding particular motives and grievances. Refugees from serfdom in the black-earth regions, who gained the steppes, rapidly adapted to a Cossack way of life; and in major revolts the insurgent Cossacks proclaimed they wanted to impose their own political structures upon the rest of the population. Naturally the revolts with their large-scale military campaigns were particularly brutal. Therefore the revolting Muscovite Cossacks were easily considered as "inhuman", leading a lifestyle marked by looting, plundering and murdering. The foreigners are unanimous in describing the whole Razin movement as an uprising of the "populace" that was associated with the Cossacks. Along with the representations of the insurgents' social appearance Berelowitch is interested in the trigger of revolt, i.e. the crucial moment that made hitherto loyal subjects join the camp of the rebels. People were perfectly conscious of the painful consequences of revolt. Making the decisive step implied taking enormous risks. Both mechanist explanations like the powder-keg-metaphor, and rational-choice arguments of weighing pros and cons seem incongruous. In foreigners' accounts of the Razin uprising, and in representations by the rebels or the authorities themselves, one cannot find a really satisfactory answer to the question what mysterious force had often made thousands of people change sides in only a few minutes or even seconds. "Seduction" and "lure" figure prominently in contemporary representations; and often the observers ascribe irrational conduct or even "madness" to the insurgents. This incites Berelowitch to more global anthropological considerations on the human psyche and the trance-like condition individuals assume when fusing with a rebellious mass. Mass psychology à la Canetti can instantaneously eclipse rationality, which does not prevent people from alleging rational motifs for their acts in retrospective. Early-modern analysts of revolt frequently speak of "contagion" to explain the tremendous speed with which revolt can spread. In this mass psychological fever Berelowitch sees both an ennobling aspect of taking destiny into one's own hands, and an extremely destructive force that was likewise an integral part of these mass-actions: bloodthirstiness and mordlust, as the eye-witnesses describe it. With his ambivalent

appraisal Berelowitch is not too far from Ortega y Gasset's ideas as exposed in his *Revolt of the Masses*.

In Poland-Lithuania, where central power was weak, the insurgents were able to mobilize considerable communicative resources. Bigger uprisings were not only a privileged item of representations abroad, insurgents also activated far-ranging contacts and forged international alliances, which played an active role within the very uprisings. The **third section “Insurgents as Diplomates: Cross-border alliances and their Representations”** thus focuses on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Frank Sysyn analyses foreign accounts of the Cossack uprising under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi in Ukraine (1648-1657). The revolt was propelled by one of these classical vacuums of power within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Wladislaw IV had more and more retreated from an active regiment and then died in May 1648. This provided fertile terrain for factional struggles among the aristocratic elites of the country – and factional struggle paralyzed the countermeasures against the rebellious Cossacks. Sysyn does not limit himself to rather *dissimulative* standard narratives written by core-European observers. His contribution centres on two clergymen, the Catholic Venetian Alberto Vimina, who visited Ukraine in 1650, and the Syrian Orthodox Paul of Aleppo, who was there twice, in 1654 and 1656, together with his father, Patriarch Makarios III of Antioch. Especially the Syrian perspective is rather new. Both observers, Catholic and Orthodox, embrace the idea of Ukraine as a country of abundance and a realm of liberty, though probably for different reasons. Remarkably enough, they both acknowledge the movement as legitimate. This is not only due to the assumption of a general right to resist against oppression (in this case mainly by Polish nobles), but also to the perception of Ukrainian Cossacks as a nation of its own, an idea that can be traced back to the 16th century, when the Zaporozhians had already been the destination of diplomatic missions. Vimina and Paul of Aleppo came to Khmel'nyts'kyi's Ukraine with diplomatic missions, too. It was both the particular nature of their missions and their cultural and confessional backgrounds (as well as those of their readers) that made their accounts differ. Vimina's confessional sympathy was naturally rather with the Catholic Poles than with the “schismatic” Orthodox Cossacks. Furthermore, to a cultivated Venetian the Eastern European people and their manners might have appeared barbarian. But the Venetian Republic entertained intense intercultural relations. It was in close contact with the Muslim world of the Ottoman Empire, not only through constant warfare, but also through economic competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean. Ottoman power inspired awe to Venetian ambassadors. This respect

