



Fig. 9 Cities and Satellites

4. Contextualizing Bottom-Up Video Production in Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro

Chapter Four situates the emergence of video activist practices within the specific contexts of Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro. Rather than attempting an exhaustive portrayal of each city's urban dynamics and social movements – which would risk oversimplification – this chapter outlines the key contextual conditions shaping bottom-up video production. It begins with Cape Town, examining the spatial legacies of apartheid, neoliberal urbanization, and violence, before turning to contemporary urban movements. The same structure is then applied to the case of Rio de Janeiro. A final section draws out key similarities and differences between the two cities and their urban movements, setting the stage for a comparative understanding of media representation and video activism in the divided cities of Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro.

4.1 Cape Town, the »mother city«

»The colonial world is a world divided into compartments. [...] if we examine closely this system of compartments, we will at least be able to reveal the lines of force it implies.«¹

»In Brazil, the dominant instrument of social division was the encouragement of class formation. In South Africa it was racial control.«²

Legacies of Apartheid in Cape Town's Urban Morphology (1948–1994)

Approximately four million inhabitants reside in Cape Town, populating an area characterized by both its natural beauty and its massive wealth disparities. From the noble villas overlooking Camps Bay to rickety tin shacks shaking on the windy Cape Flats plane in Khayelitsha, the inequalities in living standards across Cape Town are enormous. Sussann Parnell and Edgar Pieterse describe Cape Town as »flawed beauty, marked by extreme, enduring and highly concentrated poverty.«³

These inequalities, deeply inscribed into the city's urban spaces, are the result of meticulous state planning during the apartheid era (1948–1994). Although racial segregation predated 1948 – already being codified in passports and laws – apartheid's policies of racial exclusion further intensified the city's segregation.⁴ Apartheid ideology produced

- 1 Fanon, »The Wretched of the Earth«, 103–104.
- 2 Huchzermeyer, »Informal Settlements: Production and Intervention in Twentieth-Century Brazil and South Africa«, 96.
- 3 Parnell and Pieterse, »The »Right to the City: Institutional Imperatives of a Developmental State«, 151.
- 4 For example: 1913 Native Land Act to not allow blacks to own land outside rural reserves; 1918 Native in Urban Areas Bill; 1923 Urban Areas Act: introduced racial segregation in urban planning; 1926 Colour Bar Act, denying skilled jobs to black Africans; 1934 Slum Act, employed to clear and evict people living in urban centers. With the apartheid government ascending to power, further discriminatory policies were enacted such as the 1950 Population Registration Act that formalized identity cards and racial classification; the 1950 Group Areas Act leading to forced evictions and segregation; the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act to create separate structures for black African governance; the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act to create segregated access in buses, beaches, universities and other public facilities (Turok, »South Africa's Tortured Urbanisation and the Complications of Reconstruction«, 150–153).



Fig. 10 Cape Town

»profound effects on spatial development,«⁵ shaping both the built environment and urban imaginaries. During this period, »slums were represented as places where ›devils lurk,«⁶ a narrative that provided the state with justification to forcibly remove ›colored‹ and ›black‹ residents from city centers and relocate them to urban peripheries and Bantustans. The destruction of District Six is perhaps the most emblematic and traumatic act of dispossession committed in the name of apartheid's »brutal policy of resettlement«.⁷ Between the 1960s and 1980s, an estimated two to three million South Africans were forcibly displaced.⁸

Cape Town's distinctive topography provided the blueprint for enforcing strict racial segregation. To the north of Table Mountain lies an area known as the City Bowl and a series of wealthy and middle-class ›suburbs‹ surrounding the Central Business District (CBD) and clustered along the mountain ranges.⁹ On the lower lands to the side of Table

- 5 Turok, »South Africa's Tortured Urbanisation and the Complications of Reconstruction,« 150.
- 6 Coetzer, *Building Apartheid. On Architecture and Order in Imperial Cape Town*, 214.
- 7 Turok, »South Africa's Tortured Urbanisation and the Complications of Reconstruction,« 154.
- 8 Turok, »South Africa's Tortured Urbanisation and the Complications of Reconstruction,« 154.
- 9 As Vivian Bickford-Smith argues, popular cultural productions played an important role in upholding the racist discourse that black Africans were

Mountain the vast plane of the Cape Flats stretches out until False Bay. This sandy, windy plane was designated as the place where residents labelled as ›coloured‹ and ›black‹ would be resettled during apartheid. The settlements in the Cape Flats have ever since expanded rapidly in size and population.¹⁰ It is in the resettlement areas and ›informal‹ settlements of the Cape Flats where poverty and crime concentrate. The huge socio-economic differences between the predominantly white urban center with its affluent residents and tourists as well as its surrounding suburbs are segregated by a dividing line separating it from the Cape Flats inhabited almost exclusively by black and colored marginalized urban citizens.

Cape Town's geographical compartmentalization was used by urban planners, law- and policymakers, and architects alike to impose racial and ethnic segregation.¹¹ Whereas the city center and its adjacent suburbs enjoyed the benefits of a concentration of social, economic and cultural capital, the majority of the city's population were moved to the Cape Flats, an area with little infrastructure and demeaning living conditions.

*Marketing Cape Town as the ›Mother City‹ of the ›Rainbow Nation‹
(1994–today)*

The legacies of racial segregation and built inequalities marked Cape Town and South Africa, when Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) won South Africa's first democratic election in 1994. Hopes were high. Unfortunately, however, Cape Town's historical inequalities have not simply vanished.

The transition from apartheid to a democratic Republic of South Africa largely failed to transform ownership structures due to South African and international pressure to preserve ›white privilege‹. The existing

essentially rural, making their presence in marginalized neighborhoods in the inner cities unacceptable for white elites: ›By drawing attention to the existence of slums and condemning that existence in prose or celluloid, popular disseminators of South African ›Bitter Cries‹ helped politicians in central and local governments justify policies that led to actual slum condemnation and destruction« (Bickford-Smith, *The Emergence of the South African Metropolis. Cities and Identities in the Twentieth Century*, 15).

- 10 Tony Samara describes this division as akin to one between two different cities: one with a high standard of living aspiring to world-class status and the other marked by vast swathes of marginalization and high crime rates (Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid: Crime and Governance in the Divided City*).
- 11 With twelve officially recognized languages – English, Afrikaans and Xhosa being the most commonly spoken in Cape Town – South Africa has a rich linguistic heritage. However, language barriers have further heightened the racial segregation imposed onto South African urban space.

inequalities were maintained and further deepened due to the adoption of neoliberal urban governance strategies.¹² The ANC government's embrace of policies promoting neoliberal urbanization was most evident in its replacement of its initial Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1996 with the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) plan.¹³ Even though the RDP was certainly not without its critics, it contained a »strong social welfarist element« that was dismantled through GEAR.

GEAR functioned as a self-imposed structural adjustment program »depended almost exclusively on market mechanisms, particularly privatization, fiscal ›discipline‹, and foreign direct investment, and had little appeal beyond an increasingly multiracial national elite and their foreign partners«. ¹⁴ In Cape Town, these neoliberal capitalist mechanisms such as privatization of public land,¹⁵ have continued to push urban residents into more precarious living conditions on the city's periphery, deepening rather than alleviating poverty and marginalization.¹⁶

In contrast to the gentrification and displacement affecting many parts of the city, Cape Town's natural attractions – such as Table Mountain, Lion's Head, Devil's Peak, and its many beaches – alongside historical sites like the Castle of Good Hope, the District Six Museum, and Robben Island, as well as Africa's most visited tourist destination, the V&A Waterfront, have made the city a hub for international travel and tourism. Beyond short-term visitors, Cape Town has long attracted wealthy pensioners from other parts of South Africa and expatriate retirees who settle in its affluent suburbs.

The City of Cape Town's efforts to position itself as a global capital for tourism and design were further advanced by South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup.¹⁷ Like a magnifying glass, this

12 Marie Huchzermeyer provides a detailed account explaining contemporary struggles for a right to the city in Cape Town and other South African cities and the deeply ingrained inequalities that such struggles must overcome (Huchzermeyer, *Cities with »Slums«*).

13 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*, 27.

14 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*, 27.

15 The struggle of the Tafelberg Site in Seapoint is a good example to illustrate current struggles over land and housing in central Cape Town. The Reclaim the City Campaign, the NGO Ndfuni Ukwazi and local residents have joined forces to challenge the city council's decision to privatize a plot of land by selling it to a private school. For more information on this political controversy see: Reclaim the City, »Social Housing«.

