

ceived them as a means to shape their behaviour in ways that were beneficial to governmental actors.

To sum up, the manifold programmes that were introduced around the long summer of migration sought to extend governmental control and influence over the self-conduct of new volunteers. They did so by shifting responsibilities to committed citizens while seeking to shape their self-conduct in a way that served the governments' interests regarding the governance of migration. These interventions, however, did not remain unquestioned. Volunteers continuously contested their ascribed roles and responsibilities, voiced dissent towards governmental actors and demanded space for disagreement. These dissenting potentials of 'civil society', in turn, triggered depoliticizing reactions among governmental actors, something I will illustrate in more detail in the following section.

3.4. Depoliticizing "Uncomfortable" Practices of Refugee Support

Governmental representatives often emphasized that a smooth cooperation and meaningful division of responsibilities between 'state' and 'civil society' formed a prerequisite for the successful reception and social integration of asylum seekers. There was an aspect of refugee support that did, however, not sit well with this desire for meaningful cooperation. Certain groups and individuals also intervened critically, voiced dissent and highlighted deficiencies in the workings of 'the state' while calling for legal and political reforms in the management of asylum seekers. Such potentially dissenting behaviour among newly committed citizens, however, was "uncomfortable" to many governmental actors, as one of my interlocutors strikingly remarked. It presented a controversial element of 'civil society', one that put governmental actions, decisions and policies under critical scrutiny. In the following paragraphs, I illustrate how governmental actors in the area of my field research positioned themselves towards these 'uncomfortable' forms of refugee support and how they attempted to co-opt and depoliticize dissenting voices among citizens supporting refugees.

3.4.1. The Dark Side of 'Civil Society'

During my field research, I came across instances when volunteers uncritically accepted their ascribed role in the reception of asylum seekers and es-

tablished a symbiotic relationship with governmental actors. However, there were also moments when volunteers opened up new political possibilities ‘from below’ by voicing dissent towards governmental actors and taking a stand towards perceived injustices in the reception of asylum seekers (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). The boundary between ostensibly ‘apolitical’ humanitarian helping and political action thus appeared rather blurred and was constantly exceeded by the practices of refugee support that emerged around the long summer of migration.

And yet, governmental representatives often considered humanitarian volunteering and political activism as distinguishable types of action, while seeking to restore a neat dividing line between the two. I came across many instances, when they clearly delineated activist forms of refugee support from the ‘proper’ conduct of volunteering with refugees. For instance, Marlies Vogtmann, the Deputy Secretary for Citizen Engagement at Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Social Affairs, stressed that there were two distinct parts of ‘civil society’. On the one hand, she identified those forms of citizen engagement that comprised practical projects that were “constructive” in relation to the governmental handling of asylum seekers. On the other hand, she claimed, there were those civil society groups that aimed to alter the fundamental conditions and workings of ‘the state’ through protest and political campaigning – practices of refugee support that were, in her opinion, “uncomfortable” (Interview Marlies Vogtmann: 20/4/2016). This dark side of ‘civil society’, she asserted, could not be classified as volunteering and therefore did not fall under her jurisdiction. She emphasized that volunteers should steer clear of such “uncomfortable” forms of engagement and should not allow themselves to “be stirred up” and thereby risk jeopardizing the successful collaboration with governmental actors. She put this as follows:

“I think things can work quite well if you try and keep these two sections apart, so that you don’t stir up those groups that aim to collaborate with the municipality for a common purpose. Because I think this can work quite well on the ground. Of course, that doesn’t mean that, wherever the collaboration between volunteers and professionals works well, you have to keep your mouth shut. But I think that it’s difficult if these are the same people [...] when protest turns destructive, for example, then it’s difficult to have a foot in both camps.”²⁶ (Interview with Marlies Vogtmann: 20/4/2016)

26 Translation by LF. German original: “Ich glaube, dass es allerdings ganz gut klappt, wenn man versucht diese beiden Teile auch ein bisschen auseinander zu halten, dass

Therefore, the state government made sure that it targeted those parts of 'civil society' with its manifold programmes and instruments that were conducive to its aims and decisions in the reception of asylum seekers. By silencing potentially dissenting and disagreeing voices among those seeking to support refugees, it simultaneously *depoliticized* the practices of migrant solidarity that emerged around the long summer of migration.

This connects to Ferguson's (1994) seminal work on discourses and practices of development aid in Lesotho. This "development apparatus", he argues, functions as an "anti-politics machine" that depoliticizes the reasons and effects of poverty. Rather than rendering their structural roots open for political discussion, disagreement and contestation, development aid reduces them to "a technical problem" and proposes "technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people" (ibid.: 256). This "anti-politics machine", Ferguson argues, comes with the side-effect of extending the power of the state, albeit in a hidden way. Similarly, I would suggest that the governmental impetus to intervene in volunteering with refugees around the long summer of migration also functioned as an 'anti-politics machine' in Ferguson's sense. The programmes launched by the state government of Baden-Württemberg served as a *depoliticizing* force that silenced the possibility for disagreements between 'the state' and 'civil society', while coming with a similar side-effect of extending state power over practices of refugee support.