included cultural aspects, too, but the Muslim Empire was definitely regarded as a place of difference.³² Orthodox Ukrainian Cossacks were classical allies in the struggle against the awesome Sublime Porte. Vimina was charged with rallying support against the Ottomans from both the Polish king and the Ukrainian Cossacks. This was apparently the main reason why he sought to downplay the Cossacks' religious allegiance as a means of enlisting them in a purported alliance with Catholic powers. At the same time, this has certainly inspired his positive view of the Cossack polity that he likened to antique Sparta. Thus he reevaluated what he had sometimes perceived as uncultured crudeness and ascribed native ingenuity and wit to the people. This was, of course, an ambiguous undertaking, since Sparta was associated with both exemplary soldierly discipline and despotism.³³ Paul of Aleppo (with his father) tried to raise funds for the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. For him religious purity was a crucial trait of the Cossack realm as a model Orthodox society. He drew a clear dividing line between Cossack freedom and Polish servitude, between the Polish elites' anarchy and Ukrainian justice, thus partly taking over Western European stereotypes about the Polish elites' unruliness and the Commonwealth's decline, and partly contradicting prejudices against Cossack savagery by idealizing Cossack institutions. Curiously enough, he contrasted severe oppression of the Orthodox faith by Poles, Armenians and Jews in pre-revolt Ukraine with the religious tolerance he experienced in his homeland, where the Ottoman rulers would content themselves with extracting taxes. He rather ignored the massacres perpetrated by the Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants against Jews, though. What is even more noteworthy, he also expressed his distinct preference for Ukraine over Orthodox Muscovy where "a padlock had been set on our hearts" during their two-year stay. Whereas Muscovites are described as ignorant subjects deliberately complying with their dull fate of servitude, Cossack Ukraine under Khmel'nyts'kyi is depicted as blossoming, with a whole population striving for literacy and culture. Both, Vimina's and Paul of Aleppo's accounts give a positive image of the Hetman himself, whom the writers have met personally. But if Vimina recommended a military leader as a potential ally to his Venetian

32 On the struggle for supremacy in the Indian Ocean see Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman age of exploration* (Oxford 2010). On European reverence for Ottoman might before the unsuccessful siege of Vienna (1683) see for England Gerald M. MacLean, *Looking East. English writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800* (Basingstoke [England], New York 2007), more particularly for Venetian diplomatic staff cf. Palmira Brummett, „Classifying Ottoman Mutiny. The Act and Vision of Rebellion”, in *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22 (1998): 91–107.

33 Cf. Paul Cartledge, „Spartan Traditions and Receptions”, *Hermathena* 181 (In honour of George Huxley) (Winter 2006): 41–49.

compatriots and furthermore acknowledged his despotic traits and his penchant to alcohol, Paul of Aleppo praises him also as an irrefragable monarch with unlimited moral qualities.

For the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising ended with the loss of Left-Bank-Ukraine to the Muscovite tsar, who guaranteed the Cossacks their hard-won privileges. In the following, the depleted kingdom was haunted by further wars, first against Sweden and then against Russia, so that Jan Kazimierz' reign is generally considered as the age of decline for Poland-Lithuania.