16 Parnell and Pieterse, »The ›Right to the City‹: Institutional Imperatives of a Developmental State«, 154.

17 Cape Town was awarded the title of World Design Capital in 2014. Laura Nkula-Wenz explores the »aspirational« and »fragile« attempts made

sporting mega-event exposed the contradictions and challenges of neoliberal urbanization in South Africa. The ANC's national embrace of the World Cup was built on the promise of »making economic gains, realizing identity-building benefits and overcoming global marginality,« as Shaheeb Tayob argues.¹⁸ The 2010 FIFA World Cup privatized public money to pay for the investment in sporting infrastructure,¹⁹ offered tax exemptions for FIFA and its sponsors, and led to the eviction of marginalized citizens from around the stadium precinct in Greenpoint, all while promoting an image Cape Town that was ripe for tourist consumption. This decision fortified the compartmentalization of the city by focusing all attention on an already affluent neighborhood and »reinforc[ing] the power and interest of a select and privileged group.«²⁰ The narrative to represent Cape Town as the prosperous ›Mother City‹ of a united ›Rainbow Nation‹ intentionally glossing over the deep socio-economic disparities through marketing. With promotional campaigns such as ›Fly the Flag‹ and ›Football Fridays,‹ the dream of presenting South Africa as a unified nation gained significant public support.

Violence as a Structural Feature of Cape Town's Margins

Neoliberal urbanization, as a mode of governance, is closely tied to strategies of militarization and the securitization of specific urban spaces.²¹ Tony Samara argues that the area-specific approaches adopted by police and private security companies reflect Cape Town's spatial divisions, enforcing policing policies that disproportionately target marginalized urban residents.

In the city center, a »moral panic« scapegoats persons living on the streets as well as informal traders as a threat to »making tourist and commercial areas clean and safe so that they will attract investment, middle-class consumers, and tourists.«²² The City of Cape Town's public-private partnership was established to create the Central City Improvement

by the City of Cape Town to use design as a way of affirming Cape Town's status as a world city (Nkula-Wenz, »Worlding Cape Town by Design: Encounters with Creative Cityness«).

18 Tayob, »The 2010 World Cup in South Africa: A Millennial Capitalist Moment«, 722.

19 Schonbee and Brümmer, »Public Loss, FIFA's Gain: How Cape Town Got Its ›White Elephant‹«.

20 Tayob, »The 2010 World Cup in South Africa: A Millennial Capitalist Moment«, 717.

21 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*.

22 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*, 52.

District (CCID) that lead to intensified policing tactics and an increased presence of private security in the CBD to secure tourist, shoppers and restaurant visitors while pushing out those who cannot afford the expensive consumption services offered in the CBD.²³ Laws regulating public behavior – such as bans on public intoxication – are strictly enforced against marginalized individuals living on the streets, yet are rarely applied to affluent visitors.

On the Cape Flats, gangs have blossomed that engage in profitable activities such as »alcohol and drug trade, prostitution, trafficking in stolen cars, and large-scale theft«. ²⁴ The post-apartheid government's attempts to establish police control over the Cape Flats resulted in a de facto declaration of war on gangs. In 1999, the Minister for Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete, argued that »criminals are animals« and thus »we must show them no mercy«. ²⁵ These assumptions by high-ranking police officers and politicians such as Tshwete depicted gangs as a »tumour« that needed to be eradicated with all necessary force, resulting in a series of police and military counter-insurgency interventions aimed at restoring state control over the Cape Flats. ²⁶ The result was a further exacerbation of already high crime rates as well as police violence that brought into question the citizenship rights of marginalized residents. ²⁷ As Rashied Omar highlighted in 2019: »There are people living outside of these war zones who may feel safe and sufficiently removed to be unaffected by this conflict. But theirs is a false sense of security.« ²⁸

A leader of The Americans gang from Athlone on the Cape Flats derides this approach: »[A]s long as Cape Town [city center and suburbs] is safe, they don't care about the townships.« ²⁹ In 2005, David Bruce found that there was »significant evidence of a problem of illegal killings by police« in South Africa, with an especially high rate of »bystanders who are presumably shot by error«, without corresponding to a significant rise of killings of police killings. ³⁰ Despite a surge in reports of police misconduct, only 1 percent of assault allegations resulted in convictions. ³¹

23 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*.

24 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*, 97.

25 Tshwete in: Jensen, »The Security and Development Nexus in Cape Town: War on Gangs, Counterinsurgency and Citizenship«, 83.

26 Tshwete in: Jensen, »The Security and Development Nexus in Cape Town«, 83.

27 Jensen, »The Security and Development Nexus in Cape Town«.

28 Omar, »Time to End This Civil War on the Cape Flats.«

29 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*, 137.

30 Bruce, »Interpreting the Body Count. South African Statistics on Lethal Police Violence«.

31 Smith, »South Africa Reports of Police Brutality More than Tripled in the Last Decade.«

Police violence directed at urban citizens, the general levels of violence amongst South Africans are worrying. As Anine Kriegler argues, high levels of violence are a »structural feature« of inequalities:

»Murder levels nationally have been at about this level or higher (above 30 per 100,000, which is considered very high by global standards) since at least the 1970s. High levels of violence are not a matter of police resources. They are a structural feature of this society.«³²

South Africa's murder rate of over 30 victims per 100,000 residents is similar to that of Brazil.³³ In Cape Town, however, this rate is nearly double the South African average at 59.4 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, which for the period of March 2017 to February 2018 amounted to 3,974 murders. In terms of its murder rate, the Western Cape is among the most lethal provinces in South Africa.³⁴ Within Cape Town, the prevalence of violent crime is strongly concentrated in marginalized parts of the city such as on the Cape Flats.³⁵

Extraordinary levels of violence are often legitimized by »troubling naturalizations of [the] inequalities« that produce such violence, as Samara concludes in his extensive study of crime and governance in Cape Town.³⁶ While these inequalities and high levels of violence cannot be attributed solely to contemporary forms of »neoliberal urban governance« or to the legacies of colonialism and apartheid, Cape Town's history of division and inequality reflects a more complex interplay of causes and effects.³⁷ Nevertheless, »the mutually reinforcing discourses of market rationality, liberal democracy, and security« that define neoliberal urban governance appear to deepen, rather than reduce, violence and crime at the city's margins.³⁸ The »reconciliation of formal democracy with segregation, inclusion in principle with exclusion in practice« in post-apartheid Cape Town has failed to reverse patterns of fragmentation – often with lethal consequences for the marginalized.

The result is a deeply fragmented urban landscape marked by racial segregation and stark wealth inequalities. In the urban center and its affluent suburbs, predominantly white and wealthy populations are

32 Kriegler, »South Africa Won't Become Less Violent until It's More Equal.«

33 World Population Review, »Murder Rate by Country 2020.«

34 Africa Check, »Factsheet: South Africa's Crime Statistics for 2018/19.«

35 An insider's view from a social worker who has been engaged in Cape Flats communities for decades is provided by Don Pinnock. He emphasizes the structural entanglements of gang activities within the biographies of young members of marginalized communities and the impossibility of breaking this cycle of violence through military force and police tactics (Pinnock, *Gang Town*).

36 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*, 182.

37 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*, 180–181.

38 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*, 181.

concentrated and protected by both privatized security and public police forces. These areas offer privileged access to tourist attractions, historical monuments, government buildings, and corporate headquarters. Surrounding these central zones, vast and sprawling settlements – home to formerly displaced urban citizens and low-income newcomers – struggle to secure basic infrastructure, safety, and adequate housing.

Following the characterization of Cape Town's urban morphologies and the historically entrenched divides that have developed over the past century, the next sections examine how these dynamics are reflected in the mobilization of urban movements. The discussion first highlights the role of Service Delivery Protests, which have emerged predominantly from the urban margins, before turning to the student-led RhodesMust-Fall movement.

Cape Town's Service Delivery Protests

Service delivery protests (SDPs) is an umbrella term for »local political protests« that have »emanated from poorer neighborhoods« in South Africa since the early 2000s.³⁹ The demands voiced during these protests are as diverse as the communities they mobilize – they include calls for the fulfillment of basic citizenship rights, housing rights, land tenure, and access to water, sanitation, electricity, and reliable public transport. The tactics employed during SDPs draw from a broad repertoire of resistance: »mass meetings, drafting of memoranda, petitions, toy-toying, processions, stay-aways, election boycotts, blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tires, looting, destruction of buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships, confrontations with the police, and forced resignation of elected officials«. ⁴⁰ For urban citizens in marginalized neighborhoods, the massive inequalities exacerbated by »neoliberalism« have »added to feelings of injustice« and fueled a »rebellion of the poor«. ⁴¹

In Cape Town, the Cape Flats are a hotspot for service delivery protests. Local political actions often target major roads – such as the N2 highway, which connects the central business district with Cape Town International Airport – in an effort to draw attention to their causes.

39 Alexander, »Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa's Service Delivery Protests – a Preliminary Analysis«, 26.

40 Alexander, »Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa's Service Delivery Protests – a Preliminary Analysis«, 26. A concise overview of social movement organization in post-Apartheid South Africa is also presented in Wendy Williams. »Social Movement Media, Post-Apartheid (South Africa).«

41 Alexander, »Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa's Service Delivery Protests – a Preliminary Analysis«, 37.