However, the perception of a lack of a potential *space for disagreement* formed one of the major sources of frustration for volunteers in the area of my field research. I came across many instances when volunteers voiced their anger about the expectation that committed citizens had to accept governmental decisions and policies uncritically, while expressing a desire to participate in decision-making processes. This is an issue that was, for instance, repeatedly discussed at the regular conferences of the Refugee Council of Baden-Württemberg, the non-governmental umbrella association of citizens' initiatives across the state. For instance, volunteers repeatedly

man nicht sozusagen Gruppen, die eigentlich das Ziel haben gut mit der Kommune zusammenzuarbeiten, für einen gemeinsamen Zweck dann aufzuwiegeln irgendwie, weil ich glaub tatsächlich, dass es vor Ort doch auch gut klappen kann. Das heißt natürlich nicht, dass überall, wo es gut klappt, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Hauptamtlichen und Ehrenamtlichen, dass man dort dann den Schnabel halten müsste. Aber dass das halt glaube ich schwierig ist, wenn das die gleichen Leute sind, die dann [...] also wenn dann zum Beispiel der Protest destruktiv wird sozusagen, dass es dann irgendwie schwierig ist, dass man dann sozusagen auf beiden Hochzeiten tanzt."

criticized how the municipalities appointed Volunteer Coordinators with the aim of controlling and determining their activities, something they perceived as a significant erosion of their independence and their ability to voice criticisms. Several volunteers also remarked that they were frustrated with local governmental representatives who did not take them “seriously” and did not include them in decision-making processes. For instance, one of my interlocutors, the head of a citizens’ initiative supporting refugees, vented his irritation at the local council’s lack of consultation in its decision-making, stating:

“If the council says ‘we need volunteers for our work’, then, in my opinion, they also have to consult them on decisions and include them to a certain extent. Of course, we know that when the council hands out money, we’re not the ones holding the purse strings. But they should at least say: ‘Hey, what do you think? Are you okay with that?’ And if we have objections, then we have to try and find a course that both parties can live with.”²⁷ (Interview with Klaus Böhlen: 25/4/2016)

I talked to numerous other volunteers who insisted that they did not only want to engage in immediate helping practices but also object governmental decisions and policies if need be. Like Klaus Böhlen, many seemed quite frustrated if their own critical opinions were not considered in governmental decision-making processes.

The space of disagreement between citizens supporting refugees and governmental actors thus presented a highly contested issue during my field research. As I will outline in the following subsection, this became most visible in the context of deportation orders.

3.4.2. Deportations and the Contested Space of Disagreement

In October 2015, the newspaper *Stuttgarter Nachrichten* (20/10/2015) published an article with the headline: “Refugee brochure: Green-SPD asylum advice

27 Translation by LF. German original: “Wenn das Landratsamt sagt, wir brauchen die Ehrenamtlichen für unsere Arbeit, dann muss sie die Ehrenamtlichen eigentlich nach meinem Dafürhalten auch bei Entscheidungen fragen und in gewissem Sinne einbeziehen. Natürlich wissen wir, dass das Landratsamt, wenn es Geld rausrückt, dass wir da dann nicht am entscheidenden Hebel sind. Aber einfach zu sagen: ‘hey, wie seht ihr das? Ist das in Ordnung?’ Und wenn wir Einwände haben, dann müssen wir schauen, dass wir eine Linie finden in der beide mitkönnen.”

have to uncritically accept governmental decisions but could, in fact, disagree with and challenge them. On the other hand, representatives of opposition parties and municipalities framed such critical interventions in the context of deportations as unacceptable “acts of civil disobedience” or as a complication of local efforts in the management of asylum seekers. The *space of disagreement* ascribed to ‘civil society’ was thus contested among governmental actors.

The Green-SPD state government did, indeed, appear to be more receptive to dissenting positions among citizens supporting refugees. This came through in my interview with Gisela Erler, who stated that “uncomfortable conflicts” between volunteers and governmental actors around the issue of deportations would be unavoidable in the future (Interview with Gisela Erler and Annette Brüderle: 17/4/2015). For my interlocutor, the topic of deportations thus represented a potential but acceptable source of disagreement and contestation between ‘civil society’ and ‘the state’. Our interview indicated that she herself held rather ambivalent views on the enforcement of deportations:

“To be honest, we shouldn’t be desperately trying to deport refugees, not even those from the Balkans ... we should really be focusing more on integration because we won’t be able to deport the majority of them anyway.”³⁰
(Interview with Gisela Erler and Annette Brüderle: 17/4/2015)

My interlocutor, the Green State Counsellor for Civil Society and Civic Participation, was thus herself critical of the rigorous enforcement of deportations. She voiced her understanding of and sympathy for those volunteers who refused to accept governmental decisions to deport certain asylum seekers and protested against them or opposed them in other ways. This more supportive stance towards the dissenting voices of committed citizens might in part be explained by the particular history of the Greens, a party that itself arose out of the anti-nuclear, women’s rights and peace movements of the 1970s, and was thus formed in opposition to a ruling elite.