Angela Rustemeyer examines the transnational dimensions of Jerzy Lubomirski's aforementioned *rokosz* (1665-66) that divided the nobility (*szlachta*) into supporters and adversaries of the reigning king and thus paralyzed the Diet, where every member had the right to a *liberum veto*. Even though she highlights foreign observers' difficulty understanding the very idea of "legal rebellion", Rustemeyer is not in the first place concerned with representations of the phenomenon abroad. She rather focuses on how the conflicting parties themselves appealed and variously referred to transnational entanglements in the course of their inner confrontations. On the one hand foreign support was an important resource; on the other hand it could eventually be used as a discrediting argument. However, Lubomirski benefited from wide-ranging support, also within the *szlachta*. He was one of the highest-ranking nobles of the realm and could easily have been a candidate to the throne himself. It was merely impossible to accuse him of treason simply because he enjoyed backup from the Brandenburg elector, since at the same time the king drew on support from the elector's adversary, the noble opposition of Brandenburg-Prussia. In the end Jan Kasimierz tried to fight out the conflict on juridical ground and accused his adversary of *lèse-majesty*. This was not less problematic, since the Sejm had significantly restricted the extension of this major crime in the 16th century. But as Rustemeyer demonstrates, the crucial argument brought to the fore by the king's party was based on a transnational comparison. The anti-centralist oppositional confederation was accused to have planned a regicide and Lubomirski himself to have been aiming at the office of Lord Protector, similar to Cromwell in England. Curiously enough, this allegation echoed major propaganda-battles during the French Fronde, where Mazarin's party accused the Frondeurs of imitating the English Parliament's treason against King Charles. Similarly, in his *History of the Cossack War against Poland* (1663), the Frenchman Pierre Chevalier had compared Khmel'nyts'kyi to Cromwell, i.e. at a moment when the memory of the Fronde was already neatly disentangled from the English civil war. All this shows the enormous impact of the English Revolution on the continent, but as an appalling spectre and a ready-made pattern of accusation rather

than as a model for real imitation.³⁴ Interestingly, Jan Kazimierz' party invoked the spectre of the English regicide even in its propaganda addressed to the peasants of the Podhale region, who were known to be particularly rebellious. This agitation of Polish peasants against Lubomirski shows to what extent transnational motifs apparently mattered (or were believed to matter) even among the rural lower classes, which are generally imagined to have been confined to a narrow local horizon. But the very fact of this risky address to the peasants also drew on the precedent of the fight against Swedish invasion in 1655 and it is not a coincidence that simultaneously the term "civil war" was thrown into public debate. Public debate in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth played a crucial role in the conflict and it included major players abroad: Apart from Lubomirski himself, who acted mostly from his exile in Silesia, Rustemeyer draws attention to the Anti-Trinitarian Lubieniecki who offered a particularly "modern" analysis of what was going on from his Prussian exile. Instead of interpreting the events in terms of conflicts of honour, he emphasized economic aspects and the problem of the Commonwealth's financial dependency upon foreign powers. Sensitive to transnational entanglements, he also distinguished clearly between Cossacks and their Tatar allies, who were often tarred with the same brush by contemporary observers. However, he would not reveal his "heretical" identity: here the "modernity" of the Polish-Lithuanian public spheres would have reached its limits. Taking into account the high degree of publicity channelled by political communication and negotiation, Rustemeyer comes to the conclusion that it was rather its modernity than the frequently quoted anachronism of medieval-style noble prerogatives that weakened the Polish-Lithuanian state in a period where absolutist tendencies were the dominant paradigm in the European environment.

The **forth section "Governments struggling with foreign representations of internal revolts"** introduces a dimension of double reflexivity. Governments were not only concerned with suppression of their internal revolts but also feared the dissemination of news on the events abroad, which might be damaging to their country's image in international relations. This preoccupation is particularly salient in Russia, where the government registered coverage on its internal affairs in

34 On the arguments drawn from the English Civil war during the Fronde see Philip A. Knachel, *England and the Fronde. The impact of the English Civil War and Revolution on France*. (Ithaca N.Y. 1967). On Chevalier's comparison of Khmel'nyts'kyi with Cromwell see Christopher Hill, „The English Revolution and the Brotherhood of Man”, in *Puritanism and Revolution. Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century*, ed. idem (London 2001), 112–138.

Western newspapers and sometimes reacted immediately to representations of major revolts.