In other instances discussed in this work, SDPs have taken the form of marches to the city center, bringing together different communities.⁴² One of the most striking and widely recognized strategies used in Cape Town's SDPs is what Colin McFarlane and Jonathan Silver have termed »poolitical tactics,« in which human feces are dumped in public spaces.⁴³ These »poo protests« have literally involved »the throwing of shit by residents of informal settlements into targeted sites of the city, including the airport, a main arterial road, the Provincial Legislature, and the Mayor's car.«⁴⁴ *Ses'khona* – meaning »We're Here« – was one of the grassroots organizations that played a vital role in these »toilet wars«, which were often suppressed in draconian style. For example police violently broke up protest marches on the N2, and the judiciary imposed long-term prison sentences on activists.

Since the start of the 2000s, grassroots organizing has resulted in city-wide alliances being established across South Africa, among the most well-known of which are the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign in Cape Town,⁴⁵ the shack dwellers' movement Abahlali baseMjondolo in Durban,⁴⁶ and the Anti-Privatisation Forum in Johannesburg.⁴⁷ These new »new social movements' disrupted old partnerships from the anti-apartheid struggle that had seen social movements working hand in hand with the ANC and its alliance partner, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). As Marcel Paret argues, »[O]bservers emphasised the distance between organised labour and community protests«, reflecting a break between workers and residents.⁴⁸ The tension between the militant grassroots protest campaigns of local communities and COSATU's bureaucratic procedures – and its close alignment with the ruling ANC – was starkly revealed through service delivery protests

42 For an example thereof, see Chapter Six.

43 McFarlane and Silver, »The Poolitical City: »Seeing Sanitation« and Making the Urban Political in Cape Town«.

44 McFarlane and Silver, »Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa's Service Delivery Protests – a Preliminary Analysis,« 131.

45 Sophie Oldfield and Kristian Stokke highlight the tension between pluralist approaches and interests, on the one hand, and the necessity for unity in community-based political struggles like that of the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (Oldfield and Stokke, »Building Unity in Diversity: Social Movement Activism in the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign«).

46 Selmeczi, »Abahlali's Vocal Politics of Proximity: Speaking, Suffering and Political Subjectivization«.

47 Paret, »Labour and Community Struggles 1994–2014«.

48 Marcel Paret's discussion of how the interests of workers and the unemployed have increasingly diverged in post-apartheid South Africa offers important insights into the new institutional arrangements and their implications for resistance (Paret, 41).

across the country,⁴⁹ especially in the aftermath of the 2012 Marikana massacre.

Service delivery protests in Cape Town exhibit distinct dynamics in the South African context. They are shaped by the political landscape in which the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Province have been governed by the ANC's main national rival, the Democratic Alliance (DA), since 2006 and 2009 respectively. For example, the dual role of Andile Lili, a key figure in the ›poo protests‹ as a member of Ses'khona as well as an ANC councilor in the City of Cape Town, was immediately seized upon by the DA as evidence that SDPs in Cape Town were being fermented by the ANC leadership at the Western Cape. This ongoing power struggle between the two parties found little resonance among poor Capetonians. As one activist declared: »People are suffering because of these [sic.] political point scoring and grandstanding«. ⁵⁰ The frustration of popular demands going unheard amid the background noise of party politics further encouraged the use of disruption as a political tactic.⁵¹

M'du Hlongwa, an activist with Abahlali, captured the fury of many impoverished South Africans who feel that top-down representation serves only to silence them:

»We are supposed to suffer silently so that some rich people can get rich from our work and others can get rich having conferences about having more conferences about our suffering. [. . .] I want to say clearly that I am a Professor of my suffering. We are all Professors of our suffering. But in this South Africa the poor must always be invisible.«⁵²

This silencing of the poor is what Partha Chatterjee captures with his notion of a »political society«, which involves populations being governed as mere objects of »administrative policy,« with little regard for the individual or collective voices of citizens. Sophie Oldfield and Claire Benit-Gbaffou invoke Chatterjee's heuristic distinction between ›civil

49 Paret, »Labour and Community Struggles 1994–2014«, 41.

50 Activist quoted in: McFarlane and Silver, »The Poolitical City: ›Seeing Sanitation‹ and Making the Urban Political in Cape Town«, 132.

51 Julian Brown reads the practices and forms of service delivery protests as disruption in the sense implied by Jacques Rancière. However, the trouble with Brown's account is that despite his detailed description of these practices, his interpretations are explicitly drawn from the perspective of a distant observer. Without ever participating in any protests or speaking to activists directly, Brown ignores their demands that researchers speak to them and not just about them (Brown, South Africa's Insurgent Citizens).

52 Selmeczi, »Abahlali's Vocal Politics of Proximity: Speaking, Suffering and Political Subjectivization«, 511.



Fig. 11 *Seats Not Statues*

society« and »political society« to emphasize the importance of paying attention to the local practices and circumstances that drive mobilization rather than imposing universal concepts such as the Right to the City without paying sufficient heed to the specificities of localized struggles.⁵³

The marginalization of service delivery protests and their demands closely mirrors the urban morphology described earlier, a connection that becomes even more apparent in the examination of media representations. However, before turning to how urban movements are portrayed in the media, it is worth considering a second and contrasting case: the Rhodes Must Fall student movement. Unlike SDPs, this movement emerged to a significant extent from the prestigious University of Cape Town, situated on lush hillslopes near the city center.

Rhodes Must Fall and the Quest for Decolonization

The Rhodes Must Fall (RMF)⁵⁴ student movement was born on 9 March 2015, when Chumani Maxwele blew a whistle and emptied the contents

53 Bénéit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, »Claiming »Rights« in the African City: Popular Mobilisation and the Politics of Informality in Nairobi, Rabat, Johannesburg and Cape Town«, 292.

54 In my book, I refer to this student movement as the Rhodes Must Fall (RMF) movement to emphasize the specific context of the early 2015 UCT

of a portable toilet onto the statue of Cecil John Rhodes on the University of Cape Town's (UCT) Upper Campus. This act directly referenced the earlier ›poo protests‹ by symbolically transposing feces from Khayelitsha to the affluent university setting. Maxwele described the act as a deliberate use of disruptive tactics::

»We knew that the moment we do anything that is violent, or damaging [to] the statue, we will be deemed with the stereotype of Black violence. We sat down and thought through this thing and – because of our lived experiences – we knew that we had to use our psychological pain, our trauma, that the statue gives to us as Black students and Black staff. I am deeply traumatized by that statue. We thought: let's take the pain of our parents, the pain of our brothers and sisters in Khayelitsha, who will be using porta-potty toilets for the rest of their lives. That is my pain. Let me take that porta-potty with feces back to where it belongs. So that the powerful people – the elite – can feel how it feels to be Black. How it feels to be on the ground and [using] those toilets as your way of relieving yourself. The dehumanization of Black people in this country has gone on for too long.«⁵⁵

To transpose »Black pain« to »the elite« at the University of Cape Town proved to be an effective symbolic intervention by kick-starting the RMF movement, which according to Abdul Kayum Ahmed became »a radical student movement centered on decolonizing the university by confronting questions of institutional racism, access to education, and reforming the Eurocentric university curriculum.«⁵⁶ The movement's »radical« nature meant that it did not aim for the »transformation« of a »violent system of power« targeting Africans, but for the very destruction of this »system«.⁵⁷ Building on the three pillars of »Pan-Africanism, Black Consciousness, and Black radical feminism«, the students' fight for decolonization gave

student protests, which I have examined most closely and which were most public in the Western Cape. Eventually the Rhodes Must Fall movement turned into the nationwide Fees Must Fall movement in September and October 2016, with Wits University in Johannesburg as its epicenter. The October 2016 protests in Cape Town picked up the new Hashtag #Fees Must Fall. However, since the Rhodes Must Fall protests were the origins of the students' movement in Cape Town, I have chosen to consistently name the student activism in Cape Town Rhodes Must Fall rather than Fees Must Fall. The documentary movie »Everything Must Fall« (2019) by Rehad Desai offers a more pronounced insight into the causes and drivers of the movement.

- 55 Maxwele in: Boersema, »Re-Racing South Africa: Rhodes Must Fall as Antiracist Movement«, 4.
- 56 Ahmed, »The Rise of Fallism: #RhodesMustFall and the Movement to Decolonize the University«, 1.
- 57 Ahmed, »The Rise of Fallism«, 3.

rise to one of the most important social movements in post-apartheid South Africa.⁵⁸

Ahmed identifies five crucial moments in the history of the RMF movement. The first occurred in April 2015 when, after the Rhodes statue had been removed by the university following further protests, students occupied the Bremner Building on the UCT campus and renamed it Azania House.⁵⁹ RMF's second campaign, which became famous under the hashtag #EndOutsourcing, was an act of solidarity with outsourced UCT staff that culminated with a series of strikes in October 2015.⁶⁰ Emerging immediately out of these strikes in early October 2015 was the spread of student protests to other universities across the country under the banner of the Fees Must Fall movement.⁶¹ The fourth key moment occurred on 15 February 2016, when #Shackville was erected on the UCT Upper Campus in protest against a lack of student housing.⁶² The final phase of the RMF movement was marked by its »splintering and unravelling,«⁶³ most visibly during the opening of an exhibition titled *Echoing Voices from Within*, held exactly one year after Maxwele's symbolic act at the Rhodes statue. A transgender collective disrupted the vernissage, prompting intense internal debates that exposed and deepened existing fractures among RMF activists. Despite these tensions, student strikes continued to spread across the country under the broader banner of the hashtag #FeesMustFall.