Such conflicts around the issue of deportations and the question of how volunteers should react ‘properly’ towards them, I would argue, are deeply political. Dissenting voices in the context of deportation orders shine a light

30 Translation by LF. German original: “Ehrlich gesagt müsste man auch diese Abschieberei nicht forcieren, weil auch die Balkanflüchtlinge ... man sollte wirklich mehr auf Integration setzen, weil wir kriegen eh einen Großteil nicht abgeschoben.”

on the injustices and uncertainties pertaining to the distinction between ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ refugees and, in doing so, call for the inclusion of groups who are excluded from protection. According to the French philosopher Jacques Rancière, “dissensus” or “dis-agreement” forms the true basis of the political (Battista 2017). To him, dis-agreement goes beyond the mere confrontation between opinions and occurs whenever a ‘wrong’ is voiced that challenges the partitioning of the dominant order in the name of ‘a part of those who have no-part’ (Rancière 1998, 2009). He expresses this as follows:

“The essence of politics is *dissensus*. Dissensus is not the confrontation between interests or opinions. It is the manifestation of a distance of the sensible from itself. Politics makes visible that which had no reason to be seen, it lodges one world into another.” (Rancière 2001: no page number; emphasis in original)

Following Rancière’s conception, I would suggest that those moments when committed citizens contested the deportations of asylum seekers challenged the dominant order in such a way that *dissensus* arose. Such acts were deeply political, while attempts to suppress or silence them might be read as attempts to depoliticize practices of refugee support.

Scholars in the field of critical migration studies have also emphasized the significance of struggles over deportations (see De Genova 2010; Darling 2014). Nyers (2010a: 415) argues that they might be “read in terms of contemporary disputes over who has the authority to protect, and under what terms and conditions. Such activism can reveal new problematizations as well as new ways of thinking and acting politically”. Other works highlight that deportations of rejected asylum seekers have a strategic function for governments in that they reinforce sovereign power (Nyers 2010b; Ilcan 2014). For instance, Mountz and Hiemstra (2013: 388) outline how the enforcement of deportations serves as a means for governmental actors to seemingly bring “order to chaos”. Tyler and Marciniak (2013: 145) point out how the risk of being deported contributes to the criminalization of ‘undesirable migrants’ and functions as an important source of domination in the governance of migration. Volunteers’ criticisms and protests around the issue of deportations might thus also be read as a contestation of sovereign power and of the basic tenets of the governance of migration.

During the long summer of migration, governmental actors sought to impede such possibilities for politicization around deportations through different means. For instance, the state government emphasized the need

for “returnee counselling” (“Rückkehrberatung”) for rejected asylum seekers. Governmental representatives repeatedly stressed that the ‘proper’ way for volunteers to respond to deportation orders would be to advise the affected on how to ‘successfully’ return to their country of origin. During my field research, I encountered an example for this emphasis on returnee counselling at the conference “From Refugee to Fellow Citizen” organized by the Baden-Württemberg Greens in March 2015. Several speakers at the conference emphasized that, along with efforts to integrate accepted refugees, “qualified returnee counselling” for those asylum seekers who had been rejected was an “equally important” responsibility for committed citizens (Field notes: 14/3/2015). For instance, the moderator of the conference problematized how volunteers will often have emotionally bonded with families whose asylum case is eventually rejected. He therefore asked a governmental representative in the audience about the ‘right’ way to respond in such instances. The governmental representative replied: “You need to move on to returnee counselling, even if the heart says otherwise” (ibid.). She thus made it clear that volunteers had to put their personal attachment to rejected asylum seekers aside, to accept the governmental decision, and to counsel returnees on practical matters. With this emphasis on returnee counselling, she left no space for disagreement and protest and, instead, asserted that ‘civil society’ had to uncritically accept and support governmental decisions to deport asylum seekers. Vandevordt (2016) identifies a similar tendency in Belgium. He argues that, through the promotion of voluntary return to the migrants’ country of origin, civil society actors became complicit in governmental objectives in migration management.

Despite these government’s efforts to make committed citizens complicit in the governance of migration, volunteers did not cease to voice dissent and to demonstrate their disagreement, something I will illuminate in more detail in the subsequent fourth chapter of this book.

3.5. Concluding Remarks: The Government of Refugee Solidarity

This chapter looked at the manifold governmental interventions that aimed to enhance, coordinate or facilitate volunteering with refugees. Around the long summer of migration, governmental actors launched numerous programmes and instruments seeking to shape the volunteers’ ‘proper’ conduct while extending their control over newly committed citizens. By doing so, they in-