Ingrid Maier and Stepan Shamin take the Razin uprising as an initial point. Unlike Berelowitch who examines foreigners' accounts of this uprising as such, they analyse the reflection of Western revolt-reports in Russian *kuranty* of this period, i.e. in translations from mainly German and Dutch newspapers for the Tsar's court.³⁵ The *kuranty* indicate how the Muscovite government wanted, and how it did not want to have its country presented to a European public in this period of major internal crisis. At the same time the translations mirror a particular interest in contemporary events of contestation abroad. Since the translations for the end of 1670 and the beginning of 1671 are entirely lost, Maier and Shamin focus on the period between March and July 1671, for which the *kuranty* seem to be complete. At that time the uprising had almost come to an end: in April Razin was handed over to the authorities by his closest Cossacks followers. But this did not stop rumours and many Western newspapers continued to report on the movement's alleged successes. Much of the Russian reception of these reports was motivated by a preoccupation with the possible abasement of the Tsar's might. Apparently the Muscovite government specifically collected erroneous foreign reports on Razin, in order to use them as a means of pressure in diplomatic negotiations, particularly towards Sweden. Translators even omitted insertions qualifying the related news-item as "rumours" that were "not believed to be true". Occasionally, though, Maier and Shamin have discovered detailed and astonishingly accurate accounts that betray considerable insider knowledge. Due to the noticeable delay with which the events are reported, they presume that these accounts must have been delivered to the foreign newspapers by Muscovite authorities in order to actively correct current misrepresentations. With regard to revolts abroad, those of concern for Russian foreign policy were apparently the activities of the Ukrainian Cossacks under hetman Doroshenko that figured prominently in translations. Their alliance with the Ottoman Porte was of immediate importance, not only for Poland-Lithuania, but

35 Both Ingrid Maier and Stepan Shamin are major specialists in these handwritten translations. Maier has coedited the last published volume to date. In contrast to the preceding ones, it consists of two parts, one with the translations from the Moscow state archives, the other one with the text of the original Western newspapers reports, from which the translations/paraphrases have apparently been drawn from. Since the sources were neither indicated nor conserved together with the translations, she had to search for the original newspapers in innumerable libraries and archives throughout Europe. Thanks to this tremendous work she is able to compare the texts and thus follow the translators' choice, preferences, omissions, errors, biases. See Ingrid Majer and Sergej I. Kotkov, *Vesti-Kuranty. 1656g., 1660-1662gg., 1664-1670gg.* (Moscow 2009).

also for Muscovy that risked losing Left-Bank Ukraine anew. Further away was the Magnate conspiracy in Hungary against Habsburg rule (1670/71). Since the rebels, however, also tried to mobilize Ottoman support for their aims, the *kuranty* diligently covered the events. Ottoman engagement in Poland-Lithuania and/or in Hungary was likely to deflect military ambitions from Muscovy. Other revolts that were farther away from Muscovite immediate interests showed to be items of curiosity, but were covered in a more stereotyped manner that did not allow a precise conception of what was actually happening. In the case of the Braunschweig citizens' desperate resistance against the Duke of Lüneburg's encroachments against their city's traditional liberties, the *kuranty* only reproduced the Duke's medial propaganda that presented the commoners as rebelling against their lawful sovereign. According to Maier and Shamin this misconception of the situation in the Reich rather corresponded to the legal status of Muscovite towns since the extinction of Novgorod's and Pskov's autonomy in the late 15th and early 16th century.

In my own contribution I follow up Muscovite/Russian preoccupation with its image abroad and with foreign representation of its internal revolts. I try to view foreign accounts of Russian revolts in a long-term perspective, in order to point out a major shift of paradigms that apparently occurred in the early years of Peter's I reign. The abundance of such accounts of Russian revolts in the 17th century contrasts glaringly with their scarcity in the 18th, which is even more astonishing since in general the Russian Empire of Peter the Great and his successors was much more a focus of Western interest than the pre-Petrine Muscovite state. This observation makes the diplomatic scandal revolving around the publication of Johann Georg Korb's diary in Vienna (1701) a cornerstone of my investigation. Korb depicts the last *strel'tsy* rebellion and narrates subsequent mass repressions in great detail because he had witnessed them during the embassy's journey to Moscow in 1698/99. As soon as Russian diplomats and Peter I got wind of the book, they tried everything they could to have it prohibited. When diplomatic pressure failed, they staged a book-burning with all the copies they could get hold of. On the one hand I analyse the reasons and context of this harsh reaction. Since central descriptions of the mass repressions had been previously published in newspapers and journals that were systematically screened by the translators of the Foreign office, I argue that the visual representation of torture and mass executions (on a copperplate enclosed in the book) was a major bone of contention. Therefore the conflict also needs to be regarded as a clash of two fundamentally different visual cultures and, in a way, as a cultural misunderstanding, since author, illustrator and publisher were hardly aware of provoking the Muscovite government. On the other hand, the exchange of letters between Russian officials and the head of the imperial embassy (which was held responsible for the book) reveals a considerable reevaluation of (foreign) public opinion by the Russian