The tactics, demands, and modes of mobilization of these two movements form the basis for understanding how they have been portrayed in mainstream media. The following sections provide an overview of the broader media landscape in South Africa, as well as the role of internet access in disseminating conflicting narratives emerging »from within« the movements themselves.

4.2 Rio de Janeiro, the »marvelous city«

After outlining the urban context for video activism in Cape Town, the following chapter turns to the development of Rio de Janeiro, offering

58 Ahmed, »The Rise of Fallism,« 2.

59 Ahmed, »The Rise of Fallism,« 24–31.

60 The #EndOutsourcing campaign gave rise to a documentary film that is discussed in Chapter Six.

61 The protest on 21 October 2015 in Cape Town during which demonstrators broke through the gates of the Legislative Assembly in Cape Town is discussed in Chapter Six.

62 This is discussed in Chapter Seven.

63 Ahmed, »The Rise of Fallism«, 49.




Fig. 12 Rio de Janeiro

an overview of Rio de Janeiro's urban development and its key urban social movements.

*The Making of the ›Paris of the Tropics‹ by Colonizers,
Authoritarian Rulers and Elites*

Rio de Janeiro is a city with a population of approximately eight million inhabitants within the municipality and a total of circa twelve million residents in the wider metropolitan area. The area's history of European settlement began with a small outpost that was established by Portuguese sailors.⁶⁴ In 1763, Rio de Janeiro replaced Salvador de Bahia as the capital of Portugal's Brazilian colony. In 1808, the Portuguese crown and its entourage fled Lisbon to settle in Rio de Janeiro, which made Rio the capital of the entire Portuguese colonial empire.⁶⁵ In this role, Rio de

- 64 The naming of their settlement after a river that did not exist is a »misapprehension typical of the colonial enterprise in the Americas« but this name has lived on in that of the city of Rio de Janeiro: »Saturday, 30 April, early morning we arrived at the mouth of the River of January,« noted Pero Lopes de Sousa as the Portuguese ships entered Guanabara Bay in 1531 (Williams, Chazkel, and Knauss, *The Rio de Janeiro Reader*, 9). There they founded the settlement that was to become São Sebastião do Rio de Janeiro.
- 65 The Portuguese crown left Lisbon with an armada of ships just before the armies of Napoleon conquered the Portuguese capital.

Janeiro functioned as one of the biggest slave ports worldwide and as the seat of the Portuguese royal family before becoming the seat of government of the newly independent Brazilian state in 1822.

In the early twentieth century, Rio de Janeiro underwent large-scale urban redevelopment in preparation for the Brazilian National Exhibition of 1908. Francisco Pereira Passos, the city's mayor from 1902 to 1906 and an admirer of Baron Haussmann, sought to ›civilize‹ and ›Europeanize‹ the city. His overhaul of the city center included the construction of wide avenues such as Avenida Central – later renamed Avenida Rio Branco – as well as central squares like Cinelândia and surrounding landmarks including the Municipal Theatre, the National Library, and the Museum of Fine Arts. The installation of electric power lines further contributed to Rio's nickname as the ›Paris of the Tropics‹.⁶⁶ At the same time, Passos's reforms discriminated against poor and Afro-Brazilian residents, approximately twenty thousand of whom were forcefully evicted from the city center.⁶⁷ Resistance to this top-down urban restructuring culminated in 1904 in the *Revolta Contra Vacina*.⁶⁸

The ›formal‹ city of Rio de Janeiro developed from its center at Guanabara Bay southwards into the neighborhoods of Flamengo, Laranjeiras and Botafogo. After the construction of the first tunnel to today's South Zone with the city center in the early twentieth century, the Copacabana and later the Ipanema neighborhoods developed rapidly.⁶⁹ Soon Copacabana attracted worldwide fame as a cultural hub in Rio's strictly class-stratified society of the 1950s and 1960s.⁷⁰ Simultaneously, the U.S.-inspired model of car-centered urban growth drove expansion toward the southwest with the planned neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca, as well as sprawl into the present-day North Zone and the neighboring city of Niterói.

66 Williams, Chazkel, and Knauss, *The Rio de Janeiro Reader*, 139.

67 Skidmore, *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change*.

68 A comparison between this early twentieth-century mass movement and the twenty-first-century *Jornadas de Junho* in terms of their organizing, demands and support bases highlights a number of interesting similarities. In both cases, there was a perceived intrusion of the state into the life of ordinary citizens – manifesting itself in 1904 in the form of forced vaccinations and in 2013 through an increase in public transport ticket prices that threatened to further curtail mobility – as well as subsequent heavy suppression of dissent by the authorities (Santoro, »Um Estudo Da Política Criminal de Controle Dos Protestos Populares Na História Do Rio de Janeiro.«).

69 Cultural productions such as the Hollywood film *Flying Down to Rio*, which is set at Copacabana Palace, augmented the myth of Copacabana (Jaguaribe, *Rio de Janeiro. Urban Life Through the Eyes of the City*).

70 Beatriz Jaguaribe's account of the development and representation of the Copacabana neighborhood and its iconic sites, such as the Copacabana Palace hotel, and new practices like swimming in Chapter Five of her book is highly recommended (Jaguaribe, *Rio de Janeiro*, 133–170).

Today, while the North and West Zones are home to more industrial activity and lower- to middle-income neighborhoods, the South Zone – with its iconic landmarks such as Pão de Açúcar (Sugarloaf) and Cristo Redentor (Christ the Redeemer), and famous neighborhoods like Copacabana and Ipanema – attracts the majority of tourists and is predominantly inhabited by middle- and upper-class residents. Although Rio’s Central Zone remains the city’s cultural, economic, and political core, the city lost some of its symbolic and political prominence when Brasília became Brazil’s capital in 1967.

Favelas and the ›informal‹ growth of the city

Simultaneous to the development of the ›formal‹ city, significant ›informal‹ development accompanied Rio’s expansion throughout the twentieth century. In 1897, after the end of the War of Canudos in north-eastern Brazil, returning soldiers occupied Providência hill in the city center to demand their unpaid wages.⁷¹ Although these payments were never settled,⁷² their occupation camp turned into a permanent settlement that was to become the first favela in Rio and Brazil.⁷³ Ever since, favelas have spread out all across Rio’s fractured urban landscape of hills, lush forests and islands, providing a home to an estimated one-third of the city’s population. While favelas are scattered throughout the city,

71 The word ›Favela‹ goes back to the 19th century, when a group of unemployed soldiers returned from the Canudos war to Rio de Janeiro and settled on the hill of Providência that came to be the first ›favela‹. The Term ›favela‹ is used with some caution in this work as it is often associated with discourses that criminalize its inhabitants. For example João H. Costa Vargas describes how the Jacarezinho Favela in Rio de Janeiro was portrayed in corporate media as a space that is »likely to produce future generations of dangerous blacks« which presents one of the many ways of stereotypical discussions driving an overall discourse of criminalizing specific groups of urban citizens in Rio de Janeiro (Costa Vargas, »When a Favela Dares to Become a Gated Condominium: The Politics of Race and Urban Space in Rio de Janeiro,« 49). In my work I use the term ›communities‹ (Portuguese comunidades) and ›favela‹ synonymously. However, it is important here that the use of the word favela by no means wants to reproduce the negative and stereotyped discourses that unfortunately are often connotated to the term.

72 Jaguaribe, *Rio de Janeiro*, 175.

73 The construction of favelas on hills – a typical characteristic of these neighborhoods – makes the word ›morro‹ (Portuguese for ›hill‹) almost synonymous with the term ›favela‹ and places it in contrast with the ›asphalto‹ (›asphalt‹) of the paved streets of the ›formal‹ city below (McGuirk, *Radical Cities. Across Latin America in Search of a New Architecture*, 169).

they are typically built on geographically undesirable sites, such as steep hillsides or swampy terrain. Nearly one thousand self-constructed favela neighborhoods – often inhabited by migrants from northeastern Brazil – have become an iconic feature of the *Cidade Maravilhosa* (Marvelous City). Housing in these dense settlements, which often overlook the formal city's upmarket neighborhoods below, is typically built with red brick walls that allow for vertical expansion as residents can afford it. While some favelas, like Santa Marta, are relatively small with only a few thousand inhabitants, larger complexes such as Rocinha or Complexo do Alemão are home to over 100,000 residents.