government. From that time on it was not only the foreign policy-makers' image of Russia that mattered, but also the broader public's views. This shift led to a new media policy with the creation of the *Vedomosti* (the first so-called newspaper in Russia) and the installation of Russian agents abroad, whose task was both to intervene against undesirable coverage (at best before publication) and to provide the foreign press with "correct" information about Russia. Even though Emperor Leopold I had not succumbed to diplomatic pressure concerning Korb's book, the scandal and accompanying measures had a long-lasting effect on foreign writings on Russia. Traces of social unrest became scarce and authors tended more and more to distort and minimize the few events they continued to mention. Once threatening and dreadful, revolts were increasingly interpreted as manifestations of backwardness contrasting with the progressive civilizing mission propelled by enlightened tsars.

The depiction of punishment that plays a crucial part in the case of the Korb scandal is also at the heart of the **fifth section "Revolts as political crime: Legal concepts and public representation"**, which analyses representations of revolts from a legal perspective.³⁶ Therefore Fabrizio Dal Vera's and Karl Härter's contributions deal with the emergent concept of political crime in contemporary legal thinking and with visual representations of retribution as an integral part of legal representation.

Fabrizio Dal Vera investigates the elaboration of the early-modern concept of political crime referring to collective violence against political authorities. Since the escalation of unrests in the late 14th century, we witness an ongoing process of criminalization of seditions that led legal scholars to systematize the legal questions involved. Under the immediate impression of such collective violence, jurists developed the legal tradition in order to define a *crimen seditionis* functional to the actual turbulent situation. Embracing the methodological approach suggested by a legal history based on evolutionary theory, Dal Vera traces the development of the term *seditio* in legal and political treatises and *dissertationes* published on this problem from the beginning of the 16th until the end of the 17th century. During the 16th century jurists elaborated an extensive definition of *crimen seditionis* – strongly

36 Another volume on the reactions of legal systems to revolts, going back to a conference at the Max-Planck Institute for legal history in Frankfurt is currently in print. See *Revolten und politische Verbrechen vom 12.-19. Jahrhundert. Reaktionen der Rechtssysteme und juristisch-politische Diskurse/ Rivolte e crimini politici tra XII e XIX secolo: Reazioni del sistema giuridico e discorso giuridico-politico. (Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte.)* (Frankfurt am Main forthcoming). I have contributed an article dealing with the thesis of juridicization (*Verrechtlichung*) as a long-term consequence of revolts.

associated with *proditio* and *rebellio* – and understood any form of collective violence as a violation of *maiestas*. In the following century, they developed a more nuanced representation of crime that differentiated between a wider range of violent behaviors in order to classify them with respect to the extent of their dangerousness for inner stability. Consequently, jurists defined different *gradi* of sedition that were not always related to *crimen laesae maiestatis*. They also applied to minor unrests punished as *cimen vis*. The study of legal doctrine shows how the definition of *crimen seditionis* was embedded in more general political conjunctures and closely related to broader political theory. In contrast to that, previous doctrine had provided legal justifications of ad hoc-measures toward ongoing episodes of urban and agrarian unrest. The advent of political realism and new theories on *ratio status* in Machiavelli's footsteps largely influenced the legal understanding of seditions: to prevent disorders jurists made greater efforts to precisely analyse the organization of dissent. For that they built on examples of revolts both at home and abroad. This realist approach partially modified and enriched the definition of crime, which had a long-lasting impact on practical implementation of both repressive and preventive strategies with regard to concrete unrests. The taxonomies of collective violence and the recommended remedies are inscribed in an international development of legal doctrine on political crimes. Jurists in different countries shared a common legal background, used the same concepts and quoted the works of their predecessors, regardless of territorial borders or even confessional allegiances. Moreover, they continuously referred to insurrections all over Europe and their joint efforts produced a common representation of inner turbulences in early-modern times.

If jurists in their academic ivory-towers were able to discuss revolts more or less freely, the authorities concerned were much more reluctant to commemorate the events that challenged their rule. This is reflected in the brutal scenes of public retribution and their dissemination through the print media. Descriptions of punishment tended to eclipse the actual revolt, which was classified as a political crime.

Karl Härter explores the representations of early modern revolts in illustrated broadsheets, a genre that could even be “read” by the illiterate and thereby constituted an important addition to purely textual representations. Both pictures and the accompanying texts focused on punishment, whereas the revolt itself was often ignored or summed up in a very short and distorted version. In this sense the broadsheet-representations are part of a whole juridical arsenal of condemnation. Prosecution of political crime went along with *damnatio memoriae* of the very event of the revolt. Especially the authorities tried to obliterate memory of any just causes of the revolt. Härter studies broadsheet-coverage of exemplary revolts of three different categories and presents the Fettmilch-uprising in Frankfurt/Main in 1614-16 as an implementation of urban revolt. The resistance of the Bohemian

nobility against the Emperor in 1621 and the Magnate conspiracy in Hungary are shown as examples of aristocratic revolts; and the Bavarian upheaval of 1705 against the Habsburgs and the uprising led by Horea and Klossa in Hungary in 1785 demonstrate common patterns of peasant revolts. Interestingly, these different social classes and their quite different resources in terms of societal weight and access to public space are hardly reflected in the representation of their crimes in the media. Broadsheet production seems to be dominated by the authorities and their interpretation of the events as political crimes, at least as far as commemoration or retrospective representation is concerned. Often the verdict is related to the accusation of conspiracy and collaboration with foreign powers, in the case of the revolts in the Reich mainly collaboration with France and/or the Ottoman Empire. This important transnational feature in representation of revolts underlined the idea of treason and made brutal execution with loss of personal honor and property an ineluctable consequence that was deemed necessary to re-establish public order and justice. However, representational patterns were not identical: while the revolt was still going on, it was described in a different way than after it had been suppressed and the ringleaders publicly executed. When the rebels themselves managed to issue broadsheets, these prints naturally differed significantly from those issued by the authorities. But in this phase the authorities' broadsheet-propaganda, too, conveyed a certain flexibility that suggested scope for compromise, negotiation and by the same token for reinterpretation of the situation. People were more or less invited to change sides. This changed fundamentally once the revolt had come to an end and ringleaders publicly executed. Now the revolt was being described in black and white: former flexibility was erased. It was exclusively the point of just punishment that was put to the fore. In this sense, the illustrated broadsheets analysed by Karl Härter correspond to Yves-Marie Bercé's observation made for the Fronde in France, where all former attempts to come to an arrangement, also through public representation of what was going on, were ignored after the defeat of the Frondeurs.³⁷ However, besides authoritarian censorship Härter also hints at the commercial interests of the publishers who had to sell their production and were dependent on the curiosity of the readers and spectators.

This commercial aspect was probably more developed in the Reich than it was in France under Louis XIV, where the political imperative was paramount and printers independent of the state's domain of control could only be found abroad

37 Commemoration under Louis XIV.'s reign was paradigmatically symbolized by Gilles Guérin's statue of the king crushing underfoot a Frondeur, or rather the Fronde as such. For a reproduction and interpretation see Peter Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (Yale 1994): 54.

(mainly in the Netherlands and partly in Geneva and Neufchatel). In spite of the emperor's overarching position in the Reich, censorship was mainly exercised on the level of the principalities. For this reason, publishers from cities or realms that had not been struck by a revolt would sometimes depict the events in adjacent territories differently, as it was the case for a broadsheet on the Fettmilch uprising published in Darmstadt, where one of the ringleaders had sought refuge. What broadsheets from Frankfurt depicted as a dangerous revolt spurred by four demonized ringleaders was represented as a quarrel for the true Christian faith elsewhere (the uprising was largely directed against the Frankfurt Jews). In the pro-revolt accounts, the leaders are portrayed as respectable burghers and ordinary sinners.

The cross-border perspective is thus an important dimension which has considerably contributed to the dynamization of revolt-representations and their circulation.