Whether under democratic rule or during the military dictatorship (1964–1985), the Brazilian state has rarely exercised effective governance over favelas. The development of most of Rio's favela neighborhoods occurred without state planning or oversight. As self-constructed communities beyond formal control, favelas often lack basic infrastructure and, since the rise of organized crime in the 1980s, many have come under the influence of gangs. Evictions during the dictatorship⁷⁴ as well as forced evictions under the auspices of government housing programs in more recent times point to the deep levels of mistrust and tension that exist between favela communities and the state.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, despite infrastructural shortcomings and high levels of violence, residents often maintain strong attachments to their communities.⁷⁶

A discourse inherited from Brazil's history as part of the Portuguese Empire that remains deeply embedded in its national identity is the »myth of *mestiçagem*« – the idea of racial harmony among the ›three races‹ that downplays the dominance of the white upper classes.⁷⁷ As Naomi Wood observes, »[n]arratives of racial harmony are seen imploding in

74 The eviction of an estimated 175,000 residents from favelas in the period from 1960 to 1975 captures the dictatorship's hostility towards favelados (McGuirk, *Radical Cities*, 189).

75 While the *Mora Carioca* housing program aimed to upgrade existing built environments in the 1990s, the follow-up *Minha Vida*, *Minha Casa* program privileged the construction of new settlements on the outskirts of the city as resettlement sites (McGuirk, *Radical Cities*). In this regard, the *Minha Casa*, *Minha Vida* program resembles South Africa's transition from the more socially oriented RDP and to the more neoliberal GEAR program for social housing.

76 Community solidarity and a rich cultural heritage, among other reasons, make many favelados deeply attached to the communities in which they live, thus providing them with little incentive to move to other neighborhoods (Alves and Evanson, *Living in the Crossfire*, 21).

77 Marshall Eakin's study offers a valuable historical overview of how the myth of ›mixture‹ has been translated into Brazilian popular culture and been used to construct an imaginary national identity (Eakin, *Becoming Brazilians: Race and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Brazil*).

the face of growing economic disparities and diminishing opportunities for Brazil's mostly darker-skinned poorer classes.«⁷⁸ While there are genuine elements of shared nationhood – such as a common language and a legal code that formally guarantees equal rights – citizenship in Brazil remains contested. Leslie Bethell characterizes the country as a »[d]emocracy without [c]itizenship,«⁷⁹ highlighting the gap between formal recognition and the actual guarantee of rights.⁸⁰

This tension between de jure and de facto rights manifests in many ways and results in what James Holston terms »differentiated citizenship,« where »most rights are available only to particular kinds of citizens and exercised as the privilege of particular social categories.«⁸¹ Despite some progress toward more equitable urban planning, Rio de Janeiro remains a deeply class-segregated city, with race and class privileges closely intertwined.⁸²

Catalyzing Urban Transformation through Mega-Events?

In 1960, Rio de Janeiro lost its status as Brazil's capital. During the turbulent 1980s, drug cartels increasingly asserted control over the city's favelas, fueling a surge in crime and violence. Brazil's successful bid in 2007 to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup, followed by Rio's selection in 2009 as the host of the 2016 Summer Olympic Games – making it the first South American city to do so – was widely seen as a chance to restore Rio's former grandeur.⁸³

78 Wood, *Brazil in Twenty-First Century Popular Media*, 6.

79 Bethell's political history of Brazil assesses the long durée of social and political transformation in the country as such: »Throughout modern Brazilian history every change of political regime [...] has demonstrated the extraordinary capacity of the Brazilian elites to defend the status quo and their own interests [...].« (Bethell, »Politics in Brazil: From Elections Without Democracy to Democracy Without Citizenship«, 16)

80 For a nuanced understanding of the historical roots and current practices of citizenship, James Holston's comparison of the notion of citizenship in the USA, France and Brazil is highly insightful (Holston, *Insurgent Citizenship*).

81 Holston, »Insurgent Citizenship in an Era of Global Urban Peripheries«, 255.

82 A useful ethnographic case study of the Jacarezinho favela illustrates how »race and urban space intersect«, leaving »favela activists [with] no choice but to confront their continued dehumanization« (Costa Vargas, »When a Favela Dares to Become a Gated Condominium: The Politics of Race and Urban Space in Rio de Janeiro«, 49).

83 A good overview of the hopes and dreams that were initially associated with the staging of these world events, their supposedly strong catalytic effects, and the subsequent disappointment they engendered is well captured in Barbassa, »Brazil's Olympic Rollercoaster«. For a collection of essays

These mega-events were envisioned as catalysts for sweeping urban transformation. Yet, while the global spotlight fed the ambitions of local and national elites, the preparations also reignited long-standing tensions. The promise of renewal exposed deep social divides, causing old fractures in the city's fabric to resurface.⁸⁴

The top-down urban renewal plans launched to fulfill the promises of the two mega-event bids targeted three key areas of Rio de Janeiro. The first was the area surrounding the iconic Maracanã Stadium, slated to host the World Cup final as well as the Olympic opening and closing ceremonies. The second focus was Barra da Tijuca, an affluent neighborhood in Rio's southwest, which received the bulk of investments. This area was designated for the construction of the Olympic Village and major transport infrastructure. However, these developments came at a high social cost: they led to the violent eviction of Vila Autódromo, a neighboring favela. The forced removal of its residents turned Vila Autódromo into a powerful symbol of the mega-events' negative impact on Rio's lower-income communities.⁸⁵

The third target was the Zona Portuária, the city's historic port district north of the center. Here, the city sought to attract large-scale private investment and pushed for sweeping gentrification.⁸⁶ In this process, housing for predominantly Black and low-income residents was replaced with upscale, loft-style apartments. The area was also rebranded with high-profile attractions such as the futuristic Museu do Amanhã (Museum of Tomorrow) and a cable car designed to transport tourists to Morro da Providência, Rio's oldest favela.

that reflect citizens' perspectives on whom the World Cup and the Olympics are staged see: Frechette, *Copa Pra Quem? Olimpíadas Pra Quem? Arte e Megaeventos Esportivos No Rio de Janeiro – Contranarrativas Na Cidade Turística*.

- 84 Barbassa, »Brazil's Olympic Rollercoaster«; Vannuchi, *Transforming Cities for Sports Mega-Events: Another Path to Accumulation by Dispossession?*; Raspaud, »Méga-événement sportif et situation d'exception«; Frechette, *Copa Pra Quem? Olimpíadas Pra Quem? Arte e Megaeventos Esportivos No Rio de Janeiro – Contranarrativas Na Cidade Turística*; Gaffney, »The Mega-Event City as Neo-Liberal Laboratory: The Case of Rio de Janeiro«; Pereira, »Transport Legacy of Mega-Events and the Redistribution of Accessibility to Urban Destinations«.
- 85 Attempts of authorities to evict the community are documented with rich resources and links by RioOnWatch. »Timeline: Vila Autódromo, Story of Resistance«
- 86 The private public partnership to renovate Porto Maravilha in port stimulated massive real estate speculation that benefited Brazilian and international elites and construction firms but had few positive effects for local residents (Vanucchi, »Transforming Cities for Sports Mega-Events«).

The World Cup and the Olympics did leave lasting legacies in Rio de Janeiro. One of the most notable was the significant investment in urban transport infrastructure. However, with the introduction of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system and a third Metro line – linking the upper-class neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca with the South Zone and city center – most of these developments were concentrated in privileged areas. This further »exacerbated socio-spatial inequalities,« particularly for »low-income transit-dependent groups.«⁸⁷

Another major consequence was the investment in sporting facilities such as the Maracanã Stadium and the Olympic Village, along with the broader upgrade of transport infrastructure. These projects triggered an unprecedented wave of evictions in lower-income neighborhoods and favelas, carried out in the name of expanding the »entrepreneurial city« or »event city« for the tourist market.⁸⁸ The social cost of these transformations was disproportionately borne by Black and lower-class residents.

Despite the promises of progress, the aftermath was marked by crisis. In 2017, the federal state of Rio de Janeiro declared bankruptcy, and police and military interventions had happened. Yet perhaps the most significant legacy of the two mega-events was the wave of protests they sparked. These popular demonstrations challenged the official narrative of urban renewal and exposed the deep contradictions underlying Rio's transformation.

Before turning to these protests, however, it is important to examine the military and police interventions that were also central to the preparations for both events and the successive protest movements.

Violence in the »Pacification« of Favelas

The intervention by the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP), the so-called Pacifying Police Unit, in Rio de Janeiro's favelas began in 2009 and has evolved into an overwhelmingly militarized campaign targeting lower-income neighborhoods deemed most ripe for real estate development.⁸⁹ The UPP established its first base in 2009 in Santa Marta, a favela

87 Pereira measured access here empirically by calculating the time that Rio residents have to spend on public transport in order to reach their nearest healthcare facilities. This sound empirical study illustrates that a net growth in public transport infrastructure has not benefited all residents and neighborhoods equally (Pereira, »Transport Legacy of Mega-Events and the Redistribution of Accessibility to Urban Destinations«, 29).

88 Aguiar, »Manifestações: Democratição Contra Capital e Estado«, 57.

89 Aguiar, »Manifestações: Democratição Contra Capital e Estado«, 57; Sabório, »The Pacification of the Favelas: Mega Events, Global Competitiveness, and the Neutralization of Marginality«.

overlooking the South Zone neighborhood of Botafogo,⁹⁰ and has since expanded its operations drastically across the city. This military intervention in the affairs of what were effectively self-governing neighborhoods provoked clashes with the ruling drug cartels, leading to shifts in power both within individual cartels and among them.⁹¹ Despite favela residents having mixed views on the ›pacification‹ of their neighbourhoods,⁹² the ongoing intervention by UPP and Military Police has undoubtedly sustained Brazil's culture of violence rather than eliminated it. As Julio Jacobo Waiselfisz documented for the IGARAPÉ Institute: »The overall statistics on violence and more specifically police violence in Brazil are devastating. Between 1980 and 2014, 218,580 children and adolescents were murdered in Brazil.«⁹³

Since 2014–2015, the rate of violence has skyrocketed even further.⁹⁴ In 2017, the total number of homicides in Brazil reached a record high

- 90 Jaguaribe describes Santa Marta as the »global pop favela«, since it became famous through its appearance in music videos by popstars such as Michael Jackson and Madonna (Jaguaribe, *Rio De Janeiro*, 193).
- 91 Cartels such as Comando Vermelho (the Red Command) started their own turf wars against each other, resulting in heavy casualties among favela residents. At the same time, there have been innumerable reports of local UPP units and cartels collaborating or forming alliances.
- 92 On the empirical basis of an ethnographic study in Cidade do Deus, Anjuli Fahlberg argues that the heterogeneity of favela inhabitants is reflected in their diverse responses to the UPP occupation, with light-skinned women more likely to be much less critical of the UPP than black men (Fahlberg, »It Was Totally Different Than What We Had Before: Perceptions of Urban Militarism Under Rio de Janeiro's Pacifying Policing Units«). Conor Foley looks at pacification from a humanitarian perspective and offers a detailed account of the military interventions (Foley, »Pelo Telefone: Rumors, Truths and Myths in the ›Pacification‹ of the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro«). Rodrigues presents the UPP perspective through the eyes of one of its officers (Rodrigues, »The Dilemmas of Pacification: News of War and Peace in the ›Marvelous City‹«).
- 93 Waiselfisz, »Homicides of Children and Adolescents in Brazil«, 2.
- 94 Serious caution is necessary when viewing the official homicide statistics, since the actual numbers might in fact be significantly higher than those presented in the official figures. The reason for this is legislation that does not make provision for the counting of various forms of homicide committed by the police. For example, when the police bring a wounded victim to hospital and that person dies of his or her injuries, this is not counted as a lethal police assault. Furthermore, victims who had engaged in so-called acts of resistance (see the discussion of the assassination of Eduardo in Providência in Chapter Six) and victims whose bodies disappear after their death also do not appear in the statistics (Alves and Evanson, *Living in the Crossfire*, 115).

of 63,880 victims.⁹⁵ The fact that the majority of those killed were young Black males living in favelas reaffirms the intimate link between race and class – one that quite literally determines life chances, including the chance of survival.⁹⁶ The number of reported rapes in the country was equally horrifying, with 60,018 victims recorded in 2017.⁹⁷

While the overall picture of police violence against citizens in Brazil is grim, that in the state of Rio de Janeiro does not look any better. Amnesty International has openly questioned police tactics as well as official rhetoric in Rio de Janeiro:

»In the context of the so-called »war on drugs«, military police forces have unnecessarily and excessively used lethal force, resulting in the deaths of thousands of people over the past decade. The authorities often use the legal term of »resistance followed by death« [...] as a smoke-screen to cover up killings committed by the police officers.«⁹⁸

Between January and November 2017, 1,035 killings by police were recorded in the state of Rio de Janeiro.⁹⁹ For the same period in 2018, this number rose to 1,444,¹⁰⁰ and in 2019, police officers killed 1,810 people.¹⁰¹ The trend of young Black males being the most frequent victims of police violence in Brazil is even more pronounced in Rio de Janeiro. Of all officially registered cases of lethal police assaults between 2010 and 2013, 99.5 percent of victims were male, 79 percent were Black, and 75 percent were between 15 and 29 years old.¹⁰² There is little hope that the situation in Brazil – particularly in Rio de Janeiro – will improve, especially in light of legislation passed in 2017:

»Law 13.491/2017, signed by President Temer on 13 October [2017], provided that human rights violations, including murder or attempted murder, committed by military personnel against civilians would be tried by military courts. The Law violated the right to a fair trial, as military courts in Brazil did not guarantee judicial independence.«¹⁰³

President Jair Bolsonaro, in office from 2019 to 2023, effectively gave carte blanche to the police by openly advocating for police to employ

95 Phillips, »A Devastating Scenario: Brazil Sets New Record for Homicides at 63,880 Deaths«.

96 Amnesty International, »Amnesty International Report 2017/18 – Brazil«.

97 Phillips, »A Devastating Scenario«.

98 Amnesty International, »You Killed My Son! Homicides by Military Police in the City of Rio de Janeiro«, 6.

99 Amnesty International, »Amnesty International Report 2017/18 – Brazil«.

100 Human Rights Watch, »Brazil: Police Killings at Record High in Rio«.

101 Associated Press, »Rio de Janeiro 2019 Homicides Fall as Police Killings Surge.«

102 Amnesty International, »You Killed My Son! Homicides by Military Police in the City of Rio de Janeiro«.

103 Amnesty International, »Amnesty International Report 2017/18 – Brazil«.



Fig. 13 Protest Against Rising Public Transport Cost

lethal force: »If he [a police officer] kills 10, 15 or 20 [*bandidos* or gangsters] with 10 or 30 bullets each, he needs to get a medal and not be prosecuted.«¹⁰⁴ Rio de Janeiro's evangelical governor, Wilson Witzel, also called on the police to use »shoot to kill« tactics.¹⁰⁵ Violence within favela communities – already shaped by the rule of drug cartels – was thus further exacerbated by the actions of the UPP and Military Police.¹⁰⁶

*Protest Movements in Rio de Janeiro:
From the Jornadas de Junho to Fora Dilma!*

The Jornadas de Junho¹⁰⁷ was a wave of protests across Brazil in 2013 that was of historic dimensions. Rauquel Rolink describes the Jornadas as

- 104 Jair Bolsonaro in: VOA News, Brazil Presidential Candidate: Let Police Kill Criminals, <https://www.voanews.com/a/brazil-presidential-candidate-let-police-kill-criminals/4550275.html> (accessed 22 October 2018).
- 105 Human Rights Watch, »Brazil: Police Killings at Record High in Rio«. South Africa's Minister of Police has made statements that echo the call for lethal police violence by politicians in Brazil.
- 106 Through their extensive and insightful qualitative longitudinal study that has stretched for over four decades, Janyce Perlman and her research team have produced a detailed record of the voices and experiences of favela residents and the complex stew of violence in which they often boil (Perlman, *Favela. Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro*).
- 107 »Jornadas de Junho« – or, in short, »Jornadas« – is the term for the wave of protests that swept across Brazil in 2013. Its literal meaning is »June Journeys«, but I refer to the protests by their local name.

an »earthquake«¹⁰⁸ that made visible the ruptures of »unsolved agendas, contradictions and paradoxes«¹⁰⁹ within Brazilian cities.¹¹⁰ The Movimento Passa Livre (MPL), which first made a name for itself at demonstrations in Salvador de Bahia in 2003 and in Florianopolis in 2005, played an important role in organizing protests in various cities during the *Jornadas*.¹¹¹ MPL demanded a complete elimination of all public transport tariffs – or, at the very least, a ban on all price increases.¹¹² However, the protests were not simply ›about 25 cents,‹ the amount of the 2013 fare hike. Protesters also denounced Brazil’s crumbling public infrastructure in contrast to the billions of reais invested in stadiums, the corruption and tax evasion linked to FIFA, the police’s excessive use of force against demonstrators, the violent evictions of communities to make way for elite spectacles, and the biased reporting on protest by Brazil’s corporate media – particularly Globo.

Rio de Janeiro was an epicenter of the June demonstrations, experiencing the largest and most sustained wave of unrest.¹¹³ Protesters’ anger had been building well before the peak of the protests in June 2013. The most significant event predating the *Jornadas* was the attempted

- 108 The demands of the *Jornadas de Junho* protesters and the significance of urban agendas – such as the demand for free public transport – for the protests is discussed in a collection of essays by influential critical thinkers: Marciato, *Cidades Rebeldes. Passe Livre e as Manifestações Que Tomaram as Ruas Do Brasil*.
- 109 Raqule Rolink in: Marciato, »Cidades Rebeldes«.
- 110 A useful source on the development of this wave of protests across Brazil is Moraes et al., *Junho*.
- 111 Pablo Ortellado, who examined MPL’s non-hierarchical organization prior to the 2013 protests, posited that the movement’s experiences in Salvador de Bahia in 2003 and in Florianopolis in 2005 taught it crucial lessons about its organizational structures (Ortellado, »L’antiparti«).
- 112 Ironically, there was a fleeting moment in Rio when MPL involuntarily achieved its goal of free public transport. When an estimated 300,000 protesters descended on the Maracanã Stadium during the FIFA Confederations Cup match between Spain and Haiti on 20 June 2013, the authorities decided to temporarily stop requiring metro passengers to buy tickets in the hope of getting the approximately 70,000 spectators away from the venue before the police clashed with demonstrators (Eisenberg, »A Crise Da Mobilidade Social Brasileira«, 13).
- 113 Idelber Avelar and Juliette Simont offer an interesting perspective on the *Jornadas* by discussing how the brutality with which the 2013 movement was met in Brazil’s urban centers resembles the suppression of indigenous movements in the Amazonas. Both examples reflect the »shadows« of the military dictatorship, whose legacy continues to live on long after its fall in Brazil’s largely unchanged power structures (Avelar and Simont, »L’ombre de la dictature«).

destruction of Aldeia Maracanã¹¹⁴ – a religious and residential site housing Indigenous citizens next to Maracanã Stadium – to make way for the new Museum of the Olympic City.¹¹⁵ The violent eviction attempts in March 2013, during which the *Polícia Militar* (PM) used massive amounts of tear gas and rubber bullets against unarmed citizens, sparked widespread outrage and solidarity campaigns. These experiences became a crucial reference point for activists, fostering unity and motivating further mobilization in the months that followed.

The climax of the *Jornadas de Junho* demonstrations came swiftly in June, as public anger reached a boiling point. In Rio de Janeiro, 17 June 2013 lives on in the city's collective memory as a defining moment. On that day, approximately one hundred thousand protesters marched from Cinelândia Square in central Rio to the *Assembleia Legislativa do Rio de Janeiro* (ALERJ),¹¹⁶ the state legislature.¹¹⁷ Outside the ALERJ, demonstrators attempted to storm the building, triggering violent clashes with the police.¹¹⁸ Just three days later, on 20 June, Rio hosted the largest street march of the *Jornadas*, with an estimated one million participants.¹¹⁹ Once again, protesters were met with heavy-handed police tactics, including mounted officers beating their way through the crowd.

In July 2013, a new wave of mobilization emerged from the Rocinha favela in response to the ›disappearance‹ of Amarildo de Souza. As *BBC News* reported: ›Critics say [this] is symptomatic of a large number of disappearances in Rio and the lack of investigation into them.«¹²⁰

114 The ruling by the council of the Rio de Janeiro municipality to destroy the building which housed Aldeia Maracanã – a museum for indigenous culture that was to be replaced by the FIFA sport museum – demonstrated to many observers the Rio elite's complete ignorance of local culture, disrespect for marginalized communities, and willful collaboration with allegedly corrupt international organizations such as FIFA (Raspaud, ›Méga-événement sportif et situation d'exception‹).

115 Pinheiro, ›Nada é Impossível de Mudar‹.

116 The ALERJ is the Legislative Assembly of the state of Rio de Janeiro. It is in the Palácio Tiradentes building, which was constructed in 1922 and was home to Brazil's Chamber of Deputies until 1960.

117 The confrontations which occurred on both dates are discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.

118 This 2013 protest is interpreted by Aguiar as historically parallel to the 1968 demonstrations in which protesters demanded formal democratic rights from the military junta. For their part, the 2013 protesters demanded that their formal democratic rights have an effect on political decision-making (Aguiar, ›Manifestações: Democratização Contra Capital e Estado,« 62).

119 Simultaneous demonstrations were held in all of Brazil's other major cities.

120 BBC news, ›Brazil Police Charged with Rio Murder over Amarildo Case.‹



Fig. 14 *Nao Vai Ter Golpel Fora Cunha!*

Indeed, the disappearance of the 43-year-old Amarildo was not an isolated case. However, in this instance, public outrage over the *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora*'s (UPP) use of torture and extrajudicial killings – followed by claims that victims had simply »disappeared« – sparked widespread protests. These culminated in the *Onde é Amarildo?* (Where is Amarildo?) campaign. At the same time, activists occupied the square in front of state governor Sérgio Cabral's residence, launching the *Ocupa Cabral* (Occupy Cabral) campaign. This occupation played a vital role in reuniting the local activist scene after the upheaval of June. During this period, media activists made significant strides in developing counter-hegemonic media production techniques.

In September, a teachers' strike triggered another wave of mobilization.¹²¹ A brutal police assault on teachers occupying Cinelândia Square – who were demanding better working conditions and higher salaries – sparked the emergence of the so-called *Black Profs* movement.¹²² Then, in January 2014, when the state once again attempted to raise public transport fares in Rio, unrest flared up once more. During a protest against the proposed fare hikes on 6 February 2014, Santiago Andrade, a cameraman for TV Bandeirantes, was killed.¹²³ For many activists, Andrade's death was like a »cold shower«, finally putting an end to the

121 This is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.

122 The teachers received this nickname after learning from their students how to protect themselves from the police using black bloc tactics. A more detailed account of these events is to be found in Chapter Seven.

123 The death was caused by an accident in which fireworks shot by two teenagers participating in the protest march hit Santiago Andrade at his head. For more details see Chapter Eight.

nearly year-long cycle of contestation in Rio and leaving them with a »hangover«¹²⁴

In 2015 and 2016, a new wave of protests emerged demanding the ouster of then-president Dilma Rousseff. Protesters accused Rousseff and her *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party) of involvement in the *Lava Jato* (Operation Car Wash) corruption scandal – an accusation that, in Rousseff's case, remains unproven to this day.¹²⁵ Although these protests attempted to replicate some of the tactics seen during the *Jornadas de Junho*, they differed in several significant ways.

First, the *Fora Dilma!* protests were launched in Rio's South Zone – a predominantly white, middle- to upper-class area – whereas the *Jornadas* had been staged in the city center, a more accessible location for residents from across socioeconomic backgrounds. In fact, most of the *Jornadas de Junho* protests, as well as later mobilizations by emancipatory urban movements, were staged in central Rio along key roads and at sites of historical significance. These included routes from Cinelândia Square to the Candelária Church¹²⁶ via Avenida Rio Branco, as well as locations such as the *Assembleia Legislativa do Rio de Janeiro* (ALERJ), Avenida Presidente Vargas, and the Central do Brasil train station.

Second, while activists during the *Jornadas* were pepper-sprayed, tear-gassed, arrested, and prosecuted, *Fora Dilma!* protesters applauded the police, took selfies with officers, and even violently attacked bystanders wearing red T-shirts – assuming they were supporters of Rousseff or the PT – while police stood by.¹²⁷ A third major difference was the media coverage: Globo and other corporate outlets made little effort to conceal their vested interest in Rousseff's impeachment, offering extensive and favorable coverage of the *Fora Dilma!* demonstrations.¹²⁸

The movement achieved its goal in August 2016, shortly after the Olympic Games concluded – at a time when global media attention on

124 Int. 37, Rio de Janeiro, 2 September 2016.

125 Michel Temer, who became president after Rousseff's impeachment for the remainder of her original term, was jailed for corruption after leaving office.

126 Candelária Church is of historical significance as the site of the infamous Candelária massacre in 1993, in which police officers killed dozens of homeless children who were sleeping on the stairs of the church. Candelária Church also hosted the mass service for Edson Luís de Lima Souto, who was murdered by police officers on 28 March 1968, which triggered mass protests against the military regime (Amnesty International, »Rio de Janeiro 2003: Candelária and Vigário Geral 10 Years On«).

127 Police officers did not intervene in most of these attacks on other citizens.

128 When the killing of Souto and the dissatisfaction in Brazil spiked dramatically, 1968 turned into a year of major protests across the country. Globo decided to air news reports about the protests instead of ignoring them. However, in Globo news, the protest in São Paulo were presented as a

Brazil had already faded. Rousseff was impeached and replaced by her vice president, Michel Temer, who had never been elected to parliament. As the culmination of a successful conservative and right-leaning mobilization, the *Fora Dilma!* protests cannot meaningfully be linked to the campaign for a Right to the City or other emancipatory demands. As such, they have been largely ignored – or outright dismissed – by media activists in Rio de Janeiro. For this reason, *Fora Dilma!* is not the subject of further discussion here.

4.3 Situating Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro in Comparison

Two Divided Cities

The respective histories of urban space in Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro tell a tale of two ›divided cities,‹ both marked by extreme inequality and violence.¹²⁹ However, there is a striking contrast in how socio-spatial inequalities are inscribed into their urban landscapes. Cape Town remains a largely racially segregated city, still grappling with the legacy of apartheid. The controlled marginalization of poor, predominantly Black and Coloured residents has produced a ›belt model,‹ in which a mostly white and privileged urban core is encircled by rising levels of socio-economic exclusion that intensify with distance from the city center.¹³⁰ As Samara argues, »[s]patially and socially, Cape Town is perhaps the most segregated city in the world.«¹³¹

In contrast, segregation in Rio developed with little to no state planning and followed strongly class-based patterns, underpinned by racialized

peaceful music festival without any political content – the intentional misapprehension is discussed in AlJazeera English, »Brazil: Media, Monopolies and Political Manipulations«, The Listening Post.

129 Despite my own observations, my reading of the two cities is influenced amongst others by Perlman, *Favela*; Vainer, »Cidade de Execução: Reflexões a Partir Do Rio de Janeiro«; Santiago Giannotti, *Experiências Em Comunicação Popular No Rio de Janeiro Ontem e Hoje: Uma História de Resistência Nas Favelas Cariocas*; Enders, *Histoire de Rio de Janeiro*; Jaguaribe, *Rio De Janeiro*; Williams, Chazkel, and Knauss, *The Rio de Janeiro Reader*; Coetzer, *Building Apartheid*; Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*; Bickford-Smith, *The Emergence of the South African Metropolis*; Morange, »Right to the City, Neoliberalism and the Developmental State in Cape Town.«

130 This model does not preclude exceptions in the form of traditionally wealthy neighborhoods such as Constantia, which stretch out along the mountain ranges of the Cape Flats.

131 Samara, *Cape Town after Apartheid*, 42.

dynamics.¹³² Rio's self-constructed favelas are scattered across the city like a mosaic, often bordering middle- and upper-class neighborhoods. This pattern of social and physical proximity generates complex dynamics. As McGuirk contends: »This is not the standard centre-versus-periphery dialectic; here, those living on the margins can be right in the centre.«¹³³ Thus, while both Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro are deeply divided cities whose divisions perpetuate inequality and violence, geographical and social marginality converge in Cape Town but diverge in Rio.

Second, I have argued that neoliberal urbanization¹³⁴ is a driving force in the production of urban space in both Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro,¹³⁵ privileging a few while disregarding the majority of urban residents.¹³⁶ However, as the examples of the 2010 and 2014 FIFA World Cups demonstrate, similar mechanisms of neoliberal urbanization can be enacted with varying levels of intensity and differing outcomes. In South Africa, the 2010 World Cup involved an estimated \$3.6 billion in public spending. In contrast, the 2014 tournament in Brazil cost the state an estimated \$15 billion – before even accounting for the additional expenses of hosting the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio.¹³⁷

While South Africa's hosting of the soccer spectacle, despite some criticism, generated a moment of genuine national pride and unity, Brazil's 2014 tournament was met with widespread outrage. In both cases, the event's supposed catalytic effects for urban transformation largely

132 Property rights guided the allocation of land in Rio, thereby strengthening class differences more than race differences (Huchzermeyer, »Informal Settlements: Production and Intervention in Twentieth-Century Brazil and South Africa«).

133 McGuirk, *Radical Cities*, 164.

134 Neil Brenner emphasizes that there is a dialectical movement between neoliberal urbanization and urbanizing neoliberalism (Brogan, »Neoliberalization and the Matrix of Action: In Conversation with Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore«).

135 »In Brazil there is a strong intellectual awareness that the main cause of deprivation and impoverishment is tolerated exploitation of the working class through low wages, lack of efficient and affordable transportation, and negligence in the provision of housing [...] The existence of class differences and their relevance to informal-settlement intervention [in South Africa] were consciously played down by the neoliberal orientation of the Urban Foundation's position, which in turn was legitimized by denouncing racism« (Huchzermeyer, »Informal Settlements: Production and Intervention in Twentieth-Century Brazil and South Africa«, 97).

136 Theresa Caldeira and James Holston argue that citizenship rights are too often ignored in »uncivil political democracies« such as Brazil, where »violence, injustice and impunity are often the norms« (Caldeira and Holston, »Democracy and Violence in Brazil«, 692).

137 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economics_of_the_FIFA_World_Cup

benefited domestic and international elites. However, the impact in Rio de Janeiro was significantly greater than in Cape Town – both in terms of the scale of urban transformations and the degree of mobilization it provoked among urban social movements.

Finally, neoliberal urban governance – aimed at marketing cities as tourist hubs – is characterized by a paradoxical combination of aggressive security regimes and the militarization of marginalized urban spaces, a pattern clearly visible in both Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro. As Loïc Wacquant asserts, neoliberalization demands »more state« [be deployed] in the realm of the police, criminal courts, and prisons to remedy the generalized rise of objective and subjective insecurity which is itself caused by »less state« on the economic and social front.¹³⁸ In both cities, violence is concentrated in marginalized communities: on the Cape Flats in Cape Town and in the favelas of Rio.

In Cape Town, this violence is largely confined to distant »townships« that remain spatially and socially separated from the city and its suburbs. In contrast, the geographical proximity of Rio's favelas to tourist zones and affluent neighborhoods has incentivized state-led efforts to »pacify« these areas – ostensibly to enhance tourist safety and protect investor interests. These contrasting spatial configurations – Cape Town's »belt« model versus Rio's »mosaic« morphology – also manifest phenomenologically. While the sound of gunfire is a routine part of daily life across much of Rio, it is rarely heard in Cape Town's privileged neighborhoods.

The emerging spatial pattern of race and class segregation in Rio de Janeiro does not follow an organized, belt-like model as seen in Cape Town. Instead, it resembles a mosaic, where some of the city's poorest and wealthiest neighborhoods exist side by side. This contrast between a belt and a mosaic structure – where radical differences in socio-economic status are either spatially separated or closely juxtaposed – produces two very distinct forms of »divided cities.« These differing urban morphologies have significant implications for how urban social movements emerge, organize, and operate in each context.

Compartmentalized Urban Movements and Cathartic Explosions

Urban movements in Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro differ significantly in the constituencies they mobilize, the scale of street protests, the

138 Wacquant first formulates this hypothesis in relation to the USA, but he then applies it to Brazil, which he contends has been used as a »living laboratory« for the »punitive containment« strategy described above (Wacquant, 56-58).

nature of their claims and demands, their tactical approaches, and their choice of protest sites.

In Cape Town, both service delivery protests (SDPs) and the *Rhodes Must Fall* (RMF) movement mobilized clearly defined constituencies. In the case of SDPs, local communities demanded urgent improvements to basic services in their neighborhoods – most visibly expressed through the so-called »poo protests.« Meanwhile, students at the University of Cape Town – later joined by peers from other universities – launched their campaign with concrete demands, such as the removal of the Rhodes statue. Despite a few shared tactics, notably the symbolic use of human feces to draw attention, there was little overlap between the two movements. Street demonstrations in the city center were rare, and mobilization largely remained confined to the constituencies themselves: various communities across the Cape Flats or the University of Cape Town campus. This fragmentation of protest action appears to mirror the compartmentalized nature of Cape Town's urban space.

In Brazil, the *Jornadas de Junho* marked a »new cycle of protests« that reconfigured civil society, political subjectivities, and the very conception of democracy in the country.¹³⁹ In Rio de Janeiro, this mass upheaval represented a cathartic moment – an explosion of public unrest that brought together diverse segments of the population across lines of race, class, and gender. During the four pivotal days from 17 to 20 June 2013, the city center was effectively taken over by protesters, creating a rare moment of collective occupation and resistance. At the same time, the FIFA Confederations Cup¹⁴⁰ served as a global stage, amplifying the visibility of the protests and intensifying opposition to the top-down, catalytic urban transformations being imposed in preparation for the upcoming cycle of sporting mega-events.

In Brazil, the *Jornadas de Junho* were a »new cycle of protests« that reconfigured civil society, political subjectivities, and the very conception of democracy in the country. In Rio, this mass upheaval represented a cathartic moment, an explosion of public unrest that brought together diverse segments of the city's population that cut across lines of race, class and gender. This mass coming together resulted in the center of Rio effectively being collectively taken over by protesters during the four ›hey-days‹ of 17 to 20 June 2013. At this time the FIFA Confederations Cup served as a stage of worldwide attention, which amplified the resistance to the catalytic top-down transformation of the city for the

139 Bringel and Pleyers, »Les Mobilisations de 2013 au Brésil: Vers une Reconfiguration de la Contestation«, 11.

140 The FIFA Confederations Cup is a preparation event that is organized and played out one year prior to the FIFA World Cup.

series of sporting mega-events that were due to be held in Rio over the course of the next three years.

The way urban movements are perceived depends not only on their ability to mobilize people in public spaces but also on how they are represented. Media coverage plays a crucial role in shaping public understanding of protest campaigns, often influencing their legitimacy and reach. The following chapter therefore turns to an analysis of how different protest movements were portrayed in mainstream media, while also exploring how urban movements have used the internet as a tool for self-representation and narrative control.